

HISTORY OF HUMANITY

Scientific and Cultural Development

Volume V
From the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

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History of Humanity

Scientific and Cultural Development

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In memory of Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carneiro,
President of the first International Commission
for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind
(1952-1969) and of the present Commission from
1979 to 1982

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The International Commission for the History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind bears intellectual and scientific responsibility for the preparation of this new edition.

Generic names containing the word 'man' should be understood to refer to both sexes of the species.

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PREFACE

Federico Mayor
Director-General of UNESCO

'Our civilization is the first to have for its past the past of the world, our history is the first to be world history.' As we approach the year 2000, the phenomenon described over fifty years ago by Jan Huizinga becomes an ever more sensible reality. In a bounded and increasingly interconnected world, we necessarily find ourselves a part of that emerging global civilization that constitutes the matrix of our collective destinies.

The years immediately following the Dutch historian's assertion were indeed to illustrate, and in the most horrific manner, the interdependence of the world community. The planet on which millions of humans wished for nothing more than to live in peace and well-being presented the unnatural spectacle of a world at war. Land, sea and air routes were patrolled day and night by armadas venting fury on all that was most precious and vital to the inhabitants. The dreadful hurt that the populations sustained, physically and morally, dispelled *in perpetuum* a number of illusions and faced humanity with a stark choice – that of being, in the words of Albert Einstein, 'one or none'.

Thenceforth the grave danger attendant on inter-racial, and consequently inter-cultural, ignorance was conspicuous to thinking minds. A flawed consciousness of our common humanity must be incompatible with the survival of a world armed with knowledge of such awesome potential. Clearly the only course of action, the only way forward lay in building bridges between peoples, in forging a resilient awareness of the unity inherent in human diversity.

Such was the background to UNESCO's decision in 1947 to produce a truly universal work of international co-operation that would provide 'a wider understanding of the scientific and cultural aspects of the history of mankind and of the mutual interdependence of peoples and cultures and of their contributions to the common heritage'.¹ That initiative, which was one of UNESCO's earliest projects, sprang from the Organization's fundamental principles and was widely acclaimed, although not a few saw in it a Sisyphean undertaking at which past attempts had signally failed.

Three years later, in 1950, the first International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind began the task of fashioning a history that – in the words of René Maheu – would 'present to man the sum total of his memories as a coherent whole'. As the distinguished international team of collaborators took shape and as the first results of its work began to appear in the Commission's review the *Journal of World History*, it became clear that new ground was being broken in pursuit of this ambitious goal. When some fifteen years later the first edition began to appear in six languages, the reception accorded to the work confirmed – some inevitable reservations apart – the success of this 'first attempt to compose a universal history of the human mind from the varying stand-points of memory and thought that characterize the different contemporary cultures'.

The compilers of the first edition of the *History of Mankind* were conscious that all historiography is 'work in progress', that in the continuous flux of history nothing is fixed, neither facts nor interpretations. In 1969, Paulo de Berrêdo Carneiro declared: 'The day will come when what we have written . . . will, in its turn, have to be replaced. I like to think that our successors will attend to this, and that a revised edition of the work we have begun may be published at the dawn of a new millennium.'

That day is now with us. The General Conference of UNESCO decided in 1978 that the work should be revised, and two years later the Second International Commission met to formulate its aims.

Much has changed since the publication of the first edition. In recent years, the historical sciences have been enriched by contributions from many disciplines, giving rise to new methods of investigation and bringing to light new facts, particularly in the realm of 'prehistory'. At the same time, a heightened awareness of cultural identity has intensified the demand for a corresponding decentralization of historical viewpoints and interpretations. UNESCO has both heeded and nurtured this trend by undertaking a series of regional histories, one of which – *General History of Africa*² – is on the point of completion while others are in active preparation. Finally, history itself has moved on, altering in the process the perspectives from which the past is viewed.

For all these reasons and to take account of some valid criticisms of the original version, it was decided that the new

¹ HUIZINGA, J. 1936. A Definition of the Concept of History. In: KLUBANSKY, R. & PATON, H. J. (eds), *Philosophy and History*. Oxford, p. 8.

² UNESCO. 1947. *General Conference, Second Session, Paris, Resolution 5.7*.

³ The complete version of *General History of Africa* has been published in Arabic, English and French and the abridged version in English and French.

edition of the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Humanity*, to be called simply the *History of Humanity*, should not be merely a revision, but rather a radical recasting of its predecessor. Its goal – to provide an account of the history of humanity in terms of its varied cultural and scientific achievements – remains unchanged, but the view it offers of its subject is – it is hoped – more detailed, more diverse and broader in scope.

Ten years after the launching of the project, it is my privilege to present this new *History* which has built upon and extended the pioneering work of those dedicated scholars responsible for the first edition. I should like to express my admiration and deep gratitude to the members of the Second International Commission and to the some 450 distinguished specialists from all geocultural backgrounds who have contributed to this historic undertaking. Readers will, I feel sure, make known their own views in the years to come. In committing this work to their scrutiny,

the International Commission – and, through it, UNESCO – is taking the final step in the task entrusted to it by the community of Member States represented at the General Conference. Each of us, I am sure, stands to benefit from this concerted testimony to our common past and act of faith in our shared future.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Every effort has been made to achieve consistency in the transliteration of non-western writing systems but this has not proved possible in every case.

FOREWORD

Charles Morazé
former President of the International Commission

Among the great tasks assigned to UNESCO by the Constitution is the duty to promote and encourage mutual knowledge and understanding throughout the world. While many of the divergences which divide people date from a distant past, an analysis of their historical antecedents discloses links which draw them nearer to one another, brings to light their contributions to a common patrimony of humanity, reveals the ebb and flow of cultural exchanges and emphasizes their increasing tendency to become integrated into an international community.

This is how Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carneiro, President of the International Commission (1952-69), expressed himself in the opening paragraph of the Preface to the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind* in 1963. Today, it would be difficult to say anything about humanity's 'increasing tendency to become integrated into an international community', unless an attempt is made to assess the outcome of this 'tendency' as reflected in the state of the world since. Today, few events remain local. Information on any minor or major occurrence is communicated to almost everyone immediately and an action undertaken in one part of the world inevitably has its repercussions on the others. Those who experience fully this 'planetaryization' sense the 'integration' of all human beings into an international community less as a 'tendency' than as a *fait accompli*. But what about the subordinates who are more or less associated or the vast excluded majority of people? These others put the question in completely different terms. What they seem to ask is: can a 'common patrimony of humanity' be achieved solely through an integration based on scientific and technical developments? What then can we do to ensure an equal access to such means for all when the more fundamental task of reducing existing differences in the very standards of living lags far behind?

The idea of writing a history of the development of humankind was first put forward by Julian Huxley, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of UNESCO. In 1946 Huxley wrote that 'the chief task before the Humanities today would seem to be to help in constructing a history of the development of the human mind, notably in its highest cultural achievements'. He underscored the major role that historians would play in the realization of what he called a 'gigantic enterprise'. Huxley later out-

lined a project which was to be submitted to the future UNESCO. In 1950, in accordance with a resolution passed by the General Conference of UNESCO, an International Commission was set up and the publication of a *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind* in six volumes was approved. The first volume appeared in 1963.

What was this 'gigantic enterprise', conceived by Huxley worth? Critics received the volumes more often badly than well. They did not question the data included. What they objected to mainly were the criteria of the selection of data and the interpretations offered. Yet a closer look at these criticisms revealed that, skilled as they were at pointing out certain flaws and misconceptions, these commentators hardly ever came up with concrete suggestions that would lead to any improvement of the work in the future. On the whole, however, we were left with the impression that notwithstanding its shortcomings, a very large number of readers found the work commendable, particularly as a first step towards the achievement of an 'essential task'.

No elucidation, rational or otherwise, of the origins or the evolution of human beings can be offered once and for all, as if by divine revelation. Writing a history of the development of humankind necessarily constitutes a work that one has to return to over and over again. Nearly thirty years passed by before UNESCO decided to take up once more a work that could by no means be regarded as finished. Requested by the new Member States, a recasting of the first edition deserved the wholehearted support of all those who helped establish the Organization. The changes which have taken place over these last thirty years rendered necessary and amply justified a revision and revaluation of history, and the members of the International Commission were the first to acknowledge such a need. There were, of course, other and more imperative reasons. Two of these should be pointed out here.

The first concerns the developments in the area of research methodology since the 1960s. Over the last three decades historical knowledge has increased considerably and has turned from factual history to greater interest in anthropological research. Although they still remain far from being fully capable of answering all the questions that we ask today – or for that matter the more serious of those posed thirty years ago – the added insight that present studies offer us deserves to be transmitted to a larger public. The second,

and perhaps less obvious, reason springs from the very role that the writing of history can, and is meant to, play in increasing our level of awareness. A writing or, as in the present case, a rewriting of the history of human scientific and cultural evolution signifies not only taking stock of the new data available but also helping one and all in evaluating and assessing the various implications, positive and also negative, of all the changes. Justifying science in the name of all its benefits and advantages amounts to refusing to accept the damaging effects it can have. We have gradually accustomed ourselves to the presence of many latent nuclear volcanoes without compensating for the technological risks. Not enough has been done to counterbalance the excessive monetary investments needed to build up such arsenals with sufficient funds to help confront the problems and miseries afflicting one section of humanity and which is on the way to becoming a danger for the other. Technological development has also begun seriously to endanger animal and plant life on this planet. Factors such as these plead for greater vigilance.

Universal histories and histories of the world abound. So many have already been published and continue to be published that one could question the need to bring out yet another one. No doubt many readers will be surprised at this venture. Each in his own way will of course judge this work better or worse than another of its kind. There is however one major difference. Other works of history enjoy a certain freedom that has in a sense been denied to the present one. They are free to choose themes, periods and regions that suit best the demands of a particular readership and a specific conception of history. Such works can thereby claim a certain cohesion of the elements introduced; a cohesion which also helps establish a certain uniformity of expression and style. The present work is founded on an entirely different principle: a maximum of diversity. This diversity proves to be, on the one hand, so great that it is difficult to stop it from becoming disparate and, on the other, not great enough to allow for a convenient regrouping of elements into types. The fault lies not in the venture itself nor in those who took up the task. It lies mainly in the present state of historical knowledge. The analytic nature of historical research today blocks the way to synthesis, to the kind of approach required in the writing of a history that can be considered truly universal.

This work can serve only as a history of the world and not as a universal history. This, of course, is already a great deal. We should not count on the diffusion of a universalism, which is the subject of reflection by a very small, privileged minority, as long as all cultures are not equally represented and historians from all parts of the world are not endowed with the same means and cannot claim the same status, social and otherwise.

Not claiming to attain the unattainable does not, however, mean renunciation. The roads to universalism are full of bends and curves. But, they all lead to the same destination: one history for one united world. Since this history could not reach the highest common factor, it had to tend towards the lowest common multiple. And in this respect, the present work has not failed in its mission.

In 1950 we opted in three days for a plan that would take thirteen years to complete. With a view to ensuring a unity of style and presentation, we decided that each of the six volumes would be written by a single author. Such ideas had to be abandoned. Some thirty years later, the New Commission decided to take more time over the distribution of

the work to be done among seven and not six volumes, each well co-ordinated with the other and allowing free play to as many authors as would be necessary to cover a maximum of domains. The selection of the criteria on which the new history would be based first led to a detailed examination of the comments made by the readers of the first edition. After many debates and discussions, all agreed that it would not do simply to juxtapose a series of regional histories one after the other. Then one of the two possible solutions had to be chosen: dividing history either into themes or into periods and analysing each according to themes and regions. The first option – an idea that had already been put forward before 1948 – would perhaps have helped bring out in a more significant manner the factors which render manifest the common destiny of mankind. But the present state of historical research, which in most cases and owing to an ever-increasing acquisition of skills, proceeds in the form of temporal as well as regional specializations, constituted a real obstacle to the realization of such a scheme. It was therefore decided that each of the seven volumes would be devoted to a single period and would contain a thematic and regional section.

Yielding to the constraints imposed by the state of knowledge and research today does not, however, solve all probable problems. Let us take a look at the issue point by point.

The idea of splitting up into periods a past that the mission of all historians is to revive as an organic whole pleased no one. But, taking everything into consideration, had the objective been to separate one cultural component from another or, for example, the physical from the cultural or the religious from the profane, this surgery would have turned literally into a vivisection. Opting for the lesser evil, the Commission thus decided to work on chronological sections. This, at least, allowed for the preservation of a certain unity within each group.

Already in the 1950s it had become evident that the form of periodization upheld by the European tradition loses its significance when applied to the other parts of the world. Terms such as 'Antiquity', 'the Middle Ages' or 'modern times' do not correspond to much in so far as Asia is concerned, and perhaps even less for what concerns Africa. Admittedly we continue using such words for the sake of convenience. We cannot totally discard them, but we should try at least not to trust them fully.

The importance of each period is measured more in terms of what humankind has contributed to each than in terms of a duration defined by astronomy. The 'Grand Discoveries' of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries led to some spectacular changes in the history of the world. A sudden growth of ideas and of commercial capitalism accompanied by or resulting from military conquests gave rise to migrations that brought about the creation of a new map of the world and new conceptions of humanity's destiny. This moment marks a turning point that we have ever since sensed as an acceleration of history. It was, therefore, decided that three volumes of the present work would be devoted to the period succeeding these significant changes and transformations as against only four which would cover the entire preceding period, starting from the origins of humankind and leading up to the sixteenth century. The Commission also decided to devote more and more pages to the more recent years. The fifth volume thus covers three centuries; the sixth, one and a half; and the seventh only about seventy-five years.

A word of caution is, however, necessary. We often make use of a concept of progress that is based on the quantitative

and not the qualitative value of what has been achieved. Manufactured goods, consumer items and exchanges, whether they concern concrete objects or ideas, can be more or less quantified. But, as we do not possess any means of measuring happiness or well-being, we cannot infer therefrom that the quantitative and the qualitative values of this progress are the same, particularly in so far as the world in general is concerned. This notion of progress should not, moreover, hinder a proper appraisal of all that was contributed to history by our ancestors, to whom we owe our existence and our way of living.

Great care was taken to avoid putting an undue emphasis on what could be considered as being only the European landmarks of history. The years 1789 and 1914, although highly significant in the history of Europe, served only nominally as points of reference. It was understood that, depending on the case, the ethnocentrism implied by these dates would be reduced as much as necessary through a proper and adequate treatment of the issues preceding or following them. Similarly, to avoid falling into the traps of Western traditionalism, it was considered necessary to cease using the Christianization of the Roman Empire as a mark of the end of the Ancient World and the beginning of the Middle Ages and, therefore, to include the first years of the Hegira in the third volume, which covers the period from 700 BC to AD 700, the middle of which comes before the beginning of the era acknowledged – belatedly – also by the Muslims.

The Commission's choice does not conflict very much with the Chinese system of dating, because around the same epoch the same phenomenon appeared in both the east and west of Eurasia: the awakening of tribes in these Central Steppes who until then had been restricted to a disorderly, Brownian form of movement of particular groups, henceforth united together and set off to conquer the largest empire that the world has ever known. Events such as this draw our attention to the advantages of following a calendar determined not according to the permanent aspects of the planets but according to the variations of climate. Indeed, the Mongols would not have reached such a high degree of power had the climate not favoured the humidification of the pasture lands which nourished their horses. However, it will be a good while before we have available a calendar based on climatic variations. We still lack information on some vital factors: the evaluation of harvests, the extension or the regression of lacustrine and forest areas, physiographical analyses, and so on. Only when we have obtained such necessary data can we think of establishing a new type of periodization that can be verified through meteorological calculations extrapolating and applying to the past our present conjectures about the influence of solar explosions on the atmosphere.

The period to be treated in the fourth volume was therefore set by the end of Volume III (the seventh century) and the beginning (the sixteenth century) of Volume V. Volumes I and II have been devoted to the many thousands of years constituting the origins of humanity. The richness of the new data at our disposal made it necessary to treat separately the period spreading from the third millennium to the beginning of the seventh century before our era.

This division into seven volumes, dictated by a combination of factors ranging from the abstract to the practical – amongst the latter, being that of ensuring the more or less equal size of the volumes – is more or less in keeping with historical facts. Beyond all specific differences, five principal stages can be recorded in human evolution: the use of

material tools accompanied by the emergence of cultures destined to be full of meaning for a long time to come; the moulding of a geo-politics or a geo-culture signalled by the appearance of major works of all kinds, all of which were to be of lasting value; primitive convulsions that forced in advance the distinction of cultural identities through the play of mutual influences; conceptions resulting from a closed human universe whose planetary course lies within a limitless space; the intensification of centres of development under the pressure of a capitalism that has become industrial and an industry that is becoming scientific – phenomena which push to the outskirts the excess of constraints from which the thus privileged zones escape. The seventh volume will thus deal with the issue of these new currents and the tidal waves that they provoke; factors that lead to the birth of a new type of polarization and as a result of which traditional cultures fall into abeyance.

Such bird's-eye views as those offered here are not misleading because they are crude; they seem questionable because they escape our sight when we keep ourselves too close to the ordinary facts. And it is in this that we mainly conform to the limitations of our methods of research. No one is unaware of the difficulties that continue to affect all attempts to provide a synthetic view of humankind's common destiny. There is no answer to these difficulties from which the present subdivision of each volume into themes and regions suffers; into themes to bring out what all human beings share in common; into regions to mark the diversities.

In each volume, the thematic parts should have been the easiest to work out. Several problems were, however, encountered. In order to ensure that the cultures that benefit from the spectacular development that we witness today be no longer favoured beyond measure, it was considered necessary to reduce the importance granted to theoretical innovations and their applications and therefore to refrain from using scientific discoveries as chronological pointers. Had this not been the case, the distribution of themes would have been a simple matter. It would have sufficed to begin with a survey of the scientific and technical knowledge acquired over a given period of time and then renace the causes in their sequential order.

Now, from the moment when it becomes necessary for history to tone down the privileges conferred on some by the process of evolution – and, more particularly, to question a system of values rooted in an overly univocal notion of progress – it also becomes necessary to standardize the distribution of themes by including more 'ordinary' references, for example, by starting with a description of the physical and natural conditions in order to arrive at the scientific through the demographic and the cultural. This not only increased the uniformity of the volumes but also offered the major advantage of emphasizing the ways of living. Whatever they are, these must first satisfy the basic physiological needs – a vital minimum dictated by the instincts of survival and rendered partially relative by the differences of climate. Each culture responds to this in its own manner and according as much to its natural environment as to the habits that it inherits. Certain acquired needs are then added to this vital minimum – superfluous needs turned into necessary ones and established in varying degrees according to the social hierarchies and geohistorical differences. Moreover, as human beings are not only biological but also thinking and feeling entities, each material culture is accompanied by a culture that can be called 'spiritual' in the widest sense of the term and that also varies according to the situation already

mentioned. Finally, even though the conditions are not identical, material culture and spiritual culture are interrelated.

This enunciation of the common grounds on which all human lives are established stands to reason and would seem evident to any lay person. It could also, however, lead us to think that it is easy to find historians ready to develop each theme. The present state of historical knowledge proves that it is not so and, as always, for the same reason. Insignificant as this problem may be, the solution lies in turning one's back on analytical methods and adopting an approach that would be one of synthesis.

Undoubtedly, current research and investigations help us in our evaluation of material and spiritual cultures, but separately. We are completely ignorant about the interconnections between the two. Where does this notorious deficiency come from? Two main reasons can be put forward.

The first concerns the elaboration of a global history. Indeed, when it comes to local or regional histories, each confined to a particular epoch, the data that we possess help us either to deal with some of the problems or to contribute by offering some information. But when one or the other problem needs to be looked at from a global point of view, then we confront a major difficulty: which elements of the data available should be included in an inventory of an absolutely common heritage? In other words, what advances made at one place or the other, or at one point of time or another, effectively contributed to what can be called 'general progress'? The workshops of historians can boast of few if any historians at all who specialize in the evaluation of 'generalities'. When the need for one arises, then it has to be admitted that the courageous few who have undertaken such a task suffered from the absence of sufficient information and were compelled to work in conditions that rendered their merits highly eminent but cutbed considerably their influence.

This first reason leads to the second, the absence of criteria that would make it possible to distinguish effectively the subjective from the objective as much in the work accomplished as in the reputations won. Here we touch upon an issue that is too important to dismiss without fuller attention.

The studies on primitive or savage societies, particularly those conducted over the last fifty years, carried anthropology to a high degree of what must be called the 'intelligence' of cultures. Indeed, in these societies, myth plays a fundamental role. It legitimizes matrimonial and social behaviour as well as customs and ways of living – the way one eats, dresses and organizes one's life inside and outside one's own dwelling. In an even more significant manner, it legitimizes humankind's spiritual behaviour as much in times of war as in peace. This global aspect of myth itself leads us to the heights from which, at one glance, we can view not only the various behaviours as a whole, but also, and as a result, the very logic that sustains them.

Historical evolution disperses myth, without however abolishing the mythological function. It provokes the growth of branches and favours ramifications. What had been thanks to myth, at one and the same time, religion and literature, moral and political, art and technique, breaks up later into more and more subdivided areas of knowledge; differentiations that led namely to the belief that the logic of myth or of the sacred is gainsaid by that of science, 'Science': this word which obstructs more than all others what we term historical intelligence. In the original sense of the word,

science means knowledge, with no distinction implied between knowledge and know-how. Today this same word has taken on such a specific meaning that for a vast majority of the most highly informed minds, science denotes truth, as against the falsity of myth. Yet, many eminent scholars acknowledge that this 'truth' contains a part of myth and that it is indeed thanks to this that methods and knowledge advance. It is by working within the mythological that we reduce the part of myths, something of which always survives in the very heart of science.

The barriers that have been most resolutely built against the 'intelligence' of history have their sources in the gradual formation of separate enclaves of investigation. Social, economic, political, literary history and so on: each domain follows its won path and rarely meets the other, or never enough to allow for the establishment of criteria common to all that could constitute the basis for a truly universal history of scientific and cultural developments. The worst form of such separations can be found in the cosmic distance that has been introduced between the history of religion and that of science, and this, in spite of some highly remarkable, though rare, attempts to make them move towards each other via the social and the philosophical. No significant results should be expected until the gaps between ordinary language and scientific language are bridged, particularly when the latter makes use of mathematical terms so fully exploited by the initiated few and so little accessible to the secular mass.

This brings us back to the question of the limitations of this edition referred to earlier: limitations concerning the basic logical presuppositions on which a truly universal history of humankind should be founded. It is only on the basis of certain common features that one culture can comprehend something that is part of another culture and that the people of today can understand a little of what lies in the past. But then, given the present state of our knowledge and the manner in which the basic logical presuppositions are handled, our history will remain beyond the reach of the general public, however enlightened, for which it is intended.

None the less, a certain merit – perhaps less significant than hoped for – makes this second edition worthy of our attention. By eliminating the notion that the cultures rendered marginal by 'progress' represent groups of people 'without history', the study of cultures where myth is dispersed among all kinds of domains could only gain from the experience of those whose lives are, even today, steeped in a mythology that they all consider fundamental. We have not as yet reached our goal, but the step taken marks a sure improvement in terms of our understanding of history. And, as the readers will themselves find out, it is this aspect of the thematic part of each volume that makes this work truly exceptional.

We now come to the question of the treatment of regions in each volume. To begin with, let us look at a major ambiguity which threatened the very conception of these sections. An example will suffice. To which region does Newton belong? To Cambridge? England? Europe? The West? The world? There is no doubt that the universality of his law of gravitation makes him a part of the common heritage of humanity. Yet, undoubtedly this law discovered by a particular man, at a particular place and point of time, would seem to have miraculously descended from the skies, if we did not take into account the facts of the discovery, the circumstances leading to it and the manner in which the law was adopted by all. Should we have then talked about

Newton in one way in the thematic chapter and in another in the regional? Although the difficulties involved in solving such a problem are great, they turn out to be less so when confronted with yet another problem that would have resulted from any attempt to merge the two parts into one: for, in that case, the question would have been, which one? A fusion of all into the regional would, to a great extent, have simplified the task, given that we are dealing with specializations in different fields. But it would have led to the very unpleasant need to emphasize the merits of one culture at the cost of the others. A fusion of all into the thematic? In that case, Newton's law would have been stripped of its socio-cultural characteristics and this would have led to some kind of sanctification of the 'genius'. Needless to say, what has been noted as regards Newton applies to all thinkers, discoverers and to all that humankind has created.

Some readers will perhaps regret the fact that this history, whose dominant note is certainly transcultural, does not succeed better in overcoming certain problems resulting from habits and preconceived notions. We all talk about Asia, Africa and Europe. Originally, these were names given to Greek nymphs and were used to distinguish the three principal, cardinal points of the world perceived by the Mediterranean navigators: the south, the east and the north, respectively. To these seafarers the west was nothing but a vast indecipherable stretch, presumably a part of the legendary Atlantis. As for the continent of America, its name was curiously given to it by a cartographer who, while outlining a map of this continent, used the information supplied to him by Amerigo Vespucci – thus depriving Christopher Columbus of the recognition he deserved. In the case of the nymphs as well as in that of the cartographer, we can no longer distinguish the subjective from the objective. What was in fact a very subjective decision in the first place now appears to be very objective because it is commonly accepted by everyone. We cannot change something that has been so firmly established over the years, but the often very serious problems and disadvantages that result from the ethnocentrism implied by such customs need to be pointed out.

Depending on the epochs, Egypt is at times best understood when considered as African and at others when its civilization is regarded as having acquired much of its significance from a dual Nile-Euphrates identity. Similarly, instead of remaining Mediterranean, southern Europe became continental when the centre of gravity of exchanges and developments shifted to the Atlantic. China constitutes another example. This Middle Kingdom felt the effects of the existence of other continental regions when its Great Wall no longer protected it from the conquerors it tried later to assimilate, or when it yielded, perhaps for too long a period, to the attacks of the seamen and naval forces coming from the other end of the world, that is, from Europe.

Geographical perspectives change from one era to the other. But it is difficult to incorporate such changes and align them with the periodization adopted for a work on history. Those responsible for planning the seven volumes had to devise the ways and means of solving such problems. At times they had to have recourse to certain subterfuges so as to prevent the periodization from turning into some kind of a jigsaw puzzle and requiring a frequent arrangement and rearrangement. This entailed, however, the risks of introducing certain anachronisms.

Such risks are in no way negligible. To a modern mind, for example, the commerce or the conquests in ancient times across the deserts of Sinai appear as manifestations of the

hostilities existing between Africa and Asia. This distinction between the two continents becomes nonsensical when applied to the period when Egypt did not see itself as African nor Assyria as Asian. Each region thought of itself first as constituting in itself the whole universe or as representing in itself the whole universe as defined by its own gods. We must be aware of the dangers of accepting such ideas, which still survive in the unconscious, affect our conscious minds, and foster notions of rights and privileges detrimental to the development of universalism.

The need to determine the number of pages to be devoted to each 'contingent' arose from certain customs that, although anachronistic, generate at times very strong emotions and influence our decisions. It also arose from the fact that the distrust of ethnocentrism expressed itself in terms that were very ethnocentric. Including Cro-Magnon man in an inventory of 'European' sites amounts to attributing to him a label that contradicts all that was felt in times when existence could not be conceived of except in terms very different from those related to our planetary territoriality. Similarly, the concept of Africa was itself foreign to the African empires or kingdoms, each constituting for each a world in itself and, at the same time, a world which belongs to all. The readers will themselves correct such imperfections, which have resulted from a need to adopt a pragmatic approach.

Applying modern notions of geography to any period of the past relieves us of the dizziness felt when we look down into the immense depths of time, yet it is in these depths that cultural but also natural interactions, direct or indirect, multiplied: a swarming mass much too indecipherable to allow for the delineation of linear ancestry. It is, therefore, better to avoid distinguishing overmuch our distant common ancestors. Physical evolution leads perhaps to the formation of races. But as the human species can be known through its customs, faculties and cerebral activities, this privilege common to all reduces practically to nothing the particularisms that some not always disinterested viewpoints defined formerly as racial.

The human species cannot really be differentiated except as ethnic groups and through customs that defy any simplistic typology. A strong capacity for adaption, peculiar to humans, enables them to invent a practically limitless number of solutions to the problems posed by all kinds of environments, and even more so by circumstances that the smallest events modify and great events transform altogether. In this lies the most amazing aspect of history: the infinite variety of answers that each individual or collectivity finds to the questions put to it by destiny. The more history accelerates its pace and becomes more specific, the more our destiny becomes enigmatic. This is because every human being is a human being and no single one resembles another.

The end of the colonialisms that believed or claimed themselves to be the civilizers of this world led to the birth of many new nations and many new Member States of international organizations. 'New' in what sense? The establishment of a 'New World Order' is bound to remain a Utopian idea as long as history has not explained how a local body of historical cultures finally engendered what it has over the centuries referred to as 'civilization'; a word full of contradictions. Intended as universal and respectful to other cultures, this civilization turned out to be materialist and destroyed many cultures as a result of the superiority that it attributed to its own system of laws and rights. Two heavy tasks thus face historians: acknowledging the

universalism that lies hidden beneath all particularisms and agreeing among themselves on what should be made generally known in this respect.

An elucidation of the past requires personal as well as collective efforts. This two-fold process should therefore have found spontaneous expression in a work meant to aid the advancement of knowledge. The Commission recommended therefore that, in addition to the thematic and regional parts, a third part be added that would have comprised specific supplements on details that needed developing, problems that needed solving, and finally an exposition of different and opposing opinions on interpretations in dispute. This project met with overwhelming difficulties and some explanation is called for!

This international history, which had been conceived as a series of dialogues and discussions, would evidently have gained considerably from an exposition of the differences in interpretation in their proper dimensions. It would have been more lively and instructive and have given readers more food for thought. Unfortunately, the dispersion of authors to be included and chosen from the whole world demanded means and time that we did not have. The Editors, who already had a heavy task, could not have undertaken this extra work without assistance, in particular from committees specifically chosen and brought together in the light of the subjects to be discussed. Taking into account the costs of travel and accommodation, the already high cost of the operation would have almost doubled. No doubt a day will come when, debates on themes and regions being easier than they are now, it will be possible to expound history as it is revealed by a confrontation of knowledge and viewpoints on particular questions concerning all humanity.

Until the state of knowledge and of historical research in

the world has reached this convergent point, we are obliged to give up the idea of showing the divergences that future workshops of historians will have to face. We have, however provided notes at the end of articles, which have been written so as to ensure maximum diversity and the broadest possible participation. A certain arbitrariness persists, of course. But this will remain unavoidable as long as the excesses that analyses lead to are not minimized through the elaboration of syntheses based on criteria derived from irrefutable logical presuppositions — presuppositions that help establish universal certitudes. Let us not forget, however, that innovations originate only within the gaps of certitude.

One of the merits of this work lies in that it has succeeded in enlisting the collaboration of a very large number of people, representing a large number of regions and cultures. The Commission also encouraged the formation of local working groups responsible for obtaining and organizing the data to be included in the various chapters. This present work marks perhaps only the beginning of such collective efforts. Nevertheless, it permits us to anticipate satisfactory results. Knowing oneself well in order to make oneself better known constitutes a major contribution to mutual understanding. In this respect, historical research resembles an awareness of unconscious phenomena. It brings into the daylight what in the nocturnal depths of individual or collective existences gives them life, so to say, in spite of themselves or against their will.

This publication will no doubt give rise to many criticisms. If these turn out to be harsh, they will justify the project, whose main objective is to arouse us from our dogmatic slumber. Historical events take care of this much more efficiently, but at a much higher price.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Georges-Henri Dumont
President of the International Commission

Societies are making greater demands than ever on history, but urgent as they might be, these demands by various groups are not altogether straightforward. Some societies look to historians to define their identity, to buttress the development of their specific characteristics or even to present and analyse the past as confirming a founding myth. Conversely, other societies, influenced both by the *Annales* school of historiography and by the geographical, chronological and thematic enlargement of history, aspire to the building of bridges, the ending of self-isolation and the smoothing out of the lack of continuity that is characteristic of the short term.

In 1946 those attending the meeting of the first Preparatory Commission of UNESCO agreed that it was part of the fundamental mission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to lay the foundations for a collective memory of humanity and of all its parts, spread all over the world and expressing themselves in every civilization. The International Scientific Commission came into being four years later with the apparently gigantic task of drafting a *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind*. Publication of the six volumes began in 1963, marking the successful conclusion of an international endeavour without parallel, but not without risks. Success with the general public was immediate and lasting, notwithstanding the reservations expressed by the critics, who often found certain choices disconcerting but were not consistent in the choices and interpretations they proposed as alternatives.

For its time – not the time of its publication but that of its long preparation – the first edition of the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind* must be seen as a daring achievement, having a number of faults inherent in the very nature of historical knowledge but opening up new avenues and encouraging further progress along them.

In 1978, the General Conference of UNESCO decided to embark on a new and completely revised edition of the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind* because it realized that the considerable development of historiography, the improvement of what are called its auxiliary sciences and its growing links with the social sciences had combined with an extraordinary acceleration of day-to-day history. What it did not know, however, was that the pace of this acceleration would continue to increase until it brought profound changes to the face of the world.

It scarcely needs saying that the task laid upon the International Scientific Commission, under the chairmanship of the late Paulo de Berrêdo Carneiro and then of my eminent predecessor, Professor Charles Morazé, was both enormous and difficult.

First of all, international teams had to be formed, as balanced as possible, and co-operation and dialogue organized between the different views of the major collective stages in the lives of people, but without disregarding the cultural identity of human groups.

Next, attention had to be given to changes in chronological scale by attempting a scientific reconstruction of the successive stages of the peopling of our planet, including the spread of animal populations. This was the goal pursued and largely attained by the authors of the present volume.

Lastly, steps had to be taken to ensure that traditional methods of historical research, based on written sources, were used side by side with new critical methods adapted to the use of oral sources and contributions from archaeology, in Africa for the most part.

To quote what Professor Jean Devisse said at a symposium in Nice in 1986 on 'Being a historian today': 'If we accept that the history of other people has something to teach us, there can be no infallible model, no immutable methodological certainty: listening to each other can lead to a genuine universal history.'

Although historians must be guided by a desire for intellectual honesty, they depend on their own views of things, with the result that history is the science most vulnerable to ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall a few weeks after I assumed office symbolized the end of a particularly burdensome ideological division. It certainly makes the work of the International Scientific Commission easier whenever it has to come to grips with the past-present dialectic from which history cannot escape.

In a way, the impact of ideologies will also be lessened by the fact that the Chief Editors of each volume have sought the invaluable co-operation not only of experienced historians but also of renowned specialists in disciplines such as law, art, philosophy, literature, oral traditions, the natural sciences, medicine, anthropology, mathematics and economics. In any event, this interdisciplinarity, which helps dissipate error, is undoubtedly one of the major improvements of this second edition of the *History of Humanity, Scientific and Cultural Development* over the previous edition.

Another problem faced was that of periodization. It was out of the question systematically to adopt the periodization long in use in European history, that is Antiquity, the Middle Ages, modern times, because it is now being extensively called into question and also, above all, because it would have led to a Eurocentric view of world history, a view whose absurdity is now quite obvious. The seven volumes are thus arranged in the following chronological order:

- Volume I Prehistory and the beginnings of civilization
- Volume II From the third millennium to the seventh century BC
- Volume III From the seventh century BC to the seventh century AD
- Volume IV From the seventh to the sixteenth century
- Volume V From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century
- Volume VI The nineteenth century
- Volume VII The twentieth century.

It must be stated at once that this somewhat surgical distribution is in no way absolute or binding. It will in no way prevent the overlapping that there must be at the turn of each century if breaks in continuity and the resulting errors of perspective are to be avoided. Indeed, it has been said that we are already in the twenty-first century!

In his preface, Professor Charles Morazé has clearly described and explained the structure of each of the volumes, with a thematic chapter, a regional chapter and annexes. This structure, too, may be modified so as not to upset the complementarity of the pieces of a mosaic that must retain its significance.

When the International Scientific Commission, the Chief Editors of the volumes and the very large number of contributors have completed their work – and this will be in the near future – they will be able to adopt as their motto the frequently quoted saying of the philosopher Etienne Gilson:

We do not study history to get rid of it but to save from nothingness all the past which, without history, would vanish into the void. We study history so that what, without it, would not even be the past any more, may be reborn to life in this unique present outside which nothing exists.

This present will be all the more unique because history will have shown itself to be not an instrument for legitimizing exacerbated forms of nationalism, but an instrument, ever more effective because ever more perfectible, for ensuring mutual respect, solidarity and the scientific and cultural interdependence of humanity.

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A

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Peter Burke and Halil Inalcik

This volume of the UNESCO *History of Humanity* is concerned with the so-called 'early modern period', the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from the European discovery of America to the French Revolution. To divide world history into periods is a practical necessity, especially for multi-volume projects like this, but these periods should not be taken to be natural. They are always artificial, imposed by historians on the past, and they are always problematic, fitting some trends and some parts of the world better than others. The period 1492–1789 is no exception to this rule.

In Western Europe, it is traditional to say that the 'Middle Ages' ended around the year 1500 and that the 'modern' world began at that time. The tradition goes back to the Renaissance, when humanists invented the term *medium aevum* to describe what they considered to be the period of 'darkness' between the decline of Rome and their own time. The idea of a 'modern' period took root in the eighteenth century, although there was some disagreement over its beginning. Some writers favoured 1453, the fall of Constantinople, on the grounds that the flight of Greek scholars to Italy encouraged the Renaissance. Others favoured 1492, the date not only of the discovery of the New World by Columbus but also that of the Christian conquest of the Muslim kingdom of Granada (welcomed by Europeans of the period as compensation for the loss of Constantinople). Political historians, from Bernardo Rucellai (c.1500) to Leopold von Ranke, favoured 1494, when the French invaded Italy and a series of European wars ensued. Protestants favoured 1517, when Martin Luther was supposed to have nailed his controversial theses to the church door at Wittenberg, a date symbolizing the beginning of the Reformation. A number of intellectuals defined the new age in which they thought they were living in technological terms, arguing for its superiority on the grounds of three new inventions, the printing press, gunpowder and the compass, which made possible the discovery of the New World. Others, like the French nobleman Michel de Montaigne, were sufficiently well-informed to point out that the Chinese had printing and gunpowder 'a thousand years' earlier (and we now know that the Chinese were familiar with the magnetic compass as well).

As for the French Revolution, it was viewed almost immediately as the beginning of a new age (whether for better or for worse). It was this event which redefined the concept of 'revolution' (which had traditionally meant a 'return' to some earlier state) as a fundamental change which

could not be reversed (despite the belief of some in the possibility of a 'counter-revolution'). The revolutionaries themselves contributed to this view by introducing a new calendar, with 1792 as 'Year One', but the symbolic date which stuck in the collective memory was 1789. If the modern world really began in 1789, the significance of 1492 clearly needed to be redefined. Hence the rise of the apparently self-contradictory term 'early modern' in order to describe the three centuries between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the revolutionary or post-revolutionary era.

Looking back on this period from the end of the twentieth century, what can we say? A good case can be made for opening the period in 1453 rather than 1492. The Muslim penetration of Christendom in the second half of the fifteenth century might be seen as marking a new age, since the Ottoman Empire was the only non-European power directly in contact with Europe capable of using its weapons and challenging it in east-central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In economic history too the year 1453 marks a turning-point, since it heralded the end of Genoa's enterprise in the Levant, forcing the Genoese to look westward, to Spain and the Americas.

For a history of Europe, the dates 1492 and 1789 have much to recommend them, provided the events to which they refer are treated as symbols of more gradual processes. For a history of the world, they are rather less appropriate.

In the case of America, it is hard to deny the significance of 1492 for economic and social history as well as that of politics and culture. The choice of a date to mark the end of the period is rather more difficult. It might reasonably be argued that 1776 or 1810 (the beginnings of the independence movements in North and South America respectively), make more appropriate dates than 1789. All the same, there is little doubt that the events in France made a considerable impression in the Americas, in Haiti, for example, and in Minas Gerais in Brazil (see Chapter 26.1.3).

Africa and Asia (especially East Asia) are more problematic. In the case of Africa, the year 1492 or thereabouts does mark a kind of turning-point. Africa declined in importance in the world economy after the Spaniards began to exploit the mines of Mexico and Peru, which as D. T. Niane puts it, 'surpassed those of Bure, Bambuk, Ngalam and the Mwene Mutapa'. The baptism of the ruler of the Kongo in 1491, under the name 'Afonso', may be taken to symbolize the increasing cultural penetration of Africa by Europe. Colonial domination of Africa developed slowly rather than suddenly, but it may be taken as beginning around 1500.

All the same, a number of historians of Africa think that the years around 1600 mark more of a break in continuity than those around 1500. They see the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a separate period, a period in which economic and political history was transformed. One reason for this transformation was the import of western firearms, which gave rulers interested in the new technology the opportunity to dominate others. Another, still more important in the history of Africa – and of the Americas as well – was the export of slaves. Around a million Africans crossed the Atlantic, against their will, in this period, to begin a life of slavery in the New World. The decline of the slave trade at the end of the eighteenth century is another argument for ending volume V at this point.

In the case of the Indian Ocean area, the arrival of Vasco da Gama in Calicut in 1498 marks the beginning of European penetration, like the voyages of Columbus to the Americas. Indeed, K. M. Panikkar's well-known study, *Asia and Western Dominance*, describes the four and a half centuries between 1498 and 1945 as 'the Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian history'. The rise of the three great empires – the 'gunpowder empires', as they are sometimes called – under the rule of the Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mughals, also coincides with the beginning of this volume. As Savory suggests (see Chapter 18, t.1), 'The creation of the Safavid state in 1501 marks a watershed in Iranian history in a number of ways'. In India, the Mughal state was established in 1526, while the Ottoman ruler Süleyman the Magnificent, who began to rule in the 1520s, is generally considered to have been the greatest of the sultans. In the Indian case at least, the later eighteenth century marks another turning-point, with the battle of Plassey in 1757 leading to the first phase of the colonial regime.

If we consider the major regions of the world, the dates 1492–1789 would seem to be of least relevance to East Asia, where they look somewhat Eurocentric. In this region the great divide surely runs down the middle of the 'early modern' period. In China, the time of troubles leading to the replacement of the Ming dynasty by the Qing in 1644 is a much more important turning-point than the years around 1500 or 1800. (Of course, a 'mid-seventeenth-century crisis' can also be detected in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and Mughal India). A case can also be made for the end of the eighteenth century as a turning-point in Chinese history, marked by the British request to trade, in 1793, the end of the sixty-year reign of the emperor Qianlong, in 1795, and the rising of the White Lotus Society in 1796, a rising described below (see Chapter 22) as a 'point of no return for the Qing dynasty'. However, the British request of 1793 was refused and it was only after the Opium War of 1840–2 that the conversion of China into a 'semi-colony' began.

In the case of Japan, the coming of peace after decades of civil war and the change of political system following the victory of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600 are much more important than any events a century earlier or two centuries later. The next major turning-point came well into the nineteenth century, whether it began with the arrival of the American Commodore Perry and his 'black ships' in 1852, or with the imperial 'restoration' – which was more of a 'revolution' – in 1868.

If we look at the world region by region, then, it proves difficult to define our period satisfactorily. Will the task become easier if we attempt to look at the world as a whole, or will it prove to be impossible?

A leading European philosopher has put the case against writing world history, or 'universal history' as it used to be

called, in our time. Hans-Georg Gadamer suggests that universal history is at once necessary and impossible. It is necessary because the different parts of history have significance only in relation to the whole, but it is impossible to write such a history without believing that History (as distinct from individuals and groups) has a goal. Such an approach was possible for medieval Christian chroniclers, because they saw the hand of God in history. It was possible for Vico, who believed in Providence, for Hegel, who believed in the 'cunning of reason', and for Marx. It was possible for European historians who believed in Europe's civilizing mission, and even for Max Weber, who studied India and China in order to define the uniqueness and what he called the 'rationality' of the West. In other historiographical traditions, including the ancient Greek (Polybius, for example), the Muslim (Ibn Khaldun) and the Chinese (Sima Qian), the movement of history is regarded as cyclical rather than linear, but the sense of pattern remains strong. The problem for historians of our own time, from any part of the world, who are sceptical of such grand theories as these, is to find the red thread which will give unity to their story.

For some, this red thread is the rise of 'modernity', associated with capitalism, bureaucracy, secularization, the 'scientific revolution', and so on. These terms certainly refer to a complex of connected changes of great importance for the history of humanity. There is little doubt about the importance of studying the centralization of government, say, in different parts of the world, or the different responses to the 'new science', the ideas of Copernicus for example, in Amsterdam, Rome, Moscow, Istanbul, or Beijing.

The problem is that 'modernity' is almost impossible to define in a satisfactory manner. In the case of western culture, where the term 'modern' has been in more or less continuous use from the twelfth century onwards, its meaning has continually changed over the generations. Over the last half-century or so, it has become increasingly clear to historians that the search for the 'modern' in earlier centuries, even in the history of Europe, leads to anachronistic judgements and paradoxically makes it more difficult to explain how 'our' world eventually emerged. The objections to the imposition of western concepts of modernity on the history of the rest of the world are too obvious to require discussion in detail.

It might be better to make the 'rise of the west' the central theme of the volume, asking whether, to what extent, how and why one complex traditional society, that of Europe (or better, some regions of Europe) was able to acquire a technological, economic, military, political or cultural 'lead' over the rest of the world in this period, and how this 'lead' was translated into dominance. The work of Fernand Braudel might be taken as a model in this respect. Braudel began his career by demonstrating that the Mediterranean world, east and west, Muslim and Christian, shared a common economic destiny in the later sixteenth century. He went on to show that fundamental trends such as the rise of population in the sixteenth century could be found in Europe, India and China alike, but ended his study of 'material life' with an account of the rise of western capitalism.

Combining the ideas of Braudel with those of Marxist dependency theorists, Wallerstein discusses the rise of an economic 'world system' in sixteenth-century Europe, a system with a 'core' (north-western Europe), a 'semi-periphery' (the Mediterranean world) and a 'periphery' (eastern Europe and Hispanic America). Wallerstein suggests that the rise of commercial capitalism in Western Europe is linked to the rise of serfdom in eastern Europe and slavery

in Hispanic America and Brazil. In other words, economic and social developments in widely separated parts of the world were becoming more closely interdependent. An indicator of this interdependence is the silver mined in Mexico and Peru and channelled into Europe through the port of Seville. Some of this American silver passed through the Ottoman Empire to reach the Indian Ocean. Silver also travelled direct from America to East Asia on the galleons which sailed between Acapulco and Manila.

This world economy was not the first in history. Janet Abu-Lughod recently pointed to the existence of a 'world system' in the late thirteenth century (functioning at the level of luxury goods, like its sixteenth-century successor). However, this earlier system fragmented as a result of the invasion of the Mongols and of the arrival of the 'Black Death', the epidemic which ravaged Western Asia and Europe in 1348.

A vivid illustration of the increasingly close connexions between different parts of the world in the period 1492-1789 is offered by the history of sugar, grown in America on the initiative of Europeans with the labour of black slaves, and, added to coffee from Western Asia and tea from East Asia, helping to transform European social life, not only that of the upper classes but by the eighteenth century that of ordinary people as well.

Another possible solution to the problem of the red thread is offered by W. H. McNeill, who has suggested that the history of the contacts between cultures in different parts of the world is the central theme of world history. These contacts between cultures became increasingly intense in the age of discoveries, which was also in the West at least, the age of print, which allowed many people - including Montaigne, whose views on China have already been cited - to acquire some knowledge of alien cultures from a distance.

Some individuals, however, did their best to incorporate themselves directly into another culture, like the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci, who presented himself to the Chinese as a mandarin, or the English 'renegade' Samson Rowley, who turned Turk and served the High Admiral Ulugh Hasan (see Plate 1) or the historian Garcilaso de la Vega, Spanish on his father's side and Inca on his mother's, whose history of Peru used the techniques of Renaissance historiography to demonstrate the achievements of the civilization of the Incas. In cases like these, in which individuals not only acquired information about another culture but assimilated some of its mentality, it may be useful to use the anthropologist's term 'acculturation'. Acculturation was not a new phenomenon in 1492 - think of the cultural interaction between Jews, Christians and Muslims in medieval Spain - but it took place thereafter on an unprecedented scale as a result of immigration, whether voluntary (as in the case of English or Spanish migrants to the Americas) or involuntary (as in the case of African slaves).

It is difficult to reach a balanced verdict on the process of acculturation. Should we condemn it because it is so often linked to conquest, oppression and exploitation? Should we praise it as a form of cultural communication and enrichment? Should we fear it because it creates psychological tensions and problems of identity? However we react, it is essential to be aware of the importance and ubiquity of this process - for Chinese Muslims, for the Jews of Venice and Amsterdam, and for many people of mixed ethnic origins, especially in the New World.

Of all the encounters between cultures which took place in the early modern period, the one between the inhabitants

of the Americas and the Europeans was at once the most dramatic, the most intense, and the most important in its consequences.

There was of course considerable regional variation in what began as an encounter between cultures but quickly developed into conquest and colonization. It will be obvious that the different histories of North, Central and South America after 1492 depend on variations in local traditions as well as on differences in the physical environment. Before the arrival of the Europeans, Mexico and Peru were highly developed agricultural societies with surpluses sufficient to maintain urban élites, while the inhabitants of many other parts of the Americas lived in small, mobile communities based on hunting, gathering or slash-and-burn cultivation.

In the second place, the different developments or 'trajectories' of different parts of the Americas obviously owe something to the different cultural traditions of the Europeans who conquered and colonized different regions: the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British, the French, the Germans and so on. Some missionaries and settlers were Catholic, others Protestant. Some came from relatively centralized, authoritarian regimes, others (notably the Dutch) from a decentralized polity. Even economic activities in the New World depended on cultural traditions. The sugar plantations in Brazil, for example, followed the model of those already established in earlier Portuguese possessions such as the Canaries. Differences in imperial policy had important cultural consequences for the Americas; for example, the Spaniards founded universities and presses in their colonies, while the Portuguese did not.

It is only after differences of this kind and on this scale have been taken into account that it is possible to make a useful comparative analysis of the Americas. One might, for example, consider the 'vision of the vanquished', the various reactions of the indigenous populations to the efforts of Europeans to spread their ideas and values in the New World - reactions which ranged from acceptance through syncretism to passive resistance and open rebellion. One might, like Alfred Crosby, study the consequences of the so-called 'Columbian exchange', in other words the introduction of European plants (wheat, vines and olives) and new animals (horses, pigs and cattle) to the New World, and of New World plants (maize, potatoes, manioc and so on) to Europe and Africa. One might examine the cultural consequences of the changing relation between metropolis and colony, centre and periphery, noting the rise of separate colonial identities at more or less the same time in different parts of the New World. It is also important to study the creation of a distinctive Afro-American culture, to be found in Brazil, for example, in Cuba and in Haiti, in which a kind of unstable synthesis took place between European Catholicism and west African cults.

Culture is defined here in a wide sense, including the arts, literature and science but also the attitudes and values of ordinary people as well as élites, expressed and embodied in artefacts, performances and everyday life as well as in classic works of music, architecture and so on. The history of sugar has a place here too, because the consumption patterns of a social group are an expression of its values, its culture. To understand changes in culture over the long term, these changes need to be placed in a political, social and economic context. The present volume is therefore very close to what the French call a 'total history' of humanity, in other words an attempt to show the links between all major human activities.

Certain unifying themes run through the book, two of them in particular. The first theme is that of the relation between centres and peripheries (it is important to emphasize that the term 'centres' is used in the plural). The centres which will receive most attention are those of Western Europe, because Lisbon, Madrid, Amsterdam, Paris and London were centres of sea-borne empires (and Rome the centre of a spiritual empire). However the spread of Islam from its centre in Mecca to south-eastern Europe, to South-East Asia and even to China will also be discussed (as we learn from Chapter 22 below, it was in this period that the Qur'ān was translated into Chinese).

Another important example of cultural diffusion is the spread of Persian learning and literature to the Ottoman and Mughal empires. A high culture inherited from ancient Iran and developed under the Caliphate was adopted by the Ottomans and Mughals as well as by the Safavids, in much the same way as ancient Roman culture, revived in fifteenth-century Italy, was adopted by the European courts of the Renaissance. Persian miniaturists were much in demand in Istanbul and Delhi, like Italian painters in France and Spain. Works such as the *Qābūsnāme* and the *Siyāsetnāme* (the first describing the rules for the behaviour of the perfect gentleman, the second for the behaviour of the ideal prince) defined and transmitted the essentials of this high culture.

This theme of cultural centres and peripheries raises a number of problems. Did economic, political and cultural centres generally coincide? Can the cultural influence of cities such as Beijing, Istanbul, or Paris in this period be separated from their political influence? What of cities such as Florence or Kyoto, with a cultural influence quite disproportionate to their political power? One point at least is clear. Although provincial élites often looked to a metropolis as their cultural model or exemplar, following its fashions with a certain delay (traditionally thirty years), the culture of the province cannot be described as nothing but a pale reflection of the culture of the centre. The frontier was sometimes the locus of an alternative culture, like the popular culture of the *gāzis* and dervishes in the case of the Ottoman Empire.

In any case, the penetration of the periphery by the culture of the centre was not an automatic process, like the spread of an oil slick. Even the European commercial penetration of Asia should be seen as infiltration rather than an 'imposition' (as Panikkar called it), drawing on indigenous capital as well as western capital and intensifying local trends to commercialization rather than creating trade where none existed before. Without such a 'fit' between local trends and forces from outside, the rise of capitalism might have been a far slower process. More generally, as the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has shown in his study of Hawaii and the arrival of Captain Cook, the story of culture contacts cannot be understood without a reconstruction of the ways in which individuals in each culture both perceived and used the other.

'Acculturation', as the anthropologists call this process (or 'transculturation', emphasizing reciprocal influences), cannot be identified with simple borrowings of cultural elements. For example, although the Ottomans borrowed many such elements from Europe, this did not lead to their assimilation to European culture, because the Ottomans – like some other Asian peoples – retained their own value system embodied in the religion of Islam. As Braudel used to say, it is necessary to study not only the diffusion of technology and ideas but also the 'resistances' to such diffusion.

At this point it may be useful to discuss a specific case, that of the Ottomans and firearms. The Ottomans began to

use cannon and hand-guns such as arquebuses in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. First they hired foreign experts, then they learned the art of making firearms for themselves (indeed, Ottoman specialists were in demand in neighbouring countries). The excuse for making use of such 'infidel' inventions was 'the necessity of using the enemy's weapons', as Muslim lawyers put it. The Ottomans were thus the first non-European nation to adopt modern technology from the Europeans.

Borrowing military technology in this way did not lead to a more general acculturation. The Ottomans borrowed specific techniques, not the cultural tradition of continuous technological improvement. Hence they suffered severe defeats at western hands, defeats which encouraged more extensive borrowing from the West in order to modernize education (the foundation of a school of military engineering in the eighteenth century) and, after 1839, the administration itself.

This example suggests the necessity for adding a sociological as well as geographical dimension to the history of culture. Some cultures seem relatively resistant to innovation, others relatively receptive. Why should this be the case? To answer this question it is necessary to look more closely at the attitudes and values of different social groups within a given culture, and especially at the relation between the culture of élites (old and new, lay and religious, military and civilian) and the culture of ordinary people, the 'subordinate classes'. To what extent did the élites transform popular culture in different parts of the world in these centuries? To what extent did the people yield to such pressures for 'acculturation', to what extent did they resist them or adapt elements of élite culture for their own purposes? How much cultural traffic was there in the opposite direction, 'upwards' from ordinary people to élites?

Some of these problems are discussed in the regional section of this volume, others in the thematic section. Without comparison, the volume would risk being merely descriptive rather than analytical. On the other hand, systematic comparison between cultures on a world scale raises awkward problems. It is relatively easy – but also unilluminating, not to say ethnocentric – to follow the lead of Marx and Weber and to assess other cultures from a western point of view in terms of their difference from the west and their lack of what the west possesses (rationality, individualism, capitalism, and so on).

If we try to go beyond this kind of comparison, we are quickly confronted with the problem of the western origin of the conceptual apparatus with which we are working. As attempts to study 'feudalism' on a world scale have shown, it is very difficult to avoid circularity in this kind of enterprise, defining the phenomenon to be studied in European terms and then 'discovering' that it is essentially European. Even apparently harmless, unspecific terms such as 'university', 'novel', or even 'art' were created with European history in mind, with the consequent danger that comparison will turn into attempts to force Islamic institutions or Chinese texts to fit a western model. Yet there seems no third way, at least at present, between using this western apparatus and refusing to compare at all. To undertake comparison while remaining aware of the danger of Eurocentrism is surely the lesser evil.

To sum up. Like other volumes of the UNESCO history, this one attempts to give the different parts of the world the attention which is due to them, and to allow a wide range of voices and opinions to be heard. It tries to strike a balance between a simple story of the rise of the West and a collection of essays on different parts of the world which emphasize

diversity at the expense of a unifying theme. It does this by concentrating on the history of 'culture', in a wide sense of that term and looking not only at the spread of western culture throughout the world but also at responses to it, responses which vary from acculturation or assimilation through syncretism to various forms of resistance (such as

the famous Japanese attempts to close their country to the west in the early seventeenth century). The story it tells – or better, the dialogue which it allows to be heard – is much more complex than the traditional view of the period 1492–1789 as the rise of modernity, the rise of capitalism, or the rise of the West.

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THEMATIC SECTION

POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

Jacques Dupâquier

THE WORLD IN 1500

We do not know a great deal about the world's population structure in 1500.

At that time births, marriages and deaths had only just begun to be registered in a few European countries. The oldest register preserved is probably a register of marriages in Rimini (Italy) for the year 1232. About ten registers are to be found for Italy in the fourteenth century, and approximately 50 for the rest of Western Europe in the fifteenth century.

Censuses of the population have been taken since ancient times for taxation and military purposes; but the fall of the Roman Empire brought this to a halt in Western Europe. With the advent of modern states, some half-hearted attempts at counting were made (counts of heads of families, lands, cattle and feudal rights); but their results have not been preserved, apart from the Domesday Book (England, 1086), the *État des paroisses et des feux du royaume de France* (List of parishes and numbers of households in the Kingdom of France) (1328) and the Catasto (cadasiter) of Florence from 1427 to 1430.

In China, the ancient tradition of taking the census was resumed by the Ming emperors (1368–1644). First the population was counted, house by house, and the occupation of the head of the family and the composition of the household noted; lists (known as 'yellow registers') were then drawn up of the people, their goods and the taxes to be paid.

In Peru, the Inca emperors had proper accounts kept of individuals and property with the assistance of 'quipus', bundles of cords of different colours (according to the nature of the object) knotted at several levels: units at the bottom, tens above them, followed by hundreds, and so on.

All the figures that have been proposed by modern authors for the populations of the fifteenth century thus result from cautious and not-so-cautious extrapolations hazarded on the basis of subsequent information or of assessments based on the size of inhabited areas, to which different coefficients are applied according to whether the economy depended on hunting, stockbreeding, extensive farming, rice-growing or other activities.

The demographic factors themselves, such as deaths and marriages, are a little better known, for they changed only very slowly, and the data that are available to us for the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, together with the calculations concerning Europe of the 'political arithmeticians' (the first demographers), make it possible to put forward reasonable hypotheses about the demographic dynamics of the past. The extraordinary variety of family


structures and matrimonial customs obviously meant that the anthropological map of the world was a richly coloured mosaic, but the necessity to live and survive set the limits of what was possible: mortality rates were so high everywhere that, in the final analysis, no demographic dynamics were viable unless they ensured the reproduction of the population. Subtle balances were therefore established over the centuries, within all peoples, between the toll exacted by death and the response made by life. It was the upsetting of these balances following the great voyages of discovery that was to cause the demographic disasters we shall discuss with reference to Latin America and Africa.

How the world was peopled in 1500

The population of the world (see Map 1), which had probably increased from 5 million to 250 million during the 'Neolithic revolution' (Biraben, 1979), reached a ceiling during the Early Middle Ages. It probably rose to 400 million by approximately 1200, and to 431 million by 1300. For the end of the fifteenth century J. P. Durand suggests 490 million, J. N. Biraben suggests 461 million, and C. MacEvedy and R. Jones 425 million distributed as follows:


Continent	Total population	Notes on composition
Europe	81 million	Including 15 million for what is now France, 12 million for Russia, 10 million for Italy, 9 million for Germany, just under 2 million for the Iberian Peninsula and 5 million for the British Isles.
Asia	280 million	Including 110 million in China and 100 million in the Indies, including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Africa	46 million	Including 38 million for Black Africa, a figure that is questioned because the numbers are still under debate.
The Americas	14 million	Including 8 million for Latin America (although some authors suggest as many as 80 million for Central America alone).
Oceania	2 million	

Figure 1 Population in the different continents, c.1500
Source: C. MacEvedy and R. Jones, 1978.



Map 1 (top) World population in 1500 (after J. Dupâquier).

Map 2 (bottom) World population in 1800 (after J. Dupâquier).



Map 3 (top) Large towns in the world in 1500 (after J. Dupâquier).

Map 4 (bottom) Large towns in the world in 1800 (after J. Dupâquier).

This classification by continent gives no more than a very imperfect view of the distribution of world population, for some parts of the continents were already occupied, whereas vast stretches were still empty: population density appears to have varied greatly, ranging from 100 or more inhabitants to the square kilometre in some deltas in East Asia to one inhabitant or less to the square kilometre in equatorial forests and subtropical deserts. A purely geographical study shows the existence of three main populated areas:

- the Indian subcontinent (approximately 100 million people), corresponding to a great extent to what has been called 'the rice civilization'
- China (120 million to 150 million inhabitants, according to Michel Cartier), corresponding to 'the millet civilization'
- Western Europe and the Mediterranean countries (75 million to 80 million people), corresponding to 'the wheat civilization'.

As for the fourth main area ('the maize civilization', in Central America), it seems unlikely that it could have fed more than 30 million inhabitants.

Of the 23 towns in the world with over 100,000 inhabitants at the time (Chandler and Fox, 1974), 22 were located in the three main populated areas or in their immediate vicinity (see Map 3):

- 6 in the Indies (Vijayanagara would then have had 500,000 inhabitants) and Siam (Ayutthia)
- 8 in China (with 672,000 inhabitants, Peking was then the largest town in the world) and Korea (Seoul)
- 4 in western Europe (Paris, Naples, Venice, Milan)
- 4 in the Mediterranean Muslim world (Istanbul, Adrianople, Cairo, Fez). Tabriz (with 250,000 inhabitants) might in fact be included in this group.

This polarization of human populations is probably a very ancient phenomenon: according to J. N. Biraben (1979) the aggregate population of China, the Indian subcontinent and Europe (excluding the former Soviet territories) probably accounted for 58 per cent of the total world population at the beginning of the Christian era; 46 per cent in the year 500, 50 per cent in the year 1000, and 53 per cent¹ in the year 1500, in spite of the ravages caused by the Black Death in the fourteenth century.

This concentration north of the tropic of Cancer is probably, as W. H. MacNeill suggests (1976), the result of very early migration by small groups of hominoids escaping from their African cradle and venturing into the temperate zones of the Northern hemisphere, where they multiplied 'like mice in a barn'. This proliferation, however, is comparatively recent: from 35,000 to 8,000 years ago the total world population remained close to 5 million; it was the 'Neolithic revolution' that brought it up to approximately 250 million at the beginning of the Christian era.

Climatic variations and their consequences

The Neolithic revolution was made possible by the general warming of the climate. From approximately 75,000 to approximately 30,000 years ago the earth had gone through a period of cooling (known as the Würm Glacial Stage for the Alps and the Wisconsin Glacial Stage for North America): enormous icecaps had formed around the poles and on the high mountains, and the level of the seas had gone down by

at least 100 m. The great plains of Asia, Europe and North America were then covered by meagre steppe (tundra), where herds of large mammals (bison, aurochs, mammoths, and so on) roamed; hunting was the only possible activity for the people of the Palaeolithic, but it supported only very low population densities.

The gradual warming of the climate led to a radical alteration in the flora and fauna, which took humankind unawares. The disappearance or at least the greater scarcity of large mammals made them look for new resources (fish, gathered fruits, small game and so on); the Mesolithic period (10,000–5,000 BC), with its warm, humid climate, was a difficult period for them at first. We know how they overcame the problem – by learning to breed stock and inventing agriculture. With these new techniques they became sedentary. In the early sixteenth century nomads accounted for only a very low percentage of the world population (below 5 per cent). The main feature of the time was stability – of cultural areas, the major religions and states.

Within this overall interglacial setting, however, there were minor climatic fluctuations. Paradoxically, through the study of peat bogs, the analysis of plant remains by the radiocarbon dating method and dendrochronology (annual growth measured by the thickness of the rings on tree trunks), we are better informed about the history of the climate during the distant past and the Middle Ages than about that of the population itself (Le Roy Ladurie, 1967). We know that there was a warm period from AD 800 to 1160, which made it possible for people to settle at the furthest limits of the *cannene*; this was followed by marked cooling during the fourteenth century. Towards 1500 the situation returned more or less to what it had been previously, but half a century later the 'Little Ice Age' began and was to continue until 1870 with catastrophic consequences on the most exposed human settlements: Iceland, Greenland,² the Scandinavian Great North, and the mountains and high plateaus of Western Europe.

In these regions it was not so much the harsh winters (like that of 1709) that caused damage as the summers, which were too cool for crops to ripen or too wet for plants to resist the onslaughts of mould and insects. Famines became frequent again during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many villages had to be abandoned in Scandinavia, Scotland and the Alps. At the same time the glaciers gained ground, most spectacularly during the seventeenth century in the Alps for example, and this 'glacial flooding' spread over the period 1590 to 1850, with peaks in 1600–10, 1640–3 and 1678–80, put certain villages in danger. There is concordant information relating to Scandinavia, Iceland and Alaska. In addition, the advance of the glaciers coincides with a period of increasing dryness in Arizona, Colorado and California. This leads one to think that the 'Little Ice Age' observed in Europe marks a change in the earth's environment.

Some specialists have connected these changes with the structure of atmospheric circulation: whereas today (as probably in the Middle Ages) the prevailing system of circulation is slow and contracted around the pole, which allows tropical air to penetrate deeply into the northern regions and warm them up, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were probably characterized by a very rapid flow from the west that spread out towards the southern regions; the latter would therefore have been cooler and wetter, whereas further north an anticyclonic system probably kept the climate dry and cold. But this hypothesis merely begs the question: how can the change in atmospheric circulation be explained? In addition, it comes up against a major

objection: the spread of the glaciers implies not only that summers were cool (and the glaciers therefore melted less) but above all that they were replenished by copious snowfalls. The chronicles of this period mention moreover that there were many bad springs and summers in north-west Europe.

A possible cause is solar activity, which has been found to follow an eleven-year cycle but probably has longer cycles as well or at least fluctuations in them. But the emission of atomic particles and ultraviolet rays does affect life on earth, especially the proliferation of viruses and bacteria. It may well be that the great epidemics at the end of the seventeenth century were linked with the reduction in ultraviolet rays shown to have taken place during the period 1665–1715 and known as 'Maunder's minimum'.

However, since the 'Little Ice Age' lasted for far longer than Maunder's minimum the explanation is undoubtedly far more complex: the possibility of modifications in the composition of the atmosphere needs to be taken into account.

Major volcanic eruptions have a significant effect on the climate, partly on account of the ashes blown into the troposphere and partly on account of the massive emission (several tens of millions of tons) of sulphur dioxide; this causes the formation of a cloud of aerosols, made up of billions of billions of droplets of sulphuric acid, which reflects away some of the solar radiation and thus causes marked cooling of the lower layers of the atmosphere and the surface of the earth. During the period under discussion the eruption of Laki volcano (1783), for example, covered the whole of Iceland with a bluish haze, which finally spread to the whole of Europe and as far as China, depressing average temperatures by 1.5° for several years and putting the crops in danger. However, volcanic eruptions are accidental phenomena, and it is unlikely that they can explain anything more than occasional variations in the climate; in any case, certainly not an episode as long as the 'Little Ice Age'.

Omnipresent death and regulatory mechanisms

We do not, of course, have anything like a mortality table¹ for any of the groups of people who were living at this time, but the chroniclers, at least in China and Europe, recorded any number of catastrophes, the most spectacular and the most recent being the Black Death of 1347, which carried away one quarter or one third of the population of Europe. It struck again on many occasions (1359, 1369, 1382, and so on) and finally became endemic. It was to continue to be rife in Western Europe until 1670,² in eastern Europe until 1879 and in the rest of the world up to the present day (Biraben, 1975–6).

Disease, war and famine, symbolized by the Horsemen of the Apocalypse, nearly struck in concert. War, with its train of massacres, made a strong impression on the chroniclers, but since the numbers of people involved were low the part it played as a factor in overall mortality remained slight: Tamerlane himself accounted for far fewer victims than the Black Death. In the final analysis, troop movements were lethal mainly because they helped to disseminate germs. Famine could cause terrible loss of life – as it did in particular during the seventeenth century, when the cooling of summers left the people who had ventured to the limits of the *cultivés* without any food resources – but in temperate zones there usually had to be a major epidemic to transform 'dearness' (a food shortage that results in a rise in prices) into 'mortality'. Disease, on the other hand, even alone, was always lethal.

It killed day after day, carrying off about half a generation before they could reach adulthood. It also killed large numbers at a time, wiping out 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the population of a village, town or region at a stroke.

It was lack of hygiene, promiscuity and lack of space rather than undernourishment that caused epidemics. This meant that deaths exceeded births in all large cities, where generations therefore never regularly renewed themselves but were maintained in demographic balance by the influx of young people from country districts. Indeed, the fact that a slight rural surplus was compensating for net urban under-reproduction explains the low level of urbanization rates.

This precarious balance between the town and country is no more than the most visible aspect of the regulatory mechanisms that enable the communities of the past to maintain themselves in spite of being decimated by catastrophes from time to time. If they were to survive, all human groups had to be endowed with institutions, customs and behaviour patterns that could simultaneously limit their expansion and ensure their reconstitution after a crisis. Without them they ran the risk either of dying out or of exploding (and therefore, in the latter case, of entering into conflict with their neighbours). These were the institutions and patterns Malthus tried to list right at the end of our period in his second *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1803) to justify the general theory he had put forward in his first *Essay* (1798) – in which he drew a distinction between repressive brakes (war, slavery and the abandonment of children) and preventive brakes (abortion, infanticide, polygamy and the postponement of marriage).

This comparative equilibrium of human groups meant that the population worldwide remained extraordinarily stable: from 1200 to 1500 the world population had risen by only about 60 million, which represents an annual increase of hardly 0.5 per mil. It may therefore be assumed that the world population was stationary, with birth and death rates of approximately 40 per mil and a life expectancy at birth of between twenty and thirty years.

This is why migrations played such a small role at the time: they consisted mainly of cyclical movements within a given area or drifts from the country to the nearest town; they were of no significance at the international level, a fact that helps to account for the biological, demographic, economic and social stability of the world. This state of equilibrium, which was scarcely ruffled by the Turkish expansion, was to be profoundly disturbed in modern times by European expansion. Christopher Columbus's arrival in America (in 1492) was thus a turning point, but in 1500 nobody could yet foresee its consequences.

THE WORLD IN 1800

By 1800 knowledge of demographic data had made immense progress.

Demographic events were being accurately recorded in almost all Western European countries and were beginning to be recorded in the colonies (see Figure 2 and Map 2).

As a general rule it was the religious authorities that carried out such registration, when administering the sacraments or burial formalities, but the State sought to regulate and supervise it, especially in Protestant countries (England in 1538 and Sweden in 1736) and in France, where the government finally required that a second copy be kept and deposited and where civil status became a secular matter in September 1792.




Figure 2 Population evolution in different regions of the world, from 1500 to 1800 (after J. Dupâquier).

Summaries of population movements were drawn up and published for some towns (Paris, 1670) and even for whole states (Brandenburg, 1683, Sweden, 1749, and France, 1742), although at this stage the science of statistics was still in its infancy.

Likewise, while the practice of counting the number of households had become widespread (J. and M. Dupâquier, 1985), the only censuses worthy of the name in the eighteenth century were those of the Cape (1700), Japan (1721), Sweden (1729), revolutionary France (1791 and 1793) and the Batavian Republic (1795). In China, on the other hand, the system of carrying out censuses had declined, and the administration was concerned with only that part of the population from whom unpaid labour could be extracted. In India a census was ordered by the Emperor Akbar (1580) but was not followed up.

The most remarkable occurrence, however, was the foundation of the science of demography or 'political arithmetic', whose founding fathers were John Graunt, author of 'Natural and Political Observations . . . Made upon the Bills of Mortality' (of the City of London) (1662) and William Petty, author of several essays on political arithmetic. At almost exactly the same time Leibniz, the Huygens brothers and Halley invented mortality tables, drawing on advances in the calculus of probabilities (J. and M. Dupâquier, 1985).

The demographic structure of the world in 1800

By 1800 the population of the world, according to J. N. Biraben, was probably 954 million – having increased by 493 million (+107 per cent) in three centuries, though at a very uneven rate: +25 per cent in the sixteenth century, +18 per cent in the seventeenth century and +40 per cent in the eighteenth century.

For the end of the period, C. MacEvedy and R. Jones (1978) suggest a figure of 900 million, consisting of 180 million for Europe (+122 per cent), 625 million for Asia (+123 per cent), 70 million for Africa (+52 per cent), 24 million for America (+71 per cent), of which half was in South America and 2.5 million for Oceania. These figures must be treated with caution: it is probable that the populations of America and Africa decreased rather than increased during the period.

We are better informed with regard to Europe: with 36 million people, Russia was probably the most populated country on the continent which, at a time when a monarch's power depended on the number of subjects he or she had, explains its great-power status. France was in second place although its population within the area bounded by its present frontiers had only doubled (from 15 million to 30 million). The population of the British Isles would appear to have more than tripled (from 5 million to 16 million) and that of Germany doubled (from 9 million to 18 million), and much the same occurred in Italy (from 10 million to 19 million) and the Iberian States (from 8 million to 14 million). To sum up, an absolutely astonishing increase had occurred, mainly during the eighteenth century (23 per cent in the sixteenth century, 20 per cent in the seventeenth century and 50 per cent in the eighteenth century).

The most striking fact is that the proportion of the world population in the three areas mentioned above – the Indian subcontinent, China, and Europe excluding those lands that were to become part of the ex-Soviet Union – had considerably increased, reaching almost 69 per cent. These areas alone accounted for 410 million of the 493 million additional people.⁵

Except for Mexico City, Srinagar (India) and Surakarta (Malaysia), all the large cities were in those areas or in their immediate sphere of influence. At that time there were sixty-four cities with a population in excess of 100,000 inhabitants, of which twenty-one were in China, twenty were in non-Islamic Europe, sixteen were in the Indies and six were in the Islamic Mediterranean. With 1,100,000 inhabitants, Beijing was still the largest city in the world, but London, which had reached 861,000, was close to overtaking it.

European expansion

(See Map 4.) The increase in the number of large European cities (from four in 1500 to twenty in 1800) was a reflection of both rapid demographic growth in the old continent and economic change: the proportion of the working population engaged in the secondary sector (manufacturing) and the tertiary sector (services) rose steadily, probably reaching a third of the total in north-western Europe and even half in England.

It was in about 1800 that the average annual population growth rate in Europe (see Figure 3), which was then close to 5 per mil, overtook that of Asia. The rate in the two Americas was even higher (probably 10 per mil), but there too the population was of European origin, at least in part.

In fact, the large-scale intercontinental migrations so characteristic of the nineteenth century had not yet begun, although there were already colonies of Europeans in nearly all the continents:

- about 5 million in North America;
- at least 3 million in Latin America;




Figure 3 Population growth in Europe, from 1500 to 1800 (within present-day frontiers) (after J. Dupâquier).

- probably 1 million in Asia (Siberia, the Indies and Indonesia);
- perhaps 100,000 in Africa;
- 10,000 in Oceania (Australia).

Thus the proportion of Europeans in the world total had risen over a period of three centuries from approximately 16 per cent to 21 per cent, a phenomenon of historic importance.

This expansion was initially characteristic of north-western Europe⁶ and, in particular, of eastern Europe. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the total population of the territories now forming European Russia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary and Romania was much the same as that of the three Mediterranean peninsulas, both areas having about 23 million inhabitants. By the end of the seventeenth century the former had increased by 170 per cent and now represented a third of the European total, while the second, despite an increase of 90 per cent, did not even make up a quarter of the total.

In descending order, the rates of population growth in the main European states in the eighteenth century were as follows: the Hapsburg possessions and the Russian Empire,⁷ the United Kingdom (73 per cent), Sweden (67 per cent), the Holy Roman Empire (45 per cent), Spain (43 per cent), France (35 per cent). The population of The Netherlands remained virtually stagnant, as did that of the Ottoman Empire as a whole (24 million).

Demographic trends

For most of the continents we have no detailed figures on mortality and fertility levels and only very vague ideas about

their demographic balance. We are slightly better informed about Latin America and the newly founded United States. However, we have very detailed information, thanks to the integral family reconstitution carried out by the Department of Demography of the University of Montreal, about the behaviour of French Canadians (Charbonneau, 1975). It was they who were to introduce us to the analysis of European demographic systems, which are well known for France (Dupâquier, 1988), England (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981), Sweden and isolated parishes in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain (Flinn, 1981).

In French Canada life expectancy at birth for people born in the seventeenth century was 35.5 years, while at the age of 5 it exceeded 44 years. This apparent paradox is explained by the very high death rate in early childhood: out of 1,000 newly born children only 789 survived their first year, but 715 were still alive four years later. On the other hand, the latter's chances of reaching the threshold of old age (60 years) were by no means negligible: 267 were able to celebrate their 60th birthday and 135 their 70th birthday. From the ages of 5 to 40 mortality was relatively low. Thus the notion of life expectancy is particularly deceptive when applied to populations of the past: it hides both the enormous peak of deaths in early childhood (283 deaths out of 1,000) and the second peak between the ages of 55 and 74 (224 deaths out of 1,000). Finally, about six births out of ten could be regarded as 'useful', that is, likely to produce an adult who would in turn be capable of reproducing.

We have no similar mortality table for Canadians born in the eighteenth century, but it is probable that by about 1800 their average length of life was close to 40 years. It was then approaching 35 in Sweden, Norway and England, and 30 in France.⁸

These differences between European countries resulted mainly from the levels of infant mortality: the rates per 1,000 live births are reckoned to have been 211 in Canada (at the beginning of the century), 227 in Sweden (in about 1757), 223 in Finland (1751-90) and Denmark (26 rural parishes), 270 in France, 264 in Geneva, 273 in Spain and only 161 in England. Thus, we can see a clear difference emerging between northern Europe where infant mortality rates were under 250 per mil, and southern Europe, where they nearly always exceeded that figure. About eastern Europe we know nothing at all, but the rates were probably even higher still.

This 'massacre of the innocents' strikes us as horrendous - it exceeds anything happening in the very poorest countries nowadays at the end of the twentieth century, but it is historically meaningless to interpret it as revealing a lack of maternal love. It is explained both by the difficulties of pregnancy and childbirth and by the methods of feeding children. Mothers worked hard right up until the last moment, and many babies, born prematurely, died within days or weeks. Furthermore, in some communities (for example in Bavaria) there were prejudices against breast-feeding, which gave rise to the practice of bottle-feeding and resulted in frequent cases of dysentery. Finally, in other countries (especially France) rich women and most city women were in the habit of entrusting their children to wet nurses; the fact that this led to a high death rate now seems self-evident to us, but people at the time had no clear awareness of the danger.

Death struck mainly at the end of summer (intestinal illnesses, which were frequent in eastern Europe and in Mediterranean countries) and at the end of winter (pulmonary illnesses, which were often fatal to old people). In Finland,

where the causes of death have been analysed by O. Turpeinen,⁹ the most fearsome scourge was smallpox (369 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants), followed by typhus (318), pulmonary tuberculosis (232) and whooping cough (194). In London, in the second half of the eighteenth century, smallpox killed 101,038 people; it struck every year, but with particular savagery every five years (1752, 1757, 1763, 1768, 1772, 1781, 1796). The regular recurrence of this scourge can probably be explained by the development of immunity after each epidemic among part of the population, before a new generation prone to the illness was born. Thus, people at the time regarded smallpox as a childhood illness, though it is just as dangerous for unimmunized adults.¹⁰ When smallpox reached Iceland for the first time in 1707 it caused horrendous loss of life among people of all ages. It was for this reason that vaccination, discovered by Jenner in 1794, right at the end of the period under consideration, was to play a decisive role in reducing the mortality rate; in London, for example, the average annual number of victims was to fall from 2,020 (1750-99) to 1,375 in the first decade of the nineteenth century and to 833 in the second decade.

The variability of the mortality rate from one year to the next also needs to be stressed. In France, for example, the annual number of deaths recorded for the period 1740-89 averaged 857,000, but it could fall to 677,000 (1751) and rise to 1,077,000 (1779). In England, for the same period, the average was 174,500, but it ranged from 138,500 (1744) to 220,000 (1741). In Sweden there was an average of 55,100, with a minimum of 39,693 (1745) and a maximum of 105,139 (1773).

The major demographic crises were nearly all due to epidemics (Charbonneau and Larose, 1979), but war and famine could extend them and make them considerably worse, for example in Finland from 1788 to 1791 (105,863 deaths in four years, compared with 72,192 in the previous four years) or in Iceland in 1784.¹¹

This dreadful mortality rate was offset by very high fertility, at least within marriage. Clearly, it was only in exceptional circumstances that women could have a child every year: in the past, the intervals between births were approximately two or three years, depending on the duration of breast-feeding, and they became considerably longer towards the end of a woman's child-bearing years. The numbers of legitimate births, calculated for a large number of parishes, according to the method of family reconstitution based on the mother's age were as follows (Flinn, 1981):

Country	Women's actual age					Theoretical fertility
	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	
French Canada	511	479	478	413	218	12.76
Belgium	424	476	385	313	204	9.36
France	426	459	400	309	148	9.06
Germany	474	456	379	311	180	9.00
Geneva	424	451	356	254	115	8.35
England	437	393	301	239	164	7.67
Scandinavia	410	362	300	225	121	7.10

Figure 4 Average annual number of births in Europe per 1,000 married women in the eighteenth century.

Source: Flinn, 1981.

It can be seen that the rates fall with age, but very gradually. The decline after 35 is due to the approach of the menopause rather than to a conscious wish by women to limit the size

of the family. Among the Canadians the proportion of couples who stopped having children after the women's 35th birthday does not exceed 9 per cent. In Europe it is higher (perhaps because gynaecological illnesses were more frequent there), but the average age for the last birth remained very high: over 40 in Belgium and Germany, 39 in France, and 38 in England.

With the calculations of theoretical fertility¹² shown in the table above, all the populations cited should have been expanding rapidly. Even with the terrible infant and child mortality rates of the time, there would have been, in the space of a generation, a doubling of the population of France and a quadrupling of that of French Canada. That the increase was much lower was because four factors helped to limit reproduction:

- considerable female mortality at a fertile age (the risk of dying in childbirth was between 1 per cent and 1.5 per cent, but after seven births that represents about 10 per cent);
- a fairly high rate of widowhood: given the difference in age between husband and wife, a woman married at the age of 25 had about a three-in-ten risk of losing her husband before her twentieth wedding anniversary;¹³
- a relatively high rate of celibacy (even in Canada, where nuptiality was very high, the frequency of permanent celibacy exceeded 6 per cent, and in Western Europe it was sometimes double that) – and fertility among the unmarried was very low on account of the social disapproval associated with illegitimate births;¹⁴
- late marriages: nowhere in Western Europe, except in some noble families, was marriage during puberty a frequent practice. In the rest of the world about 80 per cent of girls were married before the age of 20, while here it was only 20 per cent. Even in French Canada, where there was a shortage of girls, in about 1700 their average age at their first marriage was 22 (boys: 27.7). In England, Sweden, Germany and Belgium it was about 25 and tended to rise during the century.

Late marriage seems to be cultural in origin, but it tends to increase even more as the marriage market becomes glutted. It causes a considerable fall in natality because it reduces a woman's fertile period by about ten years. It has been truly called by P. Chamou 'the contraceptive weapon of eighteenth-century Europe.'

However, it can be understood only if seen in a larger context that takes account of religious imperatives (no contraception outside marriage), family-structure models (with a separate home for each couple) and economic powers (property distribution must be such as to permit the creation of new farms or other concerns). Thus, in the old agrarian civilizations of Western Europe the notion of tenure played a role similar to that played by territory in animal societies. Young people were deprived of the right to have sexual relations until they had inherited property from their parents or amassed, as servants, sufficient savings to be able to set up home on their own account.

On the other hand, in eastern Europe it was common for different generations to live together, land was abundant, and the large landowners were always ready to grant land to new couples in order to gain more serfs. Girls could therefore marry very young and, despite a mortality rate that must have been very high, the population increased more rapidly than in the old states of Western Europe.¹⁵

However, three puzzles remain: why did population growth increase more rapidly in the eighteenth century, not only in Europe but also in North America and China? Why

did Latin America lose half its population between 1500 and 1800? Why did black Africa lag behind?


the only region of the world to show a decline during the three centuries under consideration is Central and South America.

THE FACTORS OF CHANGE

As has been seen, some European states (for example The Netherlands and Iceland) hardly showed any advance during the eighteenth century, and the same is true for Japan, but

The tragedy of the American Indians

(See Map 5.) The Indians of America were the descendants of small groups of people who had managed to cross the



Map 5 The demography of the Americas: the Amerindian and African contributions to the demography of the Americas (after C. MacEvedy and R. Jones, 1978).

Bering Strait and then make their way between the glacier of the Rocky Mountains and the coast, taking advantage of the fall in sea-level caused by glaciation. The first groups, which arrived about 40,000 BC, had initially settled in California, where their numbers had increased. They had then crossed the Isthmus of Panama and reached South America. Others, passing along an ice-free corridor between the Rocky Mountains and the Canadian Shield, had spread into the great plains of North America in about 12,000 BC. In comparatively recent times large kingdoms had been established in Mexico, in Central America and on the Andean plateaus.

How many people were involved? We shall probably never know. Estimates range from 12 million to 80 million, although the latter figure is probably too high since it is based on the demographic potential that would be warranted by the cultivation of maize. We shall therefore take as our basis the figure suggested by Dr Bitahen (39 million in 1500).

These communities, completely cut off from the rest of humankind, had a reduced genetic pool; their blood did not contain the antibodies that had developed, through selection, among people in the Old World. This contact with Europeans had disastrous consequences for them. Attempts have been made to explain their sudden demographic collapse by the impact of conquest, massacres, the levying of tribute, forced labour and even the total destruction of their cultural universe, but it was the epidemics that played the decisive role. Smallpox had decimated the Aztecs even before the siege of Mexico City by Cortés, and huge numbers died in Mexico in 1521, 1545-6, 1576-9, 1585, 1593 and in other years. The natives spoke of 'matlazahuatl'. It is not totally clear what this was, but it was probably smallpox, together with measles and all kinds of illnesses of the respiratory system: the least head cold was fatal to an Indian. Thus the population of New Spain fell to 7 million by 1548; to 2.7 million by about 1570, and to 1.5 million by about 1600. It began to recover, and then only very gradually, in the middle of the seventeenth century.

On the Andean plateaus, the epidemics were less deadly at least until about 1720, probably for climatic reasons, but the population of Latin America, as a whole, was no more than about 10 million in the seventeenth century.

The settlement of Spanish and Portuguese colonists only slightly offset losses among the indigenous people; there were only about 150,000 of them in 1570, although they soon increased in numbers as a result of both natural growth and immigration. It has been estimated that by about 1650 Latin America probably had a million whites and the same number of half-castes. Together with the blacks brought in from Africa, they probably made up a third of the population.

The black slave-trade and its consequences

(See Map 5.) In order to replace the deceased Indians who had worked the plantations and the mines, the Spaniards devised the plan of bringing slaves from Africa. The Portuguese, French and English soon followed their example. Thus began the 'great deportation' in the course of which about 10 million people were transferred from Africa to America.

In fact, the black slave-trade was nothing new in history. Examples can be found in the ancient World and the Middle Ages. From the Sahel and the Horn of Africa about 8 million slaves were transported along the trans-Saharan routes to the markets of the Maghrib and the Middle East between the seventh and the nineteenth centuries. However, it was

the American market that predominated from about 1650 onwards.

A century earlier Black Africa had provided about 15,000 slaves a year, of whom 10,000 came from the northern savannahs (mainly young women, intended for the Arab markets), 2,000 from the east coast and 3,000 from the coastal regions in the west (mainly young men intended for work in the mines and plantations of America). By about 1660, while the first two flows were continuing as before, the third had gradually increased and had overtaken the other two. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a rise in demand led to a quadrupling of the price of slaves of Africa, and the average number deported annually gradually increased, to reach 100,000 a year by about 1780.

As Luiz Felipe de Alencastro has observed,¹⁶ 'this rise in the price of "specimens" led to a marked development in the social mechanisms and policies for producing slaves in Africa: raids by warlike tribes, abductions carried out by organized bands and customary practices punishing various crimes by captivity all increased'. The same writer estimates at about 12 million the number of individuals captured in West Africa (Senegambia, Upper Guinea, the Bay of Benin, the Gold Coast, Loango and especially Angola) from 1700 to 1850. Out of this number, 2 million probably died in Africa while they were being taken, 4 million would have been delivered into domestic slavery in Africa, and 6 million (two-thirds of them men) would have been transported overseas. Such abductions had a catastrophic effect on the populations of the west African coast, who probably lost 3 million to 7 million people (out of 25 million) between 1730 and 1850.

During the eighteenth century, considerable numbers died during the crossing: 20 per cent on average, though the slave-traders subsequently took measures to reduce deaths at sea, not so much for humanitarian reasons as for economic reasons (slaves were very expensive to buy) and the mortality rate would appear to have fallen to 10 per cent by about 1750 and 5 per cent by the end of the century.

The demographic effect of the slave-trade was therefore very negative in Africa: on the east coast because it involved women of child-bearing age, and on the west coast because of the very high numbers involved. And it had little positive effect on the population in America, even though up to about 1840 America received more Africans than Europeans. Its lack of positive effect was due largely to the imbalance in the sexes and ages (very few children were transported), to the very high mortality of slaves and to their low fertility. Of the 10 million blacks transported to America in the course of these three centuries (1550-1850), fewer than 2 million founded families. It was only in the United States that the reproduction rate of slaves became positive from the beginning of the eighteenth century, not because they were better treated, but because the female slaves had adopted the European habit of early weaning. The American blacks, who were the descendants of a mere fraction of those involved in the Atlantic slave-trade, already numbered a million in 1800; they were to become, in the course of the twentieth century, the largest group of African origin in the New World.

The puzzles of the demographic take-off

Except for Africa, South Asia and Japan, world population began to increase again, as has been seen, in the eighteenth century, but it is very difficult to date the various stages with

any accuracy, since the process was not continuous but was interrupted by severe demographic crises, for example in Iceland in 1707, in England in 1726-9, in Mexico in 1736-7 and in France in 1738-43. It is clear that it was faster and more continuous in the second half of the century than in the first, but it has now been established that it began well before 1750, especially in China and in eastern Europe.

Except in England, this growth in the population did not coincide geographically with industrialization. Everywhere else it resulted from economic changes incorrectly described as the 'agriculture revolution'. In fact, it was undoubtedly demographic pressure that forced European peasants to improve farming methods and increase the area of cultivated land. If the means of subsistence had increased ahead of population growth, supply would have exceeded demand, and the price of grain would have tended to fall, whereas what happened was that there was a general rise in prices after 1760. All of a sudden, producers made large profits, which induced them to invest, to devote greater attention to their land, to stockpile grain and sell it elsewhere. At the same time, life for ordinary people became more difficult: they sought to cut down on what they needed to buy by growing alternative crops in their gardens (such as maize, potatoes and vegetables). Thus, agriculture advanced on all sides as a result of demographic pressure. It was not technological innovation that destroyed the rigid reproductive patterns of the peasantry but the increase in needs that engendered technological innovation.

Only in England did industrialization, which was more advanced than in any other country in the world, stimulate demographic growth. The development of the secondary and tertiary sectors gave young people the opportunity to settle down and found a home without going through a long apprenticeship or building up savings. Marriages increased, and the birth rate followed suit.

In Ireland, where the population, which could hardly have exceeded 3 million in 1725, reached 4 million in 1780 and 5.2 million in 1800, different causes produced the same results. In order to increase their income, extend the areas of cultivated land and increase the cultivation of cereals (for export), the English landowners promoted the division of their estates into smaller holdings, a small plot now being sufficient, thanks to potatoes and milk products, to support a family. Thus, a ruthless socio-demographic mechanism was set up, and Ireland headed for the catastrophe of 1846-9, providing a belated but none the less tragic illustration of the theory Malthus had put forward for the first time in 1798 in his 'Essay on the Principle of Population'.

In eastern Europe demographic growth rested on more substantial foundations, since there were reserves of available land. The large landowners, just like the English landlords, promoted the establishment of new households, and immense areas of land were opened up to settlement after the Turks had retreated. On this pioneer frontier population pressure was both the cause and the result of imperial expansion.

In France, on the other hand, where population density was already very high, particularly in the northern half, the effects of the increase were not salutary. Signs of crisis became more frequent from 1770 onwards; there was an increase in vagrancy, begging and crime; the age of marriage rose still further, which partially explains the rise in illegitimacy and pre-nuptial conception; among couples fertility fell slightly, especially in the towns, in Normandy and in the Ile-de-France. Social tensions were exacerbated, and this certainly contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution.

Despite the above remarks, the reasons for the increase remain largely unknown. For a long time historians sought to explain it by technological progress, arguing that advances in medicine made it possible to conquer diseases and that advances in agronomy provided Europeans with more food and thus reduced the mortality rate. Unfortunately, these hypotheses have collapsed, and nothing has replaced them. Since population growth is a worldwide phenomenon, purely national explanations must be rejected. As there is no reason to assume an increase in fertility we are obliged to accept the validity of a fall, albeit small, in mortality.¹⁷

Excluding the possibility of miraculous uniformity in human behaviour over the whole surface of our planet, the only plausible explanation for the take-off is to be found in changes in morbidity after the paroxysm of the seventeenth century, and that assumes the occurrence of changes in the environment.

And yet we have no tangible proof that the earth became warmer during the eighteenth century. It was still in the grip of the 'Little Ice Age': in mountainous areas and on the fringes of the inhabitable parts of the planet survival remained precarious, and even on the plains of central Europe harvests could be destroyed by terrible spells of cold weather (for example, the 'great winter' of 1709) or, in summer, by tornadoes, like the one that swept across France on 13 July 1788. The only indication of change is solar radiation which, after having been very low from 1645 to 1715 (Maunder's minimum), regained its full force until 1783 (the year in which Laki erupted).

Are we to suppose that ultraviolet rays helped to reduce the spread of viruses and bacteria after the catastrophic epidemics of the seventeenth century? Should we accept E. Le Roy Ladurie's theory on the microbial unification of humankind and the general dissemination of antibodies? Should we look no further for an explanation than the eradication of the plague in western Europe after 1670 (except for the outbreak in Provence in 1720) as a result of a policy of establishing 'cordons sanitaires'? It is clearly disappointing not to be able to come to more definite conclusions, but the historical connections between human beings and germs are very far from being clearly understood.

NOTES

- 1 More probably 57 per cent if one accepts Michel Cartier's estimate that China had a population of 120 million to 150 million.
- 2 The Viking colonies in Greenland had disappeared by the fourteenth century. Contact by sea ceased in 1347 on account of the advance of the ice floe; when a Norwegian ship reached Greenland in the early fifteenth century it found all the villages there deserted: the last settlers had died of cold and hunger.
- 3 With the exception of a few isolated indications worked out from genealogies.
- 4 It became virulent again in Provence in 1720.
- 5 Using Biraben's figures for China in 1500.
- 6 British Isles, Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, France, Germany, Switzerland and Austria.
- 7 These two powers more than doubled, but in part as a result of territorial expansion.
- 8 The mortality table calculated by INED for the decade 1780-9 gives 27.5 for men and 28.1 for women, but it is probably a little pessimistic.

In Sweden, life expectancy at birth during the period 1751-90 was 33.72 years for men and 36.64 years for women; for the period 1791-1815 the figures rose to 35.35 and 38.44 respectively.

9 Tuupainen, 'Infectious diseases and regional differences in Finnish death rates 1749-73', *Population studies*, 33, 1, pp. 101-14.

10 Louis XV died from it in 1774 at the age of 63.

11 The population of the island, which totalled 49,459 people in 1780, fell to 39,578 in 1785; by 1800 it had still not regained its 1703 level (50,444).

12 The theoretical completed fertility is that of a woman who, at all ages, would have the fertility observed for the corresponding female population as a whole.

13 About half the widowers and a third of widows remarried, but that only very partially offset the lost births.

14 The frequency of illegitimate births at the beginning of the eighteenth century varied from 1 to 3 per cent in the countryside, and from 5 to 10 per cent in the towns, but it rose considerably at the end of the century to 3 per cent in revolutionary France and 5.9 per cent in England and Sweden for the period 1791-1820.

15 In England, population growth in the eighteenth century was due both to a lower mortality rate than in France and to greater opportunities for young people to set up their own homes as a result of a change in economic and social structures.

16 Article 'Traite des Noirs' in the *Encyclopedia Universalis*, 1990.

17 A fall of 2 per mil in the mortality rate (for example, from 38 to 36 per mil) would be enough to explain the differential in growth between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

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TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Ifan Habib

TECHNOLOGY OUTSIDE EUROPE, c. 1500

For twenty thousand years, or perhaps double that time or more, the two great segments of mankind in the two hemispheres remained practically isolated from each other, until Columbus made his discovery in the year 1492. By now the New World populations in the areas of the Inca and Aztec Empires were at the level of true civilizations, with technologies that had evolved since the Palaeolithic stage in absolute independence of the Old World.

The Amerindian peoples had developed agriculture, domesticating and improving maize and potato, sweet potato, chili, beans, tomato, peanuts and varieties of cotton. In the Andean region they had domesticated the camelid llama, to serve as pack-animal and source of wool. They had developed textile production, with the use of spindle, loom and needle, and dyes. The New World entered the Metal Age fairly early; and its smiths now worked in gold, silver, copper and even natural platinum alloys; and they knew how to make bronze by alloying copper with tin. The Maya in a past age had created an ideographic script and a remarkably accurate calendar.

Yet the isolation of the Western Hemisphere undoubtedly constricted technological development. There were no wild cattle, camels or horses to be domesticated for service as draught animals; and so no possibility of the plough or cart being used. In fact, the Amerindians had no knowledge of the wheel. This was related to their inability to discover other devices based on rotation, such as the spindle-whorl, draw-bat, moving belt, all forms of gearing, and crank. Treadles too were not known. And they were yet to discover iron. Except for the Maya characters and the 'quipu' threads of Peru, there was no way of detailed communication beyond the spoken word, gravely limiting thereby the pace of intellectual exchanges.

As 1492 so savagely exposed the technological backwardness of the New World relative to the Old, we can perhaps find here a fresh illustration for Confucius's statement that 'if I am one of three men walking, the other two can always teach me something'. The basic fact was that the Old World had a much larger area and population than the New World. However powerful the obstructions, and however uneven the pace of diffusion, the contributions of its numerous parts led nevertheless to a minimum common technological inventory within the Old World, that was much larger than the one attained by the most advanced of the Amerindian cultures.

When the forced merger of the two hemispheres occurred, there was, therefore, little that the New could teach the Old in mechanics. Still, by enlarging the latter's stock of species of domesticated plants the merger greatly enriched the agriculture of the Old World. Maize and potato became important new subsistence crops for the colder northern regions; chili, a much cheaper substitute for pepper, and peanut, an additional oil-crop, in the tropical countries; and tobacco, a new cash-crop the world over.

It is doubtful if, in the century preceding 1492, an observer of crafts in the major civilizations of Eurasia and North Africa could have established a clear precedence of one region over another. Today, we can, with Needham's monumental volumes (1954-) before us, see so much more clearly that China had kept until the fifteenth century a significant lead over other cultures. Within the previous three quarters of a millennium, paper, the magnetic compass and gunpowder had diffused from China. China had known book printing for centuries before its appearance in Europe in the fifteenth century. Less well known is the diffusion from China of the spinning wheel and the treadle for shed-control in the loom, which, reaching the various corners of the Old World by the fifteenth century, everywhere revolutionized the textile industry. The use of coke by the eleventh century and of decarburization of cast iron since much earlier times placed the Chinese ahead of every other people in the realms of fuel and metallurgy. In agriculture, China contributed the winnowing fan, an early Dutch import, for Europe's new husbandry.

Even more remarkable were China's achievements in the field of machine design. Wang Zhen in 1313 described a water-powered spinning machine for hemp with multiple spindles. Song Yinxing, in the *Tian Gong Kai Wu* (1637) described and illustrated a blast furnace with double-acting piston-bellows; a silk-reeling machine with a flyer, worked by eccentric and driving belt from a main shaft powered by a treadle crank (see Figure 5); a deep drilling tool, worked by capstan and pulleys; and a draw-loom, all showing amazing sophistication. As Needham (1970, p. 117) reminds us, already around 1300, four centuries before Europe, the Chinese were applying water power to textile machinery.

If one turned to the Islamic or the Arab-Iranian world, c. 1500, one would also have found considerable use of water power in the watermills of Iran and Afghanistan and of air-power in the windmills of Seistan. The devices had horizontal wheels, without gearing. But pin-drum gearing was otherwise quite common in Islamic technology, especially in water-lift mechanisms. Moreover, the Islamic civilization had taken




Figure 5 Chinese silk-reeling machine, Chinese diagram of 1843, similar to a drawing in *Tian Gong Kai Wu* (1637 edn). Source: J. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China and the West*, Cambridge, 1970, p. 124.

an important role in diffusion of techniques: from China it took over and transmitted manufacture of paper, draw-loom and treadles to Europe. Eastward, it had diffused the Mediterranean geared *sāqiya* (water-wheel with potterland) and capstan. Wulff (1966) and al-Hassan and Hill (1986) give us excellent introductions to the level of technological advance attained in Iran, West Asia and North Africa before the beginning of modern times.

India too had developed important technological processes: the mulling rollers used for cotton-ginning and sugar-cane crushing spread from India westward, unthinkingly losing, in the transfer, the worm-gearing by which these were worked in India. By the seventeenth century Indian methods of textile-printing, along with indigenous terms like *dihapa* for the block and *dihint* for the printed cloth, had been adopted in Iran; and Indian cloth-printing became the source of inspiration for textile-printing in England in the eighteenth century. There were notable inventions too at the court of emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605): a wagon mill that worked as the cart moved, and a machine that smoothened the insides of multiple gun-barrels through rotating rods – both devices based on pin-drum gearing; the cooling of water by saltpetre; and the ship's camel (Chapter 20). Nearly all

these had precedence in time over similar inventions in Europe.

EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGY DURING THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

From the fifteenth century, trade and commerce rapidly spread their tentacles in Europe. The European craftsman, helped by expanding markets, undertook an assimilation of inherited, as well as exotic, mechanical principles, applying them in ever new combinations. Central to this endeavour, as Lynn White (1966, pp. 103–15) makes us see now, was the emphasis on forms of conversion of reciprocal into rotary motion and vice versa, based mainly on the compound crank and on diverse forms of gearing, with more and more efficient governors and escapement. These gave more regularity and power to drills, lathes and other cutting instruments, which, in turn, helped produce new metallic tools. From the early fifteenth century the coiled or spiral spring came into use as a means of storing and concentrating power; and the threaded or grooved screw appeared in the mid-sixteenth century as a detachable fastener of metal pieces. Miskets (matchlocks and then flint-locks) and chronometers (clocks and watches) were, perhaps, the most visible 'consumer' products of the new technology.

The European artisan's achievement was significant, even, perhaps, primary. But, as Cipolla (1970, p. 28) puts it, technological progress 'accelerated dramatically when the resources of craftsmanship were strengthened by the systematic application of scientific principles developed by more or less professional scientists'. Our period opens with the Renaissance master, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), whose manuscript notes and Madrid codices contain brilliant designs of the most sophisticated devices and machines, illustrated with fine diagrams and sketches. It is a testimony to his genius that although his unpublished plans and designs had no immediate consequences, he anticipated many later problems of mechanics and not a few of their solutions. The German Georgius Agricola (1494–1552), the 'father of mineralogy', closely observed and systematized existing mining practices in *De re metallica*, 1556.

With Galileo the Florentine (1564–1642), mechanics took the first step towards becoming a true science. He constructed one of the earliest telescopes (1609). His discovery of the isochronism of the pendulum, and, still more, his finding that bodies do not fall at speeds proportional to their weights and that they accelerate as they fall, represented a fundamental break with the wisdom received from Aristotle. They were also a necessary prelude to the three laws of motion that Isaac Newton (1642–1727) propounded in the *Principia* (1687). These were that bodies at rest or in movement will so continue unless affected by an external force; that force itself is the product of mass and acceleration; and that every action creates an equal reaction.

That discoveries of 'laws' of this kind could contribute directly to practical mechanics is illustrated by the development of the steam engine. Evangelista Torricelli (1608–47), while investigating the effects of a vacuum, found (1643) that air has weight. This generated experiments by von Guericke (c.1650) and Denis Papin (1687, 1707), followed by those of Thomas Savery, who built a steam-engine (1698), designed to pump out water. But it was left to Thomas Newcomen (1663–1720), a blacksmith and locksmith, to take the discovered principles and create a really successful machine (1712) (see Figure 6). Newcomen separated the




Figure 6 Steam engine erected by Newcomen and Savery at Durdley Castle, England in 1712.

Source: C. Singer, *A History of Technology*, vol. IV, Oxford, 1970, p. 174.

piston-cylinder from the boiler, and had the piston descend as steam condensed and rise as steam expanded. This reciprocal motion was transmitted to another piston moving within a pipe which drew up water to fill the vacuum its upward motions created. There can be little doubt that this 'atmospheric' engine was one of the greatest mechanical inventions before the Industrial Revolution, involving as it did the first harnessing of steam power. Newcomen's invention underlines the anxiety to use sources of power beyond human muscles. Cattle-power had been long in use for agricultural operations such as ploughing, threshing and milling; but for most craft tools human muscles had up till now sufficed. But as from the fifteenth century onwards tools became progressively more efficient, with the capacity to transmit and apply more power, there began an increasing shift to animals, especially horses, for driving machinery; and then, as these proved insufficient, increasing use was made of water power. The geared water-wheel, with attendant masonry directing the stream flow, came to provide the driving force of all machinery of any pretension by the end of the seventeenth century. It must be remembered that steam by Newcomen's time or till much later could not compete with water power, wherever the latter was available. Indeed, Newcomen's own engine proved to be economical only where water itself needed to be pumped out, as in the coal mines.

The stress and tension which the tools had now to bear began to transform the material out of which the critical portions of the tools were made. The metallic component increased substantially, wood now providing the frame and supporting parts but not those parts that were directly subject to friction. The fact that animals and water-wheels could supply sufficient power to bellows for sustaining blast surfaces meant that Europe could produce cast iron by the end of

the fifteenth century. By the mid-seventeenth century cast iron guns were fast replacing bronze cannon in Europe. As the demand for iron increased, a fuel crisis ensued, since the production of charcoal needed for iron-smelting tended further to denude forests that were already in retreat owing to expanding arable and the demand for timber for shipbuilding. The country worst affected was England, which, with great iron mines of its own, was still forced, before the mid-eighteenth century, to import Russian and Swedish iron. The solution could come, in everyone's view, by divesting mineral coal of its sulphuric compounds; but attempts to discover a successful method to do so had ended only in frustration. At long last, success was attained – initially as a well-guarded secret – by Abraham Darby in or before 1709. The industrial fuel of past ages obtained from the forests could now be replaced by one dug out of the bowels of the earth: the age of coal and iron had arrived.

For the two centuries before 1700, Europe's shipping had served as the most visible proof of that continent's technological superiority to people throughout the world. Multiple masts and combinations of square and lateen sails had appeared in the fifteenth century in Iberian ships, making them capable of distant oceanic voyages. The capstan began to be used to weigh anchor early in the seventeenth century; and the steering-wheel (1703), controlling the tiller with winch and tackles, provided the most convenient instrument for keeping the vessel on course. For determining the ship's position, the mariner's astrolabe had come into use before 1535, and Davis's quadrant by 1600. To set the course, once the position was known, the magnetic compass was now supplemented by Mercator's chart (1569). The telescope invented early in the next century greatly extended the navigator's vision. In these aids to navigation, the scientist's hand was fairly visible. But the design of the ship's body after the initial advances long remained subject to the shipwright's traditional rules-of-the-thumb, here and there modified by the lessons of sailors' experiences. Anthony Deane (1638?–1729) was reputed to be the first naval architect able to calculate from the weight of material used and the volume of the body of a ship, the draught of water needed to float her for launching. With an ever-increasing number of decks, and more and more 'stream-lined' hulls, the European shipwright succeeded in creating sailing ships in which even today it is hard to see any defects of design.

TECHNOLOGY OF THE EARLY PHASE OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The period of fifty years after Newcomen's invention seems to have been essentially one of consolidation. Newcomen's engine itself was improved, by siphon and taps being connected with the lifting and falling beam to make the recurring spray of cold water on the cylinder automatic; but the loss of energy involved in cooling the steam remained unrectified. Nor did any important scientific breakthrough occur during these fifty years.

The plateau gave way to a spectacular ascent mainly from the 1760s onwards. Numerous inventions, one after another, took place in one sector of industry after another, each greatly increasing productivity so that, by the end of the century, the factory system was firmly established, and the Industrial Revolution in England was firmly set on its course. Of these inventions there are two main aspects that immediately strike us. First, the inventions seldom involved new theory. Both

thermodynamics and kinematics developed only in the nineteenth century. On the whole, these inventions were artisan-level achievements which represented ingenious new combinations of known technological principles or the employment of these principles to new purposes. Second, whereas up till now the different countries of Western Europe had contributed to the different inventions accompanying the preceding Scientific Revolution, the first cluster of inventions during the Industrial Revolution belonged to Britain alone. This underlines the fact that the economic pressures and incentives which lay behind the accelerating pace of invention in this phase were practically specific to Britain.

One can see this most clearly in the developments in the textile industry, which, in their turn, seemed to provide the main thrust to industrial invention generally. England could not produce cotton, but the slave plantations of its colonies in the West Indies raised excellent long-stapled cotton. This advantage and the protection granted to the industry by Parliament in 1720 laid the basis for indigenous cotton-textile manufactures. But at this very period, especially from the 1750s onwards, the English East India Company phenomenally increased its trade in Indian cotton textiles, both cheaper and better than the English products; and, therefore, with smuggling ever present, there remained a hidden competitor even in the domestic market. Only reduced costs could save the industry from stagnation. So came John Kay's fly-shuttle (1733), which speeded up weaving while increasing the width of woven cloth. Overcoming the opposition of poorer weavers, the fly-shuttle established itself by 1750 almost everywhere. The larger amount of cloth that could be woven generated a larger demand for spun yarn; and the consequential rising labour costs in spinning could only be avoided by labour-saving inventions. This purpose was served by James Hargreave's Jenny (1762), Richard Arkwright's water-frame (1768) and Samuel Crompton's mule (1779). Arkwright's invention shifted spinning most firmly from the cottage to the factory, because the heavy machinery needed water power to drive it; not surprisingly, Arkwright's own establishments were among the first true industrial factories in England. Once spinning by these machines became general, there were now large quantities of spun yarn waiting to be woven on the hand-loom. Thus the pressure now shifted towards mechanization of weaving so as to dispense with the high wages of weavers. This induced Edmund Cartwright, an Oxford don, who dreamt of heading a profitable business, to patent his power-loom in 1785. By 1809 he could claim that it had, by coming generally into use, proved its 'national importance'. Like Arkwright's invention, Cartwright's loom could produce better results only when driven by a larger and larger application of power.

As the factory system was established in the textile industry, the inadequacies of water power began to be increasingly exposed, especially by the limits set to the amount of power available at any particular point, and the constructions of locale that contours and streams impeded. If steam power could become cheaper, it could rectify both these inadequacies. James Watt's steam engine (patented, 1769; built, 1774), first designed to pump out water from mines like Newcomen's engine, succeeded in such a saving of energy as to make steam power potentially competitive with water power. What Watt essentially did was to separate the condenser from the piston-cylinder and to let steam also drive the piston in its descent. Suitable for pumping, the

engine could not yet drive a wheel, so in 1781 Watt patented his rotative engine, and in 1783 made it double-acting. The major use of the steam engine was now in the factories: of the 496 steam engines installed by the firm of Boulton and Watt between 1775 and 1800 as many as 308 were rotative engines; of the remainder, 164 were designed for pumping. Richard Trevithick completed the transformation of the atmospheric into a high-pressure engine by c.1800. This put the loss of energy at the minimum and made steam power supersede water power almost everywhere. It must be realized that improvements in the steam-engine were not a mere matter of creative design. Further improvements at each stage became possible largely because of the success in the improving of strength and precision to metal parts by craftsmen. John Wilkinson, the great ironmaster, built in 1775 a boring machine for iron cylinders; and it was he who provided Watt with perfectly shaped cylinders for his steam engine. This true precision-engineering was born simultaneously with steam-powered machinery. The two together soon detached England from her romance with water-wheels and made her factory chimneys more numerous than her church steeples.

Parallel to the triumph of the factory in England, was the triumph of New Husbandry. Agriculture had already received new inventions such as the winnowing fan and threshing rollers, the former known in Holland in the seventeenth century and the latter in Italy as early as the sixteenth. In the eighteenth century the major principles of the New Husbandry, based mainly on the experience of Flemish agriculture, were systematized in England and made into an experimental science by Arthur Young (1741-1820) and others (Bath, 1963, pp. 239-310). Their principal concern was, first of all, with the improvement of the soil, through drainage and use of natural fertilizers, second, with rotation of crops, designed to reduce the frequency of fallows. Here the infusion of new crops, such as potato, helped; but a still more important role was played by fodder crops, notably clover, whose culture was now spreading outwards from Holland. Third, the concern was with selective stockbreeding, to which Robert Bakewell (1725-95) made the most outstanding contributions. Implementations too were by no means neglected. Jethro Tull (c.1701) invented a mechanical seed-drill; iron ploughs with many colters began to be produced before the end of the century; and a mechanical threshing machine was successfully designed by Andrew Meikle (1784). However, by and large, the invasion of agriculture by machinery belonged to the next century: the 'Last Labourers' Revolt' in rural England, provoked by the threshing machines, took place as late as 1830. In other words, while England's eighteenth-century Agricultural Revolution ran parallel to the Industrial, it was not, technologically speaking, a part of it.

RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGY IN OTHER CULTURES

The technological advances that we have discussed in the two previous sections of this chapter were confined largely to the Latin and Germanic parts of Europe. It is a matter of major concern for students of intercultural relations why other cultural areas were unable to participate in these advances. It may be readily conceded that Europe's scientific literature, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tended to be produced so extensively in Latin, was not easily

available to peoples not familiar with that language. Even Russia remained outside the zone of the technological revolution until Peter the Great (reigned, 1696-1725), after his visits to Holland and England, initiated a deliberate policy of 'westernization'. It is not surprising that in other cultures the scientific transmission should have been still slower. China's case is particularly suggestive: here from the time of Matteo Ricci (d. 1610), the Jesuits undertook an extensive presentation of European mathematics, astronomy and physics under court patronage. Yet there was very little interest displayed in this scientific literature by the Chinese 'literati'; nor can much effect of it be seen on Chinese modes of thought or technology. Clearly, language was not the only barrier to absorption of western science in other civilizations: existing ideological frameworks were also important. It seems more likely, then, that the diffusion of new technological devices would take place mainly through an urge to copy what was actually seen of the products of European technology. Such diffusion appears to have been fairly rapid during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, especially in the realm of weaponry. This can be seen best in the speed with which the simple hand-gun was replaced by the matchlock in the sixteenth century over most of the Old World. Quite naturally, it was the Ottomans who, with their constant wars with European states, learnt to manufacture the matchlocks first and acquired an unmatched reputation as musketeers and gunners in the Islamic world. In India matchlocks arrived both overland (though whether Babur used matchlocks or hand-guns at Panipat, 1526, must remain obscure) and across the sea through the Portuguese. The workshops of Emperor Akbar (reigned, 1556-1605) were not only able to manufacture matchlocks, but also produced a possible version of the wheel-lock, an Italian invention of c. 1520. In East Asia, some Portuguese castaways brought matchlocks to Japan in 1543. The weapons were copied by Japanese smiths; and Nobunaga, by arranging volleys successively from 23 ranks, attained an almost continuous barrage in 1575 - a feat not achieved anywhere in Europe until twenty years later.

The 'lock' was the crucial part of the mechanism of the matchlock. It could be made without the use of a screw as a fastener; but the disadvantage would have been severe. Within about a hundred years of its use in European muskets the screw arrived in India (before 1666), though the threads had to be provided by soldering wires to the male and female parts.

There were areas other than weaponry where, too, diffusion from Europe occurred. The sand-glass, first made in Europe in the latter half of the fourteenth century, was certainly in use for time-reckoning in India before the end of the sixteenth. So also were glass spectacles. In China, Poyu and Sun Yün-Chün between 1620 and 1630 made telescopes, compound microscopes and magnifying glasses, possibly under the direct or indirect inspiration of the Jesuit mission.

In India by the mid-seventeenth century, the bell-drive was being used to rotate drills to cut diamonds, though the machine, driven by manual power, fell short of European machines 'in fancy'. Even more remarkable was the way the design of Dutch and English ships was copied around the same time to build ships in Indian yards, often seeming to exceed their models in quality. The advance in shipbuilding extended to the devices for hauling: in 1670s ships of as heavy a burthen as 1,000 tons were hauled on to land for repairs by use of dogs, tackles, crabs and rollers, though the power needed was supplied by men's strength alone.

These technological imitations or adaptations suggested considerable potentiality for change in non-European craftsmanship. But already in the seventeenth-century Asian and north African skill in tool-making was falling far behind Europe's. Till the late seventeenth century Iranian smiths were unable to use screws in their gun-locks. And the shift to flint-locks, largely completed in Europe by the mid-seventeenth century, was ignored in Asia, where matchlocks continued to hold sway till much of the eighteenth century was over. Japan after its initial success with matchlocks, began in the seventeenth century to revert to the sword. When there was an attempt, as in certain Indian states like Mysore and Gwalior in the latter half of the eighteenth century, to manufacture European muskets, the attempt failed to achieve full success because of the lack of expertise in ancillary technological sectors. The inability to manufacture watches was, perhaps, the most obvious index of the Asian smiths' lack of tools necessary for precision work.

One naturally seeks a general answer to the question why European technology was not successfully adopted by non-European peoples before the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman failure, despite the proximity of that empire to Europe, is particularly hard to understand. It is possible that this practically universal failure to respond to the challenge of European technology may tell us something more about the mainsprings of that technology than we can know by looking at evidence internal to Europe alone. We have already noted that the transmission of European science should have been far more difficult than that of European technology, for linguistic reasons, though not because of them alone. As Needham underlines in respect of China, and, as has been often emphasized for the Islamic civilization after Ghazali's denunciations of the scientists (twelfth century), there were ideological factors too that impeded the acceptance of the fruits of the 'experimental science' which came into its own with Galileo. How important the latter was for the development of European technology can be established by the fact that a failure to absorb that science by other cultures seems to have doomed to failure all spontaneous or partial effort in them to keep pace with European advances in technology.

There has been a tendency to emphasize a concern with 'labour saving' as the driving force behind the technological revolution in Europe, and the alleged absence of such concern as lying behind the lack of technological growth in non-European civilizations. But the argument seems somewhat misplaced even when it comes from such an authoritative source as Lynn White (cf. Needham, 1954-7, 4(2), pp. 28-9). The urge for labour saving must exist in all technology, since every tool substitutes in some way or another for human labour. The block-printing of cloth in Mughal India, for example, can be seen as saving the enormous amount of labour involved in embroidery or cloth-painting. Whether a device in a particular society could be introduced might depend more on whether the wage-costs saved were sufficiently large to justify investment in the new device. Thus cultures with a superabundance of skilled labour might not readily accept an expensive apparatus designed to produce the same product. To cite an example, again from India, Indian weavers by resorting to a kind of laborious needle-weave, obtained figured cloth that was similar to the products of the draw-loom; and this inhibited the generalization of the latter apparatus in India. Sometimes fear of causing unemployment might be a factor: in 1689 Ovington thought this to be the reason why book-printing, which would have

dispensed with the services of the scribes, was not adopted in India (Habib, 1980, p. 32). But such fears (wherever they genuinely existed) could always be overcome in the long run.

One can only plead at the end that on such a question, involving so many civilizations, any general answers must be extremely tentative or provisional, with speculation playing an excessively large part. At the same time, the failure of the non-European world to respond effectively to the technological challenge of Europe seems everywhere so patent that the question can never be glossed over, however 'Eurocentric' its posing may appear.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Irfan Habib

AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN RELATIONSHIPS

From the point of view of major economic activities, the world around 1492 would have appeared divisible into three major zones. The largest, in terms of the portion of the world's population it maintained, was the settled zone whose agricultural surpluses allowed villages and towns and industries to flourish within it. In the Old World (excluding Australasia), it embraced practically all the great alluvial river basins outside of Siberia and sub-equatorial Africa. In the New World, lacking the assistance of iron and plough, cultivation mainly stuck to hill-sides and plateaus in Mexico and Peru.

The second was the zone of pastoral nomadism. It ran in a broad band from Mongolia and North China, through the steppes of Central Asia and the rocky wastes of Iran, and, then, interrupted by the Fertile Crescent, took in the Arabian and Syrian Deserts; it swept into North Africa, across the Sahara to the Atlantic. It had extensions, particularly towards Russia and down the East African shores from the Horn towards the Cape; and there were large pockets of it too like the Thar in Western India or Tibet in China. Nomadic peoples raised cattle, sheep, horses and camels. Horses and camels bred by them, and wool, were supplied to sedentary societies. The nomads also served as transporters, using chiefly the camel. The nomad economy, through its exports and transportation services, was tied up closely with that of the settled, agricultural zone. In the New World, since there were no domesticated animals of economic importance except the cameloids in Peru, pastoral nomadism was entirely absent. Finally in the Eurasian north and in considerable portions of sub-Saharan Africa and Australasia, as well as all over the New World outside its two main agricultural regions, a 'gathering' (hunting-and-fishing) economy prevailed. Most gathering societies tended to be isolated and primitive: for many of them the Stone Age, as in Australasia, had not yet passed. In the nomadic and agricultural zones, consistent with their main forms of production, different kinds of economic organization had evolved. Among the nomadic communities, commerce led to the possession of large flocks in the hands of individual breeders, and taxation by rulers often took the form of heads of cattle or sheep. The era of the nomadic empires, which, by their superiority in cavalry, could levy tribute on sedentary societies was, however, coming to a close (the last principal nomadic success being the Manchu conquest of China, c.1650). The development of firearms had now tilted the military balance decisively against the nomads.


In the sedentary zone, the dominant unit of production was the peasant farm, and it was how the surplus was extracted from the peasant that determined the basic form of economic and political organization. There were two alternative forms, as it were, of surplus extraction: land-tax and landowner's rent. In India, the land-tax tended to comprise the larger part of the surplus. It was this situation, where 'rent and taxes coincide', that Marx (1959, pp. 771-2; 1887, p. 351) thought to be one of the two crucial pillars of the Asiatic Mode of Production. The other pillar was the self-sufficient village community; and Marx argued that only the surplus, alienated by the village as tax, was put on the market. This hypothesis seems to suit Mughal India where production for the market was widespread.

Taking his cue from some of Marx's ideas Wittfogel (1957) attempted a heavily forced concept of an 'Oriental Despotism', based on hydraulic activities. Samir Amin has tended to emphasize the tax-rent equation and has employed the term 'Tributary Mode of Production' for the agrarian regimes in which claims of private landownership were subordinate to state-appropriation of revenue from land. It is, however, important to recognise that even where state taxation embraced the larger portion of the surplus, extensive private land-ownership and rents could yet exist. Such was the case in China, India, Iran and the Ottoman Empire (cf. Wickham, 1985, pp. 172-82; Lambton, 1953, pp. 110-18, 136-90). In Tokugawa Japan a heavy land-tax coexisted with large-scale landlordism with the landlords enjoying considerable authority over the tenants' persons (Smith in Hall and Jansen, 1968, pp. 263-99).

Western Europe, after the breakdown of serfdom by c.1400 saw a widespread conversion of the hereditary fiefs into private landed estates, the conversion perhaps being the most completely attained in England by Tudor times (sixteenth century) (Bloch, 1966, pp. 126-7). In France and many other countries of Europe, the conversion was less undiluted, the lords continuing with many of their quasi-feudal rights over peasants. Generally, by c.1500 money rent had become the basis of the major economic relationships in Western Europe.

We may now turn to the changes that occurred in agriculture during our period, c.1500-1800. These were considerable, and the world witnessed both an increase in total agricultural production and an expansion of the agricultural zone, most notably in Asia and Europe.

First of all, there came the wholesale exchange of the domesticated plants of the Old and New Worlds. Many of the New World crops were now diffused all over the Old



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Map 6 The Old World - agricultural and nomadic zones c. 1600 (after map from *The Times Atlas of the World*, redrawn by Faiz Habib).

World. Maize ultimately became the third principal cereal after rice and wheat; and tobacco a universal commercial crop. The potato substantially enlarged the food supply in Western Europe (Salaman, 1949); and maize and cassava in Central Africa. At the same time, the plough, cattle and sheep, along with the full stock of Old World crops, arrived in the Americas to lay there the basis of plantation agriculture.

The second impulse behind the development of agriculture came from the continuously rising population in the Old World (see Chapter 1), especially from the rising ratio of the urban to the total population. This intensified not only country-town trade, but also long-distance inter-continental trade and commerce. The gains the latter could bring led to the Chinese navigations of the earlier part of the fifteenth century and the great European navigations towards the century's close. Higher grades of food crops, fibres, dyes, spices and drugs were put under increasing demand. In local trade, there was increasing demand for milk-products and meat.

The increase in the stock of cultivable crops and the larger demand for agricultural produce led to a steady extension of cultivation in different parts of the world. In China peasant migrants moved west to 'fill up' Sichuan, the future 'rice bowl' of China; and there was a steady migration northward into Manchuria and Mongolia (Chapter 22). In India, there was considerable clearing of land for cultivation in the Punjab and the sub-montane Terai forests (Habib, 1963, pp. 10-22). In Anatolia peasants steadily encroached on pastoral lands, the nomads being expelled or 'sedentarized' (Islamoglu-Inan, 1987, pp. 114-15). Russian peasants extensively colonized the Volga basin and crossed the Urals into Siberia and Kazakhstan (Lyashchenko, 1949, pp. 232-4, 241-2). Nomadic pastoralism retreated under this onslaught, particularly because its own economic strength was undermined by the steady fall in the demand for cavalry horses and by the shift of trade from the overland Central Asian to the oceanic routes (Rossabi in Tracy, 1990, pp. 351-70).

In the New World, in the sixteenth century there was an enormous decline in the cultivated area owing to the decimation of the Amerindian population: a fall from 25 million to less than one million in Central Mexico alone in the century after 1518 (Cook and Borah, 1979, pp. 132, 168-76); but thereafter under the pressure of demand of European metropolitan markets the agricultural zone expanded into new areas of the Atlantic seaboard and the Caribbean.

This expansion of cropped area was accompanied by an increase in agricultural productivity, not only by the exchange of crops between the two hemispheres, but also by the replacement of inferior by high-grade crops: cotton cultivation spread in China from the thirteenth century onwards and in Japan in the late sixteenth century and rye was replaced by wheat in many parts of Europe (Needham, 1965, p. 124; Hauser, 1974, p. 117; Toshio in Hall, 1991, pp. 510-12; van Bath, 1963, p. 263). By and large, these additions to cropping did not bring about any major changes in the principal methods of agriculture, especially in the tropical regions, like south China or India, where already the peasants, with at least two harvests a year, had been cultivating a large number of crops (some forty-five in Northern India, c.1600). Over most of the Old World, the changes in cropping could thus be largely absorbed within the existing system of peasant production. But with larger production the pressure for tax and rent could increase. The tax-burden tended to be heavier in the Mughal Empire in

the seventeenth than in the sixteenth century (Habib, 1963, pp. 193-6, 319-29); and the rise in rents considerably outstripped the rise in prices in England during 1540-1640 and again in the eighteenth century (Keiridge in Carus-Wilson, 1962, pp. 208-26; Parker in *ibid.*, p. 329). In areas of low population density in Eastern Europe, the attraction of cultivating market crops led the lords to impose constraints upon peasants' movements and also have crops raised on their own estates through *corvée* and cheap wage-labour. Russia, Poland and Prussia, witnessed a 'second serfdom' from the sixteenth century onwards (Lyashchenko, 1949, pp. 273-6; Kula, 1976). At the opposite end of Europe, in the Iberian Peninsula, where there was a decline of population in the seventeenth century, there was a considerable growth of the *latifundia* or large estates (Hamilton in Carus-Wilson, 1954, p. 224).

Agrarian relations changed most in the Western Hemisphere, the first large part of the world to experience direct colonial dominance. The rapidly dying Amerindian hoe-wielding farming communities could not adapt themselves to the entirely different plough- and cattle-based system of Old World agriculture, nor could they provide to the conquerors what they had provided to the Incas and Aztecs. So in both Peru and Mexico, Spanish settlers established *haciendas* (estates and cattle ranches) worked by semi-servile 'peons', forcibly drawn from the local communities mainly through the rights of *encomienda*. In coastal Brazil, the Caribbean islands, and the North American Atlantic seaboard, Old World market crops like sugar-cane, cotton and indigo, besides rice and the indigenous tobacco, began to be raised in slave-plantations, the slaves brought over from Africa. Only in a relatively small zone on the Atlantic did immigrant English peasants initially undertake advanced plough cultivation; but in time they supplanted and extirpated their hoe-farming and hunting predecessors over an ever-extending area, which would cover, by 1860, most of the present United States.

The most crucial transformation in agriculture took place in a part of north-western Europe comprising the Low Countries, especially The Netherlands. Here the relatively small number of crops previously raised was enlarged by New World arrivals; and growing urban demand put a premium on dairy products. With new systems of rotation, in which fodder crops played an important role, and cattle selection exclusively for their meat and milk, a new symbiosis between agriculture and the pastoral economy ('dairy-farming') was achieved within the framework of peasant agriculture (Bath, 1963, pp. 242-3). But when the New Agriculture was taken over to England in the eighteenth century, it became here the mainstay of large-scale farming carried on with farm servants and hired labourers. As 'capitalist' farmers came forward, ready to take lands from landlords on rents higher than what the existing tenants could pay, the Enclosures, private and Parliamentary, began, and by the end of the eighteenth century most English peasants had been evicted from their tenancies and converted into labourers (Mantoux, 1962, pp. 136-85; Hammond, 1919; for survival of owner-occupants, a small minority, Mingay, 1961).

In France, peasant resistance to enclosures and to private rights over stubble and commons thwarted a similar imposition of New Agriculture from above. The drive for higher rents thus blocked, the Seigniorial Reaction tended to emphasize quasi-feudal claims and privileges, thereby bringing about a crisis in the relations between the aristocracy

and the peasantry (cf. Ladurie, 1976, pp. 211–86). With the French Revolution came the National Assembly's 'Abolition of Feudalism' decrees in August 1789 and the subsequent confiscations of the lands of the Church and of the '*émigré*' and 'suspect' aristocrats (Lefebvre, 1947, pp. 162–8; Bloch, 1966, pp. 233–48). It was the very opposite of what had happened in England and equally unprecedented. There has been much debate on the equity as well as economic consequences of these two different kinds of 'expropriations'. If the English example has been lauded for its contribution to scientific agriculture, the French has since been the source of inspiration for land-reform all over the world.

CRAFT PRODUCTION AND PROTO-INDUSTRIALIZATION

On the eve of the modern age there was everywhere a considerable continuation of agriculture with crafts, especially when the demand for products came from the rural households or communities themselves. In China, Iran and Europe, peasant women spun or reeled, and their men, especially in the winter, occupied themselves with weaving. Many of the admirably woven textiles of Peru came from the very elementary looms of peasant women (Mason, 1957, pp. 237–40). Some occupations, like blacksmithing, carpentry and quality weaving, because of the skill and time they demanded, tended to be separate professions even in the most 'self-sufficient' villages. In India, except for some tribal communities, this was true of all kinds of weaving as well, though spinning was generally done by peasant women. Craft specialization, in so far as it catered essentially to local demand, also developed a network of customary relationships. In India, for example, artisans often had small plots of lands assigned to them, which they cultivated on privileged tenure, and they also obtained small shares out of the peasants' produce, in return for their own goods and services (Habib, 1995, pp. 143–4).

For the urban and distant markets, the artisans had to detach themselves from such customary ties. Except for activities like mining, large building construction or shipbuilding, the usual place of production was still the artisan's own hut or cottage. There was a general tendency in Eurasia to free him from various constraints. In China under the Qing, state demands for unpaid labour from artisans were first replaced by money-claims and then abolished altogether (Chapter 22). In India, despite the caste system, sections of castes, in response to demand, could abandon their traditional occupations and take to others (Habib, 1995, pp. 174–7). In the Islamic countries there were practically no religio-legal limitations on occupational choice, though guild-restrictions supported by the state existed in the Ottoman Empire (Levy, 1957, pp. 33–90; Baer, 1970, pp. 145–63). And in Western Europe the collapse of feudalism, and the break-down of the guilds in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, freed crafts and commerce from feudal restrictions. It was all different, of course, in the New World, where the conquerors exercised royal control over the labour of the subjugated peoples through *encomienda* and other privileges granted by the Spanish monarchy; they thereby killed off many of the traditional crafts along with their practitioners.

As the Old World artisan freed himself, in varying degrees, from social constraints, he became increasingly enmeshed in those of the market. Helped by the vast silver influx from the Americas, there was a steady process of monetization,

witnessed all over Eurasia. There was a general expansion of what Marx (1887, p. 787) called 'the petty mode of production', where the individual artisan (and peasant) worked on his own for the market. But it was not only the marketable portion which expanded relative to the whole of craft production; the latter expanded too at an increasing pace. It is a safe assumption that the net additions to exports were general absolute additions to production. In the 1660s it was estimated that as much as two-thirds of the Bengal silk brought to its major mart was exported to Europe, Japan, other parts of India and 'Tartary' (Habib, 1963, pp. 71–2 & n.). In the West, Italy in the sixteenth century and the Low Countries, Northern France and England in the next two centuries supplied the rest of Europe with their craft-products. The large expansion of craft-production in Western Europe as a whole is evidenced by the increase in its urban population by over three times between 1500 and 1700, to judge by the number of cities which had more than 100,000 inhabitants each (Sheila in Cipolla, 1974, p. 367).

The increase in total production of manufactured goods was not achieved simply by proportionately increasing the artisan labour force; it also involved attempts at increasing productivity. The capacity of craft-production to adopt and diffuse labour-saving devices outside Europe has often been underrated (Chapter 2). Without such capacity the older manufacturing countries could not have maintained till fairly late their position in the face of Europe's growing manufacturing prowess. Around 1750 China might well have contributed as much as 32.8 per cent, and India 24.5 per cent, of world manufacturing output; India and Europe were still at about the same level in absolute output (Simmons, 1985, p. 600, table from P. Bairoch). But by now Western Europe was on the eve of its Industrial Revolution.

From about 1500 the Western European artisan began a course of improvement and innovation which, assisted by scientists, led to technological changes of unprecedented dimensions. The fifteenth century had seen the arrival of printing. Now came iron-casting, the power-drill and lathe, metal screw and spiral spring, along with inventions in glass making. While guns and muskets represented the 'heavy industry' among crafts, clocks, watches and telescopes were the major precision products. Newcomen's steam engine (1712) was undoubtedly the crowning achievement of this accelerating process of proto-industrialization.

The term 'proto-industrialization' has recently been used (after Mendels, 1972) in a different sense, however. It is seen, in the context of Europe, as based not on technology, but on the connected processes of rural craft specialization and commercialization through the use of family labour and the utilization of off-seasons in the agricultural calendar. It is argued that the process, beginning in the fifteenth century, laid the ground for the Industrial Revolution by generating entrepreneurs who could turn to urban industry at the opportune moment. One difficulty in this argument is that the symptoms of such 'proto-industrialization' have been found in almost every pre-industrial market economy from Japan to West Africa; almost everywhere one finds merchants making advances in money and materials to rural producers. Unlike Western Europe's technological revolution of these three centuries, such 'proto-industrialization' was, then, by no means unique to it; and this naturally weakens the argument for the centrality of the process among the factors behind the Industrial Revolution.

The crucial question is: what is the opportune moment when 'entrepreneurs' shift from individual rural petty

production to concentrated mass-production? Two successive forms could give concentrated production the crucial advantage. In the first place, such concentration could secure a better division of labour (skill-specialization), the importance of which was underlined in 1776 by Adam Smith (1910, I, pp. 4-11); second, it could enable machinery to be used, increasing the productivity per labourer, of which in 1821 Ricardo (1911, pp. 263-71) furnished the classic analysis. In the first form, we would have the workshop or 'manufactory'; in the second, the factory. In the latter the division of labour would be largely done away with by the levelling down of all labour to unskilled labour (Marx, 1887, pp. 311-474).

While it seems certain that 'manufactories' preceded the factory system on a fairly large scale in Europe (Braudel, 1985, pp. 329-44), it is important to stress that the mere existence of a workshop where labourers are employed does not necessarily imply the presence of proto-capitalist relations, unless one can establish that its profits derived largely from an improved division of labour. This is because many workshops, like the *kachhanas* in India and Iran, were established principally because the materials to be worked on (silk, gold, silver, precious stones) were too expensive to be 'put out' to home-working artisans (Habib, 1995, pp. 221-3). This must also have been the case with the large silk workshops of Qing China and official mints everywhere. Some workshops, like the Chinese salt-refining and tobacco-processing workshops, were established for their usefulness in operating state-granted monopolies (cf. Balazs, 1964, pp. 40-5). Moreover, in the European workshops much of the improvement in the division of labour they achieved was due not only to the availability of workmen but also, as was recognized by Adam Smith (1910, I, pp. 9-10) himself, to progressive sophistication of tools. Here, too, we can see Europe's unique technological revolution at work.

COMMERCE, CREDIT AND MERCHANT CAPITAL

It is now often stressed that what is important for economic growth is not only the development of markets but how these are serviced, that is, how commerce is backed by a mechanism of credit, risk-sharing and communication.

No legal prohibitions in China and India operated against usury. In the Islamic world too, the dominant theological tendency was to see usury and gambling more as sins than as penal offences; and, in any case, many credit and banking operations could be left to be carried on legitimately enough by Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and by Indians (Banyas) and Jews in Safavid Iran (Petty, 1691, pp. 25-6; Rodinson, 1974, p. 40). In the Ottoman Empire, interest-bearing loans advanced by Muslims were common, and as high a rate as 20 per cent per annum was recognized as legitimate by Muslim judges (Inalcik, 1969, pp. 97-140; Jennings, 1973, pp. 168-216). In Europe the canonical condemnation of usury had long weakened by 1500, and loans at interest had become an established feature of commercial operations. Bills of exchange as credit and remittance instruments were universally prevalent in the Eurasian and north African trading worlds.

Effective demand for credit led to the development of deposit banking. By the 1640s money changers in Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo in Japan were accepting deposits, while using these to advance money at interest. By the 1650s their

deposit receipts circulated as notes fairly widely in Osaka (Hausel, 1974, p. 16). In India the *sanāḍīs* (money-changers) engaged extensively in deposit-banking, accepting deposits at interest and making loans, while issuing and discounting bills, payments being extensively made in such bills (Habib in Tracy, 1990, pp. 394-6). Circulation of bills reached a high point very early in Western Europe: in England in 1698 it was estimated that more than half the money in circulation was bill-money (Davis in Carus-Wilson, 1962, p. 277).

Risk-sharing devices were important for encouraging commerce and extending credit, through reducing the 'transaction costs'. Simple partnerships were often designed to meet this end. But the widespread use of insurance in this period in India and Europe certainly represented a major advance. In seventeenth-century India, *bima* or insurance covered the value of goods transported; sometimes the insurers also undertook the conveyance of the insured goods and payment of transit taxes. Bills too were insured. Marine insurance developed in the form of *'arog'*, analogous to *hottomry* (Habib in Tracy, 1990, pp. 394-6). In Europe marine insurance had a traceable history of some centuries before the sixteenth, especially in the Mediterranean ports. In the seventeenth century, it was not yet 'universally available'; the situation changed in the eighteenth, when the peace-time rates fell considerably (Price in Tracy, 1991, pp. 288-9). The Ottoman Empire apparently had no system of insurance, and its merchants had to use Venetian insurance facilities in the seventeenth century (Faroghi in Islamoglu-Ilan, pp. 329-30). In trying to explain the triumph of European commerce over Asian, van Leu (1955; Steensgaard, 1974) argued that Asian commerce, though large in its aggregate volume, was really small in its units ('pedlars'), while the constituent units of European commerce were larger and growing in size ('companies'). This thesis has met with much justifiable criticism. In India, for example, large mercantile firms existed, with 'factors' or agents established at many places, similar to those of the European companies. Virji Vora, a merchant of Surat (seventeenth century) built up a capital of Rs.8 million; his junior contemporary, Mulla Abdul Ghafur, was said to own twenty ships of between 300 and 800 tons and to drive a trade equal to that of the English East India Company (Braudel, 1985, pp. 120-5; Raychaudhuri in Raychaudhuri and Habib, 1982, pp. 340-2). In Qing China, similarly, there were merchants with enormous capital controlling, as a group, the extraction, transport and sale of salt all over the country through their factors. They thus handled 600 million pounds of salt and made annual profits of 7 million taels (Balazs, 1964, pp. 49-51). One must also recall the pervasiveness of brokerage in India that worked to reduce the trading risks of small men (Habib in Tracy, 1990, pp. 387, 391-2).

But two unique developments in commercial organization did occur in Europe, which helped to mobilize capital on a scale and with a flexibility unknown before. The first was the joint-stock company. The most successful models of it were the East India Companies, where stock raised for individual voyages was replaced with permanently raised stock in the form of transferable shares. By 1612 the Dutch Company, and by 1659 the English, had gone over to this system, and by the turn of the century their shares were being quoted on the Amsterdam and London stock exchanges (Neal in Tracy, 1990, pp. 195-223; Davies in Carus-Wilson, 1962, pp. 273-90). The other institution was public or corporate banking, the models for which were the Rialto Bank of Venice (opened 1587), the Wisselbank of Amsterdam

(1609) and, finally, the Bank of England (1694), whose issue of convertible currency notes enabled it to create money and so extract capital from the community at large.

In the late seventeenth century, the brilliant French traveller François Bernier (1916, pp. 225–6) asserted that the Asian states, by not protecting, or even admitting, the merchants' right to property, greatly hindered the development of commerce. Even some modern historians (Balasz, 1964, p. 53; Morland, 1920, pp. 50–2; Misra, 1978, pp. 21–35) have supposed that the abject subjection of the merchants to the state was the main factor behind the failure of mercantile classes in China and India to obtain power and influence in the way they did in Europe. It would seem, however, that the role of state in the East varied considerably. On the one hand, under the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) the Chinese government imposed monopolies, multiple taxes and restrictions on production and foreign trade. On the other, measures such as the taxation reform of 1581, the lifting of constraints on artisans under both dynasties and the dismantling of much of the state monopoly under the Qing undoubtedly favoured commerce (Bai Shonyi, 1982, pp. 413–8; Chapter 22). In the Mughal Empire itself, free-trade conditions prevailed by and large, and commerce was not subjected to excessively heavy taxation. The coinage was of high metallic purity; and mining was 'free' or open (Chapter 20). In the Ottoman Empire, the state's 'ability to direct the flow of goods' was undermined after the sixteenth century, a process attributed by some historians to the growing pulls of the European 'world-economy' (Islamoglu-Inan, 1987, pp. 9–10).

When we turn to Western European states, we must remember that with the collapse of the *hief* system, the monarchy's ability to tax the land, now largely held by the aristocracy and gentry, was greatly restricted; and the states were compelled to turn to commercial taxation supplemented by gains made from the debasing of currency and sales of monopolies. None of these policies were likely by themselves to encourage commerce. Mercantilist arguments for higher taxes on merchandise imports were especially welcome to governments because these rationalized high duties on trade. The struggle for the removal of the monopolies and other obstructions to competitive commerce imposed by the monarchy formed a distinct strand in the English Civil War (1640–60) (Dobb, 1946, pp. 161–78).

The relations of the state with merchant classes in Asia and Europe are therefore not susceptible of a simple black-and-white classification. The early European nation-state was not yet in its basic motivation a state of merchants; nor were the Asian monarchies blind despots for which the merchants simply did not exist. Large imperial administrations, such as that of the Mughal, helped in the standardization of coinage, and weights and measures, both very important for commerce. If, in a manner similar to European states, the imperial Chinese government allowed merchants to purchase land, it is hard to see why this should yet have been 'another impediment to the development of capitalism' in China (Balasz, 1964, p. 52).

Whatever the policies of individual states, over much of Asia and North Africa trade and commerce was in fact expanding from well before 1500, and continued to do so thereafter, even if one excludes the European intrusion. One outstanding feature of this commerce was the spread of community trading networks. Hokkien merchants from South China established themselves in South-East Asia and Japan (Wang Gungui in Tracy, 1990, pp. 390–1). The Banya

merchants and bankers were spread all over India, and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf countries (Habib in Tracy, 1990, pp. 390–1). The Armenians, initially based on Julfa near Isfahan (Iran), engaged in trade in Europe, Russia, Western Asia, India, and South-East Asia, going as far as the Philippines (Matteo in Tracy, 1990, pp. 270–4). The Jews had extensive settlements in Europe and the Mediterranean (Brandel, 1975, II, pp. 802–3). The European companies entered the scene in the seventeenth century and began to command the seas of the entire Old World. Traffic to China over the great Silk Route declined, while the Red Sea trade increased phenomenally in the seventeenth century. This in turn was supplanted in the eighteenth century (as the Asian merchants finally lost out to the European companies) by trade around the Cape of Good Hope. The limits of the inter-regional networks, often intersected, resulting in competition as well as collaboration. The 'Age of Partnership' (cf. Kling and Pearson, 1979) was, however, already beginning to pass with the use of gun-and-shot to enforce European dominance over Asian seas, first under the Portuguese (sixteenth century), and then under the Dutch and the English (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). Yet as long as the main volume of Eurasian trade passed through the Red Sea/Gulf, and the Mediterranean (down to about 1700), market forces could have had a determining role in the movement of goods and money. This raises the question whether, since this trade was increasingly fuelled by the influx of American silver via Europe, there was not an invisible movement of capital eastwards. This may perhaps explain the remarkable synchronization of the fall of interest rates around 1650. Rates of interest on commercial loans fell by half in Western Europe; and a similar fall was witnessed all over India, whereafter in both regions the rates stabilized, although the rates in the Indian Ocean area continued to be higher than in Western Europe (Moosvi, 1987(3), pp. 371–4; cf. Homer, 1963, pp. 123–9). K. N. Chaudhuri (1978, p. 159) finds 'no long-term downward movement' of rates in the East over the century 1660–1750. The success of the Dutch Company in financing its Asian trade out of the revenues of its South-East Asian possessions might now possibly have neutralized the eastward movement of capital through the Mediterranean. After the 1730s, with the extraction of the Tribute from India on an ever-rising scale by the English, the direction finally reversed dramatically.

COLONIALISM AND WESTERN EUROPE'S GLOBAL DOMINANCE

The history of modern colonialism begins with Columbus's discovery of America, 1492, and Vasco da Gama's voyage round the Cape of Good Hope, 1498. Colonialism involved in our period three major processes: the mining of silver with forced labour in the Americas; the forcible transfer of millions of Africans as slaves across the Atlantic; and the levying of tribute on Asian shipping and land.

The Spanish conquest of Mexico and Peru was followed by a wild hunt for gold and silver. Silver mining began almost simultaneously at Potosi in Bolivia and the western mountain ranges of Mexico in the middle of the sixteenth century. It was not only the richness of the veins, but also the low cost of requisitioned Amerindian labour (Wolf, 1982, pp. 135–8) that made the expense of obtaining silver practically negligible. Between 1493 and 1700 the Americas produced 51,100 metric tons of silver, or nearly 81 per cent of world

production (Barrett in Tracy, 1990, p. 225; cf. Hamilton, 1934; Vilar, 1976, pp. 103-4, 193, 197-8). Such massive output greatly cheapened silver in relation to gold in Europe, and converted the increase in prices that had already begun into a long-term inflation, the 'Price Revolution' (Brandel and Spooner in Rich and Wilson, 1967, pp. 378-86; Wallerstein, 1974, pp. 67 ff.). From 1693 Portuguese Brazil began to mine gold with the assistance of slave-labour, and this, joined with increased American silver production in the following century, initiated a second round of price increases in Europe. Hamilton (1929) has emphasized the redistributive consequences of the silver influx, in that it increased the incomes of the merchants and market-oriented gentry at the expense of the wage-earners and peasants. Vilar (1976, pp. 157, 159-61, 188) has, on the other hand, underlined the difficulties the manufacturers of the primary treasure-importing country faced owing to rising costs. One may infer that the proto-capitalists who ultimately benefited most from the silver influx were not those of Spain and Portugal, nor of Italy (which through its exports to Spain in the sixteenth century was in the second line of bullion recipients), but of The Netherlands and England (in the 'third' line) (cf. Cipolla, 1981, pp. 250-96). There is another dimension of Europe's possession of such a rich source of silver, a dimension which the mercantilists had been so much concerned about, that is, the re-export of bullion from Europe. As silver stocks accumulated in Europe, it became an increasingly attractive commodity for export to the East, where its price in terms of gold (and, of course, of other commodities generally) was much higher. In other words, Western Europe was able by the use of a precious metal very cheaply obtained, to exchange it for far more valuable commodities, year after year, for over two centuries. The scale at which Europe annually exported silver may be judged by estimates for 1600, ranging from 64 to 101 metric tons (Vilar, 1976, p. 101; Barnett in Tracy, 1990, p. 251; Parker in Cipolla, 1974, p. 529). The eastward exports increased during the seventeenth century, to a minimum annual average of 150-160 tons (Flynn in Tracy, 1991, p. 333, citing Atman).

Silver influx of this magnitude was bound to exercise an inflationary effect in Asia, since all the major Asian Empires (Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, Ming/Qing) had silver as the basic money metal. The case for the extension of the Price Revolution to the Ottoman Empire has been presented by Burkan (1975). In the Mughal Empire, the absorption of silver in the currency, in order to replace copper, softened the impact on prices in the sixteenth century, but prices began to rise in the seventeenth (Habib in Richards, 1987, pp. 137-70). In China, where silver came in large quantities from Japan, until well into the first half of the seventeenth century, and from Spanish America via the Philippines, in addition to supplies from Europe, silver plummeted from its previous high value in terms of gold (5:1 or 6:1) (Vilar, 1976, p. 95; Flynn in Tracy, 1991, pp. 334-6, 342-3). Even after the early phase of super-profits from bringing silver to such markets had passed, advantage still lay with Western Europe, so long as low-cost silver mining continued in the Americas.

What Europe received in return for the treasure were cotton textiles, silk, indigo, tea, saltpetre and spices, drawn from India, China, South-East Asia and Iran. These had been major goods in the internal Asian trade as well; but now there was a wholesale diversion to Europe, heavily disrupting thereby the traditional pattern of commerce in Asia. Since the new trade increasingly passed into European hands, spearheaded by the East India Companies, the profits gained

went on to add substantially to the size of European commercial capital.

The second process which colonialism initiated was that of enslavement carried out on the greatest scale so far known, and accompanying the biggest forced migration yet in terms of person-miles. From about mid-fifteenth century the Atlantic seaboard of Africa began to be ravaged by European slave-hunters, the ravages extending, with time, southwards from Saharan West Africa, and then round the Cape of Good Hope, up to Mozambique. The slave-traders were first the Portuguese (later including Brazilians), subsequently joined by the Dutch, the English (later including Americans) and the French. According to Curtin (1969) as many as 8 to 11 million African slaves were transported across the Atlantic between the 1400s and 1860s. By 1700 over 1.5 million had been sent across, but it was the eighteenth century which saw the largest numbers transported, estimated at over 6 million. Estimates of African slaves received in the regions of destination vary but suggest a total of at least 10 million (the estimate of slaves received by Brazil, having been revised from 2.5 million to 5 million (Schwartz in Jha, 1991, pp. 23-4). The Caribbean received about 3 million slaves (Scarano in Jha, 1991, p. 50). By 1830 there were 2 million African slaves in the United States. When one recalls that many slaves died under their brutal handling on board ship, averaging some 20 per cent before 1700, 10 per cent by 1750, and finally 5 per cent by 1800, but never lower (Klein in Tracy, 1990, p. 304), it would seem that over a million slaves must have perished in the passage across the Atlantic. All this was over and above the continuing transport of slaves across the Sahara estimated at nearly 2 million during 1400-1900 (Austen in Tracy, 1990, p. 322). Africa's loss of its men and women from slave trade during three and a half centuries could then at the very least have been 13 million, a loss paralleled, or exceeded, only by the decimation of the Amerindian populations in the same period.

The slaves, drawn from African farming communities, proved ideal labourers for the plantations producing sugar, tobacco, coffee, indigo and cotton, in Portuguese Brazil, the Caribbean (shared by Spain, Holland, England and France), and England's Southern American colonies; in Brazil slave-labour was also used for gold-mining. The profits of the trans-Atlantic slave trade were naturally only a fraction of the gains that African slave-labour produced for its masters in the Americas.

In Brazil, 'sugar, cotton and the various leather products, which totalled 68.4 per cent of all colonial exports (1796-1811), offered profits ranging between 40 per cent and 60 per cent; profits derived from coffee, rice, cacao, and tobacco were between 85 per cent and 100 per cent' (Arruda in Tracy, 1991, pp. 414-16). But in the latter half of the eighteenth century the palm went to English colonies in the West Indies. According to British customs-house figures (multiplied by 2.1 to allow for undervaluation and smuggling), the annual excess of West Indian exports to England over imports from England was £3.9 million during 1785-94 and £4.8 million during 1795-1804 (Habib, 1976, p. xxiii).

The third phase in the colonial rhythm was the achievement of dominance over the Asian seas and much of the southern rim of the Asian continent. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese controlled the Indian Ocean sufficiently to monopolize certain routes and to impose tribute on Asian shipping elsewhere, thus building a monopolistic commerce whose capital came out of such tribute and other local extortions (Pearson in Gupta and Pearson, 1987,

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pp. 83–93). This structure collapsed with the appearance of the Dutch and English East India Companies in the seventeenth century. The Dutch Company, by gradually occupying the rich and populous island of Java (Indonesia) during the course of the century and submitting its peasants to harsh taxation and forced labour, built up resources by which it could finance much of its Asian trade (Glanville, 1958). In magnitude this was dwarfed by the success of the English Company in Bengal after Plassey, 1757: all of that Company's 'investments' in Indian export goods now came from local revenues, and large private exports also occurred, financed by the exactions of the new 'Nabobs'. In the 1780s the 'tribute' from India according to a detailed official statement of Indian exports and imports, exceeded £4.93 million annually, on the average (Chaudhri in Kumar, 1983, p. 817).

What this tribute, realized through the sale of Asian goods, implied was that Western Europe was in effect acquiring these goods free. Indian textiles, were used extensively to acquire slaves in Africa (Klein in Tracy, 1990, p. 292); and, to this extent, the slaves too came free. English dominance in India was thus the major invisible engine behind the enormous simultaneous expansion of the African slave-trade and so of the slave plantations in the Americas in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

But just as the colonial system in its 'mercantilist' phase had established itself on a global scale, there arose circumstances which would lead to its transformation early in the next century. First, the unevenness in degrees of colonial control by European powers led to bitter wars among them, notably between England and France, during much of the eighteenth century. The Anglo-French rivalry facilitated the independence of the American colonies (1783), the first major breach in the political order of mercantilist colonialism. The rivalry merged in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, where the French Revolution (1789) introduced a moral dimension into the conflict. French declarations against slavery (1794) were matched by the English abolition of the slave trade (1807), whereafter it became of interest to England to prevent other powers from continuing with the trade (Conrad in Jha, 1991, pp. 212–32). Second, with the English Industrial Revolution, the quest for colonial markets became more important than colonial tribute (though it still remained useful). The Abolition of Slave Trade was followed within six years by the Charter Act of 1813, by which the monopoly of the English East India Company over trade with India was abolished. A new colonial fabric was now in the process of construction, at whose heart was what Marx (1969, p. 374) in 1859 called the English Free Traders' 'monopoly of the market', and what Gallagher and Robinson (1953) have styled 'the Imperialism of Free Trade'. But the story of this transformation belongs to the next volume.

The three centuries of ascending colonial domination of the world after 1500 saw a massive redistribution of the world's wealth. The processes we have described in this section were seen by Marx (1887, p. 775), as 'the chief momenta of primitive accumulation' of capital in Western Europe. Indian nationalist critics of the 'Tribute' (Naoroji, 1901; Dutt, 1901) developed similar conclusions for a more limited sphere, so too Eric Williams, (1944), across the Atlantic. More recently Gunder Frank (1978) and Eric Wolf (1982) have presented considerable data on the redistribution; and the conclusions of the 'World-System' school (Brandel, 1984, pp. 21–70) tend in a similar direction (Islamoglu-Inan,

1987, p. 8). England was the country within Western Europe which was the most heavily enriched by colonial exploitation. And it was at the very peak of its colonial enrichment, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, that England also witnessed the world's first Industrial Revolution.

BEGINNING OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

In the economic history of the world, what happened in England in the last thirty-five years of the eighteenth century still stands as the major turning point: these years were marked by an ever accelerating pace of mechanical invention. In the textiles industry, which became the leading sector of the British economy, Arkwright's water-frame (1769) opened the gates to the factory system. The invention of the power-loom by Cartwright (1787) extended full scale mechanization to the weaving sector. James Watt's steam engine was in commercial use by 1776, leading to the harnessing of steam as the main source of power. Thirty-one blast furnaces were in operation in England in 1775. To transport the goods of industry, canal construction began in 1761, 'a great canal mania' set in during the 1790s, and by 1830 2,000 miles of canals and over 1,300 miles of 'navigations' had been laid out (Knowles, 1922, pp. 242–3).

Statistics lend point to the extraordinary spurt in production that England achieved as it industrialized. In 1810 over 11.2 million tons of coal were being dug annually in Britain; France and Germany together did not even exceed 2 million tons a year by 1815. Around 1720 England produced 25,000 tons of pig iron; in 1806, some 227,000 tons; in 1803–12 French production averaged 200,000 tons annually. In 1760 Britain consumed in its manufactures about 1,500 tons of cotton; in the 1780s the annual average reached 8,100 tons. France in the 1780s consumed barely half of this quantity. But British raw cotton consumption in its manufactures, went on climbing to an average of 18,500 tons in 1798–1800 (Mitchell in Cipolla, 1973, pp. 770, 773, 780; Ashton, 1955, p. 154; Deane and Cole, 1962, p. 185). The annual investment in 'machinery and mill work' in Britain grew from an estimated £0.8 million, c.1770, to £2.0 million in the early 1790s and to £4.0 million, c.1815 (Crouzet, 1972, p. 24, citing Pollard's estimates). Well might Rostow (1960, pp. 31–5, 38) put the 'take-off' stage of the British economy – the first such take-off in the world – within the twenty years 1783–1802.

There is no doubt that, at the beginning, the Industrial Revolution was primarily the work of small men, the artisan manufacturers, who saved and reinvested their profits into improved tools and machines initially made by local carpenters and blacksmiths. The other immediate source of investment in machinery was the capital of merchant middlemen, to whom this might appear as a profitable extension of the 'putting-out' system (cf. Ashton, 1964, pp. 66–8; Dobb, 1946, pp. 277–81). But one must remember that even where machinery was introduced, the circulating capital (for payment of wages and raw materials) remained very important: according to Pollock annual investment in stocks alone equalled that in machinery (£2 million) in the early 1790s. Circulating capital came in a large part from solicitors (dealing with estates' funds) and through bankers' discounting of bills and loans on mortgages. This gave capital convertibility to wealth obtained in non-industrial sectors (rents, income abroad). If one were also to consider investments in

infrastructural facilities, like canals and buildings, which together dwarfed those in machinery (£0.8 million in canals, and £4.5 million in residential buildings in the early 1790s), the contribution of landlords' rent-income to enlargement of capital was by no means small. Nearly one-third of stocks in eighteenth-century canal companies came from landowners (Crouzet, 1972, pp. 24, 36; Anderson in Crouzet, 1972, pp. 223-55; Ashton, 1955, pp. 178-88). Thus it seems impossible to hold (as do Crouzet, 1972, pp. 55-9; and Deane and Cole, 1962, pp. 34-5) that the enlargement of landowners' income through the Enclosures and the flow of external incomes out of colonial tribute did not add substantially to the capital supply needed for the Industrial Revolution.

The same conclusion would also be forced upon us if we consider the circumstances which tended to make the capital invested in industry more profitable (which would amount in effect to adding to its size). The Enclosures certainly gave industry access to large reserves of labour maintained on depressed wages in the countryside; and colonies gave it access to cheaper (at the level of national accounts, free) raw materials and wage-goods. So considered, not only the enclosing landlord, but also the 'nabob' returning from the East and the West Indian slave-trader and planter, had a hand in the industrialization of England.

Its first position in the industrializing countries enabled England to begin to conquer world markets. Already in 1795-1804, Britain's annual export of cottons exceeded in worth £5.3 million, and of iron and steel, 300,000 tons (Deane and Cole, 1962, p. 59). She was well on her way to becoming the Workshop of the World.

What the English Industrial Revolution marked, above all, was the completion of the genesis of Capitalism. In tracing the evolution of the capitalist system, the range of meanings given to the word 'capital' by historians must always be borne in mind. To most, all stock and fixed assets (other than land) that are used to yield an income, usually in terms of money, is capital. Since from the sixteenth century onwards, a larger and larger share of total production came to be directed to the market, and the trading stock began progressively to expand, one is tempted to trace the emergence and development of Capitalism right from the period of the Renaissance. Marx (1959, pp. 319-31), however, distinguished between merchant capital, which grew on the foundations of 'petty production', during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and capital proper, which emerged only with the Industrial Revolution when it had brought production under its full control by employing wage-labour (the proletariat) mainly in the factories. The British Industrial Revolution was not, therefore, a simple further stage in the linear evolution of capitalism, but a wholesale transformation of capitalism itself, a true social revolution.

THE COMPONENT PARTS OF SOCIETY: COMMUNITY, CLASS, RACE

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the bulk of humankind lived by agricultural pursuits; and this was still true at the end of the eighteenth century. A large majority again lived in villages or concentrated rural settlements, rather than in scattered huts or cottages. The village tended to become a social, economic and administrative unit; and there existed various kinds of 'village communities' all over Eurasia. In India the community seems to have had two main aspects: first, an apparatus of village artisans and servants, obtaining

sustenance partly from small tax-free (or favourably tax-rated) holdings; second, a limited section of the peasants (of one or more castes) forming a 'council of five' (*panchayat*), which disposed of waste lands and had the obligation to collect and pay the land-tax (Chapter 20). Both aspects remained seemingly from village economic self-sufficiency and the obligation to meet a heavy tax-demand.

Two other well-studied contemporary forms of Village Communities are the Japanese and the Russian. The Japanese community of the Tokugawa period was a corporate body of propertied families (*hanbyakusho*, *hyakusho*) with a 'five-man' group (*goningumi*) and headman responsible for collecting the tax, maintaining security and carrying out government instructions (Befu in Hall and Jansen, 1968, pp. 301-14). Tenant-farmers and landless labourers were not only outside the community, but were subject to all kinds of penalties and humiliations imposed by their landlords and the *hyakusho* (Smith in Hall and Jansen, 1968, pp. 263-82; Toshio in Hall, 1991, pp. 487-8).

The Russian community was apparently more egalitarian than its Indian and Japanese counterparts. It was not based on kinship; the arable land was assigned to a family on long-term basis, the meadows annually; the pastures and forests were held to be accessible to all. The decision in these matters rested with heads of all the families. Wealth differentiation expressed itself mostly in possession of cattle, and there were only a limited number of landless labourers (Shanin, 1983, pp. 11-12). In Western Europe by the sixteenth century traces of village communities survived only in village customs such as the three-field system and access to commons.

In the New World the comparable social unit seems to have been the *ayllu* of Peru, based on kinship and endogamy, as well as shared settlement, with its own communal cultivation, pasture and forest. Under the Incas these *ayllu* were also instruments through which produce and labour could be requisitioned as tribute (Mason, 1957, pp. 170-5). Under Spanish rule the system was savagely distorted, its ritual destroyed and the labour of its members drafted away. In Mexico, the Spanish Crown sought to maintain the communities for purposes of control and taxation, with their own charters and communal lands and treasures. The Mexican villages were strongly endogamous and discouraged internal differentiation (Wolf in Shanin, 1971, pp. 53-4).

In so far as the village communities were a convenient unit for tax-collection they were sustained by the dominant regimes, and, as in India or Japan, they tended to become vehicles for a system of sub-exploitation. But it is hard to see how the communities could survive the development of private landownership of the type that developed in Western Europe, or retain their autonomy under the Russian 'Second Feudalism', as serfdom expanded eastwards. They also could not withstand the impact of the British land-revenue 'settlements' in India, beginning with the closing years of the eighteenth century. To varying degrees - and more of all in its Indian caste-based form - the Village Community introduced a parochialism and hierarchy which obstructed the self-recognition of peasants as a class. However, the pressures of subjection, rent and taxation could not but force a recognition of common bonds among the peasants, especially in moments of great social crisis. Among the Twelve Articles of the rebels in the German Peasant War (1525) were demands for abolition of serfdom and the reduction of forced labour, rents, taxes and tithes (see Ladurie, 1981, pp. 300-10, for analysis of objectives of sixteenth-century peasant uprisings in Western Europe). In Russia the process of serfdom

compelled the peasants and cossacks to unite again and again in desperate revolts, notably under Bolotnikov (1606–7), Stepan Razin (1667–71) and Pugachev (1773–5). As Razin's followers put it, they were out to 'kill all of you, boyars, nobles and clerks' (Pankratova, 1947, pp. 227–35; 1948, pp. 69–74). The peasant revolt on the largest scale took place in China (1627–45): under Li Zicheng, the rebels, animated with the slogans 'Equalization of landownership' and 'Freedom from taxation', overthrew the Ming dynasty (1644) (Bai Shouyi, 1982, pp. 363–8, 374–6). In Japan, Hideyoshi (ruled 1582–98) was obliged to initiate, with his 'sword hunt' of 1587, a 'total disarmament of the peasantry' (Toshio in Hall, 1991, p. 483). At times, peasant distress might take forms of mystical and religious protest through organizations of militant societies or sects, like the White Lotus Society (revolted, 1796–1804) in Qing China (Bai Shouyi, 1982, pp. 397–400) and the Satnamis and Sikhs (latter half of the seventeenth century) in Mughal India (Habib, 1963, pp. 342–5). Even when he could not rebel, the peasant's sense of grievance remained, though his illiteracy usually prevents us from having direct access to his sentiments. This makes it exceptionally fortunate for us to have in the *Haziz al-Qiduf* (c.1664) the verses of a rural poet that furnish a detailed description of the travails of the Egyptian *fallahin* (peasants). Predictably, the *fallah* laments: 'I have doled out my very life for the *kharaj* (land-tax)' (Rahman, 1975, p. 260).

In countries like India, enslavement of his family, along with the seizure of his cattle, was a danger always to be faced by the peasant upon his failure to pay the revenue (Habib, 1963, pp. 322–3). But this was the ultimate threat, not the norm. Except in some territorial pockets, where agrarian slavery existed, slavery had come to be largely of the domestic sort in Asia and Europe, by the sixteenth century. (On slavery in the Mediterranean, see Branilel, 1975, II, pp. 254–5.) What the African farming communities were subjected to, from the fifteenth century onward, was an enslavement of a totally different kind and magnitude. The 11 million or so who were ferried across the Atlantic lost their tribal and linguistic identities, and could only see themselves henceforth as black slaves. In America, their initial act of resistance was to flee and join with other fugitives in setting up 'maroon' farming communities (Price in Jha, 1991, pp. 116–29). Towards the close of the eighteenth century, the slaves' internal surge for emancipation as a class at last began, helped by both the revolutionary ideas received from France, and the strength given to them by their large concentrations in plantations (Geggins in Jha, 1991, pp. 116–29). Rebellions in Martinique (1789) and Tortola (1790) were crowned by the greatest revolt of all, the successful slave rebellion of French Saint Domingue (Haiti) and Spanish Dominica, 1791–1804, led by Toussaint Louverture (d.1803). The slaves' own freeing of themselves in Haiti was the first great breach in the system of black slavery, though its general dismantling could not be achieved until much of the nineteenth century was over: emancipation in the United States came as late as 1863 and in Brazil in 1888.

A class with whose emergence and prominence historians so often associate the rise of modern societies in Western Europe, is the so-called 'Middle Class'. Definitions of this class vary, but, as it occurs on historians' pages, it generally includes not only the merchants and proto-capitalists, but also medium landowners ('*hidalgos*', 'gentry'), and professional men of higher status. The growing integration of this class, through occupational mobility and intermarriages, gave it substance and strength, which more than balanced its rather

varied economic basis. Its initial strength in England has been attributed to the 'rise' of the 'gentry' (the medium, untitled landowners) in the century following upon c.1540, benefiting from the Tudor seizures of the church properties, and prospering from more efficient modes of rent-collection in their estates (Tawney in Carus-Wilson, 1954, pp. 173–214). This phase must be distinguished from the second round of enrichment which came with the enclosures of the eighteenth century, and added a new group to the Middle Class, that is, the 'capitalist' farmer.

It has been a matter of some debate whether the groups that constituted the Middle Class in Western Europe did not have their counterparts elsewhere. The argument has been advanced that Mughal India had a growing Middle Class of merchants, medium *zamindars* (rural magnates), petty officials and professionals, benefiting from the expanding trade and urban life that the Empire supported (Smith, 1944; Khan, 1976). But these groups displayed little evidence of occupational or social integration, especially owing to the caste system (Misra, 1978, pp. 7–10). But in China, through the instrumentality of the literary examinations going back to the eighth century, the ruling officialdom ('bureaucracy') was recruited from the scholars ('*literati*') who, through the necessity of an expensive education, came generally from the ranks of the landowners ('gentry'). The circle was completed when officials, upon accumulating wealth through office, bought up land. Merchants could also enter the circle by similarly buying land (Balazs, 1964, pp. 39–51; Fairbank, 1978, pp. 11–18). Indeed, the environment of Qing China seems to have been more conducive for the growth of a 'Middle Class' than that of Tokugawa Japan, which had a far more rigid 'bureaucratic' structure, so that merchants 'remained on the outer fringes of society' (Strayer in Hall and Jansen, 1968, pp. 10–12).

All this may make one pause in ascribing too large a share in modern developments to the formal structure and size of the Middle Class. The nature of its ideology was, perhaps, of much greater importance. Both China and Europe had the printing press; but it was Neo-Confucianism, with its extreme commitment to the social status quo, which the printing press popularized in China; in Europe it popularized the products of the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution, creating thereby a different attitude in the Middle Class, that is, imparting to it the 'capitalist spirit' on which Max Weber (1989) has laid so much emphasis.

While Europe internally generated a large Middle Class, externally, its advance to global dominance created a new 'imagined' community, the European 'race', which to its members appeared increasingly as the chosen segment of humanity. It is estimated that by 1650 about 1 million European emigrants were living outside Europe (Cipolla, 1981, p. 239). There developed, in the New World, an absolute degree of distinction between the settlers, in whose hands wealth and privilege were concentrated, and the subjugated and pauperized Amerindians. Subsequently, with the African slave-trade in full swing, there was erected a three-tier structure of 'white', 'mulatto' and 'black'. Since the Amerindians and African slaves had been converted to Christianity, the distinction was purely one of race determined by colour (Rodney in Gray, 1975, pp. 589–99). Elsewhere, the older religious differences reinforced assertions of racial superiority. The expulsion of about 300,000 already depressed Moors (Moriscos) from Spain in 1609–14 was put into effect under the stamp of the Inquisition (Hamilton in Carus-Wilson, 1954, p. 219n.; cf. Brandel, 1975, II, pp. 787–8, 792–7).

The position of the Europeans as the ruling caste in Asia began to take shape with the establishment of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese association with the Catholic Church and missionary activity was fairly close, so that Portuguese superiority could, to a degree, be concealed behind a belief in the native immorality of the 'Gentiles' (Hindus) and the 'Moors' (Muslims). But with the successes of the Dutch and the English, whose interests in missionary work were minimal, the religious veneer wore off, and white racism became as undiluted as in the New World.

WOMEN

Women did not form a socially homogeneous group, since they also shared with men the privation or privilege of class and race, at the same time as, being 'the second sex' in practically all societies, they suffered greatly from male dominance. Women, especially among the poorer classes, were assigned much hard work. Spinning (as well as quilting and reeling), which taxes the fingers so much, was a work assigned to women almost everywhere, as is so well illustrated in paintings from China (Nvedlium, 1963, Plates CXLVIII, CLII-CLIV), India (Kuhnel and Goetz, 1926, Plate I), and Iran (Blochet, 1929, Plate CXXXVII). In sixteenth-century India, painters show women breaking stones, sieving lime, and carrying bricks and mortar on their heads at construction sites (Qaisar, 1988, plates 3-7) (see Plate 2). Indian women also did the cooking, hand-milled corn and fetched water (Fryer, 1912, pp. 138-39). Women of the poorer classes were similarly put to much hard labour in eighteenth-century France (Beauvoir, 1953, p. 131). In Islamic countries, the wife, if poor, was called upon 'to occupy herself with outdoor work in the fields or with domestic animals' (Levy, 1957, pp. 99-100). In Central Africa, women formed the primary workforce in agriculture (Birmingham in Oliver, 1977, p. 338).

Women were made to suffer physically as a token of men's assertion of control over their persons and movements. Foot-binding became a scourge for Chinese women of all classes under the Ming and Qing; it was abolished only in 1902. In India, among the Hindu ruling clans, there was the practice of *sati*, or widow-burning, not effectively prohibited until 1829. Female infanticide was practised in India (Dubois, 1912, pp. 1903-60), Japan (Hauley in Hall, 1991, pp. 69-70; Rozman in Jansen, 1989, p. 366), China (Fairbank, 1978, p. 582) and Europe, where girls predominated among foundlings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Cipolla, 1981, pp. 69-70). In sixteenth-century France 'the lower classes maintained the medieval tradition of male chauvinism and brutality' towards women (Ladurie, 1981, p. 212). In Islamic countries, legal justification was found for wife-beating 'in the bed-chamber', and seclusion was enforced, with full or partial veiling, on women of the upper classes (Levy, 1957, pp. 98, 124-30).

One of the principal instruments of control over women was provided by the various systems of marriage. Outside Christian Europe the practices of polygamy and, wherever slavery existed, of concubinage, were almost universal, though both were largely the privilege of men of the upper classes. Marriage was usually imposed on women at their fathers' will in China, India and Europe; and so also ordinarily in the Islamic world, although under Islamic law marriage was in the nature of a contract between man and woman as independent parties. Child-marriage, especially of young

girls with much older men, was widely prevalent in India and, to possibly a lesser extent, China. After marriage, the wife's position in relation to her husband tended to be one of subordination. In India, 'a kind of servile attendance' upon her husband was expected of her (Ovington, 1929, p. 194). In some parts of China, among poorer people, the wife could even be 'hired out' by her husband (Chapter 22). In Western Europe in the sixteenth century any action taken by the wife without authority of the husband was treated as void (Pevier, quoted in Aires, 1990, p. 177).

The personal subordination of the wife to the husband affected the position assigned to widows. In India widows in Hindu upper castes could not remarry; among some lower castes, they were often simply claimed by brothers of the dead husbands, or given away against bride-price by their parents-in-law (Chapter 20). In China a remarriage widow was by a Qing law deprived of any possessions, including the dowry, that she had received from her former husband's property (Chapter 22). There were few bars to widow remarriage in Christianity and Islam. In Islam, indeed, divorce too was permitted, though the decision was generally that of the husband, so that the wife's position could, on this account, be very insecure (Levy, 1957, p. 121).

Women suffered considerable discrimination in respect of inheritance. In sub-Saharan Africa, inheritance ran separately in the two sexes (Goody *et al.*, 1976, p. 13); while this could give some security to women, the basic inequality in property was perpetuated. Among major legal systems the Muslim law was perhaps still the most favourable to women. Yet even under this law the share of the daughter was fixed at only half of that of the brother. As wife, the woman claimed from her husband a dowry (*mahr*) as settled in the marriage contract (Levy, 1957, pp. 113-14, 145-6). In early modern Western Europe, women did not normally have any shares in inheritance from their parents. The dowry given by the wife's father at time of marriage was by custom appropriated by the husband (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, 1987, pp. 222-8); she, however, received her dowry given or promised by the husband, and the widow's portion upon the husband's death. In some cases, by local custom, brotherless daughters could inherit (Goody *et al.*, 1976, pp. 15-8). Things were not very different under Hindu law. The daughters did not inherit, but they had the right to be provided with their marriage portion; the wife did not obtain a dowry from her husband, but, as widow, she could have a share in the husband's property (Dubois, 1912, p. 368). In China too women were generally excluded from inheritance. The woman's dowry from her parents usually passed into her husband's hands (Chapter 22). In Japan a son-in-law succeeded to a business as heir, in the absence of sons, for the daughter herself apparently could not inherit (Shively in Hall, 1991, p. 722).

Inequality dogged women in every sphere. They were far behind men in literacy and education. At the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868) the ratio of female to male literates in Japan was 1:2.5 (inferred from general rate given by Jansen in Hall and Jansen, 1968, p. 325, and male literacy rate by Haya'sini, *impub.*). But this was very exceptional for pre-industrial societies. In 1891, there was only one literate woman for almost every 23 literate males counted by the Indian census. In Western Europe before 1800, colleges and universities were all-male institutions, and so women were deprived of access to higher education.

Overworked, secluded, deprived of education, the woman was thus forced into outwardly conforming to the model set

for her by religion and custom: spiritually weak and mentally inferior. The model's inherent falseness was surely the reason why it could not be entirely accepted in practice. There could be stateswomen like Elizabeth I (reigned, 1558–1603), and Nur Jahan (empress, 1611–27) in politics as divergent as Tudor England and Mughal India. Both Hindu and Muslim women on their own held and sold *zaminidaris* (land rights) in seventeenth-century India (Habib, 1963, p. 153 & n.); and the records of a seventeenth-century *cadi's* court in Ottoman Turkey disclose a large number of women of property among the litigants (Jennings, 1975, pp. 53–114). A breeze had also perhaps risen, foretelling of stronger winds to come. In sixteenth-century China, Hsu-Wei wrote two plays *A Girl Named Mu-hu* and *The Successful Woman Candidate* which asserted women's capacity for equality with men; and Cao Zhan (c. 1715–64) underlined the oppressions of the Confucian family system and forced marriages in the *Dream of the Red Chamber* (Feng Ynan-Chun, 1958, pp. 102–3). In India, the Mughal Emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605) advocated monogamy and the apportioning of equal (even large) shares in inheritance to daughters; he also condemned widow-burning and prohibited pre-puberty marriages (Habib, 1993, pp. 303–7).

In France in 1673 Poulain de la Barre published *De l'égalité des deux sexes*, boldly setting forth its author's declaration of the equality of sexes. A radical change came when women themselves came forward to claim their rights. An early salvo was fired by Mary Astell (1666–1731) in England, who propounded in 1694 and 1697 a project of a college for women. The French Revolution of 1789 ignited a new enthusiasm among women for gaining their rights. Olympe de Gouges (executed as an Anti-Jacobin, November 1793), already the author of *Prince Philosophe* (claiming equality in education), came out with the clarion-call, *Déclaration des Droits de la Femme et de la Citoyenne*, September 1791. Across the channel, Mary Wollstonecraft (d. 1797) published her sensational *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792). Women formed clubs in France to press for their rights. In 1790 they won equal rights in inheritance, a truly landmark victory; in 1792, the right of divorce was won with considerable protection for the wife; and in 1793 and 1794 were obtained promises of compulsory primary education for 'children of both sexes'. Only the suffrage was denied to them. Many of their gains were, however, revoked by Napoleon in his Civil Code (1804), especially in respect of married women; and right of divorce was taken away in 1816 after the Bourbon Restoration. Obviously, though important advances for women's rights had been made during the high tide of the French Revolution (1789–94), the more permanent victories were still a long time away.

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POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS

John A. Hall

It will prove helpful, both as a corrective to contemporary preconceptions and as a means of highlighting arguments to be made, to begin with some abstract, ideal-typical comments on the difficulties of rule given the agrarian baselines of social life before the industrial revolution.

The character of social and political life before the industrial era derived from the fact that it was necessary to employ the vast majority of the population as peasant agrarian producers. There were relatively few cities, and those who lived in them rarely amounted to more than a tenth of the population. Such an agrarian world tended towards stasis. Unless a society was situated close to rivers, inland canals or the sea, economic integration by means of the market was effectively impossible: most markets were therefore usually no more than 4 or 5 miles from producers' homes – for the very obvious reason that, beyond that distance, costs of transportation ruled out all profit. This, in turn, made it rational for peasants not to specialize: self-sufficiency dictated a wide range of crops for obvious reasons of ecological insurance. Furthermore, peasants sought to hold on to their land at all costs, and this limited the size of the market in land.

The socio-political consequences of these simple facts were banal but profound. Blundly, the power of the state in such circumstances was likely to be highly constrained. Taxation, the life blood of state power, was hard to extract from direct producers without the co-operation of landed élites dominant in the localities. In consequence, the social condition of the majority of people was carried on without the benefit of the sort of state regulation to which the twentieth century has made us accustomed. Agrarian producers tended to be literally insulated into distinct communities, each with dialects or languages that would have made it incomprehensible to its neighbours. As state power did not normally reach into such communities, order and justice tended to be provided very much as the result of membership in what can best be termed 'self-help' groups. The key organizing principle in these conditions was that of kinship, and any person without kin was in a very vulnerable position indeed.

On reflection, it is not all surprising to realize that little attempt was made in most world civilizations to proselytize to the masses, or indeed to police their beliefs in any way whatever; in general, rulers feared the development of all horizontal linkages between the people. This made for suspicion towards religious specialists and still more towards capitalists, since both could establish non-official channels of communication. Rule was based on avoiding the

mobilization of the people, and not, as in modern circumstances, upon demanding it. Political stability, accordingly, depended heavily upon the ability to integrate those who were freed from immediate agrarian production into a single culture. Politics was élite politics, and it was successfully conducted when intellectuals, the military élite and landlords felt themselves to share a single destiny. Such unity was naturally hard to achieve, and there always tended to be a secular movement towards the loss of power by the centre. As the state could not exercise significant power at the local level, landlords increasingly tended to resist taxation and to hide or protect peasants who felt similarly inclined. State power, in other words, tended to be at its peak when a new state was formed or when a new dynasty came to power, that is, when new rulers had gifts to hand out rather than interests with which to contend.

Given all this, great scepticism needs to be shown to the claims made by ideologists – paid, of course, by the powerful! – about the powers of the state. Analysis of logistics makes it apparent that the striking range of armies in basic agrarian conditions was severely limited, and certainly far less than ideologists – and far too many later historians! – claimed. Equal scepticism should be shown towards other assertions of vast powers. Such despotic claims need to be counter-balanced by an awareness of how rarely such pretensions could be realized: the 'infrastructural' power of the state to actually penetrate society and to organize social relationships tended to insignificance. This might seem as if it is a contradiction, but it is, in fact, merely a comprehensible paradox: the very lack of infrastructural power occasioned arbitrary and irregular action.

It would be possible to continue at some length in stressing the similarity of conditions facing all states in the early modern world because of the basic limitations imposed by agrarian circumstances. But such considerations must be kept in mind as background circumstances which make it possible to highlight the two key political transformations that took place roughly between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The first, neatly symbolized by Columbus's voyage in 1492, is simply the extraordinary growth in the power of North-West Europe in comparison with the rest of the world in the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. This growth in power is seen most obviously in the fact that militarily Europe begins to dominate the world; and that in turn rests upon the greater wealth achieved by Europe in this period, largely due to an intensification in its capitalist economic dynamic. The argument will be that much of the characteristic

European social portfolio was in place before this period, as well as the fact that it was only after this period that industrialization allowed the establishment of complete Western hegemony over the world. Nonetheless, these years contain crucial episodes in the birth of the modern state. This development is explained in terms of two types of competitive pressure, those of capitalist market relations and those of state competition, between which there are subtle and complex links. In general terms, what is most striking is that North-West Europe's ability to escape the limitations on rule in agrarian circumstances depends upon politics which were at once low in despotism and high in infrastructural power. This too might seem a contradiction but it is equally a paradox.

The second transformation to be discussed is one within Europe. In this period, a divergence took place between absolutist and constitutional regimes, that is, between, to take obvious examples, France and Prussia on the one hand, and Holland and Britain on the other. This divergence was by no means total; both types of regime drew on and remained indebted to the characteristic social portfolio of their civilization. Nonetheless, regimes which had more restrained states proved capable of generating greater sums of social energy: constitutional regimes were not 'weaker' than their absolutist rivals, as the outbreak of revolution in France in 1789 symbolizes so aptly.

One warning should be issued before proceeding. Words carry moral connotations. Those words used to describe the power break-through in the Occident during these years – 'development', 'rise', 'dynamic', 'modern', and, sometimes, simply 'success' – imply moral approbation and endorsement. By these standards, other civilizations are judged to have 'failed' or 'stagnated'. In a nutshell, 'transformation' is seen as both desirable and normal. This viewpoint should not be accepted, and it does not underlie the observations made here. Just as human beings try to solve the problems that confront them, so too do societies try and find some *modus vivendi* with the conditions within which they have to operate. It makes more sense to judge adaptation to circumstance as success rather than failure. By this standard, the world civilizations which did not give birth to fundamental political transformations in this period are both normal and successful. Analysis of the Occident should concentrate on that lack of order and balance, that is, a fundamental lack of an achieved identity within a settled way of life, which led it to create new and powerful institutions.

DESPOTISM AND THE ORIENT

The concept that Europeans invented towards the end of our period in order to understand the Ottoman Empire and, to a lesser degree, imperial rule in India and China, was that of 'oriental despotism'. This concept has had a remarkable hold over later supposedly scientific inquiry. Key elements of the theory of oriental despotism appear especially clearly in Marx's positing of an 'asiatic mode of production', with a fuller if slightly different and cruder statement being made in 1957 by Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism*. If this last treatment possessed a certain originality in its insistent emphasis on the type of polity required by irrigation agriculture, its central argument – that despotic power was total power – repeated most earlier positions. The general comments already made suggest that this is scarcely likely to be an accurate description of the small states of the pre-industrial era, let alone of those both of China and of Islam.

But if it is necessary both to refute the idea of total power and to suggest differences between the regimes of different civilizations, this is not to say that every element of the concept need be abandoned.

Wittfogel began his career as a sinologist, and it would seem most likely that his notions would apply to Chinese civilization. Might it not be argued that the presence of an imperial state, manned by bureaucrats schooled in a statist creed, gives evidence of a truly powerful state outside the Occident? The answer to this question must be decidedly negative. There were never sufficient mandarins to form an efficient governing class. The first Ming emperor sought in 1371 to have as few as 5,488 bureaucrats in government service, and by the sixteenth century there were still only about 20,400 in the empire as a whole, together with perhaps another 50,000 minor officials (C. R. Huang, 1981). So the Chinese state had no means of total control. To the contrary, it had little capacity to create, let alone enforce law: most social norms were those of a kinship system – which, importantly, was not normally turned against the state.

Of course, the state sought to gain autonomy from society. But arbitrary action against individuals was counterbalanced by an inability of rulers to move against the gentry as a whole. Similarly, the state sometimes sought to improve the workings of the economy but it had very limited means with which to push through any plan of its own. Reformer after reformer tried to establish a decent land registry as the basis for proper revenue gathering, but all were defeated by the refusal of landlords to cooperate. The empire, as a whole, witnessed what deserves to be called a 'power stand-off' between state and society which made it impossible to generate a large sum of societal energy.

This stalemate can be seen at work in the 'dynastic cycle'. A newly established dynasty sought to create a healthy peasant base both for its tax and military potential. Yet even without internal or external pressures, the state tended to lose control of society. The local power of the gentry enabled them, as we would expect, to increase their estates and to avoid taxation. But other pressures on the empire were habitually also present. Internally, an expansion of population, often encouraged by the gentry, eventually caused land hunger and peasant rebellion. Externally, the nomads on the border found the empire more and more attractive as its prosperity waxed in front of their eyes. Such nomads were often employed as imperial mercenaries, and they thereby learnt military techniques which, when allied with the military resource inherent in their great mobility, made them a formidable force: the state was, in consequence, forced to increase taxation rates. It was at this moment that the power stand-off between state and society proved to be important: landlords chose to shelter peasants who refused to pay such taxation and, thereby, increased their own local power. The combination of decentralizing disintegration with overpaying peasants, in such circumstances, the state was forced to tax even more heavily where it could, and this, in turn, fuelled peasant unrest. These processes marked the final years of the Ming, and the collapse of their power in the mid-seventeenth century was accordingly scarcely novel.

But it was equally characteristic of Chinese civilization that the empire was restored. The mandarins remained true to the imperial ideal, and, on this occasion, particularly disliking the revolutionary ideas emerging amongst the bonded labourers of the Yangzi basin, they invited the Qing to assume 'the Mandate of Heaven'. It is interesting to note

that something like a confidence trick was played on the members of the gentry: they remained loyal to the state, but the paucity of their numbers shows that they did not do that well from it.

The great German sociologist Max Weber once claimed that bureaucracy in pre-industrial circumstances killed capitalism. There is much to justify this view. Negatively, it is worth remembering that capitalistic developments tended to gain greatest strength in Chinese history in periods of imperial disunity: markets and cities gained autonomy as the result of weakened central control, whilst the quality of coinage, provided by states, tended to improve during disunity because traders would not return to, or trust, governments which manipulated the coinage. But how did the empire, when it was reunited, react to capitalist forces that had flourished previously? Most obviously, the Ming failed to follow up the overseas voyages of the admiral Zheng He; indeed, improvements to the Grand Canal were such that between 1371 and 1567, all foreign trade was banned. And this desire to control did not stop at economic matters. The autonomy of cities was curtailed. More important still, early Qing intellectuals tried to restore the ideal Confucian order, that is, to free it of Buddhist and Daoist accretions. This attempt proved successful: whereas the Ming had failed to suppress heterodoxy, the Qing succeeded – and thereby created a passive orthodoxy in which 'invention was almost absent'. The imperial bureaucracy can be said to have sat on top of a series of separate 'societies' which it did not wish to penetrate or mobilize: it feared all horizontal linkages, whether religious or economic, that were not easily visible and which might get out of control. More particularly, the Ming deliberately chose not to allow any area of the empire to become, in their eyes, economically overdeveloped; they realized that they could not police such resources which could, accordingly, be used by discontented generals in a bid for power. Thus, the centralization of political life mattered. Although the bureaucracy was not able to penetrate into society, it could, and did, prevent other forces from gaining much autonomy. Given that history issues no orders insisting that capitalism must be adopted, what is noticeable about the pattern of the Chinese past is its increasing movement towards a stable political form – within which marked extensive economic and population development took place in the form of increasing colonization in the south.¹ A strong case can be made for seeing such developments as a sign of civilizational success.

If the desire for control was such as to block the development of intensive capitalist relations, this is not to say that the impact of the state upon capitalism must always be negative; we shall argue later that the state in North-West Europe, once market relationships had gained a certain autonomy, proved capable of providing key services for capitalism. The Chinese state – which clearly often wished to help improve the economy – was incapable of so doing. The state was not capable of providing legal protection for businessmen, nor was it able to furnish well developed banking and credit facilities. No wonder that farming was found to have greater attractions than business involvement.

If politics and culture in China tended to have the same extensive reach, it is vital to note that other world civilizations had, at least for crucial periods, cultures more extensive than their politics. In classical Islam, Hindu India and Latin Christendom, social identity was achieved and maintained without benefit of state regulation: ideology created and did not reflect a society. What has been said about China suggests that the absence of a single political centre within these

civilizations might well allow for the emergence of capitalism, free from bureaucratic interference. It will be seen later that this factor does play a part in Occidental history – but that it is only a part can be seen from the fact that both Islam and India, despite having extensive cultures often free from bureaucratic interference, nonetheless proved infertile ground for the emergence of capitalism, and accordingly for states – rather than their landed upper class – blessed with significant moneyed resources.

The social physiognomies of India and Islam shated a disunity within the élite that had a negative impact upon state power. Whilst it is difficult to reconstruct early Indian history, there may be something to be said for the view that a division occurred between kings and priests, according to whom secular power is important only so long as it serves as a custodian to the social order. Social life within the subcontinent seems to have been ordered largely by means of the caste system, with states, despite the challenge of the Mauryas, having rather shallow roots in society. The situation within Islam was often at once interestingly similar and dissimilar. The intellectuals of this civilization were as far removed as were the Brahmins from justifying political power: the ulama felt themselves to be the protectors of the sacred norms of society, rather than state servants whose task was to produce some sort of Caesaropapist creed. But the presence of militarily active tribes in the mountains surrounding the Mediterranean Basin meant that mere intellectuals could not rule by themselves: to the contrary, in a world in which kinship ties threatened social order, they were forced to rely on the services of a single tribe, often supported by slave soldiers. As early as the fourteenth century, the great Muslim philosopher of history Ibn Khaldun pointed out that politics within Islam tended not to be stable: a ruling tribe became corrupted by city life and thereby lost its fighting spirit – with the ulama consequently condemning the ruling house, and calling in a new tribe to provide order for city life.

A quick succession of despotic states necessarily meant that economic investment was disadvantaged. Interestingly, some of the reactions of society to this situation exacerbated the weakness of state power. In Islam land was given to religious foundations on the condition that the donor would receive an income from it thereafter; a similar practice to such *waqf* donations explains the extraordinary wealth of south Indian temples. By and large, states did not dare to touch such religious foundations, with a consequent weakening of their capacity to penetrate and organize their societies. It is important to have a comparative consideration in mind at this point, namely that in our period European states were making great inroads into sacral property, most famously when England's Henry VIII ordered a dissolution of the monasteries.

On reflection, these comments about characteristic patterns of Indian and Islamic life might seem irrelevant. Is it not the case that between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries a thoroughgoing political transformation takes place? Is this not the period of the great gunpowder empires of the Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mughals? A distinction must be made in order to answer this question.

On the one hand, it is doubtful whether Mughal and Safavid imperial rule, for all its undoubted achievements, really represents a fundamental political transformation. Whilst there is no doubt of the importance of the split within Islam occasioned by the Safavids seeking legitimacy on the basis of the Shi'ite cause, the actual course of imperial rule seems rather predictable. The empire in fact only lasted from

1517–1722, and its rule was always weakened by the fact that the *Shī'ī* 'ulamā refused to provide it with any statist legitimization. The Mughals attempt to establish a firm agrarian empire suffered equally at the hands of the 'ulamā. The aim of the Mughals had been to cultivate universal standards of culture in such a way that implementation of the Shari'a would not undermine the empire. In fact, 'ulamā discontent proved to be one of the factors that so weakened the empire that it fell to invasions by Persians and Marathas long before the appearance of the British in any significant force.

On the other hand, the Ottomans did pioneer a genuine revolution in government that created a long-lasting empire. This achievement may have had historical roots going back to the Mongols, but it rested largely upon remarkable institutional innovations. The recruiting of slaves was ensured by means of the *devshirme*, that is, by means of a regular extraction of children from Christian families. Military force was maintained by the granting of *timārs* – land lent out to support a warrior élite.⁴ It is true that by the seventeenth century much was out of joint: tax farming increasingly took the place of the *timārs* in a period of rising prices, and the state lost control over much land. Nonetheless, the empire gained new life under the *Köprülü*. If one element behind this revival was a measure of ecological diversity such that crisis was not felt simultaneously in the Balkans and in Anatolia, a more important factor was surely that the Ottomans managed effectively to bind the 'ulamā to the state.

If the longevity of the Ottoman Empire is a novelty within Islam, the consequences of continued bureaucratic rule for economic life are precisely those which an appreciation of Max Weber's dictum – that bureaucracy killed capitalism in pre-industrial circumstances – would lead us to expect. Under the *Köprülü*, innovation, in military, cultural and economic affairs, was placed very much at a discount. Equally, imperial rule constantly interfered with economic life to such an extent that it was unable to gain any real autonomy: indeed 'the economy' did not exist as an entity distinguishable in its own right. Finally, the supposed strength of the empire hid a very weak penetration of society. The Ottoman state provided few infrastructural services, as was symbolized by the recurrent outbreaks of disease in Constantinople itself.

STATES IN EUROPE: WEALTH, WARS AND NATIONS

It is as well to begin an account of more complete political transformations in Europe by reminding ourselves of the classic social portfolio of Europe so that it will then be possible to trace political transformations between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. We could do no better than to start by considering the Church.

Christianity was born within an empire which subsequently persecuted it. Once the imperial state found that persecution did not work, it took the opposite course of action: what it could not destroy it sought to join. The attempt to create a new imperial order blessed by a Caesopapist creed succeeded in the Eastern half of the empire, and it had thereafter some impact on the character of the Russian state. But in the West, religious intellectuals refused to integrate themselves with the political order – as was clearly apparent in St Augustine's insistence in *The City of God* that there was no relation between God's kingdom and the fate of Rome. Instead, the Church went out to the barbarian tribes and acted on their behalf, most of all as codifiers of laws. That they did so largely explains the

impossibility of restoring the empire. But their actions should be seen in a positive rather than a negative light. Most obviously, the Church was the medium through which the legacy of antiquity passed into European history. Still more important, the church served, in Thomas Hobbes's formulation, as 'the ghost' of the Roman Empire. The collapse of the empire might have ended the extensive unity, thereby causing a reversion to tribal fragmentation. That Europe was a single society was the result of the normative order provided by the Church.

The single most striking quality of Latin Christian civilization as a whole was that it was acephalous. European feudalism was especially fully developed in that the virtual absence of states for long periods after the Fall of Rome made property particularly secure. Equally, religious specialists possessed perhaps a third of European property, not least as the result of that attack on kinship networks which allowed more individuated subjects to leave property to the Church so as to aid the salvation of their souls. The fact that the church did not have its own armed forces meant, in the long run, that it had an obvious motive for encouraging states which would provide sufficient order for the protection of its property. But this desire did not lead to the restoration or creation of empire: the Church rather turned to kings, whose position as something more than *prius inter pares* was largely secured by the Church's according to them the various numinous aspects of rule. Thus was born within Europe a multipolar system of competing states, as was the balance of power much preferred by the Church to subordination to any Holy Roman Emperor. Kings in their turn, in order to gain revenue and to balance batomial power, encouraged the development of cities, and these, given the parcellization of European sovereignty, gained an autonomy altogether unique in world history. And to this plural mixture should be added the presence of large numbers of free peasants, possessed of 'liberties' or rights of their own.

Within this society, nonnatively one but decreed in practice, strong market relations developed. This was not simply a question of the revival of a trade in luxuries, for exchange of such basic products as wool and wood also took place – probably aided by a fortuitous combination of rivers and an indented coastline. Moreover, the early medieval economy witnesses an intensification of practices – from the application of water power to the ploughing of clay soils by means of the heavy plough – right down the social scale. Such bursts of market dynamism are not unique in history; what matters more is whether they can gain sufficient autonomy to become self-sustaining. North-West Europe stands opposed to bureaucratic empires which throttled nascent capitalism because its acephalous character meant that nobody could control capitalism. Now was it the case, as it was for much of Indian and Islamic history, that non-imperial states proved a poor shell for market activities because of their predatory behaviour. European states were not created through conquest; rather, they arose in the middle of pre-existing civil societies with which they had to bargain, to co-opt and to co-operate. Importantly, the process of development of key European states is extremely long: battles at the start of the thirteenth century mark the moment at which France and England became actors within the European polity. Differently put, these were long-lasting rather than transitory states, and this simple fact meant that it was at least possible, both for states and for landlords, to think in terms other than those of immediate gratification.

This mixture was made dynamic by the constant interaction between states and society that was entailed by competition

in war. One particular consequence of this was the need to entangle the social practices of the leading state, with the possibility of extinction being very real if such learning was not successfully carried out. Absolutely crucial at all times was the search for money. The desire to increase income lay beneath both the provision of justice and the granting of charters of freedom to the towns. But the ruler was forced to interact with his society if he wished to gain significant amounts of revenue for warfare. As a feudal king was supposed in principle to 'live off his own', the quest for money – given the widespread acceptance of such Canon Law dicta as 'what concerns all, must be approved by all' and 'no taxation without representation' – necessitated the calling of parliamentary assemblies made up of the great functional estates of nobility, church and townsmen – and, in Sweden, of peasants. More generally, as a particularly important source of revenue was that provided by customs, rulers within a multipolar state system found it not to be in their interest to 'kill the goose that lays the golden egg'. Very much to the contrary, rulers attempted to attract merchants and craftsmen. We can generalize by saying bluntly that the survival of capitalism was assured because it faced states rather than an empire.

All this deserves summary. The extensive order maintained by the Latin Christian church came to an effective end roughly by about 1300, albeit it was only with the acceptance of the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 that this became formalized. The Christian *commune* was replaced by a set of states whose workings and interactions made up the reality of European political life. Competition between these states encouraged an ever-increasing territorialization of social life; if this was evident in 1477 when non-territorial Burgundy was defeated in battle, it remains the case that such territorialization was a long secular process – there were 500 sovereign political units in Europe in 1500, but only 25 in 1900. Between the end of the fifteenth century and the French Revolution, competitive pressures were felt particularly strongly, and the state accordingly became far more central to social life. Let us trace a development which led in this period to a move from the national to the nation state.

At the back of virtually every problem that faced rulers from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries was the 'the military revolution' that took place between 1550 and 1650. There were two key facets to this revolution. If the impact of gunpowder was at first slow, its effect on military life was eventually profound. Cities and fortresses were not made indefensible by gunpowder; to the contrary, the invention of heavy 'Italian walls', capable of absorbing massive punishment from artillery and of providing an area behind which musketeers could pick off besiegers, made the reduction of cities ever more difficult. If this increased cost so too did a huge increase in the size of armed forces, which jumped in some instances perhaps tenfold in a century; the fact that such armed forces had to be drilled more intensively than before, if their new weapons were to be used efficiently, added additional burdens to the state. State expenditure figures make it crystal clear that in the early modern period the largest business of the state was warfare. And the burdens involved, it needs to be noted, were ratchet-like in effect: spending jumped because of war, but it stayed high once peace was resumed both because due account had to be taken of new military developments and because states had to ensure, through the manning of garrisons, that they would not be taken by surprise. And military changes did not stop in the middle of the seventeenth century; agrarian

improvements made strikingly larger armies viable by the end of the eighteenth century, albeit the mass mobilization that this entailed was, perhaps not surprisingly, only fully accepted by the armies of the French Revolution. Nonetheless, this whole area really is a one of permanent revolution.

The effects of the military revolution on political life were immediate and obvious. Most Italian city states lost their independence immediately after the French invasion of 1494: smaller and poorer states could not protect their sovereignty in a world of ever larger actors. This is not to say that these city states left no legacy: their capitalistic military techniques came to be adopted throughout Europe, by the armies of Elizabeth I of England quite as much as by those of military entrepreneurs like Wallenstein. That there were such entrepreneurs showed how hard it was for states to monopolize violence, albeit their very existence depended upon it. In order to do so they needed money, money and yet more money.

Before analyzing the rather different tactics adopted by absolutist and constitutional states in their drive to raise money, let us first ask why states fought at all. Whilst wars between states are occasioned by many issues, from territorial claims to a desire for prestige, the best answer to this question remains that given at the time by such writers as Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant: given that states in a multipolar system have no government above them, the search for secure sovereignty is always likely to make war rational. Accordingly, France refused at key points in the Thirty Years War to side with Spain, despite sharing the Catholic faith, precisely because it preferred a balance of power to the emergence of any European hegemony.

European rulers and their peoples were, however, far from content with this situation. Accordingly, hesitant attempts were made to move from the mere anarchy of a system of states to a genuine society of states. Renaissance courts first sought to establish shared rules, not least so that their ambassadors might thereby be protected. This process received a further significant boost at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 when religious obligation was held to follow state lines. But it was the horrors of the Thirty Years War that encouraged an active attempt to order international politics. What is noticeable about the designs produced at Munster and Osnabruck – far different meeting places for Catholic and Protestant parties were necessary – is that they sought to deal with the past war. This gave a measure of success for the future: the situation of the German princes was guaranteed in such a way that they were secure until 1806. More importantly, the religious issue was removed (except of course for war against the Ottomans) from the international agenda – indeed one can say that the inability of either Catholics or Protestants to gain complete victory at this time is the factor underlying the beginnings of toleration within European civilization. But the attempt to deal with the underlying issue – the Spanish bid for hegemony – was less successful. If Spain was humbled, no rules were created by means of which future bids for hegemony could be prevented. The fact that no European peace treaty in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was able to create such rules meant that war and the preparation for war continued to force states to find money in order to survive. How then did they go about this task? Two regime strategies, those of constitutionalism and of absolutism, stand out, and each can be considered in turn.

The most obvious political development within Europe from the late sixteenth century onwards was the creation of

absolutist regimes in Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In principle, there were two defining characteristics of absolutism: the monarch was held to be the sole human source of law whilst government was to be by means of a professional bureaucracy and a standing army. In practice, it is important to note limits to supposedly 'absolute' power. Absolutist rulers were not emperors, and they remained subject to divine and to natural law; equally, they were still supposed to live off their own and had no claim to the 'private' property of their subjects. With the exception of Russia, absolutist rulers had no stomach for really taking on their landed upper class: much more typical was the French pattern of seeking to watch over them at Versailles – attendance at which in any case diminished aristocratic power in the localities. But were these rather limited developments enough to increase the power of absolutist rulers to a significant extent? The answer to this in historical terms must be a resounding negative: in the test of war, absolutism, first in Spain and then in France, was found to be deficient. The infrastructural weaknesses involved can best be seen by concentrating attention on the French case.

Rebellion by the great nobles in the Fronde in the mid-seventeenth century meant that no attempt was made to extract revenue from the landed upper class: rather, they were exempted from tax. More widely, the attempt to reconstitute the tax base in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century must be judged a notable failure. Taxation remained largely direct in character, falling very largely on the land: the weakness of absolutism stands most clearly revealed in the failure – and this despite Richelieu's reduction of the independence of the towns! – to impose indirect taxes on commercial dealings, which developed rapidly during the eighteenth century. This was just one example of special privileges and exemptions, the most important of which was the sale of offices. To all this must be added those corrupt and nepotistic practices that characterized even the reforming ministries of Colbert. The consequence of all this was that the largest part of the tax burden fell on the peasantry of the populous north-east of France. It is not surprising to discover that it was this section of the peasantry which was prepared to take the law into its own hands in 1789.

If we are to realize the full weakness of the French state, however, some attention must be given to comparative extraction rates. At the end of the eighteenth century, the French economy was still at least double the size of that of Britain, despite the larger share that commerce played in the economy of the island nation. Nonetheless, Britain won every encounter in the War of the Atlantic between the two powers – except for the occasion when she fought alone when trying to retain the America colonies. The reason for this success is simple. Taxes as a per cent of GNP in France rose from 5.06 per cent in 1700 to 8.71 per cent in 1789; in contrast, those of Britain rose from 11.90 per cent to 18.61 per cent in the same years (J. Goldstone, 1991). Before turning to the important task of seeing how Britain managed this, it is as well to stress the point at issue. In the late 1780s France faced a crisis brought on by bankruptcy: it was unable to pay for the accumulated cost of war, even though it had in fact been at peace for some time. The weakness that war discovered in French society was not, however, anything to do with exhaustion or poverty: its troubles lay in the inflexible and infrastructurally weak institutions of what was still a patrimonial state.

There is a sense in which Britain had faced in the middle of the seventeenth century the crisis that confronted France

in 1789. By 1640 the gentry were unwilling to surrender taxation revenues to a king whose foreign and domestic policy they did not trust. However, the British case differs in that the political nation in 1640 was not facing an absolutist king, merely one who had wished to attain this status. The defeat of royal pretensions owed much to two factors. First, Britain's geopolitical position encouraged spending on naval rather than armed forces, an accident which deprived the monarch of a standing army that could be used to control his own society effectively. Second, the centralized nature of feudalism in Britain meant that opposition to the king could not easily be handled: where European monarchs could deal with one regional assembly at a time, a permanent fact of British political life was that there was but a single national parliament.

The consequences of the defeat of absolutism in Britain were profound, and the most remarkable have to do with the increased efficiency of the state. The victory of parliament in the Civil War brought fundamental reform. Life tenure was gradually eliminated, the traffic in offices curbed, fee-taking discouraged, salaries raised and recruitment opened to all with talent. Boards of commissioners were named to run the navy and ordnance and supervise customs and excise, and a new army built up free of venality. The Restoration in 1660 looked set to reverse these developments, but humiliating defeat in the Second Dutch War (1665–7) gave parliament the chance to re-institute the key reforms – and to go beyond them. Underlying all the reforms that took place was an increase in parliamentary control. If considerable conflict took place between 1660 and, say, 1725, the key point that needs to be made is nonetheless crystal clear: an increase in the ability of the political nation to control the monarch made them ally their fortunes more closely to the state's. The point at issue can be made very simply: the landed classes were prepared to pay high taxes because they could supervise how they were spent. Different sources of social power pointed in the same direction in eighteenth-century Britain, rather than blocking each other. This is not to deny that divisions remained. On the contrary, one of the signal political achievements of eighteenth-century Britain was the creation of a conception of a 'loyal opposition', that is, of the right to criticize details secure in the knowledge that the fundamentals of political order are accepted. This in turn was made possible and in turn rendered more possible such growth in the economy that every section of the élite stood to benefit. If land was taxed so too was the very rapid development of commerce, something which particularly delighted the state given that it is always easier to tax things which move. That the British state was no weakling, and that its power was enhanced by the spread of commerce, is perhaps best demonstrated by the founding of the Bank of England. If the state benefited immediately from the way in which the Bank diminished its debt by converting it to low yield consols, its long-term military power was vastly enhanced by the ability to borrow more broadly.

The modernization of the British state was, at key points, less inevitable than the product of luck. Most important in this context is the simple fact that Britain, from the end of the eighteenth century, was able to move to industrialism: in contrast to the Dutch, whose early capitalism could go no further given the exhaustion of peat stocks, Britain had sufficient coal resources to allow the most fundamental power transformation in history. The loss of the American colonies consequent on their refusal to pay taxation without representation was also a blessing in disguise: it forced that

further attack on 'old corruption' responsible for making the state efficient enough to triumph against revolutionary France. If a key element in that modernization was a split amongst the élite, some of whom supported 'economical reform', it is worth noting that popular politics were making themselves felt by the end of the eighteenth century. If one cause of this was an increase in civil society links brought by the commercial revolution of the time, another was the increasing taxation demanded by the state. At this point a remarkable general development must be noted. Movements of popular protest in the sixteenth century were habitually the result of local issues. By the eighteenth century popular protest had been territorialized to such an extent that social movements were accordingly directed against the state.

This consideration of Britain and France allows a final point of great importance to be made. Although political argument occurred concerning the nature of British – or, quite often, English – virtues, there can be no doubt but that by the end of the eighteenth century nationalist sentiments had spread through what was becoming a nation-state. Given geopolitical rivalry, it is scarcely surprising that the popular soon became the national – which means that this period sees the beginning of the creation of popular national stereotypes throughout Europe. This is yet another way in which the British state was strengthened in the eighteenth century, and in a way that did not disrupt society. The contrast with France is once again clear. There the national principle was enshrined only in revolution – in the course of which totally new principles of politics, properly held to distinguish modern from early modern politics, were developed.

THE START OF EUROPE'S DOMINATION OF THE WORLD

The consequence of the intensification of power resources within Europe were increasingly felt throughout the world by the end of the eighteenth century. If the European incursion into the Americas and Asia had initially been small and for purposes of trade, it became an altogether more powerful force. Most obviously, Spain and Portugal acquired vast empires, not least because the diseases they brought wreaked demographic disaster in South America. Settler society in North America established a completely new social world. Control from London (but not from Paris) was less bureaucratic but this did not make life easier for those on the receiving end; to the contrary, civil society forces confident in their racism began to wipe out the native societies they encountered as soon as they were strong enough to do so. The loss of Britain's first empire in North America did not, of course, prevent it expanding massively in the rest of the world. The battle of Plassey in 1757 cemented the move in Asia from trade to the acquisition of territorial empire. Of course, it would be a mistake to suggest that rule was always exercised directly by Europeans. This was often not so. In India, British hegemony was exercised through client princes, whose existence increasingly depended on their obedience; more generally, indigenous states changed utterly as the result of contact with the West – not least in West Africa where moneys gained from slave trade allowed for the dramatic construction of native imperial systems. All-in-all, by the end of the eighteenth century, only Japan and China remained free from interference – but, as we know, that was soon to change. In general, the pattern of development was increasingly influenced by European dominance.

That dominance rested on two intertwined forces. Early European trade had often, despite the extortion of protection monies, proved to be compatible with and complementary to the activities of Islamic and Chinese traders. Furthermore, much of the trade was initially conducted by capitalist traders, albeit such traders – most notably, of course, the East India Companies of the Dutch and the English – were licensed by states. But the presence of competing capitalist organizations did not create a stable situation, with the dynamic of development in the periphery proving to be the same as that in Europe itself. State competition variously between Portugal, Spain, Holland, France and Britain encouraged a search for security. The fear that others might permanently acquire territory led each state to pre-emptive territorial strikes. European state competition, rather than capitalism *per se*, encouraged the building of empires. It is worth stressing, in this context, that European economic development was not in any sense economically dependent upon its peripheries.³

All these considerations force a conclusion upon us. There can be no doubt but that the European impact on the rest of the world was exceedingly destructive. Some of this was the result of accident rather than design, as in the fearful demographic consequences of diseases that ravaged the Americas. But much was the result of extraordinary cruelty and barbarity: millions of Africans died in the slave-trade's 'middle passage' between West Africa and the West Indies, whilst whole cultures were destroyed by the ruthlessness with which European settlers quenched their hunger for land. No triumphalism should occasion any account of the rise of the West: for that rise was written in blood of others.

NOTES

- 1 It is worth noting, however, that the success of this sort of low intensity rule depended in very large part upon having nomads rather than other states of similar stature as neighbours.
- 2 A distinction is properly drawn between this 'prebendal' feudalism and the feudalism of the Occident. Only in the latter case was land formally alienated, i.e. even the fiction that the land was the possession of the ruler was abandoned.
- 3 As this goes against the grain of much recent popular and scholarly opinion, it is well worth highlighting a brilliant analysis that makes the point particularly powerfully: Patrick O'Brien, 1982, pp. 1–18.

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CULTURAL CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES

Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo

The two decades that elapsed between Christopher Columbus's first voyage (1492) and the arrival of the Portuguese in the Molucca Islands (1512) may well be considered the watershed between two eras. The era prior to 1492 may be said to have been characterized by a certain balance among the great civilizations of Eurasia, by their essentially land-bound and continental character, by the fact that there was little contact among them and by the yet secondary role played by maritime communications. The era following 1512 saw the development of regular sea voyages between all the continents, including the recently discovered New World and, from the end of the eighteenth century, Australia and the Pacific islands as well; as a result, where before contacts between civilizations and cultures had been few and far between or indirect, relatively infrequent and on a small scale, they now became more numerous and more consequential. Europe was able to take full advantage of these new circumstances, not only reaping the benefits of trade in which it engaged even then on a world scale, but also gaining new knowledge about the world and about the rich geographical and human diversity of the earth. This widening of Europe's intellectual horizons acted as a powerful spur, gradually causing it to become more productive, in the economic, technical and above all scientific fields. Islam, China and India, however, did not seize the new opportunities which they failed to appreciate, and which they were actually unaware of or indeed deliberately rejected. All this made it possible, albeit more gradually and more slowly than is usually believed, for the previous balance among the civilizations of the Old World to shift in favour of Europe, whose ascendancy could be seen from the mid-eighteenth century and heralded its subsequent hegemony as an industrial and scientific civilization in the nineteenth century.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONCEPT OF THE FRONTIER

It is true that there were increasing contacts between civilizations and peoples from the sixteenth century onwards, but such contacts had always existed or at least ever since the human race had become scattered over much of the earth and as the various peoples developed increasingly distinct and different ways of life. Given the great intrinsic and chronological variety of those contacts, it may be useful, in order to classify them in some way, to use the concept of

frontier which has its origins in the historiography of the United States but is applicable to many other places and historical periods. In the broadest sense, the frontier may be defined as the geographical area within which a people on the move comes into contact with another people or other peoples whose culture is very different from theirs. The frontier also designates at the same time the process of interaction of those peoples and of their respective cultures which are influenced by each other (*acculturation*) to a greater or lesser degree. If contact does not entail the military or political domination of one or more peoples by another, isolated elements and features of the foreign culture are usually incorporated selectively into the recipient culture, and the latter in turn exerts a similar influence on the former. If the differences in the degree of development of the cultures coming in contact are very great, the most developed culture exerts a powerful influence over the other, especially if it dominates the latter militarily or politically, possibly leading to the complete *assimilation* of the weakest culture by the strongest one.

Normally, however, *cultural fusion* occurs, resulting in a new synthesis of elements of the cultures in contact, but structurally different from either one of them. In such cases, it is more common for one of the cultures to predominate over the other or others after an ever-complicated process in which the absorption of cultural elements implies *selection* of some, *rejection* of others and *modification* of most of them. The result is a mixture that is much more complicated than it appears. In the field of religion, for example, the apparent fusion of religious beliefs and practices of diverse origins (*syncretism*) is not always a mere superimposition but rather accretions of one religion incorporating elements of another, which in fact ceases to exist except through this legacy in the guise of superstitions, liturgical variants, and local traditions or customs. Then again, there are instances of resistance, either selective resistance in respect of specific cultural elements or total; in its efforts to withstand the influence of another culture, a given culture undergoes changes as great as those that would have occurred had it accepted acculturation, albeit of a different kind.

FRONTIERS IN A PREHISTORIC STAGE

The least known frontiers are those populated by pre-literate nomadic peoples or subsistence farmers. Their movements and history are known to us through archaeological evidence,

which is never very eloquent, or are deduced through comparative linguistic studies. These peoples' oral traditions provide some information about their past, combining true facts with myths and history with literature into a whole that is very difficult to interpret, especially as far as remote times are concerned, because the techniques currently applied to the study of oral history lose much of their effectiveness beyond two generations back from the present.

The *Bantu* peoples, who today inhabit practically all of southern Africa from around the equator and number more than 60 million, are a case in point. What they have in common is, first, the fact that they belong to the black race and, second, that they speak one of the more than 200 languages of the Bantu subgroup of the Niger-Congo linguistic family; one of the most widely used languages is *Swahili*, which has been influenced by Arabic and is a kind of *lingua franca* used today in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and on the islands and seaboard of East Africa, and which developed a written literature using Arabic characters as from the eighteenth century. Community of race and language bespeaks a single origin: diversification of languages and ways of life reveals considerable geographical dispersion, the general pattern of which can be determined by collating archaeological, linguistic, botanical and even historical data (for example, references in Ptolemy's *Geography* and in other ancient writers).

The dispersion of the *Bantus* seems to have started at the beginning of the Christian era, as a result of rapid population growth due to a combination of three factors. The first was the introduction into sub-Saharan Africa of domesticated plants from Asia such as the yam and the banana which were taken to Madagascar by Malay emigrants and then spread to the nearest continental seaboard, thus providing a basis for the development of productive tropical agriculture. The second was the introduction of metal-working and the use of iron which spread from the north of the continent and made it possible to produce more effective tools. The third factor was the spreading of domesticated livestock from Egypt and along the eastern highlands, which was to contribute to the cultural diversification of the group through the emergence of pastoral peoples. Starting in the fifteenth century, a number of *Bantu* States organized as monarchies of divine origin were formed on the fertile lands around the East African lakes, from Lake Albert in the north to Lake Tanganyika in the south, prominent among which were: Buganda on the northern shore of Lake Victoria; Rwanda, beside Lake Kivu; Luha, on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika and Lundato to the south-east. The arrival in Africa of maize, tobacco and other American plants was instrumental in the further development of these and other African States as from the seventeenth century.

As they advanced towards the south, the *Bantus* absorbed a Negroid population group that had settled earlier in the River Congo Basin, the *Bushman* further to the south, and the *Hottentots*, who were a people of mixed *Bushman* and *Caucasoid* origin still widespread throughout East Africa around the year 1000 and who also came to be assimilated by the *Bantus*. The latter reached the extreme south of the continent shortly after 1770, and came into contact with the *Boeren* or *Bosjes* of the then Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, where they have remained to this day.

On the Arctic shores, which were not populated until very late, the main movements of peoples, belonging to both *Caucasoid* and *Mongoloid* races, were from the south

northwards. The *Mongoloids* spread out from the Lake Baikal region to the north-west, north and north-east over a very long period; some of those groups, like the *Yakuts*, did not reach the midpoint of the River Lena before the seventeenth century; others, such as the Proto-Eskimo peoples, reached the Arctic region early and were probably the first to switch from being reindeer hunters and freshwater fishermen to specializing in hunting sea mammals and in salt-water fishing. Modern Eskimo culture is not, however, a hang-over from an ancient way of life, but the outcome of a recent development known to archaeologists as the maritime tradition of the North, a cultural variant that originated in north-east Siberia, not far from the Bering Strait, just before the beginning of the Christian era, and spread eastwards along the Arctic coast until in about AD 1200 it reached the western seaboard of Greenland (Thule culture). These peoples moved southwards along that coast, and came into conflict with the Viking settlers of Scandinavian origin who left the island shortly before AD 1500. Nevertheless, Europeans regained a foothold on the island a few decades later as a result of sporadic visits by whaling ships and, as from 1721, the arrival of the first Danish immigrants; between the latter and the Eskimos interbreeding soon began.

The European presence in the Americas was in some instances a barrier to movement by indigenous peoples like, for example, the *Caribs*, advancing from the Venezuelan coast and the Lesser Antilles and brought to a halt in Puerto Rico; on the other hand, it gave rise to further migration as quite a few tribes left their usual places of abode in order to move away from the Europeans, which sometimes entailed a difficult adaptation to a different physical environment. Even in those areas not directly affected by European colonization, its consequences were felt in the form of frightful epidemics of contagious diseases from the Old World transmitted along indigenous trade routes over long distances. However, the introduction of horses and techniques for breaking them improved the lives of many indigenous peoples, making it easier to hunt guanacos in the pampas and Patagonia, and bison in the North American prairies, leading from the sixteenth century onwards to a rise in the population there.

FRONTIERS OF WESTERN EUROPE

Although all civilizations have gone through phases of territorial expansion, the one referred to as European by virtue of its original geographical location has been said to be more inclined towards expansion than any other, from the time of its modest beginnings in ancient Greece and its diffusion along the shores of the Roman *Mare Nostrum*. The Roman conquest and Roman institutions caused the Mediterranean world to be culturally of a piece, thus preparing it for the spread of Christianity which was to be its defining characteristic in terms of religion. It was indeed the Church that not only preserved European civilization after invasion by barbari or 'barbarian' peoples, but also, by preaching the gospel to them, succeeded in assimilating them culturally and thus extended Europe to the north and east by bringing the Germanic, Scandinavian and Slav peoples into its cultural fold. The expansion of Europe continued in spite of the invasions and consequent territorial losses that it regularly suffered; the Arab conquests during the seventh and eighth centuries deprived it for ever of the romanized parts of North Africa and, for quite a while, of most of the Iberian peninsula,

during the ninth and tenth centuries it was harried by Normans from the north and the Magyars from the east; and while the Saracens were taking possession of the Mediterranean and several of the Mediterranean islands in the thirteenth century, the Mongols were laying waste Eastern Europe, destroying the first emergent Russian States; then, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman Turks, after annihilating the Byzantine Empire, advanced to a point where they posed a threat to both Central Europe and the renewed European presence in the Mediterranean. Over the centuries, the alternating expansion and contraction of this frontier between Turkey and Europe was responsible for the emergence of a large number of ethnic, religious and language enclaves that came to form the basis for the geopolitical concept of *balkanization*, whose potential for cultural diversification and for political and military conflict has survived right up to the present day.

One early expansionist episode of special significance and importance was the First Crusade, which started in 1096 as a collective undertaking of Christendom to free the Holy Land from the 'infidels' and make it accessible and safe for Christian pilgrims. The Crusaders founded kingdoms in Palestine and Syria which withstood Muslim pressure until going under in 1291: while they existed, merchants from Venice, Genoa and other Italian city-states met the logistical needs of the Crusaders and provided transport for the pilgrims, but they also established a number of trading posts in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the shores of the Black Sea. From then on until it lost those colonies in the seventeenth century, Venice was the main intermediary between Europe and the East, growing rich from its trade in expensive products and luxury goods, bringing Eastern spices, Chinese silks, Persian carpets and other Asian manufactured articles to the West. Genoa, Venice's rival until the fifteenth century, extended its mercantile activities towards the western Mediterranean, with the result that Italy's commercial, financial and naval techniques became known along the coast of the Iberian peninsula where they were adapted later on by Iberian sailors and merchants for the purpose of exploring the Atlantic and trading with the Americas.

To make up for the losses sustained in Eastern Europe, the Atlantic was systematically explored during the fifteenth century, and this was to be of crucial importance for the future course of European civilization. The venture started modestly during the thirteenth century, after the Christians reconquered the southwest region of the Iberian peninsula, with Atlantic voyages by Portuguese and Andalusian fishermen who drew on their experience of the waters between the Straits of Gibraltar and Cape Bojador and, on their way back, rediscovered the Canary Islands and Madeira, and gained the first sight of the Azores. The fish they caught became the staple of a highly reputed and lasting food processing industry that exported both salted fish and luxury sea-foods, including most notably tuna in olive oil. A suitable type of ship was required for deep-sea fishing, and this spurred the creativity of shipwrights who combined aspects of the art of Mediterranean and Atlantic shipbuilding to design new prototypes, the most successful of which was the *caravel*, which became a prime means of exploring the Atlantic and all of the Atlantic coastline during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Benefiting then from experienced sailors and suitable ships, the Genoese, Spanish and Portuguese merchants set their sights on the exploration of the Atlantic coast of Africa, whence originated the gold that was brought to the Muslim cities of the Mediterranean from far away in the south. Then

for good measure, Prince Henry, the son and brother of Portuguese kings, provided the planning, continuity of effort and initial investment capital that were required to make the exploration of the coast between Cape Bojador and Sierra Leone a profitable venture, and at his death in 1460 this enterprise was regarded highly enough for his country to dedicate itself to it on a national scale. Shortly after, when explorations of the Gulf of Guinea in 1472 showed the continent to be tapering, it was thought that the southernmost tip of Africa was close at hand; the explorers were then set the new objective of finding a passage that would make it possible to sail directly from Europe to East Asia. Spices, previously obtained through costly Muslim and Venetian middlemen, were the commodities most coveted and sought after. The Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1487, albeit with more difficulty and covering a greater distance than expected, and in 1497 Vasco da Gama undertook the first direct voyage to India. The Molucca Islands, the main source of spices, were reached in 1512.

In Africa, the Portuguese succeeded in re-routing to the coast much of the Sudanese gold that was previously exported exclusively through the Sahara by way of the Muslim caravan routes. The caravan routes were also the sole channel for the trade in black slaves, which the Portuguese likewise re-routed towards the coast and took up from the mid-fifteenth century, expanding it considerably one century later. The Portuguese hoped to secure the monopoly of the spice trade in Asia; although this eluded them as spices continued to reach Europe via the old routes through the Turkish Empire and Venice, thanks to them, from 1501 onwards, the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope became the spice route *par excellence*. In addition, they showed themselves to be capable of dominating the main shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, squeezing out the Muslim traders who had previously monopolized them, trading in their own ships and demanding that foreign ships carry a *cartaz* or Portuguese license in order to sail with a measure of safety. In view of the length of the route to Asia and the time needed for the voyage, bigger ships – carracks and *naos* – having considerable cargo capacity and broad sails, and on which a fair number of cannons could be mounted, were then built in Spanish and Portuguese shipyards.

The technical superiority of the Europeans – not only the Portuguese but also the Dutch, English and French who followed in their trail to Africa and Asia as from the seventeenth century – lay in their sailing ships and cannons, which gave them supremacy at sea although they were always very weak on land (see Map 8). For that reason, the Portuguese based their maritime trade on a minimum of *feitorias* or trading posts and harbour cities conquered and subsequently defended from the sea. The trading posts, established according to the ancient Mediterranean tradition of the Phoenicians and Greeks, were more or less fortified commercial ports situated on the coast or on coastal islands, a combination of store, market, anchoring place and village, and the biggest ones grew into cities. Considerable interbreeding, both biological and cultural, occurred in and around the trading posts, based on stable but mainly illegitimate unions between Portuguese men and indigenous women; their descendants, deeply religious Christians, played an outstanding role in spreading the Portuguese language, which in a more or less modified form came to be used over a very wide area, long gaining currency as a *lingua franca* in extensive coastal regions in Asia and Africa.

This commercial expansion was paralleled by population movements towards the Central Atlantic archipelagoes and

later on the New World. During the Middle Ages, the Iberian peoples had long and intense experience of frontier life: they had settled in desert regions, conquered Muslim peoples and repopulated big cities and rural areas, practised transhumance and became masters in the organization of *algaras* and *cabalgadas* – short swift surprise raids on foot and on horseback against enemy territory in order to seize semi-movable or movable booty. Castile was named after the forts – *castella* in medieval Latin – built to provide defence against raids by the Muslims who also adopted the tactic of counter-attack and ambush. The Portuguese simply carried on as before, embarking on the conquest of northern Morocco which they considered they were reconquering because it had belonged to the ancient *Hispania iunior* and had been Christianized before the Arab conquest. In the period between the taking of Ceuta in 1415 and the disastrous battle of Alcazarquivir in 1578, Portugal shed a great deal of blood in its futile bid to dominate the region. Castile confined itself to a series of cavalry raids and looting expeditions, concentrating, however, on the Canary Islands from 1393 until they were completely conquered in 1496. In the meantime, the Portuguese were sealing the remaining uninhabited archipelagoes of the middle Atlantic which, like the Canaries, were to be no more than territorial extensions of Europe, into which they were soon integrated.

Scarcely had America been discovered than the Castilians started in 1494 to set up trading posts in the Greater Antilles based on the dredging of alluvial gold found by the discoverers. The gold was depleted in a quarter of a century but made it possible to finance both the establishment of domesticated European flora and fauna in America – which meant a real ecological revolution – and the conquest of 'Nuclear' America, that is to say, those territories, from Central Mexico to Peru, where indigenous civilizations were established. The spectacular nature of the conquest, which was generally achieved within a short space of time, has tended to put in the shade the much more important and lasting process of settlement and colonization, which immediately followed it and had a markedly medieval stamp. Each of the more than 200 Castilian cities founded during or after the conquest served historically as a small but vigorous culture hearth, a genuine centre for the spread of European ways of life relatively isolated because of the enormous distances and therefore forced to be as self-sufficient as possible in order to survive.


The Castilian city in America, which played a role comparable to that of the Roman *colonia* or colony in the ancient Mediterranean world, provided the physical and institutional framework for the establishment of a society organized along the lines of a European Estate system. The absence of a ruling class – there being no aristocracy – was remedied by the conquistadors and the first settlers taking on the function and life-style of the nobility, at least until its formal creation later on. That society adapted to local realities, allowing for the integration of new hybrid social groups, ambiguously called *castes*, resulting from intense and massive biological and cultural interbreeding. As for the aborigines, known as *Indians*, they also joined urban society in much higher numbers than is usually estimated, until becoming fully assimilated culturally. Each city was the centre of a medieval type of economy, characterized by its out-and-out economic diversification, its aspirations towards self-sufficiency and its aim of securing a plentiful and low-cost supply of consumer goods; it was dependent on Europe for just two essential metals, iron and – in Mexico only – mercury

for use in silver-working. Both metals could be imported thanks to the economic surpluses resulting from the mining of gold and silver, not only for export to Europe but also to provide the investment capital required for domestic economic development, which was generally rapid. In contrast with the medieval character of colonization, the political structure of Castile's American dominions was very modern as a result of the triumph of monarchical absolutism over the lordly and all but feudal aspirations of the conquistadors. Recent European fashions and models were also followed in science, literature and the arts.

Unlike the Spanish, the Portuguese established in Brazil an economic system that might be described as colonial because of its absolute dependence on Europe. It was based on the specialized production of sugar – and other tropical agricultural produce later on – for the growing European consumer market. The farming unit on which sugar-cane was cultivated and sugar produced, some of it in refined form, was called the *engenho* or sugar plantation. The sugar plantation, an adaptation of the medieval model developed in the Italian colonies of the eastern Mediterranean, was a very special mixture of capitalist enterprise and a patriarchal and all but feudal micro-society, whose manpower requirements led to the development of the African slave-trade with the Americas; it acted as a melting pot for European, African and indigenous races and cultures. From the seventeenth century onwards the sugar plantations in the Dutch, French and British colonies in the Lesser Antilles became much bigger for productivity reasons, governed by more progressive economic criteria and administered in a more impersonal manner (see Map 9).

Although it has cynically been said that religion was the pretext and greed the motive, there is no doubt that, because of their medieval origins, there was a very strong religious ingredient in the Iberian colonizations. In exchange for the privileges of *Royal Patronage*, the Castilian and Portuguese Crowns took on, as from 1508 and 1514 respectively, not only the task of financing and protecting the establishment of the Church in the colonized regions but also the more difficult and burdensome task of preaching the Gospel to the indigenous peoples and to all pagans in general. Although Christianity was not established in any lasting form outside the small areas in Asia and Africa where Portugal managed to consolidate its hold, it is estimated that 0.5 million to 1 million indigenous people were Christianized, in small scattered groups, from the African kingdom of the Kongo to the Molucca Islands, China and Japan. This figure is low if set against the total population of the two continents, but high in view of the limited resources available to the Portuguese Crown for such purposes, the small number of missionaries and the brief span of their lives when on mission in an insalubrious climate. The more intelligent evangelists tried to de-europeanize Christianity, attempting to adapt the essence of its dogma and ethics to the traditions and characteristics of the civilization in which it was to be propagated; that attempt, which could have had very weighty historical consequences, caused strong opposition among the missionaries themselves, theological debates in Europe and controversies as sensational as those sparked off by the so-called 'Chinese rites' and 'Malabar rites'. After a long period of doubt and equivocation, the Vatican finally took a stand against those rites in the eighteenth century, with the result that Christianity and Europeanization continued to be closely bound up with one another.

A different, albeit parallel, attempt to separate evangelization from Hispanicization occurred in America: the Franciscans



Map 8 European influence in the eastern hemisphere in 1690 (after G. Cèpedes).

in Mexico, the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas in Verapaz and the Jesuits in the missions in Paraguay are a few examples of those who tried to build a Utopian Church composed exclusively of Amerindians and European missionaries; although they scored some successes, which were nearly always short-lived and never conclusive, the indissoluble blend of Christianization and Hispanicization was deliberately imposed. When the Papacy finally acquired the resources to found the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (1622) and attempted to perform its evangelizing tasks directly, to revoke the powers granted to the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns through the institution of royal patronage, and to rid the missions of their nationalistic bias and content, it was too late for it to succeed. The Spanish Church converted the Indians of Spanish America to Christianity, although a number of remnants of pre-Hispanic religions survived as local traditions, rites, superstitions or magical practices. Under its policy of establishing settlements for Christianized Indians (*reducciones* and *encomendaciones*), the State assembled declining indigenous communities that had remained in rural areas and set them within the physical and institutional framework of *pueblos de indios* or Indian towns, in which mixed Indian-Spanish cultures emerged to replace vanished indigenous cultures. Cases of genuine religious syncretism – like that demonstrated by the Yucatan Mayas up to the end of the eighteenth century – or of partial Hispanicization were

exceptional: a two-pronged and simultaneous process of Christianization and Hispanicization, comparable with the romanization of the ancient Mediterranean world, was also deep-seated, all-encompassing and irreversible, even in Brazil where it was pursued less energetically. (It is to be noted that until the end of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese considered themselves to be Spaniards, the term used until that time to cover all the peoples of the Iberian peninsula.)

In contrast with the colonization practised by the Iberians, that undertaken later by the Dutch, English, French and, to a lesser degree, by the Swedes and the Danish from the seventeenth century onwards, corresponded to a more advanced stage in the development of capitalism. It therefore led to more intense and efficient economic exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the respective home countries. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Lesser Antilles were generating a greater volume of transatlantic trade and more profits for France and England than the whole of Spanish America for peninsular Spain. On the other hand, the costs of administering and defending Spanish America were immense in comparison with those of the small islands and the small British or French dominions. While the Spanish colonization was designed to people, evangelize and organize very vast territories, subsequent non-Iberian settlements were 'colonialistic' (as far as they pursued economic exploitation and dependence instead of economic development), centred



Map 9 European expansion in the western hemisphere in 1697 (after G. Céspedes).

on the organization of trade and not concerned with any missionary activity; racial interbreeding shrunk to modest proportions and the colonists organized their settlements on the edges of the areas inhabited by the indigenous peoples. France may be considered, up to a point, to be an intermediary case: missionary activities were carried out, not under royal patronage but through a *Société des missions étrangères de Paris*; an attempt was made to colonize North America but the population was so dispersed and small that it could not withstand British attacks.

FRONTIERS OF EASTERN EUROPE

The geographically European part of Russia was in principle a frontier or area of contact between Slav peoples living in forested regions and the Turkish and Mongolian steppe peoples from Central Asia who had settled south of them. The city of Novgorod, which was in contact with the Baltic Sea and the merchants of the Hanseatic League, was the commercial centre of the Slav zone and its link with Europe, while Moscow, the main bastion of defence against invasions

by the peoples of the steppes during the thirteenth century, was its political and military centre. The Slavs in this area pushed towards the north in the fourteenth century, partly displacing and partly assimilating the Finns and the Lapps, whose culture was rather primitive; as from 1478, the Slav zone was united politically under the authority of the Tsars who, between 1552 and 1598 succeeded in destroying the Tatar *khanates* that were blocking their passage towards the east along the line marked by the Ural Mountains and the course of the River Volga. The frontier of Siberia was thus opened up, the north-western part of which was occupied by the Russians by the end of the century. During the next century they continued their advance eastward until they reached the Pacific coast. Except for the region around Lake Baikal, where the local people put up some resistance, the thinly scattered nomadic population, consisting of groups whose culture became increasingly rudimentary according to how far east they lived, was partly exterminated – in spite of protective regulations issued in Moscow – and partly assimilated culturally.

The reason for such a spectacularly rapid expansion was the great and growing demand for skins, both in Russia itself

and in Western and Northern Europe, to which up to 80 per cent of skins produced in Siberia were exported. The frontier was able to be pushed back because of the daring, physical resistance and energy of the Russian trappers, but also because the climate and the lie of the land were not very different from those of northern Russia to which they were accustomed; they were also expert river navigators, which enabled them more easily to cross that land frontier so different from the maritime frontier of Western Europe. Nor did they come up against serious human obstacles; in most of Siberia, they encountered only scattered tribes of primitive hunters whose relations with each other were marked by rivalry and hostility and who each tried to win the Russians over to their side but finally succumbed to them. The advancing Russian trappers in the front line were few in number, but their weapons and tools gave them overwhelming technical superiority over the natives; in the second line behind them, the traders who bought the skins and provided them with supplies established fixed channels of communication and trade with the West; the government in Moscow set up fortified posts manned by small garrisons at points of greatest strategic value along those routes, both to defend the territory and to give support to the first governors in their efforts to establish a public administration and the rule of law.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, that part of Siberia that comes within the taiga, or coniferous forest belt, changed considerably. First, a new frontier region for pelts and skins had opened up in North America from which the English working for the *Hudson Bay Company* and, especially, French and half-caste trappers, were already sending to Europe large quantities of skins. These were, for the first time, competing in terms of class, quality and price with those sent from Russia, which was forced to adjust its prices and lower its profit margins just when its transportation line had been extended to the far east of Siberia. Second, the vanguard on what had hitherto been a land frontier no longer consisted of trappers only, but also of military garrisons billeted in ports along the Pacific coast which served as bases for naval expeditions organized either to open up a sea route to Europe via the Arctic Ocean or to consolidate the first fisheries recently established in the Aleutian Islands, or to explore the coasts of Alaska where the Russians soon settled. This maritime exploration, which marked the true beginnings of the scientific expeditions characteristic of Enlightenment Europe during the second half of the century, was a notable innovation, symptomatic as it was of the already complete Europeanization of Russia. About 1725, the metal-working plants built near the iron and copper mines in the Urals marked the beginning of the new mining frontier of Siberia, which was preceded by the discovery of some gold and silver deposits and became fully developed during the twentieth century.

The Russians advanced much later into the steppes region in the south because of the aggressiveness of the Tartar and Mongol peoples and the military effectiveness of their light cavalry. It seems to have been the incursions by the Mongols into Burma and into the Chinese province of Yunnan at the end of the thirteenth century that caused the bubonic plague to spread among the rodent population of the steppes; subsequent epidemics among humans during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries led to the depopulation of extensive regions of Central Asia and even the south of the European part of Russia, as seems to be proved by the fact that large areas of the Ukraine were uninhabited when the Russian advance began early in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, the Mongols had learnt from the Chinese how to use

gunpowder and they had many opportunities to acquire firearms which the Ottoman Empire supplied with pleasure to the Khanate of Crimea. What both the Mongols and the Tartars failed to do was to keep adequate stores of gunpowder and ammunition for their weapons. Exposed as they were to epidemics and lacking a war industry comparable to that of the Europeans, the peoples of the steppes stopped being a threat to the sedentary civilizations of the South, East and West for the first time in history. In the seventeenth century the Mongol horsemen, previously invincible and representing the most effective light cavalry ever recorded in military history, were defenceless against quite sophisticated firearms and, as fighters, proved to be behind the times. From the eighteenth century onwards, the steppes were overrun by Russian peasants in search of new arable lands, who finally settled and took possession of them.

On the banks of the River Amur, the Russians came into contact with the Chinese, who were likewise in search of arable land and had spread northwards, opening up and settling extensive forest areas in Manchuria. These contacts resulted in China tea being adopted as the Russian national drink and in the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanchang (1689), under which China took over control of the entire Amur basin until the mid-nineteenth century. It was from this time onwards that the frontier between China and Russia was determined by the line of the river. Before the end of the eighteenth century, the *Cossacks* of the southern frontier, who were already organized as regular troops of the Tsar, had extended Russian control as far as the Black Sea, the regions close to the Caucasus Mountains and the north-eastern shores of the Caspian Sea (see Map 8).

FRONTIERS OF ISLAM

Until the seventeenth century, the Islamic world was the most far-flung, influential and powerful civilization, centered on three major States. The richest and no doubt the strongest from the military point of view was the Turkish Ottoman Empire which in the sixteenth century dominated Asia Minor, Western Asia, Egypt, North Africa except for Morocco, and south-eastern Europe through which it expanded until it posed a threat to Vienna in 1529. To the east of the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire experienced a remarkable economic and artistic renaissance under the new Safavid dynasty. Lastly, the Mughal Empire stretched from Afghanistan, expanding gradually towards the south as from 1526 until it encompassed practically all of India at the end of the seventeenth century. These three empires surrounded by lesser Muslim States formed the Islamic world, which stretched from Morocco in the West to the Molucca Islands in East Asia, and from the steppes of Central Eurasia in the north to the south-eastern coasts of Africa and part of the island of Madagascar.

So large, rich and populous an aggregate was always undergoing expansion, a long process that was unbroken from the seventh century when it started with the Arab conquests and continued in spite of brief checks and some local setbacks, as was the case with the Iberian peninsula, reconquered by the Christians. It was indeed in Europe that the Muslim advance ran into the greatest and best organized resistance, both culturally — Orthodox Christianity held its ground in Greece and the Balkans under Turkish rule — and militarily; but the Turkish Empire continued to be a sea power in the Mediterranean even after the important, but

indecisive, naval defeat of Lepanto in 1571; on land, the Turks' military superiority over Austria and Poland lasted until 1683.

In Africa, the countries of the Maghrib were defended effectively against persistent attacks mounted by the Portuguese from the fifteenth century and by the Spanish from the sixteenth; furthermore, the expansion of Islam in Africa, which started in the Middle Ages, continued uninterrupted until the end of the eighteenth century in two main areas: on the east coast, towards the south and also inland, and in the Sudan, south of the Sahara desert. In some instances, Islamization was achieved peacefully, spread by merchants who took pagan wives and brought up their children in their father's faith; in others, it was the result of wars and conquests, as in present-day Somalia or in the Sudanese kingdom of Songhai, which was invaded by Morocco in 1590. The results, in terms of the number of converts, were much better than those achieved by the Christian missions organized by Portugal. Lastly, Muslim traders distributed black slaves from East Africa throughout Islam – as they had been doing since the Middle Ages – in numbers below those brought by the European slave-trade from the mid-fifteenth century, first to Mediterranean countries and then to tropical America.

South-East Asia and Indonesia was another important area for Islamic expansion through the agency of Muslim traders. They arrived by sea, partly from Arabia but mainly from India, attracted by the lucrative trade with China and the spice islands; they brought up their children, the fruit of polygamous unions with women of the local population, in their faith and went around spreading Islam in the harbour cities where they lived and through the coastal areas where they traded. They started to arrive in this region in the thirteenth century and, as from the fifteenth, were concentrated in the great port of Malacca, and spread from there along the northern coasts of Sumatra and Java and, much later, to the north of the Celebes, to all the Molucca Islands and finally to a stretch of the Borneo coast and the island of Mindanao until the Spanish put down roots in Manila in 1571, thereby halting the advance of Islam in the Philippines. The need for order and security required by any lucrative trade led to the gradual emergence in the above-mentioned places of Muslim coastal states, generally in the form of small sultanates, just big enough to perform the task of providing protection and support for trade. The conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511 shook but did not put an end to the Muslim hold on the region, as the reigning dynasty withdrew to the southern tip of the Malay peninsula where it founded the Johore Sultanate.

Disputes and rivalry between the Muslim states made it possible for the Portuguese to retain control over Malacca until it was taken by the Dutch in 1641. The Portuguese were able, however, to be kept in check up to a certain point, in spite of their supremacy at sea. It was already well into the seventeenth century that the Muslim positions started to weaken, not only in the Indian Ocean, but also on its shores, before the invasions made by the Dutch and the English who were stronger, more aggressive and commercially more competitive than the Portuguese. If any single event may be cited as marking the beginning of the decline of Islam, it was probably the signing of the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), under which the Turkish Empire, which, from being on the offensive in the sixteenth century, had adopted a defensive stance in the seventeenth, acknowledged complete defeat by a European power; this event was particularly serious for

Islam, which had always considered military victories to be proof of divine blessing. During the eighteenth century, it suffered an increasing number of defeats, and the Turkish, Safavid and Mughal Empires started to collapse; the Muslim states in the Eurasian steppes were also swept away; the Europeans could allow themselves the luxury of contending among themselves for supremacy in southern Asia and in the Indian Ocean, without, however, losing it to the Muslims anywhere. However, the political and military decline of the Muslim empires did not have any concomitant impact on the demographic and cultural features of Islam as a whole.

Faced with such a situation, two solutions were tried. The first was religious and consisted in regaining Allah's protection by restoring the faith of his Prophet in its pristine purity and by punishing sins and corruption harshly. The other possible solution lay in adopting the new economic and military techniques used so effectively by the Europeans. Both of these solutions were tried and there were even short-lived successes, but the miracle did not occur and the modernization bid failed. Perhaps the fault lay exclusively in the internal strife between Sunnis and Shi'is which shook the foundations of Islam from the first decade of the sixteenth century; its worst consequence was not the bloody conflict that it sparked off between Ottoman and Safavids, but the fact that both Turkish and Persian States then organized orthodox practices and religious education, persecuted critics and dissidents and imposed conservative and anti-intellectual attitudes that were both sterile and paralyzing.

RESISTANCE TO EUROPEAN EXPANSION

Europeanization of America was as far-reaching and thorough as it was rapid. In general, the indigenous cultures survived for only a short period of time as European colonists came to settle in one region after another. Mixed Amerindian-Hispanic cultures emerged in only a few areas of Spanish America. Indigenous resistance, very short-lived in general and in some instances non-existent, was very sustained and effective in some cases, for example, among the *Araucanians* in Chile; it was possible only in those circumstances where Europeans were few in number or were interested in keeping the frontier open, and where the Indians had the time, before being assimilated or destroyed, to learn European techniques – especially of warfare – and to devise, by imitation or invention, the means of counteracting them (see Map 9).

Although the presence of European navigators and merchants made many ports and coastal areas into frontiers from the sixteenth century on, in both Africa and Asia, it is evident that they long occupied a marginal position and had very little impact (see Map 8). In the case of Africa, geographical obstacles made the continent impenetrable, especially on its Atlantic front; first, the desolate coasts of the Sahara desert, then the impassable tropical forests, with rapids and waterfalls on practically all rivers, difficulties of acclimatization, and, above all, numerous tropical endemic diseases from malaria to sleeping sickness, helped to endanger and shorten the lives of the few travellers, missionaries, merchants or soldiers who were so bold as to live on the coast or who ventured into the interior. Until well into the nineteenth century, Europe did not have the techniques, scientific knowledge or capital required for such an undertaking. There was but one healthy and hospitable area, and there in 1652 the Dutch founded 'the tavern of the Indian Ocean', as Cape Town, a mere

stop-over and revictualing point on the long route to the East until the end of the eighteenth century, was called.

In contrast with Africa, resistance to the European presence in Asia was mainly human and cultural, not geographical. Islam succeeded in barring points of access to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; the Turkish Empire, which because of its central position was kept busy on two fronts, had to assign most of its naval resources to the Mediterranean, and so could not prevent European ships from gaining control over practically all of the Indian Ocean; the Persian Empire had to content itself with a purely defensive victory, wresting Hormuz from the Portuguese in 1622. The Europeans consequently sailed and traded without hindrance between the main ports of India and Indonesia; they bought spices with their earnings from this trade, thus minimizing the amount of precious metals that they had to bring with them from Europe for that purpose. But their influence did not extend beyond the trading posts that they used as bases, the ports that they visited and the small and scattered Christian missions.

It is true that the Jesuits introduced the use of the printing press into India, and the paintings and prints that they took there clearly had an influence on indigenous visual arts. But these and other examples have little significance alongside the fact that Hinduism revived and spread during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, although the Muslim conquests had deprived it of all state support and although Buddhism continued to be the official religion in places such as Sri Lanka, Burma and Siam, where it also constituted a sign of national identity as opposed to universal religions like Islam and Christianity. Even in South-East Asia, where small societies that could be defined as cultural hybrids subjected for centuries to external influences and invasions had coexisted and where Christians were at first well received and indeed encouraged to come, partly to counteract earlier Muslim penetrations – even there, once it was realized that their presence could endanger local customs and traditions, xenophobic attitudes developed spontaneously, together with inward-looking, isolationist policies. This state of affairs started to change only in the second half of the eighteenth century with the extension of British control in India and Dutch in Java.

By contrast with the typically conservative and traditionalist character of the central regions of Islam, its frontier areas (Arabic: *nahḍ* or *ḥawṣ*) were the setting not only for the exploits of the *ghazis* or warriors, but also for cultural exchanges and, as such, can be seen to have been, to varying degrees, areas of cultural syncretism and religious heterodoxy. The most notable and important case was the invasion of India and the subsequent formation of the Mughal Empire. Under the Emperor Akbar (1556–1605) there was a policy of tolerance towards the non-Muslim majority of the population and an attempt to apply the principle that all religions are basically true. His endeavours to merge the religious currents of Hinduism, Islam and Parseism – or at least their outward ceremonial aspects – did not prove successful, but the reign of Akbar as an exercise in religious tolerance and the drawing together of cultures was to mark a golden age in the history of India, and its capital, Fatehpur Sikri, came to represent the merging of Hindu and Muslim architectural traditions that was to culminate a century later in the rightly celebrated Taj Mahal in Agra.

FRONTIERS OF CHINA

China's relinquishment of its naval power and its voluntary isolation, suddenly decided upon in 1434 by an emperor of

the Ming dynasty who at the same time prohibited the building of ocean-going ships, had far-reaching consequences, one of them being to make it easier for the Europeans later on to gain control over the Indian Ocean and its trade routes. However incomprehensible it may seem to us today, that decision was not illogical from the point of view of the Chinese. To begin with, Beijing, the capital of the Chinese empire, lay not far from the edge of the steppes where the Mongols posed a serious and permanent threat; the Mings could not allow their resources to be dispersed for the sake of distant maritime ventures. Secondly, the merchant was held in Confucian philosophy to be a social parasite and while the previous dynasty, of Mongol origin, protected traders and their activities, the native Ming dynasty did not consider itself in duty bound to do so. On the contrary, the rural landowners' attachment to the soil, and to the mainland, won out, especially at a time when agriculture was making great strides forward. The fact that, on losing their jobs, many Chinese sailors joined the Japanese and Malay pirates who immediately took advantage of the power vacuum in the China Sea, certainly did nothing to raise the social prestige of the nautical professions. Above all, China had acquired such prestige and wealth, its economy had achieved such a degree of diversification and its institutions and culture such perfection and balance, that Chinese leaders rightly thought that they did not need anything from the outside world and – less wisely – that the situation would never change. They felt that it was enough to defend the borders of the empire by military means and to use coastguard vessels, which proved fairly effective against the pirates and were even capable of defeating Portuguese ships, along the coast.

History seemed to prove the China right for two centuries. European ships and merchants agreed to all the restrictions imposed on their trade through the narrow gateway of Macao, used to bring into China not only the goods that it wanted, but also new domesticated plants such as sorghum, maize, potato, tobacco, etc., which made Chinese agriculture more varied. Christian missionaries were admitted to court – once they had learnt to deport themselves in accordance with Chinese etiquette and knew enough about Confucius's ideas – and what they had to say about geography, astronomy and other aspects of European science and technology was listened to with interest and courtesy. This did not prevent the Christian missions from being closed down as soon as the Pope decided against the Jesuits in the aforementioned rites controversy.

China's defensive and isolationist attitude changed from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, first with the accession to power of the Ching dynasty, which was of Manchu origin and under the auspices of which Manchuria and Korea were fully absorbed into the Chinese sphere of political and cultural influence. Fear of Russian expansion in Siberia and of the British and French presence in India was largely instrumental in dictating the steps which China took to organize its external defence boundaries by conquering Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, while its strategic system was completed in the south by the tributary states of Burma and Tonkin. China's cultural influence was stepped up in all the conquered territories and would continue to be significant in Japan and overwhelming in Viet Nam. The high cost of these military ventures, together with other economic problems created by rural overpopulation, gave rise to peasant revolts of some seriousness from the end of the eighteenth century on. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, China was still the biggest empire in the world and its land borders remained secure;

the danger would come from the despised sea through the ambitions of the equally despised European trade.

The case of Japan was parallel to but different from that of China. Japan also cut itself off from the world, shipbuilding was restricted and piracy persecuted, owing to the exigencies of internal political stability. European culture, greeted with interest at first, was rejected in the seventeenth century, although some of its aspects were adopted after careful selection. The Catholic missions which had been the most successful ones in Asia were destroyed in 1637 and converts were savagely persecuted. The Japanese leaders feared that Christianity would arouse among its subjects stronger loyalties towards European culture than towards their own traditions and political leaders.

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE FRONTIER IN THE SIXTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The historical consequences of Europe's expansion were gradual and cumulative in character, and took place more slowly than is usually believed. The most immediately perceptible ones were economic; however, it was not until after the mid-eighteenth century that the network of essentially maritime and Europe-centred intercontinental trade came into its own. This brought to Europe tropical agricultural products from Brazil, Venezuela, the West Indies and East Asia, pelts and skins from Canada and Siberia, and precious metals from Spanish America and Brazil, which were largely re-exported to the East, as a result of which there was a rapid increase in Asian imports to Europe. All this called for more and better means of transportation over long distances and the development of insurance and long-term credit, and also increased the need for investment capital. At the same time, in Europe the social prestige and importance of merchants and bankers grew. Through their new capitalist ventures, the Dutch and British present in South Asia began in the eighteenth century to influence local production. The commercial cultivation of Arabian coffee and China tea in Java or the production in India of cotton fabric for export to external markets, whether European, African or Asian, are some examples of induced economic development, which soon exerted considerable influence on indigenous societies in areas near the major commercial ports.

It was in America that Europe met with the least and weakest resistance in transplanting its culture, making the adjustments and modifications necessitated by a different geographical setting, by the omnipresent indigenous universe they encountered in Nuclear America and by the African stratum which constituted the demographic base of the new slave societies organized in the Atlantic coastal regions of tropical America from Brazil to the south of what is now the United States of America. Due to this fact and to the relatively easy crossing of the Atlantic, a special and intimate relationship was very soon established between America and Europe as the latter tried to impose on the former not only its own culture and values, but also the fulfilment of its dreams and utopias. Unlike the Old World where there had been contacts between the major civilizations since ancient times, America was a completely new and unfamiliar world to the Europeans. Even in the most unknown and remote regions of Asia and Africa, the European discoverers and travellers found points of reference that enabled them to adjust to the intellectual trauma induced by new realities through

comparison with what they knew or were accustomed to. The Bible, the historians of Antiquity, travellers' tales and medieval chronicles, not to mention the very widespread presence of Muslims, at once disturbing and familiar, provided very incomplete but nearly enough material in order to make possible to incorporate what was seen as exotic into the classical-Judeo-Christian cultural tradition of Europe. In America, everything was a challenge to European beliefs concerning geography, physical and human nature, history and ideology.

Under such circumstances, there was an immediate curiosity to see and to learn, and an effort was made to observe and classify, comparing known facts with unknown, followed by the no less difficult task of describing new realities in ways that would enable them to be understood in Europe. Diego Ribero's world map of 1529 was a great stride forward in cartography both by virtue of the new geographical information that it contained and because it corrected earlier errors of representation; it was the first scientific map of the world, in which there still remained many unknown regions, but which already reflected a new conception of the Earth. Beginning in Portugal and Castile, and following in the rest of Europe, the medieval chronicle quickly changed in form and was filled with modern contents; travellers' tales multiplied, becoming gradually less imaginative and ever more precise and realistic. The information thus obtained was disseminated somewhat slowly by two channels, namely, in the form of printed books among educated people and through oral accounts within the illiterate population, although part of this information was deliberately withheld to avoid giving an advantage to trade competitors and rival states, and was not published until the nineteenth century or the present day.

The generally purely descriptive reports by navigators, soldiers and merchants were followed by attempts on the part of clerics and missionaries trained in theology, colonial civil servants versed in law, and intellectually curious travellers and colonists to *understand* recently discovered facts, whether in respect of new land features, unknown fauna and flora, climates, or human groups and their customs, languages and religions. The immediate reasons were practical in nature, namely, to facilitate trade with other peoples, to evangelize the pagans, or ensure more effective governance of the native population, etc. However, a purely intellectual interest was soon being taken in what was exotic and unknown, learning about it and above all incorporating it into the European scientific tradition, even if this meant modifying and readjusting that tradition.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, starting with writings like those of the Spaniard José de Acosta and others, the first attempts were made to shape the new worlds and the old world into a rational and logical structural whole; the results obtained are, of course, important; but, still more important than their hits and misses is the fact that those who engaged in these attempts had less and less recourse to the authority of writers in Antiquity and to tradition and relied increasingly on empirical observation and systematic experimentation, thus paving the way for the scientific revolution that took place in Europe in the seventeenth century, which in turn ushered in the technological and industrial revolution that gave Europe world hegemony in the nineteenth. Then, side by side with the ethnocentrism that had led European civilization to evaluate and interpret other cultures in its own terms, an effort began to be made to understand, see and judge each culture in terms of itself

and in its own context, an unprecedented approach that developed until it crystallized as the cultural relativism that predominates in the world of science today.

Curiously, the search for universal truth led to intellectual pluralism since no hierarchical organization of knowledge would be able to provide a global, comprehensive design such as might suffice for understanding the world in the satisfactory manner exemplified by the major religions. But, in any event, the growing expansion of scientific knowledge so stimulated Europe's inventiveness and creativity that it was able, like no other of the major civilizations, to make good use of the new opportunities afforded by cultural contacts and exchanges from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Lastly, mention must be made of the reciprocal nature of those exchanges. The growing, albeit unequal, influence exerted by Europe in the other continents was paralleled by the equally growing and unequal influence of Asia, America and Africa on Europe, within whose societies the conservatism of the masses and their attachment to traditional ways of life contrasted, from the seventeenth century onwards, with the frequently receptive and innovative attitudes first of their intellectual and economic élites, and later of their political and indeed social élites.

From the very beginning, European civilization had demonstrated a great ability to assimilate foreign cultural elements. During the Middle Ages, for example, Islam contributed to Europe's wealth through its agricultural technology (irrigation, cultivation of fruit trees and sugarcane), the use of the triangular Arab sail or Hindu numerals, and Chinese inventions such as the compass, gunpowder and printing, which were to play such a decisive role in European expansion. The Muslims even brought back to Europe much of the science of classical antiquity, which had been lost in the West but preserved in Egypt and Western Asia. Such European concepts as that of the Crusades and institutions like the military orders or late medieval chivalry were no more than imitations or modified copies of Islamic models.

A process of Orientalization of techniques and the arts started in Venice in the twelfth century and spread slowly through Europe. The presence in European societies of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa, brought first to Portugal in the mid-fifteenth century, had a significant effect culturally – in both the Old World and the New – especially on popular beliefs, music, folklore and the art of the Western world. Culinary recipes that are considered typically and traditionally European use various native American species of flora and fauna as ingredients; the same may be said of many social practices – including the use of tobacco – and Americanisms in European languages. In the eighteenth century the European vogue for *chinoiserie* was not confined to fashion and the decorative arts; the range of influence of China

extended from industrial techniques to intellectual life and ways of thinking. It seems clear that cultural relativism could be the product only of a civilization like that of Europe which was imbued with exoticism, familiar with diverse cultures very different from its own, and hence capable of rising above its initial provincialism and of overcoming, even if only in part, its instinctive ethnocentrism.

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6

COLONIALISM

6.1

INTRODUCTION

Irfan Habib

With Columbus's discovery of the Americas (1492) and Vasco da Gama's rounding of the Cape of Good Hope (1498) began the era of Colonialism, manifested in the advent and advance of Western Europe's political dominance over the whole world in the four following centuries.

What turned into the initial drive towards colonialism came out of a different objective, namely, Atlantic Europe's establishment of direct lines of trade, across the oceans, with the spice-producing regions of the East. Yet if the objective was seemingly purely commercial, the navigational search in both directions was breathtaking in its boldness of design and execution. That it was successful, beyond all possible expectations, signified that Europe had already attained an edge over the rest of the world in the realms of technology and war.

With success, the original impulse for purely commercial gain was subsumed in the desire to extort and exploit by force. In what is now Latin America, this led to silver mining on a large scale in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by a reckless use of semi-enslaved Amerindian labour. This was increasingly supplemented by agrarian exploitation for the benefit of Iberian and, later, other West European immigrants. First began the overtaxation of Amerindian peasants; then came the creation of the settlers' *latifundia* or estates worked by Amerindian 'peons' or servile labourers, sometimes by African slaves. Finally, there began to be established in Brazil and the Caribbean, full-fledged slave plantations. These were made possible by the African slave-trade across the Atlantic, by which, according to Philip Curtin's estimates, some 8 to 11 million Africans were enslaved and transported to the Americas. This massive spoliation of the population of Africa made up part of the still more massive decimation of the Amerindian populations by the smallpox, influenza, silver mines and settler's gun.

Asia formed the third side in the colonial triangle. A considerable part of the silver mined in the Americas was used up to buy Asian spices, textiles, silk, china, indigo, etc., that were in demand in an increasingly prosperous Western Europe. But this was not an act of exchange between two equal parties. Already in the sixteenth century, the Portuguese established monopolies over lines of sea trade and levied tribute on Asian shipping. They were followed in this in the next century by

the Dutch, who in addition created a further and major source of 'capital' for trade by levying taxation and tribute in conquered lands, classically in Java. In the eighteenth century, the English created the greatest tribute system of all, by taxing and extorting money in their conquests in India and using the resultant revenues for 'investments', that is, for purchase of Asian commodities by both the East India Company and private Englishmen. This constituted the celebrated 'Drain of Wealth' from India to Britain, which by the end of the eighteenth century probably exceeded £5 million per annum in value.

This global extension of Western European political and economic dominance had enormous cultural consequences. The region that was culturally the most affected was that of the Western Hemisphere. Here the Amerindian cultures were savagely destroyed. The indigenous cults gave place to Christianity, which did not spread by voluntary conversion alone. Iberian settlers in the hemisphere brought over European high culture as the exclusive preserve of the dominant white minority for long, though in time it developed a richness of its own and sank roots in the soil that genuinely became Latin America. In the northern parts of the New World (modern United States and Canada), the process of physical elimination of the Amerindian populations had already begun in the eighteenth century, to be completed in the next. Here the extension of Western European culture to America was complete and undiluted. The African slaves, shorn of their old tribal and cultural roots, and mixed up by continuous sale and territorial redistribution, could not easily reconstruct an autonomous culture, whether in the Caribbean or in North America.

In Africa and Asia, the cultural impact of Europe even up to the end of the eighteenth century remained limited. In North Africa, Western Asia, India, China and Japan it was not really until the nineteenth century that ideas emanating from Europe and received mainly through colonial channels began to challenge traditional modes of thought. But this proved to be a process less of Europeanization than of national regeneration, as Volume 6 will show.

In the next three sections are presented surveys of what happened in the Americas, Africa and Asia as European exploration and dominance progressed in these continents.

6.2

EUROPEANS IN AMERICA

Anthony Pagden

Sometime on the morning of Friday 12 October 1492, Columbus landed on an island in the Caribbean which he named, 'in honour of the Great Majesty who has made all these things possible', *San Salvador* (Holy Saviour).

Europe had 'discovered' a new world. From Columbus himself (although he maintained until his death that what he had discovered was, in fact, a part of Asia) until at least the mid-nineteenth century, all Europeans looked upon America as a continent which, because it had not been accessible to the European gaze, had until that morning, remained, quite literally, hidden. The fact that it was the home to flourishing cultures of its own, and that these had extensive trading relationships with each other, was never considered. Even the Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas, the great champion of the rights of the Amerindian peoples spoke of America, 'so full of such an immense number of gentle and happy people' as having been 'hidden for so many centuries' (Augustin Millares, 1951, pp. 27-8). This idea, the notion that America had only really come into existence when it had come into contact for the first time with Europe exercised a powerful and enduring influence over the attitudes and behaviour of the Europeans in America.

Both Columbus and Las Casas, in common with nearly all Europeans of the late fifteenth century, shared at least two fundamental beliefs. The first was that the re-population of the world after the Flood by the sons of Noah, as described in the Bible, had begun in Europe. From this, it followed that Europe was the original birthplace of all the peoples of the world. To be, as was America, both unknown to Europe and populated by beings who were clearly human, could only mean one thing: that the Amerindians had, at some remote period in time, travelled from Europe, across some northern land bridge (what is now the Bering Strait), and then down the American continent, settling as they moved. If this was so, then they had been cut off, isolated both from the rest of the world and, since all this must have taken place before the incarnation of Christ – an event which, of course, had also occurred in Europe – denied all possibility of salvation. Until, that is, they were 'discovered' and thus reunited with the European world they had had literally no existence. The second belief was that all forms of civil society were defined by property and it was, therefore, property which marked off the savage from the civil state.

These two beliefs were closely linked. 'Discovery' was thought to confer property rights upon the discoverer. Columbus's contract with the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, said as much. He was to 'take possession' for them of all that he 'discovered', because he was 'the first to set eyes on them'. And that, indeed, was the first thing he

did on landing on 'San Salvador'. Later, the explorer Vasco Núñez de Balboa would take possession of the Pacific Ocean simply by kneeling in it.

The peoples these Europeans had discovered shared, of course, no such beliefs. Their creation myths, so far as we can tell, made no claims to universality. The Circum-Caribbean tribes whom Columbus first encountered were probably non-surplus producing, gathering only what they required for immediate consumption. Even the Aztec, who had a highly developed commercial economy, and the Inca, who practised an elaborate and complex system of redistribution – which in the nineteenth century earned them the reputation for being the first 'socialist empire' – and clearly understood the notion of possession, do not seem to have thought of the lands or of other humans as things which one could own. The tragedy which was to be the colonization of America derived for the clash of these incompatible world views.

Settlement, which followed rapidly after discovery, necessarily involved possession. Because they had hoped, in the first instance, to discover gold and silver, the first European settlers had to own the land they hoped to mine. The Antilles were, of course, already occupied when the Europeans first arrived. Some Spaniards, most of them theologians and at least some of them missionaries, believed these peoples to be 'in just and pacific exercise of their rights', even though they were not Christians and they themselves had no sense of what an exercise of rights might involve. Others, however, claimed that because the Amerindians seemed to know nothing about property, they could not be said to 'own' their land. They merely foraged on it. It could, therefore, be settled by the first man who made a claim to it, and once it was settled it could be defended by force.

It was the same argument that the British were later to use in North America. Because, or so it was said, the North American tribes practised no form of agriculture, and hence had no understanding of territorial possession, they could be driven off the land which now 'belonged' to the colonists, because they had been the first to settle and, a term they used frequently, 'improve' it. We now know that the tribes of the eastern seaboard of what is now the United States were, indeed, agriculturalists, and, indeed, that without their support, and their instruction in how to handle new crops in a wholly unfamiliar environment, the first settlers would certainly have perished. But a strict adherence to the ethnographical facts was no more in the interests of these Calvinist Englishmen than it was in the interests of their Catholic neighbours to the South.

The French, who began to arrive in northern America from the early seventeenth century, adopted, at least at first,

a somewhat different approach. Their initial attempt to assimilate the Indians and to convert them to Catholicism failed. Conversion in America, and with it the bid to transform the Indians culturally into Europeans, only succeeded where it could be backed by force. And the French in America had none of the resources of either the Spanish or the Portuguese. The segregation of the Indians into 'reserves' (a socially-controlled environment where – or so it was hoped – the Indians might adapt to a French way of life in their own time) also failed. Unlike any of the other Europeans, however, the French had come principally to trade rather than to conquer. What is now Canada was, for the most part, bleak and inhospitable and therefore unsuited to the implementation of large-scale territorial ambitions. But it was enormously rich in furs. The French trappers, the *coureurs de bois* as they were called, could only survive, and prosper, with the assistance of the Indians. They, therefore, abandoned attempts to force the Indians to adopt French cultural behaviour, and instead adapted themselves to Indian customs, so that by the mid-eighteenth century it was possible for one observer to note that, 'the French in Canada in many respects follow the customs of the Indians'. The *coureurs*, many of whom were originally Huguenot, became an image of the nativized European. Speaking Indian languages, wearing Indian dress and tolerant of Indian customs, they frequently married into Indian families.

The fundamental difference between the European settlers in the northern, largely Protestant colonies, and the southern and wholly Catholic ones, was one of social attitudes. The English settlers had come to America in order to create the Calvinist 'City on the Hill', a world of Christian virtue, remote and isolated from all those – Europeans as well as Amerindians – who might corrupt them. For these men America was – as indeed it would remain – a land of promise, where the Utopian dreams of marginalized Europeans could, or so they hoped, be realized. The French, on the other hand, had come to trade, and as the Portuguese had done before in Africa and Asia, they slowly settled only in order to protect their commercial interests. The Spaniards and, to a lesser degree, the Portuguese in Brazil, however, came to re-create, as far as possible, the late feudal societies they had left behind in Europe. In order to achieve this, they required the presence of a large acquiescent peasant class. Thus, whereas the English drove the Amerindians ever westwards, and the French tried to live among them, the Iberians sought first to enslave them, and then to turn them into an indentured labour force. In this respect, if in no other, the Spanish Empire in America was closer to the British Empire in India, or to the British and French Empires in Africa, than it was to either the contemporary British or French settlements in America.

Because they colonized the land but not the people, the English spent very little time in justifying their treatment of the native populations of America, and the French – before the emergence of an anti-colonial movement in the eighteenth century, – none at all. Neither were the British, nor the French, after their initial attempts had failed, much concerned with converting the Indians to Christianity. There were English and French missions, but these were either conducted by small groups – such as the Huguenot Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon's mission to Brazil in 1556 – or, like the Jesuit mission to Canada in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were largely independent of any initiative by the crown. The Spaniards, on the other hand, spent an enormous amount of intellectual energy on legitimating their conquests,

on describing and evaluating the peoples they ruled and – since Spanish rule could not be detached from the Christian religion – on evangelizing them. Because of their neo-feudal attitude towards the Amerindians, the Spaniards in America uniquely conducted both a sustained inquiry into the nature, status and rights of the Amerindians and then, over a period from the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, a lengthy inquiry into what they could discover about their pre-contact history. Partly as a consequence of this process, the history and identity of the Spaniards in America is far more closely bound to the history of their relationship with the autochthonous inhabitants than is that of any other European group in the Americas.

At the centre of this relationship was the prolonged struggle between the colonists and the agents of the Crown on the one hand, and the members of the missionary orders on the other, over the rights and status of the Indians. This hinged first on the question of whether or not they could be described as property-less beings, and second on the more treacherous question of whether they were really men at all. No reflective European, at least, ever assumed that the Indians were other than human. But faced with stories (all of them almost certainly apocryphal) of cannibalism and of human sacrifice, and of other 'crimes against nature', it was, to some at least, not so certain what kind of human they might be. The argument, first suggested in 1510 that they might be the 'natural slaves' described by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (whose writings on political, physical and biological matters were held to be authoritative by most Catholics at this time) inevitably won considerable support from a number of the colonists, eager to find a justification not only for the conquest of America but also for the virtual enslavement of its population. For Aristotle had described the 'natural' slave as one who although he was not fully rational, 'participated in reason' enough to be able to understand and execute a command. To many Spaniards this both explained away the Indians' puzzling behaviour, and provided a legitimization for the enforced labour system – the *encomienda* – which the crown had introduced in America. But Aristotle's argument – although it was to be revived by an eminent French doctor in the early nineteenth century and by the British in South Africa as late as the early twentieth – was ultimately unpersuasive. It could not explain why such peoples as the Aztec and the Inca, even if they did sacrifice and sometimes consume their own people, had a highly sophisticated political and technical culture. It failed to account for the enormous differences between the various tribes in America, and it suggested that a supposedly omnipotent God had somehow managed to create something which, by being neither fully beast nor entirely man, defied the laws of his own creation. It also could not stand up to the torrent of abuse poured upon it and its supporters by the missionaries who, while they wished to transform both the Indians' beliefs and with them their way of life, nevertheless defended both their political rights as subjects of the Castilian and Portuguese Crowns, and their human status.

But if the Indians were truly 'men', they seemed, even to their most ardent supporters, to be inferior to the Europeans in all their cultural achievements. Their technology, even that of the Aztec and the Inca, was poor and their social organization, although in many respects impressive, was, at best, a ramshackle affair. This, some colonists claimed, was why they had failed to resist European invasion. What further proof of their natural inferiority could there be, argued the Spanish humanist Juan Gines de Sepúlveda in the middle of

the sixteenth century, than Montezuma's 'cowardice' in the face of Hernando Cortés's tiny army? Indian society, it was claimed, was not only technologically inferior and inherently cowardly (as well as lazy and lascivious), it also had no sense of the past – an obvious condition for progress – no arts and, crucially, no letters. The large body of literature gathered by Spaniards in Central and South America in the early years of the conquest when there was still some possibility of contact with the pre-conquest cultures, and in Canada in the eighteenth century by such Jesuit missionaries as Joseph François Lafitau, made much of this supposed absence of 'letters'. The Aztec screen-folds, which employed complex mnemonic systems to record the deeds of past dynasties, the Mayan ideographic glyphs, and the Inca 'quipus' (elaborate networks of coloured and knotted strings) were all recognized as belonging to early stages in the history of writing. But for the educated European, although they were evidence that the Indians had started out along the long road towards full alphabetic representation, these forms of notation were inadequate. They were inadequate primarily because they could not express abstractions, and for all Europeans the capacity for abstract expression, which implied a capacity for logical reasoning, lay at the basis of the capacity for technological and social 'improvement'. Mayan astronomical and Aztec calendrical skills were generally thought of as simple and merely functional. Every agricultural people, after all, requires an accurate calendar.

Faced with all this evidence, the Spaniards came to think of the Indians not as 'natural slaves', but as a species of grown-up children, a method not so much of dehumanizing, as a method for semi-humanizing them, which was, and still is, widely employed by colonizing powers. For if the Indians were children, the Europeans were their tutors until such time as they could become fully 'civil' beings and hence capable of self-determination. And under Roman Law (which provided the basis for all international law at this time), a tutor could claim to exercise the right to use all that belonged to his charge.

Final emancipation, however, was never seriously contemplated, except by the most idealistic of the defenders of the Indians. And only one, Bartolomé de las Casas, went so far as to demand that the Spanish crown should withdraw all its forces from America and make restitution for the Indians for all the possessions which had been taken from them, including their precious metals. The Indians would remain either, as in Central and South America, a forced labour class or, as in the North, increasingly marginalized societies as the colonists inevitably came to occupy more and more of their traditional homelands.

By the mid-seventeenth century, the whole debate over the nature and status of the American Indian had been very largely set aside. In part this was due to the fact that by the end of the sixteenth century the possibility of either the emancipation of the Indians within a state still ruled from Europe or, more radically, of a European withdrawal from America had ceased to be even a remote possibility. In part it was due to a wave of epidemics of European diseases against which the Indians had no resistance, smallpox and influenza being the worst, which devastated much of Central and South America. It has been calculated (although the figures are notoriously imprecise) that up to a third of population of Mexico died in successive epidemics between 1545 and 1570 and again between 1595 and 1596. By the end of the sixteenth century these disruptions and dislocations of the Indian population was too great for anyone among

the settlers to consider seriously the possibility of anything other than the continuation of European rule.

By this time, the colonists in the South had also begun to create societies which had fully integrated most of the Indian populations – and in most areas depended upon the labour of those populations for survival. The concept of an 'Indian nation', though it clearly had some meaning for those involved in the Indian revolts which occurred sporadically throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, no longer had very much meaning for the settler population. And even the major Indian revolts operated very largely within the terms established by the European community. The most devastating of them, the Tupac Amaru revolt in Peru in 1781, whose leader styled himself 'Inca' and spoke of recreating the Inca 'Empire of Tawantinsuyu', was, nevertheless very largely directed against the Bourbon system of taxation, for which reason it enjoyed considerable support from the colonists, and employed Christian imagery and the rhetoric of Spanish political theory.

Indian political and religious cultures slowly lost contact with their pre-conquest past. What came to replace them was a series of negotiations with European culture, a civil order which replicated some but not all of the features of European society and a form of religion which, although generally called 'syncretic' was – and still is – predominantly an original reinterpretation of Christianity which owes very little to pre-conquest influences. The emergence of this new Indian identity was a part, and also a consequence, of the process by which the Europeans in America came to acquire independent cultures of their own.

In the North, however, the Indian tribes which escaped annihilation and total integration into settler society, changed little until they were forcibly 'settled' in the nineteenth century. The gun and the horse made an enormous difference to the economic life of the Plains Indians of the North American west. But they remained otherwise impervious to European influences. The same is very largely true of the Huron and Iroquois tribes of what was to become New France. It was also true of the Brazilian tribes which, where they could, retreated inland to escape forced labour on the sugar plantations. In these areas the new 'American' culture evolved largely independently of cultural exchange with the Amerindians.

Amerindians and Europeans were not, however, the only racial groups to settle in the Americas. From the early settlements in Hispaniola, first the Spaniards, then the Portuguese in Brazil and later the British in North America and the Caribbean began importing African slaves. For the European colonists, and their patrons in their respective 'mother countries', these presented no legal problems, since all Africans were 'legally' purchased from other African or Arab traders. They made a stronger labour force for work on the sugar plantations than the Indians had done, and since they were in an alien land, they were less inclined to rebel or to flee. One of the consequences of this for European society in the South was increased miscegenation, so that by the mid-seventeenth century to the already large number of *Mestizos* (the offspring of Indians and Spaniards) there was added a varied community of mixed races which became known as *Castas*. These were divided, by Spanish officials with a passion for classification, into as many as sixteen different degrees of racial colouring. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were few native-born Spanish families that were entirely without some Indian blood, and the claims of near-white *Pardos* (persons of mulatto and white

origin) and of some *Mestizos* to the status of 'Spaniard' were tacitly accepted by many local authorities.

In British and French North America and in the Caribbean, however, no such integration occurred. There are a few cases of interbreeding between Europeans and Indians but never on a scale sufficient to create separate racial and cultural groups within these societies. These differences between the colonies were, of course, greatly to influence their subsequent cultural, political and economic identity. For whereas Spanish Central and South America and Portuguese Brazil gradually evolved into multi-racial communities, British and, to some degree, French, America remained segregated societies.

By the early eighteenth century all the Europeans in America had effectively ceased to be Europeans. The attempts that all the early colonists had made to preserve Old World traditions had failed. Such attempts had required a very high degree of imaginative innovation, if only because most of the traditions were already under threat in the metropolitan culture and could not survive in the absence of the institutions and the normative structures that had traditionally sustained them, and which only the metropolitan culture could provide. The British, it is true, persisted in claiming that they had preserved in the colonies a way of life and a moral and political integrity which the Old World had lost. As one settler, John Clarke, observed in 1625, 'while Old England is becoming new, New-England is becoming old'. (Clarke, 1652, p. 27). But even they could, by the mid-eighteenth century, speak of themselves as 'English-Americans' and it was obvious enough to other Europeans that theirs was a culture which was, in most respects, *sui generis*.

The Spanish and Portuguese Americans developed cultures which soon became radically different from those of the metropolis. The high degree of miscegenation made any attempt to preserve European ways for long impossible. For the Blacks, the *Mestizos* and the *Castas* the colony was the 'Mother Country'. It is not surprising, then, that the earliest bid for independence was made in 1567 by a group of Peruvian *Mestizos* calling for an 'American nation', nor that the first independent republic in the South, that of Saint Dominique (now Haiti) in 1804, should be the creation of a slave revolt. Even the élites, although they were still white, and still thought of themselves as Spanish or Portuguese when confronted by hostile outsiders, spoke of themselves as 'native sons of this land' – as the Town Council of Mexico City phrased it in 1771 (Pagden and Cann, 1989, p. 68) – on an equal footing, in this respect, if in no other, with the Indians. The term 'criollo', originally used as a epithet of abuse by the metropolitan Spaniards, came to be employed by the American-born Spaniards themselves as evidence of their distinctiveness, and as early as 1668, the Mexican scholar, Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, was speaking of 'our criollo nation'.

One crucial component in this new identity was a close, if uneasy, relationship with the Indian past. Some criollos, such as the Marqueses of Valle Umbroso in Peru, went so far as to dress in Inca costume, speak Quechua and have themselves addressed as *Apu* ('lord'). They were an exception, but the image of a distinct political culture which, while it was to remain firmly in the hands of the white settlers, could draw on the imagery of the old Indian 'Empires' became a powerful political force. For these men, the struggle over Indian rights became a part of their history, and the Spanish subjugation of the Indian was translated into a metaphor for their 'enslavement' under the three-hundred year rule of the Spanish Viceroys. Nothing, Simón Bolívar, the 'Liberator'

of the southern continent, was later to declare, had been so heinous a crime against humanity as the Spanish attempt to brand the Indians as non-human creatures.

The Spanish South thus came to cultural independence before any other European society in the Americas. But it was, of course, the British North Americans who were the first to sever their political ties with Europe. Given that the 'English-American' were perhaps the least culturally independent of the Europeans in America this might seem unexpected. But the British colonists claimed that their revolution had been precisely to defend the rights and liberties which were guaranteed to all Englishmen by the Magna Carta and the common law. When the Crown violated these rights, as its attempt to raise taxes without representation was believed to have done, then the Crown had, they claimed – in the terms used by John Locke who exercised a powerful influence on the political ideology of the American Revolution – resorted to a 'State of War' against his subjects and could, therefore, be destroyed 'like any other animal'. As European, and other American, observers immediately recognized, Washington's army had created a new kind of society: the first modern democratic republic based upon (near) universal suffrage. But it had done so because, at the end of the eighteenth century, that kind of society was the only one which could preserve the traditional liberties and privileges of the old order that the first English colonists had gone to America in order to create. Cultural identity in the North may have come only after political independence had been achieved. But any act of rebellion will eventually alienate rebels from the political culture to which they belong; and when that happens they will, in effect, have acquired a separate identity, if only an identity as rebels. The American revolutionaries may have begun by thinking of themselves as Englishmen betrayed by their crown or, at most, as 'American Englishmen', but they ended their rebellion, as all the Europeans in America ended theirs, as Americans.

The year 1776 marked a turning point in both American and European history. The success of the American Revolution showed that the old European monarchies could be defeated. It showed, too, that the societies which replaced them could become the basis for a new kind of political order, one which would not only be free of European constraints, but also, ultimately, free of centuries-old European systems of dominance and hierarchy.

Independence in Spanish America came some twenty-five years later (and in Brazil not until 1822 and in Canada not, in effect, until the 1840s), and was finally made possible, in part at least, by Napoleon's invasion of Spain itself in 1813. Between the creation of the United States and the first Insurgency in Mexico in 1810 there had, of course, fallen the shadow of the French Revolution. For many criollos that revolution was further evidence that history favoured both revolutions and republics. But for many, in particular after the success of the revolutionary leader in Saint Dominique, Toussaint Louverture, between 1791 and 1802, Jacobin revolution also brought with it the fear of rebellion among the Black, Indian and *Mestizo* masses. For Simón Bolívar, the new republican order, was, like that of the French Republic, to be subjected to the constitutive force of the 'General Will'. Although Bolívar (unlike Washington) freed his slaves and made emancipation one of his first legislative acts, the 'Republic of Gran Colombia', whose constitution he drafted in Angostura in 1819, was to have been predominantly a white, criollo society in which only those sufficiently educated to understand the political process would

have the vote. It was to have been a multiracial society in which the Indians were to have had some of their political rights and their lands restored to them. But they, together with the *Castas* and the *Mestizos*, would have vanished – as indeed most of them have now vanished – into an undifferentiated peon class. The Spanish American, and when it came the Brazilian, republics were far more conservative than either the United States or the French. But emancipation from Spain – as the case of Cuba, which passed from being a Spanish colony to a dependency of the United States, would seem to demonstrate – could not have been achieved in the form it was without their example. As the Abbé Dufour De Pradt, one-time Napoleonic ambassador and Bolívar's political advisor, noted, the emancipation of Spanish America

was 'the most extensive result of that grand act which, in its totality we call the French Revolution' (Dufour De Pradt, 1817, p. 9).

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6.3

EUROPEANS IN AFRICA

Jean Boulègue

When Christopher Columbus's voyage in 1492 opened up the way for the formation of a 'world economy', Portuguese navigators had already explored the Atlantic coast of Africa a few decades earlier. Cape Bojador, which provided access to the Saharan shores, had been rounded in 1434, and the mouth of the Senegal was reached ten years later. The Cape of Good Hope was sighted in 1488 by Bartholomeu Dias and in 1498 Vasco da Gama touched the eastern coast of Africa before crossing the Indian Ocean. While proceeding with its maritime expansion, Portugal was also negotiating with Castile. The two countries signed the treaties of Alcáçovas (1479) and Tordesillas (1494) defining their respective zones of expansion. Africa (with the exception of the Canary Islands) was acknowledged to be in the Portuguese zone. As a result, the European presence in the continent in the sixteenth century was essentially Portuguese. By the end of the century, the growing power of the countries of North-West Europe was visible on the African coast. The Dutch, English and French established trading posts and laid claim to territories of their own. At the same time, the slave-trade, present from the outset, began to expand. But it was above all the eighteenth century which was the peak period for deportation to the Americas. The French Revolution took the first decisions which – though soon repealed – inaugurated the series of measures that led to the abolition of the slave-trade and slavery.

THE PORTUGUESE THALASSOCRACY IN AFRICA (SIXTEENTH CENTURY)

Portuguese maps of Africa reveal an ignorance of the interior of the continent in sharp contrast with the abundance of information about the coast. In Africa, as in Asia, the Portuguese Empire was essentially built on maritime supremacy based on a few, modest-sized island and coastal possessions. Although the officially proclaimed objectives were conquest and conversion, its ambitions were, in fact, confined to trade and, in particular, the acquisition of certain products in great demand in Europe: gold, spices, ivory and slaves. Its activities were governed by a dual monopoly: Portugal's monopoly in relation to other countries, and the monopoly of the Crown, which did not permit its subjects to venture overseas without an authorization or a contract.

At the very beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese defeated the only sea-going rival they encountered – the Swahili trading cities of the east coast – by attacking and pillaging them. However, they exercised

control over this coast only indirectly and imperfectly from their captaincies in Malindi (in present-day Kenya) and Mozambique, contenting themselves with eliminating whatever posed a threat to their economic hegemony over the Indian Ocean. Trade on the east coast remained linked to that on the other shores of the Ocean, with the Portuguese taking over the old trade relations and exchanging ivory and gold for spices in India. The captaincies of Malindi and Mozambique were dependencies of the viceroy of the Indies, based in Goa.

On the Atlantic coast, the Portuguese created their own trans-oceanic links. Under this arrangement, the islands assumed strategic importance as ports of call and sources of supply for their ships. On the neighbouring coast, the Portuguese limited their settlements to outlets for the gold mines of the Akan States (now Ghana), the richest in West Africa. Here, in 1482, they founded the fort of São Jorge da Mina (see Plate 3). This gold was already sustaining trans-Saharan trade through a West African network under the control of the Wangara traders (later known as the Dyula). The establishment of the Portuguese at São Jorge triggered off an economic confrontation between maritime and interior trade ('caravels versus caravans' to quote Magalhães Godinho). The archive accumulus of São Jorge reveal that after a short period of expansion at the beginning of the century, imports of gold to Lisbon abated in the mid-sixteenth century. Portugal had failed in its attempt to challenge the Sudanese and Saharan gold circuits.

In other parts of the Atlantic seaboard, the Portuguese were chiefly interested in slaves. They were particularly active on the coast from Senegal to Sierra Leone, and along the coasts of the old Benin (now in Nigeria) (see Plate 4) and the Kongo (Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola). Slaving was carried on in ports under African control. Like the gold trade, the slave-trade did not involve close relations between the Portuguese and local African societies, except in the case of the Kongo, the biggest kingdom in coastal Africa. The conversion of the king to Catholicism in 1491, followed by the accession of a reformist king, Afonso I, in 1526, gave impetus to relations between the two kingdoms. But the adverse impact of the slave-trade ruined the economy of the Kongo while the activities of traders tended to detach the peripheral regions from the central authority. In his correspondence with the king of Portugal, Afonso I lucidly analysed the causes of the weakening of his kingdom (the slave-trade and the Portuguese monopoly), but could do nothing to remedy it. The Portuguese further weakened the Kongo by founding the colony of Angola to the south.

DUTCH, ENGLISH AND FRENCH COLONIZATION: CHARTER COMPANIES AND THE PROLIFERATION OF TRADING POSTS (SEVENTEENTH CENTURY)

Throughout the sixteenth century, English and French pirates and traders had breached the Portuguese monopoly from time to time. Towards the end of the century they were joined by the Dutch, who, during the following century, were the first to carve out a zone of influence for themselves, at the expense of a declining empire (attached to the Spanish Crown since 1580). In 1611–1612, they erected the fortified trading post of Mouri on the Gold Coast; in the 1620s, that of Gorée, on a small island opposite the Cape Verde peninsula (now Senegal); and in 1637, they seized from the Portuguese the São Jorge da Mina fort (thereafter known as El Mina). In 1632, the English established themselves at Carmantam on the Gold Coast, and in 1638, the French settled at the mouth of the Senegal, where they later built Saint Louis. These trading posts were followed by others, and other European powers (Sweden, Denmark and Prussia) followed suit.

The instruments of the maritime expansion of North-West Europe were the private companies protected by states, which granted them a commercial monopoly. The Dutch, who were the pioneers, set up the powerful structures of the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (East India Company), founded in 1602, and the *West-Indische Compagnie* (West India Company), founded in 1621. To begin with, the French and the English were content with more modest associations of shipowners, before proceeding to establish the French East and West India Companies in 1664 and the Royal Africa Company in 1672. The companies themselves had to build and maintain the fortified trading posts which became a standard feature of the European presence in Africa – a presence that remained very limited despite the proliferation of such structures, since the company's authority barely impinged on the neighbouring populations beyond the protection of the ramparts. Having no territorial authority, the occupants of the trading posts attempted to rule over the nearby coast from the sea, in order to keep it for their own exclusive use, but they were only partially successful.

By the end of the seventeenth century, European trading posts in Africa were very unevenly distributed. The Gold Coast had by far the largest number of them: about thirty forts in all, belonging to six nations – but mainly English and Dutch – spread over less than 500 km and sometimes only a few kilometres apart. The neighbouring Slave Coast had a handful of establishments, for the most part at Whydah (now in Benin). A few forts were scattered along the coast from Senegal to Sierra Leone and to the south of Angola. Other coastal areas had none, which does not imply that there was no commercial activity. Thus, in Central Africa, the English, French and Dutch were successfully challenging the Portuguese.

It was the gold trade which led to the proliferation of trading posts on the coast named after it. It supplied the Amsterdam mint – the first in Europe, in the second half of the seventeenth century – and the London mint. But on the Atlantic coast as a whole, the slave-trade advanced in step with the plantations of America.

The presence and activities of Europeans were much less pronounced in East Africa. Ethiopia put an end to Portuguese penetration into the interior by expelling the Jesuit

missionaries at the beginning of the seventeenth century. On the coast, the maritime expansion of an east Arabian kingdom – Oman – put an end to Portuguese hegemony north of Cape Delgado (now in Mozambique) during the second half of the seventeenth century.

THE APOGEE OF THE SLAVE-TRADE (EIGHTEENTH CENTURY)

In the Atlantic region, as elsewhere, it is difficult to put a figure on the massive deportation represented by the slave-trade, since there is no way of knowing whether the documents are exhaustive. Estimates vary widely. The latest studies settle on a figure of a little under 10 million people shipped to America. The share of the eighteenth century was enormous: approximately two-thirds of the total. In the 1780s, the annual figure was close to 100,000 souls per year. The English took first place with about 50 per cent of the total trade. Next came the Portuguese and the French (see Plates 5a, b, c).

In addition to the principal destination, mention should be made of the slave-trade with the Mascarene Islands. French exploitation of these islands in the eighteenth century created a need for man-power which was imported from the East African coast and Madagascar.

Apart from the growth in numbers, what made the eighteenth century the age of the slave-trade was its predominance over other forms of trade in all regions, and its near-exclusivity in some. Even on the Gold Coast, a shift towards slaving was apparent by the turn of the century; indeed, Brazilians came with gold to buy slaves. During the same period, the skin trade in Senegambia collapsed as a result of the French company's increasing demand for slaves.

Any attempt to define the demographic loss, even if it cannot be evaluated, must take into account not only the number of persons deported, but also those who died during the voyage and those who were killed in the captive operations. Moreover, the losses were not just demographic; slaving expeditions were accompanied by pillage and the destruction of crops and thus engendered an atmosphere of insecurity.

Admittedly, the situation was not the same everywhere. Some coastal states organized and equipped themselves to capture slaves, procuring firearms through trade with Europeans. Other societies, situated in the hinterland of the coastal states, were raiding territory and suffered severe consequences. But it seems likely that the former also suffered economically and politically – at least in certain cases – as a result of this specialization. The losses they underwent should not be taken to mean that African societies and authorities remained passive. The constraints of the system imposed on them by external demand did not take away their initiative or their ability to respond. They were able to exploit the rivalry between Europeans, and, in the slave-trade as in other dealings, the terms of trade gradually shifted in favour of the African partners. In the ports controlled by the coastal states, trade was strictly supervised and the European partners were subject to all manner of restrictions and taxes. Even where they had forts, they were not exempt, since they often had to purchase goods elsewhere, and whatever was brought into the fort passed through state control and the hands of courtiers. Local attempts to acquire a monopoly by certain companies came up against stubborn and effective resistance. Lastly, it was only with great difficulty that Europeans could journey

to the interior of the continent, which they still knew little about at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

THE FIRST TERRITORIAL OCCUPATIONS

Up to the mid-nineteenth century, territorial occupation was still a very minor form of European colonization in Africa. The first land to be occupied was the Atlantic islands. The Spanish settled the Canaries at the expense of the Guanches, while the Portuguese established themselves in the uninhabited islands of Madeira, Cape Verde and São Tomé. These settlements largely depended on the work of slaves imported from the continent, and the African element became predominant in the Cape Verde archipelago and in São Tomé. The exploitation of these islands marked an important phase in the expansion of the sugar-based economy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, before they were eclipsed by Brazil and then the West Indies. They were, however, a staging post for the introduction of American plants into Africa.

In present-day Angola and in South-east Africa (now Mozambique and Zimbabwe), Portugal launched an attempt at territorial colonization that contrasted sharply with its policies in the rest of Africa. In both cases, the undertaking was inspired by the lure of precious metals: gold mines in Monomotapa and imaginary silver mines in Angola. Colonization in Angola was on the American model. In 1575, a territorial grant was made to Paulo Dias de Novais, a conquistador, of lands he was to subjugate. He founded Luanda and conquered the Ndongo kingdom, to the south of the Kongo, which gave its name to the colony of Angola (after the title of its ruler). After his death, the territories reverted to the Crown. However, this venture did not live up to expectations, from either the territorial or the economic point of view. The Portuguese were hemmed in by the

resistance put up by neighbouring kingdoms and occupied only a strip of land thrusting some 300 km into the interior. They accumulated very little wealth, contenting themselves with an economy based on extortion from the inhabitants and slave-trading with neighbours. In the south-east, Portuguese activities were less direct. From their trading posts on the Zambezi, they interfered in the domestic policies of Monomotapa, a vast kingdom on the high plateaus of present-day Zimbabwe, and succeeded in taking over the management of its gold mines in 1607. In 1629, they even managed to install a king of their own choosing. But the economic and social state of the country deteriorated as a result of reckless gold mining, and revolts broke out. At the end of the seventeenth century, Changanure, the king of Butwa, to the south of Monomotapa, extended his authority to the entire plateau and drove out the Portuguese.

Dutch colonization in South Africa had more modest objectives, but was more effective. The Cape was founded in 1652 by the East India Company as a port of call on the route to Asia. Settlers known as 'free burghers' were authorized to take up residence there – some stayed in the towns, others cultivated the land and raised cattle to resupply ships. The latter (boeren or farmers), by absorbing new immigrants (including French Protestants fleeing religious persecution) and making use of slave-labour, extended the boundaries of the colony at the expense of the Khoi Khoi (or Hottentots) (see Plates 6 and 7).

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6.4 EUROPEANS IN ASIA

6.4.1 EUROPEANS IN WESTERN ASIA

Halil Inalcik

ITALIAN COLONIES IN THE LEVANT

Western Asia, or more exactly the Levant of the Europeans, comprising the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea coastal zones, experienced in its history three main periods of colonialism. The first period 1204–1453 was a time when Latins, or more precisely the Italians, the French and Catalans, founded, in the wake of the crusades, trading posts or colonies to exploit the resources of the area for their expanding economy and to participate in the intercontinental trade between Europe and Asia. In the wake of the Latin capture of Constantinople in 1204, Venice established a real colonial empire in the Levant while its rival, Genoa, used a subtle method, taking over from Byzantium the eastern Aegean islands threatened by the Turks and obtaining a trading monopoly in the Black Sea. The general pattern of establishment and general features of the Italian colonies in the Levant can be summarized as follows. Italian maritime city-states, Venice and Genoa to mention the most important ones, secured, through legal instruments called *capitula* or *shunait*, or capitulations, trading privileges from regional states, including the Byzantine Empire, the Seljuqid state of Asia Minor and the Mamluk Sultanate of Syria and Egypt. The capitulations obtained from Muslim rulers stipulated an extraterritorial status for the trading colony and freedom of trade with guarantees for the lives and properties of the traders. But no territorial rights were granted. Capitulations were then not treaties but trade privileges unilaterally granted by the Muslim ruler. The regional state always claimed its sovereign rights on the territory where foreigners settled for trade. The process of the foundation of the powerful Genoese colonies followed the common pattern. Over time, however, profiting from circumstances, the Genoese persuaded local governments to permit the surrounding of the colonies with walls and fortifications. Such trade centres, as they expanded, overshadowed the original port cities of the natives. Weakened by internal strife and in need of the benefits of the expanding trade, the imperial government in Byzantium, the Golden Horde and Egypt came to grant the Latins further privileges, although always affirming their sovereign rights on the territory. Latin colonies, however, became, in the end, practically independent of the local government and

were under the control of their mother city. The colonial character of these thalassocracies becomes evident from the fact that Latins were first class citizens and kept for themselves the monopoly of trade in spices, grain and slaves between the mother country and its colonies, leaving to the native population the retail or regional trade. The Genoese and Venetians exploited the resources of the northern Black Sea lands in grain, fish, meat, leather and furs, not to mention the Slav, Tartar and Circassian slaves, employed as Mamluk soldiers in Egypt, and as domestic or industrial slaves in Italy.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

As they revived the Byzantine centralist-bureaucratic empire, the Ottoman Sultans succeeded, in a long struggle between 1390 and 1571, in eliminating Latin domination of the Levant. They put an end to the political-territorial existence of the Latin colonies and principalities everywhere in the region – Salonica in 1430, in the northern Aegean islands in 1454, the Morea in 1460, Mytilene in 1462, Euboea in 1470, Rhodes in 1522, the Cyclades and Chios in 1566, Cyprus in 1571. Only Crete, the Dalmatian coastal zone and the Ionian islands remained under Venetian control after 1571. What helped the Ottomans in their takeover of the Latin possessions in the Levant was the alienation of the native masses from the Latins who imposed a feudal and Catholic domination and an economic exploitation on the Greek Orthodox populations in the region. Reduced to the status of serfs, the peasantry in the islands of Cyprus and Crete resisted and rose up several times against their Latin lords. In the conquest of the Genoese Black Sea colonies, the non-cooperation, and even hostility, of the Greeks, Armenians and Jews against their Genoese lords, appears to have facilitated the work of the Ottoman conquerors. The completion of the Ottoman takeover necessitated such a long struggle because of Venetian sea power, the foundation of their political and economic domination in the Levant. First co-operating with the Genoese and then building up their own armada in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans were ultimately able to challenge Venetian sea power in the Mediterranean.

While striving to put an end to the territorial domination of the Latins, the Ottomans, nevertheless, needed and duly appreciated the economic contribution of the Latins and encouraged their trade in the Levant by granting them the capitulatory privileges for a free and safe trade. These Italian states owed their economic growth in the sixteenth century mostly to this Ottoman policy, until the French, English and Dutch, obtaining their own capitulations, replaced them in the trade with the Ottoman Empire from 1569 onward. In the following centuries it was these western nations, applying a mercantilist policy, which expanded their trade in an economic exploitation of the Levant. Then, every European nation aspiring to economic growth with mercantilist ideas endeavoured to obtain the same capitulatory privileges from the Ottoman Sultans.

OTTOMAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEPENDENCY ON THE WEST

In the sixteenth century the Ottoman state was the only power in the world capable of challenging European expansion and its control of the world's economic resources. But towards the end of the century the Ottoman economy and Ottoman military technology, which was based on pragmatic knowledge and borrowings from Europe, proved to be inadequate to continue the struggle against a Europe which, as a result of its phenomenal progress in every field, overshadowed all the traditional cultures of the world. In the economic sphere, with its systematic and aggressive drive to dominate world markets, European mercantilism found an open market in the Ottoman Empire. With their belief in an economy of plenty and concerned above all with the abundance of goods in the home market, the Ottomans adopted a policy of low tariffs and obstructing exports. The shattering impact of western economic superiority based on mercantilism and colonialism appeared first in the invasion by cheap American silver and western silver coins of Middle

Eastern markets. Under the ensuing financial crisis the Ottoman classical system of government was shaken in all its basic institutions. This meant the beginning of the economic dependence on the West of Middle Eastern countries, including the Ottoman Empire, Iran and North Africa. Intensified over time and coupled with political influence this process would result in the complete dependence of the empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, turning the region to a semi-colony of western nations. In competition among themselves, the imperialist states of Europe tried to carve out zones of the Ottoman Empire as their exclusive regions of exploitation. After 1783 when Russia wrested the most favourable capitulations from the Ottomans, the capitulation ceased to be a privilege granted unilaterally by the Sultan and became a binding treaty bilaterally concluded. Under the capitulations thus conceived, the Ottoman government lost its capacity and opportunity to introduce a commercial regime favourable to its own economy and finances.

Throughout this development the military-political factor was as important as the economic. In early modern times, first Venetian sea power in the Mediterranean, and then in the 1590s the English and Dutch carracks with formidable fire power, which superseded the galley fleets of Venice and the Ottoman Empire, became perhaps the basic factor in the commercial dominance and monopoly of the northerners. Ottoman naval decline coincided with economic decline. In the following centuries the empire had to depend on the French, Dutch and English vessels for Istanbul's communications with the vitally important regions of Syria and Egypt.

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6.4.2

EUROPEANS IN OTHER PARTS OF ASIA

Sarvepalli Gopal

From the end of the fifteenth century Europeans came to Asia in considerable numbers – first the Portuguese and then the Dutch, the British and the French. Their chief concern was trade, and this remained the pattern until the middle of the eighteenth century, when their political interests spread over large areas. The Portuguese sought the monopoly of the spice trade to Europe and control of trade in Asian waters, and became a land power in Asia to the extent that domination of trade required the control of key posts and factories. In Europe in the sixteenth century racial condescension and religious intolerance were the norms. International law was thought to be inapplicable outside Europe and moral scruples were considered to be out of place in dealing with the peoples of Asia. So in the areas which they occupied in that continent the Portuguese treated the local populations as belonging to an inferior breed.

This attitude was strengthened by an animosity towards Islam. Pedro Cabral, the commander of the Portuguese fleet which sailed for India in 1500, was instructed to inform the local ruler of the ancient enmity which existed between Christians and Muslims and the obligation therefore imposed on every Catholic king to wage war on these enemies of the faith. In 1502 Vasco da Gama set alight and watched burn a crowded pilgrim ship; and in 1510 Albuquerque, the Portuguese viceroy, killed over four days 6,000 Muslim men, women and children. From the middle of the sixteenth century, with the arrival of the Jesuits, conversions to Christianity by force or persuasion were attempted. The Inquisition was set up in 1560 in Asia and functioned, with a breach of three years from 1774, till 1820. In Sri Lanka the Jesuits succeeded in converting to Catholicism a ruler and his queen, but threw away any possible long-term advantages that might have resulted from this by ruthless efforts, which proved counter-productive, to suppress the practice of Buddhism. Japan prohibited the preaching of Christianity, but it was the Jesuits who brought European influence to Indo-China and China. In Indo-China the desire of the European powers to establish ports of call on the route to China secured less success than missionary effort. In China the Jesuits were welcomed in the seventeenth century and they built up their influence by claiming to find considerable affinity between Christianity and Confucianism. But when in 1715 the Pope condemned Chinese rites as idolatrous the Emperor retorted two years later by forbidding the teaching of Christianity. Foreigners would be allowed to enter or reside in China only with special permission. No new settlements were founded and foreign traders were confined to Canton.

In the Portuguese settlements conversions to Christianity were sought to be encouraged by the enactment of laws

favouring converts and preventing the public practice of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam; but these laws were not always enforced. Nor did Christianity tone down the essentially racist nature of Portuguese rule. Slavery was a general practice and those who could afford to do so bought large numbers of slaves. The Jesuit College of St Paul admitted pupils from various countries of Asia and Africa but within the Church converts could not hope to rise higher than the status of secular clergy. While many Portuguese settled down in Asia and took local women into their households, great emphasis was laid on the concept of purity of blood, and the term 'contaminated races' appears frequently in official documents and private correspondence right through the period. In the administration the Portuguese reserved the senior positions for themselves, excluding as far as possible even local-born Portuguese; they did not interfere with village administration, but in the municipal councils even Christian converts had no place, let alone the rest of the population.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the Portuguese were displaced by the Dutch East India Company in major control of the spice and carrying trades in Asian waters and between Asia and Europe. Its servants, and those of the British East India Company which came to Asia around the same time, were less interested in proselytization than in commerce and in such dominance as promoted that commerce. The Dutch established themselves in Indonesia, weakened the political independence of the local principalities and reduced them to economic subjection. Production of cloves outside the territory controlled by the Dutch was prohibited and resistance to this injunction was put down by force. Dutch permits were required to trade with the spice islands. The Company intervened regularly in the civil wars and rebellions that resulted from heavy taxation and acquired territories in return for military aid. When, from the eighteenth century, profits from trading in cloves began to dwindle, the Dutch turned to coffee plantations. This involved much greater interference with the lives of the people. Labour was exploited and the economic activity of the local population closely supervised. There was no one from whom the workers in the plantations could seek redress and their own leaders of society were reduced to the level of overseers.

By the end of this period the Dutch had established their supremacy over the whole island of Java. They had also tried to consolidate their position in Sri Lanka where, in 1638, in return for military assistance to expel the Portuguese, the king of Kandy promised to pay for all expenses in the form of commodities and to grant the Dutch freedom of commerce to the exclusion of all other European nations. Whether he

had also permitted them to garrison the fortresses captured from the Portuguese was a matter of dispute. Even so, this arrangement opened the door to Dutch dominance of the island. The Portuguese were, after long years of fighting, driven out and the local ruler reconciled himself to the Dutch presence. They held the coastal towns and most of the cinnamon fields, but their rule was dependent on Sinhalese officials and they had to keep the king of Kandy in good humour. They controlled all overseas transactions but lent the king ships to sail to Burma and southern India. The tenuous nature of Dutch dominance in Sri Lanka was stabilized only in 1766, when the king of Kandy recognized Dutch sovereignty over the regions they had occupied, transferred sovereignty over a strip of coastal land running round the whole island, permitted them to trade in such produce of the country as they were interested in, and, in return for protection from external aggression, promised not to sign any treaty with any other European or Indian power and to hand over all Europeans who entered his kingdom.

However, even by the mid-seventeenth century, Bengal in India had become the major centre of European economic enterprise in Asia. In return for the textiles and raw silk of that area, for which there was a great demand, Europe had little to offer Asia, and therefore precious metals had to be shipped out. But the pressure of demand on domestic capacity did not stimulate technological change. Land and labour were plentiful and the capital required to expand production was provided by the Dutch advances of cash against orders placed (Om Prakash, 1985). The artisan sector expanded but its indebtedness to the local merchants resulted in the latter retaining most of the profits from the growing trade.

This process continued after the British East India Company overtook the Dutch and became the leading agency in the foreign trade of Bengal. During the first half of the eighteenth century, the Indian commercial community, in close association with the British Company's servants, gained control of the economic life of the area. The local rulers increased their revenue by taxing the merchants and weavers but in fact it was the merchants who wielded effective power. European control of trade had not as yet meant the imposition of political and economic subordination. But from around 1750 the position began to change. The European Companies started to take a direct interest in production. Their growing penetration and the evolution of the world economy synchronized with conflicts which accompanied the dissolution of the empires of the Ottomans in Turkey, the Safavids of Iran and the Mughals in India (Bayly, 1989). The factory settlements in various parts of Asia were becoming busy towns virtually under European control. When the ruler of Bengal tried to prevent the British from exercising political power based on their economic influence, he was overthrown and ultimately the whole province came under British rule. The Indian merchants, who had grown wealthy

under British sponsorship, assisted the Company with capital and knowledge. British military power was inadequate to maintain unbroken law and order throughout the province they had taken over; but they used their authority to further their trade. The Company posted its agents at various places to control the weavers, smother competition and promote the quality of textiles. Between 1777 and 1797 the volume of Bengal's overseas trade increased five times. The Company's servants, barred from participating in the direct trade to Europe by the monopoly enforced by their employers, invested their money in inland trade; and this developed many ties between them and the Indian merchants. But the links between British power and indigenous capital hardly now been transformed into those between a dominant authority and a subordinate partner.

The large revenues from land gained by the British in Bengal were utilized by them to support a large army and intervene in other states. Already, in line with the Dutch precedents in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the French and the English had in India provided military assistance to local rulers in return for cession of territory. Now, with the French reduced to insignificance, the British developed this policy in various parts of India and received for the help of their armies either what were euphemistically described as subsidies or productive territories on lease. Regular payments of these subsidies were frequently made difficult by British officers who were serving with the garrisons in these kingdoms reducing their revenues by securing monopolies of many commodities; and such defaulting in payments led to annexations of territory. From 1789 the strength of the Company's army in India grew rapidly, and with it the pace of expansion. The craving for profit and the eagerness to control trade led to the acquisition of political dominance and an increase in piecemeal annexations; and British expansionism was beginning to develop a well-knit policy of colonial exploitation. Curiously, in another part of Asia, the end of the period witnessed an instance of a blend of Christian evangelicalism, so marked a feature of the early years of European expansion, and of the later phenomenon of military assistance to secure dominance. In 1789 a French bishop raised an army to assist a ruler in Indo-China to recover lost territory, and this firmly established French influence in that kingdom.

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RELIGIONS AND WORLD-VIEWS

Ninian Smart

The history of religions and other world-views and of the practices which shaped and were shaped by them during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries AD was much affected by European colonialism. While it was not until the nineteenth century that its full impact was felt, nevertheless in some areas the shape of culture and politics was being profoundly altered by it. For that reason it is best to start with Western developments.

The year 1492 was indeed a significant one, both for Spain and for the Western hemisphere. It was the date of the final defeat of Muslim powers, with the fall of Granada, and of the expulsion of the Jews from the country. The newly achieved unification of the country showed off its adventurousness by the discovery of New Spain. For the inhabitants of the Americas this was a huge disaster, but it led to the great expansion of Catholicism. The fact that the Iberian lands had seen a long and bitter struggle to drive out Muslim culture gave its Christianity a hard character, which it was to retain to a great degree during the conquest of Central and South America. That operation was seen as a crusade, in which a triumph of arms was also a victory for faith. Yet the Western Church was to be rocked by the rebelliousness of Luther and his successors and split into rival factions. This led, because it was the mercantile powers of Northern Europe which largely controlled the settlement of North America, to an echo of Europe's North-South division in the Western hemisphere. The values of reformed Christianity were a major factor behind the success of the American Revolution. Although, however, the Reformation weakened Catholic power, it also stimulated the revival of the spiritual and organizational life of the Church brought about by the Council of Trent (1545-63).

Martin Luther (1483-1546) triggered the Reformation through his presentation of theses or propositions critical of current Catholic practice in 1517. He used the Bible as the basis of a critique of Church tradition, and in emphasizing the role of God's grace as central to salvation provided grounds for abandoning practices such as monastic life, pilgrimages, the use of relics, the sale of indulgences (that is, certificates supposedly shortening the faithful's life of purgation for sins in the next life) and so on. The use of printing presses gave the Reform wide power, while the Northern European dissatisfaction with papal claims and interference gave many rulers a motive for backing the new movement. One wing of the Reformation, therefore, allied spiritual and political power in a new configuration, in which, ultimately, the principle came to be adopted of *cuius regio eius religio*, that is

to say, a citizen's religion should be determined by that of the ruler of the principality to which he belonged. The establishment of national Churches along such lines resulted in arrangements whereby Lutheranism became the official faith of countries such as Sweden and many German States, Anglicanism in England, Calvinism in Scotland, The Netherlands and parts of Switzerland, Catholicism in Poland, France, Hungary and much of southern Europe – leaving Orthodoxy dominant in Russia and elsewhere. In Eastern Europe Muslim Ottoman Sultans recognized the Greek Orthodox church's primacy in their territories. Jean Calvin (1509-63) provided a sober and intellectually complex faith which emphasized activity in the world as a way of salvation, which, however, was wholly determined by God. He substituted preaching and the pulpit as the chief sacrament of the Church in place of the mass or communion, and the laity as a whole as constituting the true priesthood. But because of Calvinism's strongly political dimension it too was less truly revolutionary than the values of what may be called the radical reformers.

Among the most important leaders of radical Reform was Menno Simons (1496-1561): the Anabaptists for whom he spoke argued that only adults should be baptized, since only they could have faith. This paved the way for a radical individualism which challenged the spiritual authority of the State. In this they were followed by such other groups as the Baptists, the Independents (Congregationalists) and the Quakers. Puritans such as these settled in the ill-defined lands of Northern and Eastern Europe, and helped to settle the 'New World' of North America, where they provided a radical dimension to American religion, side by side with Anglicans of the magisterial tradition. They also helped to demonstrate the fragmenting nature of Protestantism. By basing faith upon the Bible the Protestant movement more easily followed charismatic leaders who expressed divergent interpretations of scripture. In ritual and life there was a strong sobriety, which underpinned a strongly ethical world-view, paradoxically based on faith in God's unique power to save and human impotence except in depending on the Divine.

The renewal of Catholicism through the Counter-Reformation, from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards, involved better training for the priesthood, the reformulation of the doctrine of the sacraments, the reshaping of and strengthening of the Church's administration, the reaffirmation of the practices criticized by the Reformers, from the cult of the Virgin Mary to the practice of

pilgrimage, and a flourishing of new orders, notably that of the Society of Jesus or Jesuits under the leadership of Ignatius Loyola (1491?–1556). There was, too, a revival of the mystical life, for instance through the work of St Teresa of Avila (1515–82), and the evolution later of baroque art in the life of the Church, culminating in the sacred music of such composers as Josef Haydn (1732–1809) and W. A. Mozart (1756–91).

But both Catholics and Protestants were intolerant, of each other, of the radicals and of the Jews. This was a major factor in driving puritans and others to seek refuge in North America. The Thirty Years' War (1618–48) was sufficiently damaging to encourage thinking about toleration, and in John Locke (1632–1704) there emerged a major philosopher of toleration, who had some influence upon the Enlightenment and the more pluralistic thought of such as G. Lessing (1729–81) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

The reconquest of Spain led to a new wave of problems for Judaism. Their expulsion from Spain led them to southern France (where however they could not live openly as Jews until three centuries later), Italy and the Ottoman Empire, including North Africa. From time to time Christian principalities had the Talmud burnt – in 1553 in Italy and as late as 1757 in Poland. They encountered the ghetto system in Italy, and were segregated in Northern Europe. In the Ottoman Empire they could live, albeit as second-class citizens, according to their laws or *halakha* under the controlled pluralism of the *millet* system, which gave Jews and Christians the right to live in religiously autonomous communities under their Church with some status. Poland and the Ukraine proved to be the most favourable environment, with some alliance between Jews and the aristocracy.

The renaissance with its accompanying humanism created a climate more favourable to Judaism. Even so the general Christian attitude was based on a dangerous epistemology, which thought that the meaning of the Bible and the Old Testament in particular is transparent, so that the Jews, in failing to follow the Christian interpretation, were being wilful and perverse. Notable was Martin Luther's rather violent polemic *On the Jews and their Lies* (1543). Even if he was equally fierce against Catholics and Turks, his anti-Semitism apparently prepared the way to the Nazi Holocaust.

Among the important religious movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the messianism focused on Shabbetai Tsevi (1626–76), Hasidism in Eastern Europe, and the beginnings of the Haskalah or Jewish Enlightenment. Not surprisingly strong yearnings grew out of the general repression of Jews, and the charismatic figure of Shabbetai Tsevi of Smyrna in Turkey. Expectations of the coming work of the Mashiach or Messiah were disappointed when he converted to Islam ten years before his death. More stable and long-lasting was the movement in Eastern Europe known as Hasidism, under the initial leadership of the Ba'al Shem Tov (acronymic: Besht) (1700–60). This stressed the practice of the presence of God, a popular interpretation of Jewish mysticism, and warmth of feeling in the detailed practice of the Law or Torah. While some orthodox leaders opposed the fervour of the new movement, it came to leave a lasting imprint on American (and later Israeli) Judaism. The philosophy of Barukh Spinoza (1632–77) was remarkable in its modernity, and in some ways he foreshadowed modern Jewish life through his critical approach to scripture and his loyalty to the cultural, though not to the religious, tradition. More important was the Enlightenment thinking of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86),

who used contemporary philosophy to defend Judaism, seeing the Torah as a means of guarding ethical conduct against false idolatry. He was a major forerunner of Reform Judaism. The various motifs of modern Jewish life were being laid down in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: secular Jewishness through Spinoza, devotional and highly conservative Hasidism through the Besht, Reform Judaism through the Haskalah, and traditionalism through the ongoing life of the community through the teachings of the generality of rabbis.

Meanwhile the arrival of refugees in North Africa and the Ottoman Empire helped to revivify Jewish life there. There was also in Palestine the revival of mysticism, notably through the life and writings of Isaac Luria (1534–72), who saw the human need to reascend to God; the divine light was catastrophically dispersed through the world and through the contemplative life we can return each her or his own spark to the divine source. Some migrants from southern Europe also helped to give added vitality to Jewish settlements in India, which were concentrated at Cochin, after the Portuguese had dispersed the well-established settlement in Cranganore to the north of Cochin, in 1524. Before the American Revolution a small Jewish community had established itself in America.

The effects of the Spanish and Portuguese conquests of America were, of course, profound. The well-developed religious systems of the Aztec and Inca Empire, as well as the remnant of classical Mayan religion, were extinguished very rapidly. In Cuzco, the capital of the Incan Empire, the State religion was a complex amalgam of localized traditions welding together the imperial loyalties of the vast realm, under the cult of the Sun, whose father Viracocha was supreme Creator. The Temple of the Sun also embraced the God Thunder, the Moon Goddess (vital for women) and other deities, below whom in the pantheon swarmed a cloud of numerous beings. The centralized State was, however, too organized: the impudent blows of a few adventurers could, in 1532, cause the whole system to collapse. The golden glories of the Incas, their healing and vivifying powers, disappeared in short measure, to be rapidly replaced by the Christian Trinity.

Almost as sudden was the collapse of the Aztecs. Their religion was grimmer than that of the Incas, but the achievements of their civilization were impressive. Their world-view posited that the cosmos is inherently unstable. The axis of the universe ran through their city of Tenochtitlán, modelled on an older city, that of Teotihuacán or Dwelling of the Gods. We are now, they thought, in the fifth and last period of the universe, during which the Sun is given energy through human sacrifice, performed centrally by the Emperor. A pantheon of deities, such as the all-powerful and androgynous Omteotl, and the culture-creating and clever Quetzalcoatl, identified as a messianic figure with Cortés come to reclaim his kingdom, in his feathered ships coming out of the East. This remarkable cult and glittering culture were conquered with astonishing ease by the confident Spaniards.

The demise of the urban civilizations was matched by the decimation of smaller cultures – the Arawaks and Caribs, and many shamanistic cults of South America, which were gradually absorbed within the embrace of dominant Catholicism. One important development was a new synthesis between indigenous practices and Catholic orthodoxy through, above all, the veneration accorded throughout Central America to Our Lady of Guadalupe. She appeared in a vision to a convert, speaking Nahuatl, on a

hill outside of Tenochtitlán (Mexico City) in 1531, and became the focus of a mixed ritual and loyalty—that is mixed as between Spaniard and Indian.

The Indians were often treated with great cruelty and suffered viciously from European diseases. In the debates on their treatment a large and beneficial part was played by the Catholic priest Bartolomé de las Casas (1474–1566). The Spanish New Laws of 1542, promulgated partly under pressure from him, gave some protection to Indians. The Church was a force for their induction into Hispanic cultures. In much of Central and South America missionaries drawn from orders such as the Franciscans and Dominicans would minister to villages and communities of Indians. To some degree the cult of saints helped to bridge the gap between the pre-Columbian religions and the Catholic faith. The paternalism was intense, as witness above all the Jesuit settlements in Paraguay and the Franciscan missions in California under Junípero Serra (1713–84).

In North America the indigenous religions, such as those of the Pueblos, and those of the Plains Indians, persisted into the eighteenth century and beyond; they even in some measure survived the later destruction of much Indian culture in the nineteenth century. Various motifs can be discerned, as the Native Americans first encountered the European settlers, such as the *kachina* or sacred mask ceremonial among the Hopi, the belief in a dual creation by heavenly Twins among the Iroquois, the vision quest among the Lakota, the shamanism of many other groups, the belief in the Mistress of Sea Animals among the Inuit (Eskimo), and so on. Society was somewhat changed by the introduction, by the Spaniards primarily, of the horse, which intensified the pursuit of the buffalo among the prairie Indians (the buffalo were ultimately all but wiped out by the gun).

Meanwhile in North America the White settlements brought new combinations of religion among the largely Protestant settlers. The southern colonies were in theory primarily Anglican, while New England was made up of dissenters mostly. With the growth of plantations in the South and the slave-trade, another important element was added in American religion: that of the Africans, whose indigenous and imported beliefs faded, to be replaced by fervent forms of Protestantism. In some other areas of African culture in the Western hemisphere, mixed forms of Catholicism and African religion generated complex rites, such as those of Haitian Voodoo. But the dominant motifs among both Whites and Blacks in North America were radical, experience-oriented kinds of Protestantism, often Baptist and in the late eighteenth century Methodist. Important were revivals, such as the Great Awakening, which started in 1734 in Northampton, Massachusetts, and spread through the influence of charismatic preachers such as George Whitefield (1714–79). Also important among the educated élite was deism, that is belief in a God who was somewhat aloof from his creation—an intellectual construct rather than a living personal reciprocator of devotional love. The combination of Enlightenment ideas and the Anabaptist motifs woven into ordinary piety led to the First Amendment laying down the separation of Church and State under the new United States constitution.

Meanwhile in Eastern Europe a long struggle developed between Christian powers and the Ottoman Empire. Its success in subduing the Byzantine Empire and the establishment of the capital at Istanbul ushered in a period of success. By the middle of the sixteenth century the Ottomans controlled all of North Africa except for Morocco. In this

region spirituality was dominated by brotherhoods, centring on chapels or *zāwiyah*, led by sheikhs who possessed charismatic power or *barakah* and who after their death played the part of intercessors on behalf of the faithful. The system stressed the importance of good works and divine grace as mediated by holy persons. It tended to marginalize scriptural Islam and the work of jurists. While in urban centres, highly sophisticated pantheistic ideas dominated in the religious orders, *tarikas*, in the countryside syncretist *tarikas* combining Islam, Turkish, Shamanistic and popular Christian beliefs merged. For the former *Mamharism* and for the latter *Bektāshism* is known as most prominent.

In Arabia there arose the first major reforming movement reaffirming a puritanical version of Sunni orthodoxy of Hanbalism. This was led by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–92), who emphasized the notion of the unity of God and saw in the cult of saints a kind of polytheism. This purified Islam became the official credo of the Sa'udi family, which conquered most of Arabia (though the first Saudi state was suppressed by the Ottomans in 1812).

The Turkish folk religion was initially syncretistic, combining Turkish shamanism, Shi'ism and some indigenous beliefs, for instance through the Bektāshī order. This became important because Janissaries, the élite military body of the Empire, adopted it as their religious order. It was given its persisting shape by Bālim Sulhān in the early sixteenth century. It contained Shi'i elements, recognizing twelve imāms, and a kind of Trinity comprising Allāh, 'Alī and Muḥammad. The initiation involved a sort of communion service, involving drinking water from a ceremonial cup, bread and cheese. Much of Islamic law was disregarded, and it obviously had appealed for Christian converts to Islam. But the Ottomans, partly out of opposition to the Persian dynasty of Safavids, championed the cause of Sunni Islam while the founder of the Safavid dynasty, Ismā'il I, was at the same time the sacred head of a dervish order claiming that by God's direct and constant guidance he had the supreme knowledge and control of the phenomena in the two worlds, material and spiritual.

The greatest of the Safavids (1501–1736) was Shāh 'Abbās (1571–1629), (see Chapter 18.1). With its Shi'i ideology and popular mysticism the dynasty succeeded in uniting its varied peoples. It also encouraged a revival of Sufi thought and practice, especially through the teachings of Mīr Dāmād (d. 1630) and of his even more distinguished disciple Mullā Sadrā (1571?–1640). The latter perceived the universe as a continuum of changing existence under God as the supreme and purely existing being. The mutual integration of Shi'i practice, Sufism and ancient Iranian political tradition gave the Safavid era important cohesion.

Meanwhile the influence of Islam in South Asia was solidified through the establishment of the Mughal Empire, centered on Delhi, by Bābur (reigned 1526–30). Especially under the emperor Akbar (1542–1605) attempts were made to unify Muslims and Hindus in his administration: Akbar's strong interest in the various religions he came into contact with (including Christianity as expounded by Jesuits) led him to the belief that formal religions were based on illusory differences. He strove to create a 'circle of disciples' to whom he would teach this truth under the name of *Sulh-i Kul* (Absolute Peace). Also influential were the Islamic orders of Qādiriyyah, Shattāriyyah and Nakshbandiyyah. Some Sufi thought, especially the philosophy of Ibn al-'Arabī (1165–1240), was congenial to Hindus, for it had analogies with the ideas of the Vedānta tradition, affirming a pantheistic unity between God and the universe. Also significant were

the wandering beggars or *qalandārs* who resembled Hindu mendicants, and who often paid scant regard to Islamic norms (for example in their lack of clothing). They served as a bridge between traditional Sufism and a population accustomed to give honour to holy men. Moreover, Islam became rooted in some of the vernacular languages such as Bengali and Tamil, as Sufi and other pious works were composed in them. It was thus during the Mughal period up to the decay of the Empire towards the end of the eighteenth century that Islam came to acquire a very solid presence in the Indian peninsula.

It was during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, moreover, that Islam made its greatest strides in South-East Asia. It had already established itself in the coastal areas of Malaya and Sumatra. During these three centuries it spread to the rest of these regions, and reached as far as the Moluccas to the East, the Southern Philippines, and through most of the intermediate islands, including Java, Sulawesi and much of Borneo. A key role was played by the State of Aceh especially during its apogee under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607–36). It dominated the western end of Sumatra and parts of Malaya, and functioned as a major node of the Muslim trading network, which extended as far as Europe through the Red Sea, Egypt and Syria. The faith spread partly through trading contacts, partly through the Sufi orders and family connections. Also trade fostered the pilgrimage to Mecca, and here contacts with Sufi and other movements in the Islamic heartlands had significant impact. It will be seen from all this that the period in question saw an extensive spread and solidification of Islam as far as New Guinea at one end of the world and West Africa at the other. As a reaction against the Christian domination, aid from the Muslims of Gujarat in India and the Ottoman Empire also played a role. It was probably the most productive missionary era since the early conquests. Though Indonesian Islam was often entangled with Hindu and local cults, it nevertheless was in a position to become more orthodox as time went on and world communications improved. It was sufficiently grounded to resist much effect from the Dutch conquest of the East Indies.

In Central Asia Sunni Islam flourished under Uzbek dominance, especially through such rulers as 'Ubayd Allāh (d. 1539) and 'Abd Allāh Khan (1539–98). Once again the role of the Sufi orders was pivotal in spreading the faith among nomads. The cultural life of Islam centred on a number of cities, above all Bukhārā. But the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were full of decline and suffering, because of the repeated depredations by the Buddhist Kalmyks who settled in the lower Volga area from 1613 and by the co-religionist Oirats further to the East. These Mongol peoples conducted a religiously-legitimated crusade against Islamic Turkistan.

Despite the successes of Islam during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, European sea power was already making a difference, siphoning trade away from the Silk Route, which brought prosperity to Central Asia, and from the Red Sea, which fed the Middle East. It was beginning to decrease the significance of the trans-Saharan trade too. The major empires – Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal – were to feel the impact of the West. So by the end of the period, Islam was in a state of cultural decline, from which it has been striving to recover during the two centuries since. Further, while the sea powers were slicing off parts of Asia from the southern side, Russia was expanding across the northern part as far as the Pacific, and pressing upon Central Asia.

Though Christianity had been chiefly centred in Kiev, the Mongol incursions had shattered it as a capital, and other nodes of culture such as Pskov and Novgorod were exposed to the pressures exerted by the Teutonic knights. Orthodox missionaries were active in spreading the faith throughout the region.

The move of the Patriarchate to Moscow inspired the notion that Moscow was the 'Third Rome'. The first Rome was in schism; the second (Constantinople) had fallen to the Ottomans; Russia would act as the true leader of the Christian faith. The attempt by the Patriarch Nikon (1605–81) to bring Russian practice in line with that of Byzantium was seen as a repudiation of that theory. His ritual reforms led to a split with those who carried on in the old ways – the Old Believers. During the reign of Peter I (1682–1725) the Patriarchate was replaced by a synod, and the Church was put under bureaucratic control. The opening to the West became controversial, with differing views represented by the Slavophiles and the Westernizers – these were to become vital trends in the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the eighteenth century saw a revival of spirituality, partly through the introduction into Russia of the movement known as mystical Hesychasm (Quietism) from Mount Athos in Greece introduced in the fourteenth century in which breathing techniques were used in contemplation and in the expression of the Jesus prayer – 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me'. With this increased emphasis upon the mystical life went the veneration of the holy man or *starets*, who acted as a spiritual adviser and guru to the faithful.

In the Western part of the Ukraine the Church was unite, that is accepting the primacy of Rome, but adhering to Orthodox-style rituals and organization. This mode dated back to the Council of Brest in 1596, and was found elsewhere in the region, for example in Transylvania. Other Orthodox Churches in Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece survived under Ottoman rule brought under the Patriarch in Istanbul. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe Lutheranism took hold, in Finland, Estonia and Latvia, while Catholicism predominated in Lithuania and Poland, and in Hungary, Croatia and elsewhere. Jews were a vital ingredient virtually throughout the area, as were Muslims in many parts.

Conversion to Islam predominated in Bosnia, the Rhodops and Albania while Muslim Turks from Anatolia settled largely in Eastern Balkans, Dobrudja and the Maritsa River (see Chapter 16 on the Ottoman Empire).

The European Enlightenment, centering in Britain, France and Germany, and expressed in such writing as that of Adam Smith (1723–90) David Hume (1711–76), the French encyclopedists under the leadership of Denis Diderot (1713–84), Gotthold Lessing (1729–81) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), largely passed Russia and the Balkans by. Enlightenment in Greece and the two Rumanian principalities was quite important.

The expansion of Europe through sea power had its effects on the underbelly of Asia, especially in South Asia, but increasingly too in China and Japan. The Portuguese voyages opened up the East to Western trade: Vasco da Gama (?1460–1524) had gone round Africa to India in 1497–9. In 1510 the Portuguese established themselves at Goa, and in 1517 at Colombo. The British, Dutch and French were to follow at the end of the century: Pondicherry was founded by the French in 1683, Calcutta in 1690 by the British, while the Dutch had taken Colombo in 1656. Primarily through the Seven Years' War (1756–63) the British established dominance over the region.

Meanwhile in India itself, Hinduism was digesting Islamic influences as well as generating new forms of devotional religion. It was not a precisely glorious period for Hindu philosophy, but piety was channelled into new forms. Important were the *smṛti* tradition, the new devotionalism of Caitanya and his successors, and the emergence of Sikhism as a third force between Islam and Hinduism. Also important in the religious arts was the work of Tulsidās (d. 1623), whose epic *Rāmcaritmānās* (Lays of the Deeds of Rāma) has had a huge influence in the Hindi speaking part of India.

Kabīr (1440–1518) was probably a Muslim, but he had a strong influence on the Hindu tradition as well as being a main root of Sikhism. He was critical of the way the pious often cling to externals; he was stimulated in this thought by the clashes between Muslims and Hindus. He was thus critical of the worship of images, the caste system, pilgrimages (whether to Mecca or Banaras), sacred texts and so forth. His beliefs, though he abhorred theology and rejected all ritual, were largely Hindu, albeit involving considerable simplification. He believed in rebirth and karma, and used the notion of illusion (*māyā*) to describe the world which we experience. He came to be seen as the first founder of the Sikh religion, but a following called the Kabīrpanthis (those who adopt the Kabīr path) has persisted as a form of the Hindu tradition. He is regarded as a prominent member of the *smṛti* or holy man tradition. It represents a form of aniconic Hinduism that is rejecting the use of material images or icons.

While Kabīr's poems came to be incorporated in the Sikh scriptures, the community looks back on Nānak (1469–1539) as its first Guru or spiritual leader. He synthesized Islamic and Hindu ideals and in dispensing with the tradition of a Brahmin priesthood, laid the foundations for a new religious community. Among his successors as Guru were Arjan, who led the movement from 1581 to 1606 and who founded the famous and beautiful Golden Temple in Amritsar, and Gobind Singh (1666–1708), who in 1699 founded the Sikh community along new lines. He picked out five initial members of the new order or *Khalsa* (the Pure), gave his followers external signs (such as uncut hair and beard, hence the Sikh turban), substituted a scripture, the *Adi Granth*, for the Guru, and preached a strong military ethic. Such measures appeared to him necessary to ward off Mughal power, and the backbone of the community were the sturdy *jāts*, a stratum of Punjabi farmers. Eventually the Sikhs established dominance in the Punjab. While many Hindus regarded them as variants within the rich and diverse Hindu tradition, the Sikhs in effect formed themselves into a third faith, alongside of both Islam and Hinduism. But their theology was more Hindu (involving reincarnation, for instance).

Caitanya (1486–1533) was a major figure in the intensification of devotional or *bhakti* religion, focused on a warmly personal picture of the Divine Being. At the age of 22 he experienced a strong call to the service of Krishna, while on the way to perform the rituals of the dead for his first wife. Thereafter he devoted himself to worship: he called his followers to sing hymns and dance, sometimes for days on end, in honour of Krishna. Vaiṣṇava wandering recluses and Caitanya's immediate followers helped to spread his message throughout Bengal, where it became especially influential among the merchant class, and elsewhere. In all this Caitanya had set forth a renewed devotionalism. Philosophically, his position came to be known as *acintya-bhedābheda* or the doctrine of indefinable difference-in-non-difference. This meant that in a paradoxical way

human and other living beings are offshoots of the Divine, both different from him or her, and not different. The fusion of the soul in the divine glory is symbolized by the intense love of Krishna for his spouse Rādhā and of her for him. Caitanya was believed to be a joint incarnation of the divine couple. The Caitanya movement was in some decline as the British established themselves in Bengal. During the eighteenth century, however, British administration functioned through the East India Company which excluded missionaries from its territories, so as not to upset the inhabitants: it was only later that Hinduism as a whole formed a self-conscious tradition which underwent revival in the face of, and under the stimulus of, Christian criticisms of its social and spiritual life.

Though Buddhism had a thousand years earlier been a highly vital ingredient in Indian civilization it had largely died out in the Indian subcontinent, save in areas to the north and south. In Sri Lanka, Theravāda Buddhism was for part of the period at a peculiarly low ebb. The island was dominated by the Portuguese from 1505 to 1658, by the Dutch from the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth and finally by the British. It was during the reign of Kīrtisiri Rājāsīha (1747–81) that the order was renewed through ordination from Thailand—this branch of the Saṅgha (monastic community) being known as the Siam Nikaya (Thai branch). This was the beginning of a process of renewal carrying on until the twentieth century.

To the north Buddhism persisted in its Tibetan and Nepalese forms. In Tibet, there was a revolutionary innovation in the installation of the Dalai Lama in 1642 as temporal head of the state, under Mongol influence. The Dalai Lamas were thought to be successive incarnations not only of their predecessors but also of the great bodhisattva or Buddha-to-be Avalokiteśvara (the Lord who looks down with compassion). Tibet was important in the transmission of vast numbers of texts, but it was during the eighteenth century under the suzerainty of China, and somewhat isolated from the rest of the Buddhist world.

In South-East Asia, the two most dominant states, namely Myanmar and Thailand consolidated their Theravādin ideology, which they had imported from Sri Lanka, in succession to Hindu and Mahāyāna systems of belief and practice. In turn they helped to revivify Buddhist practice in Sri Lanka. In turn these developments influenced Cambodia and Laos and to a lesser extent Viet Nam, more under Chinese cultural influence.

China during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries experienced the Ming and Qing dynasties. During the latter phase of the former, the integration of the 'three religions'—that is, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism—was further developed. Actually in an important sense there were four traditions (this not including the important but minority presence of Islam and Christianity), if we add folk religion as a general but localized substratum beneath the three major traditions. Such reformers as Zhu Hong (1535–1615) wove Confucian values into a Buddhist context, while the famous philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) had earlier expounded a form of Neo-Confucianism with a strongly contemplative flavour which fitted in with Buddhist and indeed Chan (Meditation) School values.

Wang's vision also had Daoist ingredients: he practised Daoist meditation and was deeply influenced by the Daoist quest for immortality. In his *Inquiry on the Great Learning*, finished shortly before his death, he depicted a vision of a unified and interconnected reality, so that Heaven, the things

in the cosmos and human selves reflect each other's nature. For him, principle and mind are one: and so our inner constitution can itself be a guide to the understanding of the cosmos. This contemplative emphasis was in opposition to the official theory of Confucianism, expounded by Zhu Xi (1130-1200). Wang also affirmed the solidity between knowledge and action. In various ways he became profoundly influential both in China and in Japan. On the other hand the Zhu Xi interpretation remained the official version of the tradition as examined for the imperial civil service, even under the succeeding rule of the Manchū rulers, who took power in 1644.

China in the late Ming experienced its most serious early contacts with European culture through the Jesuit missions, notably that of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610). By adopting Chinese customs and gaining a good knowledge of Chinese intellectual and literary tradition he established himself at the court, and published in the areas both of Christian theology and of science. He became director of astronomy and helped with the manufacture of cannon. His experiment of promoting Christianity in Chinese dress, like a similar tactic of Roberto de Nobili (1577-1656), was ultimately rejected by the Vatican, due to the criticism and rivalry of other missionaries.

The merging of the three traditions into a complex and loose unity was accompanied by a gradual synthesis within Buddhism, so that Pure Land and Chan (Meditation) Buddhism became effectively the only main forms, and themselves combined, so that for instance the practitioner of piety, calling on the name of the great Buddha Amitābha (creator of the Pure Land whither the faithful are to be transported after death), should ask himself who it is that calls on the Buddha. In other words, Chan methods of self-awareness were combined with Pure Land devotionism. Also vital during the Ming and Qing dynasties were various forms of messianism, often focusing on the future Buddha Maitreya, thought of as coming to earth imminently.

In Confucian thought there was a swing towards a kind of empiricism in the Qing period, notably through the work of Dai Zhen (1729-77) who advocated the method of *kao-zheng* or inquiries grounded on evidence. This method went back to Hui Dong (1697-1758), critical of scholars who neglected practical affairs in favour of metaphysical speculation and subjective explorations. But though Dai Zhen involved himself in various practical investigations, in mathematics and hydraulic engineering, he also engaged in a critical evaluation of the Confucian texts, and ultimately such literary concerns stood in the way of Chinese scientific developments. Moreover, the imperial civil service scarcely rewarded forward-looking thinking. Still, the eighteenth century was in many ways a high point in Chinese culture, underpinned by a rich religious and spiritual life.

A significant contribution to Confucian thought was made by Korean scholars, notably by the two thinkers Yi Huang (1501-70), known by his pen-name T'oege, and Yi I (1536-84), known as Yulgok. They were founders of two rival schools, those of Principle and Matter. In other words, while both, in Neo-Confucian style, saw everything as being a melange of *li* or principle and *qi* or material energy, they gave different emphases in relation to each's priority. For T'oege, principle could be veiled by material energy, and this accounts for evil. For Yulgok there was no logic in deeming principle as moral and matter not: goodness has to manifest itself in concrete individuality, since what makes an individual is the mixture of *li* and *qi*.

The overthrow of the Ming dynasty was to prove greatly disturbing to the Korean élite. The Ming were thought of as the true bearers of Chinese – indeed all – civilization, while the Manchū or Qing were foreigners. One of the important thinkers in redefining the position of the Korean monarchy was Yun Hyu (1617-80), an independent-minded theorist. From his investigation of the history of dynasties he concluded that the monarch's position and obligations should be defined publicly (as distinct from his obligations as a family member): this affected Yun Hyu's attitude to the rites surrounding the imperial position. Eventually this doctrine, which stressed also the need for the moral to act with high moral rectitude, brought him into collision with Sukchong, who reigned from 1674-1720, but only after he had served in various ministerial capacities. He took an independent stand also on the question of Confucian orthodoxy, writing his own commentaries on the classics, a challenge to the traditionalists' recognition of the definitive position of Zhu Xi's work. The main point which Yun Hyu and his followers wished to make was that civilization, though it might have the thought of Confucius at its heart, was a growing thing, and that Korea had a special destiny as the new bearer of Chinese civilization.

Buddhism had undergone, in the fifteenth century, considerable regulation and persecution by the monarchy: temple lands were confiscated, temples were not allowed in the main cities, and the various schools were amalgamated into two, one of which was Chan or Son. In the sixteenth century, some revival occurred, led by Sōsan Hynjōng (1520-1604) wrote not only a guide to Son practice but accounts of the Daoist and Confucian traditions, with a view to effecting a reconciliation.

An expression of a modernist strand in Confucian thinking at the end of the eighteenth century prefigured Korea's ultimate adaptation to Western and Japanese challenges. It was associated with the voluminous writings of Chong Yagyong (1762-1836), the chief exponent of the school of practical learning. He rediscovered a primordial theism in the thought of Confucius. He had come under the influence of Ricci's thinking, and a number of his relatives and friends had been baptized as Catholics. For this he was expelled from government. His prolific works included a critical review of Confucianism, and he had some grasp of the principles of modern science.

As well as the Chinese-derived traditions, indigenous cults in Korea, for instance shamanism, were important at a local level, and reverence for ancestors. Such indigenous religious motifs were later to help to form some of Korea's new religious movements.

Meanwhile Japan experienced a crisis during the sixteenth century which related to the coming of Catholic Christianity, through the mission of Francis Xavier (1506-52) from 1549 to 1551, and his successors. The feudal lord Ōda Nobunaga (1534-82), seeking the unification of the country under his rule and incensed by the Buddhist resistance to his rule not only burned down the main Tendai monastery on Mount Hiei, outside Kyōtō, but killed and persecuted thousands of monks: and he encouraged Christianity as a counterbalance to Buddhism. His successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98) reversed this policy, fearing that Christians could be manipulated by foreign powers. He had twenty-six Franciscans and Japanese converts crucified. Eventually the battle for unity was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), who established the shogunate or military dictatorship at Tokyo. The Tokugawa regime was a system which lasted till the Meiji

era in 1867, and composed a comprehensive organization of Japan, in which the concept of national seclusion was prominent, and involved the banishing of foreign missionaries. Japan was organized as a Buddhist nation. Such trade with the outside as was allowed was channelled through the port of Nagasaki, via Dutch and Chinese merchants.

The shogunate reinforced their legitimacy by emphasizing the sacred ritual surrounding the imperial family who were, however, without power. They reorganized Buddhism in a comprehensive system of parishes. Generally, both religions and philosophical thought was subordinated to the needs of the regime. The crowning ideology of the Tokugawa regime was a form of Neo-Confucianism, but all ethical and spiritual systems were supposed to support the hierarchical arrangement of society, divided rigidly into four classes – warriors, farmers, artisans and merchants. A synthesis between Confucian teachings and the ideal of the heroic warrior (*bushi*) was achieved in the thinking of Yamaga Sokō (1622–85), who identified the superior man or gentleman of the Confucian tradition and military elite. Moreover, with the centralization of feudal administration and the stamping out of civil war he sketched a new range of occupations for soldiers, which would need a new level of education. In short, martial skills and superior conduct were blended in a refined code of chivalry suitable for the new age.

The major ideology of the court was a relatively conservative interpretation of the school of Zhu Xi, especially through the work of Hayashi Razan (1583–1657) and his family. Also important in stressing propriety of behaviour rather than the expression of emotions was the Kimon school, headed by Yamazaki Anzai (1618–82). There was also some exploration of the idealist thought of Wang Yang-ming, especially in the seventeenth century, when the themes of intuitive insight and its linkage with action had relevance to the *bushidō* ideal. Eventually the Wang school would have an important role in the final dissolution of the Tokugawa system and its replacement by the Meiji order.

Buddhism was brought under political control through the parish system. In theory every household was affiliated to a temple, and this led to a growth in the number of temples, but at the expense of their freedom and creativity. The conflict with Christianity implied that each person had to have a certificate of not belonging to a forbidden faith. All this was part of the centralization of the Tokugawa system and its closure, so that trade and other contacts with the outside world were rigorously controlled.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also saw a revival of Japan's ancient religious culture and the formation of a Shintō ideology. While Buddhism, as elsewhere in Asia, had had no great difficulty in accepting the spirits or *kami* as forces, ultimately impermanent, within the cosmos, and blending Shintō rituals with Buddhist practices, Confucianism was also brought to bear, identifying the supreme being or Great Ultimate with one or other of the great primordial *kamis*. More significantly, in the eighteenth century there was a movement known as Kokugaku or National Learning which sought to go back to national beginnings and the old religion, before its contamination by foreign ideas and cults. The founder of the school was Kamo no Mabuchi (1697–1769). Some writers in this tradition argued for the essential superiority of Shintō to other religions, and this served to express the nationalist ethos of Tokugawa Japan.

The system was an interesting experiment in dealing with the perceived external menace of the West, as symbolized by Christianity in particular, by a rigidly controlled organization

of society. Despite this some Japanese maintained their Christian religion secretly, and some 40,000 such believers emerged during the Meiji restoration. Generally speaking, however, the blend of Buddhist and indigenous rites, Confucian ethics and philosophy and the revival of interest in ancient Japanese values provided a stable, though not especially creative, ideology.

To the south of Japan in the vast Pacific region, European voyages had a massive impact. In the sixteenth century the Spaniards took control of much of the Philippines, and indigenous religions were largely supplanted by Catholic Christianity, vigorously organized by Spanish priests. Polynesia, Melanesia, Micronesia, Australia and New Zealand were comprehensively affected by the remarkable eighteenth-century voyages of Captain Cook (1728–79), which prepared the way for colonization. In 1788 New South Wales was founded as a British penal colony, and thus began the devastating contact with European diseases and ambitions which decimated Aborigine culture.

The world of the Pacific had taken its shape from the great sea voyages of the Polynesian peoples, which started before the Common Era and were complete by the fourteenth century when the second great wave of migrants came to New Zealand. Religion was denched in various key concepts such as that of *tapu* or taboo, controlling the behaviour which was commanded or forbidden, *māia* or numinous power which linked in the natural phenomena of ocean, thunder, mountain, fire, and so on, and the deities including such creator figures as Tangaroa, god of the ocean. Also important was the great trickster figure of Polynesian culture, Maui, ancestor of the human race, who lends divine forces to human uses. As in other relatively small-scale societies, the signs of nature were read to figure out the actions and intentions of the gods, and society included specialists in visions and dreams, as well as in ritual activities. Much of this religion, and its analogues in Melanesia and Micronesia, was to be displaced by missionary Christianity, which also brought literacy into the region and with it new views about sacred power.

Australian religion centred mythically on the primordial Dream Time, when supernatural beings were engaged in creative processes. Widespread also was the practice of totemism, in which there was thought to be a bonding between a particular group or individual with some natural species or phenomenon. It was part of the larger conception of a close symbiosis between humans and the rest of their environment. Aboriginal culture was masterly in its control of the forces of survival in the very harsh landscape of so much of Australia. Apart from some cultural exchanges with Melanesia to the north, the Australians were able to develop in separation from the rest of the world until the arrival of Europeans in the late eighteenth century. Diseases spread rapidly. The European conception of landholding was quite different from the Australian perception of their relationship to the territories through which they ranged. The encounter between the two races proved to be tragic for the Aborigines.

Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries classical religion in sub-Saharan Africa was increasingly affected by outside forces – the continued stimulus of Islamic cultures penetrating from the north, the arrival of the Portuguese as far as the Horn of Africa, the effects of both European and Arabian slave and gold trades, and the establishment of the Cape colony by the Dutch.

In the sahel region was an important empire, known as Songhay, founded by Muhammad Askia in 1493, including

the important mercantile city of Timbuktu, also an important Islamic intellectual centre. Later in parts of West Africa during the last quarter of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth a series of holy struggles or *jihāds* had revolutionary effects on a number of kingdoms which operated a somewhat syncretic system, blending classical African cults and Islamic beliefs. These struggles served to reform Islam through the takeover of power by stricter adherents.

In the Horn of Africa the Somalis launched a *jihād* against Ethiopia, which had long maintained itself as the only long-standing Christian power in Africa. In northern Abyssinia, Ottomans supported the *jihād* of Ahmed Grān against the Christian south in 1540s. The arrival of the Portuguese led to the ultimate defeat of the invasion in 1543. This paved the way for increasing Jesuit influence, which led to a short-lived union between the ancient Ethiopian Church and Rome, in the reign of Susenyos (1607–32). Ethiopia's independent and highly traditional faith maintained itself, and later was to become the focus of many Black aspirations, especially in the Western Hemisphere. Gold trade from Western Sudan was responsible for the spread of Islam there. The slave-trade, conducted by Europeans – most successfully during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the British and the Portuguese – led to certain shifts of power from the older states of the sahel to the forest kingdoms of West Africa, together with the depopulation of regions such as Angola. It caused the mingling of African cultures in the Western Hemisphere, and the creation of new forms of spirituality such as Haitian voodoo, where Catholic and African and other elements blended. Such states as Ashanti, Yoruba, Benin and Dahomey benefited from the trade. In East Africa, the Arab trade spread Islam, from such centres as Zanzibar.

But over much of sub-Saharan Africa there was a continuance of classical religions, which loosely embraced certain central ideas, such as the existence of a High God, some sense of the alienation of our ancestors from God, the prevalence of a multiplicity of lesser but more accessible gods, the vital importance of healing, witchcraft and other accomplishments of ritual specialists, shamanic experiences in which visionaries consort with supernatural powers, and the reverencing of ancestors. Such beliefs could be blended in varying ways with orthodox Islam and Christianity.

In the south of Africa a Dutch post was established at the Cape in 1652. This originally was meant as a supply post for the ships bound to and from South Asia and the East Indies. Gradually it extended into an agricultural settlement with a predominantly Dutch-speaking population (but with an admixture of Huguenot and other European migrants) who imported slaves from Portuguese Africa and from Indonesia and Malaysia. Inter-marriage between Whites and others gave rise to the so-called Coloured or mixed-race group. The religion of the settlers was a fairly strict Calvinism, often emphasizing the need for separate cultures even despite the widespread practice of cohabitation between races. Numbers of Europeans were small; perhaps 15,000 in the late eighteenth century. The spread of European farming brought both cultural and economic conflicts between the Bantu of the region, notably the Xhosa on the eastern frontier.

Across the world the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century saw the completion of various processes affecting and affected by religion. The Renaissance and the Reformation in Europe had set in train turbulent forces which tended towards the emergence of the nation-state, which in turn evolved religious ideologies, typically enforcing one kind of Christian practice as being the norm for citizens.

The United States was unusual in affirming the separation of Church and State. Still, the second half of the eighteenth century saw the laying down of the foundations for secular ideologies.

At the same time, religiosity was a vital European export, in particular through the consolidation in the eighteenth century of the Catholic faith in Central and South America. Catholic missionaries had also had their modest successes elsewhere, in parts of Africa, in South India, in China. Protestantism's chief effect was the implantation of Protestant communities in North America: the radical Reformation, combined with the emphasis on reason as an Enlightenment value, had drawn the American Founding Fathers to the Church-State separation.

The influence of sea power was beginning to be felt across the world. Japan had decided, with some perspicacity, that it needed to turn against European penetration (it later came to see that the acceptance of certain European ideas and practices was necessary for survival, hence the Meiji restoration). Its tight Tokugawa system had advantages. But China while noticing some effects of European adventurism in the eighteenth century was not much alerted to its dangers. The eighteenth century was in any case a luxuriant period in the development of religious and philosophical values, and Chinese values were much admired in Europe. South Asia was, however, being heavily penetrated by the West. Mughal civilization was in decline, and there was some revival of Hinduism and the creation of a new Sikh power. Buddhism was at rather a low ebb, not merely in Sri Lanka, but also in Japanese life, where Tokugawa control accounted for its lack of creativity. On the other hand, Islamic culture was making important inroads into Malaysia and Indonesia. Its reform in Arabia was significant, but basically it was not until after 1789 that Muslim countries at all came to grips with the underlying seriousness of the Western challenge. Wahhabi puritanism spread in North Africa and India.

In Africa, the slave-trade continued to drain some of the areas of West and East Africa. While there were other effects of Western colonial expansion, they were relatively small compared with the seeping southwards of Islamic religion and culture. In the meantime north Asia from Russia to the Pacific saw an immense expansion of Russian values and religion. As elsewhere smaller-scale societies were under great pressure from Western colonial expansion and cultural transfer.

In brief, the period from 1492 to 1789 was a crucial one for many religions.

The period saw a notable expansion of both Islam and Christianity, largely at the expense of indigenous polytheistic belief-systems, as in Africa and Latin America. But the new composite 'Indo-Islamic' culture made highly significant inroads into Indian culture and in South-East Asia, which had a partially Indian civilization. In South Asia it laid the foundations of its modern massive presence, and in Indonesia was well on the way to penetrating what is now the world's most populous nation. Christianity during the period extended its territorial grip not only in the Americas but across much of northern Asia, through the extension of Russia. It was less successful in establishing itself in areas dominated by the other great traditions.

Though European expansion was largely due to a small number of inventions, such as new methods of navigation and fighting, it was backed up by a new world-view, just beginning on the path to express the values of scientific enquiry, new uses of reason and a kind of vague correlation of civilization with Christianity. For better or worse these

forces had an immense impact on the rest of the world. In the late eighteenth century we stood on the brink of the creation of a world civilization. Most countries including Europe itself and America were not yet ready for the forces which they had helped to unleash. Religious forces remained important – in fact they underwent revival in Britain, America, and in parts of Islam (for example Arabia and West Africa); as also new more secular values.

In Islam, two trends developed: primordial fundamentalism or adaptation to Modernism through *ijtihad*, or interpretation of basic sources for modern needs.

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THE STUDY OF NATURE AND THE UNIVERSE

Steven J. Harris

From a global perspective the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries must rank as one of the most dynamic and complex periods of the post-classical era, for these centuries are distinguished by a theretofore unmatched intensification of hostile clashes between peoples. Indeed, when we consider that this period witnessed the fall of Constantinople (1453) at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, the decimation of the Aztec and Inca empires in the sixteenth century by Spanish conquistadors and European disease, the consolidation of Mughal rule in India under Akbar (1542–1605), and the Manchurian termination of the Ming Dynasty in China (1644), we may be tempted to see it solely in terms of the grand themes of military conquest and political hegemony. Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that this was also a period marked by great intellectual activity and peaceful cultural exchange among peoples. However significant these harsh contests of power were in the history of nations, they ought not cause us to neglect the many – and perhaps equally significant – developments in the history of knowledge. We should therefore not be surprised to find that this period was also an extraordinarily rich one in regard to the study of nature and the international commerce in natural knowledge.

The most concentrated – though by no means the only – episode of innovation in the study of nature occurred in Western Europe where a series of theoretical, methodological and technical break-throughs culminated in the so-called scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Often viewed as a watershed in the history of science, the scientific revolution is taken to mark the demise of the ancient and medieval tradition of a qualitative and speculative natural philosophy and the rise of modern mathematical and experimental sciences. Its central accomplishment was the abandonment of the finite, spherical, spatially closed and geocentric cosmos of Aristotle and Ptolemy in favour of the heliocentric universe of Copernicus and Newton. At its core, the transition from an Earth-centred to a sun-centred world picture was essentially a debate in the fields of astronomy and cosmology and depended in the first instance upon often highly technical details accessible only to a handful of mathematically-trained specialists. These technical innovations, however, carried in their wake profound implications for other sciences (especially physics, geography and mathematics) and even more importantly helped establish new standards of evidence and explanation. From the early seventeenth century onward natural philosophers placed increasing emphasis on those aspects of the natural world susceptible to mathematical analysis and promoted

explanations couched in terms of the mechanical interaction of material bodies. Accompanying the mathematization of theory and the mechanization of explanation was a shift in the definition and evaluation of evidence; qualitative speculations regarding 'self-evident experience' (for example, casual observation of the fall of a stone or the hotness of fire) typical of traditional Aristotelian natural philosophy gave way to quantitative measurement and instrument-mediated analysis of 'experimental evidence' (for example, systematic measurements of a barometer enclosed within an air pump). While instruments, experiments and quantification all had medieval and even ancient precedents, they had never before been integrated into a systematic program of research nor pursued with such energy and breadth of application.

Copernicanism also called into question the remarkable synthesis between Aristotelian natural philosophy and Christian theology accomplished during the High Middle Ages, a synthesis which succeeded in erecting upon Aristotelian – and therefore geocentric – foundations a world picture the very architecture of which was thought to reflect the moral order of the Christian faith. What was most disturbing was the apparent contradiction between Copernican theory and certain passages in the Bible that seemed to support a geocentric cosmos. Thus by the early seventeenth century Copernicanism was no longer just a piece of technical astronomy but a pressing matter of philosophical, metaphysical and even theological concern. The abandonment of the Christianized Aristotelian cosmos of the Middle Ages and its replacement by a new heliocentric cosmos was not only a seminal movement in the origin of modern science, it also marked a highly significant episode in the cultural transformation of the West. For this was one of the very few times in history that a cultural élite abandoned its traditional cosmology in favour of a new natural order for largely internal, conceptual reasons and not because it was compelled to do so by external forces (such as military conquest or political revolution). Indeed, openness to innovation became one of the most important values in the ethos of the 'new science' of the seventeenth century (Harrman, 1980, *passim*).

Given the importance of these transformations in the history of the West, it is both surprising and revealing to discover how difficult it was to 'export' them to other learned cultures of the day. However significant the scientific revolution has been in the history of the West, its central cosmological and conceptual claims made but limited impact on the other learned culture of the time. The sun-centred

cosmos remained almost exclusively a European conceit that failed to touch, let alone transform, traditional Muslim, Indian, Chinese or Japanese world-views. This is not to say, however, that there was little or no cross-cultural exchange of scientific knowledge. Quite the contrary. While some of the techniques and instruments associated with the Western revolution in astronomy travelled quite extensively, it was the largely unrelated fields of natural history, geography, botany, and pharmacology that participated most strongly in the international exchange of natural knowledge. Plant and animal specimens, geographical data, descriptions of remote peoples and places circulated at unprecedented rates (see Figure 7).

While not unrelated, these two lines of development – the transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric cosmos and the international exchange of natural knowledge – have typically been treated separately and with different emphasis. The former has often been viewed as central to (sometimes even synonymous with) the scientific revolution while the latter has (until recently) been given a secondary role as part of a vaguely Baconian programme of data-gathering. Whatever their relative significance and mutual relations, we might, for the purpose of exposition, sustain this division and consider first the 'revolution in astronomy' and then the 'commerce in natural knowledge'. Before recounting the emergence of the new heliocentric world, we must first review the world that was lost.

The ancient Greek cosmos devised by Aristotle (384–322 BC) formed the conceptual foundation for the ancient and medieval cosmos largely because it succeeded in accounting

for a great number of the most obvious features of the physical world, and it did so with a great economy and consistency. Its essential structure may be visualized as a series of nested spherical shells, each of which is clear as crystal, rigid and free to rotate with a steady and unending motion about an independent axis. The largest of these crystalline spheres, marking the outermost limit of the physical universe, has affixed to it the stars and its rotation once every 24 hours accounts for their nightly motion from east to west. As we move inward toward the centre of the stellar sphere, we find a series of successively smaller crystalline spheres whose rotations account for the motions of the planets, sun, and moon. At the very centre of this layered, onion-like world is the Earth. Although also spherical in shape, the Earth is fundamentally different from the spheres of the celestial realm. The terrestrial region consists of four transmutable elements (earth, water, air and fire), while the moon and all celestial objects (including the crystalline spheres) are composed of ether, or 'quintessence' (that is, the 'fifth element'). At the geometric centre of the cosmos is earth, the heaviest element, surrounded by more or less spherical shells of water (also heavy) and then of air and fire (both light elements), the last of which extends up to the orb containing the moon. Thus the Aristotelian cosmos is a *plenum*, with neither large-scale void nor microscopic vacuum, where every element and object has a 'natural place' defined in relation to the centre and circumference of the cosmic sphere.

In addition to sketching the gross anatomy of the world, Aristotle also outlined his physiology by indicating the general physical principles he thought governed its motions. If a terrestrial element is forcibly removed from its resting place it will endeavour to return via 'natural motion', either downward for earth and water or upward for air and fire, to its 'natural place'. Thus, even though terrestrial elements are subject to constant churning and change (or, in Aristotelian terms, to 'generation and corruption'), all terrestrial motions are short-lived and serve to return elemental objects to their natural places and natural state, which is rest. This is all in marked contrast to the celestial realm, where heavenly spheres experience neither decay nor alteration of any sort and move perpetually in uniform circular motion – the only type of motion appropriate for the changeless and perfect heavens.

Broadly conceived and internally consistent, the Aristotelian cosmos offered a picture of the world that accorded well with everyday observations and experiences. By the same token, Aristotle's cosmology rested upon reasonable assumptions and well-reasoned arguments; it thus provided both the broad theoretical framework and detailed conceptual tools necessary to sustain a rich tradition in speculative natural philosophy. It was largely the Greek-speaking regions of the eastern Mediterranean, from Alexandria in Egypt to Constantinople, that sustained a more or less continuous literary tradition of Aristotelian commentary, criticism and elaboration. The most important period by far was the efflorescence of Arab, Persian and northern Indian – or, more generally, Islamic – scholarship from the ninth through fourteenth centuries. Much of this Graeco-Arabic scientific corpus became a part of the intellectual culture of Western Europe for the first time beginning in the twelfth century when it was translated from Arabic into Latin.

In the medieval period, Latin scholars and theologians forged a world-view that was structurally based on the geocentric cosmos of Aristotelian natural philosophy and yet preserved the prerogatives of the creator-god of the Christian




Figure 7 The first published illustration of the telescope in China, by Jesuit missionary Johann Adam Schall von Bell, in his treatise on the telescope. Bell's fellow Jesuit, Johann Schreck (Terentius) brought the first telescope to China in 1618.

Source: Johann Adam Schall von Bell, *Yuan-ching Shue*, Beijing, 1626, repr. in I. B. Cohen, *Album of Science*, New York, 1980.

tradition. In this Christianized version of Aristotle, the god of Genesis fashioned a vast and beautiful celestial world, the grandeur and incorruptibility of which bore testimony to his creative power. Yet he placed humankind – his 'special creation' made in his own image – upon a central Earth subject not only to decay and corruption but located (morally as well as geometrically) as far as possible from the immaterial heaven, or empyrean realm, where he, his ascending angels, and the elect resided. Thus in the hands of Latin scholars the natural order of the Aristotelian cosmos was made to signify the moral order of the Christian faith.

The beginning of the end of this grand edifice is traditionally dated to 1543, the year the Polish canon and amateur astronomer Nicholas Copernicus (b. 1473) published his magisterial work entitled *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* ('On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres') and, coincidentally, the year of his death. In fact, the idea of a heliocentric planetary system probably first occurred to him around 1510, soon after an intensive period of study in northern Italy (1496–1503), and was written up before 1514 in manuscript form under the title *Commentariolus* ('Little Commentary'). Despite its profound cosmological implications, Copernicus's treatise was essentially a technical work in planetary theory written very much in the tradition of Graeco-Arabic kinematic astronomy (Swerdlow and Nengebauer, 1984, pp. 6–9).

At the core of this tradition was the work of the Alexandrian Greek, Claudius Ptolemy (fl. AD 150). The translation of his *Almagest* from Arabic into Latin by Gerard of Cremona (1114–87) brought this tradition to the West for the first time. Arriving about the same time as Aristotle's cosmology and natural philosophy, Ptolemy's astronomy was also assimilated into Western universities, though because of its highly technical nature it was neither as widely studied nor as thoroughly mastered as Aristotle. It was not until the mid-fifteenth century, in the several publications of the German astronomer-humanists Georg Peurbach (1423–69) and Johann Regiomontanus (1436–76), that the problems and complexities of Ptolemaic astronomy became comprehensible to Western astronomers. Copernicus's own education in astronomy rested squarely upon their works, and his presuppositions, methods, and goals were entirely consistent with Ptolemaic astronomy. His purpose was not to overthrow this tradition but to re-establish it upon what he thought were its proper classical foundations. In this sense he was not a revolutionary but a reformer. And while his single innovation in astronomy – exchanging the position of the sun and Earth – would later be taken up and turned into a 'revolution' by others, his works (and intentions) can only be understood as a continuation of the Graeco-Arabic tradition (Swerdlow and Nengebauer, 1984, pp. 41–6).

The goal of classical Greek astronomy was simple: to account for the complex motion of the planets (including the sun and moon) in terms of a composition of uniform circular motion. The task was therefore essentially geometric and kinematic; that is, to reduce planetary motions to simple geometric models without regard to the forces or causes of those motions. It was Plato (429–348 BC) who first articulated the programme to 'save (or give a rational account of) the phenomena' and who insisted that astronomers employ only uniform circular motion. This constraint was not only a practical matter (the geometry of the circle was well understood) but also an aesthetic one since circular motion was understood to be 'eternal' (that is, capable of endless repetition) and hence the most perfect of all motions. With

its theoretical framework firmly established, classical Greek astronomy flourished, especially in Alexandria, for the next several centuries and culminated in the work of Ptolemy.


Copernicus tells us (in the preface of his work of 1543) that he was distressed by Ptolemy's use of the equant (a geometrical construction that caused planets to move at irregular rates), which he saw as an egregious violation of the platonic principle of uniform circular motion. He argues further that Ptolemy's planetary models are a hodge-podge of constructions ('monsters' he calls them) in which the parameters for each model are assigned arbitrarily and hence the entire structure lacks unity of plan and internal consistency. It is the desire to construct an astronomy embodying principles of simplicity and harmony that emboldened him to propose the heliocentric theory. Yet even here Copernicus can point to classical precedents, especially the work of Aristarchus of Samos (fl. 270 BC) who first proposed a sun-centred system.

Copernicus believed he could achieve his goals by making three geometrically simple changes: (1) fix the sun at the centre of the planetary system; (2) have the Earth revolve around the sun once a year; and (3) cause the Earth to rotate once a day about its axis. In the Ptolemaic system, all the planets share an annual motion while the Earth remains at rest. This seemingly arbitrary redundancy in planetary motion could be eliminated by giving the Earth an annual revolution about the sun. By the same token, the daily rotation of the Earth would eliminate the need for the outermost sphere, which by definition was the largest thing in the universe, to rotate once a day. The heliocentric system did not violate the classical principle of uniform circular motion, and retrograde motion was easily explained. Thus Copernicus's 'radical step' in trading the positions of the Earth and sun depended upon two interrelated matters, the ability of a heliocentric plan to resolve technical problems in Ptolemaic astronomy and his belief that the physical world must embody the platonic principles of simplicity and harmony (see Figure 8).

Whatever technical and aesthetic advantages the Copernican system may have had, there were many objections raised against it. First of all, in order to attain predictive accuracy Copernicus was forced to add approximately the same number of epicycles to his heliocentric system as are found in the Ptolemaic. Yet even with these cumbersome additions, Copernicus's predictions were no more accurate overall than Ptolemy's. Seemingly more devastating were the physical objections since by putting the Earth in motion Copernicus was doing great violence to the fundamentals of Aristotle's natural philosophy. Given the fact that Earth was a large massive object, what force could possibly keep it in motion around the sun and upon its axis? Even if such a force could be imagined and the Earth were in motion, why do we sense neither this movement nor the wind that must necessarily blow against us as we spin around? If the Earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, how are the downward motions of heavy things and the upward motions of light things to be explained? If the Earth is made into a planet moving about in the heavens like other planets, how could the fundamental Aristotelian distinction between 'terrestrial' and 'celestial' realms be maintained? In a word, geocentric physics and heliocentric astronomy were mutually incompatible: Copernican motions made no sense within an Aristotelian cosmos just as Aristotelian motions made no sense within a Copernican cosmos. The physical problem that the Copernican theory faced was thus as simple to state as it was difficult to overcome; if one wished to preserve the

Del Galileo:

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Supponendo hora, che quando la terra è in B. Giove sia in b. si apparirà a noi nel Zodiaco essere in p. tirando la linea retta Bb'. Intendasi hora la terra muoversi da B. in c. e Giove da b. in c. nel istesso tempo; si apparirà Giove esser venuto nel Zodiaco

Figure 8 In the heliocentric model, both the Earth (inner orbit) and the superior planet (middle orbit) move clockwise, but as the Earth catches up to (B, F) and passes (H, M) the superior planet, the apparent position of the planet against the backdrop of fixed stars (outer circle) seems to execute a retrograde motion (P, T, X, A).

Source: Galileo Galilei's *Dialogo*, . . . septi i due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo Ptolemaico e Copernicano, Florence, 1632.

theoretical elegance of the heliocentric system, then it would be necessary to construct a new physics compatible with a moving Earth.

In addition to problems of predictive accuracy and physical implausibility, there were also problems of authority: not only was the weight of tradition on the side of Ptolemy but the authority of the Bible came to fall increasingly on the side of geocentricism. The growing tensions between Protestants and Catholics in the final decades of the sixteenth century drove theologians on both sides to adopt strongly literalist interpretations of the Bible. Thus the few passages in Scripture that seemed to indicate a moving sun and fixed Earth were understood to be descriptions of physical reality (medieval exegetes would have favoured figurative and allegorical interpretations). Thus by 1600 the reception of Copernican theory had proceeded very slowly; only a handful of mathematical astronomers and a few theologians even concerned themselves with the question, their discussions

of it were scattered in a small number of academic publications and private correspondence, and its prospects as a physically valid theory of the heavens seemed very dim indeed. By 1700, however, most of the leading astronomers and natural philosophers of Europe had completely abandoned geocentrism in favour of a heliocentric world view and rejected much of Aristotelian natural philosophy. This remarkable transformation depended upon three developments: (1) a series of dramatic astronomical observations (both naked-eye and telescopic); (2) crucial modifications to heliocentric theory itself; and (3) the development of an alternative to Aristotelian physics.

In the last quarter of the sixteenth century the Danish astronomer, Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), engaged in an extensive programme of naked-eye observations. He was motivated in large part by the discrepancies he had found in Ptolemaic and Copernican predictions. In the midst of these observations, there suddenly appeared in 1572 in the constellation Cassiopeia a new star – the first ever observed in the West. Tycho's precise measurements of the 'new star' (actually the explosion of a previously-existing but dim star) convinced him that it was part of the stellar sphere. For Tycho this was incontrovertible proof that the stellar region was subject to alteration, thus contradicting the Aristotelian notion of a changeless heaven. A few years later, in 1577, a bright comet appeared and Tycho made careful measurements of its motion. He demonstrated first, that it lay in the celestial realm (thereby contradicting the Aristotelian assertion that comets were atmospheric, and thus terrestrial, phenomena) and second, that its motion carried it through the orbits of several planets. This latter conclusion was highly significant since it rendered the Aristotelian notion of rigid crystalline spheres untenable. Although these observations could do nothing in themselves to decide between the Copernican and Ptolemaic systems, they did serve to call into doubt the traditional assumptions underlying the Aristotelian cosmos. More importantly, the inadmissibility of crystalline spheres allowed Tycho to postulate yet another world-system, the so-called geo-heliocentric model, in which all planets orbit the sun as the sun orbits a central and stationary Earth. The Tyconic system initially seemed the perfect compromise: it had the advantage of retaining the simplifying aspects of Copernicus's heliocentric system while preserving Aristotle's geocentric physics. However, Tycho himself was unable to give his schematic model the technical detail necessary to make it yield predictions (Thorén, 1990, *passim*).

With this goal in mind, he had invited the young and mathematically-talented German astronomer, Johann Kepler (1571–1630), to join him in Prague and help him perfect his geo-heliocentric model. In a death-bed scene fraught with irony, Tycho gave permission to Kepler to use his observational data on the condition that he perfect the mathematics of the geo-heliocentric system. The latter, however, was already deeply committed to the Copernican theory. His final promise to the dying Tycho notwithstanding, Kepler immediately set about using the data to vindicate Copernicus. After years of difficult work and frequent setbacks, Kepler was able to publish in 1609 his *Astronomia Nova* ('New Astronomy') in which he preserved a heliocentric system – but only after making a number of crucial changes. First and most significantly, he abandoned the central tenet of classical astronomy by jettisoning uniform circular motion altogether and replacing it with elliptical orbits. Second, he placed the sun at one of the two foci of each orbital ellipse and made it the engine driving planets around their orbits.

And third, he devised two laws (the area law and period law) that enable him to predict planetary positions with unprecedented accuracy.

Kepler's innovations in many ways represent a more dramatic break with the past than Copernicus's, for it was he who discarded the fundamental principles that had defined the Graeco-Arabic – and Copernican – traditions in astronomy for 1,500 years: gone were crystalline spheres, uniform circular motion and the Ptolemaic apparatus of epicycles, deferents and equants. Kepler replaced these essentially geometrical and kinematic constructions with three simple and interrelated physical laws. His purpose was no longer simply to describe the motion of planets but to explain them dynamically in terms of physical forces. He thus postulated a central force emanating from the sun, which he believed (correctly) rotated upon its axis, as the cause of orbital motion. Although his scheme turned out to be unworkable, his attempt to formulate planetary theory in terms of celestial dynamics made him one of the pioneers of modern astronomy.

Despite the overwhelming importance of Kepler's contribution, his work failed to become the rallying point for heliocentric astronomy. Rather, it was the spectacular, though largely circumstantial, evidence of Galileo's telescopic observations that turned Copernicus's obscure technical theory into a widely debated issue. Galileo did not himself invent the telescope, but he was adept at making very good ones and succeeded in turning it into a serious astronomical instrument. Many of his most significant observations were performed in late 1609 and early 1610 and published in 1610 under the provocative title, *Sidereus Nuncius* ('Starry Messenger'). Here Galileo recounted how his telescope revealed countless stars never before seen, four satellites orbiting Jupiter and mountainous features on the surface of the moon. Within two years he had also announced the telescopic discovery of sun-spots and the phases of Venus. These were truly spectacular discoveries and they had an electrifying effect on the debate over Copernican theory. Their novelty and directness (no esoteric knowledge was required, just a good telescope and one's own eyes) compelled European scholars to question the most basic elements of the received world picture. Following so closely on the heels of Kepler's 'New Astronomy' (which, ironically, Galileo never accepted), they helped propel heliocentric theory to the centre of a European-wide debate.

Beyond their self-evident novelty – the telescopic observations revealed things in the heavens that no ancient or medieval philosopher had ever dreamt of – their chief importance lay in their ability to weaken further, or eliminate altogether, some of the arguments marshalled against the Copernican theory. Critics had pointed out that in the heliocentric arrangement the Earth was the only planet with a satellite (the moon). The detection of four Jovian satellites removed this criticism, and indeed Galileo argued that Jupiter and its moons were like 'a Copernican system in miniature'. The mountainous appearance of the moon suggested that it, like the Earth, was massive, which in turn implied that the massive Earth could also be sustained in its Copernican motions. Sun-spots were taken as evidence of the 'imperfection' and changeability of the heavens, thus further weakening Aristotelian theory. The only decisive observation, however, was the detection of the phases of Venus. The Copernican theory predicted a complete range of phases, from full to crescent, whereas Ptolemaic theory predicted crescents only. The telescopic observation of a 'full

Venus' thus eliminated the strictly geocentric model of Ptolemy. (Venetian phases were, however, perfectly compatible with the Tychonic or geo-heliocentric system.) Jesuit astronomers in Rome quickly confirmed Galileo's observations and accepted most of his conclusions as valid. This initially happy relationship between Galileo and the Catholic Church was not, however, to endure.

Galileo's adroit use of his telescopic discoveries had secured for him not only a European-wide reputation but also a prominent place at the Medici court in Florence. Freed from the intellectual and institutional constraints of his former life as a university professor, Galileo now made it his personal cause to attack Aristotelian natural philosophy on multiple fronts and to champion the Copernican theory. His 'Copernican campaign', however, met with a serious setback in 1616 when Copernicus's *De revolutionibus* . . . was placed ('until corrected') on the Index of Forbidden Books and the heliocentric theory condemned as 'foolish, heretical and absurd' because it was thought to contradict Scripture. While Galileo was not directly implicated in these proceedings, he was admonished privately not to represent Copernican theory as a physical truth but only as a hypothesis. The ascension of Maffeo Barberini, long-time friend and admirer of Galileo, as Pope Urban VIII in 1624 turned matters in Galileo's favour. After several audiences with the Pope, he received permission to proceed with his long-planned book on the Copernican and Ptolemaic world-systems, although Urban again enjoined him to treat the former only as a hypothesis. The work, entitled *Dialogo dei Massimi Sistemi del Mondo Tolemaico, e Copernicano* ('Dialogue on the Two Great World-Systems of Ptolemy and of Copernicus') was finally printed in 1632. Despite having received the *imprimatur* from the Roman censorial board, the *Dialogo* was immediately set upon by Galileo's critics who succeeded in convincing Urban that he had not only violated the injunction of 1616 by treating the Copernican system as a physical truth but had also made a mockery of the Pope's own warning to him. Galileo soon found himself before the Roman Inquisition and, in ill-health and faced with the serious charge of heresy, recanted his belief in the Copernican system in 1633. The charge of heresy was lifted but he was nonetheless sentenced to life-long house arrest in his villa outside Florence.

Despite the fame his telescopic discoveries achieved – and the infamy of his trial and recantation – Galileo's greatest contribution to heliocentrism was his work on motion completed after the trial of 1633 and before his death in 1642. Through a combination of actual experiments, thought experiments, and brilliant mathematical reasoning, Galileo was able to argue that horizontal motion, in the absence of any impediments, would continue indefinitely at a constant speed (an idea close to the modern notion of rectilinear inertia). He also demonstrated that the downward fall of a stone accelerates at a uniform rate (again contradicting Aristotle's position) and therefore its motion obeys a simple mathematical law. More importantly, he argued that the fall of a stone was unaffected by – or as he put it, was 'indifferent to' – the rotation of the Earth. Finally, in an elegant analysis of the motion of a projectile, Galileo showed that the downward acceleration would combined with the constant horizontal motion to produce a parabolic trajectory. Here was the beginning of a theory of motion that was not only compatible with a moving Earth but also rested on precise mathematical laws. (Westfall, 1971, pp. 40–5).

While Galileo was able to provide a rigorous alternative to Aristotelian physics – and thus remove one of the most

powerful objections to Copernican theory – he was not able to explain what caused planets to move in closed orbits about the sun. René Descartes (1596–1650), the French philosopher and mathematician, appreciated the significance of the problem for the Copernican system. He posulated the existence of a huge vortex with the sun at its centre and the planets carried around in their orbits by the whirling of matter in the vortex. Although this was a bold attempt at a physical explanation of planetary motion, Descartes' model was purely qualitative and in fact (like much of his natural philosophy generally) did not lend itself to quantification. Thus by the third quarter of the seventeenth century the 'problem of the planets' had become the greatest challenge facing the heliocentric theory.

The challenge was answered in the 'new physics' of Isaac Newton (1642–1727). Newton, student at Trinity College (Cambridge University) in the mid-1660s and subsequently a professor of mathematics there, immersed himself in the scientific literature of the day (including the enormous corpus on alchemy) and essentially recapitulated on his own most of the major developments from Copernicus to Descartes. Convinced of the essential correctness of Copernicus's heliocentric theory, familiar with Kepler's laws (though critical of his celestial dynamics), but eschewing the qualitative vortices of Descartes, Newton sought to develop further the rigorously mathematical approach to the analysis of motion pioneered by Galileo. His work on a comprehensive theory of motion, beginning as early as his undergraduate days and continuing intermittently throughout the 1670s and early 1680s, culminated in the publication in 1687 of his *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica* ('Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy'). Here Newton refined the notions of mass, force and inertia, embedded them in his three laws of motion and developed the inverse square law of gravitation attraction. Taken together these laws could be used to provide a consistent and mathematically rigorous explanation of idealized motions on the Earth (for example, free fall and parabolic trajectories) as well as in the heavens (closed elliptical orbits). Moreover, Kepler's three laws of planetary motion, which until Newton's time had languished in near total neglect, could be derived from Newton's laws. More important still, Newton understood his laws of motion and gravitation to be universal in that they applied to the motion of every physical body anywhere in the universe. Newton's synthesis of celestial and terrestrial mechanics thus dispensed entirely with the fundamental bifurcation of the Aristotelian cosmos and established the Copernican – or rather Keplerian – theory upon a rigorously analytical foundation.

The world picture that emerged from Newtonian natural philosophy was radically different from the Christianized Aristotelian cosmos of the High Middle Ages. In the latter a unique Earth was situated at the centre of a closed, finite, spherical universe filled with majestically rotating crystalline spheres subject neither to decay nor even to alteration. The Newtonian world was of course heliocentric but only locally; the sun was understood to be a star, other stars could be the centres of other planetary systems, and so the unique Earth gave way to a plurality of worlds. These gravitationally closed systems, though separated by immense distances, moved like clockwork in accordance to the strict laws of gravitational attraction and inertia through an infinitely extended, three-dimensional void space (essentially the physical analog of the geometrical space of Euclid). The changeless, incorruptible entities in the Newtonian universe were not physical structures (as in the Aristotelian cosmos) but time and space,

each infinite and eternal and each unaffected either by any material entity or its motion. Finally – and perhaps surprisingly – the Newtonian world retained the Christian god, not just as creator but also as sustainer of the world. As Newton argued on many occasions, not only was it inconceivable to him how the universe could have attained its present distribution of matter in the absence of a wise creator, not only was God's occasional intervention necessary to maintain his cosmos, but (according to Newton) the very action of gravitation was inexplicable without the continued presence of God (see Figure 9). Thus rather than characterizing the heliocentric revolution as a wholesale overthrow of the medieval cosmos, it would perhaps be more accurate to speak of the rejection of the medieval synthesis between Aristotle and the Bible in favour of a new synthesis between Newton and the Bible.

The ramifications of the transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric cosmos extended far beyond the fields of astronomy and cosmology. The repeated success of mathematical approaches to problems of terrestrial and planetary motions encouraged natural philosophers to view nature almost solely in terms of matter and motion. Under the broad (and somewhat vague) heading of 'mechanical philosophy', the attempt was made to reduce all visible phenomena to the direct, mechanical interaction of




Figure 9 The 'Copernican revolution' culminated in Newton's work on the laws of motion and gravitation. Source: T. Wright, *An Original Theory, or New Hypothesis of the Universe*, London, 1750.

microscopic 'corpuscles'. These microscopic chunks of matter (not unlike the variously shaped atoms of Democritus and Lucretius) possessed only the simplest properties of size, shape, hardness and motion. These 'primary qualities', as they were called, were considered irreducible and thus constituted the proper grounds for all natural explanation. The various motions, collisions, configurations and rearrangements of these primitive corpuscles were to account for all the richness of our sensible world. Conversely, 'secondary qualities' like taste, colour, texture, hotness, and so on were thought to arise only in the act of perception. Having no real existence of their own apart from our sensation of them, they reveal nothing about the underlying reality of the physical world. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities reinforced one of the profoundest lessons of heliocentric theory: namely, we cannot rely upon our sense experiences to tell us how the world really is since the very Earth beneath our feet moves and we cannot sense it. If we are to know the world, we must rely on theoretical consistency, reasoned inference and mathematical analysis.

If the movement toward the mathematization and mechanization of natural philosophy led to a devaluation of the self-evident experience of the senses, it also led to the elevation of 'experimental evidence' as the proper means of studying nature. Specially designed experimental apparatus (most famously the mercury barometer and the air pump), careful measurement, and replication of results increasingly became part of the natural philosopher's repertoire of tools for the experimental investigation of nature. The period between Copernicus and Newton not only witnessed the birth of a new theoretical astronomy but also new instruments to facilitate observational and practical astronomy. Tycho's observational programme depended centrally upon both the enlargement and refinement of existing instrument design as well as upon novel inventions; Galileo's simple refracting telescope was soon improved with an eyepiece of Kepler's design; and Newton was the first to produce a reflecting telescope. It is not too much to say that this crescendo of mensural and experimental activity altered not only the methods of natural philosophy but also its very character. Natural philosophy, which theretofore had been largely speculative, textual and qualitative, had by the end of the seventeenth century expanded to embrace the metaphysics of the 'mechanical philosopher', the methods and apparatus of the 'experimental philosopher', and the technical skills of the 'physico-mathematical philosopher'. In this context we may recall the title of Newton's magisterial work and note that he viewed himself first and foremost as an experimental philosopher.

New activities required new spaces, both physical and social, and so it should come as no surprise that a number of novel institutions arose during our period to facilitate the novel study of nature. The most significant of these institutional developments was the founding of scientific academies dedicated to experimental demonstration, the collection of observations and the dissemination of natural knowledge. The largest and most prestigious of these were the Royal Society in London (1660) and the *Académie des Sciences* in Paris (1666). Attached to both academies – and to several of the many others that sprang up in the eighteenth century – were scientific journals which greatly facilitated the exchange of 'news reports' from nature, scientific debates and communications within the 'Republic of Letters' generally. While laboratories in the modern sense appeared only much later, the early scientific academies were often

sites for important experimental work and provided the social matrix necessary for the validation of results and the building of consensus around a given interpretation. Finally, there were also a number of institutions, sometimes associated with academies but of independent origin and support, dedicated to the collection and reduction of discipline-specific knowledge; for example, astronomical observatories, chart rooms (for the production of maps and gazetteers), natural history collections (or 'curiosity cabinets'), anatomy theatres, botanical gardens, pharmacies and alchemical laboratories.

Given the more or less distinct character of each of these last-named institutions and the divergence of their respective goals, this list may seem a miscellany of unrelated activities. Nor for the most part have these institutions, *qua* institutions, found a place in the historiography of the scientific revolution, where overarching theories, dramatic discoveries and creative individuals are given pride of place. Yet they sometimes provided the empirical foundations for major breakthroughs (as in the case of the observatory for Tycho or the anatomy theatre for discoveries about the function of the heart and circulation of the blood) and collectively they were the most important sites for the study of nature during our period. Despite their diversity of forms, most of these institutions trace their origins (at least in the European context) to the late fifteenth or sixteenth centuries and all experienced rapid expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What they had in common were the sustained and systematic attempts to gather up natural objects and observations (preferably from widely dispersed regions), bring them together in one place and reduce them to some sort of order 'on paper' (for example, star charts, terrestrial maps, anatomical diagrams, botanical handbooks, *materia medica*, and so on) in the hope of capturing the presumed order of nature (see Plate 8).

The programme of actively gathering and ordering natural objects and observations has long been associated with the English essayist and methodologist Francis Bacon (1561–1626), yet the origins of these institutions predate the publication of his directives by decades, the motives that sustained them rarely derived from his philosophical programme, and their practices only incidentally overlapped with the 'Baconian' (or inductive) method. It would seem that a more immediate – and powerful – engine driving this movement to 'collect nature' was the emergence in the sixteenth century of European-controlled long-distance trade networks and the overseas colonial and missionary work they eventually entailed. While merchant ships provided the means of conveyance, it was the more or less permanent residency of colonists and missionaries in remote regions that provided the stable base needed to sustain the collection of natural objects and observations (see Plate 9). The gathering of 'remote and heterogeneous' objects from nature and the systematic recording of observations on paper resulted in an unprecedented concentration of natural knowledge in Europe. By the end of the seventeenth century, the West possessed the largest and most diverse botanical and natural history collections, the most extensive stores of pharmaceuticals, the fullest descriptions of foreign peoples, the most detailed representations of the world's geography and the most complete star charts of any contemporary culture. Like the mercantile interests that indirectly sustained it, the commerce in natural knowledge had its centre in the trading nations of Western Europe and its avenues of exchange reached into virtually every corner of the known world (see Figure 10).




Figure 1c Reports from European travellers concerning the flora and fauna of new regions confounded naturalists with a bewildering array of 'natural curiosities' such as the anteater, armadillo, sloth, pangolin, porcupine and panther depicted in this seventeenth-century engraving.

Source: Library of Congress, Washington, DC, repr. in Judy Reardon and Raymond W. Smock (eds), *The Western Civilization Slide Collection*, Instructional Resources Corporation, 1982.

If we now turn our attention to the study of nature in other cultures, we should avoid trying to evaluate their accomplishments in terms of the particular ensemble of ideas, methods and institutions peculiar to the West and grouped – somewhat promiscuously – under the heading of 'the scientific revolution'. Rather, we ought to look for evidence of the intensity of scientific activity and the concentration of natural knowledge across linguistic, geographic, and/or temporal boundaries. By this method of accounting, the West may still retain its scientific importance during the period in question but for reasons having as much to do with mercantile and colonial expansion as with the intrinsic correctness of any given theory or discovery. While a survey of the indigenous scientific traditions of the major learned cultures to be considered (Islam, India, China) is beyond the scope of this essay, we may venture to undertake a reconnaissance of the 'import/export' patterns. Let us first consider the situation under Islam.

The remarkable accomplishments of Muslim astronomers, mathematicians and natural philosophers in the ninth through fourteenth centuries in preserving and expanding the Greek scientific legacy were, as noted above, crucial for the development of Western science (see Plate 10). After the fourteenth century, however, the decline in the vigour of the Islamic tradition in science, coupled with a persistent indifference to the emerging science of the West, meant that the dramatic conceptual break-throughs of the scientific revolution – even those within the once-familiar fields of mathematics and astronomy – had virtually no impact on the Muslim world. Throughout the medieval period Muslim scholarly interest in the West (with the exception of the Iberian peninsula) was quite low, and although hundreds of Greek and Arabic manuscripts then flowed into Europe, there was but one European work translated into Arabic during this time. Only under the Ottoman Turks in the seventeenth century and thereafter did Muslim scholars show much curiosity about Western science and technology, with geography, navigation and ship-building, and the military sciences constituting the chief fields of interest. The first world geography was published in 1655 and derived from

European sources; before the end of the century an expanded edition contained a brief account of both the Copernican and Tychoenic world systems – though apparently without any perceptible influence of Muslim cosmology. Although Jewish physicians acted as conduits for Western medical knowledge from the sixteenth century onwards and although translations of works on Paracelsian medicine were made in the early eighteenth century, there was no Muslim recognition of Western advances in anatomy and physiology (though some therapeutic practices were adopted). And while Turkish emissaries brought back occasional reports of Western scientific apparatus, astronomical observatories and experimental demonstrations, there was no sustained effort to import or imitate these practices domestically. The first Turkish printing press, established only in 1729, produced several works on Western geography and military science before being closed down in 1742. Also in the eighteenth century the presence of a number of European miners, shipbuilders, military architects and clock-makers (mostly commissioned by the state) helped establish certain forms of Western technology on Turkish soil. Primarily for military and economic reasons, the Turkish government also opened a military school in which courses on Western trigonometry, medicine, geography and the military sciences were taught; within a few years, however, a conservative reaction closed the school. By the end of the century, knowledge of Western science was fragmentary at best (tending toward the practical and utilitarian and eschewing the theoretical and experimental), poorly supported institutionally, and (in the absence of printing presses) not widely disseminated. Engagement with Western scientific practice was concentrated almost exclusively in the Turkish provinces of the Muslim world and driven mostly by military and economic interests (Lewis, 1982, *passim*).

Thus the brilliant accomplishments of Arabic science in the medieval period did not become the foundation for a continued expansion of scientific inquiry in our period. And despite the enormous indebtedness of the Western scientific tradition to Arabic sources and the deep lines of continuity linking Graeco-Arabic mathematical and natural sciences to their European descendants, there was no repayment of that debt in the form of a reflux of heliocentrism, Newtonian mechanics, experimental science and mathematical techniques back into Muslim lands until the nineteenth and even twentieth centuries.

As we move further east into the Indian subcontinent, we encounter what is perhaps the most interesting cultural-geographical boundary in the history of science. The eastern border of the old Persian Empire and the northern regions of India had marked the farthest advances of Alexander (356–323 BC) and therefore the geographical limits of exposure to the Greek scientific corpus. While there had been much exchange between Greek and Hindu science in the classical period and even more between Muslims and Hindus from the ninth century onward, direct contact between Indian and Western science was virtually nonexistent until the arrival of Catholic (especially Jesuit) missionaries in the sixteenth century and Dutch traders in the early seventeenth. By the eighteenth century, there had arisen a modest but not uninteresting scientific exchange between Europe and India chiefly in the fields of geography, astronomy, and botany. As early as 1590 a Jesuit missionary, who had travelled in the retinue of Akbar, produced the first map of northern India compiled by a foreigner. In the field of astronomy, we may note that while the first telescope was

presented to the Emperor Jahāngir in 1625 by the Englishman, Sir Thomas Roe, it was the Jesuits who independently carried out almost all of the recorded telescopic observations in India throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Their observations included the comet of 1689, occultations of the Jovian satellites, the position of a number of southern-hemisphere stars (including several binaries), the Magellanic Clouds, and the Coal-Sack region of the Milky Way. Although Jesuit missionaries continued their astronomical research only at a modest level throughout the eighteenth century, they were able to contribute significantly to geographical knowledge of India by measuring and mapping the co-ordinates of a large number of towns from Goa and the Malabar coast to Bengal and even into Tibet, thus laying the foundation for the great cartographic projects of the British in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Sharma and Hüberty, 1984, p. 99).

By far the most interesting scientific contact between India and Europe transpired under the initiative of the Jai Singh II (1686–1743), Raja of Amber and great patron-practitioner of astronomy. Jai Singh sought to revive the old Muslim tradition of royal patronage of the sciences and founded five observatories in Delhi, Benares (Varanasi), Mathura, Ujjain (site of an observatory dating from the sixth century AD), and the newly-created capital of Jaipur. The observatory at Jaipur had the greatest importance – if not the largest instruments – since it supported many scholars, had an outstanding library of works (in Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit) and became the centre of translation work as well. Jai Singh had translated into Sanskrit Ptolemy's *Almagest* and Euclid's *Elements* (both from the Arabic) as well as a number of contemporary European works in mathematics and astronomy (including la Hire's astronomical tables of 1727). Having learned of European advances in astronomy from a Portuguese Jesuit missionary called to his court in 1728, Jai Singh sent an embassy of Hindu astronomers to the Portuguese monarch, King João V, with the request that they be made acquainted with the current state of European astronomy and provided with relevant treatises and tables. Upon their return in 1730, the observational programme necessary for calendrical reform continued and an up-dated astronomical table was eventually produced in 1739 (in Persian) (Forbes, 1982, *passim*).

There are several interesting – perhaps even puzzling – aspects to this episode of Indo-European scientific exchange. First, despite Jai Singh's familiarity with Jesuit telescopic observations (several Jesuits were active, though not centrally, in his observatories), all of his observational instruments and structures were naked-eye devices. Despite the availability of Newton's work in mechanics (first published in 1687), Jai Singh's astronomical theory was geocentric and calculations were based on geometric and numeric methods rather than on Newtonian celestial mechanics (it should be noted that la Hire's tables, the chief Western source upon which Jai Singh relied, itself depended upon empirical procedures and not upon Keplerian-Newtonian theory). Despite the elaborate investment in time, money, and expertise, there was no apparent continuation of the observational programme in India after Jai Singh's death in 1743 (his own observatories were soon abandoned and fell into ruin, many of the manuscripts from his library were lost and the metal observation instruments sold for scrap). And finally, despite the remarkable stimulus to an 'ecumenical approach' to Arabic, Hindu, and European systems of astronomy provided by Jai Singh, there was essentially no engagement on the

part of Indian astronomers with Western heliocentric theory in the eighteenth century nor, for that matter, with any of the other recent scientific innovations of the West. Conversely, while Jesuits were the first Europeans to study Hindu astronomy directly (they had sent several treatises in Sanskrit to Europe and had themselves written informed commentaries on Hindu calendrical and eclipse methods), their own astronomical and geographical techniques were exclusively Western. And while Jesuits did train a few Indians to assist them, they were no more successful in disseminating Western astronomical and mathematical practices than Jai Singh. In the absence of a continuous institutional basis for research, education (Western science only began to be taught in India as part of British colonialization in the nineteenth century) and dissemination (the only printing presses in India were those operated by the Jesuits and the Dutch East India Company), it proved impossible to sustain the initiatives of either powerful indigenous patrons like Jai Singh or determined foreign practitioners like the Jesuits.

While the subcontinent enjoyed an extremely rich flora and fauna and a long tradition in medicine, the first systematic exploration of Indian botany by Europeans began only in our period with the expansion of European trade routes to the east, first under the Portuguese and then the Dutch and British. From the mid-sixteenth century onward, Catholic mission apothecaries (chiefly Franciscan and Jesuit) sought to care for the health needs of their fellow missionaries by establishing local pharmacies and herbal gardens. By the seventeenth century, the physicians hired by the Dutch East India Company were faced with similar problems and also sought recourse to local herbal remedies. It was, however, the overriding commercial interests of the Company and the ease of making shipments back to Holland that soon led to a substantial stock of plant specimens of commercial as well as pharmaceutical value. By the end of the century botanical gardens, herbaria, and published floras in Amsterdam, Leiden, London and Paris marked an unprecedented concentration of Indian botanical knowledge on European soil. This systematic effort to gather, preserve and classify only intensified in the eighteenth century, as Dutch and especially British colonial policies called for the identification of commercially valuable plants that could be brought into cultivation in India. European interest in Indian botany did not, however, extend to Indian botanical learning. While the attempt to comprehend the Hindu astronomical system dates from the last years of the seventeenth century, the first scholarly study and translation of Hindu pharmaceutical and medical treatises began only in the mid-nineteenth (Bhattacharyya, 1982, *passim*).

The history of Chinese science is, as Joseph Needham and others has made us aware, a very long one and enormously rich (Needham, 1981). The history of East-West scientific contacts, however, really only begins in the seventeenth century with the arrival of Jesuit missionaries. For nearly two centuries Jesuit missionaries-turned-mandarin occupied high positions in the imperial 'Mathematical Tribunal' in Beijing and (especially under the reign of the Manchurian Emperor Kangxi, 1661–1722) served not only as the Emperor's most capable mathematicians, astronomers, geographers and engineers but also as the most powerful intermediaries between two great – and largely independent – scientific traditions. However, despite keen mutual interest, high levels of technical competence and sustained institutional support on both sides, the central theoretical accomplishments of the West's 'scientific revolution' (that is, heliocentrism,

mathematization, mechanization and experimentation) made only the slightest impact on the Chinese study of nature and scarcely altered at all the fundamental principles of Chinese cosmology or the Chinese view of nature.

Some historians have explained the failure of the 'Copernican revolution' to take hold in China as a consequence of the theological constraints placed on Jesuits. The Catholic Church's injunction against heliocentric astronomy severely limited what Jesuits could teach Chinese astronomers and so the latter received only an incomplete and badly garbled account of the 'new astronomy' (Sivin, 1973, p. 103). As plausible as this explanation may be, it only addresses part of the problem; there were other possible avenues of transmission (notably the Dutch) and other branches of European science unencumbered by papal decrees (see Figure 11).

Part of the explanation surely resides in the differences in character separating the European and Chinese scientific traditions. Throughout its long and fruitful history, the Chinese study of nature developed largely in isolation from classical Greece and thus without exposure to the underlying principles of Aristotelian natural philosophy, Euclidean geometry or Platonic astronomy. Whatever the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the classical Greek and Chinese scientific traditions may be, three fundamental differences

seem clear. First, whereas Aristotle's attempt to derive a natural philosophy (and cosmology) from a single, all-encompassing set of metaphysical and methodological rules led to a unified image of science in the West, in China 'the sciences were not integrated under the domain of philosophy . . . [and thus the] Chinese had sciences but no science, no single conception or word for the overarching sum of all of them' (Sivin, 1982, p. 48). Second, despite remarkable achievements in mathematics using algorithmic and algebraic techniques, the Chinese never developed an axiomatic-deductive approach to geometry or any other field of mathematics. And third, while the Chinese possessed a rich tradition of speculative cosmology (the 'celestial sphere' model was strikingly similar to the Aristotelian system of homocentric spheres) and sophisticated methods for astronomical prediction, the two traditions were essentially independent; cosmological models were not at all capable of prediction and predictions did not depend upon geometric or physical models.

The introduction of the Graeco-Arabic scientific legacy into China by seventeenth-century Jesuits thus faced many obstacles, and the commingling of traditions was both highly selective and woefully incomplete by the end of our period. The Jesuits' attempts in the first half of the seventeenth century to bring Aristotle to China were wholly unsuccessful,




Figure 11 The most important instance of cross-cultural collaboration in the early modern period was between Jesuit mathematician-astronomers and the Chinese members of the 'Mathematical Tribunal'. Shown here is the Beijing observatory in 1674, soon after it was outfitted with new instruments designed by the Jesuit missionary, Ferdinand Verbiest. Source: Ferdinand Verbiest, *I-hsiang shih/I-hsiang'u*, Beijing, 1674, repr. in Neel Golver, *The Astronomia Europaea of Ferdinand Verbiest*, S.J., Netetal, 1993

and traditional Chinese notions of yin-yang and the five-element theory were neither displaced nor perceptibly altered by Aristotelian metaphysics or natural philosophy. Jesuit explications of Euclidean geometry led some (but not all) Chinese mathematicians to appreciate the axiomatic-deductive approach in mathematics; and in astronomy some (but not all) adopted the West's superior calculational methods and instrumentation. A handful of Chinese astronomers understood the Ptolemaic and Tychonic systems and (after its much-belated introduction by Jesuits in 1760) the heliocentric system, but overall there was little interest in physical models from the West. Yet even these modest steps toward assimilation faced opposition in the eighteenth century as Chinese scholars, rediscovering the forgotten accomplishments of traditional Chinese sciences, successfully campaigned for the rejection of 'foreign knowledge'. What the Chinese were able to import from the West were methods for the calculation of eclipses, certain astronomical instruments (including telescopes and mechanical clocks), and some (but not many) medical and surgical practices. But as we have found in the Hindu and Muslim worlds, very few of the conceptual, methodological, or organizational developments held to be of such central importance in the West made much of an impact in China.

From even a hasty review of the international scene it is evident that although cross-cultural exchange has been a fundamental part of elites' study of nature from antiquity onward, there have been powerful filters at work that have resulted in differential rates of exchange and asymmetries in the direction of flow of scientific knowledge. If we consider the general question of the geographic and linguistic mobility of scientific texts in the sixteenth through eighteenth century, what we find is that Europe is the only cultural region that engaged both in the importation of 'foreign learning' (especially the recovery of Byzantine and Muslim sources) and the exportation of domestically produced scientific treatises (technological and medical works to the Ottoman Turks, astronomical and mathematical works to China and India, and so on). In fact, the European export trade included not only scientific texts but also practitioners (often in the form of Jesuit missionaries), practices (for example, methods for calculating eclipses) and instruments (telescopes, clocks, barometers, and so on). These Western exports, however, were part of a strikingly asymmetric relationship since non-Western practitioners, practices, and instruments were neither sought out by Europeans nor forced on them by foreign states (for example, Istanbul, Jaipur and Beijing may have sent emissaries to Europe but never 'missionaries'). With regard to commercial and technological matters, however, the story was different: Europeans eagerly sought out techniques for the production of porcelain from China, dyeing techniques from Ottoman Turks and textile methods from India. What was imported from overseas were natural objects and observations; indeed, no other culture could match the intensity or duration of the West's efforts to collect, classify, preserve and represent (quantitatively) the natural world. Consequently, by the eighteenth century the botanical gardens, apothecary shops, natural history museums and chart rooms of Europe had become the greatest repositories in the world of the world's natural knowledge.

The pattern that emerges from our import-export model suggests not only that the West was the centre of a world-wide commerce in natural knowledge but that it was a net exporter of 'manufactured goods' (like texts, techniques, maps and instruments) and a net importer of 'raw materials'

in the form of natural objects and observations. Those elements of Western science that fail to partake of this global economy are no less interesting than those that did. What the West did not succeed in exporting and what did not become incorporated into any other culture's system of explanation were the very things deemed central to the West's scientific revolution; namely, the grand theories of heliocentrism and Newtonian mechanics; the philosophical systems of Aristotle (important to Jesuits), Descartes, and neo-Atomists (or 'mechanical philosophers'); the new methods of mathematization and experimentation; and the novel institutions of the scientific academy, experimental laboratory and scientific journal. At least in regard to our period, it would seem that objects (both natural and artificial) and practices (both mathematical and technological) circulated much more readily than either conceptual structures or social institutions and that the successful importation of 'foreign learning' depends centrally upon the residency of knowledgeable and skilled practitioners.

Having concluded our survey of the international commerce in natural knowledge, we may identify three characteristics, none of which was by itself unique, that collectively distinguished the West from all contemporary – and almost all previous – learned cultures. First, beginning as early as the twelfth century there was the West's openness to 'foreign learning', both in the form of the ancient Greek scientific corpus (Aristotle, Euclid, Ptolemy, and so on) and the enormous body of commentaries and original works by Muslim scholars. While the dynamism of the medieval Muslim scientific tradition can scarcely be overstated, European scholars were not only able to appropriate the fruits of Arabic science but to sustain an open, critical attitude indefinitely. Neither the Indian, Chinese, nor (in our period) Japanese cultures showed a comparable degree of openness, and each was more or less content with its respective received tradition. This medieval habit of openness to foreign learning may help explain the emergence in the seventeenth century of an attitude of openness to novelty from abroad and to innovation at home.

While a great deal could be said about the West's image of nature vis-à-vis other cultures, perhaps the most salient characteristic – and the one with the greatest long-term consequences – was the search for physical causation. Restricting the question to astronomy, we may note that Copernicus believed his heliocentric theory to be true because it seemed to him to possess greater physical plausibility than Ptolemy's geocentric models. While Copernicus's 'physicalized astronomy' was deeply indebted to Muslim astronomers, the search for physical causes in the West became the core of a programme, sustained by the work of Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and Newton, that eventually led to the integration of astronomy, physics (mechanics) and cosmology under rigorous (axiomatic-deductive) mathematical methods. In contrast, both the Hindu and Chinese astronomical systems employed algebraic and algorithmic methods whose manipulations neither required physical models nor encouraged the search for physical principles. Consequently, their astronomy was predictive but without first principles, their physics (like Aristotle's) rested on principles that were not mathematical and their cosmologies (again like Aristotle's) were qualitative images divorced from astronomical predictions. Most importantly, while the search for physical principles expressible in mathematical terms is common to both the Muslim and Western traditions, only in the latter did this programme lead to the 'internal' overthrow of the

THE STUDY OF SOCIETY

David Wootton

This chapter deals with a period in which intellectual development in Western Europe was strikingly different from that elsewhere on earth. Its story is one of Western exceptionalism, but that does not make it a story that can be told from a parochial, Western perspective. For only if one steps back and notices the peculiarity of Western social thought can one identify the factors shaping its eccentric trajectory. Many accounts of Western social thought are written from within a paradigm of 'progress' or 'discovery' which assumes that the history of thinking about society is a history of the progress of reason, the discovery of correct answers. But answers are answers to questions, and the questions people asked about society between 1500 and 1800 were the product of the peculiar circumstances in which they found themselves. Moreover the types of answer one can give depend on the intellectual tools at one's disposal, and the tools available in Western Europe after 1660 (if not earlier) were strikingly different from those available elsewhere or those available today. The central claim of this chapter is that thought about society in Europe between 1500 and 1800 was peculiarly sensitive to those aspects of European political, economic and intellectual life which marked Europe off from the rest of the world. Social thought was, sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously, an exercise in demarcation, in classification. At first the key distinction was not that between Europeans and non-Europeans; eventually it came to be.

The invention of social science marks the close of our period: it was in 1799 that the French legal reformer J. J. R. Cambacérès delivered a *Discours sur la science sociale*. For nineteenth-century thinkers such as Marx, Comte or Spengler the understanding of social behaviour involved reference to social categories ('class', 'nation', 'society') which could not (they maintained) be reduced to the motives or intentions of individuals. Against this trend, John Stuart Mill upheld the principle of methodological individualism: since societies are made up of individuals, statements about classes must be statements about the individuals in that class, and the foundation of any social science must lie in a study of individual character, in a science Mill termed *ethology*. Before the nineteenth century, this issue did not arise. Through the eighteenth century societies were assumed to be aggregates of individuals artificially held together in states, and social theories were rooted firmly in claims about human psychology, above all in John Locke's account of how motives, intentions, and beliefs are shaped by previous experience (the doctrine of the association of ideas: *Essay*

Concerning Human Understanding, 1689). This radical individualism goes back at least to Hobbes (*Leviathan*, 1651), and replaces an earlier tradition which analyses social life in terms of fictional legal entities (estates, corporations, guilds) which were the product of contracts and conventions built up over time. We can thus, very crudely, identify three main periods in the study of society in Western Europe: before 1650, the epoch of 'ancient constitutions'; between 1650 and 1815, the epoch of individualist contractarianism; and after 1815, the epoch of social science. Such rough categories are useful (though it would be more accurate to think of each new mode of thought being added to, rather than replacing, its predecessors), not only in helping us identify 'typical' forms of thought, but also because the exceptions to the rule are often the most deserving of close attention.

Our first problem then is that we are dealing with a number of radically different ways of thinking about what we now term society, and that the shift from one way of thinking to another involves a rupture or break, not a cumulative evolution. It would be a mistake to write about ways of understanding society in the period between 1500 and 1800 as if they were merely imperfect or clumsy attempts to formulate our own social sciences: the enterprises social theorists were involved in were quite different from ours.

MACHIAVELLI AND MORE: THE BIRTH OF POLITICS

Our starting point is Niccolò Machiavelli. In 1513 Machiavelli was an unemployed Florentine civil servant, suspected of disloyalty by Florence's new rulers, the Medici family. That winter he wrote a short pamphlet entitled *The Prince* in the hope of demonstrating his suitability for re-employment. The importance of *The Prince* can be briefly summarized; its devastating impact on conventional modes of thought is harder to describe.

Machiavelli lived in a world of professionalized politics. The small geographical territory of Italy had for several centuries been divided between five major and many minor states. The result had been constant jockeying for power and frequently shifting networks of alliances. In order to keep informed of developments amongst friends and rivals, governments had invented a new type of political analyst: the resident ambassador. In the past, ambassadors had been sent on temporary assignments to negotiate weddings and treaties; resident ambassadors, by contrast, were constantly

present, assessing developments. Such professionalized political analysis could only develop in a system where there were several nearly equal competing powers. It spread from Italy to Europe as a whole in the course of the sixteenth century, but one looks for it in vain in the Chinese or Ottoman empires. Modern political theory is thus in the first place the result of this subdivision of power and professionalization of politics.

Second, Machiavelli turned his back on traditional 'mirror of princes' literature. Such literature, which has ample parallels in courtly societies outside Western Europe, dealt with the education of the prince, described how he could come to embody moral perfection, and argued that the pursuit of just policies would ensure political success. Machiavelli rejected this whole approach for two reasons. First, he insisted that conventional moral teaching was completely at odds with what was required for political success. Rulers must know how to lie and to murder; they must practise the arts of hypocrisy, and only seem, not be, truthful and just. Previous courtly literature, in Europe and elsewhere, had always insisted that it was possible to reconcile political necessity and moral excellence. Machiavelli's characteristic cynicism was in part the result of professionalizing politics; but it also reflected his own radical uncertainty as to what the best political system might be.

The first cause of this uncertainty was humanism. For a century and a half scholars had been constructing an ever more sophisticated picture of the language, life, and values of ancient Rome and Greece. Intellectuals thus became acutely aware of cultural difference and of the relativity of claims for cultural superiority. This was strikingly reinforced by the discovery of previously unknown (to Western Europeans) lands and civilizations in the New World.

Different political systems imply different cultural and moral values. In a work written shortly after *The Prince*, the *Discourses on Two Livy*, Machiavelli compared the merits of different systems, arguing that the classical Roman republic, which was perfectly adapted for external conquest, was preferable to the republics of contemporary Venice and ancient Sparta, which were conservative and stagnant, and that republics in general were preferable to monarchies. But Machiavelli also believed that republics were best founded by dictators like Romulus, and that there was a natural cycle whereby one political system gave way to another. Moreover, what was politically feasible depended on the social structure of the society in question: in Florence, Machiavelli argued, the absence of a powerful landed aristocracy made participatory republicanism a theoretical possibility. Machiavelli's preference for republicanism in general did not commit him to a politics of principle. He was quite prepared to admire monarchies and dictatorships where they were likely to prove effective.

Machiavelli was not only aware of the sharply differing political systems of contemporary Italy, and of the historical examples offered by Greece and Rome. He also lived in an Italy which, since 1494, had been at the mercy of foreign invaders: France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Emperor could command armies far larger than any Italian state. Finally, like every European political theorist in our period, he was acutely aware of the Ottoman Turks as providing an alternative, and, in the sixteenth century highly successful, political order. For the next two centuries Western European theorists regarded Turkey as the paradigm of despotism (although in the eighteenth century Venice came to rival Turkey for this unenviable reputation). This diversity of political institutions

implied a comparable diversity of cultures and values, and it is the resultant uncertainty which enables Machiavelli to step aside from them all, and insist that he is only going to concern himself with the practical realities of politics, the tactics that ensure success. Machiavelli's political theory is thus the outcome of professionalized politics in a world of competing powers and conflicting value systems.

Within a few years events were to turn a way of thought that was of local, Italian significance into one of European relevance. The Reformation, which began in 1517, fomented rebellion and division within states and divided Europe into conflicting alliances of Protestants and of Catholics (while also forcing some Protestants to ally with Catholics, and vice versa). As a consequence Machiavellian modes of analysis were adopted throughout Europe, although they were usually accompanied by criticism of Machiavelli himself for his hostility to Christianity (he preferred the religion of ancient Rome) and his contempt for conventional morality. Reason of state theorists (as the new political analysts were called) also disagreed with Machiavelli over his assessment of the common people. He had repeatedly insisted that popular participation in politics was to be encouraged; they had nothing but contempt for the unreliable mob.

This was born an embryo political science which sought to explain the behaviour of politicians by identifying their interests and the pressures acting upon them. How could one predict the behaviour of a ruler who found himself endangered by powerful rivals? How could a ruler best organize his state for effective defence? This analysis of the techniques of power, however, did not call itself 'politics', because that word was closely linked both to the city state (the Greek word polis means city, while most of the new analysts of power lived in large territorial states) and to the description of the best form of life in a community: it was precisely such idealistic analyses that the new theorists were trying to escape. Theirs was the study of statecraft or (as we would now say) power politics. Moreover reason of state theory as it developed on a European stage was addressed to a political world dominated by monarchies. Although a few theorists (such as Traiano Boccalini, in his *Ragguagli di Parnaso* [News from Parnassus], 1612) continued to debate the relative merits of republics and monarchies, republican thinkers were at a disadvantage until the English Revolution of 1649-60. As a consequence, reason of state thinking lacks the critical dimension which is always present in Machiavelli's work.

One has to turn to a different tradition to rediscover the preoccupation with political diversity which was so central to Machiavelli's thought. In 1515 Thomas More had written *Utopia*, an account of an imaginary land where institutions radically different from those of Europe (Utopia was portrayed as a communist society) made possible a far superior form of political life. More, like Machiavelli, was responding to the uncertainties bred by humanism (Plato had advocated communism in *The Republic*); he was also much more interested than Machiavelli in accounts of new-found lands. Above all he was someone who had longed to become a monk, and he responded enthusiastically to the idea of a whole society organized on the principles of a monastery. From More onwards Utopian writers used imaginary societies to criticize the institutions and values of their own states and to debate the possibilities of reform. Such works focused on what were to become the central issues of social policy in the nineteenth century: how to ensure full employment, economic growth, and universal education. These ideals could only be formulated in societies which had become

acutely conscious of rapid social and cultural change: More himself believed he could see his own society being transformed by the growth of the wool trade, and *Utopia* was one of the first new books to be easily available throughout Europe as a result of the invention of the printing press.

MUSTAFA ÂLİ AND ABŪ'L FAZL: OTTOMAN AND INDIAN APPROACHES

Mustafâ Âlî (1541–1600) provides an interesting contrast with Machiavelli. Like Machiavelli he was a significant literary figure, a poet and historian, as well as a politician. Like Machiavelli he had been educated in a tradition which believed literary training provided the best preparation for political life. Like Machiavelli, he worked in a multilingual culture where Machiavelli was amongst the first to regard vernacular Italian as a literary language fit to stand alongside Latin. Âlî was a pioneer in the development of Turkish as a literary language equal to Persian and Arabic. Like Machiavelli, Âlî believed that a hostile fortune prevented his merits being recognized and constantly complained at the failure of his own career (which peaked in 1584–5, when he was finance director of Erzurum) to advance. Like Machiavelli, Âlî was familiar with a sophisticated 'mirror of princes' literature, the conventions of which he cast aside in order to bring political thinking in closer touch with practical reality. Like Machiavelli, he wrote about politics in order to demonstrate his own fitness for high office and to expose the incompetence of his contemporaries. Like Machiavelli, Âlî, despairing of success as a politician, sought to establish his reputation as an historian, in the hope that posterity would recognize his true importance.

But there the comparisons end. Âlî's *Counsel for Sultans* (1581) attacked the current administration of the Ottoman Empire, and used contemporary examples to urge reform. *His Conditions of Cairo Concerning Her Actual Customs* (1599) compared the present lamentable state of Egypt with its condition thirty years before. But Âlî was a moralizing reformer. He sought to eliminate bribery, corruption, nepotism, and the sale of office. In their place he wanted to restore what he believed to be the true traditions of the Ottoman state: an impartial bureaucracy, recruited by examination, and promoted on the basis of seniority and merit. Where Machiavelli's ideal had been realized fifteen hundred years before in ancient Rome, Âlî appealed to the still-living traditions of Ottoman dynastic law and customary practice, the *kanun*, which he believed had reached their finest form a mere hundred and fifty years earlier. Where Machiavelli was torn between republicanism and despotism, Âlî saw no need to question the political structures of his own society. Where Machiavelli scarcely concealed his hostility to Christianity, Âlî was a man of orthodox Muslim piety. And where Machiavelli saw politics in terms of destabilizing conflicts between states and social groups, Âlî saw himself as inhabiting a world relatively stably divided between a number of great imperial powers: the Muslim powers of the Ottomans, Iran, and India, and the Christian power of the Habsburg Empire. One might well argue that Âlî's vision of bureaucratic government was as 'modern' as Machiavelli's strenuous republicanism, and his *Counsel for Sultans* was the forerunner of numerous later analyses of Ottoman political decline; but it is from Machiavelli, not Âlî, that there descended a long tradition of 'objective' political analysis which claimed to be able to give an equally

good account of a large range of different political systems.

Similarly, Abū'l Fazl (1551–1602) provides an interesting comparison with More. Like More he wrote in an intellectual tradition which descended from Plato, in his case via al-Farabi (c.870–950). Like More he was preoccupied with the question of how to form a just political system in which a universal concord would be realized. But More used Platonism to demonstrate that perfection existed Nowhere, and to call in question the policies and values of the rulers of Western Europe. Abū'l Fazl presented his own ruler, the Mughal Emperor Akbar, as a philosopher king, the Perfect Man. He believed that monarchy was the only possible form of government on the basis of two principles: 'social contract' and 'divine dispensation'; and these placed two obligations on the sovereign: to uphold reason (*'aql*) as against blind faith (*imān*), and to tolerate all faiths (and all races, groups, and so on) (*sulh-i kul*).

Like Âlî, Abū'l Fazl was an administrator (although an immensely successful one), and his *A'in-i Akbari* is in part a handbook for administrators in Akbar's empire. Like Machiavelli, he stood aside from religious orthodoxy. He followed Akbar himself in believing that there was truth in all religions, that virtue must be pursued for its own sake, not from fear of damnation or hope of salvation, and that all religions must be tolerated by the state. He and his favourite minister believed that service to the state was the highest form of religious and moral duty, for from good government all humanity stood to benefit. Both were prepared to disapprove or prohibit traditional practices such as *sati* or widow-burning, pre-puberty marriage (prohibited), polygamy (disapproved), lower share of women in inheritance (disapproved), slave-trade (prohibited) and slave-holding (disapproved). (Akbar released his own slaves to re-employ them as free servants.)

If Machiavelli and More are now more widely studied than Âlî and Abū'l Fazl, it is not because the intellectual traditions they wrote within were more sophisticated, their own views more original, or their outlook more 'modern'. It is because Machiavelli offered arguments which were to fascinate Enlightenment radicals, while the arguments of More were still relevant to nineteenth-century reformers. Both were to be claimed as relevant in an age of Industry and Empire, an age during which the imperial systems which had descended from those praised by Âlî and Abū'l Fazl were destroyed by the European powers. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century bureaucrats have seen themselves as being in the tradition of Bentham and Mill, whose followers helped govern the British Empire, not Âlî or Abū'l Fazl.

THE STATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In looking at More and Machiavelli our theme was the preoccupation with diversity and change, and the consequent uncertainty about moral and social values, which was the result of the politics and culture of the Renaissance. This was rapidly supplemented by a new concern with technological change (symbolized by gunpowder and the compass, which enabled the expansion of the European powers across the globe, and by the clock and the printing press, which demonstrated the capacity of machines to produce uniform outcomes) and with scientific knowledge as first Galileo (1564–1642) and then Newton (1642–1727) transformed physics and destroyed the hierarchical and

teleological vision of nature which had been fundamental to Aristotelian science. The 'mechanization of the world picture' posed two challenges. Could the new knowledge be harnessed to transform society? And could society itself be understood as a mechanical system?

The first moment when the new science seems to have had a deep impact is in England in 1584. There a group of scientists, led by Thomas Digges, the first English Copernican, were commissioned to establish why Dover harbour had silted up and to rebuild the harbour to make it a major naval port. But Digges and his associates were not simply concerned with defence planning. Their project involved studies of tide movements and of construction techniques. The building project they commenced required the co-ordination of work on a factory scale. The dam they built was intended to work as a vast stationary dredging machine, releasing floods of pent-up water to scour the harbour bottom. This was not merely an engineering achievement: they believed their new harbour would transform the economy around it. A fishing industry would provide both employment for the elderly and infirm, who would be put to work mending nets, and cheap food. Access to a harbour would encourage economic diversification and investment: it would, Digges argued, 'manure' the surrounding countryside. There appear to have been plans to introduce artificial irrigation ('floated water meadows') in the fields around the town, and one of those working on the project, Reginald Scot, was the author of a book advocating the introduction of hop-growing methods from Holland. Indeed Holland was the model constantly present in everyone's mind. There the shipping industry was already rapidly developing and agriculture undergoing diversification and specialization. Government investment in harbour construction was the first step towards turning England into Holland.

The Dover harbour project brings together several themes which were to be important throughout our period: the attempt to harness the new science and the new technology (Digges and Scot had experimented with lenses, and appear to have made primitive telescopes long before Galileo pointed one at the night sky); the reliance on the state to undertake large-scale planning and investment; the central role of military planning in economic and technological development. From this interlocking of the concerns of science and the state two main intellectual traditions descended.

The first is that of political arithmetic, whose founding figures in England are William Petty (1623-87) and Gregory King (1648-1712). Their primary concern was to identify and maximize the state's resources. King lived during a long drawn out military struggle between England and France, and asked himself which state was in a better position to survive the costs of conflict. How many inhabitants did each have? What were their occupations, and what were the incomes and expenses of each social group? Such questions obliged him to think about diet and the allocation of resources (How much of French agriculture was given over to wine production? How many rabbits did the English consume?) But these were all preliminary to asking who could afford to pay more taxes and whether resources could be redistributed to assist the war effort.

King's enquiries were based in part on Petty's earlier work. But Petty was both more practical (he surveyed Ireland in order to secure colonial property rights and encourage new settlement) and more analytical (he seems to have been the first to consider the improvements in productivity that

resulted from increases in the division of labour). Both had to concern themselves not only with problems of economics and fiscal policy, but also demography: calculating populations involved considering life expectancies and birth and death rates, and here they could draw on the work of John Graunt, who had made a study of death rates in London (1662).

Petty and King were laying the foundations for the statistical study of social change. Underlying their work was a growing confidence in the capacity of the state to plan change and invest in its own future strength. This approach was only possible because of an earlier intellectual revolution which had taken place in England. Traditional thinking had been that the wealth of a state could be measured by the amount of bullion at its disposal, and that states would accumulate bullion if they exported more than they imported, since the balance would have to be made up in gold. Petty and King, who took for granted a much wider definition of the state's resources which made even the rabbit population of the kingdom a relevant fact, were relying on two earlier intellectual achievements.

The first is associated with the names of Thomas Mun, Gerald de Malynes, and Edward Misselden, who were engaged in controversy about the 'balance of trade' between nations in the 1620s. These authors, it has been claimed, came close to recognizing the existence of an 'automatic mechanism' ensuring that changes in supplies of bullion, in prices, interest rates and demand must act on each other to produce a balance of trade between nations (they called it 'the circle of commerce'), a system in equilibrium. Identification of this automatic mechanism meant recognition that there were natural laws governing market transactions which governments could not override. As Misselden wrote, 'trade . . . will not endure to be forced by any', while Mun argued that the balance of trade would determine the flow of bullion across national boundaries, 'and this must come to pass by a necessity beyond all resistance.'

The first part of this interpretation of the work of Mun, de Malynes, and Misselden is the result of reading them with modern economic theories in mind. De Malynes, in fact, was concerned to deny that there was any automatic mechanism at work in the economy, for, far from tending towards equilibrium, he believed it had to be constantly 'steered' towards the right outcomes. Mun and Misselden, for their part, also denied that the system had a tendency to return to equilibrium, for they believed that the correct policies could ensure a favourable balance of trade in the long term. What was really extraordinary about all three thinkers was their shared conviction that economics could be turned into a science. There was nothing particularly novel about the commercial transactions Mun and his contemporaries were concerned to analyse, so we are bound to ask what suddenly made possible their insistence on the economic laws of the market? Two factors would seem to be relevant. First, the problems which preoccupied them only occur where trade takes place between independent nation states which cannot control the behaviour of all the parties to a transaction: imperial economic systems would not have developed an economic theory of this type. Second, the slow emergence of the idea of a scientific law was bound to lead to the search for similar law-governed aspects of social behaviour (strikingly, Francis Bacon, the philosopher of the new science, is the first English author to write of a 'balance of trade' [1615]).

A third line of argument appears promising at first sight. The idea of an automatic mechanism depends on a series of

analogies which are technology specific, not only analogies to scales and balances used in weighing (where one adds or removes weights until an equilibrium has been achieved), but also to presses, clocks, and, perhaps most arrestingly, to hydraulic systems, to currents, channels, and flows. Thus de Malynes (paraphrasing Sir Thomas Smith's *Discourse* of 1581) explains the concept of a causal mechanism by reference to clocks:

We see how one thing driveth or enforceth another, like as in a clock where there be many wheels; the first wheel being stirred driveth the next, and that the third, and so forth, till the last that moveth the instrument that strikes the clock.

In a society which was already mechanically sophisticated one could have hoped to use mechanical metaphors to explain abstractions such as the balance of trade.

Unfortunately this argument runs into difficulties. Misselden, who is easily the most sophisticated of the three theorists, directly attacks de Malynes for his inappropriate mechanical metaphors. We need to note just how difficult it was to give an account of a truly automatic mechanism which feeds back upon itself for the simple reason that mechanisms as sophisticated as this did not exist. Schumpeter argues that it was not until David Hume's essay 'Of the balance of trade' was published in 1752 that the concept of the automatic mechanism was adequately formulated, and Hume, like his predecessors, has only one example of a system which moves towards equilibrium: the flow of water, which always seeks to find its level. Economic theory was struggling to conceptualize systems which lacked mechanical analogies; the successes of Mun, de Malynes, and Misselden are not closely dependent on mechanical metaphors, though they do depend on the notion that the economy must be as susceptible to scientific analysis as any mechanism.

About one thing all three were clear, and that is that their debates concerned theoretical models. As Misselden put it,

as a pair of scales or a balance is an invention to show us the weight of things, whereby we may discern the heavy from the light, and how one thing differeth from another in the scale of weight, so is also this balance of trade an excellent and politike invention to show us the difference of weight in the commerce of one kingdom with another.

and he goes on to compare his own book to a mechanical model of the functioning of the solar system. It seems likely that the disputes between the supporters and opponents of Copernicus had brought home to a wide audience the notion that there could be very divergent accounts of superficially similar phenomena, and that these different accounts did not only appeal to different bits of evidence but put different intellectual tools to work. Misselden is acutely aware that there is nothing straightforward about measuring the balance of trade, and that belief in it involves commitment to a theoretical system. Even if he has no notion of a complex automatic mechanism, he has a clear idea of how to conduct a debate about a scientific theory, and it is this which made the exchange of views between Mun, Misselden, and de Malynes the moment at which social science is first born.

The second break-through was as slow to establish itself as the theory of the automatic mechanism, and so in this case too it is hard to be sure when it is first adequately formulated. We find an early version of the argument in Mun, who maintains that luxury and extravagance may be economically beneficial if they encourage international trade or provide domestic employment. A stronger version of the argument occurs in the work of Joseph Lee, whose *Considerations*

concerning *Common Fields and Inclosures* was published in 1654; and a sophisticated version is to be found in Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* (1714). This break-through consisted in rejecting two assumptions that had permeated the thinking of, for example, Thomas More. The first was that economic developments that caused fewer people to be employed were to be discouraged. The second that the production of luxury goods must take place at the expense of more socially useful labour. The new theorists argued that the market should be allowed to determine what was produced. If greater profits could be generated by fewer employees, by (for example) switching production from arable to pasture, or by the subdivision and fencing of common lands or open fields, then this should be tolerated even if unemployment resulted, for when the profits were spent or invested elsewhere they would create new employment. Similarly the production of luxury goods might seem a waste of resources, but by creating employment and profits they ensured markets for other goods of all types. The market should thus be allowed to regulate investment and growth in the conviction that in the long run most people would be better off as a result, and the state itself would be stronger. Moral judgements based on notions of honest labour or extravagant expenditure were to be put to one side because they were an obstacle to prosperity. Mandeville made the nature of the argument clear by turning it into a paradox: 'private vices, public benefits'.

By the early eighteenth century there thus existed in England an embryo political economy which sought to harness technological development and market forces to establish prosperity and state power. Unlike the reason of state theory which had developed in sixteenth-century Italy, this new way of thinking about society assumed that change was not cyclical but progressive. Political economy was from the start a theory of modernization, one which identified commercial and technologically sophisticated economies (first Holland, then England, then Europe as a whole), and held them up as a model to be imitated by backward economies (Scotland, Ireland, and the New World, for example). At the same time one of the key tasks of the new economic thought was to ensure that economic progress was translated into military domination. Digges, Malynes, and Petty were servants of the state, and their contribution was the equal of that of merchants such as Mun and Misselden. The preconditions of the new economic theory were states and markets, which had long existed, and a new conviction that social relations could be analysed in terms of natural laws, as if societies were mechanical systems, and that this analysis could then be used to subvert traditional moral and political teaching. In insisting that 'necessity' must take priority over morality, the first economists (even a clergyman like Lee) were following in the footsteps of the first political scientists in arguing that Christian morality was not the best guide to action.

THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBS AND LOCKE, HUME AND BECCARIA

Reason of state and political arithmetic developed as exceptions in a world where most thinking about society was couched in legal terms. What were the rights of estates, corporations, and individuals? What were the legitimate powers of rulers? How far was past practice to be respected,

and to what extent could self-conscious innovation be tolerated? Debates on such subjects were conducted within the framework of a complex theory of ascending and descending powers, representative rights and god-given authority, inherited from the Middle Ages. Renaissance sophistication in historical analysis made it difficult to continue to believe in immutable customs or unchanging traditions, although such notions continued to serve technical functions in the law. In sixteenth-century France and seventeenth-century England sophisticated accounts developed of the differences between Roman, feudal, and modern institutions. Such accounts took it for granted that legitimate institutions must be preserved and that they served to link past, present, and future, even while they made it increasingly hard to be clear which institutions were to be regarded as legitimate.

This mode of thought survived not only the shock of the Renaissance but also the great crises of the French Religious Wars (1562–94) and the Dutch Revolt against Spain (1568–648). In France and Holland arguments for rebellion were honed; people had a natural right of self-defence in face of tyranny; lesser authorities had the right to depose their superiors in order to preserve the constitution from subversion. The safety of the people, it was claimed, is the supreme law. But such arguments always assumed the people to be a corporate entity, containing (like a modern business) individuals with unequal rights and privileges; and they always presumed that constitutions themselves must be preserved, not destroyed. Nobody formulated arguments that were clearly egalitarian or unequivocally revolutionary; or at least nobody did until the first winter of the English Civil War, the winter of 1642–3, when the supporters of Parliament faced defeat by the king. What would happen if Parliament admitted defeat? Then, a small group of hardliners insisted, the constitution itself would be dissolved; every individual would have the rights they would have had in a state of nature, where all were equal; and it would be legitimate to fight, not to preserve the old constitution, but to replace it with a new one.

These almost anonymous men (Jeremiah Burroughs, William Bowles) were the first modern theorists of revolution; their arguments were to be taken up by the Levellers during the revolutionary years of 1645–9, and those of the Levellers were adopted by the Whigs between 1681 and 1689. Their theories in turn inspired the polemicists of the American and French revolutions. Rather similar arguments had already been developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679; see Plate 12), but for opposite purposes. He had claimed that equal individuals in a state of nature must find themselves in constant, unchecked conflict, with the result that life would be nasty, brutish, and short. In order to avoid this, every subject should seek to support established authority, and no institution should be allowed to limit or restrict central power (although individuals themselves must retain an ultimate right of self-defence).

Both Hobbes and his radical opponents were writing in a tradition which derived from the work of the Dutch theorist, Hugo Grotius (*De iure belli ac pacis*, 1625). Grotius had tried to produce a theory which explained what rational individuals who found themselves subject to no established authority would do. His theory did not require the individuals to be god-fearing, or to recognize any divinely-ordained law or natural hierarchy. And, since they were to construct a purely artificial legal order, the authorities they created were to have no powers except those granted them by the individuals who invented them. This meant imagining a society where

authority was not divinely ordained and where the ruler's rights (for example, the right to punish) were no different in kind from those that individuals might claim to exercise in the absence of government. Grotius was concerned to stress that the state of nature was not an abstract or historical concept. Ships meeting on the high seas, governments at war with each other, individuals in stateless societies (in much of America, for example) were in a state of nature. All that was required to turn his theory into a modern account of rights was to recognize that government might either lose the capacity to govern, returning men to a state of nature (Hobbes believed this to be the inevitable consequence of civil war), or might lose the right to govern by acting in ways that no founder could have intended to authorize (this was the argument of the radicals). Either way, individuals might find themselves free of all established authority, unhindered by historical precedent, and entitled to redesign the political system from scratch.

The arguments of Grotius and Hobbes were open to considerable adaptation. Locke, for example (*Two Treatises*, 1689), insisted that Hobbes was wrong to describe the state of nature as a condition in which men would be subject to no authority (they would still have knowledge of God and of the moral law since both could be demonstrated by reason alone) and would have interests which were sharply at odds (they would have a common interest in recognizing property and encouraging commerce, for economic growth made it possible for individuals to benefit without others having to suffer a corresponding loss). Consequently individuals should not fear revolution, which restored the state of nature, nearly as much as tyranny, which was contrary to morality and destructive of prosperity.

Hume on the other hand (*Treatise of Human Nature*, 1739–40) argued that there is no natural knowledge of divine law, and that consequently property, government, even promises are complex conventions that must have been invented simply because they were useful: he pushed to an extreme the secular implications of Grotius's original position. Utility too, not abstract rights, must be the test of whether revolutions were justified or not: unlike Locke, Hume felt that revolt could rarely be justified. Hume is also important because he worked in both the natural law tradition of Grotius and Hobbes and the reason of state tradition of Machiavelli and Boccacini. That tradition had undergone an important modification in the work of the first republican theorist to escape from the framework of the city state, James Harrington, whose *Oceana* (1656) argued that political institutions could be understood as mechanisms which shaped behaviour in predictable ways, and who described himself as a 'political anatomist'. Drawing on Machiavelli and Harrington, Hume confidently asserted 'that politics may be reduced to a science' (1741).

Hume believed that human beings are naturally sociable because not only do they recognize that they will benefit materially from co-operation, but they have an instinctive capacity to sympathize with the feelings of their fellows. It was this capacity for sympathy, not divine law or abstract reason, which provided a natural foundation for morality, which consists in engaging in actions which bring pleasure or utility to oneself or others. Society, in Hume's view, reinforces certain types of behaviour (truth-telling, promise-keeping, peace-keeping) from which most people benefit. Human behaviour can thus be entirely explained by thinking of individuals as machines programmed to seek pleasure and avoid pain (a view Hobbes had propounded), and as learning

from experience on the basis of the principles identified by Locke. Hume's moral, political, and social theory were thus grounded in Lockean psychology.

The emphasis on the need to avoid inflicting pain, which is common to Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, had striking consequences as soon as it was applied to jurisprudence. Through most of Europe (though not in England or Denmark) torture was regularly used as a means of establishing whether a suspect was guilty or innocent. But how could the suffering of the innocent be justified? In most countries punishment took elaborate forms (hanging, drawing and quartering; breaking on the wheel; branding) designed to maximize pain. Such punishments were justified on the grounds that crime was an offence, not only against one's neighbour, but also against the majesty of one's ruler and the authority of God himself. But if God was irrelevant and rulers were merely artificial devices constructed to ensure order, how could one justify punishments which went beyond what was necessary to deter? The new natural law theory, which saw society as a contract between equals; the new psychology, which insisted that people were not naturally wicked and would avoid actions which would lead to their own suffering; and the new morality, which stressed the importance of sympathy, all made the old legal order indefensible. There were other forces working to undermine it, but the first systematic attack on the theories that had sustained it, the first utilitarian theory of punishment, was the Marquis Beccaria's *Of Crimes and Punishments* (1763).

Hobbes, Locke, and Hume have more than a tradition of ideas in common. They all came from backgrounds which were not poor (they were all well-educated) but were far from rich. Each of them, in order to maintain the independence required to pursue philosophy and to avoid being dependent on preferment in Church or State, avoided marriage. All of them travelled across Europe to meet famous intellectuals, and all produced books which were widely read by their contemporaries throughout Western Europe, either because they were written in Latin (Hobbes), or because they were soon translated either into Latin or the new *lingua franca*, French (Locke, Hume). All of them held views too unconventional to make a university career possible (Locke, who had embarked on a university career, was never to return to Oxford after he was driven into exile in 1683 and deprived of his college post the following year). Of the three, two depended in part on patronage, whether from great families, monarchs, or governments. Hume was by far the most independent, and was able to become wealthy by satisfying a new mass market for books discussing morality and politics without presuming any special expertise in the reader. These were, we might claim, the first intellectuals, pursuing careers made possible by the printing press, by patronage, and by the emergence of a European republic of letters. We can add to the list of bachelor philosophers: Descartes (1596–1650), Bayle (1647–1706), Smith (1723–90). Not only are they all unmarried; none of them are clergymen; none doctors (though Locke had intended to specialize in medicine); none lawyers (as Grotius had been). Smith and his Scottish contemporaries (Hutcheson, Ferguson, Millar, Reid, Robison) were the first to find university careers open to them (Hume is the exception; he was blacklisted for his hostility to religion). In this company, Beccaria is an unhappy exception. An aristocrat, he was not only an aristocrat, but financially secure. He had married for love, and when his literary fame took him from his native Turin to Paris, then the universally admired centre of philosophical debate,

he quickly left for home for fear he might lose his wife to another man. Even the tactics of publishing were alien to him: in order to become a success his book had to be edited, annotated, and reordered by a whole series of editors, beginning with his friends in Turin, but continuing with his translators in France and England.

Despite the occasional exception such as Beccaria, the first philosophers of the new social science seem to belong to a peculiar social group, different from historians (often clergymen or politicians), from natural scientists (clergymen, university teachers, doctors, noblemen), and, though less markedly, from political economists like Petty or King, whose technical skills led to offers of government employment: Locke was also both a political economist and a government employee. If they had a characteristic occupation it was that of tutor to the children of the aristocracy (Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Smith). They were not only individualists in theory; in daily life they were detached from the traditional ties of family, profession, corporation and estate. In other societies there were few opportunities for such individuals to thrive, and, without the printing press and a widespread, educated public, they would have had no chance to disseminate their ideas.

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN

It is possible to draw comparisons between intellectual developments in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe and contemporary North Africa or India partly because political theorists in all three regions shared a common intellectual heritage in the Mosaic Law and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. If one turns to Tokugawa Japan one moves outside this cultural sphere, but it may still remain possible to draw illuminating comparisons. This is an argument that Masao Miyoshi sought to develop in an influential work written during the Second World War. He argued that in the semi-feudal, rapidly commercializing Japan of the seventeenth century intellectual developments took place which were strikingly comparable to those in Hobbes's Europe.

The key figure in his story was Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), an adviser to the shogun Yoshimune. Like Hobbes, Sorai argued that men must originally have lived like beasts. Social order was not natural (as Japanese theorists had always claimed) but artificial. Each historical era was obliged to invent its own institutions, to fashion its own order. Sorai argued that the Tokugawa founder had failed to accomplish this. Like Hobbes, he turned his face against what have come to be thought of as the progressive elements in his own society, arguing for a concentration of absolute power in the hands of the ruler. Commercial development should be halted, and hereditary status be reinforced. Like Hobbes he held that authority not truth makes law and morality. Like Hobbes he wanted the ruler not the people to be the agent of reform. Like Hobbes he was critical of traditional feudal institutions because they decentralized power. But, again like Hobbes, it was in the logic of his argument that it could be refashioned to support radical and democratic rather than conservative and authoritarian change. And, as with Hobbes, a stress on the artificiality of society and morality opened the way to a radical disjunction between private and public (a disjunction which in the West was to be crucial to the development of the liberal theories of the Levellers, Locke and their

successors). Thus Sorai's disciple Dazai Shundai (1680–1747) sharply distinguished between public behaviour and private sentiments. 'The stirring of an evil thought inside one's heart is not to be regarded as a crime,' provided one's public behaviour remains correct.

Just as there are similarities between Hobbes's authoritarian individualism and the arguments of contemporary egalitarians such as the Levellers, so in Japan one can find one thinker at least who developed Sorai's thought in an egalitarian direction. Andō Shōeki (active 1751–64) was an isolated provincial scholar, whose works were completely forgotten until they were rediscovered this century. Like Sorai he believed that existing social relations were artificial, the invention of the First Kings, but unlike Sorai he wanted to see them replaced by a more natural social order. Everyone, he believed, should be required to engage in manual labour or 'direct cultivation'. In a society in which the needs of peasant producers predominated there would be equality and peace. In order to construct such a society one would have to undermine not just existing social relations, but also the metaphysical traditions which insisted there was a hierarchy implicit in nature.

To establish a hierarchy of high and low, noble and base, is based on the selfish desire to stand above the people and extend one's personal laws throughout the world. . . . Heaven and earth know no distinctions of beginning and end, superior and inferior, base and noble. Nothing proceeds or follows anything else. This is the natural way of things as they are.

The bulk of Shōeki's surviving work was destroyed in an earthquake soon after it was rediscovered, so that it is unclear how confidently we can claim to understand his position. Maruyama sees him as an advocate of barter and therefore an opponent of commercialism. But he also reports that Shōeki admired contemporary Holland as a society in which labour was valued and prosperity was achieved by following rather than opposing nature. This would suggest he was the first of many Japanese theorists who were to argue the need to imitate key institutions of Western Europe.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: FROM NICOLE TO SMITH

Having already briefly discussed the first Western European theories which stressed the need to allow investment to be governed by markets, not moral choices, we now turn to an intellectual tradition fully as important as the one that leads from Grotius to Hume, but one which has not received as much attention. Its starting point is to be found in the essays of Pierre Nicole (1625–95). Nicole was a Jansenist theologian: that is to say, he was a Catholic who, unlike most Catholics, held an Augustinian view of grace and free will; he emphasized human sinfulness and divine predestination. How was social life possible when men were wicked? Nicole turned to Hobbes for inspiration, for Hobbes had tried to show how order could be established out of disorder and selfish individuals could become law-abiding. He also turned to Descartes. Descartes was, like Hobbes, a strict materialist in his account of the natural world, and he had sought to explain how purely mechanical processes could produce the apparently ordered universe in which we live. What mechanical forces would make planets circle the sun, or objects fall to the earth? Descartes' answers to these questions need not bother us; the important point is that he

conceived of natural systems as interlocking mechanisms. Nicole sought to apply this perception to society. How was it possible for selfish, wicked individuals to construct a viable society? The simple answer was that self-interest itself made social life possible. Whatever you travel you will find people willing to feed you and put you up. Others will clothe you, even bury you. They do this not out of charity or goodwill, but simply to earn a living. The market obliges corrupt individuals to act in socially beneficial ways. Through it a respectable householder can command the services of a large army of assistants: far more than those at the command of any king in a non-commercial society. Moreover the very fact that this army works not for one person, but for everyone, ensures efficiencies of scale. For a few pennies the Parisian householder can acquire the produce of distant lands which it has required whole fleets to transport.

The market mechanism was not the only one which interested Nicole and his associates. His contemporary La Rochefoucauld (1613–80), who seems to have been influenced by Jansenism, was fascinated by the corruption of court life. Here the mask of friendship concealed envy and competition (see Plates 13 and 14). Good manners hid jealousy and contempt. Yet hypocrisy, far from destroying social co-operation, made it possible. Like La Rochefoucauld, Nicole offered an anatomy of human behaviour where apparently noble and virtuous qualities were dissected and shown to have their origin in base and corrupt motives, motives often hidden from the agents themselves, who took themselves in just as they did those who had dealings with them. Far from being inherently destructive of society, sin (when shaped and modified by self-interest and social pressure) proved to be the cement holding society together. Once one had grasped the central role of selfish drives one could hope to give an account of social behaviour which would explain how individuals unwittingly played their part within society, just as Descartes had explained how individual atoms could be driven by impersonal forces to play their role within a complex system.

Nicole's arguments had been developed within a theological context to demonstrate the compatibility between Augustinian theology and social behaviour. But it was obviously possible to adapt these arguments for quite different purposes. In 1682 Pierre Bayle, a Huguenot (that is Protestant) who had been forced to flee France and take refuge in Holland, published a book which pretended to be the work of a Jansenist theologian, the *Pensées diverses sur la comète*. Bayle's ostensible purpose was to refute the belief that comets were harbingers of disaster; his real purpose was to attack Catholic superstition. But his arguments extended far beyond this respectable (in the eyes of his co-religionists) purpose, for Bayle argued that because society was held together by self-interest, atheists would be as good citizens as Christians. Almost all social theory up to this point (Grotius and Hobbes are lonely exceptions) had taken for granted the claim that only god-fearing citizens could be trusted to keep promises and abstain from violence. Bayle, by contrast, argued that people's beliefs about the next world had virtually no effect on their actions; what mattered was their quest to be thought well of by their neighbours and their struggle to make ends meet. Where Nicole had admired God's providential wisdom in making sinners sociable, Bayle was happy to envisage living in a sinful (but orderly and prosperous) society. His arguments mark the decisive moment when social theory ceases to be a branch of moral philosophy (as it still was for Hobbes and Locke). They transformed the terms of the

conflict between religious scepticism and religious faith, for up until then even sceptics had had to admit that faith was socially beneficial and must be fostered.

Bayle's arguments were taken up by Bernard Mandeville in *The Fable of the Bees* (1714), where they were explicitly applied to the interpretation of commercial society. A society of charitable Christians, Mandeville argued, would be poor and feeble. It was vice – greed, envy, anger – which led to industry, prosperity and military strength. Private vices were, he argued, beneficial to the public. The gambler, by letting others get their hands on his money, did more for society than a frugal saver who hoarded it away. The vain woman who spent a fortune on her clothes provided employment for hand-working shopassistants and tailors. Mandeville pushed his argument as far as it would go, arguing, for example, that prostitution served a useful function, as otherwise young men would seduce or rape respectable women.

Mandeville's argument focused sharply on the unintended consequences of human behaviour. The spendthrift and wastrel has no thought of doing good, yet his actions benefited society. This line of argument developed into Adam Smith's account of the 'hidden hand' at work in the market-place. The merchant wants only to buy cheap and sell dear; but competition forces him to produce goods cheaply and to ensure that they are of high quality. Selfish behaviour is thus so directed and channelled that it serves the public interest and everyone benefits as greedy individuals struggle to make a profit.

Much of the literature on Smith is devoted to a discussion of what has been christened 'the Adam Smith problem': how to explain the relationship between *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), which seems to encourage greedy and selfish behaviour, and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1757), which insists on the importance of a concern for the welfare of others. But this problem was not of Smith's making. Nicole, Bayle, and Mandeville had not sought to reconcile their account of society with conventional moral values because they did not hold with conventional morality. Nicole believed that most individuals who appeared moral were in fact sinful and doomed to perdition. Bayle and Mandeville had little patience with much of conventional morality, particularly in its attitude to sex. Their arguments had illuminated the workings of the market system, and made possible a robust defence of free enterprise. But how could conventional morality be rescued? Smith had no hesitation in condemning what he termed the 'immoral system' of La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville, but he could not dispense with that system when it came to analysing the market. The Adam Smith problem was the result of trying to adapt an account of society which was perfectly acceptable to Augustinians and libertines so that it could be made compatible with Locke's conviction that ordinary human beings were responsible moral agents.

What made the problem all the more acute was that as the eighteenth century advanced the power of commercial society to transform the world and to revolutionize the social relations of each and every individual became steadily more apparent. Smith's *Wealth of Nations* begins with an account of how the division of labour has transformed the production of pins, with the result that pins themselves have become cheap and commonplace. This simple example serves a double function: it introduces us to the division of labour, and at the same time it gives us an indication of the capacity of manufacture to transform the world. A few paragraphs later Smith describes how the steam engine had been revolutionized by a simple invention:

In the first fire-engines [that is, steam-engines], a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which opened this communication, to another part of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance . . .

Example has a double function, for Smith is not only introducing us to the idea of labour-saving machinery, but also preparing us for the idea of a self-regulating mechanism. Soon we will discover that in the market too valves are opened and shut by a hidden hand, which here encourages investment, and there penalizes inefficiency. And it is surely not unreasonable to argue that only in a society where self-regulating machines were commonplace could one have analysed the market in the terms Smith employs. There was nothing new about markets, not, as we have seen, about the idea of economic science; there was considerable novelty, however, in the technology that made it possible to conceptualize the market's functioning. Smith's steam engine is radically different from the clockwork mechanisms that had preoccupied de Malynes, or the Cartesian whirlpools of jostling atoms which had fascinated Nicole, in that (like the pendulum clocks that Huygens had developed in the late seventeenth century) it is a self-regulating mechanism. The construction of such mechanisms prepared the ground for the discovery of 'automatic mechanisms' in the economy. (An early example of the argument that societies should be interpreted as self-regulating mechanical systems is provided by Morelly's *Code de la nature* in 1755 (see Plate 15). Morelly, in presenting one of the first defences of communism since More's *Utopia*, argued that a communist society would be a self-regulating mechanism, and that hitherto political theorists and politicians had proved themselves to be incompetent mechanics.)

There was however a third major theme in Smith's analysis of the economy, beyond the division of labour and the working of competition, for Smith set out to analyse the distribution of wealth between employers and employees, landlords and tenants, merchants and producers, town and country. The first person to try and conceptualize the flow of wealth through society and its distribution between social groups was a French doctor, François Quesnay, who published his *Tableau économique* in 1758. In 1747 he had published a three volume *Essai physique sur l'économie animale*, and it seems apparent that it was his training in a biology which, since Harvey (1628), had been preoccupied with the circulation of the blood, which enabled Quesnay to conceptualize the flow of money, goods, and services. Modern economic thought is thus equally indebted to biology and mechanics. Just as markets long preceded any analysis of competition, but took on new significance in an age of machinery, so the age-old division between town and country appeared in a new light to men who had learnt to distinguish between veins and arteries.

CONJECTURAL HISTORY

So far we have traced the emergence of a number of modes of thought which survive vigorously into the present day. Power politics is still with us, and we still analyse it in terms Machiavelli would understand. We still lay claim to the rights that Locke assured us were guaranteed us by reason and

nature, although no one had claimed them before 1642. Utilitarianism is still a living moral philosophy. We still debate the impact of government policy on the economy in terms familiar to Smith. Each of these four great modes of argument claims to identify universal characteristics of society, yet all were invented in the specific circumstances of early modern Europe. No single set of factors explains them all, and any one of them could have developed without the others. There is no natural harmony between them, indeed each is hostile to its fellows. It is amusing to speculate on the range of possible social theories, just as one can imagine Darwinian evolution, on a different planet, producing a completely different range of species. These particular modes of thought flourished because each was attuned to key aspects of Western European society in the early modern period, and, as Western Europe came to dominate the world, so the new social sciences seemed vindicated in their claim to be able to explain social practices, though each was remarkably imperceptive when it came to accounting for its own intellectual and social origins.

Even now, histories written on the assumption that the social sciences represent simple discoveries of self-evident truths scarcely pause to ask what the preconditions of these discoveries were: it is as if one were to write about Galileo without mentioning cannon balls or telescopes. And yet, just as Galileo needed his telescope, so rights theories need printed books and a free press; political equality, if it is to burst the bounds of the city state, depends on the mass production and physical survival of arguments for equality. The whole point about written constitutions is that they are printed constitutions which every citizen can read. Yet, where Galileo writes extensively about the telescope, Locke only once briefly pauses to discuss the circulation and preservation of ideas. Condorcet, who writes eloquently about how the printing press has made possible the triumph of truth and justice (1793-4), does not pause to ask whether either printing press or printed book have subtly shaped our very idea of what is reasonable or just, although even he recognizes that the values of a print culture will be different from those of a manuscript culture (more scholarly, less respectful of authority).

Because these four styles of argument remain vigorous today, it is easy to assume that they were the significant discoveries of the period; because their political, cultural, and technological preconditions were largely invisible to those who first founded them, it is easy to assume that they can be explained as purely intellectual innovations. It is salutary, therefore, to turn to two other important styles of thought which are equally significant inventions of our period, one of which now seems at best suspect, while the other seems puzzlingly alien.

Mandeville's account of how corrupt humans manage to live amicably in society raised a simple historical problem: how had humans learnt the arts of hypocrisy and deceit that made social life possible? When had man been transformed from a wild animal, giving direct expression to his emotions, to a domesticated one, concerned to ingratiate himself with his fellow humans? Since at first sight there were no facts that helped answer such questions, it seemed that they could only be tackled through a conjectural history. 'Let us then begin by laying the facts aside, as they do not affect the question', wrote Rousseau (1712-78), who was in many respects a disciple of Mandeville, though he wrote, not in praise of contemporary prosperity and hypocrisy, but in condemnation of it.

Conjectural history had other roots. The natural law theorists had asked how and why property and government had been established. Economists had to explain why commercial society had been so slow to develop, and the principles of free trade had been so late to be recognized. Religious sceptics had puzzled over the success of monotheism and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. A society which was beginning to be acutely conscious of how it was unlike any previous society on the face of the earth had to have an explanation for its own peculiarity. For the most part (Rousseau is a striking exception) it wanted to claim that its own institutions were natural, those that had gone before it in some sense artificial or abnormal.

We read these conjectural histories – Rousseau's *Origins of Inequality* (1754); David Hume's *Natural History of Religion* (1757); book six of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) – with a sense that we no longer understand the rules of the game. How could one tell a good natural history of religion from a bad one, if facts have almost nothing to do with the matter? The answer would appear to be that each begins from a claim about human psychology and tries to explain how a uniform human nature could have generated extraordinary diversity over time and space. If social theory is rooted in psychology, and psychology does not change, how can one account for diversity?

Two answers to this question were extraordinarily influential, and influence us still. In 1748 Montesquieu published his *Spirit of the Laws*, in which he tried to identify a series of different ideal types which could be used to interpret all existing political communities. Some of Montesquieu's arguments (for example, that climate shapes culture) were open to easy refutation; but what was influential was his attempt to show how political institutions, moral values, and cultural behaviours are mutually reinforcing. In republics, in monarchies, in despotisms people think, feel, and behave differently. Montesquieu was not the first to realize this. Amelot de la Houssaie, for example, had published a brilliant description of Venice in 1675 which sought to show that, although it appeared outwardly as a free republic, it was in fact a despotism, and that this explained Venetian attitudes and values. The carnivals, masked balls, and courtesans of Venice were no longer presented as discrete aspects of Venetian life, but were argued to be displaced expressions of a political world in which there was no freedom of thought or expression. But Montesquieu's work dared to apply this approach, not to an alien society, but to countries like England and France.

Montesquieu's approach was sociological rather than historical and, until he came to discuss commerce, there was no necessary chronological order to the different types of society he analysed. But within a couple of years a number of theorists, above all Turgot ('A Philosophic Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind', 1750), began to argue that the key factor determining the diversity of societies was the different ways in which human beings obtained their means of subsistence, and that there was a natural historical progression from one type of economy to another. First had come hunting and gathering, then the domestication of animals and the life of the pastoral nomad, then the sowing of crops and settled agriculture, and finally the development of cities and commercial life. This 'four stages theory of history' had profound implications, for it made geography an analogue for history. To study a hunting and gathering society in North America or a pastoral society in Mongolia was to study the prehistory of Europe, while

European culture was now defined as the future towards which all societies were progressing. Facts could now re-enter the picture, though the facts were anthropological rather than historical.

In the next century the combination of the four stages theory and Ricardo's development of Smith's account of wages, prices, and profits was to provide the basis on which Marxist theory was constructed. But in a post-colonial world, Condorcet, Turgot and other theorists of progress have come to seem dangerously complacent in their assumption that their own civilization was superior to all others, with its implicit corollary that all societies should be encouraged or forced to become like Europe (although at least their arguments assumed the natural equality of all races). The histories of colonialism, imperialism, and racism prevent us from reading conjectural histories of progress without a sense of moral and intellectual discomfort.

GAMES OF CHANCE

Although the role of the natural sciences as influential models for the social sciences has been emphasized, the existence of a distinction between natural and social sciences has so far been accepted. It is worth concluding our survey of Western European social science by emphasizing that the constellation of the sciences looked very different in the eighteenth century from the one with which we are familiar now.

The Aristotelian and scholastic philosophers had believed that true science would be deductive. A series of syllogisms would tie premises to conclusions, demonstrating necessary connections. Descartes accepted the notion of a deductive science, and argued that, if one accepted his premises, a deductive physics and even biology were possible. On the other hand, however, he insisted that measured by the standards of deductive certainty many things that passed for knowledge had no legitimate claim to do so. It was difficult on Cartesian principles to see how there could be any reliable knowledge of historical fact, for example.

Two interlocking arguments developed in response to Descartes. In the first place, John Locke emphasized the difficulty of identifying necessary causal connections; science was, therefore, mainly concerned not with demonstrative truth, but with probable interpretation, at best with moral rather than mathematical certainty. Hume developed this line of thought to insist that no necessary causal connections could be identified in nature: all natural science was based on probability judgements.

At the same time historical knowledge was being brought within the framework of probability theory. Was Caesar assassinated by Brutus? To decide on the truth-status of this supposed knowledge one must establish how many witnesses had reported the event, how reliable they were, how far their testimony might have been corrupted over time. In principle one could proceed to calculate mathematically the likelihood of the accepted historical record being correct. In France Nicholas Fréret used this approach to defend conventional historical knowledge against sceptical attacks, while Hume, following in Fréret's steps, intended to publish in the *Treatise* an essay demonstrating how belief in miracles was always based on a false judgement of probabilities to stand beside his account of how scientific knowledge depended on probability judgements.

This linking of a range of what seem to us unconnected disciplines – maths, natural science, history, law, and religion

– within the overall framework of probability theory dates back to Antoine Arnauld's and Pierre Nicole's *Port-Royal Logic* of 1662, and was reinforced by Blaise Pascal's use of probability arguments both to explain complex problems in betting and to demonstrate why Catholic belief was rational. For the eighteenth century, then, there was no fundamental division between natural and social sciences; both were disciplines founded in probability theory, both relied on similar types of argument to justify their use of evidence and their claim to establish reliable knowledge. The great historian Edward Gibbon, writing his first book in French (*Essai sur l'étude de la littérature*, 1761), argued confidently that there were two types of critical (the word was used to mean probability-oriented) knowledge of social activity. One could seek to identify the general laws governing social behaviour in general (as, Gibbon believed, Montesquieu had done) or one could seek to give a reliable account of what had really happened, with due respect for the causal mechanisms at work in a particular sequence of events (as, Gibbon believed, Tacitus had done). Natural science, social science, and historical knowledge all had a common foundation in probability theory.

Because probability theory is no longer of central importance to our classification of types of knowledge, we fail to recognize that maps of knowledge, from 1700 to 1800, used it as their cardinal reference point. When we come across Condorcet's 'Tableau général de la science qui a pour objet l'application du calcul aux sciences politiques et morales' (1793) we see it as an early exercise in demography, epidemiology, and social arithmetic. And so it is; but it is also an attempt to demonstrate that the social sciences could systematically exploit the laws of chance, and thus establish themselves as true sciences. Condorcet devoted much effort to calculating how small a jury could be, and how large a dissenting minority it might contain, while still being a trustworthy mechanism for producing a verdict. This seems to us an enquiry which is scarcely capable of scientific treatment, and which has nothing to do with demography or epidemiology; but here too Condorcet was simply trying to press ahead with the application of probability theory to social understanding.

THE CASE OF CHINA

By 1800 a number of social sciences had established themselves in Western Europe. Can we find comparable developments elsewhere? If we take the arguments that I have described as characteristic of European thought in 1500, it is not difficult to find comparable theories outside Europe. We have seen that there is an Ottoman mirror of princes literature, which Ali sought to transform. As early as 300 BC Mencius had provided China with an account of government which could be used to legitimize resistance against tyranny. Such similarities reflect the efforts of theorists to struggle with problems that recur in all courtly societies. It is not entirely surprising either that one can find Machiavellian modes of thought in other societies where politics had been professionalized. Take for example Zhang Jueheng, who was chief grand secretary at the Chinese imperial court from 1572 to 1582. Zhang, like Machiavelli, had a cyclical theory of history. He insisted that one must adapt one's policies to fit the circumstances ('the inked marking string is not suited to the crooked tree') and the character of the people. He was concerned, as Machiavelli was, to advise his ruler on how

best to take advice. Like Machiavelli he saw politics as a struggle to control fortune ('destiny') through virtue ('righteousness'). Like Machiavelli, he was prepared to sacrifice conventional morality to political success, arguing for firm government, which he described in terms which came perilously close to his own definition of tyranny. Like Machiavelli he therefore rejected conventional learning, with its emphasis on moral excellence, in favour of a new stress on practicality. Like Machiavelli he is aware of a choice of religious traditions to which he can offer allegiance, for where Machiavelli hesitates between paganism and Christianity, Zhang is influenced by Buddhism. If there are differences between the two, they lie in the fact that Machiavelli was out of office while Zhang was in power, that Machiavelli was concerned with the relative merits of several political systems, while Zhang took the imperial authority for granted, and that Machiavelli did not hesitate to claim that he was the founder of a new type of knowledge, while Zhang had no desire to emphasize the novelty of his own views. *The Prince* came to be read as a critique of monarchy, and *The Discourses* clearly represent an attempt to find an alternative to contemporary political systems. Machiavelli thus became a central and ambiguous figure in European culture in a way that Zhang did not in Chinese.

Zhang's emphasis on practicality becomes characteristic of Chinese thought after the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644 and the consolidation of Manchu power in 1661. On the lower Yangzi an intellectual tradition preoccupied with restoring an accurate knowledge of ancient texts developed, a tradition with marked similarities to the humanist movement in sixteenth-century Europe. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese scholars developed an acute historical sense, being able to distinguish forgeries from authentic texts, and insisting that even authentic texts must be read critically to allow for bias and misrepresentation. As in Europe, philology and history were used to underpin a critique of contemporary society. In this respect one may compare the 'Evidential analysis of the meaning of terms in Mencius' of Dai Zhen (1724-77) with Erasmus's attack on contemporary scholarship and values in early sixteenth-century Europe. Like humanism this new scholarship flourished in an urbanized society, where there was rapid economic change, and where new educational institutions, associations of literati, and the rise of printing fostered the emergence of an independent intelligentsia. These intellectuals often concerned themselves with practical social issues. Fang Yishi's 'Proposals concerning Monetary Policy' of 1642, an attack on paper money, seems to have been comparable in sophistication to the analyses of inflation published in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe.

Why then did China not develop its own social science? It was not because Chinese technology in the seventeenth century was significantly behind that of the West: the Chinese quickly learnt how to make clocks and could have used them as metaphors for social activities had they wanted to. Nor was it because Chinese scholars were unaware of the new astronomy and physics. Indeed they were soon aware of the competing models offered by followers of Ptolemy and Copernicus. The difference would appear to lie elsewhere. First the Chinese never adopted wholeheartedly the idea of novelty: Chinese scholars who accepted Western astronomy sought to show that it derived from lost Chinese wisdom; in the West, by contrast, scientists and social scientists were happy to claim that their ideas were without parallel. Second, the Chinese were not particularly impressed by the metaphor

of mechanism: they were quick to note that although Western clocks had the advantage of chiming they were not (until the invention of Huygens' pendulum in the late seventeenth century), as accurate as water-clocks. Above all the Chinese did not think in terms of 'laws of nature', a concept which had firmly established itself in the West by the early seventeenth century, the very moment when economics began to emerge as a prospective science. In other words, any explanation of why 'social science' did not develop outside Western Europe is bound to be first and foremost an account of why the early modern scientific revolution was a peculiarly Western phenomenon.

Much twentieth-century philosophy has been concerned to detach the interpretation of society from a slavish attachment to the model of the natural sciences (an enterprise closely linked to the effort to show that science itself has social roots). The argument here has been that even though the first social scientists did not simply try to replicate the natural sciences, it was the success of natural science that urged them onwards and that provided them with measures of success and standards of achievement. This scientific paradigm existed within a social context of growing prosperity (hence the preoccupation with progress) and increasing mechanical sophistication (hence the possibility of fundamentally novel concepts, such as that of the self-regulating mechanism). And, once the concept of unintended consequences had been clearly grasped, the new social sciences were able sharply to distinguish their own subject matter from that of conventional morality or history.

There has been much discussion about the extent to which the conceptual foundations of modern science depended on cultural commitments that were peculiar to the Christian (or even, far less plausibly, the Calvinist) tradition. It is striking that a key moment in the birth of social science is interlocked with the theological debates of Jansenists and Calvinists, and that the theological premises of Nicole and Bayle enabled them to welcome the materialist and mechanist arguments of Hobbes and (when he was not discussing the soul) Descartes. But, as early seventeenth-century theorists were well aware, materialism had its origins in ancient Greek philosophy. One is bound to suspect that if the Jesuits had brought clocks, not to seventeenth-century China, but to fifth-century BC Athens, the intellectual consequences would have been more remarkable, because the intellectual preconditions for a preoccupation with mathematics and mechanism were already in place.

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THE ARTS

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This section deals with the profound changes that took place in artistic practice and outlook in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the three centuries that laid the foundations of our present ideas on art.

The word 'art' is current in our contemporary global village from Kansas City to Calcutta and from Anchorage to Addis Ababa. And yet, as I consider here the history of the arts of the period under review, it may be relevant to ask whether art has always meant the same thing all over the world. Although the word 'art' enjoys universal currency today, it is essentially of European origin and refers to skill. It is also generally applied to painting and sculpture, the so-called fine or high arts, as opposed to the 'low' or 'decorative' arts, and sometimes to architecture as well. The classification follows the Western hierarchy of the arts ultimately deriving from the Renaissance and is applied indiscriminately to all non-Western artistic traditions, irrespective of the fact that they may have been the products of different cultural and aesthetic norms. The reason lies in that art history as a discipline as we know it arose in Europe in the nineteenth century. Today, not only does the Western art historical approach dominate all studies of art but its essential canons remain the hidden agenda in these studies. Yet the separation of 'fine' and 'decorative' art has not been so clear-cut or extreme in non-Western cultures as in the West. Hence, we must exercise caution in applying the term 'art' cross-culturally in order not to distort the specific experience of each culture.

However, with this caveat in mind, when we glance at the history of the arts globally during our period we cannot fail to be impressed by the emergence of an entirely new outlook on art and artists in certain parts of the world, notably in the West during the Renaissance (c. 1400–1600), in Mughal India (1526–1757), in Edo Japan (1600–1868) and in Ming dynasty China (1368–1644). Obviously, there were significant differences between these cultures but what they shared between them singled them out from the rest of the world. They, as secular, urban societies with new forms of art, broke away from the traditional arts prevalent in the rest of the world. In contrast to them, the traditional arts were inspired by great religions, for instance, Christianity in medieval Europe, Islam in Spain, Western Asia, Central Asia, Persia and India, Hinduism in India, and Buddhism in South-East Asia. On the other hand, the rise of secular art was intimately linked with a growing interest in the external world. In the sphere of art, the secular tendencies may be termed realism, expressing a lively and engaging concern with nature. The word 'realism' is used in different senses in the history of the

arts. Renaissance 'mimesis' or illusionism is most commonly associated with the movement but parallel developments can be discerned in Mughal painting and in the *Ukiyo-e* (the art of low-life) prints of Japan. My aim here is to consider these significant changes in art by focusing on three key areas, Renaissance Italy, Mughal India and Japan of the Edo period. However, for the purposes of comparison and contrast other areas of the world would be mentioned where relevant. Realism is also used in literature to denote the factual treatment of the secular aspects of life and it is in this sense that the term will be used in this chapter to delineate a world-wide historical movement concerned with the secular world and its activities.

These changes in artistic outlook were products of changing social and economic conditions. It is significant that those countries which were not exposed to the new forces were, for a time, able to retain intact their traditional religions and social structures. The changes had much to do with the break-up of old orders – a phenomenon that can be described generally as the transition from the feudal age to one where rich merchants moved to the centre stage, a period that saw attempts at centralization and consolidation of power by ambitious rulers. Perhaps no prince embodied these worldly attributes more strikingly than Cesare Borgia during the Renaissance – a remarkable political figure immortalized by Machiavelli. At the end of the Middle Ages a powerful oligarchical government in Florence was able to establish its supremacy by crushing all opposition. In Japan, the successive Shōguns engaged in curbing the old nobility and breaking the power of the Buddhist orders. The 'separation of warrior and farmer' is the phrase commonly used to describe the transition from medieval to modern Japan. In the sixteenth century General Hideyoshi banned peasants from carrying arms and the Samurai from changing masters. The separation reduced social mobility and created rigid hierarchical classes controlled by the Shōgun. In this, the so-called Edo period, the reconstruction of the state blended well with the emerging realism and secular outlook in Japan. In the Mughal Empire, the Emperor Akbar (1556–1605) created a centralized bureaucracy based on merit by replacing the earlier rather loose quasi-feudal system of *Jagirdars* introduced by the Delhi Sultanate (1210–1526). The *Mansabdars* of Akbar were drawn from both Hindus and Muslims. They owed personal loyalty to him, and were promoted irrespective of their religious origins, a revolutionary development that pointed the way to a secular society in India.

The second related development seen in these parts of the world was the rise of cities and of urban cultures that contributed much to the growth of secular interests in life and art. Though the earliest and most vivid expression of this worldliness and objectivity was the Italian Renaissance centred on the city of Florence, it was by no means confined to Italy or even Europe. The cities began to break away from the domination of the feudal lords who were gradually replaced by prosperous merchants and bankers, the most celebrated of whom were the Medicis of Florence. Florentine prosperity rested on its woollen industry. The origins of the rise of Florence lay in its eastern trade with Pisa but soon Florence outstripped Pisa. One of its revolutionary acts was to reform the coinage, which created the conditions for capitalist enterprise. As feudal nobles sank into ever greater debt, Florentine merchants thrived on the interests paid, eventually buying up lands of the nobility. The surplus enjoyed by the traders was spent on woollen industries and on land. The wealth of the Florentine merchants, organized in guilds, was to pay for the cultural life of the city during the Renaissance. Gradually this urban culture became the model of civilization in the West with its intellectual activities and its free life-style encouraged by the Humanists. An example may be offered: strikingly, unlike the rest of Europe where one dressed according to one's social position, according to the great cultural historian Burckhardt, Florentines had the freedom to dress as they pleased, a freedom that is easily comprehensible to our age.

In Japan, the stability attained during the Edo period favoured economic growth, as agricultural and industrial production multiplied and communication and transport systems expanded. Nobles required new castles. Builders and carpenters gained in prestige as they perfected a new form of urban architecture. By now the status of the *chōnin* (townsman) was confirmed, while towns increased in size and prosperity by the concentration of commercial operations in them. By the Genroku period (1688–1704) many lords were heavily in debt through extravagance. Merchants who lent them money profited from high interest rates. Members of powerful town guilds, they stepped forth as creditors of the *daimyō* (the ruling class). In 1603 the most powerful impetus to urban life was given by the Shōgun, Tokugawa Ieyasu, when he forced his 250 feudal lords to move to the new capital city of Edo (later Tokyo). When the *daimyō* visited their own provinces their families were kept hostages by the Shōgun in the city. The Shōgun and his nobles were followed to Edo by artisans, tradesmen and servants who served their needs. In addition, a particularly large number of builders and carpenters were employed in building castles for the resident lords. Since the retainers of the *daimyō* were forced to reside in Edo in addition to the *chōnin*, the population soared to a million by the eighteenth century. Shops, department stores and arcades sprang up, as well as the so-called 'night-less city' where courtesans entertained. Edo was connected by a network of elegant bridges and possessed one of the earliest urban fire-fighting services in the world. The *chōnin* emerged as fervent patrons of artists, actors and the *geisha*, the urban sub-culture known as the *ukiyo* (the floating world). This does not mean, however, that the aristocracy did not participate in the sub-culture which blended the old and the new. But for the first time in Japanese history the thriving merchant class became the most numerous and generous patrons. Their own taste went for colourful new ceramics of Kyōto but by now taste ceased to be confined to any particular class. The arts of the theatre and prints of

actors and the related arts of the pleasure quarters catered to a wide urban public.

The Samurai, having lost their military vocation, now embarked on different professions, developing as intellectuals, while Buddhism merged with Confucian secular ethics. Literacy spread as more books were printed and an early form of newspaper made its appearance. Popular entertainment also turned secular. The difference between the secular drama, the *jōruri* puppet play, and the ritualistic No drama was remarkable. The great Genroku puppet-master, Gidayū, elaborated the secular tales of warriors and their inequited love. The *Kabuki* theatre which followed *jōruri* was even more realistic. Contemporary romantic tales were unfolded on vast stages with special lighting effects and moveable sets. Mechanical devices created convincing illusions with simulated fires, hurricanes and snowstorms. Even ordinary residents of Edo and other cities came to enjoy a graceful, urbane life rare in the world of the time. In spring, for instance, families set out with their picnic hampers to contemplate a large variety of flowering cherry trees in the countryside. Restaurants, set up in picturesque spots, afforded their customers good food with magnificent views, so brilliantly recorded in Hiroshige's *One Hundred Views of Edo* (see Plate 16).

The arrival of the Mughal dynasty in India in 1526 witnessed parallel developments of secular attitudes, especially expressed in art and literature. The great contribution of the Emperor Akbar (1556–1605) was, as we have seen, to create a united empire by placing men above religion and offering equal status to Hindus and Muslims, hitherto unimaginable. Yet urban life, though begun at this time in India, did not take firm roots and secular interests remained confined within the imperial court. Part of the reason lay in the complex rituals advocated by the Hindu caste system which forbade free intercourse between different strata of society. Second, in the Mughal empire the personal acquisitions of the *Mansabdar* reverted back to the emperor on his death. Hence, there was no incentive for him to save but rather to live a life of aimless extravagance.

The implications of the emerging urban culture in different parts of the world for the development of the arts were significant. Previously, in most traditional societies, either the absolute monarch or the whole community was responsible for ambitious architectural and artistic projects. In the case of Hindu India, for instance, the whole community contributed to the building of massive temples as well as to their sculptural decoration. Even today, temples such as that of Madurai in South India are the wealthiest institutions in the community as well as being its pivot. In medieval Europe, the Church was the foremost patron of art and architecture. The great cathedrals headed by bishops in the thirteenth century were planned on a vast scale with magnificent decoration of stained glass and sculpture. The sculptures, mosaics and paintings served to teach the illiterate laity the precepts of the faith. The lofty heights of Notre-Dame in Paris or of Cologne cathedral were the visible symbols of 'the church triumphant'.

During the Renaissance in Italy the nature of patronage underwent changes even though the Church as an institution did not for a while lose its importance as an employer of architects and artists. But much had changed. Now the Popes, for instance, directly negotiated with individual artists to produce monuments that would glorify them as individuals as well as the Church. One of the best known was Pope Julius II who, in 1506, made plans to rebuild St Peter's basilica

on the architect Bramante's (1444-1514) model and assigned Michelangelo the task of decorating the Sistine Chapel. This attitude to patronage can be characterized as a new phenomenon, connoisseurship – art as a reflection of the taste of the individual patron – and not as part of a communal effort. None exemplified this new attitude more than the *condottieri* and the despots of Renaissance Italy. Being of uncertain pedigree but of great wealth and power as well as education, a family such as the Medici lavished large sums on building libraries, supporting Humanists and commissioning architects, sculptors and painters. Lorenzo in particular made his collection available to artists and scholars. Undoubtedly the greatest patrons of artists in this period, Botticelli's *The Birth of Venus* was painted for a Medici who had wished to adorn his villa with a Classical subject. He, and his teacher, the Humanist Ficino, who delved deeply into Greek mythology, furnished the artist with the theme of the painting.

Of course, alongside the major paintings and sculptures produced during the Renaissance that adorned the churches and other public places, Renaissance Italy saw the rise of private collections. Oil paintings flourished not only in Italy but also in Flanders and Germany. The collecting habits of the period were not confined to paintings either; they included natural and artificial objects from different parts of the world which were eagerly displayed in cabinets of curiosities. Philip II had acquired 20,000 items for his *Wunderkammer*. The Habsburg Emperor Maximilian I collected both *curiosa* and contemporary art. Archduke Ferdinand's collection at Ambras was one of the greatest while Rudolf II had turned Prague into the *Wunderkammer* of Europe. One of the first private collectors was Dr Lorenz Hofmann of Halle (1625). The cabinets of curiosities were the precursors of public art galleries and museums in that the public was allowed to visit them and marvel at the objects.

The practice of collecting paintings had been helped by an earlier development when painting became portable. In late medieval Europe, in the Islamic world and in India wall-paintings yielded place to illustrated manuscripts. With the discouragement of the graven image by Islam, figure sculptures and wall paintings ceased to exist in countries under its sway but there was no similar opposition to illustrating religious texts. We marvel at the painting of *Two Warriors Fighting in a Landscape* (1396) in a Persian text now in the British Museum. In the West, some of the finest early manuscripts on vellum were produced in Ireland and England, most notably *The Lindisfarne Gospel* (c. AD 700). But in the course of the Middle Ages secular works also began to make their appearance. The lavishly illustrated *Book of Hours* for the Duc de Berry and the *Book of Marcs* (now in the Bibliothèque Nationale) (see Plate 17) with most illustrations by the Boucicaut Master, are two of the finest examples of this genre. The latter brought to life the literary descriptions of early travellers, Marco Polo, Odoric da Pordenone, Sir John Mandeville and others. In China, too, scrolls could be carried from one place to another and collected. They were made of silk or paper and were kept in precious containers (see Plate 18).

In India, from the tenth century onwards, illuminations of religious texts took over from fresco painting. In Eastern India they were carried out in the *scriptoria* (writing workshops) of Nalanda and other famous Buddhist universities during the Pāla period. One such text, the *Prajñāpāramitā* (Perfection of Wisdom), contains illustrations on palm leaf (22" x 2.5") of Bodhisattvas, flanked by deities.

When the region was overrun by the Muslims, the scribes and painters, many of whom were monks, moved north to Nepal and thence to Tibet where they carried on the tradition.

On the West Coast of India (Gujarat, Malwa and Rajasthan) illustrations of Jain texts such as the *Kalpasūtra* (1370) came into fashion in the fourteenth century. The Jains were wealthy merchants and bankers. With the establishment of Muslim rule they were increasingly prevented from commissioning ambitious temples and turned to patronizing artists who produced small-scale manuscripts (12" x 4"). With the introduction of paper and the generous use of gold and ultramarine, the paintings gained in richness of decoration in the fifteenth century. Many of these texts, still to be found in Jain libraries (*Bhandāras*), show links between Gujarat and the Islamic world beyond India. In north India, the Islamic Sultanate, established in Delhi in 1206, did not discourage painting but nothing survives from the period. Interestingly enough, the earliest Islamic paintings in India come from Malwa and they are secular. They belong to the *Nimat Nama*, (Book of Recipes) executed for the ruler of Malwa, Ghiyas al-din (1469-1500). This secular illustration of a text was followed by others for which the rise of a new genre of romantic literature was largely responsible.

In Italy, as part of the process of secularization, the dominance of Latin waned with the rise of vernacular literature, the greatest example of which is Dante's *The Divine Comedy* in Italian. The development of Italian continued with the poetry of Petrarca and the prose of Boccaccio. In India, sacred and classical courtly Sanskrit was replaced finally around AD 1600 with vernacular languages – a process that gave birth to a new form of romantic poetry, in part the result of the synthesis of Islamic *sufism* and the Hindu *bhakti* (religion of devotion). To be sure, some of the pioneers of the romantic genre still wrote in Sanskrit but there was a world of difference between classical Sanskrit and the great twelfth-century poem of Jayadeva, the *Gīta Govinda* (the Song of the Lord) for instance. In India the immediate context and concern remained religious but love mysticism became the pretext for exploring the whole language and emotions of worldly love. When poets spoke of the passion of Rādhā (soul) for Kṛṣṇa (God) they couched it unmistakably in this-worldly terms, in terms of profane love mirroring the divine. The gods were not only brought down to the human level but they also formed the subject of passionate love. There are, of course, purely secular love poetry as well such as the classic, *Campanāśikā* (Fifty verses of a love-thief) dating from the twelfth century. Not only does the text describe the affluent life-style of the hero Villana and the heroine Campanāśī, it also probes deeply the inner emotions of the characters. This psychological element occurs in another romantic poem, *Laur Chanda*, a tale of two Hindu lovers treated by a Muslim poet, Maulana Dā'ud (1370).

But what about painting? The traditional rulers, the Rajputs had re-emerged in Rajasthan under the leadership of Rana Sanga (died 1528) after their setback at Muslim hands in the previous centuries. It was in courts such as these that painters were engaged to illustrate romantic poetry rather than the austere lives of Jain monks. These developments provide the background to the arrival of the Mughals in India in 1526, the dynasty that contributed much to the development of a secular society in India in the sixteenth century.

The case of Japan is more complex. As early as AD 1000 the Japanese had developed secular literary forms such as the novel that dealt with the complexities of human relationships. Lady Murasaki's *Tale of Prince Genji*, gives us as much a

profound insight into human character as into the refined courtly culture of the period. The realistic tendency is further expanded in Saikaku's novels in the later period. On the other hand Bashō's (1644–94) *Haiiku* verses reflect a high level of intellectual sophistication in their remarkably economic expression.

In keeping with the changes in patronage during the period under review, there were changes in artistic practices and the social status of the artist. Here again, a contrast can be drawn between the three above mentioned societies and more traditional ones: unlike the anonymous artists of the previous periods, in these worldly cultures the artist acquired as much renown as the works he produced. The background to this was the social transformation that led to the elevation of artists as a class; it can be described as the rise of individualism which eventually freed them from the constraints of artistic guilds. In the West, during the late Middle Ages, artistic guilds began to break up, as painters and sculptors set up their own private studios and sold their products directly to their clients. Competition among artists for commissions, the fragmentation of artistic practice and the consequent proliferation of artistic styles replaced the earlier universal artistic canons such as the Gothic, prevalent in medieval Europe. Each master painter offered clients works done in a unique manner, a tendency taken to its extreme limits by such a sculptor/goldsmith as Benvenuto Cellini. His remarkable autobiography bears witness to bitter rivalries between artists in an age of fierce competition. Along with extreme claims to individualism and demands for artistic freedom emerged the cult of the artistic personality – the melancholic genius who only lived for his work.

The changes in artistic practice were followed by an improvement in the social status of artists who now claimed to be intellectuals and not artisans. Scientific principles such as the laws of linear perspective and human anatomy explored by Renaissance artists offered them an intellectual and scientific basis to their work. As early as the end of the Middle Ages, artists had begun to resent their craftsman status. For example, however great a medieval master painter was, he would be treated as a servant by his patron and was certainly not allowed to sit at the same table with him. The case was different with scholars. Even though they did not enjoy a high economic standing, society made a distinction between those who worked with their brain and those who were manual workers. In the fifteenth century, for the first time, a high status was accorded to Brunelleschi, the builder of the Pazzi chapel in Florence, who was well-versed in Classical architecture. Leonardo da Vinci perceived himself both as a scientist and an artist (see Plate 19). He wished to place painting on a scientific footing with his experiments in order to elevate it to the level of an intellectual and gentlemanly pursuit. By the time we reach Michelangelo we note that he felt offended to be addressed as a mere sculptor: 'Tell him ... that ... here I am known only as Michelangelo Buonarroti ... I have never been a painter or sculptor, in the sense of having kept a shop'. The German painter Dürer (see Plate 20), who felt at home in Venice, remarked ruefully that 'here I am a lord, at home a parasite'. Countless such stories confirm the Renaissance artists' claims to a higher status as an intellectual rather than as a skilled craftsman. Finally, it was Giorgio Vasari who moved to found the first art academy in Florence. His aim was to emancipate artists from the control of the guilds and confirm their elevated social standing.

In the Mughal period, Indian artists were, for the first time, mentioned by their patrons. I had described the social

and cultural changes taking place on the eve of Mughal conquest. When Akbar, the greatest Mughal emperor, took the throne his reign brought transformations in Indian artistic practices. The Mughal dynasty was nurtured in Persian culture. On his return to India from exile, Akbar's father, Humayun, brought two leading Persian painters with him. Ahd-al Samad and Mir Sayyid Ali laid the foundations of the Mughal School during Akbar's reign. The studio illustrated manuscripts on Muslim epics, chronicles and the history of Akbar's reign (see Plate 21). Each painting was a collaborative effort with artists specializing in certain aspects, such as foundation drawing, background, portraiture, figures, and so on but significantly each painting, for the first time, bore names of the collaborating artists. Even more important, Abū'l Fazl, the chronicler of Akbar's reign and his close friend, critically discussed the merits of each artist. Among a hundred or so painters belonging to the workshop, about a dozen gained prominence as individual masters with distinct styles. No one was more striking among them than Daswanth who, as a child, was discovered drawing on walls by Akbar and placed under the two Persian masters. He quickly rose to fame but took his own life at the age of thirty in a state of depression. The lore of the 'melancholic genius' so extolled in Renaissance literature seems to occur in the sixteenth-century India even though the *topos* did not seem to exist in the subcontinent. Paintings in the *Razm-nama* (now in Jaipur) attributed to Daswanth embrace a remarkable panorama of brilliant drama, violence and complex arrangements of multiple figures unprecedented in Indian painting and seldom again to be repeated. The other painter who displayed great individualism was Basawan. But his style was quiet, severe and Apollonian in contrast to the Dionysiac frenzy of Daswanth. In Akbar's son Jahāngīr's reign (1605–27) master artists gained further confidence and social status because of the emperor's personal encouragement. He elevated the painters Mansur and Abul Hasan to the level of courtiers. However, even if individual artists occasionally reached the pinnacle of fame, artists as a group remained on the level of craftsmen. This can be explained by the fact that unlike Italy or Japan no large middle or professional class ever emerged in the empire.

In Japan, where the situation was similar to China, the most influential Far Eastern civilization, the status of the artist was exalted from the very outset and certainly by the sixteenth century. Painting in Japan was closely connected with Buddhist philosophy and with calligraphy. Painters were scholars as well. As in China with its tradition of Zen Buddhism, painting was an extension of meditation where the painter became one with his object of contemplation: the artist was taught, for instance, that it was not enough to learn all about a bamboo, one had to become a bamboo. If nature was the most important subject to both Western and Chinese artists, as opposed to Western scientific scrutiny of nature, the Chinese aim was to capture its essence. The Chinese and Japanese intellectual approach separated the artist from the craftsman. We know the names of famous artists of East Asia. In Japan, artists were invariably monks associated with powerful monasteries and belonged to privileged groups. Taiko Josetsu and his pupil Tencho Shūbun (c. 1426–65) and Tenyu Shōkei were the earliest known Zen ink painters of landscapes, the greatest of whom was Shesshu Toyo (1420–1506). The mystical tradition was carried on by the *Kano* school led by Masanobu (1454–90) and Motonobu (1476–1559). Even though the Momoyama period ushered in the age of secular urban culture (1569–1600), realistic

despatched Vasco da Gama to seek a sea route to India to bypass the Arabs who had hitherto dominated Mediterranean trade. In 1498 Gama reached Calicut in India while, on a similar quest, Columbus had already stumbled upon the New World (1492). But it was the Jesuits in the sixteenth century who confronted great Eastern civilizations – the Mughal and the Chinese – during their attempts to spread Christianity. The result was an intense exchange of Eastern and Western viewpoints and modes of thinking. Giuseppe Castiglione (1688–1766), the Italian Jesuit who studied Chinese painting by imperial command, combined Chinese brushwork and Western realism in his painting. His portraits, court scenes and military expeditions were much appreciated by the Chinese.

The Jesuits exerted considerable influence on the Chinese emperors and the nobility who were keen to learn of the new marvels of Western science and technology. And yet, Western ideas made very few inroads into actual Chinese thinking and social behaviour, remaining on a superficial level. Most significantly, the Chinese tradition of the *literati* artists – gentlemen, scholarly painters to whom nature was an object of mystical contemplation – saw no reason to adopt Western illusionist innovations in art even though the Chinese were deeply impressed with perspective. But the West had a greater impact on Japan and especially on Japanese artists. Christianity exerted a far-reaching effect when Francis Xavier arrived at Kagoshima in 1549 under Portuguese protection. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, Christianity was viewed by the rulers as a threat and banned. Meanwhile, a Europeanizing art (*nanban*) showing Portuguese influence flourished in Japan. In the eighteenth century, individual painters began to experiment with perspective and other European artistic inventions. Dutch books on anatomy played an especially important role in this. Hiraga Gennai (1726–79) was largely responsible for disseminating the new knowledge of perspective as part of *rangaku* (Dutch knowledge). Shiba Kokan produced water-colours based on the vanishing point and experimented with copper-plate engraving. Western techniques continued to spread among Japanese artists and were most effectively and inventively employed in the Ukiyo-e prints of Hiroshige, Hokusai and Utamaro.

In India, the Jesuits who were impressed with the pomp and circumstance of the Court of Akbar the Great were keen to convert him to Christianity. Akbar came to know of European arts and sciences through the gifts offered by the Jesuits and foreign ambassadors; he was particularly dazzled by illusionist art. His chronicler Abul Fazl readily acknowledged that European painters were famous for their representational skills. Mughal artists began copying the engravings in the illustrated Bibles presented to Mughal emperors and thus gained knowledge of Western approaches to painting (see Plate 25). Mughal copies include several striking ones such as a composite picture based on the crucifixion (c. 1598) in a beautiful range of colours and the master painter Abul Hasan's youthful copy of a Dürer St John. Skills in European naturalism learnt from such copies enabled painters to tell a story more convincingly, as they explored the psychological relationships between figures in a painting. Since the Mughal painters were already adept at representation, they readily rose to the challenge of European art. The technique of representing consistent lighting by means of *chiaroscuro* was easily comprehended, as Persian formal harmony of colours was given up. Foreshortening and the suggestion of distance by making background objects smaller than the foreground were also

successfully tackled. But the laws of perspective posed the greatest challenge and continued to do so even in the eighteenth century.

In the period under review, the architecture, sculptures and paintings of Spanish America are some of the earliest examples of arts under the impact of colonialism that afford us a glimpse of the tendencies of cultural assimilation and hybridity to which Western colonial empires gave rise. These developments in Latin America foreshadowed what were to be the crucial problems during the imperial meridian in the nineteenth century. Artists in countries as far apart as India and Japan wrestled with the cultural impact of the West and had to define their own works against the backdrop of Renaissance naturalism.

The pre-Columbian societies encountered by the Spanish *Conquistadores* – the Mayans, the Aztecs and the Incas – had evolved complex forms of architecture and monumental sculpture related to their religious beliefs. A literate people, the Mayans had produced illustrated texts made of bark-paper dealing with astrology, astronomy, history and rituals, four of which have survived the depredations of the invaders. Seeking to supplant the indigenous system of thought with European ideas, the first bishop of Yucatan destroyed Mayan books in 1520 as springing from the devil. The Indians continued to record their history in defiance of the Inquisition, but now in Roman script. Indigenous architecture went into decline as Catholicism was imposed on the population. The project of mass conversion of the New World included flooding the area with Christian imagery imported from Spain. However, such drastic measures failed to remove traces of earlier Indian art. The Catholic Church pressed a new religious art of the Americas into the service of Christianity. Indian craftsmen were taught Christian iconography by means of European prints which had consequences for the evolving art of Latin America. The murals in churches emulated Renaissance illusionism while incorporating Indian motifs, an early case of colonial synthesis. In fact, the sixteenth-century murals drew copiously not only upon Indian imagery but also upon indigenous stylistic conventions. For instance, the paintings in the churches at Ixmiquilpan and Cuauhtlan depict the eagle and the jaguar as present at the Annunciation (see Plate 26). Since the Indian craftsmen were already skilled in stone-carving and mural painting, they adapted their skills to the conqueror's needs. The new art quickly spread to the Indians and the growing community of mixed people, the *Mestizos*. While the guilds formed by European professional painters in search of work in the colonies were pale shadows of the Western art world and served the needs of expatriate thenans, the indigenous artists opened workshops under Indian and *Mestizo* patronage. Creators of a mixed style, the *Mestizo* artists of Cuzco, for instance, produced rigid full-frontal figures in bold colours and with strong decorative patterns in gold leaf. Bolivian artists drew upon Cuzco models; Melchor Perez de Holguin (1660–1724) blended Western depth and contour with details of Indian inspiration. In Spanish America Christian iconography was radically simplified. The Virgin, the life and death of Christ and a few saints were chosen for representation. The Virgin abandoned her blue garment for a multicoloured feathered skirt, while archangels sported contemporary vestments and the latest firearms.

If portraiture was practised by immigrant painters from Europe, religion remained the dominant subject of Latin American colonies. Among local artists, none encapsulated

the colonial experience more strikingly than Amónio Francisco Lisboa (1738–1814), a Brazilian mulatto better known as 'O Aleijadinho'. Greatly adept at deploying space in architecture and sculpture, he is best remembered for his grim Old Testament prophets adorning the church of Bom Jesus in Congonhas do Campo.

In contrast to these developments that pointed the way to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, large segments of the globe continued to hold on to traditional values. In South India, for instance, Muslim penetration had not gone deep enough to prevent Hindus from continuing to build enormously complex temples with towering *gopuras* (gate towers). If one were to choose a continent that was relatively untouched by Western ideas until recently that would be Africa. I have chosen this continent to examine the traditional art produced in the world during the period under review. Traditional arts in Black Africa – predominantly metal and wooden sculpture and some amount of masks and body and house decoration – were not regarded as works of art in the sense of being a collector's item but had certain well-defined functions. Many of them were produced to wrest power from or seek protection against natural and supernatural forces. Masks were widely used in rituals in which the participants developed a symbiotic relationship with the spirits evoked (see Plate 27). Powerful secret societies such as the Poro commissioned masks pertaining to their ceremonies. Similarly, fetishes, images which were meant to control malevolent forces of nature, were produced for those who practised witchcraft. For the fetish or the mask to be effective, it had to be produced according to prescription – a prescription whose significance was fully known to the artist and his client. Hence the success of the artist depended on satisfying certain criteria. However, one must remember that within these constraints, there was much scope for skill and choice for the artist. Several problems are faced by modern art historians in studying African art. There is an absence of linear progress in the European sense and a uniformity of style over long durations in the arts of peoples of Africa. Yet there is a wide variety among African works of art, depending on the individual mastery of the medium. Many of them show remarkable skill in carving and a deep insight into nature.

However, social and religious requirements did not demand a strict adherence to the appearance of things as often stories were told in art in a symbolic form. One of the problems of appreciating African art for art historians has been the inability or unwillingness to seek the meaning and significance of the complex symbolism behind these artefacts. These objects often represented multiple functions – to entertain, to frighten, to commemorate or as carriers of fertility. The last factor is of undoubted significance in a land where people are predominantly agricultural. While acknowledging the social and religious functions of African art, it would be misleading to hold that aesthetic considerations did not enter into the equation of African art. Because African norms of beauty are so different from the Western, they have often been misread by art historians. And yet, in many cases the African sculptor is moved by aesthetic appeal. For instance, the beauty of the *Tshokur* female masks for the *poro* dance were meant to appeal to the participants in the ritual. Equally, some of the female masks of the Dogon were fashioned because the women had appealed to the artist.

In the larger kingdoms of Africa with surplus wealth and a powerful ruling class the artists were organized in guilds. Abundant wealth, indicated by the lavish use of precious

metals, led to the flowering of art in the kingdoms of Dahomey and Ashanti: the royal courts became the focus of a rich culture.

Goldsmiths in Ashanti, a kingdom that prospered on the slave-trade with the West, were a privileged group that fashioned ceremonial objects and portraits, the most famous of which is the gold mask of King Kofi Kakari. There are other examples of artistic production: among the Bamileke, the artists were directly in the employ of the ruler who also controlled the sale of their works. Portraits were especially demanded by kings, icons that confirmed royal authority.

The exquisite Benin bronzes, made to commemorate deceased kings, go back to the twelfth century. Benin artists practised the *cire perdue* method of producing bronze sculptures. Their guild was directly under the control of the Oba or ruler. Between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries Benin bronze heads progressed from a modest naturalism to triumphs of delicacy and observation in depicting human beings, making Benin bronzes some of the finest achievements of humanity (see Plate 28). Clearly, in the powerful kingdom of Benin, where the ruling class could afford to pay for art works, the monarchs were keen to glorify themselves through art.

Not only Benin bronzes, but much of African sculpture has fascinated with its radical simplifications and an assumed comprehension of organic forms. Its abstract elegance drew artists like Picasso to it. Among the most striking wooden sculptures are the *tellem* pieces made by the Dogon in Mali, whose precise function seems to have been lost in obscurity. Such artistic confidence was often the product of long training in the craft.

Finally, as we reach the end of the eighteenth century the contrast between 'traditional' and 'secular' societies begins to disappear. The secular and 'realistic' tendencies in art first noticed during the Renaissance now come to fruition as they gradually spread to the rest of the world. The year 1789, the year of the French Revolution, may be taken as ushering in the modern age, when the universalist ideas of the Enlightenment and nationalism were borne across the seas, especially to the emerging European colonies. The full effects of these ideas were not, however, felt until the middle of the next century.

In European art the late eighteenth century witnessed the collapse of the dominant universal canon as permanent revolution became the order of the day. Even though we noticed the rise of individualism among artists during the Renaissance, until the late eighteenth century, artists continued to depend on the restrictive patronage of the wealthy. There existed a consensus as to what was required of an artist. It was in the eighteenth century that artists were able to proclaim freedom from all restraints. For the Romantic movement encouraged the artist to seek self-fulfilment above everything else. Artists developed acute self-consciousness about artistic styles. Romanticism brought a new awareness of history and of the past. The Renaissance artists, for instance, had seen themselves as direct heirs to the Graeco-Roman heritage after a short break in the Middle Ages. When the eighteenth-century Neo-classicists engaged in reviving ancient Greek Doric architecture they, as 'archaeologists', no longer perceived the cultural continuum. The Neo-classical, Gothic and other revivals were merely a confirmation of the rupture with the past. Artists now felt free to draw upon any style that pleased them or appealed to their sense of the past, a phenomenon described by modern historians as artistic historicism. Such 'archaeologizing' was not confined to Western art. In time, the net was cast wider to bring in

exotic arts. The world, to the 'armchair artist', became a museum from which to select a style that took his fancy.

In short, art, like many other aspects of modern life, became an 'object' to be taken out of its cultural context and placed in a rarefied atmosphere to be contemplated at leisure. Among factors that helped turn art into an 'object' or 'commodity' the artistic market was a major one. Dutch artists had started selling their works in an open market in the seventeenth century but the process was greatly accelerated in the eighteenth century with a growing vogue for old masters. The development had much to do with the notion of the 'authenticity' of a work of art which sought to fix a work of art within the context of its time as the product of individual genius. Already by the end of the Renaissance pictures had begun to change hands at ever higher prices. During the reign of James I an international market had appeared in London. But the 1760s became a turning point in the history of English taste when competition between the art markets of London and Paris sprang up. Gradually, London outstripped Paris as a centre for trading in Renaissance paintings. Part of the reason for London's prominence lay in the fact that money acquired in the East and West Indies circulated freely in the city. Art prices had the same interest to the informed public in the eighteenth century as they have today. No Renaissance master had a greater reputation in the eighteenth century than Raphael whose *Sistine Madonna* was bought for an enormous sum by Augustus III of Poland in 1754 (see Plate 23).

The other late eighteenth-century development that takes us into our own age was the phenomenon of annual exhibitions which was fast replacing the earlier practice of direct transactions between the artist and the individual aristocratic patron or an institution like the Church. The artist came to rely progressively on a new impersonal patron – the informed, art-loving public. Public exhibitions of works of art were regular events in Paris and London in the eighteenth century. As Jacques Louis David, the French painter, informs us:

In our time this custom of showing the arts to the public practised in England is called 'Exhibition' ... introduced ... by Van Dyck: the public came in crowds to admire his work: he gained by this means a considerable fortune.

The period of the French Revolution saw the nationalization of art objects and opening of museums for the people. With a regularly held competitive salon open to all nationalities after 1793 Paris emerged as the international art exhibition centre. Art reviews accompanied art exhibitions and art notes became a regular feature of newspapers and journals, the most famous early critic being the French encyclopaetist, Diderot. The rise of art exhibitions and art criticism as mediators between the artist and his public led to a revolution in art patronage as the critic became a powerful arbiter of contemporary taste.

And yet, it is a remarkable paradox that the 'uniqueness' of a work of art so assiduously nurtured in these developments

was seriously undermined by the final development in the modern age, the age of mechanical reproduction, as described by the German critic, Walter Benjamin. Of course, with the rise of printing during the Renaissance it became possible to reproduce a work of art but the mechanical reproduction of a work of art was a new phenomenon (see Plate 29). Lithography invented in the late eighteenth century enabled works of art to be duplicated with ease, a process taken to great lengths by photography in the next century. The reputation of academic artists in the Victorian period, notably Edwin Landseer, rested primarily on the cheap prints of their works. And yet prints attacked the very 'authenticity' of a work of art, intimately connected with the rise of artistic individualism. The 'attack' on authenticity jeopardized the historical context in which the work was produced and hence its 'authority'. Landseer was one of the celebrated beneficiaries as well as a victim of the reproductive process – the enormous quantity of prints of his works which had made him so famous also led to his downfall as a debased artist.

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INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

Peter Burke

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a general survey of the major changes in the systems of information and communication in the early modern world. It aims at comparing and contrasting the stocks of knowledge available in different parts of the globe at this time, and at analysing the acquisition, distribution and criticism of that knowledge. It is obvious that a survey of this kind cannot claim to be more than provisional. Global comparison and contrast is the essence of the enterprise, but the specialized secondary works (histories of science, histories of universities, histories of the book and so on) on which it requires to be based are reasonably numerous only in the case of one region, the West (see Plate 30).

The task of synthesis is rendered still more difficult by the fact that the basic concepts 'information' and 'communication' are extremely problematic. It is no longer possible (as it might have been a generation ago) to work with positivist notions of 'hard facts' and of intellectual 'progress' measured in terms of the accumulation of information. Information is necessarily organized in categories which vary from place to place as well as from period to period. One person's 'information' is another person's 'superstition', 'sedition' or 'propaganda'. Both the Church and the State in early modern Europe – like the 'Literary Inquisition' of Qing China – ordered the burning of books to destroy what they regarded as false information, while missionaries in the New World virtually eliminated entire writing systems in Mexico and Peru.

In order to make a vast subject manageable, it will be necessary to privilege change. To privilege change makes sense in an age of increasing intensity of communications, of what might be called a 'communications revolution', a result not only of the invention (or re-invention) of printing in the West, but of the increase in political and economic contacts between different parts of the world. However, the decision to privilege change has its price and its problems.

In the first place the problem of periodization. For the history of Europe, the early modern period makes an appropriate framework, at least if we define it for the purposes of this chapter as the period which runs from the rise of printing with moveable type in the later fifteenth century to the introduction of the steam press in the early nineteenth century. For the Americas, too, this period makes sense, since a new writing system was introduced to that continent after 1492. On the other hand, a historian of information and communication in the world of Islam or in East Asia would not be likely to begin or end his or her study around

1500 or 1800. In the case of China, the most obvious turning-point is the change of dynasty in the middle of the seventeenth century. In the case of Japan, 1600 (the rise of the Tokugawa shogunate) and 1868 (the imperial restoration) might seem more appropriate than 1492 or 1789. All the same, these last two dates do have a global significance. The period between them is that of the rise of what the American historian William McNeill, linking the increasing exchange of information with the growth of intercontinental trade, has called the rise of the 'ecumenical exchange system'.

In the second place, privileging change involves an emphasis on literary as opposed to oral or visual communication, on the information available to élites at the expense of the knowledge current among ordinary people, and on the West rather than Africa or Asia (it is for this reason that each section will begin by discussing Europe). Although the world of oral communication involved far more people than the world of writing, let alone print, there will be no discussion of the 'drum history' of West Africa, for example; no treatment of rumour or gossip; no discussion of the oral information available on the *piazza* or in the *sng*, the coffee-house or the tea-house, the western tavern or the Turkish *boza-hane*; no discussion of preachers (Christian or Muslim), professional story-tellers, or reciters of oral poetry, who have been described as fulfilling the role of broadcasting information in traditional societies as effectively as the press or radio in modern ones.

Another necessary omission from this survey is the history of education; the European universities, the Muslim *madrasa*, the Chinese 'academies' (*shuyuan*), and of course the many types of school to be found all over the world. These institutions were of course central to the process of communicating information. However, their main concern was the transmission of cultural traditions (with 'cultural reproduction', as sociologists call it) rather than the encouragement of change. Exceptions to the rule are the colleges founded to teach mathematics, science and technology, from Gresham College in London, founded in the late sixteenth century, to the Naval, Engineering and Artillery Academies in St Petersburg founded by Peter I, and the engineering school opened in Istanbul in 1734.

Today, intellectual innovation is considered one of the major functions of institutions of higher education, and candidates for higher degrees are normally expected to have made a 'contribution to knowledge'. In the early modern period, on the other hand, the assumption – in all parts of the world – was, on the contrary, that most important

discoveries had already been made, so that even institutions of higher education ought to concentrate on passing on information rather than discovering it. In similar fashion, it was generally assumed that the opinions and interpretations of the great scholars and philosophers of the past could not be equalled or refuted by posterity, so that the task of the teacher was to expound the views of the authorities (Aristotle, Hippocrates, Ibn Sina, Aquinas, Confucius, and so on).

There were of course exceptions to this general acceptance of intellectual authority. In sixteenth-century Europe, traditions were openly attacked by such university lecturers as Paracelsus (on medicine) and Ramus (on logic and rhetoric). The so-called 'Scientific Revolution' of the early modern period (discussed in Chapter 8), was associated with a repudiation of intellectual authority, summed up in the motto of the Royal Society of London ('on no-one's word'), *nil in verba*, and made most powerfully explicit by the English philosopher John Locke.

In China too there was something of a revolt against orthodoxy in this period (the timing appears to be coincidental). Confucianism was denounced by the sixteenth-century scholar Li Chih, while the essays written by candidates taking the civil service examinations are said to have become less conventional around the year 1600. The early years of the Qing dynasty continued the tendency to question traditional ideas. From the late seventeenth century onwards, however, the intellectual trends in Europe and China diverged. The Manchus re-imposed intellectual orthodoxy. In the world of Islam, the Sufis rebelled against what might be called the 'scholarism' of formal *madrasa* teaching.

On the principle of privileging the areas of most rapid change, this chapter will concentrate on a limited range of topics, six in particular: archives, libraries, reference books, popular literature, censorship and the postal service.

ARCHIVES

Governments have been interested in collecting and preserving information about the governed from the time of the ancient Assyrians, if not earlier. The documents (mainly rolls) produced by a relatively small medieval monarchy, the kingdom of England, fill an impressive number of shelves in the Public Record Office in London. However, the increasing centralization of administration required early modern European governments to know much more about the lives of the governed than had been the case in the Middle Ages. Officials in church and state were coming to realize the administrative uses of censuses and other social surveys. Questionnaires were issued to local informants such as parish priests or civil servants, dealing with the assiduity with which parishioners performed their 'Easter Duties' of confession or communion, the physical state of churches, the numbers of trees in a particular province, the quality of the land, and so on. It was increasingly necessary to know not only how many people lived in a particular state, but also how many adult males were available for military service, how many mouths there were to be fed in times of famine, and so on. Hence information about births, marriages and deaths began to be collected, and the national census became a regular event.

As they increased in volume, these records needed to be housed in special repositories, the archives, with special keepers, professional archivists. In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a number of archives in Florence,

Venice, Rome, Paris, London and elsewhere were set up or at least re-organized, inventoried and indexed to allow information to be retrieved without too great a delay. Among the Counter-Reformation popes, Pius IV, Gregory XIII and Paul V took particular interest in the Vatican archives. In Britain, King James I created the post of Keeper of the State Papers. In France, Louis XIV's minister Jean Baptiste Colbert insisted on the making of inventories of older archives as well as collecting new information. These archives were not created for the convenience of historians (though official historians of the period were sometimes granted access to them). They existed for the sake of the administrators. Only with the French Revolution was the principle of public access to archives proclaimed, making 1789 a turning-point in the history of this domain.

From a Chinese point of view, these western developments (with the exception of public access) are not particularly impressive. The census had long been an instrument of government (the first known census goes back to the year AD 2). Attempts by the administration to control economic life led to the registration of merchants and boats. Police and tax records were in no way new in the early modern period. Official history based on official records also goes back a long way – it was in the seventh century AD that the Bureau of Historiography was set up. All the same, it is interesting to note that a generation or two before the rise of archives in the West, the Chinese government had begun to think about rehousing its records. In 1492, the Grand Secretary proposed the construction of a special building for this purpose, and the building (known as the Imperial Historical Archives) was in fact constructed in the 1530s.

Official records had an important function in the administration of the three great Muslim empires of the period, those of the Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mughals. The financial efficiency of the Ottoman Empire, for example, depended on its income from land and taxation, so it is not surprising to learn that land surveys were made every thirty years or so and filed in the *defterhane* archive in Istanbul from the late fifteenth century onwards, or that the name of every adult subject to taxation was recorded. In similar fashion, the military efficiency of the empire depended on the keeping of muster-rolls of soldiers. Many thousands of registers from the early modern period still exist in the Istanbul archives, complete with tables of contents and coloured silk bands to facilitate consultation. Like their western and Chinese colleagues, the sultans encouraged the writing of official history; in the middle of the sixteenth century, Süleyman established the post of court historian or *schameci*. In the Mughal Empire, at the end of the sixteenth century, the *Ain-i Akhari* was compiled, a compendium of information about prices and wages in the imperial establishment, about crop-yields, revenue rates, tax-income, land grants, numbers of armed men and so on in different parts of the empire.

Although European city-states such as Florence and Venice were pioneers in the creation of archives, the link between the rise of this kind of information deposit and the rise of empires deserves to be stressed. It was Philip II, ruler of a vast empire, who was nicknamed by his subjects 'the king of paper' because of the number of documents generated by his attempt to learn about and control the lives of his subjects, but the epithet would have been equally appropriate for a Chinese emperor or an Ottoman sultan. The empire of the Incas in Peru also had its official archivist, the *qillqasuyaync*.

LIBRARIES

Archives generally contained confidential information, available only to a few servants of the state. It is time to consider the information available to a wider public, beginning with libraries, more especially public libraries or private collections to which there was some measure of public access.

In Renaissance Italy, the public library was already an important institution before the invention of printing, and storehouses of books became all the more necessary thereafter. Cardinal Bessarion left his books to the city of Venice in order to encourage the establishment of a public library, although the Biblioteca Marciana was not begun till 1537. The Laurenziana in Florence, named after Lorenzo de' Medici, opened in 1571. Another great library, the Ambrosiana of Milan, was founded at the beginning of the seventeenth century by the archbishop, Federico Borromeo. A few years later, an English visitor remarked with some surprise that it 'opens its doors to all comers and goers, and suffers them to read what book they please', as if this practice was still unusual.

Elsewhere in Europe, the university libraries which had developed in the later Middle Ages were increasingly supplemented by princely libraries, which were more or less open to scholars. The imperial *Hofbibliothek* in Vienna goes back to 1493, the library of the Escorial to 1557, the library of Berlin to 1661. The rebuilding of libraries became increasingly necessary, not only to hold more books but to hold more readers. In Paris, the *Bibliothèque du roi* was made increasingly accessible to the public in the 1690s, and again in the 1730s, soon after its move to the rue Richelieu. By the late eighteenth century, printed forms for borrowers were in use. In London, however, the historian Edward Gibbon was still complaining about the lack of library facilities in the middle of the eighteenth century. The classical scholar Richard Bentley had proposed the construction of a Royal Library in 1697, but it was only in 1753 that George II presented his books to the British Museum.

Founding a library and opening it to the public was obviously not enough to make information accessible. What was needed was a steady flow of new accessions. It was in 1537 that King François I gave orders that a copy of every book printed in France should be sent to the royal library. The emperor followed his example in the late sixteenth century. Thomas Bodley was granted a similar privilege for the library he founded at Oxford in 1610. Stockholm received such a privilege in 1661, Berlin in 1699. However, few libraries were so fortunate as to receive books regularly from major centres of production without paying for them.

As libraries became larger and larger, cataloguing and classifying became more and more of a problem. Distinguished scholars gave this problem their attention – reasonably enough, given the influence of such category-systems on intellectual life. It was the celebrated humanist Benito Arias Montano who devised the classification system for Philip II's great library in the palace of El Escorial. In Vienna, Hugo Blotius took more than twenty years to catalogue the imperial library. In Wolfenbüttel, the intellectual scheme underlying the system of classification was the work of the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz. A further step towards greater accessibility came with the printing of library catalogues, beginning with the university of Leiden in 1595. By 1688, the printed catalogue for the French Royal Library had itself become a ten-volume work.

China too possessed great libraries. The imperial library in Beijing was founded in 1258, while four major libraries

were constructed at the orders of the new imperial dynasty of the Qing. In the late eighteenth century, the Qianlong emperor launched an ambitious project for collecting books and bringing them to the capital. The academies too had their own libraries.

In the world of Islam, on the other hand, libraries were relatively small because printed books were virtually non-existent. The American scholar Marshall Hodgson has described the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal states of this period as the 'gunpowder empires'. It might be equally illuminating to call them the 'manuscript empires'. As in the medieval West, manuscript books were often beautifully written, and sometimes illustrated. Calligraphy was highly prized by collectors. The role of scribe (*waraq, nakkash*) was an honourable one. Booksellers' quarters had a privileged location in the great bazaars in major cities like Istanbul, Fez, or Cairo. However, handier technology made books expensive. Only rulers (like the Mughal emperors) or wealthy private individuals (bureaucrats, for example) could afford to collect books on a large scale. Public libraries existed, attached to mosques, but they housed only religious books. Some Europeans were well aware of their technical superiority in this respect and used it to impress their neighbours. When an envoy from Tripoli visited Louis XIV in 1704, he was taken to the Louvre in order to see the royal press (like the Siamese envoys in 1687).

The chequered history of printing in the Ottoman Empire reveals the strength of the obstacles to this form of communication. According to the imperial ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, writing in the middle of the sixteenth century, the Turks thought it a sin to print religious books. At the end of the century Sultan Murad III allowed the sale of non-religious printed books in Arabic characters, but these were imported from Italy (where the first such book had been printed as early as 1514). The scribes, whose status and livelihood were threatened by the new invention, did their best to resist its spread. This resistance to print attracted the attention of some western scholars like the scientist Henry Oldenburg, who as secretary of the Royal Society was much involved in the business of communication. His explanation was cynical and reductionist in the seventeenth-century style. 'No question', he wrote in 1659,

but the Great Turk is an enemy to learning in regard of his subjects, because he finds it his advantage, to have such a people, on whose ignorance he may impose. Whence it is, that he will endure no printing, being of this opinion, that printing and learning, especially such as is found in universities, are the chief fuel of division among Christians.

The first Turkish press was established only in the eighteenth century, over two hundred years after the first Hebrew press in the Ottoman Empire. It was founded on the initiative of Ibrahim Mueferrîqa, a Hungarian convert to Islam, at a time, the reign of Ahmed III, when the empire was more open than it had been to ideas from the West. However, it printed only a handful of books, including works by the scholar-bureaucrat Kâinî Çelebi (in 1729 and 1733), and the historian Naima (in 1734), and it did not last very long.

ENCYCLOPAEDIAS

The development of the encyclopaedia both summarizes and symbolizes the main themes of this survey. The encyclopaedia is not of course an early modern invention. It formed part

of the manuscript culture of the Middle Ages (to say nothing of the ancient world). Printing, however, made encyclopaedias more easily available, just as it made them more necessary as a response to the problems of the information explosion.

Sixteenth-century European encyclopaedias were relatively small, taking up one or two volumes, and they were organized thematically, the main categories generally corresponding to the organization of knowledge in universities. Examples include Giorgio Valla's *De reperiendis rebus* (1501), and P. Scalich's *Encyclopaedia* (1559). This thematic arrangement made the books unsuitable for rapid consultation, but at the same time allowed them to show the links between different disciplines, the various branches of the tree of knowledge, much more clearly than modern encyclopaedias can. It is not easy to imagine a scholar in a hurry consulting Scalich. On the other hand, it is not easy to imagine anyone (apart from the late Aldous Huxley) sitting down to read a twentieth-century edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. The communications theorist Harold Innis once noted 'the extent to which encyclopaedias may tear knowledge apart and pigeonhole it in alphabetical boxes'. The new form of encyclopaedia – the multi-volume work with entries in alphabetical order – developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and corresponds to a new way of using this type of book. Among the seventeenth-century examples may be cited d'Herbelot's *Bibliothèque Orientale* (1697), devoted to the Islamic world; it is interesting to see the editor apologizing in advance for the alphabetical arrangement, and explaining that it 'does not produce as much confusion as one might imagine'. Famous examples from the eighteenth century, when the principle of alphabetical arrangement was firmly established, include the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (10 vols, 1777–84), the *Encyclopédie* compiled by Diderot and his collaborators (35 vols, 1751–77), and Zedler's *Lexicon* (63 vols, 1732–50).

In the eighteenth century, encyclopaedias were frequently revised and expanded to take account of new information. It came to be taken for granted that knowledge could become 'out of date', and that the latest edition (or even the latest book) was the best. Hence the need for a new genre, the learned journal, such as the *Journal des Savants* of Paris (founded in 1665), the *Acta Eruditionum* of Leipzig (1682), and the *Nouvelles de la République de Lettres* of Rotterdam (1684). The title of the last-named journal sums up the functions of the genre. They spread news about the Republic of Letters by printing obituaries of scholars, intellectual projects, and above all, reviews of recent books.

The rise of western encyclopaedias, like the rise of western archives, would have been unlikely to impress a Chinese scholar of the period, supposing that he had heard of this development. The Chinese encyclopaedic tradition goes back to the third century AD. In the fifteenth century, 2,000 contributors compiled an encyclopaedia of more than 10,000 volumes, the *Yong-lo da-dian* or 'Great Handbook', too expensive to be printed but still available to some scholars. As in the Renaissance west, encyclopaedias of this kind were not works of ready reference (it goes without saying that alphabetical arrangement was unthinkable in China). They tended to offer quotations arranged by topic, the main categories being the following: celestial phenomena, geography, human nature and conduct, arts and sciences, philosophy, political economy. As far as the period 1500–1650 is concerned, change is not easy to discern. New encyclopaedias, such as Chang Huang's *Dushu Bian* (1562–77) made their appearance, but the basic categories and functions

remained the same. It was an emperor of the Qing dynasty who commissioned the most ambitious of the printed encyclopaedias, perhaps the longest printed book in the world, the *Dushu Jicheng* or 'Collection of Pictures and Writings' (1726), which had more than three quarters of a million pages.

In India, a large Sanskrit encyclopaedia was compiled at the orders of raja Todermal, a Hindu minister to the Muslim emperor Akbar. Islam too was a culture of encyclopaedias – indeed, the Arab encyclopaedic tradition goes back to the tenth century AD. Among the most important compilations of the early modern period are the *al-Hamaji* (1524, in Persian); Tashköprizade's early sixteenth-century encyclopaedia (composed in Arabic but translated into Turkish by the compiler's son); and Haji Khalifa's *Kashf az-zunun*, or 'Dissipation of Doubts', (c.1650, in Arabic), which was a bibliography of all works in Arabic, Persian and Turkish known to the compiler, together with summaries of the contents and notes on the authors. However, these works of reference circulated only in manuscript. Ironically enough, Haji Khalifa's work reached its widest audience in the west, since d'Herbelot drew on it heavily for his printed *Bibliothèque Orientale*.

POPULAR LITERATURE

A history of information centred on archives, libraries and encyclopaedias runs the danger of placing too much emphasis on bureaucrats and scholars and overlooking the information available to the rest of the population. The increasing availability of cheap and simply-written forms of printed literature was an important trend in Europe in the early modern period. Books, or rather booklets of this kind (often with only twenty-four or even fewer pages), were produced in Venice and other Italian cities in the sixteenth century, in England, France and The Netherlands in the seventeenth century, and in most parts of Europe in the course of the eighteenth century. They were most easily available in cities but they were also distributed in the countryside by pedlars. Many of these books were works of entertainment, such as poems and stories (romances of chivalry were particularly popular). Some recounted the lives of the saints, or conveyed various kinds of practical information (how to write a love-letter, for example, or how to cure a sick horse). The almanac, already mass-produced in the seventeenth century, if not before, was more of an encyclopaedia than an annual weather forecast. It normally included medical, astrological and agricultural information, and not infrequently a table of the most important dates in world history as well.

Another major development in popular communication in early modern Europe was the spread of printed news-sheets and pamphlets. They provided information on current events available to some proportion, at least, of ordinary people. Since the news-sheets sometimes took the form of ballads which could be sung aloud, it is clear that this kind of information was not restricted to the literate.

In the sixteenth century, the news was generally printed in the form of pamphlets produced for a particular occasion – a battle, an execution, an earthquake. These pamphlets did not disappear in the seventeenth century, but they were supplemented by a new printed genre, that of news-sheets, appearing at regular intervals, often once or twice a week. Amsterdam was probably the most important centre of news-sheets in the early seventeenth century, producing for export (with texts in English and French) as well as for the home market. These papers were criticized by some moralists for

pandering to vain curiosity, and by others for revealing political secrets and encouraging ordinary people to criticize the actions of rulers, but they were an economic success. By the eighteenth century, the newspaper had become an important institution in Europe and in the Americas. As a French visitor observed after noting the frequent reprinting of Thomas Paine's pamphlet *Common Sense* in the periodical press, 'Without newspapers, the American Revolution would never have succeeded'.

These developments had few parallels in Western Asia until the nineteenth century (the official Ottoman gazette was founded in 1831, and the first private newspaper established in 1840). Although the coffee-house (which ought to be regarded as an information centre) was originally a Middle Eastern institution, exported to Europe in the seventeenth century, the association between coffee-houses and newspapers seems to have been a purely western phenomenon. A popular literature existed, and in the Ottoman empire almanacs, epics and simple religious books circulated widely in villages as well as towns, but only in manuscript. In the Mughal Empire, the 'Court News' *Akhbar* circulated in manuscript from bazaar to bazaar, thanks to the bankers in particular.

In East Asia, however, the rise of printed popular literature was an important early modern trend. In the case of China, scholars formerly assumed that a writing system based on ideograms rather than the alphabet prevented literacy spreading widely, on the grounds that to learn 2,000 or more Chinese characters would require more years in school than ordinary people could afford for their children. Recently, however, historians have begun to stress the spread of 'rudimentary literacy' in late Ming and Qing China, in other words the knowledge of relatively few characters. There was a rise of relatively cheap publications around the 1570s, and various types of popular literature developed, including forms of non-fiction such as encyclopaedias and guides to letter-writing, ritual and astrology. Books such as *The Female Analeks* and *The Women's' Classic of Filial Piety* were obviously intended to reach a female public.

It has also been pointed out that publishing costs were lower in China than in Europe (thanks to the dominance of a single language), so that books should have been relatively cheaper and so accessible to more people. The Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci, whose long stay in Beijing put him in a uniquely favourable position for making comparisons with Europe, remarked on 'the exceedingly large number of books in circulation' in late sixteenth-century China, and also 'the ridiculously low price at which they were sold'.

In Korea, the rise of popular literature was aided by the invention of printing with moveable type in the thirteenth century, and of an alphabetic script, *han-gul*, in the fifteenth. In Japan, a similar development of popular literature began in the later seventeenth century, with the rise of the so-called *kana-zoshi*, booklets printed not in the Chinese characters used by the educated élite but in *katakana*, a simple syllabic script. These booklets included almanacs and guides to becoming rich (such as the so-called *Millionaire's Gospel*). It was possible to borrow as well as to buy these booklets, which circulated not only in shops but on the backs of pedlars.

CENSORSHIP

The religious and political authorities were far from happy with the increasing availability of books in the early modern period. As information became more widespread, geographi-

cally and socially, it was obviously more difficult to control. In Europe, the invention of printing undermined what has been described (with some exaggeration) as the 'information monopoly' of the medieval Church. The printing of Bibles in vernacular languages encouraged the laity to ask awkward questions about the faith. Thanks to the printing press, it was impossible to suppress the ideas of Martin Luther in the way in which the ideas of late medieval heretics like Jan Hus and John Wycliffe had been suppressed. What was to be done?

The solution adopted by the Catholic Church in the middle of the sixteenth century was the so-called 'Index', in other words a printed catalogue of titles (arranged in alphabetical order, according to the most up-to-date principles of information retrieval), of the books which the faithful were not allowed to read because they were judged to be heretical or immoral (as in the case of Boccaccio's *Decameron* and Machiavelli's *Prince*). From now on, ecclesiastical censors would read books before publication. The Inquisition took considerable interest in the books read by persons suspect of heresy.

Like the Church, the State attempted to keep the dangerous new medium of communication under control. In Elizabethan England, for example, printing was confined to three cities (London, Oxford and Cambridge) in order to bring it under more effective supervision. In similar fashion, Louis XIV's minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert tried to concentrate French printing in a few hands. Although there was no secular Index of Prohibited Books, 'seditious' works, like heretical ones were often publicly burned. Printers were generally required to submit their books to the authorities for approval before publication. Despite Milton's famous appeal, in 1643, for the freedom of the press, the British government continued to censor books until 1695. The French had two systems of state censorship, administered respectively by the chancellor and the lieutenant-general of police.

There were various means of evading censorship. Books might be printed in one country (such as Switzerland or the Dutch Republic) and smuggled to another. Dangerous books, such as Spinoza's *Treatise*, might be printed without the name of the author or publisher. The place of publication might be falsified, while the books themselves might be printed on underground presses. Alternatively, prohibited books might circulate in manuscript (the *samizdat* of the early modern period). Authors might write in an allusive or allegorical way to ensure that the censors missed the point. The risks were high, but the chances of being detected were probably low. At all events, a large amount of underground literature was in circulation, above all in the eighteenth century.

Official anxieties about seditious, blasphemous or heretical literature were not, of course, confined to Europe. The Index and the Inquisition operated in Mexico, Peru and Brazil. In the Islamic world, the fear of heresy underlay the opposition to printing and western learning. It is surely significant that Murad III allowed only non-religious books to be imported into the Ottoman Empire. Oral and manuscript communication was also subject to censorship, and the Turkish poet Nef'i was executed in 1635 for satirizing the government.

In East Asia, on the other hand, the reasons for control were political rather than religious. In China, a good deal of information was restricted to the mandarins. The official newspaper (printed in moveable type after 1640) was for them alone. Encyclopaedias were compiled primarily for the

sake of civil servants or for students taking the civil service examinations. From the middle of the seventeenth century onwards, the censorship of literature became increasingly strict, because the new dynasty of 'foreign' (Manchu) emperors felt insecure. This trend culminated in the so-called 'literary inquisition' in the reign of the emperor Qianlong, when more than 10,000 books were prohibited and over 2,000 destroyed.

In the case of Japan, the control of information became very much stricter after 1640, when the country was officially isolated from the rest of the world as a reaction to the spread of Christianity. Henceforth little information about Japan would be available to western visitors (who were now virtually confined to the island of Deshima) and little western learning (known as 'Dutch studies', *Rangaku*) would be available to Japanese. The import of foreign books dealing with Christianity or with military matters was forbidden. Chinese books were also subject to censorship, especially from the 1680s onwards. These restrictions began to be relaxed after 1720, however, and an interest in western science (among a small group of scholars, at least) soon became apparent. The Japanese 'discovery of Europe' (more exactly a rediscovery) took place long before the arrival of the famous American ships in the 1850s.

POSTAL SERVICES

A discussion of censorship is in danger of giving the false impression that governments did little more than obstruct the flow of information. In fact they also facilitated it, notably by the construction or improvement of roads and the establishment of postal systems. In sixteenth-century Europe, the development of a postal service (in the sense of an organization for the delivery of letters) was closely associated with a single family, Tasso (or Tassis), who were given a monopoly of mail deliveries in the Habsburg Empire in 1545. Their couriers departed at regular intervals, by night as well as by day. Ordinary couriers took about eleven days from Madrid to Paris, and twelve or thirteen days from Madrid to Naples. Special couriers, on the other hand, were much faster. For example, the news of the massacre of Protestants in Paris in August 1572 (the 'Massacre of St Bartholomew') arrived in Madrid only three days later.

The rapid transmission of news was obviously a matter of concern to governments, so that it is not surprising to find them increasingly concerned with the maintenance and repair of roads. In France, a new official position, that of *Grand Voyer*, was created for this purpose at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Primarily intended for the use of the state, the official postal system was increasingly employed by merchants and other private individuals. International trade depended on the regular transmission of letters giving information about supply, demand and prices in different parts of Europe. Letters were also an increasingly important method of communication between scholars in different parts of Europe in the seventeenth century, allowing them to learn about current researches and new discoveries before they were published and so helping to create the so-called 'Commonwealth of Learning' (*Respublica Litterarum*). Mersenne in Paris and Oldenburg in London both sat in the centre of a network of scientific communication, mainly conducted by letter.

In the Ottoman Empire, the state postal service (*menzil* or *idak*) was carefully organized, with stations on the main roads with fresh horses ready for the couriers (who also had

the right to confiscate horses on the way if necessary). The news of the death of Mehmet II reached Bayezid in Amasya in eight days. The Mughal Empire too had an official postal system. In China, the postal service went back as far as the thirteenth century, doubtless facilitated by the lack of frontiers within the empire. In Japan, the new dynasty of shoguns, the Tokugawa, improved the highway system and established regular post stations, especially on the road from Edo to Osaka. However, to transmit information about prices with the maximum speed the brokers in the money market at Osaka made use of fires, flags and carrier pigeons (pigeons had been used for similar purposes by Jacques Coeur, a leading French merchant of the fifteenth century).

NON-VERBAL INFORMATION

This essay has concentrated on the written and printed word. However, visual information, from book illustration to map-making, also became more widely available in this period. The printed image was possibly as important as the printed text. The illustrations to European treatises on astronomy (*On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs* by Copernicus, for example) or anatomy (Vesalius's *On the Fabric of the Human Body*) and above all, perhaps, on botany (the many herbals of the period) communicated more effectively than the text. Their numerous illustrations gave the leading eighteenth-century encyclopaedias – especially the great *Encyclopédie* – a great advantage over their predecessors. As for European map-making, its development can be charted by comparing and contrasting the atlases of Mercator (1585–95), Blaeuw (1662) and D'Anville (1737–80).

Maps and illustrated books were of course known in other parts of the world. Blaeuw's maps of China were derived from a Chinese atlas (via an Italian Jesuit, Martino Martini), and his *Great Atlas* was translated into Turkish c. 1685. Among the most famous examples of non-western maps are those made by the Turkish admiral Piri Reis in 1513 and 1528, including information about America; the world map printed in China in 1602 by another Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci (showing the 'Middle Kingdom' in the centre); and the Peruvian Guaman Poma de Ayala's map showing Cuzco as the centre of the world. In China, the seventeenth century was an important epoch in the history of geography, the epoch of Zhang Xie (who concentrated on South-East Asia) and Xu Hongzu (who studied China itself).

In cartography as in other domains, however, long trends over time are most visible in the history of the West. The same point might be made about illustrated books, an old tradition in China (where printing developed so much earlier than in the West). The early seventeenth century has been described as a crucial period for 'the progress of practical knowledge'. Important treatises were published on such subjects as machines, medicine, botany and agriculture (the *Tiangong kaimi* of 1637, for example). In all these cases, the woodcut illustrations had an important function. The development of the colour woodcut in seventeenth-century China and Japan increased the effectiveness of communication in this medium. In the Muslim world, despite Muhammad's famous statement that 'All those who make an image go to hell', miniature painting flourished at court and illustrated the deeds of the ruler, as in the case of the famous 'Book of Kings' *Shāhnāmah* completed in the reign of Shāh Tahmāsp of Iran. Mughal painters also represented plants, animals and scenes from everyday life.

A more detailed study than this one would also have to discuss statistics. The Ottoman, Mughal and Chinese Empires made considerable use of quantitative information. However, it is in Europe that we see a trend over time most clearly, the increasing tendency to present information in numerical form, from price figures to star tables. The seventeenth century was the first time when systematic demographic estimates were made, whether of the whole world (from Isaac Vossius to Benedetto Riccioli), the population of a single city (William Petty on London, for example) or the mortality rate (calculated by the astronomer Edmund Halley from information about the city of Breslau). This concern with quantitative information reflected both the rise of natural science and the rise of the centralized state (it is altogether appropriate that the English came to call numerical information 'statistics').

Other forms of non-verbal information must not be forgotten. In the case of early modern Europe, the list of newly founded institutions and locales where non-verbal information was collected and transmitted is a substantial one. It includes the anatomy theatre, the botanical garden, the clinic, the laboratory, the astronomical observatory, the museum (the *Wunderkammer* or cabinet of collections, ranging from shells to coins). To these one might add the new instruments for discovering and recording information, including the terrestrial and celestial globes, the telescope and the microscope.

In the case of astronomy, in particular, there are some parallel developments outside Europe. An Ottoman observatory was established at Galata in 1577 (though it was destroyed by janissaries only three years later, apparently because the study of the stars was considered to interfere in the affairs of God). In India, the Rajput ruler Jai Singh II founded no fewer than five observatories in the early eighteenth century. In China, the mandarins took considerable interest in the western-style astronomy expounded to them by the Jesuit missionaries, despite, or because of, their own tradition of astronomical studies (there was an imperial Bureau of Astronomy in Beijing). Once again, however, it is clear that change was most rapid in the West.

CONCLUSION

The example of Jesuit astronomy is one among many illustrating the trend in this period towards the exchange of information at an intercontinental (or as McNeill would say, an 'ecumenical') level. Among the unintended consequences of the encounters between different civilizations (discussed in Chapter 9) was the diffusion of information about the 'other'.

I am not suggesting that all cultures were equally interested in this kind of information. Some were more or less indifferent, like the Chinese, who took less interest in maritime exploration in the early modern period than they had done in the fifteenth century. They showed a polite interest in what Christian missionaries told them about the West but they were in no hurry to learn more. There were even attempts to resist the invasion of alien information, notably in Japan, where the inhabitants were forbidden to travel abroad and the country was virtually closed to foreigners after the Shimabara revolt of 1637 (for which the Portuguese were held responsible).

All the same, there was a good deal of enthusiasm for knowledge of other cultures. Herbelot's *Bibliothèque orientale*

(1697) was a western encyclopaedia entirely devoted to information about the east. Engravings spread the knowledge of western art (Chapter 12.3) to India, the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan, Mexico and Peru, and also made Europeans aware of oriental art (the fashion for *chinoiserie* in the eighteenth century is only the most obvious example). European governments tried on occasion to follow the example of the Chinese, from civil service examinations (in Prussia), to imperial ploughing rituals (in the Anavdia of Joseph II). The seventeenth-century Ottoman writer Kâtib Çelebi wrote about the Christians so that his compatriots would better understand this danger to the Empire, and eighteenth-century Ottoman rulers took an increasing interest in western technology, from printing presses to firearms. Mehmed Said Efendi was sent to France in 1721 with instructions to visit fortresses and factories and to report on what he saw. Even the rulers of Japan, who had tried to cut their country off from the outside world, took an increasing interest in *Rangaku* ('Dutch knowledge', in other words, western science) in the eighteenth century. We may conclude that the early modern period offers a spectacular example of the creative role of the periphery, of the invasion of many cultures by new information and sometimes by new forms of communication from outside.

It may be useful to end this chapter with a few general considerations on the changing place of information in everyday life in the early modern world, together with some attempts to explain the major differences between Europe, Western Asia, East Asia and America.

One might begin with the spread of clocks and watches, which made increasing numbers of people conscious of the exact time. This made it possible to establish a network of synchronized communications – the postal service organized by the Tassis family, stage-coaches, Dutch canal-boats and so on – all with their printed timetables. The rise of the weekly and the daily newspaper is another illustration of the penetration of everyday life by new media of information. So is the advertisement, whether it took the form of a poster (notably the famous posters of actors and courtesans in eighteenth-century Japan) or a paragraph in a journal.

Another general theme which deserves to be explored in detail is that of the secularization of information, at least in the case of Europe. The communications theorist Harold Innis may have exaggerated when he spoke of the 'information monopoly' of the medieval church, but one might at least speak of an information 'hegemony' at a time when the major libraries were monastic, the majority of university students and teachers were clerics. In Russia, this hegemony lasted until the end of the seventeenth century, when 95 per cent of the few printed books were still works of theology or devotion. Although *madrasa* were attached to mosques and Buddhist monasteries were important centres of learning, there was nothing comparable to this clerical dominance of European organs of information either in the Islamic world or in East Asia.

When the hegemony of the Church declined in the early modern period, it was replaced to some extent by the hegemony of the state, in the France of Louis XIV, for example, or the Russia of Peter I with their academies and official presses and journals (in Russia until 1711, the only printing press of any importance was the Tsar's press near the Kremlin). All the same, a comparison of the situation at the beginning and end of our period suggests that another trend was still more important. This trend may be described as the rise of the market in information, which became more

and more of a commodity. The rise of advertising in seventeenth-century newspapers is one example of this general trend. By the end of the century it is even possible to find advertisements for branded commodities. Another example of the rise of the market is the ending of printing monopolies. In Britain, for example, the lapsing of the Licensing Act in 1695 ended the control of printing through the Stationer's Company. In Russia, printing was de-controlled in the eighteenth century.

The information broker or information entrepreneur is also a phenomenon of the early modern period. The best-known of such brokers is probably Théophraste Renaudot, founder of the *Paris Gazette* (1631) and also the *Bureau des adresses* (which arranged meetings between potential buyers and sellers, employers and employees, and so on). In London, there was a similar 'Office of Public Advice' established in 1657. Edward Lloyd, a London coffee-house owner of the late seventeenth century (and the ancestor of Lloyd's the underwriters), specialized in information about shipping. The regional correspondents of newspapers were another kind of information broker, including the men who followed the armies on campaign in order to be first with the news of a battle. In a broad sense of the terms one might also describe publishers, particularly the publishers of newspapers and encyclopaedias, as buyers and sellers of information. Obvious names to mention are Elzevier of Leiden, who commissioned a famous series of volumes on the leading states of the world; Leers of Rotterdam, who financed Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire*; Longman of London, who was the biggest shareholder in Chambers' *Cyclopaedia*; and Panconcke of Paris, who bought the right to publish the *Encyclopédie* after its first edition. It is surely no accident that seventeenth-century Amsterdam became both a leading intellectual and commercial entrepôt, a centre of publishing and news as well as a centre of trade and finance. Its Stock Exchange (built 1609) offers a vivid example of the economic importance of information. The literary agent, another kind of entrepreneur of information, can be found in the Dutch Republic by the

early eighteenth century; Charles de la Motte in Amsterdam, for example, or Prosper Marchand in The Hague.

Thus a comparison between East Asia and the West reveals the contrast between the bureaucratic organization of knowledge in China, compared to the more entrepreneurial organization of knowledge in the West, above all in the eighteenth century. On one side the hegemony of state patronage (the Bureau of Historiography, Astronomy and so on), and on the other the hegemony of market forces. Where the French *Encyclopédie* was a commercial enterprise, the great Chinese encyclopaedias were produced under imperial patronage to aid the mandarins in their work. The closest parallel to the Chinese system in Europe was to be found in Russia under Peter I, and even in Russia the book market became more important in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The different information and communication systems were at once expressions of dominant values in the different cultures, and a potent means of cultural reproduction – though not so potent as to prevent change, in the course of this period and still more rapidly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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REGIONAL SECTION

WESTERN EUROPE

12.1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

12.1.1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY DURING THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Angel García Sanz

TWO CENTURIES WITH VERY DIFFERENT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BIRTH OF CAPITALISM

Few historical periods have sparked greater or more intense controversies regarding their value or significance in the rise of the capitalist system than the period from 1500 to 1700. And it must be said that these discussions are justified: they are not merely the gratuitous outcome of the intellectual trifling of historians with a taste for academic debate. The roots of the disagreement lie in history itself, which is complex and various and open to interpretation from very different angles, giving rise in turn to differing assessments.

In fact, if we confine our scrutiny to economic development, it is clear – and this is now a truism – that throughout the sixteenth century the countries of Western Europe experienced a period of expansion, and that the 1500s were a remarkable, and even a splendid century: the 'glorious' sixteenth century. From this same perspective, the seventeenth century, on the other hand, witnessed the onset of a depression that is clear from all the main economic indicators (population, prices, land rents, trade, and so on), and that depression affected most European countries at different times and to varying degrees. In some cases it meant a net loss of labour by 1700 as compared with 1600. In others, it meant stagnation or very modest growth. In a handful of cases, this was evidently a period of growth (Holland and England). Hence, when the 1600s are dismissed, reference is usually made to the 'crisis of the seventeenth century', although this expression has recently been qualified.

Perhaps the most telling indicator of the different climates

prevailing in these two centuries is the demographic indicator, which shows that, between 1500 and 1600, the population of Western Europe (the Iberian and Italian Peninsulas, France, the British Isles, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and Scandinavia) increased by some 13 million, growing from 58 million to 71 million during this period (a 22.4 per cent increase), whereas between 1600 and 1700 the population rose by only 2 million (a 2.8 per cent increase), which was very unevenly distributed, so that some areas experience demographic growth (the British Isles) while the population of other areas dwindled (for example the Iberian Peninsula).

But if, instead of taking the economic situation as our criterion, we look at the qualitative changes which occurred – the really profound changes in economic life – then the 1600s appear considerably more creative and original than the 1500s. From this viewpoint, whereas during the sixteenth century the economy of Western Europe grew extensively and in a traditional manner, the seventeenth century witnessed the rise of a new kind of colonialism, a new agriculture coupled with new production patterns, new industry which was very widespread in rural areas and a new economic equilibrium within Europe. All of these things laid the foundation for the development of the capitalist system over the centuries ahead, and all this occurred despite the fact that in the seventeenth century the economic indicators were less encouraging, generally speaking, than they had been in the sixteenth century.

In the light of this brief description of both centuries, one can easily understand the real basis for the debates that historians have waged with such enthusiasm in recent years.

EXPANSION IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND THE FORMATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

Western Europe at the centre of the world economy

In the sixteenth century there occurred an event whose importance is difficult to exaggerate for which reason it is best to mention it at the outset: Europe's overall expansion.

This opening up of Europe to other worlds, some of which had been completely unknown hitherto (such as America and Oceania), was led by the Portuguese and the Spaniards, who were followed by other Europeans anxious to dispute their claim to these gains. This process began around 1492 and was completed around 1570.

The Portuguese were the leaders of this European expansion. Anxious to find a route to the Orient that circumvented the eastern Mediterranean, they explored and set up trading posts at strategic points along the West African coast, where they tapped the flow of products that they wished ultimately to sell from Lisbon. As was characteristic of Portuguese colonialism, at no time did they seek to occupy

and gain administrative control over the African interior. It should be remembered that in-depth colonization of extensive territories was beyond Portugal's capabilities, since the population of Portugal at that time was little more than 1 million. Gold was the principal commodity found in Africa by the Portuguese, but they also found cereals, sugar, shellac, pelis, dye, ivory and, finally, pepper (Benin). But the Portuguese monarch did not really become the 'Pepper King' until Portuguese boats reached India and, having defeated the Egyptian counter-offensive inspired by the Venetians (Diu, 1509), achieved control of shipping in the Arabian Sea. From that point onwards, Africa gradually lost importance for the Portuguese and became a way station on the route to the trading posts which were set up along the southern coasts of Asia. As far as Portugal's expansion in the West Indies is concerned, it should be borne in mind that in 1500 Portugal discovered Brazil, the American territory which fell within the hemisphere assigned to Portugal in the Treaty of Tordesillas signed by both Iberian monarchs in 1494, whereby the world was divided into two hemispheres, one for the Portuguese and one for the Spaniards. In Brazil the colonial model finally adopted by the Portuguese in the second half of the sixteenth century showed a much greater commitment



Map 10 Colonies and major trade centres in the New World during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (after J. DeVries, 1975).

to in-depth occupation of the territory and exploitation of its agrarian resources (sugar plantations), which led them to resort to black slaves captured at their African trading-posts.


The Spaniards (Castilians, to be more precise, that is the subjects of the Spanish monarchs who lived in the territory of the Kingdom of Castile, which did not include Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, or the Balearic Islands, all of which belonged to the Kingdom of Aragon), joined the race for discoveries after the Portuguese, but they were lucky enough to have a stake in the plans of Christopher Columbus (see Plate 31), which had been rejected by the Portuguese, and thus it was that in 1492 they discovered America. America became a part of the Kingdom of Castile and the Castilians set about conquering and colonizing the territory in depth, taking with them the model of social organization current in Castile at that time: local administration based on the Castilian 'concejo' (municipal council), together with their coins, system of taxation, universities, judicial system and the class-divisions of society to which certain indigenous institutions adapted.

But what we wish to stress here is that from the time of the colonial outward thrust of the Portuguese and the Spaniards, Europe entered a global economic framework hitherto unknown, although there had been trade with East Asia since ancient times. The economic development of Europe from the sixteenth century onwards is inexplicable unless this basic fact is taken into account. Taking advantage of its indisputable technical superiority (the most obvious examples of which were the men-of-war), which was the result of a long cultural tradition and a particular attitude of mind, Europe managed to draw on the resources of other continents, both the human resources (for example the indigenous 'mita' used for mining work and the enslavement

of Africans for work on the American plantations) and the material resources (precious metals, spices, dyes, coffee, tobacco, tea, cocoa, and so on). So it was that the world economy began to evolve with Europe at the centre, the nerve centre of a world-wide communications network (see Maps 10 and 11).

The better to illustrate the importance of this fact, it should be said that between 1500 and 1600 the Spaniards shipped from America to Europe a quantity of silver five times greater than the total European stock of this metal hitherto, and a third more gold than had formerly existed in the Old World. Farm produce also made the journey from America to Europe (maize, potatoes, tomatoes, tobacco and beans, to mention the most important) and from Europe to America (sugar-cane, vines, some cereals, coffee – originally from Arabia – rice, and so on). A number of these crops did not become important to the respective economies until some time after their introduction (such as the potato and maize in Europe). Animals were also exchanged: horses, mules, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry were taken from Europe to America; the turkey is the only American animal which became established in European farming. The Europeans also transferred crops from one colonial – and tropical – territory under their jurisdiction to another (America, Africa, southern Asia and Oceania), so that on a global level greater homogeneity of economically useful crops and animals was achieved.

But the most important point to be stressed is that colonial trade was the fundamental economic sphere where commercial capital was accumulated to a hitherto unprecedented extent. The differences in costs and prices between the European and the colonial markets brought profit margins that were sometimes spectacular, particularly at the start of this great period of colonial expansion. Later, the relative saturation



Map 11 Colonies and major trade centres in Asia during the seventeenth century (after J. DeVries, 1975).

of the markets and the gradual economic rapprochement of colonizing countries and colonies tended to eliminate this difference between the purchase price and the selling price, which led Europeans to diversify the merchandise they traded in and to concentrate on goods that were in growing popular demand (from the end of the sixteenth century onwards).

The flowering of colonial trade took the form, among others, of the economic splendour and opulence of those cities having a special connection with overseas trade. This was true of Lisbon, Seville, Antwerp and, later in the seventeenth century, Amsterdam and London. These cities were the hub of commercial capitalism, emulated not only by national merchants but also by businessmen with cosmopolitan economic interests.

It has to be said that the other side of the coin was the economic, political and cultural subjugation of vast colonial territories to Europe. On occasion that subjugation meant the virtual annihilation of the indigenous population, as occurred in America, where millions of native people died because they did not have sufficient biological immunity to the diseases introduced by the Europeans, and because they were exhausted by overexploitation. It is well known that the African slave-trade in America (around 275,000 in the sixteenth century and 1,340,000 in the seventeenth) was born of the need for labour to work the European plantations.

Demographic growth and urban development

As already stated, the population of Western Europe rose by 13 million between 1500 and 1600, growing from 58 million to 71 million. Such demographic growth brought a population density hitherto unknown, and much greater, of course, than that which had existed at the height of medieval expansion.

The rate of population growth was not uniform throughout the century. Generally speaking, it was more intense during the first half of the century and tended to slow down during the second half. However, there were exceptions to this rule, such as Italy, which suffered serious demographic and economic decline during the first half of the century through being in a state of war.

The territorial distribution of this demographic increase was fairly uniform. According to the data available (often the result of estimates), no country failed to show population growth. France was the country with the largest population, which increased from 16 million to 18 million. The Germanic states had 13 million inhabitants at the start of the period which concerns us and had reached 16 million by the end of it. Italy's population expanded from 11 million to 13 million. The Iberian Peninsula was a sparsely populated area and its population reached 11 million in 1600 compared with 9 million in 1500. The British Isles, which were also sparsely populated, saw its population rise from 5 million to 7 million.

This demographic growth was the result of the economic boom that most of Europe had enjoyed during that fortunate century, but it was also a factor which stimulated economic growth, since a larger population meant greater potential demand – assuming that irregularities in the distribution of wealth were not excessive – as well as a larger labour force. In fact, work opportunities meant that people were able to marry younger, which in turn meant that the number of children per couple increased somewhat; in other words, the birth rate rose. And although the death rate, from both ordinary and extraordinary causes (epidemics, famines, wars)

remained much the same as it had been in other periods, the absolute gain from the high rate could not be cancelled out by the death rate. This equation explains the growth in population which was, as we have seen, directly related to economic growth.

It should be pointed out here that Europe's colonial expansion did not signify appreciable demographic losses for the Old World. It is estimated that in the mid-sixteenth century no more than 1 million Europeans, including those born in the colonies of white parents, lived in the overseas territories. It was not until the modern period that emigration to the colonies caused a significant drain.

The towns rather than the rural areas were the main beneficiaries of this demographic growth in the sixteenth century. This fact reveals a feature of sixteenth-century expansion: it was an urban rather than a rural phenomenon, in which the towns were at one and the same time the driving force and the catalyst. It was a century, then, of urban development stimulated by the development of industry and trade in the cities, and supported, naturally, by agricultural production in the surrounding countryside.

In fact, although it must be said that a few cities experienced stagnation or only modest demographic growth, these were the exception, and many cities saw their population double (Lisbon, Seville, Naples, Palermo and Rome) while others tripled their population (Antwerp, London and Amsterdam).

From the demographic point of view, the explanation for the growth of the cities lies not in a lower death rate for the urban than for the rural population, but rather in the phenomenon of migration. Opportunities to work and prosper offered by the cities were attractive to the surrounding peasant population, who were normally subject to harsh working conditions in the countryside. But some cities grew not only because of the immigration of peasants from the surrounding countryside, but also because people came to settle from much further afield, even from other countries. This occurred in the case of towns that were highly specialized in terms of industry and, above all, trade – truly cosmopolitan cities.

Agriculture and the expansion of cultivation

Although the towns were the most shining example of economic growth in the sixteenth century, the countryside was no exception to this trend. Indeed, without agricultural expansion there is no accounting for the urban boom.

Agrarian expansion was stimulated by a number of factors, the first in significance being the expanding population (greater demand for food and raw materials for industrial processing, a larger labour-force available for work on the land) and the second the increase in prices, which, in this century of the 'price revolution', affected the prices of agricultural produce more particularly, and among these, the price of cereals for making bread.

The new crops discovered in the colonies did not play a leading role in the expansion of European farming in the sixteenth century. At that time they were more objects of curiosity than of economic importance. This situation began to change only at the end of the century, owing mainly to the increasing use of maize.

Despite the fact that some evidence can always be cited for the intensification of agriculture (recovery of land for more or less intensive agriculture in the Po Valley – the *bonifica* – and in The Netherlands, the rotation of crops which

evolved in certain areas surrounding towns), on the whole, the most widespread – indeed almost universal – model for agrarian growth in the course of the 1500s was merely extensive, that is it involved bringing larger areas under the plough and into use as pasture, and was based on increased toil for both man and beast. This leads us to the conclusion that the basis of agrarian growth was fairly traditional, although in some densely populated areas with ideal geographical conditions (the Low Countries and northern Italy) some of the advances in the field of agriculture took place in the context of the recovery from the so-called 'crisis of the fourteenth century'. That recovery had clearly reached its apogee in the sixteenth century. In order to explain historically these cases of adoption of intensive techniques, which, until the modern period, were always exceptional and applied to relatively small areas in relation to Europe as a whole, the conditions imposed by the natural habitat should always be borne very much in mind, in addition to the economic and social factors. Too much has been made of the comparisons between the technical achievements in agriculture on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe, which is wet, and the necessarily much more traditional practices of southern Europe, where it is dry, without allowance being made for the radical differences in geography between these two European areas: from the point of view of the history of agriculture there are a number of different Europes.

Consequently, bearing in mind the most widespread growth model, the increase in production was the result of bringing under the plough previously uncultivated land which, reasonably enough, had a diminishing yield capacity. The new land brought into cultivation was used primarily for the production of cereals used in bread-making. These crops by far outstripped all the others in importance. This was a sound choice in view of the urban demand for staple foods, and also because the prices paid for cereals rose more than those of other farm produce. But in the right areas, crops grown for industrial purposes also experienced growth, to the point of regional specialization in some cases (for example dyes such as woad in the Toulouse area, which was traded all over Europe and in particular in the Iberian Peninsula).

The expansion of cultivation eventually came into conflict with live-stock farming, except in some areas which had traditionally specialized in cattle-farming (for example Denmark, which in the sixteenth century exported around 50,000 head of cattle per annum). The advance of 'ager' at the expense of 'altus' became excessive in some areas. The experience of the migratory live-stock belonging to the Castilian 'Mesta' (Corporation of sheep farmers) illustrates this situation perfectly: from the third decade of the century, the number of 'Mesta' live-stock, which every year roamed the transhumance routes between the winter and summer pastures situated in the south and the north of the peninsula respectively, steadily declined, despite the concessions designed to perpetuate grazing land. Naturally, the problems of shrinking pasture affected cattle raised for sale more than it affected draught animals.

The expansion of cultivation and the marginal boost in production which took place were not sufficient to make Western Europe self-sufficient in food, as it was too densely populated for the capabilities of the agricultural techniques of the period. For this reason it was always necessary to import cereals from eastern Europe: passing through the Sunde from the Baltic, they were destined mainly for The Netherlands, the British Isles and northern France. In

the second half of the century these Baltic imports of grain were also common in the countries of southern Europe.

During the closing decades of the 1500s the extensive model of agrarian growth had almost everywhere reached saturation point. Declining yields, as cultivation spread to poorer land, led to an increase in production costs: landlords also tended to use as demand increased. These facts, together with social factors which we shall discuss later, show that during the final decades of the century that model was running out of steam.

Industry

Like agriculture, the industrial sector, which processed raw materials, inevitably increased its output in response to growing demand and the stimulus of rising prices.

Industrial activity was organized along traditional lines, typical of the historical period prior to the 'industrial revolution', that is before modern industry designed in a fully-developed capitalist web of relations came into being. In the sixteenth century, industrial or manufacturing activities were scattered virtually everywhere. Regional specialization was rare and occurred markedly only in certain areas or regions (for example textiles in The Netherlands or in the urban network of northern Italy). Craft-workers of every trade were to be found in almost every city, which is where industry was mainly concentrated. Furthermore, except in the case of some activities which required large investments of fixed capital (such as shipbuilding or mining), the basic production unit was the family workshop (mostly situated in town centres, but in some areas, such as The Netherlands and the south of England, also in the surrounding rural areas), which belonged to the craftsman and where members of his family worked, sometimes side by side with hired labour (apprentices or journeymen). This physical dispersal of the basic production units did not prevent many of them from depending both for work and for funding on manufacturing-merchants (or business-merchants) who 'commissioned' work from the owners of the workshops, sometimes advancing them money, the materials to be processed and even some tools. This is the organizational model known to historians as the *Verlagssystem* or *putting-out system*, whose origins date back to the latter centuries of the medieval period. From the technical point of view, the production process was governed by strict Guild regulations.

During the sixteenth century, industry continued to make use of traditional sources of energy, but major progress was made in the manufacture of iron and steel with the spread of the blast-furnace, which had been known only in northern Europe since the end of the fifteenth century, the hydraulic drop-hammer and the hydraulic hammer – a device which was also water-powered and which was used to reduce the gauge of iron rods. These technological advances helped enormously to bring down production costs and thus, indirectly, to build up demand for metal products. One factor which put a stranglehold on iron and steel production was the growing scarcity of wood, which was virtually the only fuel in use, although in England coal was beginning to be used to fire the forges.

An important technical advance in metal production was the spread of the use of mercury for the amalgamation process in producing silver. From 1560 onwards, this revolutionary process, which was already in use in Germany, played a decisive role in enabling the Spaniards to work the American silver mines to an unprecedented degree. Until the

Huancavelica (Peru) mercury mine was discovered, mercury was transported from Almadén (Spain), via Seville, in annual shipments which linked the New World to the mother country (see Figure 13).

Iron was the principal metal produced in Europe at that time. The main producers were concentrated in Germany, followed by the Basque Country in Spain and then by France. State demand for firearms to equip armies and navies was an extremely important factor in the expansion of iron production and metallurgy in general.

The textile industry was rather more widespread than these other industrial activities until this time. Despite the fact that the industry was generally scattered, certain areas achieved a degree of specialization, so that the cloth they produced was traded internationally. This was the case of the southern Low Countries (Flanders), a number of northern Italian cities, western areas of England, Castilian cities such as Segovia (the cloth production of this city was similar in volume and quality to that of the leading textile centres of Italy by the end of the century), German cities such as Augsburg with their famous 'fustian' cloth, or French cities such as Rouen with their 'Breton' weaves.

Wool was the principal fibre used in the manufacture of textiles. Although local wools were used for the common type of cloth, for fine quality (the speciality at the beginning of the century of Flemish cities with a long textile tradition and, as the century progressed, of industrial cities such as Florence) Spanish merino wool was essential. This wool, which was produced mainly by the migratory 'Mesta' flocks, was traded internationally. As silk was particularly plentiful in the Mediterranean area, thanks to local production and imports from Iran, silk manufacturing was concentrated in

those countries. A more northerly and more scattered production was the manufacture of linen goods. Cotton was normally mixed with other fibres (for example fustian was made from a mixture of flax and cotton).

Factors of a fundamentally political nature brought about certain changes in the geographical location of the textile industry in Europe during the 1500s, and these changes must be borne in mind if we are to understand later history. In fact, the difficulties experienced by the northern Italian states during the first half of the century, when the region became a battlefield through the interference of other countries, proved particularly beneficial to the English textile industry, which, with high-quality materials similar to the Italian goods, was able to make deep inroads into the textile market of southern Europe. After 1560, the Revolt of The Netherlands against Spanish sovereignty had made the industrial decadence of the old Flemish cities more acute and had contributed to the emigration of skilled artisans (promoters of the new draperies, that is cheap textiles very suitable for a mass market and made in rural areas), who settled both in Holland and in England, thus helping to establish in those countries manufacturing methods which had a great future, as we shall see.

Trade, commercial capital and state finances

If the economic climate during the 1500s was propitious for the people at large, the agricultural sector and manufacturing, it was truly brilliant for commercial capital, for businessmen, for those towns which managed to capture international trade, and for the local money-changers' fairs which attracted cosmopolitan merchants, whose dealings transcended national




Figure 13 The arrival of precious metals from the Americas, 1580-1730.


Source: Original graph, M. Morineau, *La Fortune d'Amsterdam* (unpublished).

frontiers. The main factors which gave rise to this blossoming of commercial capital were price rises (this was the century of the so-called 'price revolution'), increased demand, urbanization, the formation of a world economy and the financial demands of State treasuries.

Although it is difficult to draw the distinction in practice, in theory a distinction can be drawn between two major spheres of commercial capital. The first was a local or, at most, a national sphere, where merchants of relatively modest means dealt in goods that were usually in mass demand and of fairly low value; this 'national commercial bourgeoisie' frequently operated under orders from cosmopolitan businessmen. It was the latter who moved in the second trade sphere, the intra-European sphere which formed the economic link between the Old World and the colonies. This 'cosmopolitan commercial bourgeoisie' did not confine its activities to trading in merchandise (generally wares of high value with a restricted and select demand), but also controlled the international fairs and made loans to State treasuries, apart from collecting taxes, which they often did. To this class belong the German families, the Fuggers, Welsers and Bamngartners, the Bonvisis from Luca, the Medicis and Strozzi from Florence, the Grimaldis, Centuriones and Lomellini from Genoa, and the Affaitadis from Cremona, to mention but a few of the better known business dynasties among whom naturally were several Jewish families in various cities, such as the Mendes, Marranos and so on. But there were many more who, without scaling the heights of those

mentioned above, also played a considerable role in this sphere of international trade and finance: Castilian businessmen, such as the Ruiz of Medina del Campo, the Maluendas, Astudillos, Salamanas and Cuellars who all came from Burgos, fell into this category: they played a particularly significant role in the merino wool trade (see Map 12).

The most visible result of the boom in international trade was the formation of a network of trade centres. Some of these owed their splendour to trade in a single commodity: this was true of Burgos (Castilian merino wool which was exported to the Atlantic seaboard of Europe) and Toulouse (export of woad for dyeing cloth). The economic underpinnings of these centres specializing in trade in a single commodity were exceedingly fragile: Burgos went into very sharp decline after 1560 when the Revolt of The Netherlands interfered with the export of wool; Toulouse suffered the same fate when indigo and other dyestuffs from the new territories began to compete with woad. Other centres whose activities were more diversified and which were in closer contact with the surrounding rural area were more stable and better able to adapt. This was true of Lisbon, Seville, London, the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Lübeck and Danzig/Gdansk, Venice and also some cities of the interior such as Nürnberg, Lyon, Milan and Geneva. But, without a doubt, the most important trade centre, at least until 1570, was Antwerp, which traded in almost every type of merchandise from all over Europe and the colonies: tropical sugar, Portuguese spices, Spanish and French wines, Flemish and English cloth



Map 12 Large trading companies and their subsidiaries in the sixteenth century (after P. Léon; *Economies et sociétés pré-industrielles, 1650-1750*, Paris, 1970).

(the latter, which were semi-finished, were dyed and finished in the city), metallurgical products from Central Europe, grain from the Baltic, as well as wool, cotton, timber, furs and so on.

Financial co-ordination of payments between the various trading centres was organized by means of a European fair system: the fairs of Antwerp, Lyons, Casale (Medina del Campo especially) and Genoa (held subsequently at Besançon, Poligny, Chantilly and finally at Piacenza) were organized all the year round, and in such a way that businessmen or their agents could meet to settle their accounts.

So as not to create a false picture of the trade situation during this century, it should be borne in mind that in relative terms the goods traded were only a small proportion of the goods produced, since home consumption was high. For instance, it is estimated that the value of the wheat consumed in the Mediterranean countries, on an annual average throughout the sixteenth century, was 35 times greater than that of all the precious metals brought from America and all the spices transported from Asia.

But the businessmen of the period, the great 'capitalists' in the broad sense, did not restrict their activities to simply trading in commodities, but were also involved in financial operations where their clients were usually state treasuries and the Privy Purses of Princes. This was true of the Fuggers and Welkers in relation to Charles V and later the Genoese businessmen in relation to Philip II. Monarchs' need to have large sums of money at their disposal in a given place in order to be able to execute their political and military plans offered these businessmen the extraordinary opportunity to reap profits from high rates of interest. But this was a high-risk business, because state treasuries were not always in a position to repay the loans.

The 'American treasure' and the European economy

In terms of value, the precious metals shipped to Europe by the Spaniards were the main product extracted from the colonies in the sixteenth century. Eighteen tons of silver alone were transported (see Figure 14).

Period	Silver	Gold
1503-10		4,965
1511-20		9,153
1521-30	149	4,889
1531-40	86,194	14,466
1541-50	177,573	24,957
1551-60	303,121	42,620
1561-70	942,859	11,531
1571-80	1,118,592	9,429
1581-90	2,103,028	12,102
1591-1600	2,707,627	19,451
1601-10	2,213,631	11,764
1611-20	2,192,256	8,856
1621-30	2,145,339	3,890
1631-40	1,396,760	1,240
1641-50	1,056,431	1,549

Figure 14 Kilograms of gold and silver allegedly imported into Spain from the Americas.

Source: C. M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1600-1700*, New York, 1978.

This huge quantity of precious metal had a significant impact on the European economy. Since a large proportion

of it was minted into coins, this helped make exchanges faster and facilitated the amassing of money, but, above all, it was one of the most significant factors in the so-called 'price revolution', although the pressure of demand, in relation to the relatively rigid supply, also exerted a strong influence.

Spain was, of course, this treasure's first destination, but, owing to the insufficient economic development of that country, it was not the ultimate beneficiary of this immense wealth. In fact, the share of the metals which remained within the Castilian Treasury was used exclusively to pay off the money-lenders (mainly foreigners) who had made loans to the Crown, with the result that that share (approximately 25 per cent) also left Spain. The remainder, which was the larger part, similarly left Spain to pay for the imports of manufactured goods which both the domestic Spanish market and the Spanish American market lacked, with the result that this share also benefited other European economies which were in a better position to cope with a rapid increase in demand.

But the 'American treasure' can provide only a partial explanation for the leading role of Spain in Europe during the sixteenth century. The Castilian economy had been growing at a respectable rate since before 1492, and that growth was to continue until the final decades of the century. Moreover, when America was discovered and colonized, Spain was not sufficiently developed and mature to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the new colonial territories.

Social relations in the countryside and in the towns

Despite the economic boom of the sixteenth century, social relations in the countryside continued to be very much influenced by the legal and institutional rigidity of the feudal system, although progress had been made towards a less coercive attitude towards the peasantry. Naturally, this statement needs to be qualified. In countries affected by the Protestant Reformation, church institutions, which had previously wielded considerable economic power through their ownership of land, lost their vital possessions, and these passed into the hands of social groups which apparently were able to exploit them more efficiently. Throughout the 1500s in the countries of eastern Europe (although this chapter does not deal specifically with them) stress was laid on the so-called 'second servitude', which was part and parcel of the feudal system in its purest and most coercive form (demesnes, unpaid serfs' labour on demesne lands, and so on).

Social relations in the countryside were such that, for a variety of reasons (rent, when they did not own their own land, which was normally the case; tithes; certain manorial tributes when they lived under the protection of the manor; state taxes, and so on), the farming peasantry had to hand over a considerable proportion of the harvest, which meant that income was concentrated in the hands of the dominant social classes who did not compensate the peasantry for what they took from them through extra-economic channels. Naturally, this general picture, which is the prevailing one, can be qualified, but this does not alter the basic truth. It is clear, for example, that in northern France, western and southern Germany and the northern areas of Spain and Italy the manorial regime was more homogeneous than that to be found elsewhere. It is also true that in places such as The Netherlands, an allodial peasantry, that is those who owned

their own land, became quite common in the course of the century. It should also be borne in mind that the rigid feudal system worked less efficiently in areas around towns, owing to the rise to prominence of the landed bourgeoisie (traders, professional classes, civil servants, and so on).

One fact which brooks little argument is that the economic climate during the 1500s was unfavourable to the greater part of the peasantry, the large majority of whom cultivated land which did not belong to them. The combination, and clash, of rising rents and declining yields gradually undermined their standard of living. If to this we add the fact that the price of the goods which they had to buy on the market also rose, then we see that the peasantry, the most numerous social class in Europe at that time, lived in worsening conditions and had to restrict their consumption and effective demand, which in turn had depressing consequences for the remaining economic sectors. Obviously, precisely the opposite occurred in the case of landowners who received tithes, rents and tributes. They were in a position to demand ever larger quantities of more specialized products, which explains the fact that a number of industrial centres were able to specialize in the production of high quality goods.

The framework of social relations in the towns remained fairly stable as a prolongation of the situation inherited from the last centuries of the Middle Ages. From this point of view, the towns appear as centres of power, dwelling-places of the rich and powerful, who, apart from monarchs and their courtiers, were none other than businessmen, the Guild oligarchy who controlled manufacturing and commerce, the owners of the largest tracts of land, the professional classes and skilled employees, and who frequently ran local government. Artisans who were members of the Guilds also lived in the towns: they were mostly wage-earners, as they did not own their own workshops, and they suffered the effects of secular inflation when their salaries did not keep pace with the rising price of the articles that they had to buy to survive. In the long term, the 1500s were not a good time for them either. They, together with the landless peasantry, ate the dark side of the glorious sixteenth century – glorious only for some.

THE DIFFICULTIES AND DEEP-SEATED CHANGES OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Having analysed the structure of the economy and social fabric of Europe in the sixteenth century in the previous chapter, in this chapter we shall focus particular attention on the ways in which that situation changed.

The changing economic climate and the 'crisis of the seventeenth century'

Generally speaking, the European economy grew more slowly in the second half of the sixteenth century than it had in the first half, although, as is usually the case, there were some exceptions, such as northern Italy, where the economy grew in the second half of the century.

Research carried out on parish registers (the number of births, deaths and marriages registered) shows that throughout Europe demographic growth came to a halt during the final decades of the century. During the first four decades of the seventeenth century, containment of the population

explosion metamorphosed, almost everywhere, into a fall in population, although these changes occurred at different times and with varying intensity from one region to another.

The change in the economic climate was also apparent in agricultural, industrial and commercial activity. Between approximately 1580 and 1640, poor harvests were more frequent, and this led to growing imports of grain from the Baltic, particularly to Mediterranean Europe, the decline of many industrial cities (Flemish, Castilian and northern Italian cities), and the curtailment of trade among the great mercantile centres (Seville, Antwerp, Burgos, Lyons, Venice, and so on). The great commercial crisis of 1619–1620 is a part of this process of decline.

Even the 'social climate' markedly deteriorated, hinging to the fore tensions which had lain dormant during the period of expansion in the sixteenth century. In the course of the final decades of this century there were popular uprisings in France, Rome, the Duchy of Pionbino and Norway. Furthermore, this social unrest took the form of hardship and mendicancy among the most disinherited social groups and those for whom the climate of the sixteenth century had not been particularly favourable, as already mentioned.

Thus began the so-called 'crisis of the seventeenth century', that controversial historical concept about which so much ink has flowed. In the first instance it has been debated whether it ever occurred at all, and if it did, to what degree, since for some countries, such as England and Holland, the century was highly favourable on account of the advanced structural changes that the economies of these countries underwent. Debates have also focused on the chronology of this crisis, which is different for each area. But, above all, discussion has centred on the causes and the significance of the crisis from the point of view of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

With regard to the causes, some conclusions are beginning to emerge. The first is that the depression cannot be put down to the decline in the quantity of precious metals arriving from America, as had first been thought in the light of Hamilton's research: Morineau has shown that shipments from America continued to arrive in abundance throughout the 1600s. The climatic argument, that a real fall in the average temperature and increased humidity might have had damaging effects on agriculture, does not seem very convincing either. War (the growing number and importance of armed conflicts) seems to be an effective explanation for the difficulties experienced in some areas (Germany and the Thirty Years War), but it does not adequately account for trends in other areas and, furthermore, it must be borne in mind that war also has a stimulating effect on the economy (increased demand for military hardware financed out of public funds). Although all these factors were partly responsible, if we had to isolate one particularly relevant factor, it would seem to be the progressive curtailment of demand as a result of the nature of the dominant social structures which, in the course of the sixteenth century, led to a growing concentration of income in the hands of minority groups and, in consequence, a fall in effective demand on the part of the majority groups (the peasantry, urban craft-workers, and so on). To this must be added the fact that as yet the colonial system was barely integrated in the mother countries' economies and consequently provided little stimulus.

If the 1600s are assessed in the context of the gradual birth of the capitalist system, the conclusions to this debate seem clear, although further discussion is still possible. In the

seventeenth century, decisive steps were taken towards the introduction of the capitalist system, thanks to the adoption of totally new production relations in some agricultural systems, in the industry of some countries and in the procedures for exploiting the colonies. These positive changes did not affect all countries equally. Holland and England derived particular benefit, which brought a decisive shift in the economic balance of Europe, with the Mediterranean countries losing ground. Unless this important fact is taken into account, it is inexplicable that the 'first industrial revolution' should have taken place in England.

Contrasts in demographic trends

As has already been pointed out, in the course of the 1600s the population of Europe increased by only 2 million, rising from around 71 million to 73 million. This marginal increase – somewhat less than 3 per cent compared with a 22.4 per cent increase during the sixteenth century – was the result of trends which differed quite sharply from one area to the next. The Iberian Peninsula may have lost around 1 million inhabitants, and the estimate for Germany is similar. The population of Italy and the Low Countries was the same in 1600 and 1700. The British Isles witnessed an increase of up to 2 million (the population rose from 7 to 9 million), and the population of France and Scandinavia also rose, although to a lesser extent.

Frequent wars – some long and harsh, such as the Thirty Years War – poor harvests, terrible epidemics (particularly memorable is the 'Atlantic Plague', 1596–1603, which swept down from the Rhine to Morocco reaching Italy and other Mediterranean areas in around 1603) and the general economic decline in almost every country (fewer and later marriages) help to explain the relative stagnation suffered by the population of Europe, in sharp contrast to events in the sixteenth century.

Furthermore, the population tended to be more rural than it had been in the sixteenth century. Although the rural population formed the vast majority both in the 1500s and the 1600s, in the seventeenth century the rural population was larger than in the sixteenth century, the century of urban splendour. This fact is a good indicator of the economic climate of the century.

Some interesting population shifts occurred within some countries. In Spain, for instance, the population began to desert the interior, while the population of coastal areas tended to rise or, at least, fell less sharply than that of the central region. In the British Isles, demographic pressure was concentrated in the south. These population shifts were a symptom, and also a factor, of the new interregional economic balance.

Differing agricultural systems and changes in social relations in the countryside

Apart from local or regional peculiarities, the agricultural situation in the seventeenth century was characterized by a reduction in traditional cereal crops (sometimes accompanied by conversion to the new maize crop, which spread through the wetter areas during this century, or by the planting of vines) and the spread of pasture. The price situation – higher prices for live-stock products than for agricultural produce, as a result of the slackening demand (particularly urban

demand) for cereals for bread – accounts for this change in land-use.

But undoubtedly the most interesting feature of the European countryside in the seventeenth century was the immense variation in the pattern of evolving labour relations from one country to another, which was to determine widely differing agricultural trends in the future.

In fact, and this has been brilliantly summed up by De Vries, agriculture in both Spain and Italy exemplifies static social relations in the rural sector owing to the undisputed predominance of the privileged classes (nobles and ecclesiastical institutions, and large landowners who frequently exercised feudal powers). In such cases as these, the landlords could quite comfortably offset the adverse effects of the agricultural depression by extending their sway over the peasantry and even asking the prince for favours (new dominions, and so on). In this sense it might be appropriate to talk, with all due reservations, of a degree of re-feudalization, based on making the peasantry more extensively rather than more intensively dependent. The great landowners of eastern Europe managed to survive this crisis by means of a not altogether different procedure, although in this case it was quite simply a matter of further oppressing the peasantry. It is understandable that in such a social context neither the labouring classes nor qualitative improvements in land-use could make much progress.

In France, the nobility tried to ride out the effects of the depression and recover direct control over the land by evicting the peasants who rented it, paying fixed rents in cash. But they had to contend with the expanding absolutism which, in order to be able to rely on a solvent taxpaying community, could not allow the peasantry to become impoverished at the hands of the nobility. The absolute state defended the peasants against the landowning nobles by preventing evictions and the re-establishment of ancient feudal rights, although it did not manage to prevent the extension of share-cropping (*métayage*). Although the dominant group in production relations was still the privileged classes, in rural France the agricultural bourgeoisie began to assume growing importance. That bourgeoisie consisted primarily of large tenant farmers, who formed an interface between the landowners and those who cultivated the land, and wealthy farmers. A similar development occurred in western and southern Germany thanks to the 'peasant protection' or *Bauernschutz* policy, which was promoted by the absolute sovereigns.

In Holland, the result was even more progressive. In the absence of an allpowerful sovereign, and without the restrictions characteristic of community institutions, and given the insignificant role played by feudal lords (this had long been the case, but they had become even weaker on account of the anti-Spanish revolt), the peasants who worked the land were able to manage their farms freely and directly for maximum profit. Furthermore, the possibility of importing Baltic and later British grain meant that they could specialize in selected crops and in cattle-farming, to which end they made considerable investments in land reclamation.

In England, the Civil War brought victory to the nobles against the crown, which had also protected the peasantry for tax reasons. The landowning nobility therefore continued to enclose their lands, but they rented out their farms directly to tenant farmers who worked the large farms using wage-labour. These tenant farmers were to promote the important changes in agricultural techniques known as the 'agricultural revolution', which were to come to the fore in the eighteenth

century. Flemish peasants who immigrated to the south of England made a substantial contribution to the introduction of these innovations (rotation of crops, which meant that less land had to lie fallow and a larger cattle population could be supported).

As can be seen, except in the cases of Spain and Italy which remained static and, of course, eastern Europe, in the course of the seventeenth century the change in labour relations in the rural sector pointed the way towards the emergence of a peasant class with the legal and economic capacity to promote improvements in land-use. This was, undoubtedly, one of the most significant achievements of the seventeenth century.

Changes in the organization and distribution of industry

The changes which occurred in the industrial sector in the course of the seventeenth century must be understood in the light of the depression in the agricultural sector, which affected rural Europe at different times and with varying intensity. The relative price of grain tended to fall, and this, apart from leading to alternative land-use (meat and milk production, market gardening, wine-growing, and so on), led to increased demand for consumer goods which were not basic necessities among wide sectors of society (the peasantry and urban wage-earners), who were thus able to consume more manufactured goods whose quality catered for massive popular demand. But besides, in many rural areas, where adaptation to the new circumstances was no easy task, the peasantry were forced to supplement their income by engaging in cottage industries: the family members did this work on the farm under the orders of the business-merchants, who generally lived in the cities and 'commissioned' a variety of manufacturing processes. Consequently, in the seventeenth century, demand for manufactured goods of middle to low quality tended to rise and diversify, and industrial activity moved towards rural areas. This meant an internal restructuring and geographical redistribution of the industrial sector.

In contrast to the sixteenth century, the cities were no longer a magnet for the population that drifted away from the land. Traditional urban industry, specializing in quality goods and heavily regulated by the Guilds, went into a marked decline.

This happened in the ancient textile centres of northern Italy (Florence, Venice and Genoa), Flanders and northern France (Hondschoote, Anvers and Lille) and Castile (Segovia). In times of depression there was no demand for the quality goods they had to offer. Furthermore, the rigid Guild regulations, to which they attributed their past grandeur, hindered the introduction of changes in the production process. Finally, the high wage costs – well above those in the rural industrial sector – made their products uncompetitive.

This 'new industry' was rural and scattered throughout the countryside, under the economic control of business-merchants and free from Guild regulations. But certain progress towards concentrating the production process which took place during this century cannot be omitted. The most outstanding, apart from the advances in the Swedish iron industry which achieved such prestige during this century, were the royal factories set up in France during the reign of Louis XIV under the guidance of Colbert. Specializing in

the production of luxury goods, with a view to supplanting imports (rugs, glass, mirrors, porcelain, textiles, and so on), these industries, which enjoyed state funding, were very costly and never managed to become competitive. The historical process of industrialization did not touch these 'boothouse' industries.

The future lay in the scattered rural industry, which some historians like to call 'proto-industry'. This pattern of industrial activity was not evenly distributed throughout Europe. There were countries, such as Spain and Italy, where this model did not catch on, undoubtedly owing to the limitations imposed by the agrarian structures. The main rural areas where such scattered rural industry was successful were (as summed up by De Vries) Maine, Picardy and Languedoc in France, Westphalia, Silesia and southern Saxony in Germany, Flanders and Twente in The Netherlands, but above all Ulster, the West Riding, the Cotswolds and East Anglia in Great Britain. The greatest achievements of the new industrial organization were attained in these areas.

In short, the contribution of the 1600s to industrial history was the birth of popular demand, rural dispersal of industrial activity, with the resultant extension of labour dependency of industrial workers, and the ascendancy of the new business-merchants.

Trade and the new colonial model

The 1600s were the century of Dutch commercial supremacy. The difficulties that beset The Netherlands as a result of the anti-Spanish revolt undoubtedly go some way to explain the spectacular development of trade in the United Provinces, but their pre-eminence in international markets was rooted primarily in the enormous competitiveness of the Dutch merchant navy equipped with the *shuytschip*, which was a highly efficient ship for the period. Since the end of the sixteenth century, Holland, and in particular Amsterdam, had become a great centre for the redistribution and, in the case of certain goods, for the processing of commodities which arrived from almost all parts of the world. Thus Amsterdam replaced Antwerp.

It was a vital necessity for Holland to extend its commercial sphere. It should be borne in mind that Holland depended on Baltic imports for its supplies of grain, naval material, and so on, and that to balance its trade deficit with the Baltic it needed silver, which could be obtained only if there was a favourable trade balance – through the sale of goods and naval services – with other countries and, in particular, with the Iberian Peninsula, which was the point of arrival of the 'American treasure'. When, in the first half of the century, the Dutch managed to displace the Portuguese in trade with East Asia, their silver requirements increased yet again, since European trade with that part of the globe had always been based on constant shipments of silver to settle debtor balances.

Taking advantage of their irresistible competitiveness in freight and in maritime insurance, and since they had abundant funds at their disposal (the stock exchange and the Bank of Amsterdam were set up in 1608 and 1609 respectively), the Dutch turned their country into a commercial emporium for the distribution of goods. Noteworthy institutional elements in this activity were the share companies (The Dutch East India Company founded in 1602 and the Dutch West India Company founded in 1621). This was a real innovation because, although the large trading companies had enjoyed the privilege of state support and reserved markets

(for example, the old English company, the Merchant Adventurers), until that time the capital was still the individual property of the partners. Naturally, shares were traded on the stock market.

But the Dutch did not confine themselves to acting as intermediaries, and made as much progress as they could in manufacturing goods from some of the raw materials which they received from abroad: witness the fact that by about 1660 there were sixty sugar refineries operating in Holland. However, the high Dutch salaries hindered them from making sufficient progress along the path of industrial development.

The English and the French followed the Dutch lead in tapping international, and more particularly colonial, trade until, by the end of the century, the English took the lead, thanks to their larger population and a more capable and better developed industrial sector.

Simultaneously with the rise of Holland and the rivalry with other countries, in particular England and France, there began to emerge a new model of colonial exploitation, promoted in the first instance by the Portuguese who, at the end of the sixteenth century, established sugar plantations in Brazil. The Venetians had already experimented with this form of exploitation of labour in their Mediterranean colonies – Cyprus and Crete. The new colonial model was intended to supersede the dominant sixteenth century model, whose hallmark was piracy, the straightforward appropriation of colonial goods of commercial value, and excessive specialization (precious metals, pepper and spices). As a result, as many as 1,700 tropical plantations worked by slave-labour brought from Africa were scattered widely across America, and the variety of colonial products had increased considerably with the inclusion of coffee, tea, dyestuffs, silks, cotton textiles, and so on. This meant that the dovetailing of the economies of the various colonies with that of the mother countries had taken a decisive step forward in the seventeenth century.

Absolutism, taxation and mercantilism

In the 1600s, states began to play a hitherto unknown economic role. This intervention in the national economy was achieved not only by means of the growing and specific demand of the state (marine supplies, firearms, artillery, ships and luxury goods), rising taxation and the distribution of salaries to the ever-growing bureaucracy, but also by the framing of a *bona fide* economic policy. All this was a consequence of the rise of absolutism as a form of state organization.

The increasingly heavy taxation practised by state treasuries was the factor which had the greatest social impact and was a source of constant protest on the part of the taxpayers, many of whom were already suffering the consequences of the economic recession. This unrest sometimes took the form of riots (for example the Fronde in France), which sometimes even escalated into insurrection, going beyond purely anti-taxation protests to open disagreement with basic policies (for example, the uprisings against the Spanish monarchy in Catalonia, Portugal and Naples). Indeed, the foundation of the first state bank (the Bank of England in 1694) was determined by the need to confront the issue of public debt.

The economic policy adopted by states, with a few exceptions, was inspired by mercantilism. Mercantilist

practices must be viewed as measures adopted by the state to tackle a recession. Some countries could not introduce them, either because they were too weak or because they lacked political freedom (a clear example is the Spanish monarchy, which was forced to give pride of place to dynastic interests in the international sphere). Others, such as Holland, chose not to adopt them because they believed that a policy of state non-intervention in the economy was more advantageous (Grotius's 'mare liberum' concept). Mercantilism was most widely adopted in France and England. In France it took the form of Colbertism, which concentrated on industrial development with the foundation of the protected royal factories. In England, which was more interested in controlling foreign trade, it took the form of the promulgation of the famous *Navigation Acts* (1651, 1660 and 1664), whose purpose, in which they succeeded, was to snatch a large portion of trade from the Dutch.

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ECONOMY AND SOCIETY DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Carlos Martínez Shaw

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The crisis of the seventeenth century elicited a variety of reactions in each of the countries involved and led to a general redrawing of the economic map of Europe. At all events, the instability which had been a typical feature of the previous century ceased to exist by 1730 when a strong movement of expansion set in and spread throughout Europe. This fact emerges from all the available indicators and proves the eighteenth century to have been a period of uninterrupted growth. That growth was not halted as it had been in the fourteenth or seventeenth centuries by the limitations of a system which impeded the continuous development of the

economy and finished up by placing severe restraints on the energies of the economic operators. The radically new feature was the economic take-off which gained impetus in the eighteenth century from the process of industrialization; beginning in England, this spread throughout the continent in the nineteenth century and heralded the appearance of a new system and a new era in the European and world economy.

The expansive mood of the eighteenth century is reflected in the various indicators at our disposal. Price movements throughout the century in fact point to the sustained duration, continuity and universality of the expansion. Farm prices experienced the sharpest rises which were particularly steep in Western Europe (for the period 1730/40-1801/10, the increase in England was 250 per cent and as much as 265 per




Figure 15 Wheat prices in France, 1709-1817.

Source: C. E. Labrousse, *Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIII^e siècle*, Paris, 1933, t. I, p. 98.

cent in The Netherlands and France); this phenomenon had a particular impact on the trend in the price of cereals, the food product for which demand was greatest (see Figure 15). Industrial prices also followed a constant upward trend, although the rise was slower than in the case of farm products; this phenomenon affected raw materials, fuels and manufactured goods alike. The prices of colonial articles also rose significantly in certain sectors such as Chinese silk, Indian cotton or American sugar, while others became cheaper as trade in them ceased to be speculative and gave way to a more general commerce without sharp fluctuations.

The trend of incomes followed and confirmed the price movement. As was to be expected, income from land experienced the most spectacular progression, rising even more rapidly than farm prices, nominal wages and industrial or trade profits. Landowners were thus the primary beneficiaries of expansion since their incomes profited from the growth in demand, the abundant money supply and the decline in nominal wages to a greater extent than the earnings of merchants and industrial undertakings despite the high profits generated by the colonial trade and manufactured goods produced either under the domestic system or in the nascent factory complexes of the industrial revolution.


In fact, the indices established for the national economies all point in the same direction. Despite the margin of error inherent in calculations based on inadequate statistics, there is no reason to doubt the figures obtained for the growth of the gross domestic product of France (69 per cent between

1701-10 and 1781-90) or England (170 per cent for 1688-1770 and 1 per cent annually between 1740 and 1770). Added to the previous indicators, these figures give a convincing picture of uninterrupted expansion in Western Europe throughout the eighteenth century. To the extent that the technical difficulties for the period before formal statistics were kept can be overcome, it is not a particularly complex task to observe the growth which took place; the concordance of the various indicators is in itself sufficient proof. However, a greater effort is needed to interpret the data and establish the causes of the European economic take-off.

Population

Population growth provides one useful point of departure, that is the population explosion of the eighteenth century. Between 1700 and 1800, the population of Europe rose from 110 million to 190 million, an increase of over 75 per cent (see Map 13). All the countries participated to a greater or lesser extent in this phenomenon and contributed to the ultimate positive result: the growth rate was 60 per cent in England and Wales, 50 per cent in Italy, Spain and several other countries, 60 per cent in Sweden and 30 per cent in France which had already been more densely populated since the previous century.

In our view this wave of population growth must be seen in the same light as the growth experienced in Europe at



Map 13 Growth of European population during the eighteenth century (after M. Reinhard, A. Armingaud and J. Dupâquier).

least during two previous periods of its history, that is in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. On this occasion too, the sudden increase in population numbers seems to have been a spontaneous phenomenon which was too general to admit regional explanations within narrow geographical limits; on the contrary, a global explanation must be sought. In that context, the upward trend can only be interpreted as a phenomenon of Malthusian compensation which led the European nations to fill the gaps left by the events of the seventeenth century and the critical situation experienced at that time. The easing of the adverse circumstances triggered a pendulum movement which tended to restore the balance, albeit with specific features and different backgrounds in the individual regions.

The restoration of population levels produced a dual phenomenon: the resumption of cultivation of arable land by the new generations; this reflected the permanent hunger of the European communities for land and, as a logical corollary, the increase in the prices of farm produce as a consequence of the growing pressure of demand. This is the key indicator: the demand stemming from a growing population maintains the upward trend of prices, not simply for agricultural produce but also for industrial products, cereals and other farm produce, articles of mass consumption and those reserved for the privileged classes. So far this trend had precedents in European history, but the process was to lead to a hitherto unknown situation: for the first time, the productive forces were to prove capable of increasing supply to a level high enough to satisfy the needs of a population undergoing sustained growth.

Thus the demographic revolution, as it used to be called, was in reality a complex process whose aetiology cannot be attributed to any sudden or spectacular change. Perhaps the most influential long-term factor was the renewed agrarian capacity of the European countries as a whole, starting out from an evolution which does not warrant the qualification of revolutionary or universal, but which nevertheless managed to combine the manifest improvement of yields in the most favoured zones with the advance of agricultural colonization into the areas which had suffered most from the decline in land-use in the previous century and also with the development of trade which enabled food produce to be moved from the more developed regions to the depressed areas.

However, the reduction in the catastrophic death rate was another factor which must form an integral part of any explanation of the overall situation. The great epidemics disappeared from Western Europe in the first half of the century following the devastating outbreaks in the south of France (plague in Marseilles in 1720) and Sweden; these outbreaks closed the cycle of the great pandemics which ravaged the lands of Europe throughout modern times. Was there a cause and effect relationship between the progress of agriculture and the fall in the catastrophic death rate or were these separate variables? At all events, they cannot be explained by unverifiable phenomena such as obscure biological mutations in the propagators of the disease, or by decisive break-throughs in medicine and hygiene which did not occur, even though the authorities were able to impose more severe health norms to control contagion—such as quarantine requirements or the construction of lazarets in harbour zones. In fact, the disappearance of the plague did not result in the restoration of a sound state of health in Europe which continued to suffer from many pandemics of smallpox, recurrent fevers, dysentery and other gastric infections,

endemic malaria in the marshy and rice-growing areas and so on.

Alongside the eradication of the main agent of a catastrophic mortality rate, other factors contributed to the onset of a new demographic climate in Western Europe. The lessened impact of wars on the civilian population as campaigns came to be more localized and fought by professional armies, so that losses tended to be increasingly confined to the actual combatants, may also have made a perceptible, if limited, contribution to the fall in the death rate in modern Europe.

The reduction in mortality was beyond any doubt the decisive factor in population growth in the closing phases of the old regime which continued to experience the same high birth rates as in previous epochs. However, the transition to a modern demographic trend was not reflected simply in the reduction of the overall mortality rate or in the attenuation of the sawtooth pattern produced by the great waves of dearth; another significant factor was the appearance of the first pointers to an inflection of the birth rate which had hitherto held the key to population size. At the end of the Modern Age, the first indications of the general control of births could be perceived, and this was to become one of the most significant advances of the next epoch. Birth-control can be attributed to spontaneous actions seeking to adapt the number of children to the economic possibilities of the nuclear family which had already become established in Western Europe during modern times. That adaptation was achieved partly through late marriages, necessarily combined with a lower incidence of pre-marital conception, but it resulted essentially from psychological changes which led to the separation of the notions of love and procreation, while women sought to avoid a rapid succession of pregnancies by limiting their sexual relations. At the same time, married couples tried to 'trick' nature by adopting relatively primitive birth-control techniques which were rendered possible by a slackening of the influence of religious doctrine and a less sacred view of private life. Moreover, the greater likelihood that children would survive automatically tended to reduce the number of births which the overwhelming mortality of previous centuries had made necessary simply to preserve the population balance.

Agricultural expansion

Be that as it may, if the population dynamic pre-dated and partly explained the rapid increase in agricultural production, the acceleration of population growth experienced in the eighteenth century would ultimately have run up against the Malthusian limit of the availability of resources had there not been a renovation of the technological facilities available to peasants and a resulting increase in agricultural yields and production levels.

The minor climatic variations in the eighteenth century which is generally considered to have been more clement than the previous unusually cold century, are certainly not in themselves sufficient to explain the progress made by agriculture. The first phase of this advance took the form, as was traditional in modern Europe, of the extension of cultivation to land which had been left barren as a result of the crisis of the seventeenth century. The hunger for land resulted in the adoption of techniques for land valorization which had already been known and used in previous epochs, including the reclamation of fenlands and marshes; the

drainage of water from flooded lands which were then protected by building dykes (the Dutch polders being a well-known example); the drainage of peat bogs which immediately became fit for cultivation, and indeed extremely fertile; the deforestation of belts of woodland; the improvement of infertile heaths, scrubland and moors; the conversion of grazing land which had for centuries been given over to cattle-rearing into ploughed fields, even at the cost of reducing the total live-stock herd in a manner prejudicial to agriculture as a whole; the sowing of fields in which bushes were already being grown, thus enabling two crops to be harvested; and the colonization of wasteland sometimes by incomers from remote regions who set out to reclaim areas that had been abandoned for centuries. This vast collective endeavour mobilized private initiative, normally on the part of small farmers, backed up by actions taken by the public authorities which were better able to organize the campaigns of colonization and large-scale projects. At all events, this process became a source of concern to more than one contemporary observer fearful of the possible impact of this scramble for the land on the economic and social balance.

However, despite this seeming activity in the rural areas and the immediately visible advance of ploughing into marginal lands, their effects must not be overestimated. The density of occupation of the arable areas in the previous two centuries (despite the crises which laid waste to vast expanses of Germany during the Thirty Years War, significantly diminished the area of cultivated land in Castile or paralyzed agrarian progress in the Spanish Netherlands) had been high enough for the volume of new lands brought under the plough not to result in any disproportionate increase in the extent of farmland in Europe: the percentage of newly cultivated land did not bring about a perceptible reduction in the aggregate yield per unit of land under cultivation.

The expansion of European agriculture was first and foremost a phenomenon of internal growth which led to the intensive utilization of the best lands through a process which perhaps began in the United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century before spreading to rural areas in England and being tried out with varying degrees of success throughout Western Europe in the eighteenth century.

The process may well have begun in the belts of market gardens situated around the cities where the gardens and orchards served as laboratories before the experiments moved out into the countryside. Here the intensification of cultivation generally took the form of a combat against fallow lands, that is against the practice of leaving fields barren at regular intervals, with the result that one-third of all European agricultural land was not cultivated in any given year and therefore did not bring in a harvest. The progress of agriculture thus consisted in large measure in the elimination of the more primitive systems of cultivation which were now confined to the least favoured areas, to the zones which permitted no more than an extensive utilization to avoid their total exhaustion; on the other hand, the more fertile lands were given over to continuous cultivation which brought increasingly high yields.

Thus the crop systems which involved leaving the fields fallow for two years in three, one year in two or one year in three (triennial rotation with two fallow years, biennial or triennial with one fallow year), gradually gave way to the system of convertible agriculture under which the land was sown with a series of successive crops carefully chosen to be self-supporting; the ultimate aim was to push the fallow year

back until six or seven harvests had been brought in, or else to eliminate it completely and replace it by a fodder crop or grass suitable for cattle-rearing purposes. Many systems of crop rotation were tried out in Europe in the eighteenth century, but the results of those which proved the most successful were widely disseminated and used in regions that were very remote from their place of origin. Without going into detail, the system which acquired the greatest acceptance was perhaps that established in Norfolk which put an end to the need for fallow years by combining harvests of wheat, barley, root vegetables, fodder plants and grass for cattle grazing.

The elimination of the fallow year required an intelligent application of the principle of crop rotation, but it also necessitated the employment of a larger number of farm-workers and the introduction of a series of innovations, the most prominent of which were irrigation, more sophisticated tools, selected fertilizers and a series of plants which had until then been unknown or relegated to the category of marginal crops in the agricultural practices of the time.

The irrigation of dry land was an extremely extensive phenomenon throughout the eighteenth century. It naturally assumed particular importance in the Mediterranean countries which made a considerable effort through private initiative (by sinking wells, bringing old *norias* back into use and clearing abandoned irrigation channels) and also through action by public bodies which constructed major hydraulic works to harness rivers in the service of agriculture and ensure the best possible utilization of water as a fundamental resource for agrarian progress.

Farm implements were not modernized to the same extent. New procedures were introduced to rationalize and shorten agricultural work such as sowing in rows instead of by scattering, but the basic tools underwent few improvements. The Roman plough continued to be used until more sophisticated models became available, such as the Brabant plough fitted with a mould-board and two handles. But the introduction of machinery such as the threshing machine, the reaper or the mechanical sower came much later and its results were only felt on a limited scale. The essential innovation, namely the replacement of wooden components by iron, only appeared at the end of this period as further advances were made in the steel industry, but its distribution remained extremely limited up to the end of the century. It must in any case be remembered that innovations were slow to gain ground at the time despite the efforts of famous minorities, due partly to the dominant routine of agricultural life as the intellectuals of the period liked to point out accusingly, but above all to the inability of broad sectors of the European peasantry to make investments, preoccupied as they were with gathering together the resources necessary to pay royal taxes to the tax-collectors, ecclesiastical tithes and seigniorial dues, to say nothing of the rent owing to their landowners.

The growing availability of fertilizers to renew the fertility of the soil was a still more important factor. To regenerate the vegetation cover, European peasants had traditionally made use of all kinds of products including ash, peat, mud, slime, oily pastes, seaweed and even human night soil. At this time mineral fertilizers such as loam and lime were discovered, but the fundamental factor was the increase in the production of manure. This in turn was attributable to the development of cattle-rearing at the expense of sheep-farming because of the spread of fodder plants which provided a regular supply of food for extensive herds and, above all,

the progress of stabling which enabled animal manure to be collected and used readily. All in all, the data available to us shows substantial progress in the quantity and quality of fertilizers, massive application in cases where they were needed and a rational combination of feedstuffs on the more advanced farms. The contribution of fertilizers was so decisive to the progress of agriculture that it has been said, not without good reason, that in the eighteenth century 'progress had the stench of manure'.

The agrarian map of Western Europe underwent a number of major changes in the eighteenth century. Broadly speaking, the situation inherited from the past was maintained with the predominance of cereals in all the regions (wheat in the warmer zones, rye in the colder areas together with barley and oats, sometimes accompanied by certain vegetables such as peas), the continuation of the three typical Mediterranean products (wheat, vines and olives) in the southern regions, the almost constant presence of a belt of gardens around cities and the isolated appearance of areas of industrial crops, including hops for the brewing of beer, flax and hemp for the textile industry and a number of dye plants which were able to compete with dyestuffs imported from overseas.

The first innovation observed as the century advanced was the progress of cereals (wheat to a greater extent than rye), under the influence of the pressure of population growth and the resulting consumption of what continued to be the staple foodstuff of all the social classes. At the same time, vines gained ground in the southern countries to reach at this time their maximum land cover following the increase in the consumption of wines and liquors which brought a magnificent commercial outlet for these products and made them a corner-stone of European trade in the eighteenth century.

The century also witnessed the triumph of some more recent crops such as the potato; this had been introduced from America in the sixteenth century but now, after overcoming initial rejection by a large part of the population which considered it unfit for human consumption and fed it to cattle instead, consolidated its position in a number of backward regions such as inland Flanders, Scotland and, above all, Ireland, where it became the staple diet of the whole nation and was responsible for the population growth experienced by the island in the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.

The qualities of the potato which led to its success were encountered to an even greater degree in maize, another product of American origin capable of giving two to three harvests as against a single harvest for wheat, while still leaving the soil nitrogenated for other crops, the only requirements being abundant use of fertilizers and deep digging when sowing the seeds. Maize also spread out slowly from the end of the sixteenth century along the littoral fringe of Atlantic Europe, until its area of expansion became definitively established here at the beginning of the eighteenth century and made a significant contribution to the stabilization of the population in these regions. The increase in food resources brought about by the cultivation of maize has led some observers to speak of a 'yellow revolution', at least within certain clearly defined geographical limits.

However, fodder crops were perhaps responsible for the greatest transformation undergone by agriculture in modern times. Fodder plants in fact became an essential crop for the extension of convertible agriculture through their decisive role in the various systems of crop rotation, thanks to their multiple function as a crop to be grown on land that would

otherwise have to remain fallow – a crop which nitrogenates the soil and leaves it ready for fresh sowing – while at the same time providing a feedstuff for cattle and so enabling manure to be collected and used in its turn to fertilize the land. Clover was the most important fodder crop used in the Norfolk system – the most sophisticated and best known of the techniques for crop rotation in eighteenth century Europe.

Irrigation, the modernization of farm implements, the progress made with fertilizers and crop rotation all helped to make agriculture more intensive and brought an increase in yields as their most outstanding benefit. Despite the difficulty in calculating yields on the basis of the fragmentary information available for a few farm holdings whose registers in any case look like islets in the vastness of the three centuries of the Modern Age and the huge geographical extent of Western Europe, some orders of magnitude can be defined. The yield ratio for cereals varied between five grains per seed in the German or Scandinavian fields to ten grains or more in the privileged areas of the United Provinces, the southern Netherlands or eastern and southern England. Between these two extremes, there was obviously a broad spectrum which led either to abundance or penury, but, as the century progressed, even the more backward regions seemed to escape definitively from the spectre of an endemic shortage of cereals. This happened despite the fact that cereals on the whole benefited from the general progress of agriculture to a lesser extent than other crops which experienced more substantial growth. At all events, the intensification of agriculture and its consequence, the improvement of yields, became one of the corner-stones of the economic progress of the continent.

The improvement of yields led to a greater availability of foodstuffs and so allowed population growth to continue. However, other phenomena also changed the situation of the agricultural sector within the European economy and contributed to its expansion. These were the diversification of supply, regional specialization and the growing tendency to market surpluses.

We have already looked in some detail at the diversification of the supply of farm produce. Cereals, which are an appropriate single crop for societies beset by hunger, can be replaced by alternative crops when better yields are obtainable and when the communities can be supplied with other foodstuffs through commercial trade. Another typical feature of rural Europe in the eighteenth century was thus the mobility in the allocation of resources, the replacement of crops by others which were more remunerative, the introduction of new plant species for commercial sale even to the detriment of the needs for food consumption in certain geographical areas.

Agricultural specialization was a direct consequence of this mobility of harvests. The peasants abandoned traditional systems of coexistence of the products essential for their daily lives to embark instead upon the cultivation, on a single crop system, of readily marketable products, such as wine and industrial plants. Experiments in this area grew apace and helped to instil dynamism into European agriculture.

One essential prerequisite for specialization is the possibility of marketing surpluses. Marketing facilities grew as the century progressed as a result of the general development of trade and the action of governments which removed the traditional barriers to the free movement of agricultural produce. The most outstanding example is that of wheat, habitually subject in Western Europe to rigorous control by the authorities which were preoccupied by a desire to preserve

the population administered by them; they therefore prohibited the exportation of grain, imposed price ceilings on bread and requisitioned surpluses which were within their reach, although they did not place any embargo on the wheat stocks accumulated in the granaries of powerful individuals and ecclesiastical institutions. Now the governments took steps to liberalize the trade in cereals; this action was often rejected by the popular classes as an attack on the system of the 'moral economy' which brought them a minimal degree of security in hard times. At all events the trend towards the free movement of farm produce, the cessation of intervention in the markets and the development of free competition became an irreversible process in Western Europe; despite the vicissitudes which this process brought in its train among the least protected social groups, it did in the end guarantee a better distribution of greater quantities of foodstuffs to a constantly growing population.

The transformation of the seigniorial regime

The incentive for the intensification of agriculture and the development of the trade in agricultural produce, both phenomena heightened by the rise in prices as the population grew, came from a series of fundamental changes in the system of land ownership and occupation. The eighteenth century witnessed significant progress towards the transformation of production relations in the countryside, with far-reaching changes to the seigniorial system inherited from medieval days.

Despite a number of specific features, the case of France is highly representative of the evolution which took place in Western Europe, except for England. In France the rise in income from the land generated a seigniorial reaction motivated by the desire of those in power to become the principal beneficiaries of the buoyant situation. An offensive was thus led by the landlords (the direct proprietors of the lands in the seigniorial domain or reserve and recipients of the seigniorial or feudal dues from other holdings) against the peasants who cultivated these plots of land as freeholders, leaseholders or tenants. This offensive involved more stringent efforts to collect feudal dues or the rents stipulated in the tenancy agreements, the drafting of new land registers (*terriers*) in order to revive certain taxes which had fallen into disuse, the fight to reduce the area of common land, pressure to gain control of plots of land by resorting to sharp rent increases, the transfer of operating costs to the direct cultivators, the granting of mortgage loans with a view to taking back the land as soon as the farmer fell on hard times and could not keep up his repayments. Thus the agents of the great landlords, often tenants of vast areas of land (*gros fermiers*) were the protagonists of the dual process of seigniorial oppression and capitalist modernization. This twofold process inevitably elicited resistance which was reflected in a proliferation of lawsuits, the opposition to land registers, the refusal to accept the imposition of seigniorial monopolies on baking ovens, mills or presses, or the demand for verifiable deeds to be presented before responding to new claims made by those in power. This reaction by the big landowners and resistance by the direct farmers were the logical consequence of prosperity – of a desire to share in the benefits of a rapidly expanding agriculture.

The case of England is atypical. Here, the advance of agrarian individualism bringing in its train the disintegration of the seigniorial system handed down from the Middle Ages

and capitalist penetration into the rural areas, had already taken place from an early stage in the sixteenth century. In that century, the Anglican schism had enabled the lands previously belonging to the church to be alienated and transferred into private hands, while the great noble uprisings (especially of the northern Catholic aristocracy in 1536–37 and 1569–70) had resulted in the confiscation of extensive tracts of land which were then distributed to a variety of owners, thus enlarging the free land market. At the same time, the landowners developed an extremely effective legal instrument which proved highly profitable for them throughout the eighteenth century, that is the enclosure system. These enclosures approved by Parliament brought several results at a single blow: the land was fenced in with the simultaneous disappearance of communal rights within the enclosure, plots were concentrated, thus making for more rational exploitation while communal lands shrank as privatization progressed. This process continued throughout the seventeenth century, but the enclosure system reached its peak in the buoyant economic situation which prevailed in the second half of the eighteenth century with up to 3,000 acts of parliament promulgated between 1760 and 1820. Once again the expansion of farm holdings produced its victims: the peasants who lacked any title to maintain their tenancies (squatters, cottagers) or did not have enough capital to resist the pressure by the powerful (freeholders, copyholders) and were finally obliged to abandon their fields and sign on as labourers on their own lands or escape to the towns to work in factories or, in the worst assumption, to finish up under the poor laws interned in workhouses – the workshops invented by the capitalist conception of public assistance. At all events, the ultimate result was the creation of great farm holdings worked by tenants who were able to meet regular increases in their rentals from the rising price obtained for their harvests; the employment of paid labourers was another feature of this system. Big domains coexisted with the more modest farms of the yeomen and freeholders who had been able to preserve their fields, often through alliances with the local aristocracy against other less privileged social groups in the process of land enclosure and privatization of common land. In both cases the new farms had the ability to make investments, and to establish a strong capital and labour market, the possibility of selling their surpluses and also the backing of legislation which increasingly tended to protect the interests of producers against those of consumers. Thus England gradually became the model of a fully capitalized agriculture; it became the model to be imitated by the continental countries and the true expression of economic success.

The other primary sub-sectors

The growth of agriculture brought with it a far-reaching transformation of cattle-rearing. The progress of individualism on the land, the elimination of common land (some of which had normally been used for grazing) and the search for greater profitability were accompanied by at least two major phenomena: the progressive development of cattle sheds and the gradual subordination of cattle-raising to agriculture. The logical consequence of these factors was the gradual decline of the sheep flocks in favour of cattle, even when the ox was replaced by the horse as the draft animal; horses were preferred by the new agriculture because they were faster even if they ploughed more superficial furrows,

quite apart from their prestige which was maintained and growing as a social symbol. Animals were now assessed primarily in terms of their production of manure, second as beasts of burden and draft animals, third for the marketable products which they could provide (meat, milk, chest, bristles, wool, and so on) and last of all in terms of their contribution to the diet of labourers. However, the decline of an independent cattle-raising sector did not imply a lack of interest in this activity since the eighteenth century was notable for its efforts at cross-breeding, the specialization of herds, increasingly high yields and the importation of selected breeds. Alongside this vital contribution to the development of farming, cattle-raising continued to play a fundamental role as a source of supply to the textile industry and to increase the protein content in the diet of the privileged classes.

The protein diet in Western Europe has always been complemented by another sector of primary activity, the fishery. The history of food habits and also of the eighteenth-century European economy would not be complete without an allusion to the important contribution made by the fisheries sub-sector. This was divided between traditional coastal fishing which supplied fresh fish to the coastal populations and fishing on the high seas on an industrialized basis and with marketing outlets, which brought large quantities of salt fish (especially cod in its various forms, but also herrings and sardines among other species) within reach of all social groups and in particular the popular classes. Thus the high volume of catches associated with the great mobility of a trade which reached every corner of the European coastline, made an enormous contribution to increasing the availability of food for the population and laying the spectre of the crisis of subsistence; ultimately, it facilitated the continuation of the process of economic growth led by the nations of Western Europe.

The development of agriculture generated at the same time an intellectual current which backed up this expansion. The eighteenth century was the century of agricultural experimentation with names, especially in England, which became famous for their success in increasing farm yields – such as the well-known example of Lord Townshend. This was also the age of the theorists in the virtues of the primary sector (agriculture, cattle-raising and fishing) whose exponents were legion, although here too a few figures stand out such as Jethro Tull and Arthur Young in England, Cosimo Tullio in Italy or Henri Louis DuRoi de Meneville in France. The latter was the first of a school of economists who were particularly concerned with agricultural matters and became known as the physiocrats. The physiocrats who wrote their texts and circulated their theories in the second half of the eighteenth century were the most typical intellectual group of a period of European economic life in which material progress seemed to depend largely on the attention paid to the rural areas and to primary activities in general and also to trade in agricultural products; their basic tenet was the need for freedom to prevail, just as it dominates in nature itself. They were responsible in large measure for the fashion for the country which took root in aristocratic circles and was already reflected in the devotion of the King of England, George III ('Farmer George'), to agricultural matters or in the construction of the miniature bicolor farm complex of the Trianon for the Queen of France, Marie-Antoinette. This selfsame climate was apparent in the initiatives taken by various European societies established to develop an awareness among their fellow citizens of the

benefits of agricultural modernization. Spurred on by the high earnings obtained from farm products and also by the spectacle of an increasingly well ordered and cultivated rural Europe, all the social groups began, in the famous dictum of Voltaire 'to talk about cereals'.


The expansion of trade

One of the fundamental innovations which occurred in the agricultural sector was the breaking of the strict limits of a subsistence economy and the channelling of a growing proportion of surpluses onto the market. Thus, an increasingly high percentage of farm production reached the market and swelled the current of trade, so contributing to the growth of another sector which played a decisive role in eighteenth century economic expansion, namely the mercantile sector. Trade multiplied and accelerated significantly as a result of the increase in supply and demand at both the domestic (growth of the population and of its purchasing power) and external (increase in consumption on the European periphery and in the colonial world beyond the frontiers of Europe) levels. This expansion of trade and market growth may be said to have given birth to a generalized mercantile economy which was one of the prerequisites for the industrial revolution.

The eighteenth century also saw the introduction of more sophisticated mercantile and financial instruments needed by commerce and the creation of new infrastructures which facilitated the constant growth of trade. The road infrastructure was improved mainly by the laying down of thousands of kilometres of new roads in an unprecedented State endeavour whose achievements astonished contemporary observers, especially in France and in Spain, where it may be said that the bases were laid for the future highway networks. In other spheres, river navigation and above all the construction of canals provided a dense network of alternative means of communication to road traffic: efforts here were concentrated on Germany and England where the canal fever was in effect the prelude to the industrial revolution. Harbours were also modernized with the construction of stone piers to moor ships, dykes and breakwaters to prevent the invasion of sand and sediment, customs and health installations, warehouses and other facilities to cope with the incessant bustle generated by maritime traffic.

Although roads, canals and ports were modernized, the vehicles used for transport kept their traditional forms. Eighteenth-century Europe continued to be a Europe of carts, sloops, rafts and sailing vessels. In the case of maritime transport, although navigation became safer with the discovery of the technique of calculating longitudes on board ships, the vessels themselves, especially those used for overseas trade, were slow to acquire a few more advanced techniques such as larger sails, copper lining of the hulls and the technique of seawater distillation on board. Against the background of this limited progress, the age of the railways and steam navigation was still a long way off, but the quantitative advances were nevertheless particularly significant. The English merchant fleet reached 1.5 million tons in 1790, while the French fleet totalled 1.2 million and the Dutch 600,000 (see Map 14).

The extraordinary multiplication of means of payment was one of the instruments which permitted the expansion of trade to such an extent that some authors postulate, without much foundation in the present state of research, a cause and



Map 14 Fleets in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century (after R. Romano, 1962).

effect relationship between the abundant money supply and the economic expansion of the eighteenth century, just as the price revolution was for some time advanced as the essential explanation for the expansion of the sixteenth century.

In reality, Europe was once again able to find new metal specie when the need arose. This time, the opportunity came from the discovery of the substantial Brazilian deposits in Minas Gerais which supplied such large quantities of gold to the old continent that the stock of gold in circulation had in effect doubled by the end of the century. Silver too did not lag behind, and the fall in Peruvian production was compensated by the intensive working of the Mexican silver mines which also doubled the stock available in Europe as the century advanced. This availability of precious metals was backed by laborious but successful processes of monetary stabilization which put an end, in practically all countries, to the pathological fluctuations that had affected currencies in the seventeenth century and established lasting monetary patterns.

The instruments of trade continued essentially to be the same as those used in the immediately previous stage when the main innovations had taken place, but the more modern formulae spread everywhere. It was thus possible to observe the improvement of commercial laws which tended to become codified, the creation of institutions to represent trade interests (consulates and chambers of commerce), the appearance of companies specializing in particular branches of activity (such as insurance), the multiplication of centres

of commercial credit, the consolidation of companies with share capital and of the principle of limited liability. In that sense, the eighteenth century prolonged the existence of the privileged companies (despite a number of resounding failures, such as that of the South Sea Company in England or the *Compagnie de l'Occident* in France) and in fact facilitated the creation of many new ones, dedicated primarily to the colonial sphere as a favourite formula of belated mercantilism in the more backward countries which were now seeking equality with their more advanced counterparts. But the eighteenth century gave preference to private initiative with companies devoted to all types of business (sales for their own account or on commission, transport companies, insurance companies, bondsmen loans and so on) and to all types of traffic (different routes, combination of coastal and overseas trade and so on), thanks to the extreme flexibility of their financial and organizational structures which were incomparably superior to those of the public companies.

The European financial system underwent far-reaching changes which enhanced its ability to respond to the new requirements of the mercantile economy. Amsterdam consolidated its role as the effective financial hub of European trade, the cornerstone of the international payments system which after taking a bilateral form in previous centuries was now being converted into an infinitely more flexible multilateral system. The private banks not only continued to play an indispensable role in deposit, transfer and discounting operations, but also came to dominate the system of international credit, radiating out from a series of centres

specializing in this type of business, such as Amsterdam, Genoa, Frankfurt, Geneva and others. An accompanying development was the creation of State banks which, after having been established in England at the end of the seventeenth century spread to Scotland (1727) and Spain (1782) in the eighteenth century and proved an extremely versatile instrument with their multiplicity of functions as public treasurer, issuing and bill rediscounting agents and suppliers of banking services to other banks. One fundamental factor for the future was the enormous growth of the capital market in the eighteenth century, fuelled by the profits of mercantile trade and able to offer at low cost the credits needed to maintain economic growth on all fronts.

The increase in demand

Aimed with this range of instruments, trade was able to benefit both from the growth of domestic demand and from the positive changes on the external market. The growth in internal demand depended in turn on the increase in population, the changes taking place in agriculture which obliged a growing number of peasants to obtain supplies on the open market, the progress of the purchasing power of some rural dwellers as a result of the process of proto-industrialization, the growing uniformity of consumption and the growth of the urban centres (Paris, London, Madrid, Rome) where quantitatively and qualitatively important groups of customers were to be found. The growth of the domestic market and the change of its structure, over and above the role of the external market, thus created new outlets for the massive production which already characterized the incipient industrial revolution.

However, external demand continued to exercise a powerful influence on the development of trade. To such an extent that some observers have considered that without the markets on the European semi-periphery (the subservient lands) and the colonial periphery (especially America with its system of slavery), the 'industrial breach' could not have been opened. Today the role of these markets which are weaker than the markets of the interior seems to have been limited, even though their rate of growth is sometimes faster, but it is hard to imagine the development of Europe in the eighteenth century without taking account of the spectacular growth of the new colonialism introduced into the American lands in the previous century, without allowing for the process of integration of the Asian world into the orbit of European interests and the change in the structure of trade between the metropolitan countries and the colonies, based on the concept of a colonial pact which subordinated the latter to the interests of the former. In a word, the subservience of the periphery played a decisive role in the expansion and modernization of the European productive apparatus, at the cost of the economic backwardness of the colonial world.

The eighteenth century brought notable innovations to the relations maintained by the European commercial companies with the Asian world. The system of coastal trading establishments set up by the Portuguese in this area throughout the sixteenth century was replaced in the next century by the arrival in strength of companies created by the Dutch, the English and the French in order to gain a foothold in the Asian trade. The eighteenth century also witnessed the effective expulsion of the French as influence was shared between the Dutch and the English, the implementation of a system of integral colonization which

led the Dutch to become established in Indonesia and the English to lay the groundwork of their administration in India with a far-reaching transformation of the content of European trade in the area. Thus, imports of textile raw materials, cotton fabrics and the traditional spices gave way to the dominance of tea which was to become the most highly prized product of the Eastern trade at a time when compensation in silver for the European trade deficit was progressively replaced by the consignment of manufactured textile and metal goods at the cost of de-industrialization of India under the control of the English who completed their domination of the region and guaranteed for themselves the hegemony of trade in India itself and with the Chinese port of Canton. Thus Asia was incorporated into the world capitalist system and had to accept its subordination to the economic interests of Atlantic Europe.

Far-reaching transformations also took place in the American colonial world. America continued to be the principal supplier of mintable metal which enabled it to avoid the stranglehold of the European economy, but the range of goods supplied by it became diversified to include industrial raw materials (dyestuffs, leather, timber and above all cotton) and certain food products which were consumed on a massive and growing scale (sugar, cocoa, coffee). Many of these products were placed on the metropolitan market, but a substantial proportion also went to supply a flourishing re-export trade at the heart of the European circuits of redistribution. At the same time, increasing importance came to attach to the role of the colonies as recipients of manufactured goods produced in the metropolitan nation. England provides the most outstanding example of this phenomenon; it was able to extend its circle of overseas customers thanks to the extraordinary population growth of its North American colonies, the progressive occupation of new territories in Canada and the West Indies and the legal or illegal trade with the Spanish colonies, to say nothing of the similar role played by the Asian markets (see Figures 16 and 17). The colonial trade also continued to be a superb instrument for the accumulation of capital, thanks to the imposition of unequal terms of trade, speculative profiteering from war situations, lucrative smuggling activities and inter-regional trade which went hand in hand with trade with the metropolitan country. Then there was of course the most important area of all trade with America, that is the slave-trade.

Under the international organization of labour imposed by the European nations, if America was to supply precious metals, industrial raw materials and the products of its plantations, this in turn meant that Africa must supply the slave-labour used on American farms. Thus a triangular traffic became one of the pillars of the world economy, mobilizing a current which started out in the metropolitan countries (essentially England responsible for some 40 per cent of the traffic, Portugal with 30 per cent and France with about 20 per cent), passed on through the supply bases in the Gulf of Guinea and shipped to America between 1701 and 18 to up to 6 million slaves paid for in North American cotton, Brazilian sugar or West Indian indigo which returned to Europe to complete the cycle.

England was the great beneficiary of the colonial reconversion in the eighteenth century as the series of conflicts which it fought with success brought it control over India and a sizeable part of the Asian trade, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, Canada and some Caribbean islands which were added to its establishments in North America occupied

(In £ thousand)					
1700	4,337	1734	5,403	1768	9,695
1701	4,641	1735	5,927	1769	8,984
1702	3,621	1736	6,118	1770	9,503
1703	4,521	1737	6,668	1771	11,219
1704	4,262	1738	6,982	1772	10,503
1705	—	1739	5,572	1773	8,876
1706	4,768	1740	5,111	1774	10,049
1707	4,795	1741	5,995	1775	9,729
1708	5,069	1742	6,095	1776	9,275
1709	4,406	1743	6,868	1777	8,750
1710	4,729	1744	5,411	1778	7,754
1711	4,088	1745	5,739	1779	7,013
1712	—	1746	7,201	1780	8,033
1713	4,490	1747	6,744	1781	7,043
1714	5,564	1748	7,317	1782	8,605
1715	5,015	1749	9,081	1783	10,096
1716	4,807	1750	9,474	1784	10,497
1717	5,384	1751	8,775	1785	10,315
1718	4,381	1752	8,226	1786	11,191
1719	4,514	1753	8,732	1787	11,310
1720	4,611	1754	8,318	1788	11,937
1721	4,512	1755	7,915	1789	12,970
1722	5,293	1756	8,632	1790	14,057
1723	4,725	1757	8,574	1791	15,896
1724	5,107	1758	8,763	1792	17,451
1725	5,667	1759	10,079	1793	13,117
1726	5,001	1760	10,981	1794	15,863
1727	4,605	1761	10,804	1795	15,679
1728	4,910	1762	9,400	1796	17,968
1729	4,940	1763	9,522	1797	15,805
1730	5,326	1764	11,536	1798	18,299
1731	5,081	1765	10,122	1799	22,465
1732	5,675	1766	9,900	1800	22,456
1733	5,823	1767	9,492		

Figure 16 Exports of English produce and manufactures.
Source: E. Boody-Schumpeter, *English Overseas Trade Statistics*,
Oxford, 1960, p. 15.

(In £ thousand)					
1700	2,132	1734	2,897	1768	5,425
1701	2,229	1735	3,402	1769	4,454
1702	1,177	1736	3,585	1770	4,764
1703	1,649	1737	3,414	1771	5,905
1704	1,925	1738	3,214	1772	5,656
1705	—	1739	3,272	1773	5,888
1706	1,485	1740	3,806	1774	5,868
1707	1,645	1741	3,575	1775	5,474
1708	1,495	1742	3,480	1776	4,454
1709	1,507	1743	4,442	1777	3,903
1710	1,566	1744	3,780	1778	3,797
1711	1,875	1745	3,333	1779	5,580
1712	—	1746	3,566	1780	4,319
1713	2,066	1747	3,031	1781	3,526
1714	2,440	1748	3,824	1782	3,750
1715	1,908	1749	3,598	1783	3,756
1716	2,243	1750	3,225	1784	3,675
1717	2,613	1751	3,644	1785	4,764
1718	1,980	1752	3,469	1786	4,200
1719	2,321	1753	3,511	1787	4,445
1720	2,300	1754	3,470	1788	4,346
1721	2,689	1755	3,150	1789	5,201
1722	2,972	1756	3,089	1790	4,828
1723	2,671	1757	3,755	1791	5,539
1724	2,494	1758	3,855	1792	6,224
1725	2,815	1759	3,869	1793	6,250
1726	2,692	1760	3,714	1794	9,801
1727	2,670	1761	4,069	1795	10,657
1728	3,597	1762	4,351	1796	11,228
1729	3,299	1763	5,146	1797	11,834
1730	3,223	1764	4,725	1798	13,624
1731	2,782	1765	4,451	1799	11,609
1732	3,196	1766	4,193	1800	18,350
1733	3,015	1767	4,375		

Figure 17 Export of foreign and colonial goods from England and Wales.
Source: E. Boody-Schumpeter, *English Overseas Trade Statistics*,
Oxford, 1960, p. 16.

during previous centuries. This situation enabled it not only to accumulate vast amounts of capital but, still more important, to secure the cheap supplies of the cotton needed by its factories and to find in the colonial world (and later on in the independent United States) a major clientele to sustain the massive production of its textile and metallurgical industries.

France for its part found itself in control of a number of trading centres in the Asian world and a few Caribbean islands. But despite the exiguity of its colonial territory, overseas trade assumed such importance that it was even said to have become 'colonialized', especially because of the role of the triangular trade; this consisted in the exchange of African slaves for coffee and sugar from Santo Domingo or Martinique.

Although in decline, the old Iberian colonial powers did maintain some of their positions in the eighteenth century at the cost of accepting growing interference by other European nations in their overseas possessions. Portugal was left with its important enclaves of Macao in China and Goa in India, while it made its bases in Guinea available for the triangular trade in sugar and gold with Brazil, even though its trade was mediated through its commercial treaties with England. For its part, Spain deployed a sustained effort to recover its complete monopoly of trade with its possessions in the Indies by making use of administrative means (transfer of the Casa de la Contratación and the Consulate from Seville to Cádiz), economic measures (tax reforms, liberalization of

trade) and military actions (strengthening of the fortifications); it thus achieved a relative degree of nationalization of its trade on the eve of the definitive accession of its colonies to independence.

In brief, trade played an extraordinarily dynamic role in the process of economic expansion of the eighteenth century. Domestic exchanges multiplied, thus contributing to the creation of increasingly homogeneous national markets, while international trade developed strongly. For Western Europe, the most significant changes were the strengthening of the ties between the various countries in the area, the increasing strength of the East-West transverse axis (corn, timber, iron in return for manufactured goods and re-exported colonial goods) and the spectacular advance of overseas trade as new forms of colonization became established and the slave-trade burgeoned. It has rightly been said that the European Atlantic zone came to be the driving force behind the world economy.

The expansion of industry

Finally, the historic role of mercantile capital which had been one of the main forces in European development since the early Middle Ages, was drawing to a close. As a result of the far-reaching changes that were under way in the manufacturing sector, mercantile capital was soon to take second place to

industrial capital which was responsible for the economic take-off in the period which followed immediately afterwards.

The radically new phenomenon witnessed in the European economy of the eighteenth century and which, starting out from Western Europe, heralded a new epoch in the material development of humankind became known as the industrial revolution.

Essentially, the outline of this phenomenon could just be perceived in the eighteenth century, at the time confined essentially to England, but it did in a sense give the century its true significance. This time, the combined process of demographic growth and agrarian expansion did not end in a sudden crisis as Malthus might have predicted in the light of past experience: the growth which had largely followed traditional patterns was consolidated by the process of industrialization which permitted the uninterrupted expansion of productive forces and the self-sustaining growth of capitalism.

Even before the new industry made its appearance, the secondary sector had already experienced a brilliant career throughout the eighteenth century. What is more it managed to do so within the existing productive framework. Of course co-operative industry which was still the most extensive and omnipresent had already become outmoded; when it was not abandoned in the least profitable sectors and those dedicated to articles for direct consumption, it placed itself in the service of mixed organizations in which guild members took their part either as wage-earning employees who merely kept the guild label or as self-employed workers under the domestic system, or finally as entrepreneurs who had broken out from the narrow confines of the workshop to freely employ their less-favoured colleagues.

However, it was in the eighteenth century that the oligarchical and immobile structure under which the guilds had been suffering throughout modern times was consolidated and reached its culmination. This while on the one hand the richer guilds exploded from the inside as their members sought to use their knowledge in more stimulating ventures in the larger undertakings, the poorer guilds became a stronghold of mediocrity or total failure, bodies whose members, incapable of benefiting from the environment of economic expansion and the opportunities held out by it, accepted an insecure guarantee of their daily bread and the traditional recompense of a job well done, a value that was not highly prized in a world undergoing rapid transformation. On the other hand, the corporation was the territory of routine, lack of incentive, rigidity and stringent rules, of technical stagnation, production quotas and economic Malthusianism radically opposed to the capitalist theories that were now beginning to prevail. The corporation was the world of fencible resistance to change in the sector of manufacturing industry.

To complete the picture, a craft workshop is expensive. As a system peculiar to subsistence economies, the workshop combines within it the processes of production and marketing and takes no account, at least in theory, of the division between capital and labour and of the principle of the technical division of labour. Moreover, like any other monopoly and despite the mechanisms of municipal control and competition, more theoretical than real, stemming from the theory of the fair price, it tends to promote artificial prices on the margin of the logic of the market.

Such were the reasons for which the industrial sector found its salvation from the crisis of the seventeenth century in a formula which was to prove highly successful for the future: it consisted in the transfer of manufacturing production to

the rural areas by renovating a system that had already been known since early medieval times and now spread everywhere. This was the domestic system used to organize industrial activities dispersed throughout the agrarian world, a rural industry which was to constitute the key element at this juncture in the industrial history of Europe which we know as the period of proto-industrialization.

The domestic system in fact opened up new horizons for the secondary sector in Europe. The principle was simple and is well-known: it consisted in giving piecework to rural families who used the time left over after tilling the fields to produce pieces which the entrepreneur then sold on the market. The advantages of this system are innumerable: greater elasticity of supply which is able to adjust perfectly to demand; a competitive edge over urban manufacturing because of the mechanism of externalizing costs under which only a part of the needs of the rural family are satisfied, whereas the guild member is entirely dependent on his craft work for his livelihood; greater flexibility in the movement of goods and a greater possibility of reaching supra-regional and international markets; greater freedom in placing contracts and in technical innovation, in the adaptation of production to the new requirements or simply to the currents of fashion in a Europe which was becoming increasingly prosperous and sophisticated. At the same time, this system had a secondary effect of vital importance: the increase in the purchasing power of the rural population which, it must not be forgotten, still represented four-fifths of the total population.

Thus the rural landscape of Western Europe was transformed by the presence of an infinity of textile workshops characteristic of the period of proto-industrialization. The physiognomy of many regions underwent a decisive change with the presence of a succession of textile workers and spinners, manufacturers of drapery, linen and canvas and also textiles made of cotton – the fibre of the future which was too new to be affected by the old guild system and was immediately integrated into the domestic system before later on becoming the leading protagonist in the triumph of the factory system of modern industry.

But rural industry was not confined to the textile branch; it also extended to Geneva watch-making, Solingen cutlery, Ardennes nails and Midlands metallurgy. Despite the incursions of the more advanced concentrated manufacturing system, this industry was victoriously to survive the appearance of the first manifestations of factories and retain some of its markets, while also successfully incorporating some of the mechanical inventions of the new technological era which was in its infancy at the end of the eighteenth century. In return, proto-industrialization was to bring a qualified labour-force well trained in the traditional industrial skills, and specialized technical personnel to confront the new economic adventure which could be discerned on the horizon. England was the first beneficiary of this legacy. Its 'slow semi-industrialization' provided it with an ample reservoir of talent, well equipped to handle textile and metallurgical techniques.

Thus European proto-industrialization may be seen as a transitional system which was able to play the historic role of providing technical personnel, a rural clientele with a higher purchasing power and source of the capital drained by the merchant and manufacturing bourgeoisie for the new industry which was arising with its concentrated structure and was soon to prevail in the organization of production.

However, the mere concentration of factories is not the only criterion for a modern industry. In Western Europe,

the domestic system coexisted with various forms of concentrated organization such as 'manufactures' in the narrow sense of the term, or the state factories or royal manufacturing concerns which the enlightened régimes, emulating Colbert's system, brought to the more backward countries of the area.

The inherent nature of some branches of industry had already necessitated the geographical concentration of the production process at a much earlier stage. Such was the case with mining which, because of this concentration and the capital which it required, may – with some exaggeration – be described as the 'test bench of capitalism'. It was also the case with shipyards especially when they were converted, as in the exemplary case of Venice, into a great state concern. But 'the manufacture' in the true sense of the word was established above all in the textile sector, pinned fabrics are probably the most typical example of the products of this régime. The 'manufacture' benefited from the geographical concentration of the processes of preparation and finishing of the products concerned, with the resulting fragmentation and systematic unification of labour which led to a substantial increase in productivity. Its nature as a transitional phenomenon between the domestic system and the factory was characterized by the predominance of capital in circulation over fixed capital and by the lack of mechanization beyond a strictly basic level.

Despite the efforts made and their significant presence throughout Europe, industrial establishments founded by state initiative and known under the generic term of Royal Manufactures were to prove less important for the future of European industry. These establishments did incorporate certain major advances such as the geographical concentration of the production process, the generous investment of capital, the employment of a large labour force on the margin of the corporative system, centralized management of the undertaking and investment in modern technologies. However, a whole series of other factors deprived them of the seal of modernity: the financial dependence of the state undertaking obviated the need to calculate profitability (as it was in practice aided by tax exemptions and rebates), the siting remote from the centres of consumption as a consequence of its frequent character as an experimental centre, the preference given to high quality production for an aristocratic and therefore limited clientele (crystal, porcelain, tapestry factories) or the production of essential supplies for the state under a monopoly system or with preferential treatment (factories making arms, military uniforms and naval fittings) and the dependence on the changing interests of their official sponsors. With these features, the royal manufactures appear to be a typical creation of late feudalism, a manifestation of the modernization policy of enlightened reformism which was destined to disappear with the disappearance of the *ancien régime*.

While domestic industry and the 'manufacture' paved the way for the appearance of modern industry, the factory system was the characteristic feature of the industrial revolution. This system in fact represented the final stage which combined the culmination of the process of concentration (as fixed capital won the day over circulating capital) and the decisive impetus for mechanization of the productive process which came from the introduction of the new technological advances and the use of the new sources of energy placed in the service of industry.

The factory system was only established in some areas of industry, more specifically in metallurgy and the textile sector,

particularly that of cotton. The cotton industry was the spearhead of the industrial revolution, combining all the requirements necessary for its expansion. Cotton was a new fibre introduced on the margin of the corporations, demand for it was massive because of its lightness and ability to respond to the tastes of the consumer and it also lent itself readily to the process of mechanization. Demand for cotton was heralded by the distribution of calico imported by the English from India and cotton immediately made its entry into the mechanized spinning mills before passing on to the mechanical looms and printing workshops and launching out to conquer the whole market from the interior to the European semi-periphery and the colonial world.

Iron metallurgy and the steel industry for their part benefited from the methods introduced to utilize the calorific energy of coal, the introduction of steam engines and the new rolling and puddling techniques, to embark upon a history of progress which was to continue in the next century (see Map 15).


Thus cotton and iron were the protagonists in the transition from an epoch of scarce resources in which labour, timber and hydraulic energy dominated to a new age of more abundant resources characterized by the primacy of capital, coal and steam. This was how the industrial revolution began.

The origins of the industrial revolution

At this time, however, the phenomenon was highly restricted and confined to all intents and purposes to England. Here, the revolutionary change was reflected in a spectacular and sustained increase in productivity which, from 1780 onwards, resulted in an annual growth of 1 to 1.5 per cent in the national product and up to 2 per cent in the industrial product. A process of this magnitude cannot be given any single or simplistic explanation, but must be seen in terms of the convergence of a series of significant events which occurred in all sectors of the economy.

Thus, the technological revolution did not provide the impetus which for a long time was attributed to it. Even if the catalogue of inventions is impressive and its importance in guaranteeing the success of the industrial revolution cannot be underestimated, its onset appears to us to have been a consequence of the pressure of industry to find solutions capable of preventing the asphyxiation of expansion and as the achievement not so much of intellectual theories as of a group of technicians and artisans who confronted the practical and concrete problems raised by the requirements of a manufacturing sector which was called upon to meet a steadily rising demand. The classical example is that of the evolution of the textile industry whose looms became much more efficient with the use of the flying shuttle and required increasing quantities of thread; this had to be supplied by the series of simple machines designed for this purpose until the demand for thread exceeded the capacity of the manual looms which had to be mechanized. A technological advance thus prevented paralysis of the process and enabled the critical point to be passed at which the traditional tools of industry would have become an insuperable obstacle to its continued growth. Technical inventiveness not only broke through this barrier, but permitted an acceleration of production which had been inconceivable up to then.

New technologies were needed but also capital to purchase them and invest in the new establishments. The existence of a prior accumulation of capital ceased to be the corner-



Map 15 The principal metallurgical zones in Europe during the eighteenth century (after P. Léon: *Economies et sociétés pré-industrielles*, 1650-1750, Paris, 1970).

stone of the theory explaining the industrial revolution when it was realized that the mere availability of cash was not a sufficient reason for industrialization and that the development of the first factories did not require heavy investment; nevertheless this capital accumulation is still seen as one of the prerequisites for the industrial revolution although a far-reaching change in the procedure for mobilizing capital was also necessary, and a fundamental change in investment strategies to enable accumulated capital to be converted into a lever for transformation of the productive system.

This change cannot be explained by obscure references to the collective psychology of the mercantile or industrial bourgeoisie, but rather by the objective conditions of economic activity whose evolution enabled the necessary incentives to be offered to attract the attention of investors. These investors were recruited from the ranks of the landowners who had grown rich through the increase in their agricultural rents, tradesmen who directed their profits out of the area of circulation into the productive sectors and to the entrepreneurs and engineers involved in the industrial sector who had been schooled in the earlier manufacturing systems and decided in favour of the process of technological and organizational change required by the new economic situation.

Mass production which characterized the onset of the industrial revolution was only made possible by the existence of a market capable of absorbing the goods supplied by the new manufacturing establishments. Thus, internal population growth went hand in hand with an increase in the purchasing

power of the rural population as a result of proto-industrialization and the incorporation of new consumers in the overseas territories to bring about a significant broadening of the market and produce a strong demand pressure.

On the other hand, the modernization of agriculture (and of the primary sector in general) facilitated the new population growth thanks to a better supply of food, while the increase in incomes from the land enabled capital to be transferred more readily from the rural areas to urban activities; at the same time, the transformations of the structure of ownership resulted in a growing rural population which was dependent on the market and became gradually incorporated into the industrial world, although not to the extent which had been thought initially.

Finally, the same process of modernization which led to the improvement of agricultural yields also occurred in other sectors of the economy. Thus the transport revolution brought with it great transformations which in the space of a single century (from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century) enabled England to have a system of paths and a dense networks of canals, roads, and finally railways. Similarly, the development of trade guaranteed the creation of a genuine national market which has been described as the 'most homogeneous market in the world'. Ultimately, the development of the domestic and manufacture system was the soil in which the new forms of organization of industrial production were able to take root, benefiting from tradition, experience and capital from the previous formulae in order to establish the modern factory system.

All these factors converged in England in the late eighteenth century to give it total leadership in the process of industrialization. According to the leading specialists in this sector, the requirements for industrialization may be summarized as the liberalization of the factors of production (labour, land and capital), the creation of a material, institutional and personal (communications, juridical system, labour) infrastructure and the existence of a market (domestic and external) capable of unlimited expansion.

With a certain time lag, the success of England went on to be the success of Western Europe as a whole. The general increase in population, the growing capacity of agriculture, the incorporation into the international trade network and the establishment of the factory system were realities shared by all the countries of the zone in the first half of the nineteenth century. And the transformations which took place in the other areas of social reality and heralded the transition from the feudalism to capitalism were also shared: the triumph of the bourgeoisie as the dominant social class and of liberalism as the political regime typifying the new age.

The decisive factor was the breakdown of a structural blockage which had held the European societies in bondage for many centuries and prevented their growth. The chains might have been broken during the expansive phase of the thirteenth century, or the continuous development of the sixteenth century, but on both occasions the impetus foundered on insuperable difficulties and ended in crisis. Now the economic horizon ceased to be limited by the barriers defined by the feudal system. The industrial revolution paved the way for capitalism, for the second phase of European expansion, the conquering bourgeoisie and the liberal State. Europe thus ushered in a new phase in the history of humanity.

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I 2.2

POLITICS AND STATES

I 2.2.1

POLITICS AND STATES DURING THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

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From the mid-fifteenth century onwards new forms of organization of political power developed in Western Europe, endowed with a profound internal cohesion and logic. Their main features included the concentration of power in the hands of a Prince, the tendency to monopolize military might, the construction of an apparatus of bureaucracy with varying degrees of stability, the development of institutions, an increasingly homogeneous society and the legitimation and consolidation of the entire system in the service of the idea of the divine origin of power. As these political realities evolved, generally with an aspiration to achieve internal affirmation and a position of hegemony in relation to the outside world, the need arose for them to be supported by subordinate powers which, like the feudal nobility or the ecclesiastical groups in their various manifestations, shaped their nature and sovereignty. Although it must be recognized that what we term the Modern State was often typified by an alliance with many different political powers, sovereignty remains the concept and the instrument which is used in theoretical writings of the period to establish a hierarchical distinction between the power concentrated in the person of the Prince and the other political powers: it is the Prince who at one and the same time legislates, governs and passes judgment; that is to say, the Prince holds sovereign sway in relation to the other effective political powers which do not enjoy such sovereignty.

The political theorists who, in the Middle Ages and until the mid-sixteenth century, had constructed their treatises in the form of advice addressed to Princes for the organization of the exercise of their power and their public behaviour, went on, in the second half of the sixteenth century and until well into the eighteenth, to adopt a different political approach: the new treatises presented as a description of the art of good government, or of the art of government in general, set out first and foremost to inculcate principles of administration applicable to Princes, their ministers and society at large. Both the change which political theory underwent as a result of the weakening of the feudal structures and the visible strength of the albeit recent nation States which necessitated a transition from the art of government in a narrower frame to the art of governing others, and also

the structured definition of ideas required by a recognition of the importance of the ability to administer, went on to constitute a complex political corpus. This can be approached from three different angles. In the first place, government was conceived as the expression of a moral code which fully justified unconditional obedience to the constituted power; in a structure based on a hierarchical pyramid, this obedience would involve acceptance and respect by the subjects for the person of the king and his ministers and acceptance by the latter of a higher authority in the shape of God. The religious movements of the Reformation and also those currents which remained faithful to the tradition of Roman Catholicism, maintained that not only Princes, but also their subjects, had a moral responsibility. The behaviour of their subjects was of great concern to those in power. Instances of disobedience within society were after all commonplace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; it will suffice here to cite a few particularly significant examples from the long list of social conflicts which occurred in modern European space and time. These ranged from the clans and factions which, in Castile and Aragon, rose up in disobedience against the inadequacy of the internal administration and the attempts by Emperor Charles V (see Plate 24) to achieve hegemony and also against the corruption brought about by bad government practices and abuses of the feudal system, to the war of the German peasants in 1525 which represented a degree of disobedience such that Luther felt himself obliged to equate the authority of the feudal lords with that of God, to describe the nobility as the trustees of divine ire and to assert that all material, and even religious, demands might seriously threaten and change the established moral, social and economic order; other revolts, rebellions and revolutions proliferated throughout Europe and broke out successively in the Low Countries, Italy, France, England and in the Iberian Peninsula during the Thirty Years War and continued after it had ended. The underlying issue everywhere was the morality of governments, their alienation from reality and their inability to gain acceptance for a concept of the common good founded on privilege.

Second, government can be viewed as a form of intervention in every aspect of daily reality. That reality is

essentially economic. The various governments of the sixteenth and seventeenth century interpreted most of their political and administrative functions as an activity whose ultimate objective was always to consolidate their own hegemony. From their endeavours to rule the largest possible number of people, seen as a corner-stone of the structure of the active population and of their armies, to the protectionism and restrictions imposed on agricultural, industrial and commercial activities, the governments of Western Europe drew on the writings in defence of mercantilism to define and attempt to perpetuate their policy of hegemony. Their action thus sought first and foremost to consolidate the wealth of their own country by ensuring the competitiveness of its system of production even in similarly structured external markets, with a view to establishing and maintaining a position of hegemony. The principle accepted as a rule of the international political game, namely that no one can win unless someone else loses, turned the geographical area of Western Europe into a mosaic consisting of successive hegemonies whose theatre of operations and conflicts of interest not only involved confrontations between the nations on their own territory, but were also often transferred to areas beyond Europe. In consequence, the hegemonies were short-lived. The Empire, in the most basic acceptance of the term, passed briefly through the Iberian peninsula before shifting towards northern and Western Europe: the French domination, the Dutch hegemony and the British Empire are good examples of an approach which required, on the part of the governments concerned, a large military budget and the establishment of colonies to sustain it. In addition to these minimum requirements, governments found themselves obliged to increase the productive potential of their respective societies, leaving only a narrow margin of manoeuvre for private initiative; the mercantilist illusion had exclusive emphasis on the accumulation of minerals which could be minted into coinage, on the armaments industry, on a race to exploit new territories and on the control of lines of communication and transport. All this tended to privilege certain specific economic activities to the detriment of others; agriculture, left to the sole devices of landowners and their tenants, was the great loser in the sixteenth century in face of strong intervention to support the mining industry, the processing sector and commerce. Only in the north-western part of Europe, in England, The Netherlands and some parts of France and Italy, did a number of agrarian innovations lay the basis for the far-reaching economic change which was to occur later. All this required a sustained political effort since the hegemonies tended to prolong their existence by eliminating the internal and external political obstacles to the development of their freedom of action.

The third perspective involves the consideration of government as a political undertaking. For this purpose statistics became necessary. To acquire a more accurate knowledge of the existing situation, the various sovereign powers and their many associates carried out surveys, censuses, polls and enumerations of various kinds which were essential instruments for the assessment of taxation rates, the size of the armed forces, the active population, the number of persons exempt from the payment of tax and the population which, for religious, ethnic, economic or cultural reasons, remained on the margins of the general programme for social uniformity. The need for statistics led on to the specialization of political government: the modern process of institutional construction cannot be understood without consideration of the ultimate objective of hegemony which lay behind it.

Statistics and the institutions were simply the instrument and the means of attaining the underlying objective with lasting success. The system began to acquire coherence once relationships were established between all its component parts. The seventeenth century authors of political treatises viewed government as the equitable disposition of every area of business, policy being carefully conducted to attain a suitable goal. This equitable disposition is the reflection of a governmental ethic; business is the preserve of economic government, while careful conduct is the task of political government. It follows that ethics influence the economy, while both these aspects influence politics. Machiavelli's old idea that the avoidance of change was all-important now gave way to a new concept which sought to follow a principle of rationalization that was given expression through strategies. The somewhat hasty, traditional political writings of Tommaso Campanella and the more influential work of Jean Bodin each pursued the same goal in its own way. The former, in effect, aspired to the universal rule of the Papacy, while the latter preferred a national lay monarchy. On this particular issue, alongside the prolonged survival of medieval ideas, innovative concepts now made their appearance defining what was seen to be the pinnacle of government, that is the absolute monarch and the organization on which such a monarchy must be based: a growing body of civil servants, an army of mercenaries dependent on the sovereign power and a rudimentary network of diplomacy capable of safeguarding the objectives of the hegemony in relation to the world outside. The political world had now changed and instead of pursuing the old universalism founded on Christianity, it opted in large measure for a new strategy whose calculations were based on dynastic and patrimonial considerations. Machiavelli's model in the *Il Principe*, King Ferdinand the Catholic, is a revealing example: the marriage contracts entered into by his five legitimate children – two of his daughters married into the Portuguese monarchy, another daughter and his only son espoused grandchildren of Emperor Maximilian of Austria while his youngest daughter first married Arthur and then King Henry the Eighth of England – facilitated the construction of vast royal possessions whose administration was later concentrated in the hands of Emperor Charles V.

STATE MODELS

In the political history of Western Europe, we must go back to the last quarter of the fifteenth century to find a first indicative and simplified classification of the state models which characterized the early days of the Old Regime. Around the year 1470, in his work entitled *The Governance of England*, Sir John Fouesene made a distinction between two kinds of monarchy: the constitutional monarchy based on the *dominium politicum et regale* in which the threefold considerations of moral, economic and political government required some kind of parliamentary control over the extensive powers vested in the King; and the absolute monarchy, or *dominium regale* in which no such parliamentary control existed or, if it did exist, was greatly attenuated. This simplification which focuses the exercise of all power on the royal will – controlled in the first instance to a limited extent by the manifestation of representative wishes and, in the second, with little or no outside control – has often been used as the basis for reflection on the political role of modern monarchies and of the parliaments established within them.

Thus, in Western Europe, with the exception of the Italian Republics, further analysis of this simplification reveals various shades of emphasis which have acquired fresh topicality today in the light of the latest research: the English monarchy was not in reality fully controlled and influenced by its parliament, the Castilian and Portuguese *Cortes* did not disappear from the political scene for the sole benefit of absolute royal power, nor did their counterpart, the French States-General; the English model was not readily exportable and cannot be identified with the States-General of the nearby United Provinces which declared their independence from the Low Countries under Spanish dominion. Moreover, comparisons between the scale and strength of the different monarchies and of their respective parliaments are hard to draw unless account is taken of the different legal systems and of the economic and social contexts which, throughout the Modern Age, tested relations between the monarchies and their representative chambers. These relations have all too often been described as a permanent state of mutual adversity between Monarchies and Parliaments; the recognition of this underlying conflict, sometimes latent and at others clearly visible, has been guided by the view that the states of the Old Regime constituted a body politic with permanent difficulties created by its own inherent weakness. The composition of the parliaments on the basis of the estates which constituted the established social order (classes, estates, chambers of the nobility, clergy and commons) did not function as might have been hoped in most of the kingdoms. The nobility and the clergy became absentee representatives and almost the entire burden of the existing problems came to rest on an increasingly oligarchical representation of the people. Moreover, the sessions of these parliaments were not convened with due regularity. The Parliament of England met on fewer occasions than the *Cortes* of Castile between the late fifteenth century and well into the second half of the seventeenth; the States-General of France did not meet on a single occasion between 1484 and 1560 or between 1615 and 1789, and were convened only five times between 1560 and 1615. The States-General of the Low Countries had more occasions to make their opposition manifest since they met more than sixty times between 1499 and 1577. The Portuguese *Cortes* met only once between 1580 and 1640. There were also other problems, some of which have still not been properly clarified: the method of recruiting the members of parliament, the powers which they enjoyed when they attended the sessions, the exercise of their representative capacity and the political activity pursued by them, lead us into a universe of highly complex relations which cannot be explained without a more detailed study of the formation of oligarchies and the elucidation of their concrete interests.

Both the known hostility and the apparent weakness were particularly marked in the sphere of political economy which provided the finance for the hegemonic rule. The method of raising funds is the factor which sets monarchies and parliaments apart: in the simplification referred to above, the representative assemblies of the *dominium regale* did not place an effective brake on the methods used by the monarchy to raise funds and finance its hegemonic aims, while the assemblies of the *dominium politicum et regale* were able to do so. The examples cited by Sir John Fortescue, that is France as a monarchy which was able to levy taxes with almost no opposition from parliament and England at the other extreme, enable us to adduce differentiated models of the pact which existed between the monarchies and their respective

parliaments. This pact which came into being as the Middle Ages advanced and underwent few changes in the lifetime of the Old Regime, assumed a variety of contractual forms: for example, in the German States which belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and in a majority of the eastern monarchies, the relationship between the princes and the emperor was typical of a contract between the sovereign and his vassals. These were feudal monarchies in which the sovereignty of a single individual was recognized; this model stands in sharp contrast to the renunciation and sharing of sovereignty in the Italian City Republics whose constitution and contractual forms were defined by representative assemblies or by prominent figures in the service of the prince. The English monarchy and the Crown of Aragon constitute a third model: these monarchies were founded on a pact by virtue of which relations between the king and the kingdom were normalized through institutions which determined both the political role of the king himself and the role of the kingdom through its representative assemblies and institutions. Finally, the political system of the absolute monarchies – in France, Portugal and Castile – was founded on the explicit recognition of the sovereignty of a single individual, the exercise of full powers by a superior, the introduction of the notion of the reason of state, respect for divine right and the idea of the common good. Reason of state, defined by the Piedmontese author, Giovanni Botero, in 1589, as a familiarity with the means which are most suited to the foundation, conservation and consolidation of a dominion over the peoples, is the surest way of guaranteeing state hegemony. At least to per cent of the Italian political writers of the late sixteenth century referred to reason of state in their reflection on hegemony. In Spain, Saavedra Fajardo and Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos subscribed to the ethical concept of power which continued to view politics as the servant of moral values and also to the principle of tacit compliance which stood out in opposition to political writings of the kind initiated by Machiavelli; they saw the reason of state as an empirical issue rooted in the crisis of the state which typified much of the seventeenth century (see Plate 32). However, the objective reality was far more complex than this; as the State evolved in the Middle Ages and in the Modern Age, the contractual constitutions of the feudal State represented a pact of subservience by the kingdom to the king, while the other contractual regimes resolved this duality through a social pact founded on the concept of the common good. Although pacts of both kinds coexisted in time in different state structures which, generally speaking, mark the distinction between the Eastern and Western monarchies, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a transition from the pact of subservience to the social pact. This evolution was influenced by the gradual acceptance within society of the principle of the inviolability of the king, the people and the common good and also by the introduction into political writing of the secular position which put forward reasoned doubts as to the divine origins of power and its direct transmission to the person of the king, subscribing instead to the idea that the law is the best form of contract in that it places equal obligations on the governor and on the persons governed by him. However, the law was not universal since it did not extend to all the territories or to all sectors of society, nor was it the sole prerogative of the king. In every monarchy, alongside the will of the king as the supreme expression of the law, other wills came into play: they were voiced by the temporal powers or by an accepted delegation of the authority of the king to dictate

the law. Good illustrations can be found in the history of the Spanish State of the Austrias, thus, some ministerial and other offices representing the royal power (the actions of the Duke of Alba in the Low Countries which remained under Spanish dominion until 1570, of the Viceroys in the Indies, in Italy, in the traditional hereditary states or in those, such as Portugal, which were acquired later) enacted legislation, convened and presided over representative assemblies. This phenomenon reflected an acceptance of the view expressed by the authors of political treatises that authority has certain limits. Since the publication in 1515 of *La monarchie de France* by Claude de Seyssel, the limits on the authority of the King were held to be founded on three pillars constituting the ideological substratum which determine the political activity of the government: respect for religion, the equitable administration of justice and scrupulous compliance with the tradition of the conservation and increase of the royal patrimony, the maintenance of the system of privileges which was a corner-stone of the structure of the estates within society and the preservation of the hereditary system which, through the law of male primogeniture, transmitted to the son of the king the sovereign status of his father. Any violation of this substratum endangered the pact, the king would then be treated as a tyrant and his subjects would be relieved of the obligation to obey him. From the beginning of the sixteenth century and right through to the end of the seventeenth, the issue of religious diversity was the subject of political analysis. The principle accepted at Augsburg of the identity between the religious practices of the king and those of his subjects, the intolerance brought about by the wars of religion and the radical nature of relations between the different communities within certain Western States, which culminated in the Saint Bartholomew's night massacre in France in 1572, led to many publications of political theory designed to protect freedom of conscience and justify the right of subjects to resist. Calvinists like François Hotman, who wrote *France Gallie* in 1573, Théodore de Bèze, author of *Du droit des magistrats sur leurs sujets* in 1575 and of *Vindicta contra Tyrannos* in 1579, developed a political theory which placed limits on the political powers of the king by introducing respect for religious freedom and of the right of resistance into the old notion of the contract. The proponents of a limitation of the power of the monarchy disseminated the idea that

Princes are chosen by God and appointed by the people. Just as each citizen, taken in isolation, is inferior to the Prince, so the people as a whole and the servants of state representing that body, are superior to him. When a Prince is appointed and takes office, certain tacit conventions and contracts are established between him and the people and are expressed by mutual and civil channels; in other words, the Prince is to be obeyed faithfully, provided that he hands down his orders with justice and serves the entire community so that all its members shall in turn serve him, and if he governs in accordance with the law everyone shall be subject to his governance (. . .) But any Prince who maliciously and deliberately violates these principles is unquestionably a tyrant in practice. It follows that the servants of the state may judge him according to the laws. And if he maintains his tyranny by force, their duty is to eliminate him and to do so by the strength of arms if there is no other means.

Thus, the community of governed citizens is superior to the king. The ideas of the proponents of a limitation of the powers of the monarch were shared by the English advocates of a commonwealth in the political formulation advanced by Thomas Smith in his work entitled *The Commonwealth of*

England, published in 1583. In 1599, Juan de Mariana published his treatise *De rege* in Spain. Tyrannicide as the most radical form of resistance was held to be a justified response to a violation of the right to the free exercise of any religious belief; in addition to this particular condition, the author went on to introduce new criteria for the proper exercise of royal power. Perhaps the most important among them was an appropriate policy on the levying of taxes. The underlying aim was to perpetuate the old canonical concept of the limitation of political power by divine law and also by the Christian nature of society, underpinned by the acceptance of a dual constitution which assigned some power to the king and the rest to the kingdom. This doctrine was founded on Levitism and the limits suggested were rooted in the sacerdotal ideology. Jean Bodin's position is particularly revealing in this regard; in chapter four of Book II of his *La République*, he defines the distinction between a king and a tyrant:

The most notable difference between a king and a tyrant resides in the fact that a king obeys the laws of nature while the tyrant tramples them under foot. The former cultivates piety, justice and faith; the latter knows no God, no faith and no law.

(See Plate 33.) Both the exercise of power by the king and its exercise by the kingdom raised certain problems. The monarchies of Western Europe all experienced similar difficulties: the tense relationship with the Church highlighted the confrontation between two totalitarian powers, that of the State and that of the Church. The ecclesiastical organization gained its established position within the State when it demanded that temporal power be subordinated to spiritual power. Campanella pointed this out in his political aphorisms. Christian Princes must exercise their power in compliance with the authority of the Pope; if they did so, a stable and perfect government might be expected as the felicitous result. However, the temporal power arrogated to itself the right to exercise ecclesiastical patronage, kings assumed titles such as Catholic, Christian, Defender of the Faith and so on and the administrative apparatus of the State began to encompass offices and councils whose functions touched upon issues which, in their origin and subsequent development, were in effect matters of religion. The kings often became representatives of the spiritual authority: in the Americas, the Spanish monarchs acted as vicars of the Pope by organizing churches, collecting church taxes and appointing episcopal dignitaries; at the same time, they formally asserted their right to suppress, withhold or prohibit within their kingdoms the distribution of pontifical documents addressed to them. Despite all this, the Churches acted as a brake on the secular development of States. At the same time, internal problems created by the unstable coexistence of minorities (Huguenots, Catholics and Moors) and majorities practising a different religion which was perceived as a rival of the official faith, gave rise to intolerance whose consequences were always resolved through social conflict and massive expulsions. In a political order which claimed to represent Christianity in one form or another, the wars of religion in France, the persecution of the Catholics in England, the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the forced emigration of persecuted groups from the Low Countries to the north where they established the United Provinces, the flight of the English Puritans to Holland or to the Atlantic seaboard of North America, were all common and institutionalized expressions of a violence which altered the perception of the enemy of Christianity

which had existed since the dawn of the Modern Age. The continued existence of the Turk as the overt enemy of all Christendom remained as an external, albeit close, threat; within each national territory, the concept of the enemy was defined on the basis of the crystallization of the religious divide born out of the Reformation and with reference to survival of unassimilated minorities, such as the Moors in Spain.

Another problem involved the administration of the kingdom and the penetration of royal orders down to the local structures. The first of these difficulties was resolved by modernizing the pre-existing institutional networks. In France, Parliament began to take shape even before the fifteenth century, while the courts of justice fell within the royal jurisdiction. The earliest institutional structures developed first in Paris and then in Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen and so on. In the mid-fifteenth century, French customary law began to be codified and some years previously the French monarchy had already laid the foundations of a fiscal system which enabled it to collect the salt tax, the subsidies (*aides*), certain customs duties, the rîches and a direct tax (known as the *taille*). Thus the first administrative apparatus founded on the three corner-stones of finance, the administration of justice and the army began to take shape.

Similarly, in England, the administrative reorganization was based on a fiscal criterion which consisted initially in determining the assets of the crown and on stringent procedures for the collection of the royal taxes (land duties, customs duties and so on). In the organization of the higher courts of justice, a distinction was also made between civil and criminal cases and tax misdemeanours. The delegation of powers to the justices of the peace who acted as the guardians of public order and of the consistency and rigour of the action of the courts in the administration of justice were the first signs of a process of institutionalization which was later to extend to the parliament and the creation of the first chambers with executive powers.

This process of institutionalization which lay at the origin of modern bureaucracy also affected the many kingdoms and territories administered by the Crown of Castile; although modernization began during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs (Ferdinand and Isabella), the specialization of the functions of the State developed during the Monarchy of the Austrias. An extensive body of juridical and ethical writings defined the appropriate role both of the king and of his ministers. The task of government was compared to that of a crew sailing a ship: in addition to the work of the captain, the specialized duties of the pilots, seamen and cabin-boys were all vital. The ship (the kingdom) could only be steered safely into harbour (the common good) if the collective work of the king, his ministers and officials was performed successfully. The old picture conveyed by the medieval chroniclers in which kings were portrayed receiving the *grandees* and their subjects in audience was replaced by a new vision of courtly activity. The royal courts became complex and, already in the late Renaissance, assumed the character of a social area encompassing a power structure. The royal palace became the scene of a special form of life and a complex ceremonial which projected the true and complex image of the State. In the circle of the king and his family, relatives, friends, senior officials, ministers, priests, confessors, ambassadors, servants, artists and counsellors gave colourful expression to all the specialized branches of society, politics and the administration. The whole system was

controlled by the king and by his closest ministers and officials. The court was a tightly hierarchical arena in which the courtier's aspiration was to be close to the king, to earn his favours, gain his trust, share his leisure and act as his confidant. This was a majestic circle round which the embassies were established, to say nothing of the gossip-mongers who spread rumours and the most intimate news about personages who were the envy of ordinary mortals. The seventeenth century was unusually prolific in urban and courtly chroniclers. Any event, however small, was announced; from the first stages of the pregnancy of a queen to the death of members of the royal family and *grandees*, together with all the entertainments and events in the lives of princes. The courts had a great many members; in the year 1520, the court of King Francis I numbered 500, but by the end of the sixteenth century it had tripled in size. The complex ceremonial procedures introduced from Burgundy to the Court of Emperor Charles V in Castile are well known; only in the evening of his life, in his retreat at Yuste in Extremadura, was he able to reduce his vast following from about 800 persons to 150.

While the king was present in his own court he was also represented throughout the kingdom by his officials. As representatives of the king, they followed a code of conduct based on the principle of blind allegiance and efficiency. These were servants of the political community endowed with powers granted by the will of the sovereign; between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they ceased to be bound to the monarch merely by political ties and began to be recruited on the basis of personal affiliations. The monarchies were now becoming structures with their own bureaucracies; by the year 1500, France already had over 12,000 functionaries, that is persons holding civilian, ecclesiastical and military offices. One century later, there were some 150,000 functionaries in Spain, more than twice the number existing in Portugal and nearly one-third more than in England. Like the spiritual power, the temporal power became increasingly bureaucratic. France in the reign of King Louis XIV is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. Some kings remained aloof from concern for daily affairs; Philip III of Spain entrusted the conduct of government to a Prime Minister, first the Duke of Lerma and later to his son, the Duke of Uceda. Louis XIV on the other hand was a bureaucratic monarch who attended countless councils in person, and took decisions directly with his minister Colbert on the finances of the State; he gave frequent audiences, listened to secretaries and ambassadors and set up many new specialized agencies. Around the year 1665, he enlarged the Palace of Versailles so as to have room for the senior officials of his government in his immediate vicinity in what was to become a courtly area for royal recreation. In short, the French king governed his country in person. Examples of ecclesiastical bureaucracy are numerous. To avoid repeated reference to the Church of Rome, it will suffice here to cite the example of the political and administrative role of the Episcopalian Church of England; supervision of the clergy, persecution of the Puritans and of the Scottish Presbyterians, the verification of preachings and the census of holy writings required a large part of the apparatus of state bureaucracy to be placed in the service of the Anglican church while many decisions had to be taken against collegial opinions, including those expressed by the Houses of Parliament.

This increasing bureaucracy, which turned the monarch into a servant and an official of government, enabled the lawyers and authors of political treatises to construct a body of literature which began to consider public office as an

honour and a reward for services rendered in the past. Throughout the Modern Age, public office was not only a desirable end in itself but also the object of a great deal of manipulation: the machinery of the finance ministry and the state bureaucracy made use of it to reward loyalty, to procure new resources and to reproduce and perpetuate the system. At the same time, the writings of the chroniclers and other authors refer to the social malaise which existed as manifest corruption proliferated. In Spain, criticism centred on discussion of the most appropriate length of service: the longer a public office was held, the more opportunities for robbery were thought to exist; conversely it was held that a short period of service was an incentive for the holder of the office to misappropriate it to his personal benefit. Moreover, the higher the rank, the more suspicion was aroused. In an age like the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when public values were reduced to questions of money, the probity or honourableness of officials and ministers were measured by public opinion in inverse proportion to the royal favour which they enjoyed. The purchase and sale of titles, the hereditary transmission of many of them, their association with family strategies and the phenomenon of accumulation were the four elements against which public criticism was directed. However, at the heart of this argument there remained a patrimonial concept which prevented the general acknowledgement of the principle that each individual must perform one specific function. The voicing of doubts about the quality of the work performed by a public servant who held more than one office is a constant in European political literature. These principles are set out in the treatises of the Spanish authors Mariana and Fernández de Navarrete, the Italians Roseo da Fabriano and Ludovico Agosini and in the writings of the Venetian Pietro Sarpi (who changed his name to Paolo Sarpi in 1566 when he entered a religious order). In his defence of the sovereignty of Venice against papal absolutism, Sarpi advocated the principle of the incompatibility of the accumulation of different offices and above all denounced the abuse arising from the occupation by clerics of government posts which fell strictly within the civilian domain.

The third fundamental problem was that of the security of the kingdom. The Western monarchies identified security with military control, and police systems in the sense in which we understand them today were very slow to become overt organizations with a justified existence. It must be remembered that society at the time was extremely violent and that, alongside the judicial structure of the first instance with repressive measures entrusted to local governments, the enrolment of a whole sector of society in the army was achieved through levies organized at municipal level and by recruiting mercenaries who were drawn mostly from the economically depressed regions. The prevalence of violence in society is confirmed by an impressive catalogue of measures in which the inheritance of earlier practices and the customs of the church play a dominant role. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, brutal sentences were imposed after summary trials dictated by mere suspicion or by evidence extracted by torturing the prisoner. Asylum in temples and monasteries, interrogations conducted by the accepted method of extracting information whose verisimilitude was directly proportional to the ability of the prisoner to withstand torture and sentences executed before the right of appeal had been exercised, all reflect the obscurantism of the local authorities (the *corregidores* in Spain, the Justices of the Peace in England and the *intendants* in France) (see Plate 34).

Maintaining order was a problem common to every state and the only solution was thought to reside in the organization of an army. The first police force set up with a view to the assistance of the public was probably the body created in France in the days of Louis XIV after the promulgation in 1667 of the edict on the *Lieutenant générale de la police* which only extended to the Paris urban area. Precedents for organized policing can also be found in sixteenth century Spain in Madrid and much later on in other major cities; the division of the urban area into quarters placed under the authority of men who depended directly on the *corregidor*, that is justices of the peace, constables and registrars, regular schedules for police beats and rules for drawing up statements, are all points on which the early police organization in Spain differs from its French counterpart. In Spain, the preventive and repressive role was given prominence, while in France assistance of the public was the main objective.

Throughout the Western world the specialization of the courts of justice reflected the idea that the main task of government was to mete out justice; for a long time this resulted in a failure to establish the degree of centralization which would have been desirable. Instead, jurisdiction was shared between the church, the noble estates, the local authorities and the inquisition, while the monarchy held control over the higher and specialized judicial bodies. The organization of policing assumed distinctive local features and a dependence on the nobility: the *hermandades* or ancient rural police in Castile, the *somatenes* or armed police of Catalonia, the *amadrallats* or commandos of Galicia and the general guards of Aragon, were all examples of a confused perception of crime which it was still thought could be corrected by extremely simple military organizations.

All the doctrinal guidelines and attempts to put them into practice enable different concepts of the State to be identified, as Francis Bacon pointed out with reference to the first modern monarchies of Henry VII of England, Louis XI of France and Ferdinand the Catholic of Castile and Aragon; these models of the State all signified a clear break with the acceptance of the idea of a universal monarchy, with support for the specialization of ministerial functions, with the inherent difficulty residing in the slowness of the process of modernization necessitated by centralization and with manifest shortcomings in the development of the administrative, fiscal and judicial apparatus.

ECONOMIC MODELS

One of the most typical features of the countries of Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the growing degree of state control over economic life. Although the State cannot be said to have pursued economic policies in the true sense of the term, attention can be drawn to a set of practices and a series of published writings on the subject of what we now term mercantilism. Concern for the value and supply of money, measures designed to protect the production of certain manufactured goods, the procurement of raw materials and especially precious minerals, the opening of the markets and the creation of tax offices were added as truly innovative features to the traditional economy with an agrarian base which was barely able to produce enough goods to sustain the population.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ability of the states to exercise hegemony was measured in terms of possession of minerals. The advance of the monetary

economy, the generalization of the use of currency, the state monopoly on the minting of coinage and the abundance or shortage of money on the markets, were a matter of close concern to the state authorities and to society in general. In the decade beginning in 1550, the Castilian paymaster, Luis de Ortiz, completed the first six chapters of his *Memorial* which he sent to King Philip II under the revealing title of *Less Money Might Leave the Realm*. This evident concern for the hoarding of money was to be expressed throughout the seventeenth century in most writings on economic affairs and was to become one of the variables by which the power and decadence of states were measured. Monetary policies followed a contradictory evolution: while the English currency was devalued between 1526 and 1544, the monarchy of King Charles V, as the heir to a monetary reform implemented by the Catholic Monarchs was obliged, at least in its early days, to take measures to stem the appreciation of its currency. Almost the entire economic activity of these states began to rest on the quantity of gold and silver that was available and on the quality of the coinage that could be minted. Both these metals had been scarce in the fifteenth century: the gold of Sudan and Mozambique and the silver mined in central Europe were barely sufficient to meet demand. At the end of the fifteenth century, expectations grew when new gold was brought on to the European markets by the Portuguese and Spanish from the Gulf of Guinea and the West Indies. However, it was the American mines which brought the Spanish administration the resources which shifted the balance of the bimetal system in favour of silver: after the discovery and working of American gold, supplies available to the European treasuries increased by 5 per cent, while supplies of silver rose by more than 50 per cent. In addition to the abundance of silver and the growth in the supply of gold, mention must also be made of the improvement of supplies of another mintable metal which was also used as an instrument of the monetary policies of governments: copper, extracted mainly in the Tyrol, Thuringia and Slovakia, was to become the 'poor' metal that was used to conceal national shortages of gold and silver and, at the same time, as the currency for everyday transactions. On the international markets and also within the national territories, a complicated relationship was maintained between these three metals: Venice, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam and East Asia, together with Lisbon and Seville, were the markets which showed the widest fluctuations and what may be seen as a specialization of monetary policy. The assessment of the relative value of gold and silver was not held in the fixed traditional proportion which assigned to gold twelve times the value of silver: the ratio varied and its fluctuations influenced changes in the respective social status of these metals. Speculation, accumulation and hoarding resulted in gold currency being replaced by silver and the latter in turn by copper enriched with silver. Copper flooded the European monetary system from 1540 onwards in great waves, especially during the seventeenth century. A Spanish dramatist, Tirso de Molina, denounced the shortage of currency in the following terms:

The galleons from Peru bring unbullied specie, but none is to be had here; since those pale-bearded Genoese arrived in Casite, everyone knows they have precious little hope of finding a doubloon or a maiden here, for love or for money.

The history of money supply in Europe was always bound up with two major problems. The first was that of its pattern of movement: since ancient times, gold and silver had flowed

in an almost invariable pattern from West to East and from South to North. This movement reflected the old rules laid down by Western demand for Eastern products such as silk, spices, and so on. India and China were the main beneficiaries of this trade, as too were the regions of northern and eastern Europe which supplied raw materials to the West (cereals, fish, hides, timber, minerals) and their active commercial and financial markets in London, Antwerp and Amsterdam. In the seventeenth century, Amsterdam was the centre of an extensive and complex financial network which controlled and distributed a substantial volume of payments. The states adopted interventionist measures in an endeavour to stem the outflow of money and this practice was destined to become one of the most important and obsessive theoretical principles of mercantilism. In 1515, Claude de Seyssel identified a rich state as a country which was capable of containing the outflow of raw materials and of accumulating money. After 1506, France enacted many governmental measures seeking to control currency movements; from a still earlier date, the governments of Castile and England had done the same by adopting a body of regulations which affected nearly all productive activities. Prevention of the outflow of money from the kingdoms required a wide range of measures: protection of the production of raw materials and of the processes for their conversion into manufactured products, fiscal and customs controls, a monopoly on transport, the opening of new markets, the regulation of employment and pursuit of the goal of creating a competitive industry were the most characteristic features of an economic nationalism which in effect laid the foundations of modern capitalism, the institutional development of the states and the success of their aspiration to hegemony. This *dirigisme* which in most countries entailed the creation of state monopolies, as in Portugal and Castile, for the exploitation of their respective colonial empires was adapted in the France of Colbert's day to objectives which in a sense anticipated the true ideal of mercantilism. From the government of Richelieu onwards, actions were taken with varying degrees of success to set up a strong merchant navy, establish great shipping companies and create manufacturing establishments which specialized in the development of the craft trades for the production of high quality goods at competitive prices. The regulation of labour, the new customs laws, the modernization of the textile industry and the formation of commercial companies were placed in the service of the ultimate objective of accumulating money and strengthening the state.

Similarly, the English government took extensive action to protect the quantity and quality of the money supply, industrial activity, commerce and the monopoly on transport. Since 1651, protectionist rules had been laid down to encourage the growth of the English navy: the transport of colonial imports was reserved for English ships, the appointment of the crews was the prerogative of English captains and only the transport of European goods was shared with vessels from the exporting countries. In addition to a sustained concern for the attainment of a favourable balance of trade, two other specific features of English policy set that country apart from other mercantilist systems: one was the permissivity established by an Act of 1663, by virtue of which the export of consumer goods incorporating precious minerals was authorized, as also was the export of foreign currency; this helped to stabilize the value of the national currency. The second feature was the extension of protectionism to agriculture.

In the Low Countries and in the United Provinces, both the Spanish dominion and the federative structure of society in the North, helped to simplify the economic structure and contributed in large measure to the success and consolidation of private ownership. The famous historian of mercantilism, Eli F. Heckscher, cites the Low Countries as the national area in which the foothold of mercantilist ideas remained weakest. The economic *dirigisme* of the States of Castile, France and England contrasted with private initiative in the Low Countries; this led to the establishment of trading organizations based on the straightforward principle of co-ownership. Thus, the Dutch Company of the East Indies was a private entity whose origins can be traced back to the merger of a number of pre-existing companies when its creation by the States-General was decided in 1602.

The Dutch hegemony, already apparent in 1625, was founded on the complex pursuit of productive activities determined, in large measure, by the political and religious situation of the Low Countries under Spanish dominion. The influx of skilled immigrants from the South, primarily merchants, seamen and artisans, facilitated a number of changes which were to have a favourable effect on the processes of the modernization of agriculture and increasing industrialization. These changes, together with the reclamation of more land from the sea for agricultural use, the practice of intensive farming which specialized in the production of industrial crops (hops, flax, madder, hemp, rapeseed and so on), together with fruit and vegetables, the systematic use of fertilizers and the growth of cattle-farming constituted a process which was supported by others in the area of urban development, the advance of the shipbuilding and textile industries and the institutionalization of commercial and financial initiatives.

The second problem was the immobility of productive resources in general and of monetary resources in particular. A complex series of practices inherited from the past came into play here and were consolidated throughout the Modern Age, contributing in too small measure to the crisis which hit extensive geographical areas in the seventeenth century. The cessation of population growth which affected the whole of Europe, apart from Low Countries and Scandinavia, was to be accompanied by de-industrialization, a crisis of trade and a social and political crisis. Ultimately, these led to the revolutionary processes which unfolded over most of these countries.

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POLITICAL LIFE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Carlos Martínez Shaw

Eighteenth-century Europe inherited the political structures established over the previous century. However, political life in the various States did not conform to a single organizational model, although in practice it is sufficient to distinguish between two different types of system with a number of variations.

In fact, most European countries were absolute monarchies based on divine right, at different stages of evolution due to the differing degrees of development of their economic, social and institutional structures. The most advanced, that of France under Louis XIV, appeared as the perfect model for the sovereigns of other countries to imitate. However, the eighteenth century added a number of notions of its own to the concept of absolutism as defined in France in the second half of the seventeenth century. This particular version of absolute monarchy is historically known as enlightened despotism.

ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM

Enlightened despotism emerges as the variant of absolutism specific to most European States in the eighteenth century. It is first and foremost a late version of the seventeenth century absolutism of the French monarchy. But it is also the political system adopted by those nations which had become aware of how backward they were in terms of their economic development, social stratification, institutions or education systems. Enlightened despotism spread throughout the backward countries of Europe, including the Scandinavian countries, the countries of the Iberian Peninsula, the Germanic and the Italian peoples, Austria and Russia, while France, which was more advanced than these other nations, nevertheless maintained a policy of reform similar in many respects to that of her neighbours: not for nothing was her absolute regime a direct eighteenth-century descendant of the preceding period.

While on the one hand the reforming policies of enlightened despotism sought to temper the arrears accumulated during the crisis of the seventeenth century, they also on the other hand constituted a formula for strengthening the State, organizing the fabric of society and modernizing the economy within the traditional framework of European political life in modern times. In other words, enlightened governments tried to strengthen their structures while maintaining the social and political bases inherited from the past. Not only did they not propose any measures for social change; they also tried to introduce into the system only those reforms which were necessary to strengthen its traditional foundations. In this sense, enlightened despotism was the culmination of the political

and social developments of modern times, a final twilight hour before the opposing claims made by the social forces dissatisfied with the system opened the door to the constitutional governments characteristic of the liberal revolution.

Reform in the service of community might be an apt definition of the essence of enlightened despotism. However, the regime did introduce some new features, particularly the use of an original ideological umbrella largely borrowed from the philosophers, who believed in the possibility of gradual change led by the princes and the spread of progress dispensed from above by the monarchies. Among the new concepts designed to reaffirm the loyalty of subjects on new foundations, we see the development of a more abstract notion of the essence of the State, going beyond its personification in the figure of the monarch and the mere proclamation of dynastic glory. In this context the King is no longer the incarnation of the system but the first servant of the State. A whole series of justifications backed up the actions of the Crown, in particular an array of lay concepts which soon penetrated the social fabric. Monarchs directed their governmental measures towards securing the happiness of their subjects, establishing a climate of tolerance and social peace, and disseminating the principles of the enlightenment as universally accepted tools for the progress of all men.

Thus the arguments of the philosophers served the cause of absolutism. On the one hand, they were used as an ideological bulwark against the claims brought made by an embryonic public opinion. On the other, the rational ideas of the men of the enlightenment were an effective instrument in bringing about structural modernization, streamlining the administration and correcting the most flagrant anomalies bequeathed to public life by a past age; but this was always within certain limits which left the underlying social and political premises untouched, and any transgression of these limits set in motion the mechanisms of censure and repression. In the end, the advice of the philosophers proved to be more a cosmetic adjunct than a genuine incitement to a root-and-branch change which was by no means desired by absolute monarchs. This heralded the ultimate decline of the Platonic ideal of the wise man guiding with justice the prudent performance of the enlightened ruler. It has been rightly pointed out that the ideology of enlightened despotism was inspired by the mercantilism of Colbert rather than by philosophy, by practical formulae for social engineering rather than the philanthropic declarations of the great thinkers of the century.

In this context, enlightened despotism can be seen as the last remaining prescription to uphold the traditional order for the benefit of the privileged classes, as a defence against changing the political system and the social relationships of

production typical of the *ancien régime*. Several authors have called this last manifestation of absolutism a 'homeopathic remedy' for the bourgeois revolution, a deliberate option in opposition to change and revolution. The revolution, when it occurred, was forced to destroy the political structures of the century as a necessary prerequisite for its consolidation and the birth of the new political and social world of the liberal era. By contrast, enlightened despotism was nothing more than an updating of the traditional system of the Europe of modern times: the enlightened monarch, in the words of a present-day historian, was nothing but 'Louis XIV without his wig'.

However, certain states in Western Europe do not fit the definition of enlightened absolutism. Britain had a constitutional monarchy, while Venice maintained her sway as a republic which went back to medieval times, and the United Provinces emerged as a federal republic. The Low Countries kept legislative power in the hands of the States-General made up of representatives from the seven provinces; federal executive power devolved upon the Grand Pensionary of Holland, and the main cities were governed by councils of regents each taking their turn. This obviously gave the political system its originality, but nevertheless vigilance was always necessary in view of the monarchical and absolutist aspirations of a number of provinces which encouraged the claims of the House of Orange, which since the sixteenth century – even before independence – had provided the Low Countries with their stadtholders, captains, admirals and monarchs. The other republic, Venice, was going through a golden age of decline under the protection of traditional institutions which guaranteed the unquestioned leadership of a powerful oligarchy of merchant nobles.

In the course of the century the United Kingdom of Great Britain was to develop the parliamentary system inherited from the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Legislative power lay in the hands of Parliament, not so much in the House of Lords (whose principal role was that of a High Court), as in the House of Commons, whose members were now elected for seven years in order to guarantee greater stability. Executive power was exercised by a ministerial cabinet (where, from the 1720s onwards, the figure of prime minister was to emerge) appointed by the king, whose role was increasingly reduced to that of sanctioning the results of the elections and accepting responsibility before Parliament for the ministers appointed.

The British parliamentary system and the Dutch system of civil liberty were the models invoked by the critics of absolutism throughout the century. But to confuse the parliamentary system of either of these countries with the advent of democracy would be a pure anachronism. On the one hand, political power remained in the hands of a small oligarchy whose rights were based on heredity or wealth, or both. In Britain, only landowners had the vote in the counties, while only the bourgeoisie could vote in the cities. In Holland only a small number of families of recognized name and rank could stand with any chance of success for the major offices of state, or for the offices of deputy or regent in the main cities of the country. Political life was an exclusive club, membership of which was restricted to a traditional oligarchy of leading citizens which was only slowly renewed in the course of the century.

It is also a well-known fact that corruption was rife in the British electoral system. The system of suffrage based on the property qualification flourished, thanks to the existence of anomalous constituencies originally created for historical

reasons; insignificant and practically inexistent districts returned members to Parliament, while densely populated cities which had grown up due to commercial and industrial expansion were denied representation. The possibilities of corruption offered by the 'pocket' or 'rotten' boroughs were compounded by the client system (which rewarded electoral fidelity), the barefaced purchase of votes among the deprived classes (as denounced by the satirical brush of Hogarth) and the outright recourse to the bribery of civil servants and those in positions of power.

While political practice (by undermining principles), absolutist aspirations (the assault on the throne by the House of Orange, and the use of the royal prerogative by the House of Hanover) to some extent eroded the originality of the most advanced political systems of Holland and Britain, the ends pursued by the various Western European states serve to reaffirm an impression of uniformity. In fact, with some exceptions, the states sought above all to develop their national economies, to make the institutional apparatus more efficient through greater centralization of power and increased availability of human and material resources, to maintain a social order which favoured the privileged while guaranteeing public peace and to promote territorial expansion either in Europe or overseas.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the major aims pursued by all the European states was national economic development. Among the measures adopted in the various sectors, population policy was confined almost exclusively to a number of settlement projects to bring uncultivated land into agricultural use. Following the example of Prussia which, under Frederick II, set up two contracting agencies in Frankfurt and Hamburg to import a total of 300,000 immigrants into the country, Spain promoted an ambitious project for the settlement of new population centres in the Sierra Morena and on the route to Andalusia; and Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria reclaimed 10,000 farms which had been abandoned or destroyed by settling on them foreign immigrants regardless of their religion. This solution was also adopted later by Peter Leopold of Tuscany, who did not hesitate to settle Jews and Armenians in the port of Livorno.

In agriculture, states took the initiative with ambitious projects such as the above-mentioned rural settlement programmes or the programmes to drain the coastal swamplands undertaken in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. However, the most common form of action was the growing interest in agricultural experimentation. This sometimes followed the example of experiments carried out by sovereigns on their own lands, but was more often the result of encouraging specific associations concerned with the study of agriculture or the education of farmers, such as the agricultural societies founded by the provinces in France, the Florence Academy for the Promotion of Agriculture or the many *Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País* which flourished in Spain. Lastly, legislation aimed at agricultural development fostered the technical conditions conducive to agricultural production (creation of public granaries, State aid to peasants, support for the amalgamation of smallholdings, and so on). It also helped to remove the social barriers to improved production, although in this case the opposition of the privileged classes thwarted many of the more advanced measures, such as the fearless attack on the feudal requirement of forced labour, the abolition of serfdom in Denmark and

the abortive agrarian legislation in Spain. A unique case was the British Parliament's acceptance of the policy of the enclosures, under which smallholdings were amalgamated and common lands privatized. This furthered the advance of agrarian individualism and the modernization of the countryside in Britain in a process which produced new generations of well-to-do farmers at the expense of proletarianizing large sectors of the peasantry who had been attached to the land from time immemorial.

In industry, the greatest state contributions were the creation of development areas around royal factories, with their well-known limitations, and the gradual growth of protectionist policies which shielded the secondary sector from outside competition. In this field, government measures were generally hesitant, fluctuating between the self-interest of the public treasury, which sought immediate income from trade, and the interests of manufacturers who needed high customs tariffs against foreign produce but exemption from duty for their own goods.

However, as its name implies, mercantilism found its most fertile ground in the field of commerce. Despite an ingrained tendency towards interventionism, the main aim of the State was to abolish barriers to the free circulation of goods by doing away with internal tolls, reducing export duties and limiting monopolies. In this regard, one of the most typical measures of the second half of the century was the liberalization of the wheat trade, which was introduced in Spain, France and Sweden, though not without arousing vehement fears and even open opposition in some cases, for example the 'Esquilache riot' in Spain and the 'guerre des farines' in France.

Together with such liberalizing measures, enlightened governments also set about improving trade facilities. The construction of roads was a widely adopted policy, as witness the works carried out in the Duchy of Savoy by the Kings of Sardinia, the building of the radial road network from the capital in Spain and the creation in France of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*. At the same time as they founded the royal factories, the sovereigns of each of the States also promoted the establishment of colonial trading companies. This was the case even in countries relatively little involved in overseas enterprises, such as Austria (the Ostend Company in the Low Countries), Sweden (the East India Company) or Denmark (the Asia Company). In addition, a number of ports were expanded and fitted out to cope with trading activity, for example Lorient (headquarters of the French East India Company), Livorno (developed as the sea outlet of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany) and Trieste (the centre of Austrian maritime trade in the Adriatic).

Finance was not neglected either. While the Bank of England was a creation of the previous century, at the beginning of the new century France experimented with an ill-fated state bank (the Law Bank) and Spain created its own central bank (the Bank of San Carlos). The Paris Stock Exchange opened its doors in 1724.

Despite the fact that it had a less interventionist government, Britain was not left behind by the general trend. She even took the lead in many fields, such as the policy of enclosures, the foundation of a state bank, protection of her trade and navy (the seventeenth century Navigation Acts), construction of the finest roads in Europe (using the McAdam technique) and the use of canals as one of the best ways of internal communication. In addition to increasing improvements in the parliamentary system, concern with economic development and its corollary, colonial expansion, were the corner-stones of British political life throughout the century.

STRENGTHENING THE STATE

In order to implement their policies of economic modernization, most countries had chosen the model introduced in France by Colbert during the previous century, in which state interventionism regulated all aspects of productive activity. This option implied and was derived from the choice of absolutism as a political system. Most of Europe followed France, considering the British experiment too daring and difficult to imitate.

However, imitation of the French model, or in other words the introduction of enlightened despotism, meant strengthening the State. Enlightened governments everywhere implemented policies designed to reinforce the authority of the State, increase its management capacity and stream-line its institutions.

The revitalization of state authority extended in all directions. On the one hand, it meant the subjection of representative bodies (the Cortes in Spain, diets and parliamentary institutions in general). On the other, it meant combating the aspirations of intermediate bodies, the clearest example of which was the permanent agitation of the *parlements*, or judicial courts, during the reign of Louis XV in France, until the magistrates were banished by Maupeou: a Pyrrhic victory which was later annulled when Louis XV decreed that the *parlements* should be reinstated with all their constitutional rights, including the formidable rights of *enregistrement* and *remontrance*. It also meant the repeal of regional autonomy as occurred in Spain with the abolition, decreed by Philip V, of the institutions and liberties traditionally enjoyed by the territories of the Crown of Aragon; another example, outside the context of absolutism, was the dissolution of the Scottish Parliament and the inclusion of Scottish representatives in the Parliament in London.

These measures were reinforced by the centralization of political decision-making which, from this time onwards, was to be concentrated in the hands of one or, at most, a very small number of persons with a similarly small specialized department at their service. Thus in France, the system of councils set up by Philippe d'Orléans gave way in turn to government by prime ministers (Fleury), the period of 'ministerial despotism', the ministry of Choiseul and the ministerial cabinets of the final years of the monarchy. In Spain the Habsburg council system was replaced by secretariats of state, in which there was always one outstanding main figure, who finally became a prime minister in the real sense (Florida Blanca). The same thing happened in other countries, where the institutionalization of small central organs of government gave free rein to strong personalities (Dittioni in Parma, Tanucci in Naples, Pombal in Portugal, Struensee in Denmark, and so on).

The best example of this trend was to be found in Britain, where the development of parliamentarism concentrated executive power in the hands of a prime minister and a ministerial cabinet of his choice, all of whom were responsible to the Houses of Parliament.

On the other hand, enlightened states did not tolerate any interference by the church in political affairs, nor did they accept the independence of the church from the secular authority of the monarch. As the Lutheran churches had already for some time been subjected to the State (in Scandinavia and many of the Germanic countries), the confrontation between secular and ecclesiastical power took place mainly in Catholic countries. In France, gallicism had

triumphed towards the end of the previous century and, by virtue of the Church's autonomy from Rome and its loyalty to the Crown, institutional conflict was avoided, except in the case of the Jesuits and the Jansenists who, irreconcilable after many decades of opposition to absolute power, supported the parliamentary opposition throughout the reign of Louis XV. In Spain, the Crown distanced itself from Rome by signing a Concordat which regulated the relations between them. At the same time, the Crown cultivated the support of the clergy through the system of regal patronage for the appointment of bishops, and controlled the activities of the Inquisition. In the Italian States (particularly Parma and Tuscany), regalism, or the doctrine of royal supremacy, especially in church affairs, found support among the reformist clergy (as in Spain, called Jansenists on account of their severity); this gave heightened efficiency to the struggle against the immunities and privileges of the church, and also to the movement to reduce the excessive numbers of the clergy.

The culmination of this struggle to subject the clergy to civil authority was the attack unleashed against the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits were considered to be the incarnation of ultramontanist, the fifth column of the Papacy, a virtual 'State within the State'; and they were hated by reformist clerics on account of their moral laxity. The cry was first raised in France, which decreed the expulsion of all members of the order in 1765. Within a few years Spain, Portugal, Parma and Naples followed suit, until the order was abolished entirely by Rome in 1773. The disappearance of the order was a genuine disaster for the territories of Paraguay, where the Jesuits had developed a balanced, humanitarian model of colonial administration; it also created an enormous intellectual vacuum in Catholic Europe and a huge shortfall in the field of education, for among its members were many of the most outstanding representatives of the European cultural tradition and many of the best educators of the period.

In Britain, the authorities viewed with mistrust the rise of Methodism, until events proved that it was a religious movement of consolation preaching Christian resignation, which therefore guaranteed ideological control over the masses, who were becoming increasingly proletarianized.

Enlightened governments, in their systematic efforts to achieve uniformity, could not accept the presence of unassimilated minorities of any kind. The first half of the century in Spain saw a revival of the persecution of Jews (executed in the last mass *autos-da-fé* of modern times) and gypsies (condemned to hard labour in the mercury mines); in France, the tolerance shown for a number of years towards the Protestant minorities came to an end. However, this attitude changed in the course of the century as the enlightenment spread the ideals of tolerance among the population, and sovereigns no longer felt threatened by the diminished communities of ethnic or religious minorities. Changing attitudes also spread to Britain, though discrimination against the Catholic minority lasted throughout the century; when, even as late as in the 1790s, the governments sought to promote Catholic emancipation, it met with a violent reaction from large sectors of society.

STREAM-LINING THE ADMINISTRATION

Besides strengthening its authority, enlightened despotism undertook to rationalize the administration and to develop the resources, two sides of the same coin. The exchequer was

of central concern to all governments, which reorganized taxation systems, refined fiscal concepts and continually increased their revenue; but they were not able to undertake in-depth tax reforms, largely due to the opposition of the privileged classes. This was the case in Spain, where it proved impossible to implement the single contribution system introduced by Eusebio. In France, the government similarly found itself powerless in its attempt to introduce a progressive system which would tax all landowners, rentiers and holders of public office without distinction. Three projects failed: that of Machault d'Arnouville, to replace the 'tithe' by a 'twentieth' (1749); the Turgot territorial subsidy project (1776); and the joint reform proposed by Calonne on the eve of the Revolution. The success of only one experiment of this type, carried out in the small State of Baden by the Margrave Charles Frederick, does not invalidate the overall impression of increasingly efficient public treasuries, continually increasing their revenues, which were nevertheless obliged to resort to stop-gap measures and to traditional formulae (for taxing the most deprived, while protecting the powerful), which were endangered by frequent wars (bringing them to the verge of bankruptcy) and which enjoyed a growth rate lower than that of the national economy as a whole.

Nevertheless, if the inequalities of the taxation system seem to be inextricably linked to the crisis of the *ancien régime*, the absolute increase in state revenues made possible a parallel increase in public spending. Ignoring items of expenditure such as health care and education, which (apart from a number of prestigious foundations) were considered to lie outside the sphere of competence of the State, budgets concentrated on two priority headings: staff in the service of the Crown, and the war machine.

Besides the salaries of civil servants and the pensions of many nobles, the first category included court expenses, in the form of the daily needs of the royal family and the financing of the major construction and ornamental programmes to create the appropriate environment for the ostentatious life-style of the sovereign and his family.

More important still was the military budget. A large proportion of the increase in revenue was earmarked for ambitious programmes to remodel the military machine of the various states. Thus France devoted her energies to improving the discipline of the troops, training officers and upgrading her artillery (particularly on the initiative of the Marquis of Argenson, the founder of the Grenadier Corps and the Paris Military School; also under Choiseul, who was responsible for reforming and expanding the latter establishment). France also strengthened her navy with a shipbuilding programme and the fitting out of military ports. The Kingdom of Sardinia was another country which devoted great energy to reinforcing its military infrastructure, particularly in Savoy, by increasing the size of the army, constructing a network of fortifications and creating a navy. Portugal sought to refurbish its outdated navy and remodelled its army following the example of the most advanced military machine of the day, that of Prussia under Frederick II. Throughout the century Spain maintained a coherent naval policy which led to the construction of new arsenals, the introduction of a compulsory register of seamen and the building up of a large war fleet to meet her colonial commitments. These facts, and the budgetary allocation for military expenditure, leave us in no doubt as to the priority interests of European nations during the eighteenth century.

The aims of states governed by the principles of enlightened despotism do not appear to have been vastly different from

those sought by the absolute monarchies of the previous two centuries. However, the enlightenment did introduce governments to a new situation, one which had come to stay, and which forced them to embrace, as values of the new age, a spirit of tolerance, philanthropy and the creation and dissemination of culture. Little by little, the way was opened up by timid measures which gradually put an end to many centuries of persecution of others, of minorities who were different because of their ideology, religion or race. Many countries also introduced judicial reform, which was one of the leading themes of the enlightenment and one of the touchstones of reformist zeal. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany led the way in this field by abolishing inequalities before the law, the administration of the oath to the accused, the use of torture and the death penalty. All judicial reforms undertaken by other States are timid by comparison, although almost all such reforms included important procedural improvements and the abolition of torture.

Finally, enlightened despotism protected and nurtured culture, albeit a culture dedicated in many cases to training administrators, meeting the needs of economic development or the new requirement of projecting a favourable image to public opinion. One of the characteristics of the century was the taste for the so-called 'useful' sciences as opposed to speculative culture. Another was the need felt by monarchs to surround themselves with the intellectuals of the period as proof of their open-mindedness and attainment to the latest most progressive ideas. However, the utilitarian element which permeated the greater part of this 'century without poetry' does not diminish the great attraction of a period which vastly broadened the field of cultural creativity and sought to spread knowledge among increasingly larger sections of the population. In the final analysis, the conviction that access to culture makes men freer and happier is perhaps the most genuine proof of the generous spirit of the enlightenment.

Not every country devoted itself with the same energy to implementing the modernization programme recommended to the prince and his ministers, nor did reforms proceed at the same pace. Indeed some sovereigns who, supported by an impatient minister or a progressive minority, sought to accelerate the pace of reform, had to face strong opposition from the privileged classes who felt that the stability of the *ancien régime* was endangered. This happened in Portugal: the Marquis of Pombal, when, directing with an iron rod a project for economic development, the reorganization of the army, the limitation of ecclesiastical privilege and the rational reconstruction of Lisbon which had been destroyed by the earthquake of 1755, was compelled to repress strong opposition and finally forced into exile. Similarly in Denmark, the minister Struensee reorganized the administration, abolished superfluous posts, implemented judicial reform, improved the situation of the peasantry and decreed the freedom of the press, only to be imprisoned and executed by the powerful forces of reaction. In Sweden also, using his authority after a coup d'état, Gustave III set about reorganizing the judiciary and the treasury, abolishing torture and proclaiming religious tolerance; but he came up against tenacious resistance from the privileged classes, and was assassinated in a palace intrigue during a masked ball. Obviously, reformist politicians could only progress as far as their social base would permit: the reform programme had to be an instrument in the service of those in power, not a vehicle for social change. This is the real significance of the political aims of enlightened despotism.

TERRITORIAL TRANSFERS

The strengthening of the State, with its increased ability to control its subjects, to raise revenue for the public treasury and to mobilize its military resources by land and by sea, served to further a policy of territorial expansion, both in Europe and the colonies, as a result of which France emerged as the foremost power in Europe and Britain as the major world power, due to her continuing acquisition of new possessions overseas.

The Treaty of Utrecht brought to Europe a period of international stability which the Treaty of Nystadt was to extend to the Baltic region at the end of the Northern War (see Map 16a). France's borders were more or less finally fixed, with the recognition that they included Alsace. Holland was guaranteed a secure future by the Barrier Treaty, which gave her a defensive strip to the south of her borders and five garrisons in the southern Low Countries. Spain was ousted from Italy in favour of Austria, which occupied Milan, Mantua, Naples, Sardinia (later exchanged for Sicily) and the garrisons of Tuscany, while Savoy emerged as a major power with the incorporation of Sardinia (which had been exchanged for Sicily), Nice and Monferrato, and by obtaining the title of king for its sovereign. Spain lost Flanders, which was also given to Austria, and had to submit to being despoiled of Minorca and Gibraltar, which were ceded to Britain. From 1716 a Triple Alliance (Britain, France and Holland) guaranteed fulfilment of the terms of the treaty and the stability thus achieved.

In the Baltic, the defeat of Sweden put an end to a century of expansion to the east and the south. Under the Treaty of Stockholm, Sweden withdrew from Germany, surrendering Schleswig to Denmark, western Pomerania to Prussia and Bremen and Verden with their territories to Hanover. Under the Treaty of Nystadt, Sweden relinquished to Russia her possessions on the other side of the Baltic: Ingria, Estonia, Livonia and a strip of Karelia. Here also stable conditions were established.

The Treaties of Utrecht-Rastatt and Stockholm-Nystadt defined stable frontiers in Western Europe, bringing to an end a long period of constant territorial transfers. This picture of general stability was only disturbed in Italy, where a number of notable changes were brought about by the Spanish desire for revenge, the irreversible decline of Parma and Tuscany and the geopolitical errors committed in the region by the negotiators of the Treaty of Utrecht, namely the dismemberment of Mantua-Monferrato and Naples-Sicily, the inclusion of the two largest islands in continental states, and the cession to Austria of territories far removed from its geographical and political centre. The result was that Spain claimed its Italian states, which was countered by the military action of the members of the Triple Alliance. The end was a compromise solution, finally accepted by all in 1748: the installation of Bourbon dynasties in both the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily and the Duchy of Parma. These dynasties were to remain in their new dominions until Italian unity was achieved in the following century.

Thus European conflicts no longer meant great changes in the map or in the balance of power in Western Europe. By contrast, the major powers constantly confronted each other in the colonies, seeking to attain supremacy in the territories outside Europe. The scale had been seen to tip in favour of Britain ever since the Treaty of Utrecht, which had granted to Great Britain the territories of Hudson Bay, New Scotland and Newfoundland and consequently the opportunity to develop the fur trade, as well as assuring her a virtual monopoly



Map 16a Treaties of Utrecht, 1713; Rastatt and Baden, 1714 (after *New Cambridge Modern History Atlas*).

of the cod-fishing industry at the expense of the French and the Spanish. Great Britain also received St Kitts Island, in the West Indies, and two trade concessions of vital importance which broke Spain's monopoly in her American colonies, namely the slave-trade and the 'navio de permiso', annually authorizing a 500-ton British ship to engage in duty-free trade with Spanish American ports at times to coincide with their fairs (see Map 16b).

In this context, the Austrian War of Succession presented an opportunity for a fresh confrontation between Britain on the one hand and Spain and France on the other. The two latter had signed the second of the Family Compacts which were to unite the two main branches of the Bourbon dynasty against the common enemy throughout the century. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle brought no consequences of note, but it did leave the two parties on a war footing in preparation for the next colonial confrontation, which took place in the context of the Seven Years War and ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1763 (see Map 17a). This was a great triumph for Britain, who reaffirmed her right to New Scotland and Newfoundland, extended the frontiers of her North American colonies to the Mississippi, incorporated French Canada, the Spanish Floridas, some of the islands in the West




Map 16b Treaty of Utrecht in America (after C. Martinez-Shaw).



Map 17a Treaty settlements in Europe, 1735-63 (after *New Cambridge Modern History Atlas*).



Map 17b Treaty of Paris (1763) in America (after C. Martinez-Shaw).



Map 17c Treaty of Paris (1763) in Asia (after C. Martinez-Shaw).

Indies (Dominica, Grenada, Tobago) and laid the foundations of British India, virtually expelling the French, reduced since that time to the five trading posts which they retained until this century (see Maps 17b, 17c).

The Treaty of Paris is the most significant milestone in the history of the colonial rivalry maintained between the major European powers throughout the eighteenth century. Its consequences were only slightly modified by the last great conflict of the century, stemming from the proclamation of independence by Britain's thirteen North American colonies. The Treaty of Versailles did not question the major British acquisitions in 1763 of Canada and India; it did however return some territories to their former occupants (Minorca and both Floridas to Spain and Tobago to France), while the secession of the United States was offset by the immediate establishment of trade relations between the former colonial power and the new republic.

In short, during the century of the enlightenment European states did not cease to engage in one of their preferred occupations – war. Hostilities were conducted under the conflicting auspices of a period of transition: wars of territorial conquest continued, and although frontiers altered little in Western Europe, great transfers of land took place in the colonies, where trading interests, which had already given rise to important conflicts in the previous century, became a recurrent theme in the sequence of disputes and subsequent peace negotiations. On the other hand, war was no longer waged for ideological reasons; this was a sign of agreement on basic principles up till the time that the success of the French Revolution brought about the rapid reconciliation of the former enemies and formed an alliance of all European states, monarchical or republican, absolutist or parliamentary, against subversion and in defence of an *ancien régime* which remained more united than appearances would suggest.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Thus economic development, the stream-lining of government and international politics can all be seen as tools in the service of one ultimate aim, which truly defines the horizon of political life in eighteenth-century Europe. This was none other than the maintenance of certain power structures for the benefit of a small group possessing honours, wealth and political rights, at the expense of the rest of the population who, conveniently divided so that they could not unite, and invited to partake of the crumbs from the banquet of general prosperity, were forced to consent peacefully to their unequal share in material wealth, their subordinate position in society and discriminatory treatment with regard to the exercise of political power. The State, and the social classes which benefited from the system, knew how to present their own social project as an integrating mechanism which would guarantee the prosperity of the whole population, though in fact prosperity was meted out to each according to his station.

The principal beneficiaries of the project were the nobility, who enjoyed a new golden age during the eighteenth century. The basis of their power remained the same: tax exemption, the hereditary possession of land, and occupation of high office in the administration, the army or the church. Tax exemption shielded them from the growing demands of the exchequer, which rarely if ever succeeded in extracting from the aristocracy any contribution to the expenditure of a State whose policies benefited them. At the same time, the wealth of the nobility

rose steadily throughout the century; this was not only because of the rise in agrarian rents (the variable which showed the greatest increase during the century, due to the pressure of demand and seigniorial reaction in the countryside), but also as a result of investment in other sectors (such activities were no longer considered demeaning for the nobility). Examples were wholesale trading, industry (in Normandy and Brittany, nobles became ironmasters), shipbuilding and finance; in the latter the aristocracy indulged in wild speculation, for instance in France when the Law Bank was founded. Lastly, the income of the aristocracy far outstripped that of the members of any other social class, and in addition their position was strengthened by a virtual monopoly of the best offices, whether civil, military or ecclesiastical.

However, not all offices were coveted by the aristocracy. The high nobility was quite content to sit on purely ceremonial councils and occupy honorary posts at court, leaving lawyers from the ranks immediately below them to deal with the more tedious tasks of day-to-day bureaucracy. Similarly, the militia, reserved *par excellence* for members of the nobility, who justified their exemption from taxes on the grounds of the payment of this 'blood tax', gradually lost its appeal as an army career for the aristocracy, not only in Britain, where the small size of the army permitted a rapid reconversion of the nobility to civil functions, but also in countries like Spain and France, where military leadership had traditionally been the domain of the hereditary nobility. This provoked criticism from the men of the enlightenment, who felt that the character of the true aristocracy had become irretrievably adulterated. Lastly, the Church continued to promote to the highest ecclesiastical offices the younger sons of noble families, who in many cases were less interested in concerns of a religious nature than in enjoying the power and substantial stipends associated with church benefices.

In the eighteenth century the nobility was the only social class which shared political power with the Crown. The only exception was Holland, the bourgeois State *par excellence*, where the group of regents had become an 'aristocracy of specialized administrators' who shared out offices in the cities, the Provincial States and the States-General. At the other extreme, in Britain, the exercise of political power lay in practice in the hands of the nobility through their family connections, their monopoly of posts in ministerial cabinets and seats in the House of Lords, and their ruling influence in the House of Commons thanks to the corrupt electoral system. In Sweden too, the 'age of freedom', which began after the death of Charles XII, allowed the nobility to participate directly in government through their control of the Riksdag, the secret committee of the estates and all the seats on the Royal Council.

However, power was generally exercised through intermediaries. Just as the Dutch bourgeoisie delegated the defence of their interests to the specialized élite of regents, so most European monarchs carried on the tradition of using a body of high-level functionaries recruited from the bourgeoisie or the minor nobility, thus creating the illusion that ministers ran political affairs to benefit their own social group of origin when in fact they were mere administrators of the interests of the privileged classes.

The privileged classes closed ranks so as better to maintain their position. The exception to this rule was Britain, with its loosely regulated 'open-ended' nobility, which by a kind of smooth social osmosis assimilated commoners through mixed marriages, or through their purchase of country estates (by which they became 'gentlemen' or 'esquires'), or through

success in an academic career, in a trend which gradually abandoned the principle of family connections in favour of wealth and even of personal merit.

Other countries, without attaining the flexibility of the British system, also provided opportunities of access to the nobility, either through the purchase of titles (France), service in the administration of the State (Sweden), or distinguished public service in political or economic life (Spain); but in general the trend in continental Europe was in the opposite direction. Thus in Spain, despite the titles of nobility conferred from time to time by the Crown, the number of nobles declined rapidly throughout the century. In France there arose a defensive movement designed to do away with the mechanisms for entry into the nobility, which became an increasingly closed and static world concerned only with enjoying privileges and opposing any form of advancement for the rest of the population – an attitude which explains the bitter resentment which led to the Revolution.

Briefly the 1700s can be seen as the great aristocratic age. The court nobility represented the pinnacle of refinement of the *ancien régime*, creating a truly aristocratic civilization in which the predominantly French imprint was coloured by the influence of 'Italian architecture, English gardens, German music and Spanish etiquette as observed in Vienna'. However, this world apart was built at the expense of the other sectors of what was becoming an ever more complex society.

The bourgeoisie was the second rung of the social ladder, both on account of its great wealth and by virtue of the esteem in which it was held by other groups. It consisted mainly of people who derived their income from the ownership of the means of production other than land, that is to say those who possessed 'dynamic wealth', and whose spirit of industry was in stark contrast to the idle ease of an aristocracy living on unearned income. Their ranks were swelled by individuals in different walks of life, ranging from the merchants of the *ancien régime* who traded in a variety of products, the common denominator being exchange, to industrialists or manufacturers (former artisans or specialized technicians or traders who finally became manufacturers, or younger sons of farming families who had been sent to the city to make their fortune); bankers (for example contractors or money-lenders who financed public works or advanced money to the great and powerful; or those who dealt not in goods but in bills of exchange, to provide credit for industrial or mercantile companies); and even including intellectuals, the auxiliaries of the bourgeoisie who spoke for, and represented, the bourgeoisie at turning-points in its history as a social class.

The wealth of the bourgeoisie was not equal to that of the aristocracy, but as a class they were more dynamic. Their income was derived from their business premises, investment, and real estate in both town and country, the latter consisting of properties which often formed a belt around the town where their main activity took place. This wealth frequently opened the door to social advancement and even to ennoblement, through the purchase of offices which bestowed a title on the office-holder (France) or the purchase of letters patent of nobility as a step to obtaining a title (Spain), or through royal favour, exercised directly in the most outstanding cases.

During the *ancien régime* the bourgeoisie's position of prominence from the economic and social point of view had kept them loyal to an absolute monarchy which was a source of lucrative business such as the farming out of taxes, the administration of public services, the provision of supplies to the army and navy and the raising of loans to the monarch;

and which had decreed measures favourable to trade and industry in the context of the protectionism which characterized the later stages of mercantilism. Thus the bourgeoisie had always accepted their subordinate position in society as a whole, and the system of values imposed by the nobility, their own ultimate objective being to join the nobility at the cost of abandoning precisely those activities which had constituted the basis of their social advancement. Access to the restricted circle of the privileged was the perfect reward for success in the world of business.

However, the eighteenth century saw growing disaffection among the bourgeoisie, who began to feel at a disadvantage under the order guaranteed by the absolute monarchy and enlightened despotism. On the one hand, they resented as an injustice the system of privileges which not only discriminated against them in fiscal terms but also excluded them from political life. On the other hand, the closed-doors policy operated by the nobility made them aware of their lack of social prestige and how difficult it was to change their status, while at the same time it starkly exposed the hostility and contempt in which they were held by the privileged classes. Finally, the very wealth which they had accumulated over the century found itself dead-locked in an economic system which acted as an insurmountable barrier to the possibility of further development. The bourgeoisie thus finally realized that absolutism, and the alliance between the Crown and the privileged classes, constituted the real obstacle to their economic growth, the real hindrance to their social recognition and to the exercise of political power in the bourgeois interest. They therefore mounted a project for social and political change, which sought adherents among other social groups, in an attempt to present a revolutionary alternative to the monopoly of power held by the aristocracy and defended by enlightened despotism.

Other social groups might be interested in change, but their limited power and underdeveloped class awareness prevented them from launching an organized attack on the established order. In the countryside, the peasants were not a uniform group but occupied a variety of different positions, ranging from the freeholder who farmed his own land to the destitute day-labourer who hired himself out to the well-to-do neighbour in the village, and including those who lived precariously off small plots of land. In any case, economic growth in the course of the century brought about important changes in social patterns in the countryside, both in Britain, where the enclosures drove out a large number of farmers from their lands, and on the continent, where rising rents stimulated the greed of the nobles and other landowners and caused all kinds of reactionary measures. This invariably increased pressure on a peasantry already crippled by the taxation levied by both the State and the Church, and suffering from a series of poor harvests against which no provision had been made. Social discrimination was thus seen to be accompanied by the threat of a decline in living standards which was paradoxical at a time of general prosperity.

In the towns, the rising bourgeoisie was not alone. The artisan class was still the most representative group of the urban middle classes, but their situation had continually declined over the century. Here too economic progress, which imposed new forms of industrial organization, sounded the death knell of the craft workshops which had been functioning since medieval times. The guilds gradually passed into the hands of small groups; this put skilled workers at the mercy of officials who denied them access to the highest professional category, turning them into wage-earners, and

craft goods inevitably lost their competitive edge in a market supplied increasingly by home industry or manufactured wares. Where reconversion to the reorganization of production proved impossible, the real earnings of craftsmen declined slowly but markedly, when they were not subjected to a gradual process of proletarianization which reduced them almost to the situation of that shadowy group, the urban poor.

This amorphous social group lived entirely from casual manual labour, permanently a prey to hunger and unemployment, and subject to vagrancy laws which might commit them to the harsh discipline of the workhouse, to official welfare establishments, or to the less rigorous but increasingly criticized charitable church institutions. Particularly at times of crisis, this labouring class tended to merge with an underworld of outcasts, beggars and, in extreme cases, criminals. In any case it constituted a social environment devoid of hope, sunk in illiteracy and misery, prone to alcoholism and violence, easily stirred to food riots or political revolts, as was to be shown by their participation in radical English movements or in the events of the French Revolution.

Finally, the onset of industrialization gave rise to the modern proletariat of industrial wage-earners who lived by the fruits of their labour in the mines or the cotton-weaving industry. The material living conditions of this nascent social class were not far removed from those of the underemployed labourers of feudal society; but the uniqueness of their work experience, the contact with their fellows in the close confines of factory conditions and the fact that they lived alongside each other in working-class districts contributed to a more rapid growth in class awareness, which soon led them to play a leading role in pressing their demands and in organized movements of social protest for political aims. However, this historical aspect could not develop fully until after the final crisis of the *ancien régime*.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SYSTEM

The primary objective of the political project of enlightened despotism was therefore to gain the acceptance of all social classes for a programme aimed at maintaining a number of traditional structures based on privilege, discrimination and inequality. This situation was seen as justified by natural and divine law and as one which, having always existed, was indisputable. But if these ideological arguments were not sufficient to gain the support of the Third Estate, the material prosperity of the country, which benefited the majority without distinction of class, was used as a decisive argument to unite all sectors of society behind a project which guaranteed collective progress.

The project found acceptance during the greater part of the century and in almost every country. In fact, unlike the previous century which was characterized by intense change, the 1700s emerge as an oasis of relative peace sandwiched between the intense agitation of the preceding period and the violent convulsions of the revolutionary era which was to follow.

However, this does not mean that conflict did not exist. In the first place, international conflicts, a natural feature of political life of the period, were linked mainly to colonial problems, although Europe itself was frequently turned into a battlefield. Second, some countries underwent important dynastic conflicts. This was the case in Spain, where Philip V had not only to overcome the resistance of different Castilian sectors but also, more importantly, to conduct a

long drawn-out war against his eastern provinces, which had declared overwhelmingly in favour of the Austrian claimant. This was also the case in Britain, which had to put down the last attempts to restore the exiled Stuart kings, that is the Jacobite Rebellions led by the Old Pretender, James, and his son the Young Pretender, Prince Charles Edward, in 1715, 1722 and 1745. The victory of 1745 was followed by harsh repression of the Scottish Highlands which had led the uprising.

While in both cases the dynastic claims found support in social disaffection and were accompanied by substantial movements of social protest, their profound significance lies in the background of the constitutional problems of the Spanish and United Kingdom monarchies and the even wider context of international confrontation. In the eighteenth century the specific protests of separate social groups found less violent, less lasting and less ambitious forms of expression than had been the case in the preceding centuries, although strife was not absent.

In the countryside, the *jacqueries* or peasant uprisings which had been so common in the previous century virtually disappeared from the scene in Western Europe; disputes found expression in attacks on seigniorial rights, the pulling down of boundary fences, isolated outbreaks of violence or the forcible settlement of individual claims. In the towns, protest took the form of food riots manned by the most deprived social groups in protest at the high cost of staple commodities, particularly bread. Rioters demanded enforcement of the statutory price of bread, attacked granaries and demanded measures to prevent the free circulation of wheat, in an attempt to re-establish the 'moral economy' which the authorities sought to defend, if only to avoid conflict. Some of these riots reached unwonted proportions and had wide-ranging repercussions, such as the disturbances in Britain in 1766, the riots which threw several Spanish cities into turmoil in the same year, and the so called '*guerre des farines*' in France in 1775.

Other revolts were similar in origin, such as the Gin Riots in London in 1736, which combined discontent over measures to reduce the popular consumption of alcoholic drinks with the hostility of the working classes towards the wage competition of Irish immigrants. The latter explanation has been given as the motive for the Gordon Riots, which found their most spectacular expression in the attack on Irish Catholics; but the deeper social reasons for these events may be seen in the overt hostility to the government and in the critical context of the reverses suffered in the American War of Independence. In any case, these outbreaks of popular violence, characteristic of the *ancien régime*, were surpassed by other, more modern forms of protest, such as organized strikes or the destruction of machinery in the early manifestations of the Luddite movement to protect jobs threatened by the inexorable progress of the Industrial Revolution.

During this period resistance to the advance of state centralism also gained in importance. Resistance took the form of refusal to pay taxes, riots against compulsory military service, and refusal to register on the naval lists designed to provide crews for the Navy. These were in any case sporadic protests which never gave serious concern to the authorities, even if demonstrations which were merely local or specific in principle might at times take on a political hue.

In the course of the century there were few examples of direct, violent political protest. These included the uprising against Esquilache and his reforms in Madrid in 1766; the

French parliamentary unrest which sometimes latched on to odd and apparently unconnected events such as the manipulation of the Jansenist convulsionaries of Saint Médard; and the disturbances incited by the radical discontents of John Wilkes in London in the 1760s. However, while the first two cases are proof of the reactionary attitude of certain sectors of the privileged classes trying to prevent modernization of the country and impede the programme of enlightened despotism (such as the palace intrigues which ended in the execution of Struensee in Denmark, the assassination of Gustav III in Sweden at the exile of the Marquis of Pombal in Portugal), the movement known for its watery 'Wilkes and Freedom' was born of the opposition to George III's attempts to use the royal prerogative. It originated in the English radical movement, as is shown by the Yorkshire Movement, the legitimate heir to events which troubled London for several years.

So, despite some isolated tremors, the programme of enlightened despotism developed successfully and smoothly throughout the eighteenth century. Undoubtedly one of the keys to this success was the extraordinary long period of economic prosperity which allowed the majority of the population to reap material benefits for most of the century. Towards the end of the century, however, the situation began to change. The previously sustained growth began to show signs of faltering, and cyclical crises revealed the limitations of the system. The crisis came when the developments which had taken place in the productive system made necessary a series of changes affecting not only the economy but also society and the political regime.

The success of enlightened despotism harboured the seeds of its own destruction. Some of the beneficiaries of the prosperity enjoyed throughout the century grew impatient as they realized that their economic success was not rewarded with social esteem and political rights: equally impatient were the victims of the system, who had been awaiting a sign to rebel against their situation. Similarly, the intellectuals who had believed that revitalization of the state apparatus and enlightened government would undertake in-depth reform, had at the same time spread confidence in reason and the critical spirit as rules for the establishment of a well-founded society. This in turn gave a new generation the ideological tools necessary to undermine the foundations of a system which did not appear to conform to the principles of reason and justice being preached.

The French representatives in the General Assembly took the first step from theoretical criticism of the system to the application of their ideals, leading to the revolutionary transformation of the foundations on which the society of the *ancien régime* had been based. In the decades to follow, those sympathetic to the Revolution, and liberals in other countries, were to set in motion a process inspired by the same sources, the pursuit of which was to usher in a new era in the history of Western Europe and indeed the history of the world.

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12.3

CULTURE

Manuel Fernández Álvarez

One's first impression of the culture of Western Europe in the modern era is one of great splendour. It was the era of Europe's large-scale expansion into the rest of the world, of cultural movements such as the Renaissance, Baroque art and the Enlightenment, of the huge religious upheaval represented by the Reformation, and of the take-off of sciences known to us as the scientific revolution.

This cultural splendour was admittedly the preserve of the few; the mass of the people in Europe were illiterate country-dwellers. However, the new élitist culture coexisted with popular culture, which gradually rose through a slow process of development to higher levels, where it provided a general background which was frequently a source of inspiration for the greatest creative artists and writers. By contrast with the elegant poetry recited at court, there was the poetry of the people, reflected in its songs; alongside the narratives of great writers who wrote for the cultivated few, we find the popular tales recounted in the family circle. Curiously enough, it was during this period that drama, which appealed to both the cultured and the illiterate, reached great heights. The dramatist knew that, like his forerunner the priest in his pulpit, he was conveying a message which reached all members of society.

To sum up, an élitist culture coexisted with a popular culture, each having its own social base; they occasionally intermingled and were never mutually exclusive. In fact, the new culture returned to the people to renew its inspiration, and popular culture borrowed extensively from the élite. This will be the theme of this study of the culture of Western Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, as expressed in the three main stages of the Renaissance, the Baroque and the Enlightenment.

THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE

The cultural movement called the *Renaissance*, in which Italian cities, mainly Florence, Rome, Venice and Milan played a leading role, occurred in Western Europe between the middle of the fifteenth century and the middle of the sixteenth century. It ended in the religious upheaval of the Reformation. The two events should not be regarded as independent, with no links other than their coincidence in time and space. One of the fundamental aspects of the Renaissance was Humanism, and many Humanists were extremely critical of the abuses of the Church; this prepared the ground for the work of the great reformers, foremost among them Luther.

Although there is no broad measure of agreement among scholars regarding the origins of the Renaissance, there seems to be no doubt that it reached its height in the mid-fifteenth

century and that its main centre was Italy. The fact that Italy occupied the place it did was bound up with its close links to the culture of Classical Antiquity which the Renaissance set out to revive. Its position was further strengthened by the fact that Greece, the other main heir to the legacy of the Ancient World, had fallen to the Turkish Empire, forcing Byzantine Humanists like Chrysoloras, George of Trebizond and Theodore Gaza to flee to Italy.

One of the main features of the Renaissance, apart from its worship of Classical Antiquity, and especially of its leading thinkers Plato and Aristotle, could be said to be the secular turn taken by culture, which no longer developed under the supervision of the Church, or at least not entirely. The new generation of scholars were no longer required to be members of the clergy and the main aim of their study was not so much theology as a better understanding of humanity. The result was the revival of the term *humanitas*, which had already been used by Cicero in ancient Rome to refer to the pursuit of *litterae humaniores*, and was to be used afresh by Lorenzo Valla (1405-57).

Other features of the Renaissance could be said to include the love of Nature, as reflected in both painting and poetry; the cult of the beauty of the human body; the emphasis placed on personality, so that *virtù* came to be ranked above lineage; and lastly, a keen critical sense, which caused people to reject the principle of authority, and an inquiring outlook, which enabled them to re-establish many ancient texts by ridding them of the accumulated glosses added in the Middle Ages.

Humanism in Italy

With Humanism, we come to the very core of the Renaissance, with its veneration of Classical Antiquity. This spurred people to acquire a command of the classical languages, both Latin and Greek. Learning Latin had been a long and unbroken tradition, but this had pined out in the Middle Ages. The Italian Humanists sought to improve their knowledge of the language, as in the case of Lorenzo Valla, whose book *De elegantia Latinae linguae* became widely known throughout Europe. The study of Greek, which Petrarch (d. 1374) bitterly regretted not knowing, began to spread with the arrival of the Byzantine scholars, especially after Constantinople fell to the Turkish Empire in 1453.

One of the outstanding features of Italian Humanism was the search for Classical works that had been lost since the fall of the Roman Empire and their publication in critical editions. Discoveries of works such as these were hailed as major triumphs, as when Poggio (1380-1459) found the

treaty *De institutione oratorum* by Quintilian in the abbey of St Gall, in Switzerland, in 1414. The very essence of the Renaissance was Humanism, with its veneration of antiquity.

The Italian Humanists enjoyed the patronage of the main courts, including the papal court in Rome: examples of patrons were the Medicis in Florence, Alfonso V the Magnanimous in Naples, and Pope Nicholas V and Pope Pius II in Rome. The result was the establishment of splendid libraries, such as the Vatican Library, and the formation of new cultural centres separate from the old medieval universities. These included the *Accademia Platonica* founded in Florence by the Medicis to carry out new studies on Plato, linked to outstanding scholars such as Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) and Pico della Mirandola (1463–94), author of *De dignitate hominis*, which is a defence of Humanist values; the *Accademia Romana*, founded by Pomponio Leto; the *Accademia Neapolitana*, which was founded by Pontano and concentrated on literary themes; and the press set up by the printer Aldus Manutius in Venice, which produced outstanding critical editions of Greek and Latin texts early in the sixteenth century.

Northern Humanism

This is the name usually given to the Humanism which developed elsewhere in Western Europe. Its two main proponents were the Dutchman Erasmus of Rotterdam (1465–1536) and the Englishman Thomas More (1478–1535), whose influence spread to the rest of Western Europe, and especially to France and Spain. Its strongest characteristic was its emphasis on religion; it combined an interest in classical authors with better knowledge of the Bible, and advocated a religious life more consistent with the principles of Christianity.

The writings of Erasmus were widely disseminated, in particular his *Adagia* (an anthology of proverbs from Antiquity), the *Enchiridion militis christiani*, in which he sets out the principles of true Christianity, and the *Enchiridion moriae*, or *The Praise of Folly*, his most famous work published in 1509. His edition of the New Testament reflected his concern with the principles of Christianity.

Foremost among northern humanists were the Englishmen John Colet (d. 1519) and Thomas More, author of an important, if not the most important, work of this period, *Utopia*, in which he describes an ideal society in a remote ocean island, and at the same time criticizes the contradictions existing in the society of his day.

Of special importance, in view of its links with the Reformation, was German Humanism, with figures such as Johannes Reuchlin (1445–1522), a Greek and Hebrew scholar, Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523), one of the authors of the *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*, a forthright criticism of the conservatism of the German universities, and Sebastian Brant (1458–1521), whose book *Das Narrenschiff* (*The Ship of Fools*) was in line with the thinking of Erasmus. Though they died in the early years of the Reformation, these three authors helped to establish it as a movement.

Humanism in the rest of Western Europe

In France, Humanist thought led to the establishment of an important cultural centre, now known as the Collège de France, which was completely independent of the powerful University of the Sorbonne in Paris. The members of

Humanist circle included Lefèvre d'Étaples and Guillaume Budé (d. 1540), who encouraged the foundation of the Royal Library in Fontainebleau, which was the origin of today's National Library in Paris. It was this Humanist setting that produced *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, the highly original work by François Rabelais (1494–1553), which satirized contemporary society.

French Humanism continued to exert an influence in the second half of the sixteenth century through the work of two great writers, Ronsard and Montaigne. Pierre de Ronsard (1524–85), was one of the most outstanding lyrical poets of Western culture, with his *Odes*, sonnets (*Les amours*) and his hymns (especially the famous *Hymne de la mort*). Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533–92) portrays the model French Renaissance gentleman in his *Essais*, a work full of personal references in which stoicism gradually gives way to scepticism, the fruit of his reflection on history and on the different traits of peoples; his conclusion is to advocate tolerance, possibly the best remedy for a France which was then ravaged by the wars of religion.

Spanish Humanism was initially influenced by Italy; its leading figure was Antonio de Nebrija (1444–1522), an eminent Latinist, author of the first grammar of Romance languages, the *Grammatica castellana*. During the sixteenth century, under the Emperor Charles V, Spanish Humanism was strongly influenced by Erasmus, giving rise to great thinkers such as Luis Vives and Alfonso de Valdés. Luis Vives left Spain as a child, and lived in France, England and the Low Countries. He acted as tutor in London to the Princess Mary. Eminent in education and philosophy, closely in agreement with the thinking of Erasmus, he painted a picture of daily life in his *Exercitatio linguae latinae*. Alfonso de Valdés (1490–1532) created two of the most important works of Spanish literature during the sixteenth century, namely the *Diálogo de las cosas ocurridas en Roma* (in which his aim was to justify the sacking of Rome by the troops of the Emperor Charles V) and the *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carli*. Alfonso de Valdés was one of the few Humanists who departed from the custom of writing in Latin; he used Spanish to express his own ideas on the thinking of Erasmus, of which he was one of the main disseminators.

It was this Humanist environment, influenced by both Italy and the Low Countries, which produced some of the masterpieces of sixteenth century Spanish literature: *La Celestina*, by Fernando Rojas (1465?–1536), who created a personage now known the world over; *El Lazarillo de Tormes*, by an anonymous author, a lively criticism of Spanish society at that time; and the poetry of Garcilaso de la Vega (1501?–36), who introduced Italian Renaissance poetry into Spain.

The arts during the Renaissance: urban planning and architecture

The Renaissance brought with it a new concept of the city, planned in accordance with the rules of perspective. By contrast with the medieval city, which attempted to reflect the social order by placing the palace and the church at the centre, with the necessary services around them – an example still visible today is the old city of Vitoria – the Renaissance sought to rationalize urban space on the lines of a chessboard, with a central open space, for example the Plaza Mayor, dominated by the town hall.

It is in the Renaissance palaces that the influence of Antiquity is most obvious, as in the Palazzo Medici-Riccardi (Florence),

the masterpiece of Michelozzo (1396–1492), completed in the middle of the fifteenth century, and in the Palazzo Strozzi (Florence) built in 1489 by the architect Benedetto da Majano. It is these palaces which give Florence its predominantly Renaissance aspect, set in a townscape dominated by the cupola of the Duomo designed by Brunelleschi.

Half a century later, Rome took over the lead from Florence with the work of two great architects, Bramante and Michelangelo. The result was Saint Peter's Basilica, its cupola being one of the most characteristic features of Renaissance Rome, in which work was proceeding on palaces such as the Palazzo Farnese, designed by Sangallo and completed by Michelangelo himself. The new town-planning ideals are embodied in the Piazza del Campidoglio, designed by Michelangelo to embellish Rome for Charles V's visit in 1536, though completed a century later.

The Italian Renaissance flourished not only in Florence and Rome, but also in Venice, where the architect Sansovino (1486–1570) put the finishing touch to the Piazza San Marco with his magnificent Library.

Sculpture

Sculpture also featured in Renaissance town-planning. Examples of monumental statues adorning squares are the equestrian statue of *Colonne* by Verrocchio (1435–88) in Venice; the statue of the condottiere *Gattamelata* in Padua, the work of Donatello (1386–1466), probably the most outstanding sculptor before Michelangelo; and Michelangelo's statue of *David*, on the Piazza della Signoria in Florence. The impressive set of statues created by Michelangelo for the tomb of the Medici, most outstandingly *Il Penseroso*, is also to be found in Florence. Rome also possesses some of Michelangelo's sculptures with masterpieces such as *La Pietà* in Saint Peter's (see Plate 22) and *Moses* in the church of San Pietro in Vinculis.

Painting

Renaissance painting flourished in Italy on a scale unprecedented in the history of art. The different schools included the Florentine, Venetian, Milanese and Roman schools. There was a host of first-rate artists such as Piero della Francesca, Veronese, Giorgione, Correggio and Titian, over and above the three greatest, namely Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), Raphael (1483–1520) and Michelangelo (1475–1564). Some of their masterpieces now form part of the heritage of humanity: the *Annunciation* by Fra Angelico (El Prado, Madrid), *The Primavera* by Botticelli (Florence), *The Pastoral Concert*, by Giorgione (Louvre, Paris), *Mona Lisa* by Leonardo da Vinci (Louvre), *The Last Supper* by Leonardo da Vinci (Church of Santa Maria delle Grazie, Milan), *The School of Athens*, by Raphael (Vatican, Rome), the frescoes in the Sistine Chapel, especially *The Last Judgement* by Michelangelo (Vatican, Rome) and the equestrian portrait of *Charles V at Mühlberg* by Titian (El Prado, Madrid) (see Plate 24).

The other great centre of Renaissance painting was the Low Countries, under the patronage of a rich bourgeoisie. The list of important artists from the fifteenth century onwards is impressive: brothers Hubert and Jan Van Eyck, Van der Weyden, Hans Memling, Gossaert, Hugo van der Goes,

Gerhard David, Quentin Metsys, Van Orley and Antonio Moro.

In the sixteenth century the most representative painters in the Low Countries, who concentrated on depicting the life of the people, are Jerome Van Aeken, better known as Hieronymus Bosch (1460?–1516), and Pieter Brueghel or Brueghel the Elder (1528?–69). Hieronymus Bosch painted a series of paintings imbued with a religious symbolism which has never been completely decoded. Brueghel reached an even higher level of attainment, comparable with that of the best Italian artists of his day. Particularly noteworthy are his *Labours of the Months* and *Peasant Wedding* (Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).

Germany also produced great painters comparable to the Italians, such as Lucas Cranach (1472–1553), Hans Holbein (1497–1543) and, above all, Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528). Holbein painted the excellent *Portrait of Erasmus* (Louvre, Paris) and Dürer the impressive panels of the *Four Apostles* (Pinakothek, Munich) and a self-portrait (El Prado, Madrid).

The Renaissance elsewhere in Western Europe

The importance of the Renaissance in the other countries of Western Europe depended on the influence exerted by Italy and the Low Countries and the patronage of the Royal courts. Examples of monarchs who welcomed the Renaissance were Henry VIII in England, Ferdinand and Isabella, and Charles V in Spain and, above all, François I in France. Most significant was the hospitality extended by François I to the aging Leonardo da Vinci in his palace at Cloux near Amboise in 1516.

In Spain the Renaissance made itself felt more forcefully in Castile than in Aragon, often through the intermediary of the universities. The façades of the Universities of Salamanca (a masterpiece in the plateresque style) and of Alcalá de Henares (by Rodrigo Gil de Hontañón), and the Higher Colleges of Fonseca, in Salamanca, where Diego de Siloé worked, and of Santa Cruz, in Valladolid (by Lorenzo Vázquez), are some of the most representative examples.

In painting, Fernando Gallego (1440–1507) is the most outstanding of the Spanish painters influenced by the style of the North. His most important work is the altarpiece of *San Ildefonso* in the cathedral of Zamora. Strongly influenced by Italy was the painter Pedro Berruguete (1450–1503), who trained at the ducal court of Urbino; he is best known for his *Auto-da-fé* (El Prado, Madrid), though his greatest work is the altarpiece of his native church of Paredes de Nava (Palencia).

Portugal, the first European country to constitute a modern state and the first to start expanding overseas, expressed its political grandeur in the arts in its own distinctive Manueline style. Named after King Emanuel I, the patron of Vasco da Gama on his great voyage to the East Indies, this style is exemplified in the Hieronymite monastery on the outskirts of Lisbon. A monument to the Eastern travels of Portuguese navigators is the Torre de Belém, built between 1515 and 1521, and one of the masterpieces of sixteenth-century Europe.

Music

The Low Countries are also important in the field of music. Under the patronage of the House of Burgundy their musicians dominated Western Europe until the mid-sixteenth

century. The Royal Choir of Charles V was to become famous throughout Europe. Some of these musicians were invited to the main European Courts: Thomas Stoltzer (d. 1526), master of the Royal Choir of Louis II of Hungary; Josquin des Prés (d. 1521), probably the most outstanding musician of this day, who was cantor, or choir-leader, of the papal choir in Rome. Most of them were cantors and composers. A new departure was polyphonic composition, based on a *cantus firmus* combined contrapuntally with two, three and even four other voices. Jacquet Arcadelt created the madrigal for five voices.

Probably no other field shows such a close connection between cultured and popular art forms. The masses composed by some musicians were frequently based on a popular song: an example is Josquin des Prés' most famous mass, *L'Homme armé*. Profane music followed suit: examples are the songs of Juan del Encina (1469-1529), the famous Spanish poet and playwright and author of beautiful love songs based on popular themes, such as the wonderful *Más vale trazar placer por dolores, que estar sin amores*, to be found in the royal collection.

Popular culture

The splendour of Renaissance art should not obscure the fact that it was the preserve of a minority, possibly no more than 20 per cent of the population, and that its major achievements were to take a long time to become part of the common heritage of society. According to surveys conducted by the French historian Le Roy Ladurie in the Languedoc countryside (France), only 28 per cent of country-dwellers who were parties to notarial documents could sign their names; how many of them might be considered literate is another question. This reveals the barrier that existed between the world of culture and the world of the people.

There was always, however, a measure of intercommunication. Group reading, for example, was common among the people, which meant that the illiterate received help from those who could read. The great religious buildings, with their works of art and the messages conveyed by their sculptures, were open to all the faithful. Whether literate or illiterate, all listened to the preaching of the parish priest or pastor, who himself had received a special education. The art forms of folk culture developed into legends and songs, collected by poets and musicians who wished to draw inspiration from the traditions of the people. Ballads and court songs provide many anonymous examples of this art.

This interchange between the two cultural forms was confined to common themes such as love in its many variations, the fleetingness of life, the recurring theme of death, and sometimes major political events of grave consequence to society as a whole, for example, the fall of Granada in Renaissance Spain. Love which did not conform to rigid social norms and was thus ill-fated is reflected in popular songs of medieval origin which were still sung after the Middle Ages, (an example being the Asturian ballad, *¡Ay! mi galán de esta villa*).

The population of the time consisted chiefly of peasants, with their own customs and habits, and this was inevitably reflected in the work of a number of contemporary artists. Pieter Brueghel the Elder is a case in point. The fear of death symbolized by armies of corpses overwhelming human beings, the sufferings of villagers, the events of everyday life (harvesting, hunting, children at play, dancing and death)

are vividly depicted by this observant son of the soil, for example in his *Wedding Dance*, the *Peasant Wedding* (both at the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna) and the *Parable of the Blind* (Museo Nazionale, Naples).

This may well have been the period that produced legends about babes abandoned in the wood who were clever enough to find a way of saving themselves, and amazing tales of infants exchanged in their cradles, thus falling from high lineage to wretched circumstances. Themes such as reverses of fortune, hidden treasure, the wonderful exploits of those who surmount the adverse conditions of their social background, were certainly not invented at the Renaissance, but existed already and were transmitted orally until they were written down. Examples are the old tales of ancient Spain by the sixteenth century authors Juan de Aigujo and Timoneda, and the tales made popular by Charles Perrault and the Comtesse d'Aulnoy in the seventeenth century.

Scientific progress

Although science during this period did not make the spectacular progress achieved much later, which led to the 'scientific revolution', new approaches paved the way for it. The printing press invented in the middle of the fifteenth century by the German Gutenberg was an invaluable tool for disseminating scientific discoveries.

Substantial scientific progress was made in three fields: discoveries about the earth, man and the universe. Knowledge of the earth grew with the continuing new geographical discoveries not only of the Portuguese and the Spanish but also of navigators from all the countries of Western Europe.

Outstanding studies on the human body were conducted by Andreas Vesalius (1514-64), a physician at the court of the Emperor Charles V and author of the book *De humani corporis fabrica*, printed in 1543. This provided a basis for genuine scientific knowledge of the human body, and superseded the erroneous anatomical theories of Antiquity put forward by Galen, which had previously remained unchallenged.

But even more far-reaching in importance was the work of the Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), although more than half a century was to pass before his revolutionary heliocentric theory, which displaced the earth as the centre of the universe, gained acceptance. Some of Copernicus's ideas started to spread during the 1520s when his *Commentariolus* was published. Instrumental in this was the work of his German disciple Rheius, *Narratio prima*, published in 1540, since it led Copernicus to produce a book, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, which he had kept in secret for many years and which was printed the very year of his death in 1543.

Belief in magic

Faced with the huge gaps still existing in his knowledge, it is understandable that Renaissance man continued to resort to magical practices, in the same way as primitive peoples, with a view to conquering a frequently hostile nature. But his belief in magic embraced all human activities: the desire for power, love, the battle for survival (against hunger, disease, pain) and unrealizable dreams (everlasting youth).

That the belief in magic, although criticized, was not shaken by Renaissance may be due to the influence of the teachings

of the ancients, who were highly credulous in that regard. There were however other circumstances which fostered its development, in particular the widespread belief that the devil was constantly at work in human affairs, aided by a league of witches. This belief was held at the highest levels of Christendom, and had even spread considerably by the end of the fifteenth century, as is clear from the papal bull by Pope Innocent VIII in 1484 *Summis desiderantes affectibus*. This denounced the threat which the devil represented to humanity and the danger of witchcraft, making specific references to occurrences in northern Germany at the time; it declared that the charms and spells of the evil one and his underlings were such that they were endangering life in all its forms, human beings, livestock and crops. The alarm sounded by the Pope was taken up by two German Dominicans, Sprenger and Kramer, in a book published two years later, the *Malleus Maleficarum* (the *Witches' Hammer*). This had the effect of unleashing terrible persecutions throughout Western Europe for nearly two centuries, during which thousands of poor women were tried and burnt at the stake after a mere simulacrum of justice in which evidence given by children was admitted and torture used to extort confessions. Eminent figures such as Francisco de Vitoria and Jean Bodin also held these beliefs; curiously though, the Spanish Inquisition (so cruel in other respects) was much more tolerant of the alleged phenomenon of witchcraft, as Caro Baroja has shown.

It is necessary to list the different areas of Renaissance culture and their great figures – in science, literature and the arts. But it should not be forgotten that all this fitted in with one universal vision of the world, that of the Renaissance; there was one comprehensive reason which brought together Botticelli, Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola in Florence under the patronage of Lorenzo the Magnificent. It should also be borne in mind that Leonardo da Vinci was both an artist of genius and a daring engineer, incessantly searching for new technical inventions; and that the great astronomer Copernicus was trained in Italy, the centre of Renaissance culture. It is in the context of this great unity that one should view the series of individual accomplishments of the Renaissance.

THE REFORMATION

The historian who studies the Reformation concludes that it is one of the decisive stages in the history of Europe. Between the Renaissance, starting in the middle of the fifteenth century, and the French Revolution, at the end of the eighteenth century, there was probably no other event of such far-reaching importance.

Factors contributing to the Reformation were the emergence of national feeling, the resentment against the drain of wealth to Rome, the desire, clearly felt in Christendom throughout the fifteenth century, for more sincere religious belief, and the growing indignation over the religious abuses of Rome and the worldliness of the Pope. As noted above, these were condemned by keenly critical Humanists such as Erasmus in the Low Countries and Hutten in Germany. Religious observance was limited to a formalism devoid of spirituality. The failure of the Lateran Council, which ended in 1515, to produce results seemed to demonstrate the inability of the Church of Rome to provide leadership in organizing the profound changes for which Christendom clamoured. The way was thus paved for the Reformation, a religious movement that broke with the past.

This historic task was achieved by an exceptional figure, Martin Luther.

Martin Luther

The biographers of Martin Luther (1483–1546) (see Plate 35) write about his troubled childhood and the crisis in his youth which made him enter the order of St Augustine, for fear, not of death, but of eternal damnation. At that time his thoughts were not of reforming the Church but of his own salvation. In line with the nominalism expounded by William of Occam in the fourteenth century, he considered that, though man was a sinner by nature, with divine assistance he could become worthy of grace through his own efforts. The sign of divine assistance was to be seen in perseverance in good works. On the other hand, any faltering or succumbing to temptation – for example, to the desires of the flesh – could be considered by a scrupulous conscience to be proof of abandonment by God and, consequently, proof of eternal damnation. As a professor at the University of Wittenberg, Luther found in the writings of St Paul words of salvation that brought him peace: 'The just shall live by faith'. This for him opened wide the doors to Paradise. It was at this time that Rome issued a bull, preached by Dominicans, for the sale of indulgences to those who made contributions towards the construction of St Peter's Basilica in Rome. A practice of this kind conflicted with the new principles by which Luther was inspired, and triggered off a debate on the value of indulgences, which Luther considered to be sacrilegious trafficking in spiritual goods. This led him to publish in Wittenberg the *Ninety Five Theses* against the bull on indulgences (1517), at first dismissed by Rome as 'a quarrel among friars', since the publication and recommendations of the bull had been intended for the Dominicans and Luther was an Augustinian. Luther then published a series of writings that brought him more into conflict with the Papacy: *An Address to the Nobility of the German Nation, On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church of God and Concerning Christian Liberty*, in which he laid down the principles of a new Christianity: justification through faith, a world-wide priesthood, direct reading of the Bible by all believers as the only basis of their religious life, only few valid sacraments (those mentioned in the New Testament, namely Baptism, Penance and Eucharist) and establishment of national churches under the protection of the sovereign prince and cut off from the authority of the Bishop of Rome. This doctrinal position immediately received widespread support in Germany and was condemned by Rome with Pope Leo X issuing a bull of excommunication *Exsurge Domine* in 1520.

Under pressure from the Pope, Charles V (who had been crowned Emperor a few months earlier at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle)), summoned Luther to the Diet of Worms in 1521. In his statement to the imperial Diet, after some hesitation at the beginning, Luther made a bold stand on the dictates of his conscience and reaffirmed all the published views that had brought him into conflict with the Papacy. The Reformation had begun.

This happened on 18 April 1521. The next day Charles V made his own declaration of religious faith, upholding the beliefs of his forebears; the imperial Diet placed Luther under an imperial ban, and ordered that his writings be burnt. But Luther sought refuge under the protection of the Prince Elector, Frederick the Wise of Saxony, in the Castle of Wartburg,

where he continued his work on spreading the faith. Shortly after, with his translation of the New Testament into German, Luther gave a decisive impetus to the Reformation.

Zwingli

Another important figure in the first generation of reformers was Huldreich (Ulrich) Zwingli (1484–1531), a Swiss reformer and member of the secular clergy (parish priest of Glarus and preacher at the Great Minster of Zurich). A Humanist by training, Zwingli called in his *Philosophia Christi* for a return to primitive Christianity as preached in the New Testament. Zwingli won over Zurich by the eloquence of his preaching; at a public disputation held there in 1523 he defended reforms even more radical than those of Luther.

Also in 1523, Zwingli published his *Introduction to Christian Doctrine*. He completed his proposals for religious reforms with the *Commentary on True and False Religion* and with a translation of part of the Bible into the German dialect spoken in the city and canon of Zurich.

The Reformation at work

Luther's rebellion against Rome, coinciding with that of Zwingli, brought about a series of radical reforms such as the one led by von Karlstadt (Andreas Rudolf Bodenstein) in Wittenberg during Luther's absence. These included holding mass in German, communion with both bread and wine, and the abolition of clerical celibacy. There were also iconoclastic outbursts. An even greater upheaval was caused by the private war waged by the *Ritterschaft*, a knightly movement in the middle Rhine. This was a group of minor nobles ruined by constantly rising prices and frozen rents, and frequently reduced to acts of banditry. They were also influenced by Luther's *Address to the Nobility of the German Nation*, which caused great social agitation supported by Humanists such as Himen. Their military leader was Franz von Sickingen. After some initial successes, von Sickingen decided to besiege the archbishopric of Trier in 1523. The failure of the siege spelled his ruin.

Two radical reforms stand out in terms of their scale and consequences: the Peasants' War in 1524 and 1525, and the emergence of the Anabaptists during the 1530s.

The Peasants' War has been taken as a model for the uprising of the peasantry against feudal lords. Its main figure was the pastor Thomas Müntzer. It brought together a whole range of oppressed social groups, not only peasants, but also miners and even craftsmen from the poorest urban guilds, such as weavers and carders. The result was a massive and violent uprising that swept through the Black Forest, Alsace and Upper Swabia. In the end, putting their religious disagreements behind them, the allied princes crushed the rebels in a series of punitive expeditions and skirmishes culminating in the Battle of Frankenhausen (1525). The repression was savage, in line with the exhortations of Luther himself (his work *Against the Thieving and Murderous Hordes* played a key role), who feared that his religious reformation would be overwhelmed by an avalanche of social changes.

Ten years later, another religious movement, that of the Anabaptists, which also had serious social implications, developed in Germany, primarily in the episcopal city of Münster. The Anabaptists held the city from 1535–7, and imposed a form of primitive communism under the leadership

of John of Leiden. Again the allied princes, setting aside their religious differences, put an end to a social revolution forged by the heat of the Reformation.

The spread of Lutheranism

The Reformation had by then spread to much of central Germany, under the protection afforded by its princes. Frederick the Wise of Saxony was the first to protect Luther. He was followed by Philip, the Landgrave of Hesse and Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, which took Lutheranism to both eastern and western Prussia. At the end of the thirties, most of northern Germany had also embraced the Reformation, which made itself felt mainly in imperial cities such as Strasbourg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Magdeburg and Hanover. It soon made inroads westward into the Low Countries and eastwards into Bohemia and Poland. In the north, it completely swept away the age-old Catholic faith in the Baltic States (Denmark, Sweden and Norway), thus reinforcing national feeling in each of them.

In addition to its geographical expansion, the Reformation spread through society not only through the exhortations of reformed preachers but also thanks to many Humanists and artists won over to its cause, who made use of the printing press to disseminate their ideas widely on pamphlets and woodcuts. They included outstanding artists such as Cranach and Dürer. Of capital importance was the fact that Luther took his religious creed to the people by translating the Bible into German, reflecting the popular speech of housewives, tradesmen at work and children at play, in order to make use of the most everyday expressions.

Calvin and Calvinism

John Calvin (1509–64) (see Plate 36) is the great representative of the second generation of reformers. In 1521, at the time of the Diet of Worms, at which Luther stood fast in his rebellion against Rome, Calvin was only a boy of 12. Shortly afterwards, he began his studies at the Collège de la Marche in Paris. Combining scholastic and juridical disciplines, he obtained a sound training in classical languages (Latin and Greek), theology, the humanities and law. To begin with, it seemed that he would continue along the Humanist path traced by Erasmus, when he published his study on Seneca's treatise *De clementia* in 1532 at the age of 23. But a great change occurred in his life when he had to leave Paris because of his collaboration with the Rector, Nicolas Cop, accused of being influenced by Luther. This marked the beginning of the second stage of Calvin's life (1534–41) during which he wandered about, first in France and later on in exile. During those years, he wrote his great religious treatise *Christianae religionis institutio*, probably the most important work published in the sixteenth century by the reformers. It was preceded by a letter to King François I of France, urging him to stop persecuting the reformers.

While in exile, he went for the first time to Geneva, at the request of the reformer Farel; but as he encountered difficulties in imposing his religious ideas he went to Strasbourg, where he lived for three years (1538–41). Presently, after a change in power in Geneva, the doors of that city were again opened to him. This started the last and most important stage in his life, marked by the establishment of a model religious community which was destined to become extremely

influential. Within two months of his return to Geneva, Calvin drafted a set of ecclesiastical ordinances establishing the bases of the religious and moral life of the city. He remained faithful to his idea that the Church should be independent of the civil authorities, and that religious principles should permeate the daily life of its citizens.

Calvin taught in Geneva until his death in 1564, and throughout that period he did much more than create a model of a reformed religious community. As he took a great interest in education, true in that respect to his initial training as a Humanist, Calvin also organized the Academy in Geneva where future preachers inspired by his religious principles were trained with missionary fervour. This accounts for the extensive dissemination of Calvinism, which in the succeeding decades spread through much of France, where it was well received by the minor nobility (the Huguenots), through the Low Countries and through Scotland, where it found a leader with a strong personality: John Knox.

Anglicanism

Anglicanism went through three distinct stages: the first under Henry VIII who broke with Rome, the second under Edward VI who took a radical Calvinist stance, and the third, following the brief restoration of Catholicism by Mary Tudor, under Queen Elizabeth, who showed a certain degree of eclecticism.

In 1533 Henry VIII enacted the *Act of Supremacy*, which placed the Church of England under the State, thus following the example of the German Lutheran princes and the kings of Denmark and Sweden. He then began to persecute opponents of the new religious policy, executing men of the highest moral calibre such as Bishop John Fisher, and the Chancellor and great Humanist Thomas More. For the time being, however, there was no more than a religious schism. Generally, Henry VIII continued to uphold the Catholic doctrine, including episcopal primacy over the priesthood, thus abiding by the title *Defender of the Faith* conferred upon him by the Church of Rome at the beginning of his reign. In that capacity he signed the death penalty against Lambert, who had refuted the value of the sacrament of marriage, saying that he did not wish to reign over heretics. But in socio-economic matters, Henry VIII was true to the Reformation: he dissolved the monasteries, which changed the course of history in England, and established strong ties between the King and the new class enriched from confiscated monastic property.

Under Edward VI (reigned 1547–53) the Anglican schism became radical: the *Book of Common Prayer*, clearly inspired by Calvinism, was instituted by law. Under his successor, Mary Tudor (reigned 1553–8), Catholicism was restored for a short period, during which there was a return to bloody religious persecutions. In 1558 Queen Elizabeth restored Anglicanism, on lines more akin to those established by her father, Henry VIII, although the *Prayer Book* was reinstated, the episcopal hierarchy was maintained, and ancient religious ceremonies, including the ordination of priests and the sacraments of baptism and communion, were continued. A measure of scepticism on the Queen's part probably led her to take this eclectic approach. In any event, the new religious situation triggered resistance and revolt; a particularly serious uprising occurred in 1570 in the northern counties; this developed into a real religious war with international implications, in which a Catholic King, Philip II of Spain, supported the rebels.

THE BAROQUE ERA

Without any real break with the past, there was a gradual change in Western European culture, so that by the end of the sixteenth century Europeans felt themselves living in a completely different atmosphere from that of the Renaissance at its height. The change is probably most visible in the arts, in which the canon of beauty of the human body changed from a high degree of idealization to pronounced naturalism. Botticelli's and Titian's idealized feminine figures were replaced by Ribera's beggars and Velázquez's dwarfs (see Plate 37). By contrast, in the sciences there was no break in continuity in the scientific revolution upheld by Copernicus. Between the Renaissance and the Baroque era there was, in the arts, a transitional style known as *Mannerism*. It should also be noted that the so-called baroque culture was not the preserve of the Catholic countries, as if on instructions issued by the Council of Trent, but embraced all of Western Europe, thus including the works of Rubens and Rembrandt, Shakespeare and Cervantes. Likewise it was incontestably the golden age of Spanish culture, with leading figures such as Cervantes and Velázquez, the playwrights Lope de Vega and Calderón de la Barca, the poets Quevedo and Góngora, the painters Zurbarán, Ribera and Murillo and the sculptors Gregorio Fernández and Montañés.

The question arises whether differences are discernible between the southern model, Italian or Spanish, and the northern European model. In France one can see that a rationalist school of thought (represented by Descartes) acted as a brake on the Baroque movement, soon replaced in the middle of the seventeenth century by the classicism which prevailed at the court of Louis XIV, as is obvious in the paintings of Nicolas Poussin, by contrast with the work of his contemporary Velázquez. Classicism is also to be seen in England, an example being Saint Paul's Cathedral, designed by Christopher Wren and completed between 1675 and 1710 (see Plate 38). A comparison between north and south explains why the model Baroque church imposed by Vignola in the mid-sixteenth century (the church of the Gesù in Rome) (see Plate 39), with only one nave and many side chapels dedicated to local saints, was unacceptable to the rest of Reformation Europe.

The Counter-Reformation

The term Counter-Reformation has been used, with reservations by some historians, to describe the religious movement that occurred within the Catholic Church as a reaction against the Reformation. Its starting point can be regarded as the Council of Trent, which, for historical reasons within the Catholic Church, could not be held until 1545.

The lengthy duration of the Council (eighteen years) and its two interruptions are indicative of the many difficulties, not least political, that had to be overcome. These included the swings in relations between Pope Paul III and Charles V, and the resumption in 1552 of war between Spain and France, further complicated in 1556 by the outbreak of war between Pope Paul IV and Philip II.

Despite these setbacks it can be said that when the Council came to an end in 1563 its achievements were genuinely substantial. Rising above its previous situation of confusion and uncertainty, the Church of Rome came out of the Council stronger, prepared to stand firm in Europe and even to recover some lost ground, a task which was assigned basically to a new religious order, the Society of Jesus, founded

by Saint Ignacius of Loyola in 1540 and composed of the theologians of the stature of Lainez and Salmerón.

The Italian Baroque

One of the main focal points from which baroque art spread was Italy, with striking achievements in town-planning, painting, sculpture and music.

In urban development, Rome took the lead by building a series of avenues decorated with obelisks, after the remodelling of the city ordered by Sixtus V (1585-90) and continued by his successors throughout the seventeenth century. Beautiful squares and fountains were designed primarily by two great artists: Bernini and Borromini. Bernini (1598-1680) was responsible for building the colossal colonnade planned to link St Peter's Basilica to the city as a symbol of a self-assured Church. Of this period are the Trevi Fountain (*Fontana di Trevi*) and that of the Four Rivers (*Fontana dei Fiumi*) in the Piazza Navona, one of the most beautiful in Rome and a monument to the genius of Bernini. Borromini (1599-1667) was the architect of St Agnes' Church (Sant'Agnese) which also stands on Piazza Navona. It is possible that we have here a change from the conservative Baroque represented by Bernini to a new, more innovative form. Carlo Argan suggests that in a dialectical interplay *Weltanschauung* (world's understanding) was to replace *Lebensanschauung* (life's understanding). It may well be that the scientific revolution of infinite space investigated by Galileo was to be paralleled by a new conception of town-planning, as envisioned by Borromini. In any event the works of Bernini and Borromini are combined on the Piazza Navona, the prototype of the new Rome built under the papacy of Urban VIII.

It is perhaps in painting that the major break with the Renaissance can be seen, with the shift from idealism to naturalism, which did not disdain – on the contrary, it rather seemed to seek – ugliness as a model. A taste was created for very sharp contrasts, giving rise to the tenebrist school of strong *chiaroscuro* in which parts of the human body were highlighted by being inundated with light and surrounded by shadows. This produced special dramatic effects, particularly impressive in paintings of martyrs and saints, as in the masterpiece by Caravaggio (1569-1609) *Death of the Virgin* (Louvre). But it was in sculpture, and with Bernini, that Italian art again reached heights reminiscent of the age of Michelangelo. Bernini's great work *Ecstasy of St Teresa* (Church of Santa Maria della Vittoria, Rome) expresses the resurgence of Catholicism after the Council of Trent.

As in the other arts, Italy also led the way in music. The Roman school produced Palestrina (1514-94), with whom polyphonic music reached its pinnacle. As the author of nearly 100 masses, numerous motets and Magnificats for several voices, he holds a place of honour in religious music.

The Spanish Golden Age

This is one of the highlights in the history of Europe in modern times, like the Renaissance in Italy or the Enlightenment in England and France. In architecture, the starting point was the building of the monastery of San Lorenzo del Escorial, completed in 1584 and a masterpiece of Juan de Herrera, after whom the Herreran style in Spain is named. This blends together not only the impressive mass of granite

architecture but also the natural surroundings of the Guadarrama range in which the monastery stands. Domenikos Theotokopoulos (El Greco) was one of the most outstanding artists during this transitional period. He was born in Crete, educated in Venice, where he was influenced by Tintoretto, and was attracted to Spain by the artistic centre that developed under the patronage of Philip II around the Escorial. However, his conception of art was not to the king's liking, so he withdrew from the court, and settled in Toledo, where he executed his greatest works of art: the *Epitaph* (Cathedral, Toledo), the *Burial of the Count of Orgaz* (St Thomas's Chapel, Toledo), and the splendid *St Ildefonso* (Hospital de la Caridad at Illescas, Toledo) imbued with an exquisite spirituality. All these masterpieces are examples of Spanish mannerism.

José de Ribera, one of the most famous seventeenth century painters, was born in Játiva (Valencia), but the best of his work was done in Naples. He is one of the most representative painters of European baroque art as may be seen from his *Clubfooted Boy* (Louvre) and the *Immaculate Conception* (Augustinian Convent, Salamanca), both masterpieces of seventeenth-century painting.

The religious note also runs through the work of another of the most outstanding Spanish baroque painters: Zurbarán (1598-1664), the painter of the series of Carthusian or Hieronymite friars, all clad in white or dark blue habits, of the Carthusian monastery of Jerez (Provincial Museum, Cádiz), and the sacristy of the monastery at Guadalupe, Cáceres. It is also characteristic of another of the great Spanish painters: Murillo (1617-82), famous for his paintings of the *Immaculate Conception*, such as the one at the Hermitage in Leningrad, although his paintings of child beggars (El Prado, Louvre, the Munich Pinakothek) are also worthy of note. It is likewise obvious that some of the paintings of the great Velázquez, such as *The Christ in the Prado*, were of religious inspiration.

It is the religious note which is the salient feature of the best of Spanish baroque sculptures. An example is the work of Gregorio Fernández (1566-1636), especially famous for his *Floats for Holy Week*, such as those in the collection of the museum in Valladolid, which exhibits one of the masterpieces depicting the body of the dead Christ stretched out on a sheet. Something similar can be seen in the sculpture of Juan Martínez Montañés (1568-1649), the best representative of the Seville school, especially for his representations of the Passion in which he combined naturalism with classicism, for example his *Crucifix*, in the Cathedral in Seville. Also in the work of Alonso Cano (1601-67), creator of one of the most beautiful statuettes, the *Immaculate Conception* (Granada Cathedral).

Diego Velázquez (1599-1660) took the lead in interpreting other subjects, such as court life or mythology. As royal painter to the court of Philip IV, his ideal subject was the royal family and especially the king himself. He produced splendid portraits such as the *Equestrian Portrait of Philip IV* and the *Equestrian Portrait of Prince Baltasar Carlos* (both in the Prado). He also painted nudes and mythological themes, such as *The Toilet of Venus* (National Gallery, London) and the *Triumph of Bacchus* (El Prado), in which the drunken revellers stand out even more than the strapping semi-nude youth representing Bacchus. Mention may also be made of three of Velázquez's masterpieces: *The Surrender of Breda*, *The Spinners* and *The Maids of Honour*, all in the Prado, making it one of the greatest picture galleries in the world. *The Surrender of Breda* captures a historic moment of the then all-powerful Spanish Empire during the Thirty Years War.

The Spinners, which may be considered a tribute to the humble category of spinners and weavers, contains the first signs of a new technique for capturing light, which Velázquez perfected in his best-known work, *The Maids of Honour*, a painting of the court, with the king and the queen, princes, ladies of the court and jesters. Much more than a painting, this is one of the most important art masterpieces of all time.

In music, this period was distinguished by the composers Antonio de Cabezón (d. 1568) and, above all, Tomás Luis de Victoria (1540–1608), the leading representative of Spanish polyphonic music, a worthy contemporary of the Italian, Palestrina, and the Netherlander, Orlando di Lasso. With his *Officium defunctorum* dedicated to the dowager empress Maria, Victoria introduced a mystical fervour into music, which indicates that he was influenced by a contemporary companion, San Juan de la Cruz.

In the literature of this transitional period, mystical literature stands out with two great figures, San Juan de la Cruz (1542–91) and Santa Teresa (1515–82). The lyrical poet Friar Luis de León (1527–91), who, following in the steps of Horace, was undoubtedly the most classical poet of nature, describes the banks of the Tormes in his native Salamanca, where he was a well-known professor at the university. Persecuted by the Inquisition, Friar Luis left a record of his harsh experience in one of his major works, *De los nombres de Cristo*, in which he denounced the cruelty of the Inquisition.

In 1599 a book was published which was to give rise to many others in a similar vein. Its title was *Guzmán de Alfarache* and its author Mateo Alemán (1547–1614). The picaresque novel, which had a forerunner in *El Lazarillo de Tormes*, was to reach its apogee in the seventeenth century. This new literary genre, fully in accordance with baroque aesthetic tastes, was poles apart from the pastoral novels or novels on knight-errantry so much in fashion in the preceding period. Practically all Spanish baroque writers, such as Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645) in *El Buscón*, and Cervantes in *Rinconete y Cortadillo*, tried their hand in this genre.

Also in the context of reaction to the artificial style of the pastoral and chivalresque novels should be placed the great work of world literature, *El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha*, by Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616). The folly of Don Quijote, interspersed with brief moments of thoughtful Humanism, the buffoonery of Sancho Panza combined with a vein of common sense, the adventures and misadventures of both characters, culminating in situations that the reader finds alternatively hilarious or distressing, are in fact a representation of how a genius viewed the drama of his country tottering on the brink of decadence.

During the next decade, Cervantes concentrated on writing a series of short novels, *las Novelas Ejemplares*, some of outstanding quality: *La Ilustre fregona* or *La Gitana*, *Rinconete y Cortadillo*, and *Los coloquios de los perros Cipión y Berganza*.

Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645) is another great writer of the Spanish golden age. An eminent satirist and moralist, and a sublime poet, he also excelled as a novelist with the picaresque novel mentioned earlier (*El Buscón*), and other novels such as *Los Sueños* and *La hora de todos y la fortuna con seso*. A fervent patriot, he uniquely mirrored Spain's inexorable decline in his poetry, especially in his sonnet *Miré los muros de la patria mía*.

Lope de Vega (1562–1635) gave a national stamp to drama. He sets the scene for a host of historical characters, and in particular for typical examples of country folk. Some of his

plays are interspersed with music and songs which give them an air of great modernity, examples being *El villano en su rincón* or *La niña de plata* and *Fuenteovejuna*, one of the most famous, which highlighted the oppression of feudal lords. Outstanding among the more than 400 comedies attributed to him are *La catedral de Sevilla*, probably based on the trial of Antonio Pérez, *El caballero de Olmedo*, a comment on a beautiful popular romance, *Peribáñez y el comendador de Ocaña*, in which he again deals with the theme of feudal oppression, and *El mejor alcalde, el rey*, which may be regarded as a criticism of the prevailing system of royal favourites and popular monachism.

Less prolific than Lope de Vega, but no less important, was Calderón de la Barca (1600–81), author of the two masterpieces of classical Spanish drama: *La vida es sueño* and *El alcalde de Zalamea*. The former is imbued with a philosophical note reminiscent of Seneca, which is very well reflected in its title, while the latter deals with the subject of honour, as it was understood at the time. Calderón seeks to present a new social model to replace the country squire, whose poverty and vain pretensions have made him a subject of ridicule; the model he finds is the rich honourable villein, exemplary in his social behaviour and unbending in his defence of moral principles.

Lastly, among the host of other seventeenth-century dramatists mention should be made at least of Tirso de Molina (1579–1648), particularly as the author of a drama whose subject was taken up by great numbers of writers: *El burlador de Sevilla*, on the erotic adventures of Don Juan Tenorio.

Northern baroque art

The fact that baroque art went beyond the frontiers of southern Europe, which was Catholic, can be seen from the impact that it had in both Belgium and Holland, which produced artists of renown such as Rubens and Rembrandt.

The work of Rubens (1577–1640) must be set against the splendid background of the court of Brussels during the reign of Isabel Clara Eugenia, the favourite daughter of Philip II. A court painter and also a diplomat, Rubens produced a vast number of paintings which can today be admired in the main museums of Europe; also in Antwerp, the city in which he chose to live and whose churches contain several of his best paintings. Here visitors can see the fine mansion (Rubens' house), built between 1610 and 1618, during the brief period of peace in Europe before the Thirty Years War. Perhaps the most famous painter of his time, he worked for the courts in Central Europe. The series of paintings commissioned by Queen Marie de Medicis, especially the one entitled *Débarquement de Marie de Médicis à Marseille*, constitutes one of the most notable collections of the Louvre.

So prodigious a painter inevitably created a school. Two among its members were Van Dyck (1599–1641) and Jordaens (1593–1678). Van Dyck equalled and even surpassed Rubens as a portrait painter. Famous works are his *Equestrian Portrait of Francisco de Moura* (El Prado) and *Portrait of a Genoese Lady and Her Daughter* (Musée des Beaux Arts, Brussels). From 1632 onwards he lived in London, and became court painter to King Charles I. His outstanding portraits of the king can be seen in museums such as the Prado, the Louvre and, of course, the National Gallery in London.

While Van Dyck was a kind of aristocratic Rubens, Jordaens portrayed the people in a cheerful smiling vein, as

can be seen in *The Sny and Peasants* (Musée des Beaux Arts, Brussels).

Without any doubt, however, the painter of great genius, the creator of superlative art, came from the Dutch school. This was Rembrandt (1609–69), who despite his production of an impressive series of masterpieces ended his days ruined and in debt. Highly moving in his religious paintings, such as his *Descent from the Cross* (Pinakothek, Munich), he was also unique in his ability to portray the society in which he lived. *The Sauspluig Officials of the Drapers' Guild* (Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam), the masterpiece of his old age, is famous precisely because it captures the psychology of the characters it depicts. *The Nightwatch* (Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) and *The Anatomy Lesson* (The Hague) are some of his best known works. Rembrandt's entire production consists of masterpieces enveloped as it were in a golden aura, unprecedented in the history of art.

The Dutch School counted among its members several outstanding artists: *genre* painters such as Franz Hals (1580–1666) and Adriaan Van Ostade (1610–85). The landscape painters Van Ruysdael (1628–82) and Hobbema (1638–1709) still exert an influence centuries later. Rarely has the verdant landscape of the Low Countries been depicted so faithfully as by Van Ruysdael's brush; rarely has *genre* painting produced a work like that of the *Schoolmaster*, by Van Ostade (Louvre); rarely, perhaps never, has anyone succeeded in painting interiors so charged with poetry as Vermeer of Delft in his *A Young Woman Standing at a Virginal* (National Gallery, London) and, above all, in his masterpiece the *Allegory of Painting* (Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).

Shakespeare's England

Another of the leading cultural centres at the time was Shakespeare's England. It should be borne in mind that William Shakespeare (1564–1616) was an exact contemporary of Lope de Vega, and that he died in the same year as Cervantes.

Throughout his creative work, which took drama as a *genre* to heights never achieved before, can be seen the main features of the society of that time, prevailing not only in England but also throughout Western culture. His plays are usually divided into the historical plays based either on the ancient world, as in *Julius Caesar*, or on English fifteenth and sixteenth century history, as in *Richard III* and *Henry V*; comedies (such as *Twelfth Night* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*); and tragedies, five of which stand out as the greatest and most famous, and have passed into the world cultural heritage: *Roméo and Juliet*, *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Macbeth* and *King Lear*.

With regard to the portrayal of love, Shakespeare like others broke with the old traditional system of arranging marriages without the consent of the future spouses. This is the conclusion to be drawn from one of his most popular works, *Roméo and Juliet*. Hints of belief in magic may be found in *Macbeth*, with his dialogue with the witches ('The Weird Sisters, hand in hand') though this may be no more than a concession to popular sentiment. With reference to the new schools of thought connected with the scientific revolution, Hamlet's reply to his friend Horatio ('There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy') is also worthy of note.

It was not only Shakespeare's plays that reflected the cultural environment in England at the turn of the century.

Shakespeare's rich vein of poetry made him one of the greatest poets, not only of the English language, but of all Western culture, particularly in his incomparable series of sonnets. Other authors who produced works worthy of note during that period in England were John Lyly (1552–1606), a dramatist and novelist, whose novel *Euphues* and its baroque *emphism* influenced Shakespeare himself; and poets such as Philip Sidney (1554–86) and Edmund Spenser (1552–99), authors of *Arcadia* and *The Faerie Queene* respectively. Above all, there was Ben Jonson (1572–1637), the greatest dramatist after Shakespeare, author of the famous play *Volpone*. The other great English author of universal renown during the seventeenth century was John Milton (1608–74): when infirm and blind in 1652 he dictated his masterpiece *Paradise Lost*.

The scientific revolution

The scientific revolution, the earliest of the revolutions and one of the greatest events of modern times, culminated in the seventeenth century, one century before the political and industrial revolution. It was the starting point of uninterrupted progress in science – and of its inseparable companion, technology. The principle of didactic teaching was discarded in favour of using critical judgement as a tool to learn more about human beings, nature and the cosmos. As noted earlier the first advances of the Renaissance were made in the field of astronomy. It was here, thanks to Copernicus, that the greatest progress was made during the baroque period, with the discoveries of four great figures, the Dane Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), the German Johann Kepler (1571–1630), the Italian Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and the Englishman Isaac Newton (1642–1727).

Early in the seventeenth century the fortunate invention of the telescope by a Dutchman, Lippershey, helped astronomy to make gigantic strides. Galileo perfected the telescope in order to explore the sky. From 1610 onwards he made remarkable discoveries such as the satellites of Jupiter, the galaxy of the Milky Way, the craters of the moon and sun spots. As a result of his observations he published the *Dialogo sopra i due sistemi del mondo*, in which he countered the old Ptolemaic conception of the Earth as the centre of the universe in a perfect and immutable cosmos. According to his new vision of the cosmos, Earth was part of an infinite world whose unsurpassed marvel was that of life, undergoing constant change, from birth to death.

Proof that the Book of Nature was written in mathematical characters was amply demonstrated by the Englishman Isaac Newton in his book *Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis*, published in 1687, in which he formulated his three laws on movement and, above all, his well-known universal law of gravitation: bodies attract each other with a force proportionate to the product of their mass and inversely proportionate to the square root of the distance separating them.

It was against this background that the new scientific method was applied, and a vast corpus of philosophy developed, by two outstanding figures, the Englishman Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and the Frenchman René Descartes (1596–1659). Francis Bacon rejected the syllogistic Aristotelian method adopted by medieval schoolmen and still in use in most European universities. Arguing the need for a new method which would advance knowledge, he sought to achieve this in his book *Natural Organum*, published

in 1620, which put forward a new table for the proper classification of known phenomena and for promoting knowledge by means of the inductive system. He based his system on permanent observation and, consequently, on experience; in this way he discarded the shackles imposed by theoretical syllogism.

Descartes, the famous mathematician, who abandoned the study of astronomy in order to avoid coming up against the intolerance of Rome, was the founder of the rationalist school based on a rigorously critical method. In his *Discourse on Method* he laid down the rules for obtaining a rigorous and precise knowledge of things. Taking as his basis the principle of systematic doubt, he wrote that any statement that was not clearly demonstrated should be rejected. This constituted an unmistakable break with the medieval schoolmen's principle of authority.

CLASSICISM AND ENLIGHTENMENT

We now come to a period of a great intellectual leadership in Western Europe, represented by classicism, which began in France under Louis XIV, and the Enlightenment, which spread throughout Western Europe during the eighteenth century.

The France of Molière and Racine

During what Voltaire called the Age of Louis XIV, France assumed a leading role in Western Europe, not only politically but also in the arts and literature. There was a return to the norm, dictated by reason, as advocated by Descartes; this was a return to classicism, in a form directed by the State through the Royal Academies founded and patronized by the government of Louis XIV. There was even a return to the art of Antiquity, as may be seen from the landscapes of painters such as Poussin and Claude Lorrain, embellished with ruins reminiscent of the classical world. It was during this period that Mansart (1646–1708) erected the classically symmetrical dome of The Invalides in Paris.

Classicism in the arts and literature reflected the absolutism of Louis XIV's policy. Both Bossuet (1627–1704) in his *Oraisons funèbres*, and Boileau (1636–1711) in his *Art poétique* sought to subject rhetorical or poetic inspiration to specific rules. The cultural environment was tending to become over-rigid, but new life was breathed into it by the genius of the dramatist Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, better known as Molière (1622–73). Molière dared to attack the flaws in society in *Tamffle*, in which he denounced abject baseness sheltering behind false respectability. In the *Bourgeois gentilhomme* he satirized the folly of a tradesman aping the fashions of the nobility. In the *Médécine malgré lui* he criticized marriages of convenience and in *Les femmes savantes* he ridiculed the pedantic women to be found at the Court of Versailles. Like Shakespeare, he was also an actor; in fact he died on the stage, while playing the invalid in the *Malade imaginaire*.

The most perfect representative of French classicism was Jean Racine (1639–99), educated at the Jansenist school of Port-Royal, which excelled in teaching the Greek classics. An admirer of Greek tragedy, in which he found the fatalism which was also typical of Jansenism, he consecrated almost all his work to the revival of the great themes created in Antiquity by dramatists such as Euripides and epic poets such as Homer, in his plays such as *Phèdre* and *Andromaque*.

The third French dramatist of the time of Louis XIV, outstanding also as an innovator, was Pierre Corneille (1606–84). His work was generally inspired by historical themes, taken both from Antiquity and from the Middle Ages, for example, *Horace* and *Le Cid*, based on the famous eleventh-century Spanish warrior, which won great acclaim in Paris in 1636, three years before Racine was born.

Blaise Pascal (1623–62), an exact contemporary of Molière, was not only a remarkable man of science, but also a profound thinker and brilliant writer; he defended Jansenist principles in *Les Provinciales*, and at his death, left an important work, *Les Pensées*, which established his reputation as an eminent philosopher.

Jean de La Fontaine (1621–95), a short-story writer and poet, is the most famous writer of fables in the entire modern period. His *Contes* won general admiration at that time, though his *Fables*, for which he became a member of the French Academy, were his most important work.

Madame de Sévigné (1626–96) is the best known writer of the epistolary genre, which she cultivated to perfection. Her letters described, better than any historian in her day, life at the court of Louis XIV and, in general, noble society of the time.

François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715) should be noted if only for his masterpiece, *Aventures de Télémaque*, published in 1699, which set the court against him because of the new ideas on government that he advocated by contrast with the absolutism of Louis XIV.

The crisis of European conscience

The patent failure of Louis XIV's international policy called the validity of absolutist government into question throughout Europe, and provoked a profound moral crisis in France which became widespread at the turn of the century. Paul Hazard described it as 'the crisis of European consciousness', which was to herald in the age of the Enlightenment. The basic principles underlying the European edifice, namely religious beliefs, the didactic teaching of history, and even a number of customs which had been consecrated by time, were called into question during that period.

At the same time, European culture, which had for centuries been influenced by the Mediterranean world, began to seek new sources of inspiration elsewhere. Without any doubt, Newton in England and Leibniz in Germany were ushering in a new era. And not only were the voices of men of science being heard, but consideration was also being given to new political systems and new individual values, enshrined in constitutions. Briefly, a new future lay triumphantly ahead. The political, social and scientific model chosen this time was not taken from the Roman world but from Northern Europe. A very profound change was taking place, and was to manifest itself throughout the eighteenth century. The spirit of the Enlightenment was coming to the fore.

The Enlightenment

The Enlightenment came between classicism and the French Revolution. One of its most characteristic features was rationalism, proclaimed by Descartes during the previous century. First appearing in England, to the accompaniment

of a peculiar social phenomenon, Freemasonry, the Enlightenment then spread to France. France became the main centre on the Continent, since French was the language by which it was transmitted. Its culminating cultural achievement was the French *Encyclopédie* (see Plate 40).

England takes the lead

The Peace of Ryswick (1699) and that of Utrecht (1713) proclaimed to all Europe the supremacy of England over the France of Louis XIV; it was also the triumph of the first nation to achieve domestic political stability, establish a parliamentary system and recognize some of the rights of the citizen. Europe was also provided with a political model, based on the thinking of the eminent political philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) in his *Two Treatises of Government*.

The innovating impetus given by England can be seen in the work of writers during the first half of the eighteenth century such as Daniel Defoe (1660–1731), the author of a book which rapidly became famous, *Robinson Crusoe*, in which he dealt with the theme of man alone against nature; and Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) who, in *Gulliver's Travels*, gave a lesson in tolerance by narrating Gulliver's successive encounters with different peoples ranging from giants to dwarfs, with very different customs. In *The Beggar's Opera*, John Gay (1685–1732) replaced the traditional courtiers with prostitutes and petty thieves who sang popular songs rather than the artificial arias beloved of traditional opera. The freshness of these contrasts helps to explain the influence exerted by England on the continent throughout the eighteenth century, beginning with France and spreading elsewhere.

English influence also made itself felt at the loftiest levels of thought and ethics during the eighteenth century. In the field of political theory, in addition to Locke, reference should also be made to writers such as David Hume and Adam Smith; and among men of action, to the group, headed by Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, who spoke out in favour of the abolition of slavery.

David Hume (1711–76) continued in the eighteenth century the English empiricist school of thought represented by Francis Bacon during the previous century. His empiricism, formulated basically in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, consisted in reliance on the senses, in which the self became a set of successive perceptions. This was to lead to scepticism about human ability to know metaphysical truths, which, as we will see, caused Kant to react by producing his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*).

Adam Smith (1723–90) became the great innovator of economic thought with the publication in 1776 of his *Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, in which he abandoned the previously accepted concept of wealth based on the possession of precious metals in favour of wealth based on the production of goods, thus establishing the foundations of modern political economy.

Mention should also be made here of the anti-slavery campaign of a group of Quakers led by Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, which began in 1783. Their long struggle was sustained by profound moral beliefs which finally triumphed in the English Parliament in 1792 and spread to other countries throughout the nineteenth century.

Most significant in eighteenth-century England was the creation of Freemasonry, which was destined to exert a great influence on Western culture. The Grand Lodge was founded

in London in 1717 and the constitutions drafted by Anderson in 1723. Organized as a philanthropical society, with initiatory rites and secret meetings and deliberations – which frequently incurred the hostility of the established authorities – it was soon spread from England to the continent through businessmen, diplomats and the military.

The French model

Owing largely to the use of the French language, which had become the second language of almost all other European courts, and, above all, owing to the great influence of French writers of genius, France established the model of enlightened thought which spread throughout Western Europe in the course of the century. This cultural supremacy was based on the work of three writers: Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau; and on a monumental production embodying all the aspirations of the Enlightenment – the *Encyclopédie*.

Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) greatly influenced thinking during the first half of the eighteenth century by the social criticism contained in his *Lettres persanes*. Here, instead of the traditional account of a European travelling among remote peoples, he presented the comments of a Persian traveller arriving in Paris who is amazed at the strange things that go on in the West. In this way he was able to put across harsh criticism of both the monarchy and the church. Even more influential was his *De l'Esprit des lois*, in which he advocated a new political system based on the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, in strong contrast with the absolutism of France under Louis XV at the time when it was published (1748).

François Marie Aronnet, better known as Voltaire (1694–1778) is without any doubt the key figure of the Enlightenment, who exerted influence over the culture of his time as no one else had done since Erasmus. A member of the wealthy bourgeoisie, he was educated by Jesuits and soon distinguished himself by his attacks on all types of conventionalism and on the Church. His first satirical poems led to his imprisonment in the Bastille. In 1726, he sought refuge in England, impressed by its culture and political structure which made it a haven of freedom. He subsequently maintained friendly relations with Frederick II of Prussia, the epitome of an enlightened monarch. In 1753 he withdrew to Ferney, a castle near the Swiss border where for the next quarter of a century he reigned as the great patriarch of European culture. In 1778 he returned in triumph to Paris, only a few months before his death. As a thinker, he was primarily a popularizer of ideas, for example, in his *Dictionnaire philosophique* and his contribution to the *Encyclopédie*. He was the author of a historical drama, *Henriade*, and a satirical poem, but is best known for his novels and historical works. Foremost among these are *Le siècle de Louis XIV* and above all his *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756), in which he defended a new vision of history which is still valid today: his argument was that one should study institutions and human rights rather than royal figures.

The third person of international standing in eighteenth century France who had a great influence on politics, culture and society, was Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). He marks a great ideological turning-point which foreshadowed many of the issues that were to arise during the nineteenth century. In 1750 he took part in a competition held by the Academy of Dijon on the subject of whether the restoration of the

sciences and the arts had helped to improve the mores of the times. Rousseau put forward an argument, which caused an outcry, to the effect that civilization was harmful and that man should return to a state of nature. He thus put on trial the civilization of his time; and continued to do so in three other books which had a major impact on contemporary society, namely *La nouvelle Héloïse*, *Émile* and, above all, his key work, *Du contrat social* (1762).

The emphasis he laid on sentiment was in line with early romanticism, just as his search for a new educational system found an echo in the educational reform advocated very shortly afterwards by the great Swiss thinker Pestalozzi (1746–1827).

The *Encyclopédie* may be considered as encapsulating the philosophy of the eighteenth century. It was the work of a team headed by d'Alembert and Diderot, begun in 1751 and completed in 1764, whose publication by instalments was awaited with bated breath by cultured Western public opinion. Its forerunner was Pierre Bayle's (1647–1706) *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, written from a rationalist standpoint. The élite of French intellectuals wrote articles for the *Encyclopédie*, so that it reflected the most recent advances in science and technology and contemporary ideological, social and ethical thought. The *Encyclopédie* became an ideological tool for transforming society and a weapon for breaching the structures of the *ancien régime*.

One of the French scholars who best represented the spirit of the Enlightenment was Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–88), a keen naturalist who wrote a forty-four volume *Histoire Naturelle*. A model of scientific popularization, this put forward the theory that each zoological species had its specific habitat; Buffon was a worthy contemporary of the great Swedish naturalist, Carl von Linné (1707–78), incontestably the greatest naturalist of the century and the author of *Systema Naturae* and *Philosophia Botanica*.

France's contribution to science in the eighteenth century also included the work of Antoine Laurent de Lavoisier (1743–94), regarded as the father of modern chemistry because of his research on oxygen.

Germany takes over the lead

The seventeenth century, particularly the first half, was for Germany a dark age ravaged by a series of wars. This accounted for the relative lack of creativity in the sciences, literature and the arts. Even so, names stand out such as that of Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen (1610–76), author of an interesting novel *Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus* (The Adventurer Simplicissimus) based on the Thirty Years War. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1717), the great scientist and outstanding thinker, was the forerunner of the powerful German upsurge in philosophy, and a worthy contemporary of Newton, with whom he shared the merit of discovering differential calculus. Perhaps influenced by the progress achieved in microscopy as a result of the invention of the microscope by the Dutchman Leenwenhoek (1632–1723), Leibniz developed his thesis on monads as 'the true atoms of nature'. The most outstanding German representative of the rationalist school, he clearly influenced Kant and, above all, subsequent German idealist thought.

In art, important examples of baroque architecture date back to the end of the seventeenth century and continue well into the eighteenth century, not only in Germany but also throughout Central Europe. Great edifices are to be

found in Bavaria, Austria and Bohemia: Prague is in fact one of the most remarkable urban complexes of the baroque period. The most outstanding baroque architect was Fischer von Erlach (1656–1723), whose masterpieces include the magnificent Karlskirche in Vienna, the Austrian National Library – especially the Room of the Emperor Charles VI – and Schönbrunn Palace. In Würzburg Palace, Balthasar Neumann (1687–1753) built a splendid staircase and one of the most representative chapels of late baroque in the mid-eighteenth century. Lukas von Hildebrandt (1688–1745) built one of the most beautiful palaces of Vienna, the Belvedere, for the famous soldier-prince Eugene of Savoy. Further north, mention must also be made of Poepplmann's Zwinger in Dresden, and of the work of Andreas Schlüter (1664–1714) in Berlin, above all his equestrian statue of the Great Elector. The superb abbey in Melk (Austria), the Theatinerkirche in Munich and the Klosterneuburg in Vienna are all striking examples of baroque art.

It was however in literature and music that German culture took the most impressive lead. In literature there emerged a genuinely German movement, *Sturm und Drang*, which was a reaction from French rationalism and is evident in the work of two of Germany's most universal eighteenth century writers, Goethe and Schiller.

Johan Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), one of the most prominent figures of world literature and author of *Faust*, headed the *Sturm und Drang* movement with his early literary works, for example his play *Goetz von Berlichingen* (1773), based on the character of the famous Renaissance robber nobleman. *Werther*, his novel on the ill-fated love of an adolescent driven to suicide, was written at this time, and foreshadowed what was later to be the romantic movement.

The writings of Goethe, including the long dramatic poem *Faust* on which he worked to the end of his life, made a major contribution to the forging of German culture and to its liberation from the influence of the French Enlightenment.

Next to Goethe came another great eighteenth century German writer, Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805), a wonderful poet and above all a first-rate dramatist. His first play, *Die Räuber* (The Robbers) fully reflected the *Sturm und Drang* movement. With the play *Don Carlos* (1787), Schiller created the drama in defence of freedom; while it distorted the historical character of Philip II, it was to make its own way in history, and in particular inspired the opera that Verdi wrote a century later on the same subject. Trained as a historian, Schiller liked to take his characters from history, particularly the history of modern times, examples being Mary Stuart and Wallenstein.

The powerful German philosophical movement which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century drew a great deal from Herder's historical thought. This may be seen from Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784), in which he argued that history is nothing but the development of rationality, for example the onward march to freedom.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is one of the most prominent world intellectual figures of all time. He was the father of German idealist thought, dominated by figures such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who bring us up to modern times. Kant provides us with a flawless philosophical system in which ethical and religious values have an important function, and which was to offset the drift towards the scepticism and materialism that inevitably were brought in its train by the hedonism of the Enlightenment. The 1780s saw the development of Kant's powerful line of thought in his three

fundamental works the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781 (Critique of Pure Reason); the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788 (Critique of Practical Reason) and the *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, 1790 (Critique of Judgement).

Germany made an enormous contribution to both philosophy and music. The eighteenth century was the time of great composers such as Bach, Händel, Haydn and Mozart.

Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750) and George Frederick Händel (1685–1759) dominated the musical scene in the first half of the eighteenth century, although Bach hardly ever left his home in Leipzig, while Händel moved to England where he became master of the orchestra of the court in London (1723). The genius of these two musicians was matched by the passion for music which gripped the small courts of the German princes and the court of Frederick II of Prussia, for whom Bach composed priceless works; he also composed for the Margrave of Brandenburg *The Brandenburg Concertos* (1721). Bach was likewise an outstanding composer of sacred music, above all his famous *Passion nach den Evangelien des Matthäus* (1729).

The second half of the century was dominated by the genius of two Austrian musicians: Haydn and Mozart. Franz Joseph Haydn (1732–1809), the founder of the modern symphony and a forerunner of modern music – Beethoven was one of his students – produced music inspired by popular themes familiar to him from childhood, when he had lived in humble rural circumstances, and from his adolescence in the streets of Vienna. After spending thirty years in the service of the Esterházy family, he settled in England in 1791 where he soon triumphed and was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Oxford; this was the beginning of a great creative period in which he composed among other masterpieces *Die Schöpfung* (The Creation), based on Milton's *Paradise Lost*.

Towering head and shoulders above this impressive host of musicians was Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–91), one of the few child prodigies to achieve success as an adult. The historian may indeed use the term 'genius' with reason when passing judgement on Mozart's creative work. He was the founder, together with Haydn, of the classical symphony, and also composed a series of superlative operas, the most outstanding of which are *Le Nozze di Figaro*, *Don Giovanni*, *Così fan tutte* and *Die Zauberflöte*, obviously inspired by freemasonry. Released from the despotic court of the Archbishop of Salzburg in 1782, he composed one of his masterpieces: *Figue in C Minor* for two keyboards (K. 426), in which his prodigious contrapuntal technique was used to maximum dramatic effect. It was during the last five years of his life that he composed the series of great operas mentioned above; *Le Nozze di Figaro* (1786) based on Beaumarchais' play shown two years before in Paris; which had created a furore with its message of social revolt; *Don Giovanni* (1787), based on the drama by Tirso de Molina, in which the humorous treatment of the amorous adventures of Don Juan Tenorio contrasts with the terrifying eruption of the statue-ghost; *Così fan tutte* (1789), written in Vienna at the time of the French Revolution; and *Die Zauberflöte* (1791), inspired by freemasonry, as noted above, and the first genuinely German opera.

The contribution of Southern Europe

The outstanding achievements of other countries in the eighteenth century should not obscure the contribution of the southern peoples, who also played a notable role in the

Renaissance and baroque periods. Suffice it to mention the philosopher Vico, the musician Vivaldi and the painter Goya.

Gianbattista Vico (1668–1743) was the first to formulate, in his *Scienza Nuova*, a comparative theory on the evolution of history, his fundamental principle being the great unity of the human race. Vico considered that there are laws which governed the vicissitudes of human life and its evolution.

A contemporary was Antonio Vivaldi (1678–1741), the Venetian musician with whom baroque music reached its peak. His marvellous portrayal of nature in his *Four Seasons* is more than simply a description of natural phenomena; it is a pensive work, which shows that Vivaldi interpreted the book of nature not only in mathematical, but also in musical terms.

In Spain, the Enlightenment went through three stages. During the first, the leading figure was P. Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (1676–1764), a professor at the University of Oviedo whose teachings were also disseminated in his writings, such as his *Teatro crítico universal* and his *Cartas eruditas* in which he set out the main problems of his time.

The mid-eighteenth century saw the construction of a masterpiece of European architecture: the Plaza Mayor in Salamanca, the work of Albano Churriguera, Andrés García de Quiñones and others, which has contributed to placing Salamanca among the towns forming part of the heritage of humanity.

During the third stage, the Spanish monarchy, alarmed by the aftermath of the French Revolution, ceased to support the Spanish Enlightenment. The result was the persecution of its most notable figure, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744–1811), author of the *Informe sobre la ley Agraria* (Report on Agrarian Law). Active in the arts was the sculptor Francisco Salzillo (1707–81), creator of exquisite *Nudismus* in the Neapolitan style and of the religious floats for the Holy Week (Mucía). Lastly, that period also saw the rise of a painter of genius Francisco de Goya (1746–1828), whose early work will be covered in this chapter. His first tapestry cartoons show us a cheerful, optimistic Goya who depicts popular themes: the pot-seller, playing blindman's bluff. After the illness that made him deaf in 1792 and cut him off from others both his spirit and his painting became sombre. Even so he produced admirable court portraits such as *The Family of Charles IV* (El Prado), *The Naked Maja* and *The Clothed Maja* (both in El Prado). Of this period is the impressive fresco *The Miracle of Saint Anthony* (San Antonio de Florida, Madrid). The War of Independence, which brought Spain into contemporary times, was a source of inspiration for some of his most important paintings such as *The Second of May 1808 in Madrid*, which depicts the struggle of the people of Madrid against Napoleon's troops; *The Execution of the Defenders of Madrid*, an awesome painting of the horror of repression by the victor; and the horrifying series of engravings *Disasters of War*. With these works produced by the genius of Goya Spain took its place in the modern world.

Elitist culture and popular culture

Elitist and popular culture interacted constantly with each other throughout modern times, as can be seen in all fields: religion, the arts and literature. The Peasants' War in Germany and the Anabaptist movement in Münster were no more than popular forms of the Reformation advocated by Luther; similarly, albeit in an attenuated form, the Spanish Illuminati were a popular reflection of Erasmus's thought, championed

by intellectuals such as Alfonso de Valdés. A detailed analysis of Rabelais' work shows how frequently references to classical culture and popular views went hand in hand. Rabelais combines erudition with colloquialism, which might even have seemed shocking to people at court, in quips such as '... you have much more strength in your teeth and more sense in your bum than ever Hercules had in his whole body and soul', in *Gargantua and Pantagruel*. In art, alongside painters who represent the acme of culture, such as Raphael and Titian, there are others, such as Brueghel the Elder and Van Ostade, for whom popular customs were the sole source of inspiration. Evidence of interaction between popular culture and the elitist culture during the Baroque period is not hard to find. Examples are the songs and festive gatherings in many of Lope de Vega's comedies, such as *El caballero de Olmedo* and *El villano en su rincón*. The witches' scenes in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, or the drunkard in Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew* who wakes up a gentleman, a trick played on him by a lord, are clearly linked to popular themes in the same way as some of Cervantes's *Novelas ejemplares* (especially *La ilustre fregana* and *La gitanilla*). It should also be borne in mind that Teniers' tapestry cartoons depicting rural themes were destined to adorn the houses of the great.

It might seem that elitist culture and popular culture were farthest apart during the era of classicism and during the Enlightenment. Yet it was during those periods that there was a fashion for the tales of the Comtesse d'Aulnoy and of Perrault, most of which were inspired by popular legends such as children lost in the woods or orphans ill-treated by stepmothers. It was again at this time that John Gay composed *The Beggar's Opera*, in which the characters were drawn from the most humble classes of society rather than from the court or from the great historic themes of Italian Opera; and that La Fontaine wrote his *Fables*, also based on popular themes. In turn, as the spirit of the Enlightenment spread more and more to the population at large, it effectively destroyed many superstitions such as the belief in witches. Witches were burnt at the stake throughout the seventeenth century, and it was only the spirit of the Enlightenment which gradually put an end to the practice.

Lack of space prevents us from looking into the interaction between the centre and the periphery by which ideological innovations were spread despite the obstacles encountered. Generally speaking, it may be considered that the courts were always centres of influence, the most significant example of which was probably the French court, in particular Versailles. New ideas were spread by books and also to some extent by engravings. Obstacles were encountered in the form of both political and religious censorship; suffice it to think of the implications of the Index of Forbidden Books imposed by Rome; the actions of the Inquisition under the Catholic Kings, and state censorship. In other cases, inertia

itself acted as an obstacle, as shown by the English historian Elliott in respect of Europe's acceptance of the idea of a new world after Columbus' discovery; Elliott describes this as a difficult process of assimilation.

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EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Antoni Maczak

THE CONCEPT OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE: THE REGION'S UNITY AND DIVISIONS

Discussions concerning this part of Europe as a whole are chiefly related to the recent past or to the present, and mostly irrelevant to the epoch in question. In the early Modern Age, differences within East-Central Europe were much more marked than whatever its countries might have had in common. Relations with the West were not yet the major unifying factor so characteristic and important in the last two hundred years or less. In the epoch in question, the common factor in East-Central Europe was social and political institutions characteristic of the society of orders which had fully developed in the West: rights of property and 'freedoms' which particular estates and social groups had enjoyed there since the High or Late Middle Ages. In the west, this part of Europe bordered on German parts of the Roman Empire of the German Nation; to the east, it extended towards Muscovy where Western institutions hardly developed. Through union with Poland and influenced by Polish institutions, Lithuania with her extensive Ruthenian possessions was also a part of East-Central Europe as it has been defined here.

In the fourteenth–sixteenth centuries, the southern part of the region was being conquered by the Ottomans step by step. Their progress towards and beyond the Danube marked the end of independent Christian principalities and kingdoms. The Turkish conquest stopped the development of societies of orders with their representative institutions wherever they had taken root. It created a unique social and political system based on an unequal coexistence of Islam and Christian civilizations. It also deeply changed the countries beyond the limits of direct Ottoman influence. What remained of the Christian part was a rich mosaic of ethnic groups, customs, religions and social systems. If any generalization is possible, it may be said that the State in this part of Europe did not exert a unifying cultural influence on its subjects – with the notable exception of the élites.

There is no exact date opening the modern period of East-Central European history; Western oceanic discoveries remained irrelevant (and for some time largely unknown) to these parts. As the dramatic fact of general importance the battle of Mohács (29–30 August 1526) may be singled out. This victory of the Turks over an army led by the Jagellon king, Louis II of Hungary, had multiple consequences: the Ottomans became (until at least 1699) a direct factor of

continental politics in Europe; this battle activated an agreement of 1515 between the Jagellons and the Habsburgs which, upon the childless death of Louis, offered to the latter dynasty the inheritance of Bohemia and Hungary. The competition between both families was thereby settled in favour of the House of Austria: the chances of a Jagellon empire were doomed.

The Reformation had been born in Bohemia in the early fifteenth century (John Hus, d. 1415), but became a European phenomenon a hundred years later thanks, directly, to Martin Luther active nearby in Saxony and Thuringia. In a few years it made itself felt between the Carpathians and the Baltic, and in Hungary as well. In 1525 the Teutonic Order State in Prussia was declared a secular Duchy, the nucleus of a future major European power. At that time, East-Central Europe increased substantially to the east: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a cluster of lands, mostly Ruthenian and Orthodox but also Lithuanian and (superficially) Catholic – in personal union with Poland – was adopting Polish institutions and in 1569, a union act signed in Lublin created the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In a few decades Lithuania became a mature society of orders with the characteristic eastern domination of the landed gentry over towns. On the other hand, the conquest of Novgorod by Ivan III (1478–94) destroyed the easternmost city-republic, hitherto strongly connected with the German Hansa and with the West in general.

THE ECONOMY

In the third decade of the sixteenth century, only a few structural traits of modern East-Central Europe were already visible. Bohemia and Silesia in the Middle Ages were economically advanced compared to Poland and particularly to Lithuania or the Lower Danube basin, and would remain so. As far as German lands were concerned, Saxony had an economic lead over Brandenburg and Pomerania. However, the economic development of the West began to influence the eastern part of Central Europe in various ways. What had begun as an increasing interdependence between Central and Western Europe, from the later seventeenth century changed into a unilateral economic dependence.

Probably the most disputed question is the Baltic trade in grain and in raw materials (timber, ashes, hemp). This commerce was gaining momentum in the sixteenth century until the commercial, monetary and political crisis of

1619–20). Exchange, chiefly of Western industrial goods, was stimulated by capital from The Netherlands. While areas intensively exporting grain through Baltic ports were limited to the basins of navigable rivers (Oder, Vistula, Niemen, Dvina), the commercial influence of the principal seaports (Szczecin/Stettin, Gdansk/Danzig, Königsberg, Riga) was much wider: demand for western goods was growing far beyond the areas exporting directly. It continued to increase after the 1620s when the trade balance changed for the worse. There was also an active trade between the Baltic zone and the eastern Balkans and Istanbul; conspicuous goods but, in the seventeenth century, also potash were brought northwards. Armenian, Jewish and Scottish merchants were active there.

The Baltic Zone had no substantial source of precious metals but an active balance of its foreign trade. In this respect the sixteenth and early seventeenth century brought a boom: a great demand for Baltic products and increased opportunities for transit to and from the East (Muscovy, Central Asia, Turkish dominions).

The parts of East-Central Europe which remained beyond the reach of Baltic commerce developed a trade in oxen: Hungary first of all, Ruthenia and Ukraine, Moldavia, Little Poland. Western demand was increasing because of urban development, and herds of oxen were brought to Silesia, Saxony and the Rhine valley, as well as to Austria (Vienna) and to Venice. A land route between Istanbul and the Baltic through Kamieniec Podolski was continuously used by merchants of diverse origin, from Armenians to Scots. Precious metals were brought to the south-east in addition to woollens and other Western goods, while Polish-Lithuanian nobility offered a market for silks, cold steel and other products of oriental craftsmen. Metals, chiefly lead and silver, were being extracted in Upper Hungary (today Slovakia; also copper) and Bohemia. Capital poured in from Upper Germany (Augsburg) and the mining regions developed fast. This silver production had stimulated the European economy before American silver arrived. From the mid-sixteenth century the *thaler* (from Joachimsthal; thence dollar) became the standard silver coin all over Central and Northern Europe. On the Dalmatian shores of the Adriatic, Dubrovnik/Ragusa played a crucial role in funneling the Balkan countries' raw materials (wool, hides, and so on) to Italy. The Ottomans encouraged this trade because of its active balance and in 1593 established the free port of Split/Spalato.

Agriculture was strongly diversified between the Baltic and the Mediterranean Basin. Even before money rents spread in the more remote parts of the Baltic Zone, labour services, and serfdom, had been imposed – probably because this was the cheapest and easiest way to secure to the landowners a marketable surplus of grain and a substantial income. Wherever money rent had been widespread from the thirteenth century, the peasants were exposed to usury and in some regions (that is, Livonia) their personal freedom became limited in the fifteenth, because they were (or were expected to be) deeply in debt.

A double feedback was at work in this connection. For one thing, weak urban development discouraged the introduction of money rents and the feeble circulation of money in the countryside hampered the development of towns; for another, increased coercion and the legal dependence of the peasantry upon the nobles severely limited the increase of urban population and, consequently, slowed down social change. There was no simple and direct link between grain exports and servile labour. Where farmers

enjoyed legal protection (the case of the Vistula Fens), then farms could thrive as in Dithmarschen or in Frisia. If they were left at the mercy of their lords, they could be expropriated and turned into labourers (the *Bauernlegen*, chiefly in Mecklenburg of the eighteenth century), or put into virtually slave status (Pomerania from the early seventeenth century).

In Moldavia-Wallachia demesne farming for the market was less developed than in Poland, but serfdom flourished nevertheless. In urbanized Bohemia, farmers were left much more freedom; in Hungary this was probably due to the nature of the economy: vineyards and cattle-raising. As a general rule, the rural population felt more free in border regions and in the mountains. The environment of the Carpathians shaped a particular culture of Wallachian shepherds, independent but poor and rather primitive. On the Adriatic, Ragusa and other ports remained closely connected with Italy and Mediterranean commerce. The mountainous country gave the inhabitants a chance to retain relative freedom.

A common trait for all regional economies was feeble urban development. Few eastern towns were of European importance: Gdansk for its role in the Baltic commerce, Prague for its continental trade and cultural influence; from the later seventeenth century also Leipzig. Many small towns were strictly dependent on their lords and – what was particularly important – urban credit played a very limited role in state-building and politics in general.

ETHNOS, SOCIETY AND AUTHORITY

The Ottoman conquests put an end to the development of the East-European societies of orders. The countries which remained Christian continued developing their institutions according to general European patterns but substantial regional differences grew up. Their origins and character were diverse: ethnic, confessional and political-institutional.

Ethnic differences were characteristic of East-Central Europe. The Slavs had little in common but the roots of their languages. In the Balkans they mixed with Greeks, Macedonians, Albanians and others, in the Danube basin with Wallachians/Moldavians and Magyars (that is, Hungarians), while the Ugrofinns (Estonians) and Balts (Latvians, Lithuanians) as well as German settlers populated the south-eastern shores of the Baltic. Economic, demographic and political factors had encouraged late medieval migrations and few regions remained ethnically uniform. From the thirteenth century, German settlements – some rural, but mainly urban – were a uniform factor even in the case of countries as distant from each other as Slovenia, Transylvania and Estonia: as everywhere in Late Medieval-Early Modern Europe, German miners were indispensable in Poland, Bohemia, Hungary (with Transylvania) and the Balkans. The division between the Roman and the Eastern Churches, with their different liturgies and languages, remained a major cultural phenomenon. This division increased when the Renaissance came to the eastern shores of the Adriatic directly from Italy and influenced Dalmatia and Hungary as early as the middle of the fifteenth century; Poland and Bohemia would only absorb that culture and life-style many decades later, and the northern parts along the Baltic would encounter the Renaissance in its Netherlandish version. The Orthodox lands remained immune to the influence of the Renaissance.

Characteristic for this part of Europe were ethnic – or language – differences between ruling groups and the rest of the population. This was an inheritance of high and late medieval colonization. In Estonia and Livonia (Latvia) there was an almost perfect dichotomy, both in towns and in the countryside. (The national revival of the Estonians and Latvians would come only in the later nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries.) In Prussia this cleavage was not so clear: the influx of German peasant settlers from all walks of life had been massive in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and the native population of Prussians virtually disappeared during the sixteenth century. In Poland at the end of the fifteenth, German burghers dominated in the larger towns and the opposition to the patriciates often made use of national Polish arguments. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, native Lithuanians were only a small minority concentrated in the north-west of that vast country.

Ethnic struggles had been characteristic of fifteenth-century Bohemia. At the turn of the century, the Czechs were already clearly victorious. Silesia, however, a very prosperous country which belonged to the Czech crown, was mostly German in its upper strata while its peasantry in the eastern parts remained Polish. Hungary was a country ethnically particularly complex. This fact, of crucial importance for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was of little relevance for the sixteenth and seventeenth. The Magyar nobles¹ were the undisputed élite but Upper Hungary and the southern parts of the kingdom were mostly Slavic while the population of Transylvania was a mixture of Magyars, Saxons (German settlers), Slavs and Moldavians-Wallachians who merged only slowly. Larger towns would long retain their medieval German character.

In the early modern era some important ethno-cultural changes took place. The most dramatic was the brutal change that befell the élites in Bohemia-Moravia after the battle of the White Mountain (1620). The old Czech high nobles or aristocrats (*pánové*, that is, 'the Lords') were dispossessed (many executed) and their properties distributed to the few loyal Czechs and mostly to the Austrian newcomers. This has had a portentous impact on Czech culture. In Poland-Lithuania, where absolutism did not take root, no such brutal change was possible. Instead, Polish language and manners (and some ability in Latin) became a status symbol of the nobility of Ruthenian and Lithuanian origin. This process was complemented by the migration of land-hungry Polish lesser gentry who settled down in sparsely populated Red Ruthenia, Ukraine and the Grand Duchy; proverbially poor petty noblemen from Masovia moved both to the east (Lithuania) and to the north (Ducal Prussia) where woods still abounded for clearing. But cultural influences were reciprocal: the Lithuanian Statutes were acknowledged by the courts of the nobility in Poland, while German law was current in Lithuanian towns and the county diets became – as in Poland – the forum of local politics.

Some ethnic groups were given a special legal position, even a niche in the society of orders. In Poland the Jews (formally subject to the king) had specific autonomy. Representatives of the *kohals* formally met during the fairs (the *Vaad*, until 1764) and decided upon political and economic matters like the distribution of taxes and the defence of their privileges. Jews living on the estates of the nobles (and in private towns) were subject to their lords' jurisdiction but Christian inhabitants of a private town rarely, if ever, enjoyed a privilege *de non tolerandis Iudeis*. Collective privileges were granted to the Armenians and to the Scots

(both groups chiefly merchants), and special charters encouraged the Mennonite settlers. The Tartars, in Lithuania and the Ukraine, were recognized as noblemen if they had served in the army. All these ethnic groups, with the notable exception of the Jews, were declining in importance and numbers.

The Cossacks had quite a special position. A people of mixed origin but fervently Christian Orthodox, they populated vast fertile borderlands of Turkish dominions (Moldavia, Crimea), Poland and Muscovy. Nobody but born warriors could survive there and the Cossacks enjoyed the special social status of professional troops. Nevertheless, their freedoms were hardly compatible with the interests of Ukrainian lords who had the decisive voice in Poland and regarded the Cossacks as their subjects and not as soldiers and nobles. The great insurrection of dissatisfied Cossacks (1648), and the subsequent incorporation of the Left-Bank (eastern) Ukraine by Russia (1654), was a disaster for both parties to the conflict. The *tertius gaudens* was the Tsar: the Ukraine would become the pillar of the Russian Empire from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.

The Cossacks were not the only professional warrior society. From the late sixteenth century, Habsburg-Ottoman borderlands abounded in them, like the *szeklers* in Transylvania or the *prebjegs* (*vlachs*, Ital. *uscocchi*) in Serbia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Slovenia. A close analogy may be drawn between *prebjegs* and Cossacks: both people faithful to Orthodoxy and compelled to accept the Union with Rome; conscious of their liberties and granted self-government, uncontrollable and given to piracy (on the Black Sea against the Turks and on the Adriatic against Venetian commerce); neither refused to serve Muslims (the Turks even created Orthodox bishoprics in Slavonia and Hungary for their *prebjegs*). But unlike the Cossacks, their Balkan counterparts never seriously challenged their monarchs: the Habsburgs even supported them against Croatian nobles. Myths and legends created by both these people would feed modern Ukrainian and Croatian/Slovenian national consciousness respectively.

In the sixteenth century new élites were created and shaped. The Teutonic Order had not permitted the development of any aristocracy or even a wealthy nobility that could have challenged its authority. Only the secularization of the Order-state offered aristocratic status and substantial feudal and allodial property to the chief officials. The estates assemblies developed in Prussia in the fifteenth century in a bitter struggle with the Order and, in Estonia-Livonia, during its long-term political crisis of the next century. However, these assemblies petered out in Prussia after the Thirty Years War, and even earlier when the Baltic countries became Baltic Provinces of Sweden. German *Junkers* were loyal army officers and statesmen of all consecutive rulers including, from 1721, emperors of Russia, pillars of absolutism in the Northern and Eastern Europe.

In contrast to the Baltic countries, Poland and Lithuania were much larger political units, led towards a closer union by the Jagellon rulers and the interests of their landed élites. In Poland no division within the estate of the nobility was acknowledged by the law. Nevertheless, there were clear differences of interests between great landowning families (the *magnateria*) and the gentry. The former were entrenched in the Senate (or the Royal Council), the latter in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1505, a break-through Constitution *Nihil Novi* gave to the Chamber a decisive voice in all crucial matters of the state. However, the social and political rivalry

would be decided not on the parliament floor but in daily economic and social relationships. After the Union of Lublin (1569), Lithuanian nobles were given the franchise. The Polish system of local government – in fact self-government of the nobility – transplanted to the spacious plains of Lithuania and Ruthenia, created particularly strong and extensive networks of patronage. Urban markets were feeble and the gentry economically dependent upon their mighty neighbours. This in turn had great impact on local and national politics. Because of wealth and strength of its *magnatery*, Duchy of Lithuania enjoyed a disproportionate influence in the Commonwealth.

The political role of East-Central Europe can hardly be defined as peripheral since this was the battleground of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, as well as the area where Prussia and Russia entered into European politics.

The Duchy of Prussia had begun rather inconspicuously. After a short but devastating war with Poland (1520–1), the state of the Teutonic Order declared itself a secular principality (1526) with the last Grand Master of the Order – Albrecht von Hohenzollern – as the 'Duke of Prussia'. His position as vassal of the King of Poland was duly confirmed which gave to Albrecht the protection he needed against the Emperor. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the dynastic policy of the Hohenzollerns concentrated on securing the Duchy for the Brandenburg line of the family, which they finally achieved in 1618.

The Estates Assembly in Königsberg was struggling with the dukes who played rather skilful internal politics: both loyal subjects from the Duchy and job seekers from Brandenburg were appointed to high offices. They created a new élite supported by the revenues of the ducal domain. The foreign policy of the Duchy was skilful but rather passive. The only chance for expansion was offered by Livonia. This remained an ecclesiastical order state over thirty years longer and a crucial person there was another Hohenzollern, a Bishop of Riga. However, Livonia was becoming a centre of international conflict. Sigismund Augustus, King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania – whom the last Grand Master of Livonia had recognized as an overlord – regarded that country as a minor goal only. Other competitors were more acquisitive: Muscovy under Ivan the Terrible, the Sweden of Eric XIV and even distant Denmark. Eventually it was Sweden which won, and until the early eighteenth century the Baltic Provinces would be the key to new domination of the Baltic. The German-speaking nobility accepted that and notwithstanding the great part of the land allotted to Swedish aristocrats, it would serve loyally under Swedish banners. The rebels, like Reinhold Patkul would be an exception.

The Livonian Wars (1557–82) were by no means a local conflict. Muscovy was interested in getting access to the West, also for logistic reasons: Western merchants saw Russia as a land route to the Middle East. The west of Europe was more than ever interested in Baltic grain, construction materials (timber, hemp for ropes) and chemicals (ashes). For the time being, Poland and Sweden divided the country which in the early seventeenth century would become the first milestone of Swedish expansion in her Age of Greatness (1621), as well as – one century later (1721) – the biggest prize of Peter I.

In the meantime, Prussia passed through hard times during the Thirty Years War. Playing a game between Sweden and Poland, Elector Frederick Wilhelm (1640–88) won formal sovereign status as Duke of Prussia (1657) and shortly

thereafter drastically limited the power of his estate assemblies. But Brandenburg, and not Prussia, Berlin and not Königsberg, was becoming the centre of a forthcoming new empire (from 1701, the Kingdom of Prussia). Its first major booty was Silesia and shortly after (1772–95) the western provinces of Poland.

The growth of Prussia is one of the great problems of European history. An early crucial factor was the weakness of Poland. Both her Diet and her kings (Sigismund Augustus and Batory, 1576–86) regarded Prussia as a minor asset and concentrated their attention on other theatres. They missed two opportunities to incorporate the Duchy as its suzerains at time of succession conflict. The adroit and long-term policy of the Hohenzollerns in the seventeenth century secured for them a prime place in German politics. But independent of great and petty political games, a strong government and administration was being built up. Not only was this particularly efficient absolutist rule, but it would eventually create the model case of what according to Max Weber is 'the rational' system of government. What is stunning indeed, there emerged in close proximity two systems of government based on incompatible political values: the Prussian and the Polish. In the Prussian absolutism, the great majority of the duke's officers, civil and military, were nobles. In the eighteenth century the state's service offered them social position and advancement as well as security for their rule over the peasantry. The *noblesse de robe*, in so far as it existed, was irrelevant. Against absolutism there was only a very weak resistance on the part of towns; the *tiers état* did not count in the Assembly. Even Königsberg was by no means an important city.

In this respect Poland was similar to her tiny neighbour with a great future. Only Cracow (and later Vilna) were represented in the Diet, but without votes. But while in Prussia-Brandenburg the nobleman saw his fortune in the duke's service, the Polish gentry cultivated a free citizen's ethos. All the principles of estates' freedoms took deep root there – a *habeas corpus* was already in effect in 1434 – but the nobility was not inclined to create an effective system of government. The king was for the Commonwealth (and not the other way around) and since the union of 1569, there was no question of any form of 'proprietary dynasticism'. Traditional and modern values were strangely intertwined. Institutional solutions were inconsistent with the problems of that large country. In the sixteenth century, Poland's frontiers in the east and south-east were by no means stable, but the Commonwealth's expansive tendency was very limited. Its eastern part, Lithuania, needed the constant support of Poland against Muscovy and the Crimean Tatars. King Sigismund Augustus (1548–72) did not expect an heir and this is why his principal goal was a real – and not only a personal – union with Lithuania. The king, supported by the Polish nobility, put pressure on the Lithuanian high nobles and in 1569 his dream came true. But three years later he was dead and the kingdom, hitherto elective in the Jagellon family, in a constitutional crisis.

One may argue that the later sixteenth century was the decisive period of Polish history. The Polish, later Polish-Lithuanian, polity was in a sense based on the self-government of the nobility. Linkage was weak between the centre (the royal court) and the provinces. The parliament met rather regularly and often but no effective bureaucratic system was created that would hold together so large a country (in 1634 over 900,000 km²). Nevertheless the Commonwealth did not show any substantial tendency to disintegrate. The

devastating war with Muscovy, Sweden and Prussia, with a contemporaneous incursion of the Transylvanians (1655–60), proved its stunning ability for survival.

The strength of the system was grounded upon the sense of political community based on noble freedoms, and the widely developed networks of patronage. Poland, like Prussia-Brandenburg, had remained a domain state (as Joseph Schumpeter called this system) but unlike the latter case, the revenue of royal domains fed the magnates rather than the treasury of the Commonwealth. The fundamental problem was that neither the magnates nor the gentry were interested in increasing the efficiency of public institutions. Taxes – paid by the commoners – were growing and yet from 1580s to 1652 Polish state revenues made about one twentieth of the French ones, while the population of France was roughly only twice as great. This can be only partly attributed to low development of a money economy in Poland-Lithuania. Money signified war and the nobility did not endorse the political programme of the three Wasas who were elected kings and reigned from 1587 to 1648. Catholic kinsmen of the Swedish royal family, they dreamed of a *reconquista* of the country of their origin but were not able to persuade the nobility to regard it as an element of the Commonwealth's reason of state. Their claims sharpened both the internal conflicts between the monarchy and the estates, and the international one, Polish-Swedish, initially marginal for both countries.

In 1660 John Casimir (Vasa) renounced all his claims to Sweden but after the experiences of the mid-century, the nobility could hardly be persuaded to support any aggressive foreign policy. However, from the 1660s the challenges to the country's independence were gaining momentum. In 1672 the Ottomans seized a large part of Podolia. Only King John III's active and successful support for the Emperor against the Turks (the relief of Vienna, 1683, and a subsequent campaign in Hungary) allowed the gradual recovery (1699) of what had been lost.

But Russia was becoming the principal danger. The long-term balance of power had been changed for a while during the Time of Troubles in Moscow. During that interlude, history seemed to offer one more counterfactual solution of East European history: the young Polish Crown Prince, Vladislav (the future Vladislav IV), was offered the Russian throne by the *boyars*. However, King Sigismund III procrastinated and the mood in Moscow changed in favour of a native ruler. The political crisis in Russia was overcome: Prince Mikhail Romanov began a new dynasty (1613) and strengthened the system of rule. This would have a portentous impact on Poland in the following three hundred years.

Against Russia the Commonwealth was losing lands – and elements of its independence. Step by step August II (from Saxony's Wettin dynasty) tried to win the support of foreign powers for his absolutist projects in Poland at the expense of some territories, but with no success. The 'Saxon times' (1698–1764) would remain in the nation's memory as an age of weakness and disorder, the Commonwealth became 'an inn' where any foreign army could find easy quarters. While it did not take part in the Great Northern War (1701–21), Swedish, Saxon and Russian armies were crossing its territory finding no serious resistance. Peter I and Charles XII staged elections of their clients as kings. Eventually the Tsar prevailed over Sweden. In 1721, he finally incorporated Estonia and Livonia (which, with exception of 1918–39, would remain attached to Russia until recent times) and introduced a sort of a protectorate over Poland-Lithuania. Ironically, the tsars

formally pledged to guarantee the freedoms of the Polish constitution.

The period 1764–95 is regarded as that of a political recovery but also of growing outside pressure. Three 'black eagles', that is, Russia, Prussia and Austria, first (in 1773 and 1792 – this time without Austria's participation) took away parts of the territory, and finally divided the rest (1795). The Commonwealth ceased to exist. Its final destruction greatly strengthened Russia and Prussia, and cleared the way for a new European order.

The history of Hungary in early modern times was primarily shaped by two conflicts: first, the one caused by the Ottoman expansion (and subsequent defence of the conquered territory), and secondly, the Habsburg imperial-absolutist programme and national reactions against it. Neither of them had a local character. The Mohács defeat excluded the Jagellons and opened a competition between Emperor Ferdinand I and the Palatine of Transylvania, John Sigismund Zapolya. The struggle brought about a solution, unsatisfactory for all parties concerned, which proved very stable: in 1541 Central Hungary (with Buda and the archbishop's see, Esztergom) fell to the Turks; Transylvania remained an autonomous principality under Ottoman influence; a long belt of lands on the north-west, from Upper Hungary (Slovakia) to the Adriatic (Slovenia), were regarded by the Habsburgs as their heritage. Unlike Bohemia, Hungary never became a part of the empire but Habsburg dominions there defended the empire against Turkish incursions. Still in 1663–4 the Ottomans were able to increase their possessions along their whole frontier and twenty years later besieged Vienna (then less than 50 km from their frontier posts). But the idea of liberating the ancient frontiers of the kingdom loomed large, not only in the court of Vienna but also in Protestant circles on the Hungarian nobility.

The latter concentrated their hopes on the princes of Transylvania. This peripheral mountainous country in the sixteenth century had a particular geopolitical importance but finally achieved rather little. Its princes in the seventeenth century led Hungarian insurrections against the Habsburgs (Imre Bocskai, 1604–6; Gábor/Gabriel Bethlen, 1619–22) or preferred to draft anti-Turk coalitions (Szefer Batory, elected king of Poland, 1576–86). These endeavours have some success. In 1606, Emperor Rudolf II recognized the independence of Transylvania and broadened the freedoms of the estates in Hungary, as a price for retaining St Stephen's crown. A somewhat adventurous policy of Prince György Rákóczy II (a foray to Poland which was then, in 1657, at war with Sweden but supported by the Habsburgs) caused a Turkish counterstrike; the political greatness of Transylvania was over.

From the 1660s, the situation of the Hungarian nobles was perplexing indeed. Supporting the Ottomans certainly would lead to nothing but the absolutist tendencies of Vienna seemed an equally unattractive option. The Emperor's repressive measures against Hungarian conspiracies caused new intrigues, and the Imre Thököly insurrection of 1678 triggered a sequence of wars with Turkey begun with the siege of Vienna. In 1699, the peace of Karlovac gave all Hungary (including Transylvania, Croatia and Slavonia) to the Habsburgs (who already in 1688 had taken Belgrade) but already in 1688 the Hungarian Diet had been compelled to recognize hereditary rights to the throne of the Habsburgs in their male line.

The eighteenth century began with an ill-fated insurrection led by Prince Francis II Rákóczi (1703–11). This failure signified the final victory of Habsburg absolutism. The

Hungarian aristocracy found their way to the Court in Vienna and was learning to enjoy domination over their country, that is, their own subjects; any influence of Viennese courtiers was regarded as encroachment. This is why the reforms of enlightened absolutism of Joseph II (1780-90) were disapproved by his noble subjects in Hungary even more than in Austria.

The lands of St Wenceslas' Crown, that is, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, had closer ties to Germany than any other country of Eastern Europe. Prague was closer than the rest of East-Central European cities (including Vienna) to any of major continental urban centres, and the king of Bohemia was prince elector of the Empire. The Habsburgs, since Mohács duly elected kings of Bohemia, had close contacts with the estates. From the mid-sixteenth century they secured it for their family. One of them, Rudolf II (1576-1612) made Prague his residential city and moved there the court and imperial chancery. The city on the Vltava became then the centre of Mannerism and Baroque art.

The political life of Bohemia used to concentrate in the Diet, but the Habsburgs had a clear tendency to impose absolutism; the Czech élites were predominately Protestant (Utraquist) but the country's administration was transferred to governors a majority of whom were Catholics. The conflict gained momentum and in 1619 became a rebellion when, after the death of Emperor Matthias, the estates elected as his successor in the Kingdom of Bohemia a Calvinist, Elector Palatine Frederick V.

This triggered a conflict which turned into the first stage of the Thirty Years War's drama, played between Prague, Vienna and Hungary-Transylvania. The chances of the rebels looked good indeed because both the Austrian estates and the Hungarians under Gábor Bethlen had turned against the new emperor, Ferdinand II, and tried to besiege Vienna. All of them failed, however, and the victory of imperial and Bavarian troops at the White Mountain sealed the last common effort of various lands to shake off what they regarded as a Habsburg yoke.

The reprisals in Bohemia were ruthless: the leaders decapitated, the estates' freedoms restricted and the rebellious nobility dispossessed and replaced by Catholic loyalists, chiefly Germans. This has had a portentous long-term impact on Czech culture and national development.

RELIGION AND CONFESSIONS

It was in this part of Europe that the Reformation was born: in Bohemia of Jan Hus and, a hundred years later, in Turingia-Saxony of Martin Luther (1517). His impact was immediate and momentous. Germans all over the area enthusiastically accepted the new creed, Lutheranism. But the map of Christian confessions which emerged in East-Central Europe was particularly complicated. Prussia and Livonia remained Lutheran (albeit some élites in Prussia would lean towards Calvinism). In Poland in the third quarter of the sixteenth century, Calvinist influence seemed to match Catholicism but in some regions the Polish Brethren (the Arians) were also strong. However, when in 1573 Protestant confessions were given equal rights with Catholicism, the Arians were excluded. In Lithuania and in the Ruthenian parts of Poland several mighty families embraced Calvinism and protected the Protestant gentry in their neighbourhoods and even as far as Royal Prussia. These Protestant networks were well inscribed into the general system of patronage.

In eastern parts of Poland and in Lithuania the Reformation penetrated areas where Orthodoxy and Catholicism had coexisted since the Middle Ages. That age-old coexistence of religions (and there were many religious groups) contributed to Polish sixteenth-century confessional tolerance which made her a haven of religious dissidents from all over Europe. However, something has changed towards the end of the sixteenth century. Protestantism was losing its popularity with the gentry, probably because of the cleavage between that confession and the Catholic statehood. The Protestants were not able to produce their candidate to the throne; the Catholic bishops had, as such, the first seats in the Senate and held two out of four chancellors' offices. This split was perceived as unacceptable, and it probably contributed to massive reconversions of the nobles-citizens, even independent of the Jesuits' activity.

Catholicism was also gaining ground from the Eastern Church. In 1596 the Orthodox Church in the Commonwealth has been subjected to the Holy See (and independent from Moscow – the 'Third Rome') but this controversial Union of Brest (1596) would cause endless internal conflicts. The Greek Catholic (called also Uniate) Church has been established, but its high clergy were not given position equal to the Roman, and in the seventeenth century the resistance against it was strong. This found its expression in the rebellion of the Cossacks (1648) and their decision to accept the protection of the Tsar (1654). From that time, Protestantism would be a secondary phenomenon in Poland, and the Greek creed divided. Only from the later nineteenth century the Uniate Confession, illegal in Russia, would become an element of the national identity of the Ukrainians.

In sixteenth-century Bohemia, Catholicism was on the wane. Protestant creeds were multiple: Lutherans, Calvinists, native Bohemian Brethren and Hussites. They tried twice (1575, 1608), but did not succeed to create a *Confessio Bohemica* reflecting the Czech (and Moravian) identity. On the other hand, the 'Spanish' party did not reach its goal: to eliminate from Bohemia all confessions but Catholic and Utraquist. The conflict between the estates and the Habsburgs was adding motivation to Czech Protestants and eventually the vacant throne was offered to a Calvinist, Palatine Frederick. The Battle of the White Mountain (1620), victory of 'the Imperialists', signified the victory of the Counter-Reformation. The new élite, endowed by the Emperor with confiscated landed estates, was Catholic and loyal to the Emperor.

In Hungary, the pressure of Catholicism was not so strong and consequently the confessional issues were less important. Under Ottoman rule, the Protestants were given shelter and encouragement. Transylvania remained a haven of tolerance where Polish Arians and other persecuted minorities could survive.

UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF EAST-EUROPEAN CULTURE?

(See Plates 41-43.) The question-mark signifies the problem of finding common cultural traits for the whole area discussed. More than any other part of Europe (with the possible exception of the Iberian Peninsula), the civilizations of East-Central Europe were a mixture of contrasting cultural influences. Even before the Reformation, each country there harboured at least two religions or confessions:

Orthodoxy and Islam under Ottoman rule, various Protestant denominations and Catholics in Bohemia and Hungary. Poland was even much more complex in this respect because of the multitude of Jews and numerous islets of Muslim Tatars, as well as Armenians whose religious centre was Lvov. In Livonia and ethnic Lithuania only Lutheran-Catholic competition wiped out the original 'pagan' beliefs.

Italian Renaissance art had been accepted very early in Hungary, Bohemia and Poland, and – as Jan Białostocki has shown – developed there flourishing national styles. In Hungary, however, most of its monuments would be destroyed. From the late seventeenth century, Baroque culture merged Bohemia with Austria and Bavaria. But in Poland this style also took deep root. Splendid Baroque churches – and St Peter and Paul in Vilna is second to none – as well as residences of magnates in Lithuania and the Ukraine marked the borderline of Western civilization. The influx of Western artists was a constant factor of Polish cultural development but probably the strongest were the influences of northern Italy, including the regions of Como and Ticino. Their styles created a native Baroque and Rococo, endlessly transformed by local followers.

No general assessment of the East-Central European civilization is possible but some characteristic traces should be pointed out. In some respects the East only followed the West. Early foundations of the universities in the fourteenth century were not multiplied in the Renaissance and Baroque era. However, the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles maintained cultural links with principal German and Italian intellectual centres. The Italian connection was particularly important for Poland; Copernicus (1473–1543) studied at Cracow first and later in Bologna, Padua and Ferrara; other Polish intellectuals exchanged letters with Erasmus. Noblemen and substantial commoners were now trained chiefly in very numerous Jesuit colleges (or Protestant Gymnasien) and the élites completed their education at major Western universities or in Graz (from 1573), Ingolstadt, or Altdorf. Primary education remained in the hands of the Church and was spread rather unevenly. In Poland, primary education in parochial schools reached its highest development in the late sixteenth century but literacy was and remained a stark symbol and its important element. For instance, literacy in Little (Southern) Poland in the later sixteenth century has been estimated as follows: the magnates – 100 per cent (85 per cent for the women), well-to-do nobles – 95 (45), petty nobles – 75 (15). Analogous figures for various strata of the urban population are 70–8 (25–0). Only 2 per cent (0) is the figure estimated for the peasantry. It can be assumed that 60 per cent of nuns were literate (and of course all priests and monks), as well as 80 per cent of male Jews (no information on women).

The art of printing books came to the East-Central Europe early: the earliest printing press was set in Pilsen in 1468, in Cracow in 1473 (or 1474); the first text in Polish was printed in Wrocław/Breslau in 1475. The Orthodox parts were much slower in this respect: the first book in Bulgarian appeared only in 1508 and was printed in Transylvania; the first secular Bulgarian publication is dated 1741 in Vienna. The earliest Orthodox book (in the Old Slavonic) was printed in Cracow (1491), and German Lutherans in Königsberg and Livonia contributed to the culture of Lithuania and Baltic nations by printing religious books in the vernacular.

The Enlightenment in the East had its particularities. In the Habsburg lands, the Enlightened Absolutism of the Vienna government signified administrative reforms; in Poland, French political thought was helping to shape an efficient

government. The Constitution of 3 May 1791 was a brilliant effect of the Enlightenment; however, it came too late to be effective in the government. But the modernization process was slow and many reforms have been imposed from above. The witch hunt, for instance, virtually unknown in Poland until the mid-seventeenth century, erupted in the first half of the subsequent century, only to stop sharply thereafter. Unlike in the absolute monarchies, there was in Poland no central authority able to stop the craze rooted in local social relations. The Orthodox provinces hardly knew that scourge.

Muslim civilization influenced that area as well. The contacts were manifold: through commerce but also through constant war. Ottoman, and even Persian, products (silks, tents and carpets, weapons and armour, silver and tableware) were common. In Poland's south-eastern parts, military commanders had to master Oriental languages and the Armenian merchants made a strong link between Istanbul and Lvov. It is much less known that in the seventeenth century Scottish traders created another link between Poland and the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Clearly, Turkey was by no means exotic there.

In many respects East-Central Europe had to find its own solutions to general European problems. And what problem was more general than war? While the West developed military hardware and invented rigorous movements of troops, in these parts wars were fought mainly by cavalry, light or heavy (Polish ironclad lussars), much less by foot troops; heavy artillery was used mainly for besieging the rare fortifications (both the Ottomans and the Muscovites were known for excellent ordnance). A few places (towns and magnates' residences) were fortified according to the principles of Italian and Dutch schools of military construction. However, in the seventeenth century, in Hungary, Ukraine and Lithuania, stone was still scarce and bricks expensive so most fortifications were built of timber: witness Braun and Hogenberg's iconographic album *Civitates Orbis Terrarum*. And still in 1620 a Polish commander, Stanisław Żółkiewski, defended himself at Cecora against the Turks by applying the old Hussite tactics of the *Wagenburg* or chained waggons. The more important were castles like Khoim/Chocim or Kamieniec Podolski in Podolia.

The art of war was shaped by the resources (limited compared to those of western armies) by the nature of the terrain and the tactics of the enemy. Vast Ukrainian plains witnessed – until the late seventeenth century – almost annual Tatar forays aimed at capturing male and female prisoners for sale on the Istanbul market. Therefore great landowners built numerous strongholds as refuges for the population. In the sixteenth century, the ability to protect people against Tartars or simple robbers was crucial for attracting settlers and building up a *kolonizacja*. Such investment allowed the creation of immense fortunes which neither Cossack uprisings of the seventeenth nor peasant rebellions of the eighteenth century could destroy.

The art of war of East-Central Europe did also contribute to the 'military revolution' in the West. Charles IX of Sweden and his son, Gustavus II Adolphus, drew conclusions from their encounters with Poles in Livonia and Prussia. Having experienced charges of Polish heavy hussars the latter king changed the tactics and armament of the Swedish troops he would shortly send to the battlegrounds of the Thirty Years War.

Nevertheless there was nothing like an East-Central European civilization – a phenomenon which would have

corresponded to the Nordic (Scandinavian) or Western Mediterranean ones. However, what was emerging was what may be called a community of destiny of small nations largely dependent on their big brethren and unable to unite against their fate.

NOTE

1 The word *nobles/nobility* is used here as a general term; only titled noblemen (counts, princes and so on) are *aristocrats*, while the untitled landed élite in Poland is called *magnates* (or *magnates*); their lesser brethren are the *gentry*. This usage differs from the English but corresponds rather well with the way terms like *der Adel* or *la noblesse*, and so on, were used on the continent.

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RUSSIA

The late Victor I. Bugarov

RUSSIAN CULTURE

The most severe consequences of Batu Khan's invasion on the economy and on culture were largely overcome by the beginning of the fifteenth century. The national resurgence at the time of the battle of Kulikovo (1380), and during the preceding and following decades, also had its impact on culture which similarly took a new level of life.

From the time of the adoption of Christianity, Russian culture was part of the Byzantine-Slavonic cultural community (Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, and to some extent Poland and Bohemia), with its Greek and Old Church Slavonic languages and with Orthodox Christianity as the common religious system. These two factors – religious faith and language – played a highly important and, indeed, fundamental role.

The disintegration of the Byzantine-Slavonic community as a result of the conquest of Byzantium by the Turks (fall of Constantinople in 1453) led to changes. Rus'-Russia aspired to be the centre of the Orthodox world (the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome in the early sixteenth century) and this was reflected in the ecclesiastical-political and state-governmental ideology and practice.

These centuries in the history of Russian culture were a watershed, a period of transition from the cultural traditions of ancient Kievan Rus' (which had multiplied and developed in the age of feudal fragmentation but had been undermined during the period when Rus' was under the yoke of Golden Horde) to the culture of a new age, the effects of which were to be seen in Russia from the seventeenth century onwards.

The fragmentation characteristic of the feudal system (from the twelfth to the fifteenth century) led to a certain 'narrowing of horizons' in many fields of culture such as literature, the writing of chronicles, architecture and painting. Culture nevertheless spread to a significantly broader geographical area, with the appearance of new cultural centres, greater activity in the writing of chronicles and literature, widespread building work, and so forth.

In the second half of the thirteenth century the practice of a number of crafts in Rus' died out, stone buildings were no longer built, in several places literary actions completely or almost completely ceased, in particular the work of the chroniclers (Rybakov, 1948). The decline in cultural

development continued for several decades, right up to the end of the thirteenth and the early fourteenth century.

The consequences of the Horde's yoke were felt with particular severity in the weakening of Russian towns. Towns and urban life were slower to recover after Batu's destruction than the countryside and agriculture.

The end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century saw the start of the process of renewal which gathered pace in the fourteenth century and later.

Successful economic development created the conditions necessary for uniting the fragmented Russian lands. Moscow's favourable position among thick forests away from the paths of Tartar incursions, together with the density of its population which had fled there from neighbouring lands, particularly from the south and east, the development of landowning and of crafts, and the existence of important trade routes, and the skilful policy of Moscow's princely rulers meant that it managed to win the struggle for political supremacy and to unify the fragmented territories, in rivalry with Tver, Nizhny Novgorod and other cities.

One circumstance of the utmost importance was that the Russian (Great Russian) national identity was coming into existence at this time in the north-eastern territories of Rus'. The process was completed in the sixteenth century, but even at this time many local peculiarities of language, life-style and cultural development were becoming attenuated and general Russian traits and tendencies were asserting themselves. Such episodes played a major role in the development of Russian national consciousness. These aspects of national self-awareness, and of the patriotic unity of the Russian people, were powerfully in evidence at the time of the battle of Kulikovo in 1380 (Cherepnin, 1960).

Earlier movements in economic development and political unification made it possible openly to challenge the hegemony of the Golden Horde. In the fifteenth century, Rus', under the leadership of Moscow, quickly gathered strength.

It is important to note that the period between the battle of Kulikovo and the 'stand on the river Ugra' (end on the fourteenth to end of the fifteenth centuries) was distinguished by the development of towns, particularly in the principality of Moscow and in the Novgorod and Pskov territories (Rybakov, 1948; Satharov, 1959). There was a considerable increase in building and in craft industries and trade (including

foreign trade), and guilds of merchants and craftsmen came into existence.

The formation of the Russian State created new and substantial opportunities for economic and cultural development, and this indeed occurred in the centuries that followed.

THE CULTURE OF RUS' (FIFTEENTH CENTURY)

The economic and political achievements of Russian society within individual territories, and later within the single Russian State, were also reflected in a resurgence of culture. The rebirth and continued progress of the crafts, the growth in the construction of both civil and ecclesiastical buildings, the flourishing of literature, the emergence of a great number of tales and legends about the events from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, biographies of saints and so on, and art, all attest the fact that Russian society at that time had not only preserved the traditions of the culture of Rus' before the Mongol invasion but also added to them. This material and spiritual culture responded to the vital needs of the age – the ideas of patriotism, unity in the struggle to combat the foreign enemy and to achieve the unification of Rus' are powerfully reflected in the literature and painting of the time. A new vigour was to be observed in all areas of culture and social and political life.

Russian craftsmen were highly skilled makers of cannon and sabres, chain-mail and armour and many other things, some of which were sold abroad. It was said of the Tver craftsman Mikul Kreehenikov, a superb brass forner who made bells and cannon, that 'the like of him is not to be found even among the Germans'. Jewellers made vessels and censers, Gospel covers and reliquaries, all of which were of outstanding high artistic quality. The same may be said of filigree work, metal engraving and stamping, pottery and weaving, and the technology of building and siege-works. The cultural objects of the ferial republic of Novgorod attained a particularly high level. Then, as the Russian lands became united around Moscow, the leading role passed there, but other centres of applied craftsmanship and art also existed.

It was at this time that the famous cycle of traditional heroic poems, based on ancient models, was composed – the epic *bylina* about Kiev and its Prince, Vladimir Krasnoe Solnshko (a figure combining the features of two Grand Princes of Kiev and defenders of Rus' – St Vladimir (Vladimir I) and Vladimir Monomakh (Vladimir II) – and of other heroes – Ilya Muromets, Dobryny Nikitich and Alësha Popovich). In their poetic figures, the people sang the praises of those who in older times had waged the struggle against the Pechenegs, the Polovtsy and other raiders from the Steppes, and later against the Mongol-Tatars. Folk tales and songs celebrated the memory of the heroes of the battle of Kulikovo. The Novgorod *byliny* about Vasily Buslaev and Sadko, the wealthy gites, evoke for us the stormy and dramatic life of the 'Master the Great', Novgorod, and tell of his wealth and power.

In Novgorod and Pskov, Tver and Rostov, Vladimir and Suzdal, and in Moscow and other centres, chronicles and collections of chronicles were compiled. They tell with pain and distress of the violence and punitive expeditions of the men of the Horde and recon with pride the victories won against them by the people of Rus'. The Novgorod chronicles are distinguished by their democratic tone and their directness; those of Pskov by the precision with which they record the

struggle against the foreign aggressors; those of Moscow by their sublimity, elevated style and religious moralizing. The chronicles convey the ideas of patriotism, the unity of Rus' and the struggle for Orthodox Christianity. Their authors constantly recall the glorious and heroic past of the Russian land.

Chronicles were kept in all territories, in many towns and even in churches. Great significance was attached to them not only as sources of enlightenment but also politically. It was not without reason that Ivan III, the Grand Prince of Muscovy, in setting out on his campaign against Novgorod the Great (1471), took with him his verbe, Stepan Borodary, who 'could quote easily from the chronicles'; that is, he knew the chronicles well and like a skilful speaker used them on the instructions of the Great Prince and in the polemics with Novgorod separatists. This was very necessary for the ruler of Muscovy in order to enable him to expose the 'falsehoods' of the Novgorod authorities who inclined towards Lithuania and thus, in his estimation, were traitors to the general interests of Rus'.

The chronicles, particularly those of Muscovy, championed the interests of strong princely authority and its struggle, jointly with the Church, for the unification of Rus'. Rivalry between different centres – Moscow and Tver, Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan – in the struggle for political suzerainty is reflected in the differing standpoints adopted by the authors of the chronicles and in the contradictions between them, since they championed the necessity of gathering the lands into a single entity and of struggling against the Horde for independence.

Literature, in the form of stories and legends, which were often included in the chronicles and lives of the saints, perpetuated, like chronicling, the traditions of Kievan Rus' and asserted the interests of Rus' in its struggle for unity and in its opposition to alien domination. The cycle of writings about the battle of Kulikovo is imbued with lofty religious and patriotic sentiments. Their expressive and emotional style, their idealization of heroes and, at the same time, their national poetic themes are devoted to extolling the glorious victory over Mamay's Horde which, according to the authors of the stories and legends, resounded throughout Rus' and neighbouring countries.

An etiological and colourful style is characteristic of patriotic literature. The lives of St Stephen of Perm and St Sergius of Radonezh, written by Epiphanius the Wise, and other works of the same kind are in this style. They sing the praises of the life and miracles of the Russian saints and emphasize the role of Muscovy and of the power of its princes and the Church in the better ordering of the land.

The 'Legend of Peter and Fevronia', touching in its poetic simplicity, concerns the love of a prince for a peasant girl. It is similar in subject-matter to the story of the love of Tristan and Isolde, the lover being healed of a sickness brought on by the blood of the dragon he has slain. The 'Legend of Mercury of Smolensk' tells of a hero's struggle against the hordes of Batu Khan; the 'Legend of Peter, Prince of the Horde' is about the spiritual rebirth of a man (a Muslim dignity of the Horde, an 'infidel' in the eyes of Russian people of that time!) who embraced Christianity.

New tendencies appeared in social and political thinking. Ideas and currents of thought that were fundamentally reforming, rationalist and humanistic, similar to what could be found in Western and Central Europe, where the trend was, of course, more marked and more broadly based. Nevertheless, even those cultural phenomena that occurred

in Rus' give grounds for their being described by scholars as a 'pre-renaissance': but it was not, unfortunately, succeeded by a renaissance (Likhachëv, 1962). Thus, the sprouts of humanistic reformist thought have not achieved adequate development. There were no necessary conditions for the Renaissance, in its Western European meaning, in Rus'. Failing were economical conditions (development of industry, agriculture and towns), political conditions (parliamentary life, and so on), social conditions (appearance of the third estate), cultural and other conditions.

The religious form in which the leading Russian thinkers cast their works reflected, of course, the dominance of theology as the leading social ideology of that time. The reforming heretics (the so-called 'Strigol'niki' in Novgorod, Pskov and Tver) rejected ecclesiastical and monastic organization, the veneration of icons and crosses, the belief in the resurrection of the dead and life beyond the grave, the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus Christ. They spoke of the equality of peoples and beliefs. It is important to note that they were in favour of a 'cheap Church' – without priests with their venality and other sins. The shepherds of Christ's flock could and should, so they were convinced, be ordinary hymen.

The first experiments with a rationalist approach to religious problems sprang from common sense and everyday life. The same vital necessity required the accumulation of knowledge about natural phenomena. For example, records of solar and lunar eclipses, 'tailed' comets, violent storms and other things are to be found in the chronicles. The manuscript collections include information 'on the breadth and length of the earth', 'on the terrestrial order', 'on the movement of the moon' and other subjects, following the geocentric notions of that time. The chronicles contain descriptions of mass epidemics, plagues and so forth. The treatises of Galen were translated into Russian in the fifteenth century. In volumes of 'travels', Russians described all they had seen and heard in foreign lands. One particularly well-known work is that of Afanasy Nikitin, a merchant of Tver, who travelled to India and other countries.

The culture of Rus' in the period of feudal fragmentation naturally retained local characteristics, a fact which is clearly exemplified by the difference between the various schools of architecture, painting and so forth. Even at that time, however, general Russian features (interest focused on such events as the Kulikovo battle and others in different lands, similar methods of chronicle writing in various cultural centres, their common interest in the ancient Kievan heritage, and so on) were increasingly asserting themselves. The culture of the Russian people was in the making.

THE CULTURE OF RUSSIA (END OF THE FIFTEENTH-SIXTEENTH CENTURY)

With the formation of a single Russian State – Russia – culture developed within the framework of a great power.

The development of the economy, particularly agriculture and craft industries, towns, a money-based economy and the production of goods, on the one hand, and on the other, the worsening plight of the masses of the population, the reinforcement of serfdom as a means of development, and the strengthening of autocracy, created a very contradictory picture. Russian culture during that period developed in an equally contradictory manner. As in earlier centuries, it was

permeated by the ideology of the ruling class of feudal lords. There nevertheless existed within it elements of an anti-feudal ideology and of the ideas and opinions of the exploited lower orders.

In general, feudal culture, like the feudal system of socio-economic relations as a whole, was at this time in the ascendant phase of its development.

In the intellectual life of the sixteenth century, as in the period of the unification of the Russian State, one of the leading ideas remained that of the unity and independence of the Russian lands. An important place was occupied by problems to do with interrelationships with the culture of the European countries, links with which had earlier been severed or had barely survived and had been renewed and given a new lease of life. Russia began to receive foreign ambassadors and master craftsmen (for example the Italian architects Ridolfo 'Aristotle' Fioravanti, Marco Ruffo, Alevisio and others), books and ideas. In the second half, and more especially towards the end, of the century, young Russians went to acquire an education in European universities. The end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, and the period up to the mid-sixteenth century, were a time which saw the rapid spread of reformist and Humanist tendencies, to some extent reminiscent of what occurred in Western and Central Europe with the Humanism of the Renaissance.

The forms taken by development in Russia – the strengthening of State power and of the Church, the omnipotence of the feudal lords, the weakness of towns, and so forth, ultimately led to the stifling of reformist teachings and greater regimentation of intellectual life. But in spite of this, the demands of everyday life led to an increase in practical knowledge, a spread of building activity, the appearance of printed books, and achievements in painting and applied art. For this reason, the development of culture, fluctuating and full of contradictions as it may have been, was on a rising curve.

The development of material culture was marked by new achievements. This was exemplified in dozens of special skills in metal working, the mastery of the technique of salt-mining by means of bore-holes (up to two metres in depth), the casting of bells and guns (for example 'the Tsar Cannon' of Andrei Chokhov in the Moscow Kremlin, weighing 40 tons, at the end of the sixteenth century) and the striking of coinage in mints. Hundreds of silversmiths made their wares in Moscow, Novgorod (222 craftsmen) and Pskov, where the silversmiths' row in the market square comprised 140 stalls. Costly and beautiful weapons, valuable plate and regalia for the tsars were made in the Palace of Arms in Moscow.

Stone building developed widely throughout the country – the Kremlin (see Plates 44 and 45), Fortified City (Kinai-Gorod) and the White City (Byelyi Gorod) in Moscow, the Kremlins in Kalomna, Serpukhov, Avtrakhai, Kazan and other cities. The Smolensk Kremlin, built by Fedor Kon (Savel'ev) was dubbed 'the jewel of the Russian lands'.

Historical songs recount the capture of Kazan (1552) and the heroic defence of Pskov against Stephen Bathory, King of Poland (1581). They sing the praises of Ivan the Terrible for his struggle against the enemies from abroad and against his own boyars but censure him for his cruelty (the executions and massacres carried out by his personal bodyguard, Oprichnina, the killing of his son Ivan). Yermak Timofeevich is celebrated in song as a national hero, the protector of the destitute, the conqueror of the Siberian khanate.

Throughout the country a large number of manuscript books were written and copied. As early as the end of the

fifteenth century an attempt was made by the master printer of Lübeck, Bartholomew Gribhan, to introduce the printing of books into Russia. In the middle of the following century, book-printing became firmly established thanks to the efforts of Ivan Fedorov and his pupils and associates. The appearance of the *Book of the Apostles* (1564) is regarded as the official beginning of Russian book-printing, although as early as 1553 a number of books had appeared from the so-called 'anonymous' press, that is without any indication of the place or year of publication. This was an event of crucial significance and a watershed in Russian cultural history. By the end of the century the Moscow press had published a score or so of books on a variety of subjects. Ivan Fedorov himself went to Lithuania and the Ukraine where he printed books in Zabludov and Lvov.

Historical information was preserved and amplified in the chronicles. It was during this century that large and sometimes grandiose codices of chronicles were compiled in Moscow, for example the Vologodsko-Permsky, the Voskresensky, the Nikonovsky codices and others. They included earlier codices going right back to the Chronicle of Bygone Years of the early twelfth century, and many stories, tales and other sources. One such enormous composition – the Nikonovsky Chronicle – is the basis of the 'Illustrated Codex' which contains more than 16,000 miniatures. These illustrations open up for the reader a 'window on the past' of the Russian lands, from the most ancient times to the middle of the sixteenth century.

New kinds of historical narrative appeared. In the *Book of Degrees of the Genealogy of the Tsars*, Russian history was set out not year-by-year, as in the chronicles, but by the reigns of the Grand Princes and the Tsar Ivan the Terrible (by 'degrees', hence the title of the compilation). The 'Kazan Chronicle' or the 'Kazan History' tells of the Kazan Khanate and its conquest by the same ruler. It is, properly speaking, not a chronicle but a tale.

'The story of the Coming of Stephen Bathory to the Town of Pskov', relates, in an elevated and rhetorical manner, the courage of the Russian warriors protecting Pskov from the foreigners and condemns Prince Andrei Kurbitsky who had fled to Lithuania. It was Kurbitsky who wrote 'The Story of a Grand Prince of Muscovy' in which he condemns the despotism and cruelty of Tsar Ivan and justifies his own conduct; he favours the joint rule of the Tsar and of the Wise boyar counsellors. In this work he writes as the adversary of Ivan the Terrible, as in his famous letters to him. He criticizes the monarch, the official Church and the senior members of the hierarchy, defends the 'nesvyazhnye' (non-possessors), the opponents of monastic and ecclesiastical landowning and extortion. This aristocratic boyar, who had been both in Muscovy and in Lithuania, found himself, like many other public figures of the time, at the centre of social and political dissensions. They had begun, in any event, long before his day.

At the end of the sixteenth century there was another resurgence of the reform movement. Heretics, who were referred to as 'zhidovskiyushchiklye' (from a derogatory term for 'Jew', since at that time ideas of reform were being brought to Rus' by Jewish merchants from Lithuania), again began to criticize the official Church and its dogmas – the triune nature of God, and so forth, the veneration of icons and of the relics of saints – and to reject the ritual and hierarchy of the Church and to denounce its greed. It was from such positions that free-thinkers approached the explanation of natural phenomena. Thus, they mocked the affirmations of

their Orthodox opponents, the likes of Iosif Volotsky, the former Superior of the Iosfo-Volokolamsky Monastery, and his followers, known as the 'iosiflyane' (possessors), about the 'end of the world' in the year 7000 by the Byzantine calendar, or 1492 according to the Gregorian calendar. The heretics tried not to be right and the churchmen put forward new, often unconvincing, explanations.

The heretic-reformers were not, of course, opposed to religion or to the Church as such, but rather to its sins, and were in favour of the 'true' ideals of Christianity. The realization of their ideas would in fact have led to a reformation, to the acceptance of scientific knowledge and a more rationalistic approach to the explanation of nature and society. The authorities, however, both spiritual and civilian, suppressed this movement and the Synod condemned the heretics, many of whom were burned at the stake or ended their days in prison; others were exiled or fled abroad.

The same reaction occurred in the mid-fifteenth century when the reform movement reached its height. It comprised a variety of tendencies, both moderate and radical. One representative of the former was Marver Bashkin, a middle-ranking nobleman who had given his serfs their freedom; among the latter was Fedosy Kosoi, himself a serf, who, like Thomas Münzer in Germany, preached the equality of all people, nations and creeds, the common ownership of property and the non-recognition of authorities. Kosoi and his supporters tried to put their utopian-communist ideals into practice within a communist community which they had set up.

The free-thinkers were arrested and tried and some of them were executed or exiled. Others, including Fedosy Kosoi and his disciples, fled to Lithuania and continued their work, influencing the spread there of reformist ideas.

These ends were also served by measures to codify the ideology of the power of the Grand Princes of Muscovy. The 'Legend of the Princes of Vladimir', composed in the early sixteenth century, traces the genealogy of the rulers of Muscovy back to the Roman emperor Augustus. The monk Philotheus of Pskov, in his letters to Basil III (1510–11), reverted to the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome; the centres of Christianity were initially Rome, then Constantinople; then, after the first two had declined (because of their falling away from 'true Christianity'), they were replaced by Moscow which had been 'chosen by God'; and 'a fourth Rome there will not be'. The 'Tale of the White Klobuk' (the Klobuk being the head-gear of an Orthodox monk, in the form of a high cylindrical cap draped with a cloth) sees the 'Third Rome' not in Moscow but in Novgorod the Great.

The middle and second half of the sixteenth century saw a sharpening of the struggle between an increasingly powerful autocracy and the princely boyar opposition. Initially, in the circumstances of the Moscow uprising of 1547 and the reforms of the late 1540s and the 1550s the Tsar and the feudal aristocracy conducted a policy of compromise. Sylvester, the Archpriest of the Cathedral of the Annunciation in the Kremlin, the Tsar's confessor, called in a letter to him for wise and moderate government supported by the Church. I. S. Peresvetov persuaded the Tsar to rely on the military power of the nobles; he was in favour of strong government, of a centralized monarchy supported by the nobility, and of check on the arbitrary behaviour of high officials.

The circle of Metropolitan Makary put forward a militant churchmen's ideology. The writings of this circle extolled the Church and its saints. First among them was 'Velikie

Cher'i-Mnei', a large compendium of lives of the saints. Tsar Ivan the Terrible himself in his letters to Kurbsky in Lithuania (1560s to 1570s) justified the unlimited and unfettered power of the Muscovy autocrat on the basis of the same 'ossilyane' ideology. The Prince, in reply, criticized the Tsar for his oppression of the nobility, and for the executions and banishments, and asserted the old feudal right of a vassal to leave one suzerain for another.

In the second half of the century, against the background of the hardships of the Livonian war, the repressive activities of the Oprichnina, the general devastation of the country, and the persecution waged by the tsarist autocracy and the Church, social and political thought, and a *afanini* any current of opposition, was gradually stifled.

Russian architecture, under a strong unitary State, experienced another revival. It is indicative of this revival that at the end of the fifteenth century many old places of worship in Moscow, Vladimir and Yar'sev Pol'sky were restored. Many new buildings were built and the architecture of Moscow came to the fore. A general Russian style came into existence which was a blend of features of the architecture of Moscow and Vladimir, Pskov and Novgorod.

In Moscow the entire group of buildings in the Kremlin – towers, cathedrals, the Faceted Palace (Granovitaya Palata) – was redesigned or rebuilt (see Plates 44 and 45). Together with Russian craftsmen, a major role in this was played by Italian architects – Aristotle Fioravanti from Bologna, Pietro Antonio Solari, Marco Ruffo, Anton Fryazin and Alevisio Novy. They built new fortresses and kremlins in Ivanogorod, on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, in Nizhny Novgorod and Tula, Koloma and Zaraysk, Serpukhov and other towns; towers and walls in the kremlins of Novgorod and Pskov, in the Trinity Sergius and the Solovetsky, the Simonov and the Pafnut'ev-Borovsky, the Kirillo-Belozersky and other monasteries.

A large number of cathedrals and churches sprang up. Some of them were monumental memorial shrines (for example the Church of the Ascension in the village of Kolomenskoe, 1532; the Cathedral of the Intercession or Cathedral of St Basil (see Plate 46), built to celebrate the victory over Kazan, 1555–61; the large cathedrals in Vologda, in the Trinity Sergius Monastery, in Rostov the Great, in the village of Vyazemai in the Moscow region, the Monastery of the Don in Moscow itself and so forth). Others, a fairly large number, were suburban and monastery churches, small in size and very intimate (see Plate 47).

The painting of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century produced the remarkable works of Dionysius (1440 or 1450 to after 1519) and his school. The frescoes of the Cathedral of the Assumption in the Moscow Kremlin and the Churches of the Nativity of the Virgin in the Ferapontov Monastery (others have not survived; Dionysius also worked in the Pafnut'ev-Borovsky and Iosifo-Volokolamsky Monasteries) and the icons are strikingly colourful and festive, decorative and accomplished. However, they do not have the powerful inspiration which characterizes the frescoes and icons of Feofan Grek (Theophanes the Greek) and Andrei Rubl'ev. Rather than man's inner spirituality, these paintings give pride of place to outward beauty, sumptuousness and conformity. These features, which were characteristic of the culture and psychology of people in the age of the rise of autocracy in Russia, were to become still more marked during the next two centuries. The frescoes of the Cathedral of the Annunciation in the Moscow Kremlin, executed under the direction of Theodosius, the son of Dionysius, fully reflect

the official ideology – the ideas of the historical continuity of the power of the rulers of Muscovy. The same ideas are also exemplified in paintings in the churches of other Russian towns (see Plates 48–51).

'The Church Militant', the Moscow icon of the mid-sixteenth century, glorifies Ivan IV as the conqueror of Kazan and glorifies the Russian army and the Church. In the icons of the so-called 'Stroganov school' (the Moscow masters, Procopius Chirin, the Savin family and others, also painted icons for their patrons, the Stroganovs, who were well-known entrepreneurs) what stands out is the technique of painting, which is of a very fine 'jewel-like' quality. It subsequently exercised a strong influence on the art of the painters of Palekh.

The icons painted by the commercial icon-painters of Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod and the northern provinces began increasingly to be concerned with temporal and everyday subjects – real objects and landscape; they might include monastery walls and towers; the Virgin resembles a Russian peasant woman; the depiction of religious figures is full of psychological significance.

A high degree of perfection was attained by miniature book illustrations (the Gospels, the 'Illustrated Codex' (Litsevoi svod), 'The Life of St Sergius of Radonezh', and so forth) and by engravings in books, artistic needlework (the workshop of the princes of the Staritsky family, and that of Kseny Godunov), popular and church music (plain chant, or ceremonial and polyphonic singing), the buffoon theatre and the Petrushka puppet theatre.

CULTURE DURING THE FIRST ROMANOV PERIOD (SEVENTEENTH CENTURY)

The culture of Russia in the sixteenth century, developing as it did in difficult circumstances, became the foundation on which the cultural edifice of the seventeenth century was built. During this century, major developments took place in all fields. Agricultural production spread to new regions – southern Russia and the Volga, the Urals and Siberia. Craft activity turned overwhelmingly into the small-scale production of goods. Dozens of manufactories appeared. There was an increase in the use of hired labour. A trade network began to cover the whole country (the beginning of the formation of an all-Russian market, which was completed later after the introduction of a capitalist system). The appearance of embryonic bourgeois relationships in the country's economy (for example, the emergence of manufactories, the application of free-lire system of labour) dates from this time.

On the domestic political scene, there began the change from a limited monarchy which recognized the representation of the estates of the realm – which had come into existence under Ivan the Terrible in the mid-sixteenth century (at which time the *zemskie sobory* (assemblies of the land), the body through which the estates were represented, had come into existence) – to absolute monarchy. The *zemskie sobory* disappeared, the Boyars' Duma declined in importance and there was a significant increase in the role of the bureaucracy in government. The power of the monarch grew still further and became absolute. At the same time, there was an increase in the influence of the feudal lords – particularly their middle and lower ranks – of the Russian nobility, and the dependence on them of the lower social orders became even more firmly

established (the legal code of 1649 – *Ulozhenie Sobora* – which definitely bound the privately owned peasants, increase in the burden of taxation, and so forth).

The turbulent events of the seventeenth century (the foreign intervention in the early part of the century, the massive popular movements – the peasant wars, the urban uprisings, the schism in the Russian Church, the protests of non-Russian peoples against social and national oppression) involved large masses of people and made them direct participants in the historical process. The towns and their merchants and craftsmen played a larger part in economic and political life. Democratic elements in the population became involved to an ever-increasing degree in creative intellectual and cultural activity. This, together with the incipient decline in the role of the Church and in the absolute domination of its ideology, signalled the beginning of the secularization of culture, of national consciousness and of the spirituality of man himself. This was, of course, only a beginning, the embryo of the secular outlook and of rationalism and realism (in scientific knowledge, literature, art, and so forth) which, replacing the incontrovertible primacy of religion and the Church, was to develop so spectacularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

During this century, the Russian people made still further progress in the art of working in metals and wood, in building with stone, in jewellery and in other crafts and art forms. Water-powered machinery was used; in 1613 the first rifled gun-barrel was made.

Among the people, proverbs and sayings (many of which have survived to our own day), *byliny* and tales, legends and songs were widely popular. During the years of Sienka Razin's uprising the compilation began of a song cycle about the daring Cossack chieftain and his 'children'. The rate of literacy rose (among the landowners to 63 per cent, merchants 96 per cent, craftsmen about 40 per cent and peasants 13 per cent, according to the data given by a well-known Russian linguist, Academician A. I. Sobolevsky). The nobility possessed libraries containing hundreds of volumes. The printing press in Moscow published hundreds of thousands of copies of alphabet books and other educational materials such as *Psalters*, *Books of Hours*, calendars, grammars and multiplication tables. Schools sprang up, generally attached to monasteries. In 1687 the Slavo-Greek-Latin Academy was opened, headed by two Greek scholars, the Likhud brothers. It had a broad curriculum and accepted people 'of every rank, estate and age'.

Scientific knowledge became more widespread. *The rules of martial, artillery and other matters relating to military science* (1615, compiled by Anisim Mikhailov, who made use of L. Fronsperger's *Military science* published in the mid-sixteenth century in Frankfurt am Main and other material) gives information on geometry and mechanics, physics and chemistry. Translations of medical handbooks – books of home cures, herbals – contained data about the characteristics of plants, minerals, remedies for illness. The book *Selenographia* by the Danzig astronomer Hevelius, translated into Russian in mid-century, expounded the heliocentric system of Copernicus.

Maps of Russia – its European part, and Siberia were published (*Large Atlas*, 1627, *Atlas of Siberia* by S. V. Remezov at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, and others). The Siberian territories, from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, were described in the reports of Russian explorers (Poyarkov, Dezhnev, Khabarov, Atlasov, and others). The dispatches of Russian ambassadors

are full of information about foreign countries. The Cossack, Ivan Pedin, wrote his 'Description of the State of China' after his journey to Beijing (1618–19); Nikolai Siafary-Milescu, a Moldavian boyar in Russian service, who travelled to China in 1675, wrote what was at that time the most detailed account of China. In 1637 a translation was made in the Foreign Office (*Posol'sky prikaz*) of the *Cosmography or a description of the whole world* by Gerardus Mercator; in the middle of the century, the six-volume atlas of Willem and Johann Blaeu *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum sive Atlas Novus* became known.

Russian seekers after knowledge found historical information in the same chronicles and surveys of world history as had been preserved and copied in the libraries of tsars, high officials and monasteries. They were also in the possession of the common people right down to craftsmen and minor officials. New chronicles were compiled in the reign of Michael Romanov (Tsar Michael I) and his father, the Patriarch Philaret ('The new chronicler' and others), under the Patriarch Nikon (the codex of 1652), the Princess Regent Sophia (the codex of 1686) and Peter I (the chronicles of the 1690s and the beginning of the next century). Many stories and tales appeared about the 'Time of Troubles' of the early seventeenth century, which stirred the imagination of contemporaries and those who came after them. Their authors were the scribe I. Toseev and the monk A. Palitsyn, the noble princes I. A. Khvorostinin and I. M. Katyrev-Rostovsky, and many others, often anonymous. Describing the stormy and tragic events of the 'great destruction of Moscow', they spoke, in connection with its causes, not only about divine providence and the punishment of God for the sins of the Russian people, from the sovereigns right down to the commoners, but also about their iniquitous actions. They condemned the executions, the authority based on force wielded by the wealthy, and the 'insane silence of the world'.

The socio-political thinking reflected in these and other works continued to be based on a religious outlook. But through it there began to appear the first manifestations of something new – the beginnings of a secular attitude of mind, an interest in the human personality, in people's thoughts and actions, and in social life. Yuri Krizhanich, a Croat, who had come to Russia to correct religious service books, put forward a whole programme of transformations for the development of trade and industry. A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin, the 'Chancellor' (as foreigners called him), did the same in the 1660s and early 1670s. Their plans came to nothing, but ideas within them are reminiscent of the subsequent projects and actions of Peter the Great at the time of his reforms of the end of seventeenth and during the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

The clearest signs of secularization, the strengthening of democratic and secular principles, appeared in literature and art. Satirical stories boldly and sharply criticized social failings – drunkenness and gluttony, the hypocrisy and greed of the clergy, unjust judges, the arrogance of the nobility ('The tale of the chicken and the fox', 'The story of the reveller', 'The unjust trial', 'Serving in a tavern', 'The petition of Kalyazin', 'Alphabet book about a naked man of modest means', and others). 'The story of Foma and Erema' makes fun of two feckless children of the nobility; 'The story of Frol Skobeev', on the other hand, recounts in sympathetic vein the doings of a cunning and knavish nobleman who tricks an old noble boyar. Increasing attention was paid in such works to the inner world of simple people, their spiritual and also their amorous experiences. They contain many sketches of

everyday existence, scenes from the life of merchants, soldiers, noblemen and so forth, and moralistic reflections. Wide use is made in them of creations of the popular imagination – stories, proverbs, humorous tales and parody. Elements of popular speech are reflected in the autobiography of the Archpriest Avvakum, one of the outstanding leaders of the schism in the Russian Church, and in the Cossack tales about the capture of Azov and its defence against the Turks (1635–42).

The work of Simeon of Polotsk, Sylvester Medvedev and Ration Istomlin marked the appearance of syllabic versification. The use of intricate language, allegory and polished and complex verse, even forming rebuses and cryptograms, were all characteristic features of the literary 'baroque' style during the second half of the century.

In architecture there was a noticeably increased tendency towards elegance and gaiety, ostentation and intricate workmanship and external decoration. This applied equally to wooden structures ('the eighth wonder of the world' the Tsar's palace in the village of Kolomenskoye near Moscow (see Figure 18), 1667–81, numerous churches in the north, and so on), and to stone structures with their fantastic patterning, their elegance, their beautiful tiles and plasterwork (the Teremnoi Palace in the Moscow Kremlin, 1635–6; the churches in Medvednikov to the north of Moscow, the Moscow Church of the Nativity of the Virgin in Putinki (see Plate 32), the Church of the Holy Trinity in the Nikitinki district, and so forth). The attempts of Patriarch Nikon to make religious buildings more severe and monumental in appearance (the five-domed churches which were built in Moscow and in other towns) could not stop the tendency of patrons and builders to increased secularization – the adoption

of a decorated, colourful and picturesque style. There are ecclesiastical and secular buildings in this style in Moscow, Yaroslavl, Suzdal, Ryazan, Kaluga, Ustyug Veliky and other towns and settlements. Outstanding examples are the churches in Ostankino, Khamovniki, Fili and others near Moscow (now within the town boundary), the Church of St John the Baptist in Yaroslavl, and many others.

A similar style, which became known as the 'Moscow baroque' or the 'Naryshkin baroque' (after the Naryshkin family who were relatives of Peter I on his mother's side for whom the 'Naryshkin Palaces' on the Petrovka in the centre of the capital, as well as churches, were built in the same style) was also reflected in the sculpture and carving with which places of worship and the houses of the nobility were richly decorated.

The same process of secularization was apparent in painting – frescoes, icons and miniatures. They increasingly depicted secular subjects, enjoyment of life, genre scenes and an interest in psychology. In 1671 Vladimir, the Tsar's painter in the second half of the century, a colleague and friend of the celebrated Simon Ushakov, wrote a treatise in which he attacked the old conservative canons in painting. He declared himself a convinced adherent of realism and of individualization in the portrayal of characters from the Bible and the Gospels.

Russian painters did, of course, make use of the old traditions, having recourse to abstraction and allegory in depicting and interpreting subjects from the scriptures. An illustrative style, representation of the externals of the actions and behaviour of characters, and images without depth tended to predominate in the painting both of frescoes and of icons. New elements nevertheless began to appear



Figure 18 Wooden palace in the village of Kolomenskoye (now in Moscow), Russia, 1677–81 (Courtesy of V. I. Buganov).

with increasing clarity, such as a more accurate, realistic and three-dimensional representation of space, the techniques of *diastereo* and the individualization of forms. Such features are characteristic of the works of Simon Ushakov (1626–86). *The Survivor not of human making*, 1637; *The Spread of the law of the Russian State*, 1638 (a representation of the rulers of Muscovy from Ivan Kalita to Aleksei Mikhailovich – Tsar Alexis); portraits of Tsar Alexis; *Trinity*, 1671; the allegories *Peace and Strife*, executed in the spirit of Western European engravings, and so forth. The traditions of Ushakov (a tendency towards realism and ‘corporeal’ representation) were developed in the latter part of the century by his pupils.

An outstanding place in the history of painting was occupied by the Yaroslavl and Kostroma artists, Gury Nikitin, Dmitry Plekhanov and others. It was they who painted the frescoes in the Church of St John the Baptist in Yaroslavl, in the cathedral in the Ipat'evsky Monastery in Kostroma and elsewhere, the bright pictorial qualities and liveliness of which form a real ‘feast of colours’.

The art of portraiture began to develop, initially in the icon-painting manner (the representation of the Tsar Ivan the Terrible and Prince M. V. Skopin Shuisky at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, and in the second quarter of the seventeenth century), then in a more realistic spirit (the portraits of Tsar Alexis and his son Fedor, 1670s to 1680s).

The end of the reign of Tsar Alexis, the father of Peter I, was marked by yet another innovation. Pastor I. G. Gregori, living in the so-called German Settlement (Nemetskaya sloboda) in Moscow where he had as neighbours many skilled craftsmen and military experts from Western Europe, created a theatrical troupe of sixty players who performed at Court. He organized the troupe (on the instructions of the enlightened boyar A. S. Matveev, the chief courtier) in the village of Preobrazhenskoe. The first performance, which took place on 17 October 1672, celebrated the birth of the long-awaited heir, Peter, the future Emperor of all Russia. Plays were performed on biblical themes – *Judith* and others – and also on secular subjects – *The comedy of Balthus and Venus* and *The comedy of Tamburlaine and Bajazet*. Four years after the death of Tsar Alexis, the theatre was closed by the Patriarch Ioakim, a believer in the old pieties, who detested all things foreign and who finally had his own way.

Thus, in the struggle between the old and the new, Russian culture at the beginning of the new age gathered strength and was enriched by features which were to assert themselves with full force during the succeeding century. The westernization of Russia, so evident under Peter I and his successors, had begun, although on a very modest scale, during the seventeenth century. Even then, however, as later, national sources and the development and enrichment of intrinsically Russian elements in the various aspects of Russian culture, remained the principal feature.

FROM PETER I TO CATHERINE II

Russia's backwardness, as compared with the leading countries of Europe – both culturally and in terms of its economy and its political and social structures – remained as before, a most important and extremely acute problem. Peter himself was well aware of this, as, indeed, his predecessors had been to some extent. It was not without reason that his grandfather, his father and his brother had sent for foreign specialists in manufacturing, warfare, and the

teaching of science and the arts to the young, as well as for translators and diplomats. They did not always serve the immediate purpose for which they had been recruited. Many of them, however, gave true and faithful service to Russia and by the end of the century, and more particularly in the century that followed, there were cultural contacts with the West on a far greater scale.

Peter's reforms – which also had an impact on culture – and the subsequent development of Russia played a major role in the process, already begun, of overcoming the country's backwardness. The rapid growth of industry (some 200 manufactories at the end of Peter I's reign, over 600 in the 1760s and over 2000 by the end of the century) brought Russia into the ranks of the industrially developed countries. For example, Russia became the world leader in iron-smelting. The sails of English, Dutch and other foreign ships were made of Russian canvas. A leading place in industrial production was occupied by the Urals, an important mining region with scores of enterprises. The output of metalworks, armaments factories, textile mills, shipyards and other factories and workshops in the Urals and in Tula, in Moscow and in St Petersburg, in Kazan and other centres, was high by the standards of the time. Technology improved and greater use was made of hired labour. At the same time, however – and the more remote the area, the truer it was – there was an increase in the employment of bonded labour in manufactories, with serfs and peasants being assigned to particular enterprises. This system, which had initially been conducive to the advance of industrialization, as, for example, in the Urals, had by the following century already become a cause of serious industrial backwardness as compared with England, the United States and other countries which had embarked on a path of rapid capitalist development.

As before, however, it was the feudal and serf-owning form of organization that predominated. The position of the nobility was still further strengthened. The institution of serfdom, under which the majority of the peasantry lived, reached its apogee with a series of laws in the 1760s (serfs were forbidden to make complaints about the landowners and landowners acquired the right to send serfs as recruits to the army at any time and to exile them to Siberia ‘for disobedience’) which reduced the peasants almost to the status of slaves. Absolutism, which finally became established in the eighteenth century, meant the open dictatorship of the nobility and the brutal suppression of all resistance to it among the lower social orders. During the century there were two peasant wars (1707–10 and 1773–5) and a larger number of revolts and uprisings among peasants of various categories (privately-owned, owned by the monasteries, the palace, the State) and among the urban poor, working people and Cossacks, soldiers and ‘*morodtsy*’ (as the non-Russian people of the Volga region, Kazakhstan, Siberia and other regions were known).

Russia in the eighteenth century, from the time of Peter I, was a great power and an empire. With its military might, reinforced by victories in the Northern War (1700–21) and in wars with Prussia and Turkey, Sweden and France in the second half of the century, it was a force to be reckoned with in Europe and in other continents. It recaptured ancient Russian lands (what was known at that time as the right-bank Ukraine, Byelorussia, and certain provinces on the Baltic and the Black Sea). The country obtained outlets to the Baltic and the Black Sea as well as to the Pacific Ocean.

The temporal authorities finally imposed their will on the Church. Peter I abolished the Patriarchate and in its place

introduced the Synod, a collegiate bureaucratic body for the governance of church affairs, a kind of spiritual college along the lines of other colleges which were the precursors of the ministries of the nineteenth century. He himself made a start on the secularization of the lands owned by the spiritual pastors and Catherine II carried this process to its conclusion (1764).

The great changes in economic and political life were accompanied by equally momentous transformations in culture.

The beginning of the century was marked by innovations which Tsar Peter announced one after the other. The New Year was to begin not on 1 September, as previously, but on 1 January; instead of the Byzantine calendar, beginning at the 'creation of the world', the Gregorian calendar was introduced, reckoned from the birth of Jesus Christ. The secular Russian script was introduced to replace Church Slavonic. A printed newspaper appeared, 'The News', as well as numerous printed books concerned with various branches of knowledge. Schools were opened for mathematics, marine navigation and so forth. Scientific expeditions were fitted out. Not long before his death, Peter was considering a draft decree on the Academy of Sciences, which was founded in 1725. Court and private balls were introduced, with all kinds of etiquette, dances and new, shorter and more comfortable styles of dress, based on Hungarian and Polish models.

Such innovations became part of everyday life and served to get rid of what was old and outmoded, promoting the adoption of progressive customs and modern knowledge, and encouraging the development of the economy, culture and science. There were, it is true, people who did not take to some of the innovations. For example, peasants and

merchants did not agree to shaving off their beards and had to pay a tax for the right to retain this ancient Russian adornment. Passions raged over the reforms. Some people warmly welcomed them whereas others criticized them and even execrated the Tsar as the 'Antichrist' Fëdor Saltykov, who had been to England, delivered two memoranda to the Tsar in which he urged him to borrow from that and other European countries whatever 'befits an autocracy, but not such as befits republics or a parliament'. There were also other supporters of the europeanization of Russia. Peter himself was taking that path while not, of course, rejecting out of hand everything that was Russian.

Theophan Prokopovich, V. N. Tatishchev, A. D. Kantemir and other enlightened officials of the first half of the century urged – namely, from the standpoint of the nobility – a monarchic form of government and the development of industry and commerce, and exposed the failings of society, including those of the nobility and of church circles. Prince M. M. Shcherbatov spoke out in defence of the interests of the aristocracy, and the simple customs of his forebears, and described and condemned the luxurious living, embezzlement, arbitrariness and favouritism of the Court of Catherine II. The Empress herself, while supposedly upholding the ideas of the French philosophers (Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and others), was a firm supporter of serfdom and of autocracy.

M. V. Lomonosov, the great scientist and educator, argued that schools should be open to people of all estates and that education should be given to the peasants (he was himself of peasant origin) (see Figure 19).

In his odes and other literary works he extolled not only wise rulers, foremost among them being Peter I, and their deeds but also the labour of simple and honest people. The excesses of serfdom were condemned by the son of a soldier,



Figure 19 Early eighteenth-century school engraving, Russia (from the primer by F. Polakarpov) (Courtesy of V. I. Buganov).

A. Ya. Polenov, by the Livonian pastor J.-G. Eisen and, in the Legislative Commission (Ulozennaja komissia) of 1767-8, by the noblemen G. S. Koroh'in and Ya. P. Kozel'sky and the peasants I. Chuprov and I. Zherebisov and others.

A major role was played by the Russian educators N. I. Novikov, I. G. Tiuman'sky and others, who translated and published over 400 articles from the celebrated French *Encyclopédie*, and a multitude of sources and works on Russian history. Novikov's periodicals *The Dove* and *The Bunter* entered into a public polemic with Catherine II herself. The current of enlightenment included a revolutionary tendency among the nobility in the person of A. N. Radishevsky, the author of the *Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow*, and his followers. Radishevsky vividly described the horrors of serfdom and called for its overthrow by revolutionary force. He had an undeniable influence on the future Decembrists.

Education and science, literature and art made great strides. Dozens of schools opened in the reign of Peter I and even more in subsequent years. By the start of the nineteenth century there were already 350 teaching establishments with 62,000 students in Russia. The country nevertheless still lagged far behind the most advanced countries and there were for example at that time (1794) as many as 8,000 schools in France.

Universities appeared: the Academy (1725), Moscow University (1755, founded on the initiative of Lomonosov; unlike all other universities in the world it did not have a faculty of divinity) (see Plate 33), the University of Vilnius (active from the 1780s onwards and formally established as a university in 1803). In 1757, the Academy of Arts was founded which later (in 1783) became the Russian Academy.

During the century, these schools and universities provided education for a substantial number of specialists and scholars. Foreign scholars also worked in Russia, in many cases to very good effect, such as the mathematician L. Euler, the historian G. F. Müller, and the philologist A. L. Schlözer, among others.

Even in the reign of Peter I, a great deal of scientific work was conducted on the study, description and mapping of lands and seas. I. K. Kirillov, on the basis of the discoveries that had been made, compiled the *Atlas of the Russian Empire*. Under the first Russian Emperor, the *History of the Swedish War* (that is the Northern War against Sweden) was written. Peter himself shared in this task together with his closest associates, Menshikov, Sheremetev, Makarov and others.

Among Russian scholars of the eighteenth century, the gigantic figure of the encyclopaedist Mikhail Vasil'evich Lomonosov, physicist and chemist, astronomer and geologist, historian and linguist, poet and artist, towers above the rest. He was the founder of Moscow University and it was said that 'he himself was our first university' (Pushkin).

In the second quarter and the second half of the century other eminent Russian scholars were active, for example the mineralogist V. M. Severgin, the naturalists, travellers and ethnographers S. P. Krasheninnikov (*Description of the Land of the Kamchatka*), S. I. Chelyuskin, the Laptev brothers, I. I. Lepekhin, the historians V. N. Tatishchev, M. M. Schcherbatov, I. N. Boltin and others. Five expeditions from the Academy of Sciences in the 1760s and 1770s investigated vast tracts of the European and Asian parts of the Russian Empire.

Literature was far more influential and widely available than in the seventeenth century thanks to the enormous increase in creative writing, the influence of the West and the spread of printing. Theophan Prokopovich, who has already been mentioned, had a library of 30,000 books. Other noblemen

also had substantial book collections. Printed books ceased to be a remarkable rarity and became part of everyday life.

In the second half of the century literary periodicals first appeared. Russian writers of that time wrote satires and odes, tragedies and comedies in the classical style (Kantemir, Trediakovsky, Lomonosov, Sumarokov, Khramkov and others) with its characteristic elevation and nobility. At the end of the century its place was taken by sentimentalism (the sentimental stories and novels of Karanazin) which gave considerable attention to the feelings and experiences of common people. At the same time, realistic tendencies appeared in literature with the comedies of D. I. Fonvizin (*The Brigadier*, *The Minor*) and the poetry of G. R. Derzhavin.

The eighteenth century was a period of extensive and energetic building activity. In Peter's reign, St Petersburg was laid out as a 'regular city'. D. Trezzini, an Italian, designed the Cathedral of the Fortress of St Peter and St Paul, college buildings, the Arcades (Gostiny Dvor), the Monastery of St Alexander Nevsky, and so forth. Other architects were also at work such as Schliuter, Le Blond, Michetti and others. They built palaces in St Petersburg and its suburbs, as well as institutional buildings. Russian architects were later involved in this task, for example Zemtsov and Isakov, Usov and Eroshkin, Korobov and Ustinov. Tens of thousands of Russian workmen built St Petersburg - 'The Russian Palmyra' - one of the most beautiful cities in the world.

New buildings in the baroque style went up in Moscow at the beginning of the century (the Church of St John the Warrior in Little Yakimanka Street, the Church of the Archangel Gabriel in Christie Pindy Boulevard or the Menshikov Tower, and so forth). In the provinces, little was built during Peter's reign (his main preoccupation being St Petersburg!) but such buildings as were put up imitated those in the new and old capital cities.

In the second half of the century classicism was the dominant architectural style (the Palaces of St Petersburg and Moscow designed by V. I. Bazhenov, A. D. Zakharov, A. N. Voronikhin, G. Cameron, D. Quarenghi and many others). Particularly worthy of mention are the house of P. E. Pashkov built by Bazhenov, the Senate House in the Moscow Kremlin (M. F. Kazakov), the Tauride Palace in St Petersburg (I. E. Starov), and so forth. Many of Rastrelli's buildings are in the baroque style (the Winter Palace, the Cathedral of the Smolny Monastery in St Petersburg, St Andrew's Church in Kiev, and others) (see Plate 34).

The best known sculptor of the first half of the century was C. B. Rastrelli the elder (the bronze bust of Peter I and other works); and in the second half of the century, F. G. Gordeyev and other classicists. The monument to Peter I, the celebrated Bronze Horseman, by E. M. Falconet, became a symbol of the power and greatness of Russia and of Peter's genius. Realistic portraits of contemporaries were painted by F. I. Shubin, who came from the same district as Lomonosov.

In the art of Peter's times, the portrait painters I. and R. Nikitin and A. Matveyev stood out most. Working in a realistic and secular style, they painted portraits of the Tsar and his comrades-in-arms. Secular etchings made their appearance. Classicism in painting later produced interesting work on historical themes (A. P. Losenko, *Vladimir and Rogneda*, *The farewell of Hector and Andromache*; G. I. Ugrymov, *The trial of force of Yuri Usmar* and others). They also showed the influence of sentimentalism (pastoral scenes of peasant life, M. M. Ivanov; the landscapes of S. F. Shchedrin, the portraits of V. L. Borovikovsky). Outstandingly realistic works were produced by the portraitists F. S. Rokotov and

D. G. Levitsky, the masters of genre painting I. A. Ermenev and M. Shibanov (scenes of peasant life, beggars, and the like).

Although the Church had a definite and by no means insignificant influence on many aspects of social and intellectual life, the eighteenth century is, on the whole, characterized by the victory of non-religious principles, secularization and rationalism. This is the time at which one can say that both the natural and the social sciences were born. For particular historical reasons, the process whereby historical, applied and other knowledge became the historical, physical, chemical and other sciences occurred in Russia later than in other, more developed countries of Western and Central Europe. The same may be said of secular literature, painting, sculpture, and so forth. It was nevertheless precisely at this time that Russia, its creative artists and leading cultural figures did a great deal which makes it possible to regard their work as forming a watershed and as marking a stage at which Russian culture took on a new quality. They were able in some degree to narrow the yawning gulf between the development of Russian culture and that of the Western countries, a gulf which had grown wider over the centuries since the time of the Mongol-Tatar invasion. The groundwork for the achievements of the age of Peter I and Catherine II was laid by preceding generations and it is in this sense that the eighteenth century is the end result of a process of cultural development which began in the fifteenth century. At the same time, it was the starting point for the flowering of the Russian culture in the ages of Pushkin and Gogol, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, Glinka and Mussorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov and Chaikovsky, Fedorov and Kravsky, Repin and Vrubel, Mendeleyev and Sechenov.

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SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

I 5. I

SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE BALKANS

Nikolai Todorov

In considering the general development of the Balkan peoples and cultures, it should be stressed that we are not dealing with some single, imaginary Balkan society, but rather with a whole range of societies and a number of models of development which are found together in a well-defined geographical area.

The development of the population and of human settlements on lands under the political domination of the Ottoman Empire constitutes what may generally be described as the Ottoman Balkan model. In area and population size, this Balkan model is by far the most widespread of its kind in south-eastern Europe (over 500,000 km², and at least 7 million to 8 million inhabitants until the eighteenth century). The Balkan model was the result of the mingling of various Islamic, Christian Orthodox, Byzantine, Bulgarian Slav, Serbian, Albanian and Turkish elements.

Without a doubt, the most radical change following the assertion of the Ottoman presence in the Balkans came in the wake of the conquest in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and continued throughout the sixteenth century: this was the elimination of centuries-old state structures and the native aristocracy.

Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire found itself unable (and indeed did not aspire) to create an Ottoman society or a global culture or to integrate therein the ethnic and social groups under its rule. In the dominant Ottoman class should be included native Muslim dignitaries, composed essentially of Christian converts to Islam (Bosnians, Serbs, Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Rhodope Muslims), and Christians who had been integrated into the *kul* system.

To the dominant class should also be added the Orthodox high clergy (especially in the capital, Istanbul, where the Patriarch Gennadios had been reinstated in 1454), even though the Orthodox churches had been relieved of their functions as official religious institutions in the independent Balkan countries, and had become merely the churches of the Orthodox subjects of an empire ruled by Islam. One should also note the role played by the so-called Phanariots: the class of prosperous Greek merchants from Istanbul, who were closely linked to the Patriarchate and to the Porte and maintained that they were the successors of the Byzantine

aristocracy. In the seventeenth and more especially the eighteenth century, they gained considerable influence in the Ottoman system, owing to their position in Ottoman diplomacy and in the administration of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Finally, one ought, with certain reservations, to include in the dominant class a number of representatives of the pre-Ottoman military and ecclesiastical circles – in other words, those Balkan aristocrats who had retained their land and revenue as Ottoman *timār* and *amf*-holders. All the taxpayers of the Ottoman Empire were classed as *re'āyā* (lit. 'subjects'). Originally, this term referred to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and covered all the productive groups and subgroups of the population apart from the status groups created by the Sultan. After the seventeenth century, the term *re'āyā* or *niya* came to mean any non-Muslim subjects. In accordance with Islamic law, the Ottomans protected the lives and property of both their Muslim and non-Muslim *re'āyā*, subject to the payment by non-Muslims of a special tax called the *jizya* (*dhizya*).

RURAL CHARACTERISTICS

The economic and administrative institutions regulating the status and activity of the peasantry show a certain amount of continuity with the preceding Byzantine-Slav period of the Balkans, with the exception of the *mīn* system of state ownership of agricultural land.

Historians distinguish two periods in the development of the Ottoman regime, particularly with respect to agrarian relations. The beginning of the first period, that of the *mīn* system and the *timār* system, is primarily associated with the governments of Mehmed II 'the Conqueror' (1451–81) and Bāyezid II (1481–1512); the former, while remaining a Muslim sultan, also adopted, for political reasons, some of the traditions of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Changes in the agrarian regime affected above all the *mīn* system and the *timār* system, which was gradually replaced by the system of lifelong tax-farm system of *māhkāne iltizām*. This led to the emergence of a system in which land was held in the form of large *chifliks* (farms). It can be said that

the system of large *çiflik*s indicates a tendency towards both the re-enclosedness of society and the establishment, to some extent, of commercial agriculture in the Balkans.

The peasantry were divided into the majority, who paid *miri* for the privilege of possessing and exploiting *miri* land, the increasingly numerous *ortaçdis* (sharecroppers), and indigent rural and urban day-labourers. Competition for *miri* land became keener everywhere, especially in Bulgaria and Bosnia. It was during this period that the 'social bandits' of modern historians appeared, otherwise known in oral tradition and earlier literature as *haiduks* and *klepts*.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, intensive crops, such as maize, cotton and tobacco, which found ready markets in Europe, were introduced into the countryside. Agricultural produce was sold at annual fairs which were famous throughout the Balkans, from the Peloponnese to the Danube Basin: wool was one of the main items traded, alongside cotton, tobacco, furs and grain.

The history of the countryside may also be seen as alternating between crop and live-stock production in a village-based pattern of settlement. Foodstuffs for the capital, Istanbul, were supplied by Rumelia (essentially southern Bulgaria), the Danube principalities, the coastal regions of Asia Minor and the area around Smyrna (Izmir). In 1674, total meat consumption in Istanbul amounted to 200,000 head of cattle and 4 million sheep which came mainly from Rumelia.

The production of wool and homespun cloth in the regions of Plovdiv, Sliven and Yantrali (fine carpets) far exceeded local demands. Such items were much sought after in distant markets. In the eighteenth century, the small locality of Amhelakia in Thessaly became a major centre for the manufacture of cotton yarn, in which the entire population was employed, a fact which attracted the attention of the utopian socialist, F. Boulanger.

The peasantry and the inhabitants of small towns in these two periods were, for the most part, relatively free landowners. It was thus as predominantly autonomous small-scale producers that the Balkan peasantry entered the nationalist period.

URBAN CHARACTERISTICS

Balkan towns, with their fortresses and military and civilian administrations, standing at the crossroads of the main trade routes between Europe and Asia, had for the most part long provided economic centres for their agricultural hinterlands. They were absorbed into the Ottoman system with those already elaborate functions intact.

There is little doubt that the political unification of the Balkans, the ethnic and religious shifts brought about by the conquest, and the introduction of a unified system dominated by the Muslim state all gave rise to a new set of conditions which were bound to affect the development of towns.

In the Ottoman survey registers, there were more than 200 localities listed as towns at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.

In the fifteenth century, more than three-quarters of the towns came under the category of small towns of fewer than 400 households. By the sixteenth century, the number of medium-sized towns with up to 800 households, or from 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, grew and became predominant. The towns of Adrianople, Salonika, Sarajevo, Athens, Vidin and Nikopol each possessed between 2,000 and 5,000

households, while Istanbul was the only large city, boasting 16,000 households towards the end of the fifteenth century. Istanbul's population grew considerably in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with half a million inhabitants. During the same period, special mention should be made of Dubrovnik as an important centre of trade between the Balkans and Europe.

The existence on Ottoman territory of numerous towns, some of them quite large, forced the state to take steps to ensure that they were properly supplied. A complex system had to be established, which catered for all aspects of trade: the purchase of goods from producers, transport to the large towns and to Istanbul in particular, storage, the processing, where appropriate, of raw materials, distribution to retailers, and finally sales to consumers. The Ottoman laws governing prices and the various obligations of the population were codified already in the fifteenth century.

The guilds known as *esnâf* played a prominent part in the economic life of the Ottoman Empire. They were an essential component of the social organization of Balkan towns, and involved the majority of the population. Most *esnâf* made little distinction between the various religious and ethnic groups, and were firmly unitary in outlook. Furthermore, they played an extremely important role in cultural life by promoting the building of churches and monasteries and contributing to the rise of education.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

The main result of the Ottoman conquest and the centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans appears to have been a thorough blending of the population and the emergence of a number of common traits which are deeply rooted in the way of life of all the peoples of south-eastern Europe. That is not to say that ethnic, religious, linguistic and other differences were obliterated. Nevertheless, reciprocal influence and interpenetration increased, particularly in the areas of contact between the various ethnic communities, and the coexistence of those groups within a single system finally led to the disappearance of a number of differences.

One of the main issues relating both to the demography of the Balkans is that of the Turkish colonization and Islamization of the Balkans. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the nomadic *Yürük*s (Turkish *yürük* 'nomad') were transferred from Anatolia principally to eastern Thrace, north-eastern Bulgaria and Dobruja. These populations were settled in regions of strategic importance — along military highways and in the vicinity of fortifications (particularly in the Maritsa and Vardar valleys and the hinterland of the Black Sea coast).

The increasingly prominent Muslim element in the Balkans, particularly from the seventeenth century on, may also be seen as the result of the Islamization of the native population. In the Ottoman Empire, quite apart from the official tolerance of Christianity and Judaism, membership in the dominant religion, Islam, and hence in the Muslim community, was an important factor in social mobility.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the pressure of over-population began to be felt, as grain exports to Europe declined and there was a crisis in the provision of supplies to large towns owing to an imbalance between agricultural production and demographic growth; additional factors

contributing to this crisis were the 'price revolution' in the West and the ensuing inflation, which affected the circumstances of certain social groups.

The first half of the eighteenth century was marked by an upswing in all fields of the economy – agriculture, crafts, trade – which in turn gave rise to an increase in the area of land under cultivation and the number of labourers employed, and to the introduction of new intensive crops.

These cyclic transformations in farming (and the corresponding demographic changes) were not caused by the population density in the Balkans, which, although higher than in other regions of the Ottoman Empire, was lower than 15 persons per km² (in Europe the density was between 16 and 45 persons per km²).

Liberation efforts among the Balkan peoples until the eighteenth century occurred mainly in conjunction with wars fought by European states against the Ottoman Empire and were directly affected by military operations carried on on both land and sea against the Ottoman Empire, from the south, the west and the north. Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians all engaged in periodic conspiracies, which often resulted in major uprisings. Furthermore, 'prophecies' began to circulate forecasting the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Russia played an active role in these developments during the reigns of Peter I, and later, Catherine II. The Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century became an important factor in these liberation movements, which were gaining ground in the Balkans.

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THE GREEKS

Paschalis M. Kitromilides

Prior to the end of the fifteenth century, a massive migration of Greek scholars had taken place from enclaves occupied by the Ottomans towards Western Europe. These refugees took with them manuscripts of ancient authors and worked as copyists, editors and commentators of those texts. Some of them taught the language and literature of ancient Greece in universities, including J. Laskaris (1445–1533) from Constantinople, M. Moscouros (1470–1517) from Crete, who prepared editions of ancient texts for the printer Aldus Manutius in Venice, and M. Tribolios (1470–1536), who later went to Russia and became famous as Maximus the Greek. Later on, another body of Greek scholars set out for the West. We shall mention only F. Porphy (1530–1610), who taught at Venice and Geneva, M. Margounios (1549–1602), theologian and great translator of patristic texts from Greek into Latin and vice versa, G. Vladias (1607–83), philosopher, theologian and teacher of literature, and L. Allatius (1586–1610), who worked in the Vatican and wrote numerous works. Despite this exodus of scholars, however, the age-old cultural tradition of the Greeks did not fade away during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Orthodox Church, which enjoyed a number of privileges in the Ottoman Empire, contributed greatly to the revival of education and to an eventual spiritual awakening. The monasteries, particularly those on Mount Athos, at Meteora and at Patmos, and a few schools, especially in Constantinople, Ioannina and Athens provided outlets of higher education.


In the seventeenth century, young Greeks studied at Italian universities, especially at Padua. From 1636 until the dawn of the nineteenth century, Padua had a Greek college funded by a legacy left by J. Kourtounios from Beroea in Macedonia. Another Greek college operated from 1662 to 1797 in Venice, financed by a legacy from Thomas Flanginis of Corfu. The young people who studied in the West returned East, a number of them becoming teachers and helping to develop and improve education in the Orthodox communities of the Balkans. Theophilos Korydalleus (1574–1646), from Athens, studied at Padua under Cesare Cremonini, who introduced him to the neo-Aristotelianism of Tommasius and Jacopo

Zabarella. Korydalleus, himself a commentator on Aristotle, was invited to Constantinople by the Patriarch Kyrillos Loukaris to work with him in his attempts at ecclesiastical and educational reform. From 1626 to 1646, Korydalleus taught neo-Aristotelianism at the 'Patriarchal Academy' and in Athens. Later, his pupils or disciples carried his teaching to other schools, among them the 'princely academies' of Bucharest and Jassy. As a result, neo-Aristotelianism became a shared philosophical heritage of all the Orthodox Christian communities in south-eastern Europe for about two centuries, until it gave way to the scientific and philosophical currents arriving from the West in the eighteenth century (see Map 18).

In the arts, poems that broke with tradition were composed in Cyprus and Crete and Rhodes at a time when those islands were still occupied by the Venetians and the Knights of Saint John. In the sixteenth century narrative poems were composed in Crete. Schools dispensed a classical education, workshops of copyists were busy in some of the monasteries, and learned 'academies' functioned in Candia and other towns. Under the influence of the Italian Renaissance some excellent works were composed, all in verse; most of those that have come down to us are plays – tragedies, comedies.

The historiography of the Balkan peoples was primarily focused on their past glories. The Greeks continued to call themselves *Romaioi*, or 'Romans', as they did in the Byzantine period, but gradually, and with increasing pace in the course of the eighteenth century, among scholars an awareness grew that their people were descended from the ancient Greeks. From the first decades of the eighteenth century onwards, some of the more affluent and better educated members of society became familiar with French culture. These were the so-called Phanariots, wealthy Greeks with lucrative businesses living in Phanari, an area of Constantinople around the Patriarchate. The Sublime Porte employed them as interpreters and some of them were given important responsibilities. Beginning in the early eighteenth century, the Sultan appointed Phanariots as Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia.

Such was the background for the reception of the ideas of the Enlightenment in Greek culture. E. Vonlgaris (1716–1806), a clergyman, taught from 1743 to 1761 modern philosophy at Ioannina and Kuzam, at the Arhontic Academy and at the Patriarchal Academy before being invited to Russia



Map 18 Cultural geography of south eastern Europe in the eighteenth century (after P. M. Kiriakides, 1996).

by Catherine II, who elevated him to the archiepiscopal see of Cherson. He translated Western philosophical works, including works by John Locke and Voltaire and coined the term for religious tolerance in Greek. His principal work was *Logic* (Leipzig, 1766), which is a treatise drawing extensively on ancient but also on Modern philosophy. Voulgaris's contemporary was Nikiforos Theotokis (1731–1800), who in his *Elements of Physics* (Leipzig, 1766) presented for the first time in print Newton's theory of the universe as the only scientifically acceptable interpretation. Finally Iosipos Moisiodax (1730–1800), added to the programme of intellectual renewal a pronounced dimension of social and political criticism.

SOUTH-EASTERN SLAVS

Nadia Danova

By the South-eastern Slavs the Patriarchate of Ipek played a particularly important part in the cultural development of Serb society. Through the activities of the patriarchs of the

Sokolović family, it became a centre of education and a focal point for the spread of printed books. The schools, which were founded with the assistance of the Patriarchate of Ipek, were also attended by large numbers of Bulgarian pupils. The Serbs who settled in the Habsburg Empire did not completely sever their links with their places of origin and continued to attend closely to the needs of their compatriots. It was indeed among the Serb emigrant community that an atmosphere conducive to the spread of avant-garde ideas developed. In the early years of the eighteenth century, new schools were founded and those that had existed in the Serb lands from earlier times underwent reform. Credit for this goes in particular to the Metropolitans of Belgrade, the most outstanding of whom was the Metropolitan Mojsije Petrović.

In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the teachers Stefan, Pavel (a priest), 'Master' Marko and the hieromonach Simeon all enjoyed great authority, and historians like Djordje Branković, the author of a Slav-Serb chronicle, came into prominence.

Another important centre of Slav culture was the Dalmatian city of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), which developed in a close relationship with Italy (see Plate 55). Ragusan writers have

left lyrical and dramatic works imbued with the spirit of the Renaissance. Among the most outstanding of these writers were the poet Ivan Gundulić, author of the poem 'Osman', in which the historical drama is heightened by deep feelings of patriotism, Hambal Lucić, Jurije Palmotić, Ignatius Geotgičević and Vladislav Menčenić. However, the Ragusan writers were best known for their historical writings, in which they gave expression to the idea of the historical unity of the Slav world. Among these historians, it is important to mention Vinko Pribojević, the Benedictine monk Mavro Orbini, author of 'The Kingdom of the Slavs', and Jacov Lukarević, who wrote *Capitolo ristretto degli Anali di Ragogna*.

A leading role in the cultural development of Montenegro was played by the Metropolitans of Cetinje, who had a considerable influence on political life. The Montenegrins were among the first southern Slavs to take advantage of Gutenberg's invention of printing. In 1493, the Montenegrin *Kpavda* Djindadž Cmojević set up a printing press at Cetinje, where a number of books were published by the hieromonachi Makarije for the needs of the Church.

The cultural development of Croatia and Slovenia, which formed part of the Habsburg Empire, followed its own path. A number of young people from these countries went to study in the universities of Italy and Central Europe and some of them even taught there. The cultural life of Croatia and Slovenia was deeply marked by the ideas of the Reformation. Much of the credit for the propagation of these ideas has to go to Count Jan Ungerad, who founded printing presses at Tübingen and Ulach, where Slav books using both Glagolitic and Cyrillic characters were published. The Slovene Protestants won followers among the Serbs, Bulgarians and Croats.

The eighteenth-century Serb society, one of the best-known representatives of the ideas of the Enlightenment in this part of the world, was the encyclopedist Zaharija Orfelin, whose education bore the stamp of the French Enlightenment. Zaharija Orfelin was the editor of the first Serb journal, published in Venice in 1768. Dositej Obradović set an example through his own life of the great break with the ideas of the Middle Ages, publishing books that were deeply imbued with the principles of the Enlightenment as they related to all the problems of the time. The best-known representative of this trend in the Serb Enlightenment was Jovan Rakić, who was of Bulgarian origin. All these highly educated men paved the way for the national liberation movement of the southern Slavs which was to culminate in the foundation of nation states.

Following the Ottoman occupation of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Patriarchate lost its autocephalic status and was denoted to the rank of a Metropolitanate under the Church of Constantinople. A large number of representatives of Bulgarian clergy and men of letters who had close connections with the Bulgarian Church were forced to flee to the Danubian Principalities or to Serbia and Russia. In the fifteenth century, only the Archbishopric of Ohrid extended its authority over Ipek, the Bishoprics of Sofia and Vidin, and Moldavia and Wallachia. It made a considerable contribution to the preservation of Bulgarian national traditions until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman authorities placed it under the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Sremski Karlovci was another gathering-place for a large number of enthusiastic supporters of the education movement and churchmen, among whom Paterije Pavlović, Hristofir zefarović and Paissii of Hilendar.

In the seventeenth century, the Church of Rome started to play an important role in the spiritual development of the Bulgarians. The Catholic religion had penetrated into Bulgaria at the end of the sixteenth century among the ruling communities of Ciprovci, Kopilovci and Klisica in the regions of Nikopolis and Svichtov, and in the Plovdiv region. However, Catholicism in Bulgaria suffered severely in the wake of the repression that followed the Ciprovci uprising in 1688. The survivors were forced to emigrate to the Banat, Transylvania (Erdel) and southern Hungary. It was at this time that a large colony of Bulgarian Orthodox came to be formed in the region of Brashov, while Bulgarian Protestants who had preserved their mother tongue and national consciousness had settled in the region of Sibiu and Alba Iulia.

Some of the best-known Bulgarian men of letters also settled in other countries. Konstantin Kostenecki, who had received his religious and intellectual education at the monastery of Băckovo, found refuge in Serbia and made a significant contribution to the development of Serb literature. Grigorije Cambalak emigrated to Moldavia, where he wrote remarkable books in the spirit and tradition of the Tarnovo literary school. As early as the fourteenth century, the Church of Wallachia and Moldavia had adopted Bulgarian as its official language and in the fifteenth century Bulgarian came into prominence as a literary language. In Russia, this role was performed by the disciples of the Patriarch Euthymius and above all by Cyprian and Grigorij Cambalak, who were both successively elected Metropolitan of Sofia. The activities of these two representatives of Bulgarian culture left a deep mark on Russian hagiographic and ecclesiastical literature.

A large number of Bulgarian centres reawoke to a new literary life in the fifteenth century. This was the case of the monastery of Rila, which became a place of pilgrimage. The activities of two representatives of Bulgarian cultural life in the fifteenth century, Vladislav the Grammarian and Demetrios Cantacuzino, were closely bound up with this monastic centre. During the second half of the fifteenth century and in the sixteenth, the cultural life of Sofia and its neighbouring monasteries made further strides. The town of Kratovo also became an important cultural centre in the seventeenth century as a result of the development of its oil mines. Throughout the eighteenth century, the literary activities of these cultural centres mainly took the form of publishing copies of church books and translations from Greek and of compiling collections of sermons (known as the 'Treasures') delivered by the cleric Damascene Studit.

One of the most interesting representatives of this transitional period was the hieromonach Josif Biadati ('the Bearded One'). His prolific works already display many features reflecting the needs of the time, calling for the use of the spoken language and for a 'secular church'. A special place in this cultural flowering of Bulgarian society in the eighteenth century has to be reserved for the *Istoria Slaveno-bolgarska* by the monk Paissii of Hilendar. In his bid to resurrect the memory of the glorious historical past of Bulgaria, Paissii endeavoured to arouse the patriotism of his contemporaries and inspire in them a love of their language and culture. His book represented a veritable programme for nationhood which had a far-reaching impact on Bulgarian society. After Paissii, other 'Histories' were published, all aimed at reawakening the consciousness and national identity of the Bulgarians.

THE ROMANIANS

Alexandre Duqu

The development of intellectual life in the Romanian principalities is best illustrated by the dominant concepts and images resulting from a synthesis between the inherited framework and the new elements. Some of the major aspects of this way of functioning can be understood by analysing the evolution of the culture of the printed word in south-eastern Europe. In Venice the first Greek publishing house was founded in 1493 while three more were in activity between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Thousands of works in Greek were thus published. These publishing houses had also produced Slavonic books since the fifteenth century. Printing presses had also been set up in cultural centres in Montenegro and Serbia during the sixteenth century. Slavonic and Greek books from Wallachia and Moldavia were distributed in the Balkans from the beginning of the sixteenth century. From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, the number of centres of printing activity increased; the importance of Vienna and Leipzig in this respect marked a cultural shift towards the centre of Europe, while the centres of the south Slavs were kept supplied with Russian books. Thus, the manuscript-based culture lost its hold from the time when printed books and, especially, almanacs and calendars became part of everyday life.

Books on new subjects appeared in Bucharest and Iași during the period of the 'cultural monarchy' of Constantin Brâncoveanu, who gave his support to the workshops producing books in Tbilisi and Damascus. A Humanist trend gathered strength in the seventeenth century, with a more markedly secular, 'civic' and committed tone. From this century onwards, intellectuals took the place previously occupied by scholars. The humanists weaned the attention of their readers away from everything that kept the post-Byzantine pattern in being, directing their attention instead to 'European' realities, the achievements of modern civilization. This is the message of the Romanian Humanists, Constantin Cantacuzino and Miron Costin. It was a Humanism that foreshadowed the Enlightenment which was to encompass all the peoples of the region in the second half of the eighteenth century. History assumed a philosophical dimension in the works of Dimitrie Cantemir, who pieced together the history of all Romanians and described the growth and decline of the Ottoman power. An about-face in attitudes to what was considered foreign – the latter now being identified with 'Orientalism' – paved the way for the introduction of the western model. The intellectuals prepared the mental ground for the coming of the ideologists who would participate in the creation of the new nation-States.

RELIGIOUS ART

Manolis Chatzidakis

Following the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and of the other Balkan States, one feature that dominated the art of all these Orthodox regions up to the end of the eighteenth century was its fidelity, especially in religious painting, to the aesthetic principles, techniques and iconographic

traditions of medieval religious art as it had always been practised in that part of the world. Within the Ottoman domain this fidelity results from a conscious and stubborn resistance to the contemporary art of Western Europe – both Catholic and Protestant – by following the policy laid down by the first patriarch after the fall of Constantinople, Gennadios Scholarios. Bearing in mind this fundamental point it is legitimate to speak of a certain basic unity in religious art, transcending national boundaries in this part of eastern Europe. In the first place, all the peoples of this region – Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians and Albanians – were subject to the Ottoman Empire and the heirs in different degrees to the immense common fund of Byzantine culture and thus to certain traditions of artistic approach and to certain kinds of iconographic cycles and images to which people were as attached as to religious truths. It was at the same time 'an attachment to a glorious national past in the face of power that was foreign and heterodox' (Graham).

Second, the spiritual and political predominance of the Orthodox Church headed by the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, with its very ancient traditions, strongly influenced several aspects of the lives of the Orthodox peoples. Another important factor was Mount Athos. With its numerous large ancient Greek and Slav monasteries and its subsidiary foundations scattered over the narrow peninsula of Chalcidice, it became a centre of religious and cultural activity. Through its immense prestige in the Orthodox world, this holy mountain pursued its ecumenical role and continued to contribute decisively to the dissemination of a certain style of painting used for the redecoration of old churches, chapels and large refectories and in some cases for the decoration of new buildings, especially in the sixteenth but also in subsequent centuries. The vitality of the monasteries came about for two reasons. It was due in part to the privileges, shared by the suffragan monasteries, accorded by the sultans to the Patriarch of Constantinople and in part to rich donations by the Moldavian princes. In the other Orthodox regions under Ottoman domination, however, the very difficult economic and political conditions had an undeniable impact on the quality of artistic production and on the vigour of its expansion.

This is why to meet the growing need for religious art in the sixteenth century it became necessary to turn to the excellent artists who came from or were working in Cretan cities occupied by the Venetians since the thirteenth century. In these cities artistic production was blossoming, in part because of the favourable conditions granted to Venetian subjects of Greek and Orthodox origin and in part because these big trading cities, especially Candia (Iraklion), were becoming true artistic centres in which numerous Greek painters and other artists were finding a large reservoir of customers from a wide range of ethnic, religious and social backgrounds that extended well beyond the island itself. The free movement of artists and of works of art from one area to another also helped to create a certain unity of taste throughout the Orthodox world, at least among the more sophisticated.

The regions of the north such as Epirus and Macedonia and the cities of the Black Sea such as Mesembria and Sozopol developed into centres of the arts of a certain importance. The favourable conditions existing in the Danubian principalities gave rise to great religious complexes.

MUSLIM CULTURE

Alexandre Popović

Muslim populations in south-eastern Europe were (everywhere except in Albania and Dobruđa) in the minority with respect to the surrounding non-Muslim populations and they were distributed very unevenly – not only from one region to another throughout this sizeable area but also within each region. Furthermore Muslim communities were not homogeneous but undivided: Islamized local populations (the Slavic-speaking Pomaks of Bulgaria, Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Albanian-speaking Muslims of Albania and Kosovo, the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Greek-speaking Muslims of Crete, and so on); Turkish and Turkish-speaking populations that had settled in the region (the inhabitants of the towns and villages of Thrace, Macedonia, Kosovo, Dobruđa, and so on, and nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, such as the Yürüks and the Konyaks); and finally, the non-Turkish populations of various origins that had arrived in this vast region at various times (Tatars, Gypsies, and so on).

With regard to material culture, architecture and town-planning should be given pride of place, especially since a number of towns in south-eastern Europe were founded (or began to flourish) during this period, and those already in existence came under manifest Ottoman influence (see Plates 56 and 57). Typical Ottoman traits were terraced constructions and the division of towns into two distinct parts: the *darüşü* (the central traders' quarter containing shops and craftsmen's workshops, grouped together by guilds) and the *mahalles* (residential quarters, divided according to religious and ethnic groups). Ottoman monumental architecture of this period gave expression to great art. Attention should be drawn first to the numerous mosques built in this period and *madrasas* (religious colleges). Finally, in the field of the 'minor' arts and crafts, it should be remembered that 'oriental' techniques came to be widely used in south-eastern Europe, particularly in the manufacture of leather, copper and metalware, jewellery, felt and carpets, and even in the art of cooking.

Both oral and written culture, within which several categories may be distinguished – secular and religious, learned and popular, and so on – naturally flourished in all the Balkan Muslim communities, albeit with varying degrees of intensity, according to place, time, conditions, social stratum and ethnic background. In order to gain a general idea of the different classes of Muslim élite it should be noted that there were several types of school (primary and higher education), on the pattern prevailing in the Ottoman world as a whole. The literary works of Muslims from south-eastern Europe during this period were nearly always written in 'oriental languages', in other words in Arabic, Turkish or Persian (and sometimes, if far less often, and in this case of course solely by local converts, in local languages, using the Arabic alphabet). Among the numerous poets writing in Turkish between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, there were a dozen or so figures who became well known in Ottoman literature as a whole, such as Mevlîhî of Prishtina, Süzî Çelehî of Prizren (both from Kosovo), Faqîrî of Qalqandelen/Tetovo (Slavic Macedonia), the great mystic poet Validehî of Bosnia, Dervish Pasha, the son of Bâyezîd Agha of Mostar, in Herzegovina, and Sâbit of Užice in Serbia.

Prose writers used mainly Turkish, more rarely Arabic, and Persian hardly ever. Among the famous Balkan authors of this period, one may note the learned Khalvetî *shaykh*, Bâlî Efendi of Sofia, Bulgaria, the author of a number of works on Muslim religion and mysticism; Âşîq Çelebî of Prizren in Kosovo, the author of a voluminous collection of biographies of poets; the celebrated commentator on the classical Persian authors, Ahmed Sîkî and Hasan Kâfî of Prizac in Bosnia, the author of works on law and politics, and in particular on the art of government; Müminî of Belgrade in Serbia, author of several religious works, the livorian İlmîhîn Peçevî (from Pecs in Hungary), Qocî Bey of Konçë in Albania, the 'Ottoman Montaigne'; the author of a well-known treatise of 'the causes of the Ottoman decline' (Ihtilâsînu'l 1630); and the historian and *cadî* Ömer Efendi of Bosanski Novi, and so on.

Among the rare authors who wrote both in Turkish and one of the local languages (here in Serbo-Croat), mention should be made of Uskufî Bosnevi, known as Hlevâyî, the author of a small dictionary in verse, and a Khalvetî and Qâdnî *sheikh*, Hasan Qâ'nî of Sarajevo. This type of writing, the first traces of which are thought to date from the end of the sixteenth century, is known in Yugoslavia under the name of *aljami* or *litterame*, following the celebrated Spanish literature of the same name.

Most of the authors mentioned pursued their careers outside the Balkan peninsula, on which their intellectual activity had relatively little impact at the time. The second factor, which was to be of even greater consequence, was the fact that the vast majority of Muslims in south-eastern Europe at this time were not only illiterate and therefore could not have access to this learned culture, but also were ignorant of the principal language (Ottoman Turkish, quite apart from Arabic or Persian) in which this culture and civilization expressed itself.

However, a vivid folk literature survived and expanded in towns and villages through the activities of Muslim folk poets and heterodox dervishes in Rumeli (Popović, 1991). Also, syncretism between Christian and Islamic popular beliefs and practices was a widely observable phenomenon (Hasluck, 1929).

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

16.1
HISTORY*Halil İnalcık*

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Ottoman state first appeared on the map of world history as a small emirate (see Volume IV) which straddled the uneasy border between the Seljukid and the Byzantine Empires in north-western Anatolia. It expanded rapidly and during the period 1389–1402 achieved status as a major imperial power, reaching as far as the Danube in the north and the Euphrates in the east. The first imperial experiment was brought to a sudden halt when the Ottomans, failing to use the strategic advantage gained by their defeat of a crusader army led by the Hungarian King Sigismund in 1396 at the battle of Nicopolis (Nicompolis), turned their military energies instead to the ill-fated annexation of Muslim emirates in Anatolia. In the ensuing mêlée, which was concluded by a major Ottoman defeat at the hands of Timur in 1402 at the battle of Ankara, the Ottomans' empire in Europe and Asia lost its cohesion. In the subsequent period between 1402 and 1413, the empire was racked by inveterate civil war as rival claimants to the throne sought to rebuild the patrimonial hegemony. During the period of the civil war the scope of Ottoman sovereignty in Anatolia was severely restricted, and the centre of political power in the state shifted to the European province. It was during this period that Edirne came into its own as the empire's chief political capital. While the era of the civil war is usually considered to be confined to the period of 1402–13, unstable political conditions persisted until 1425 – then ending at times to restart the process of imperial disintegration. After 1430 when the Ottomans succeeded in capturing Salonica from the Venetians, the state entered into a renewed period of imperial expansion in Europe and they defeated a succession of crusader armies mobilized from the West. The Ottomans, by their victory over the Polish-Hungarian King Ladislas at the battle of Varna in 1444, firmly restored the empire's dominance over the Balkan lands and brought the final fall of the Byzantine empire within the realm of possibility.

The Ottoman sovereign derived his imperial authority from three separate sources of legitimacy: from his adoption


of the Islamic title *sultan*, from the Turco-Mongol designation *khakan*, and from the rank of *kayser* inherited from the rulers of the Eastern Roman Empire. Following the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman sovereign felt himself a legitimate successor to the Roman imperial tradition. Indeed, the claim of the Ottoman Empire to universal rule dates from the period after the fall of Constantinople. Within the short span of sixty-four years after the fall of Constantinople the Ottomans had added the Arab capitals of Damascus, Cairo, Mecca and Medina to their imperial patrimony and were catapulted into a position as the premier Islamic power in the world.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1453–1600

The Ottoman state developed into a Western Asiatic empire whose lands in the Middle East and in the Balkan peninsula bridged the continents of Europe and Asia, remaining intact for more than five centuries between 1400 and 1922 (see Map 19). Since it was Ottoman society within the constellation of Asian societies that maintained the closest and most continuous political, economic, and cultural relations with Europe, it is natural that the history of the Ottoman Empire should have developed along lines that closely paralleled the major trends of European history. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire pursued close political, cultural and economic relations – especially during the sixteenth century – with its eastern neighbours in Iran, the Arab lands and India.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the idea of a unified Europe on the basis of Christian ideology and a holy war against the Ottomans was either a myth or an effort to exploit public opinion in Europe in order to legitimize the policies of individual states. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a crusade was possible only when Venice and Hungary agreed and supported such an enterprise in view of their own political interests (Inalcık, 1969–89).

In actual fact, Ottoman military power provided an element of balance against whatever ambitions for dominating Europe



Map 10 The Ottoman Empire c. 1550 (after H. Inalcik).

the Habsburgs and the Papacy may have had. In fact, the spread of Protestantism benefited greatly from Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs (Fischer-Galati, 1959; Kottreier, 1972). Furthermore, documentary evidence suggests that in 1494, when Charles VIII of France was preparing to invade Italy, even the Papal States hoped to receive assistance from the Ottomans. In short, at the threshold of modern times, instead of the unity of Europe under the Pope and the emperor, *Realpolitik* and a new political order, based on independent national monarchies, called for a system based on a balance of power and the Ottoman state became an important component of the new European state system.

In the following centuries Ottoman power often proved a necessary component of this new order.

As for the Arab world, without the Ottomans the map of the Islamic world would have been drastically different today. By the end of the fifteenth century Spain had brought her *reconquista* into the Maghrib and began to capture coastal cities. If the Maghrib has remained Muslim, it was because of the Ottoman presence and struggle against the *reconquista*. Also, in 1517 when the Portuguese fleet attacked Jidda to capture the Holy Cities of Islam, it was the Ottoman admiral, Selman Reis, who repulsed them (Bacqué-Grammont and Kroell, 1988). Within twenty years, the Ottomans built a defence line from Aden to Abyssinia which foiled the repeated Portuguese attempts to enter the Red Sea. Through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, under Ottoman protection, the Arab lands began to receive Indian goods and there was a full revival of the spice trade in the Middle East in the mid-sixteenth century. Syrian and Egyptian cities recovered their prosperity and expanded. Aleppo, in particular, became the centre of the caravan roads from Hejaz. Basra-Baghdad and Irbil and soon was noted as the principal trade centre of the entire region.

It is true, however, that the Arab lands had to share the reverses and heavy financial burden of the Ottoman imperial presence. The concentration of power and wealth in the Ottoman capital overshadowed such old Arab metropolises as Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus which once enjoyed universal significance in power and wealth.

The reasons for the Ottomans' achievement can be summarized under several headings. Above all else it was the Ottomans' mastery of the technology of modern warfare, including new weaponry and shipbuilding techniques, and their active recruitment of foreign engineers and technicians that ensured their success in countering the threat posed by the contemporary European powers. The second factor in their success was their geographical position which gave them the possibility of controlling the rich trade routes between the East (Iran and India) and the West (the European states), and secured them financial and material plenty. Finally, the centralized bureaucratic system of rule adopted by the Ottomans was developed to a point of perfection so striking as to attract the notice of the sixteenth-century political theorist of absolute monarchy in the West. The Ottoman sovereign possessed absolute control over all revenues and financial resources of the realm and could allocate them to whatever purposes he saw fit. Thus, as the European states gained in wealth and power, the Ottoman sultan was in a position effectively to channel the resources of his state to meet the challenge. It is an unquestionable fact that by the mid-sixteenth century the Ottoman state had emerged as a superpower claiming to universal rule. There was no aspect of world affairs from the developments in Germany, England and Holland to the political situation of Sumatra in which the Ottomans did not take an avid and direct interest (Allen,

1963). Particularly during the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire assiduously sought to capitalize on every development in the realm of international affairs so as to turn it to its own advantage within the context of its own plan for world domination. In the sixteenth century the empire was actively involved on a number of different fronts. In the Mediterranean it confronted the oftentimes combined power of Venice, the Papacy and Spain. In the Ukraine and the lower Volga, it fought to contain Russian imperial expansion. It was poised ready in the Indian Ocean to forestall the threat posed by the deployment of Portuguese fleets seeking to extend Portugal's dominance as a sea power into the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. And last but not least it was in a state of continuous confrontation with the Holy Roman emperors throughout their extensive holding which stretched from Central Europe to the Mediterranean. In 1571 the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto constitutes a turning point in the history both of the Ottoman Empire and Europe (Brandel, 1949). At Lepanto the Ottomans learned that there were limits to the empire's resources for international conflicts, and they brought to a definitive end their grand undertakings aimed at establishing domination over Europe on the one hand and the Indian Ocean on the other. They subsequently concentrated their strength and resources on the spheres of more immediate imperial concern in the Mediterranean, in Central Europe and in their own backyards in the Islamic East. The Ottomans recognized that the Europeans whom they once confronted successfully had now acquired a preponderant status in world affairs. The Ottomans acknowledged that European advances in a number of different spheres from control over economic resources and world trade routes to mastery of the technology of modern warfare and military science made further attempts to compete with them futile. In this regard it is noteworthy that already in the seventeenth century the Ottomans found it necessary to import their top grade steel and gunpowder from England. Traditional Ottoman methods in mining, engineering, and in many other branches of industrial output had become obsolete, leaving Ottoman producers hopelessly incapable of competing with Western-produced goods which now began to dominate world markets. Around this time, European products began to earn a reputation for being both high quality and inexpensively produced. Thanks to the additional advantage secured by the favorable trading concessions granted by the Ottomans, mercantilistic Europe began to flood Ottoman markets with its manufactured goods. This process was to reach its culmination in the second half of the eighteenth century at which time the Ottoman Empire assumed its place as a peripheral economic power subordinated to the capitalist world economy.

The Ottomans were also crippled as a world power by their surrendering of sea power in the Mediterranean to the Western states. From the 1590s on the entry into the Mediterranean arena of the superior English and Dutch vessels, the end was spelled for both the Venetians and the Ottomans' hegemony in that sea, and brought about their mutual capitulation to the rising economies of the North Atlantic. Even the interregional traffic within the empire on the sea routes that linked the capital with the centres of trade and pilgrimage in Egypt and the Levant was mostly carried on foreign ships. Another blow coming from the West was the invasion of cheap American silver and European silver coins from 1584 on. This resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman currency system, and state political crises followed the monetary and financial disorder (Halıcı, 1992; Barkan, 1975).

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1600–1800

Historians in general agree that catastrophic events taking place in the period between 1590 and 1632 led to the irreversible decline of the empire. The empire was then continuously wrecked by crises which extended to all spheres of government – from public order and financial security to the succession to the throne. The everlasting crisis threatened the very existence of the state. That the Ottomans themselves were aware of the severity of this crisis is made clear by the observations of the reform writers who openly debated the causes of the empire's ills (Inalcik, 1980, 1972). The Ottomans' decision to enter into a period of protracted warfare with the Habsburgs on the one hand (1593–1606) while at the same time pursuing war in the east against Iran – the latter conflict lasting with some interruptions for more than five decades from 1578 to 1639 – must be considered one of the principal causes of the empire's decline.

In particular, the chronic state of war between the Ottomans and the Safavids for control over Azerbaijan and Iran had a devastatingly destructive effect on the Ottoman state.

The period of most intense *jihād* depredations in Anatolia was followed in the period 1610 to 1632 by a series of rebellions against the centre by the provincial governors. During this period, the rebel governors sought to destroy the Janissaries as the Sultan's main source of political and military support, thus further weakening the empire's centralised rule and ability to defend itself. At the root of these power struggles too lay the intractable problem of the mercenaries and the unresolved question of how their demands for greater recognition as a force in state politics were to be accommodated. During the early decades of the seventeenth century, the mercenary *sekkân* foot soldiers dominated the make-up of the expanded military retinues attached to the service of the provincial governors, and apart from their perfectly reasonable demands for punctual payment and adequate supply, these troops had the desire for booty or for other rewards for their sacrifices in the line of duty. As late as the nineteenth century, however, problems associated with the periodic need for temporarily mobilized mercenary troops (especially for the wars against Russia) continued to plague Ottoman military planners.

During the period when the provincial scene was dominated by the rebel governors, the reins of government were effectively in the hands of the Janissaries in the capital. A Janissary-led coup in 1622 ended with the execution of Sultan Osman II, an event without precedent in previous Ottoman history. Around this time a triumvirate consisting of the top officers of the Janissary corps was formed, and its unique carried such weight in Ottoman politics that it was able to dictate its terms both to the palace and to the government (see Plate 38). The Ottoman reform writers of the period attributed this development to the weakening of Sultanate authority through power-sharing arrangements. In their view, an undivided and absolute sultanate authority was the essential precondition for keeping mutually opposing forces in society in their proper balance. By taking the reins of government firmly in his own hands when he became an adult in 1632, Murad IV (1622–40) succeeded in bringing the dictatorship of the Janissaries to an end. Sultan Murad had also put an end to the provincial disturbances and in this way sultanate authority was firmly re-established. The neutralization of Europe as an effective threat to the Ottomans during the period of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) gave

Murad the opportunity to renew the Ottoman conflict with the Safavids undistracted by other strategic concerns. In 1638 he took Baghdad. In the decade which followed, during the reign of an ineffectual ruler, Sultan Ibrahim I (1640–8) and during the minority years of his successor, Mehmed IV (1648–87), the issue of sultanate authority surfaced again. Once more state authority was divided between the proponents of rival factions while at the same time the ongoing Ottoman campaigns against Venice aimed at dislodging them from Creta concluded adversely for the Ottomans. For the time being, the Ottomans had completely lost their control at sea, and the Venetian blockade of Dardanelles placed the capital itself in jeopardy. At this juncture, the palace was left with no option but to hand over the reins of government with dictatorial powers to an experienced vizier in the person of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha who assumed office in 1656. The aged vizier proceeded to subdue the Janissaries by forceful means and assigned potentially dangerous or openly rebellious provincial governors to the war fronts in Dalmatia and Creta. In other words, Köprülü Mehmed, with the full backing of public opinion, made a successful bid to restore centralized state authority. By eliminating the Venetian blockade he removed the threat to the capital, but the effort to capture Candia which lasted over twenty-four years from 1645 to 1669 was successfully concluded only in the time of his son and successor Fâzil Ahmed Pasha. During the period of recovery inaugurated by the Köprülü family it was a relative of the Köprülüs, Qara Mustafa Pasha, who deceived himself into thinking that the Ottomans could reassert their supremacy over eastern and central Europe. He entered the Ukraine at the head of a large army and won the initial campaign against the Russian forces in 1678. Later, in 1683, Qara Mustafa opened a campaign against the Habsburgs and surrounded Vienna with a huge army. All Europe anxiously followed the event as their collective fate seemed to hang in the balance. At this time the Habsburgs were already at war in the west with France who felt compelled to cease hostilities in light of the general peril facing Christendom. Under papal guidance, a Holy League comprising the Habsburgs, Venice and Poland was formed, and after long negotiations with either side, the Russians finally threw in their lot with the Holy League. The Holy Roman Emperor with the full military support of the German princes succeeded in evicting the Ottomans from Hungary, and the League's armies advanced for a time as far as the plain of Kosovo at the heart of the Balkans. During the long war which continued over a sixteen year period between 1683 and 1699, the Habsburg occupied Hungary; Venice occupied the Morea (1686) and the Russians occupied the fortress of Azov (1696); this coordinated general anti-Ottoman attack of a united Europe orchestrated by the Holy League determined the empire's fate for centuries to come. Europe, which had lived since 1453 under the constant threat of attack being launched by the superpower which bordered it to the south-east, was finally relieved from the spectre of war by the terms of the treaty signed at Karlowitz in 1699. As for the Ottomans, the defeat and the retreat imposed by the combined forces of the Holy League forced them to acknowledge Western superiority once and for all, and finally convinced them that their only means of survival lay in the imitation of Western methods and institutions. In the period following Karlowitz the empire's traditional rivals, the Habsburgs and Russia, resumed their many-pronged attack against Ottoman territories along the northern shore of the Black Sea and in the Balkans preparatory to a final invasion of the empire's

heartlands. Alarmed by this prospect and what it implied for their own commercial interests in the Ottoman east, Western states sought to bolster the empire and preserve its integrity. The 'Eastern Question' emerged as a premier concern in the European balance of power which was now divided between two major power blocs composed of those nations pursuing pro- and anti-Ottoman foreign policies. In this period, the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire relied on support from the Western powers – in particular France and England – to protect it against the threat posed by the expansionist aims of the Habsburgs and Russia.

This dependence on Western support in the diplomatic arena strengthened the process of westernization which had begun to manifest itself in the Ottoman state. Beginning from the time of Peter I, Tsar of Russia (1682–1725), the Ottomans began to attribute the Russian tsar's successes in the battle against them to the tsar's westernizing policies. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottomans undertook westernizing reforms of their own in earnest.

THE QUESTION OF THE OTTOMAN DECLINE

During the last three decades, an extensive literature has poured forth asking the question why nations under the Ottomans remained backward. The answer was sought in the social structure of the Ottoman Empire. It was argued that the empire typified a feudal state or that it typified a state at some stage in the 'Asiatic Mode of Production'. Those who argued the former held it was feudal because society was divided into two principal classes, the ruling military élite on the one hand and the masses of dependent *raya* with few political or civil rights on the other hand. The surplus product of the latter, it was argued, was appropriated merely by force for the élite with no economic articulation. Those who identified the Ottoman Empire as one of the Asiatic empires with a strong centralist bureaucracy and a command economy, believed that in this socio-political structure there was no possibility for change which could lead to economic growth and social evolution. It is believed that the fundamental cause of the stagnant character of the Ottoman economy and society was the state ownership of arable lands, which resulted in the complete control of peasant production and labour. In this situation, there was no possibility for the agricultural economy to change and to adapt to market economy. In this major economic sector, a stagnant subsistence economy prevailed for centuries.

Similarly, a rigid regulatory regime imposed upon the crafts prevented urban industries from developing. Studies on Ottoman social structure based on archival evidence confirm the theory that Ottoman state control of agricultural land and peasant labour was indeed one of the main causes of the Ottoman failure in social and economic change. But, it must be added, this is a reductionist approach which ignores all other fundamental political and economic conditions which made possible the development of a capitalist economy among the western societies in a particular period of their history. In fact, the Ottoman Empire had a specific agrarian-social structure it strove to maintain throughout its history in the Balkans and Anatolia. It was a foundation stone for the Ottoman social-political system to maintain an agrarian system based on small peasant family-farms which were called *çift-khâne*. *Çift-khâne* was an economic-fiscal unit consisting

of a peasant household with a farm of a size workable by a pair of oxen, sufficient to sustain the household and meet reproduction and tax obligations. The Ottoman bureaucracy took every necessary measure to maintain these agrarian-fiscal units and it was basically successful in eliminating the trends aiming at converting peasant farms into big estates. The basic policy to ensure it consisted of putting all arable land under state ownership called *mîrâ*.

Recent studies argue that the population explosion which the empire experienced in the mid-sixteenth century resulted in a profound crisis in the Ottoman society as a whole. Since no technical innovations were introduced or no changes in the state-controlled Ottoman landholding system occurred, the traditional extensive agricultural system based preponderantly on wheat and barley production could not keep pace with the population increase. It is true, under population pressure peasants moved and settled in the *mezraas* which were the arable lands of the nearby abandoned villages and marginal lands, or opened new lands in the forest and swamp areas. Ottoman survey books provide evidence of such activities in the sixteenth century.

It was to resist Austrian-German soldiers equipped with hand-guns that the Ottoman government felt the necessity to replace the provincial cavalry, the *spahis*, which used only outdated conventional weapons, with the Janissaries and mercenaries. The Janissary corps was expanded but this was expensive and a result the state had to organize companies of 50 to 100 musketeers from among the wandering peasants under the command of the officers sent from the Janissary corps to Anatolia. It was an easy investment for a peasant youth to buy a musket and be enrolled as a mercenary (manufacture of muskets ceased to be a state monopoly and cheap types were available at this time).

Dismissed in peace time, such mercenary companies turned into brigands living off the villages to survive. Just as France had experienced a horrible period of anarchy at the hands of *compagnies d'armes* during and after the Hundred Years War, Ottoman Anatolia too was devastated by bands of unemployed mercenaries known as the *jelâlis* during the years 1593–1610. The critical point in this development was that landless peasants were now given the opportunity to organize themselves to fight for survival. The Balkans would experience the same type of depredation and devastation during and after the wars against the Habsburgs and Russians in the eighteenth century when the Ottoman government introduced the same enrolment method in the poor mountainous areas of Albania and Rhodopes.

COMMUNICATION IN OTTOMAN SOCIETY

For a social and cultural history of the Ottoman Empire it is of key importance to begin with a comprehensive view of the forms and techniques of communication.

Education: *madrassa*, mosque, palace and Dervish convents

Madrasas or theological seminaries existed in the Ottoman realm since Sultan Orhan's time (1324–62) and there was a state organization of the hierarchy of *madrasas* from the fourteenth century. A comprehensive reorganization was introduced by Mehmed II (1451–81) (see Plate 59) under

the supervision of the famous astronomer, 'Alī Qushju. A second reorganization was made under Süleymān I (Inalcik, 1973).

Politics, culture, and religion being inseparable in Ottoman society, we have to look at the religious institutions for social-political expression and activities. In the second half of the sixteenth century, *madrasas* in Anatolia became centres of discontent and rebellion for the unprivileged. Peasant youth or urban destitutes flowed to the *madrasas* as students, since being a student, *sukhte*, guaranteed exemption from taxation.

Sometimes on a remote mountain, they created their own 'madrasa' and they also organized gangs which roamed the country robbing the people under the cover of collecting canonically approved alms. These gangs proliferated to the extent that the government declared them to be gangs of bandits, and it abolished all such small provincial *madrasas*. *Sukhtes* caused such extensive social upheaval that historians call these disorders the *sukhte rebellion*. This situation resulted in the concentration of higher education in the three capitals of the empire, Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne.

In the Ottoman Empire, the mosque too was a place where public opinion was shaped.

In the mosques, professors gave lectures, not only for students but also for the public outside their *madrasas*. We know of cases where a simple soldier, a Janissary, attended such lectures and became a member of the 'ulamā group. After the Friday prayers a preacher, *khatib*, came to the pulpit and gave religious advice. Some preachers covered current affairs and events in their preaching. Every sermon ended by mentioning the name of the Sultan and giving a short prayer for him. This was interpreted in Islamic practice as recognizing the legitimacy of the sultan's authority. No Muslim ruler was legitimate unless his name was mentioned on the coinage and in the *khatba*, Friday sermon.

Speaking of oral communication, we cannot ignore various kinds of formal or occasional meetings. It was a venerated custom with all Muslim rulers to have periodic sessions with the 'ulamā at the palace, and to these meetings all of the outstanding scholars of the time were invited. At such meetings religious questions, theological as well as juridical, with some practical relevance to current issues were discussed. Such meetings often resulted in bitter rivalries among the 'ulamā. They were particularly frequent under Mehmed II. In one of the meetings, he encouraged the leading 'ulamā to write on the famous theological question of whether God is intelligible through reason or faith.

The Palace school and its role in Ottoman high culture deserves special attention (Miller, 1941; Inalcik, 1973). Palace education aimed at training the sultan's servants, who were mostly of servile origin called *ghulām* or *kul*, to become the political élite. The 'Perfect *ghulām*' was the one who became a blind instrument of the sultan's absolutist regime and shared a cosmopolitan culture with other élite groups in the Islamic world, in particular with their counterparts in Iran and Mughal India. Their political philosophy, artistic taste and manners were standard, basically originating from pre-Islamic Indo-Iranian cultural heritage. Common to all the political élite groups were refinement, exclusivity and the didactic of folk culture of the land. Ottomans, in the formative period of their empire, endeavored to learn this sophisticated, cosmopolitan culture from the Timurid and Iranian examples. For instance, the *qābīl-nāme*, a Persian manual for the gentleman or prince, was translated several times during this period.

Conformist dervishes received donations in the form of religious endowment, or *waqf*, and built convents, *zāviyes*

and *khānqāhs*. These were gathering places where members of the order came together for rituals. Usually religious music and dancing, *semā*, were performed to attain a mystical experience, and a religious meal followed the ritual (Birge, 1937). The government expected these establishments to fulfil the function of a sanctuary for the poor, the uprooted and travellers. Apparently such convents or lodges also provided a forum for the discussion of current affairs. Religious orders such as the *Melāmīyye*, being radical in their anti-government beliefs, survived only as underground organizations. The government persecuted *melāmī* leaders.

Militant wandering dervishes, similar to minstrels, preached in the bazaars and in public places, and they had a powerful influence on the populace of the towns as well as in the rural areas. Dervishes called *Babas* or *abdaks*, spiritual leaders of the semi-nomadic Turks or *Yörüks*, led the most dangerous insurrections in central Anatolia or in Dobruja, the centre of the *Yörüks* in Rumeli in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Popular meeting places and public entertainers

The *boza*-house and coffee-house were places of socializing in the bazaar area. (*Boza* made of fermented millet is a drink typical of Central Asiatic pastoralists.) Before the coffee-house became a place of social gathering, its function was fulfilled by the *boza*-house. Since certain kinds of *boza* were intoxicating and since the *boza*-house became an arena for political gossip, government control was exercised through a monopoly system. Each town had a limited number of *boza*-houses rented by the government. The *cadi* was in charge of inspecting them. As would happen later with the coffee-house in the middle of the sixteenth century, the *boza*-houses were labelled 'the nest of trouble makers and nasty gossip' and were often shut down by the sultan's decree.

In rural areas the Turkish minstrel who wandered from one place to another was the most popular element in communication. Mostly active in the countryside, playing his *gopuz* or *saz*, an instrument originally used in Central Asia by shamans, these minstrels were responsible for the transmission of the most varied and colourful folk literature productions, religious, popular-mystical, naturalistic-realistic and epic. The minstrel was the mouthpiece of religio-political propaganda, particularly that addressed to the oppressed *Shī'ī* sects of Anatolia, the *Qizilbash*, whose beliefs, aspirations, and complaints the minstrel voiced. Minstrels such as *Pir Sultān Abdal* became the instigators of popular protest movements. Rural classes, peasants and pastoralists voiced their aspirations through these popular minstrels.

In towns and cities the bazaar, *hamshī* or *sūq* area was the place of contact and communication for the whole urban population. Christians, Jews and Muslims belonged to the same guilds in the bazaar and intermingled there while in the residential part of town each group lived in its own quarter. As a rule, government offices, the cathedral mosque and the law court were also situated in the bazaar area, and government announcements were made by a herald in the bazaar square (Inalcik, 1971; Wirth, 1973; Faruqi, 1984, 1987).

Written communication

Islamic culture is one based on the written word. The Qu'rān, was collected in book form under the third caliph, Osman. Book writing and dissemination of knowledge in Islamic

society were determined by two principal concerns: propagation, teaching and consolidation of Islam, and the preparation of a bureaucracy in order to increase, in most efficient way, the power and wealth of the sultan-caliph. Accordingly, books were classified in two principal categories, those on religious and related areas (*ilhîm*) and those on practical uses (*imâmî*). The last category included literary sciences (*ilâhî*) as well as such sciences as mathematics (*hisâb* and *nisfî*), geography, history, astronomy and zoology. The practical sciences were supposed to serve in the last analysis 'religion and the state' (*dîn ü devlet*). For example, it was the desire to increase the tax base that stimulated writing or translating books on agronomy. Astronomy provided knowledge on weather conditions as well as the determination of good omens for the sultan's decisions. At the beginning of each year, the palace astronomer presented to the sultan an almanac with a list of good and bad dates. Of course, occasionally independent minds emerged, engaged in science for the sake of science. Ottoman mathematician Mulla Lutfî (fl. 1494) was one of them, but the corps of *'ulamâ* had him hanged at the square of the Ai-Meydanî in front of a huge crowd of spectators. Intellectual life and book production had to be and was in harmony with the needs and requirements of a traditional, patrimonial society. Tradition and social equilibrium, not change or 'progress' was the ideal of that society. Nizâmî al-Mulk's classic book on the art of government, *Siyâsetnâme*, described the ideal social order as a compartmentalized society of status groups with nonmobility allowed. It was only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that 'westernizers' in the Middle East came up with the new ideas that change and 'progress' were good, minimizing the concept of a society in 'perfect equilibrium' on the basis of the values of eternal truth and tradition.

Music and dancing in the dervish convents were condoned by some of the *'ulamâ* only when they helped stir and elevate the spirit to religious-mystical perceptions. On the other hand, it should be noted that honesty and earnest concern for careful examination and accuracy in religious sciences trained *'ulamâ* with a scholarly discipline. Ottoman sultans employed *'ulamâ* in bureaucratic services especially in the first two centuries when a fully competent group of bureaucrats had not yet emerged. Sultans also needed the *'ulamâ*'s authoritative opinions in organizing their conquests according to the precepts of Islam. While the *'ulamâ* had a *madrasa* education, the bureaucrats had their basic training in the bureaus as apprentices to the master bureaucrats in the same way as artisans. Specializing in some practical sciences, however, some of the *'ulamâ* entered the secretarial profession.

The Ottoman zeal in collecting and preserving the scholarly heritage of the Islamic world in many libraries in Istanbul made it possible for the Ottoman scholars to compose encyclopedias. Today the Istanbul libraries are considered to house the best and largest collection on Islamic sciences in the world. The encyclopedia of sciences (*Menâhî ü't al-'Ulûm*) by Tashikoprüllüzâde, and that of Hajî Khalîfâ (Kâzîb Çelebî) entitled *Kuhî al-Zumûn* are best known among many such works.

Ritual as communication

While rites, ceremonies and festivals had particularly important social functions and meaning in Islamic society, Ottoman parades and processions also showed features

common to other Mediterranean societies. The Islamic rituals had a powerful effect for stirring intense emotions and leading masses to common action. Every military campaign and victory celebration started and ended at the Aya-Sofya (Hagia Sophia), cathedral mosque of the capital city where the sultan, dignitaries, army commanders and a great crowd of believers came together and prayed for success. During the campaign, at the encampment sites, vast open air squares called *namazgâh* were used so that thousands could pray together before God and produce a powerful feeling of solidarity.

The direct contact of the ruler with the ruled was considered a fundamental principle of government in Islamic culture (Inalcik, 1973). The mirror-for-princes literature recommended that the sultan make use of outings such as a religious ceremony or a hunting party to get in direct contact with ordinary people and receive their written complaints (*nu'ân*). This was an ancient Middle Eastern custom interpreted as the sign of the ruler's concern to protect the people from the abuse of power by his agents to whom he entrusted delegated powers. The presence of the ruler at the imperial council and the right of every subject to bring his complaint to the council were considered the foundation of good government and justice.

Festivals of Iranian or Islamic origin, celebrated on certain days of the year such as the birthday of the prophet, the night of his voyage to heaven and especially Ramadan, the month of fasting, became the occasions of ceremonies. At the *'Id al-ahdâ'* festival (in colloquial Turkish Qurban festival) thousands of sheep were slaughtered and distributed to the poor by the sultan and well-to-do citizens. At the *'Id al-fitr* relatives and friends visited each other, old disputes were forgotten and a new life full of hope began for everybody. It was a strict rule that the younger and the lesser in rank paid visits first.

Nevrûz, the beginning of the New Year, on the spring equinox, a prehistoric time origin, became an indispensable part of the imperial ritual celebrated by the Ottomans in all earnestness.

Festivals on the occasion of the circumcision ceremony of the sultan's son or wedding of his daughter were organized as events of great importance. In fact, the Ottoman festival was characterized more by its ritualistic, political, and social meaning than by its being an occasion of pure entertainment. It was an occasion to show a spirit of peace and reconciliation (And, 1963/1964). The vassal princes and dignitaries offered their presents and were honoured by costly caftans and other gifts at the festivities in which social-political bonds were strengthened. The strict rules of protocol observed at these meetings established rank and hierarchy among the ruling group. Bringing together the ordinary people with the ruling élite and letting them share the joyous atmosphere of the festival fulfilled the important social function of reestablishing bonds of attachment and trust in the otherwise rigidly compartmentalized hierarchical Ottoman society.

Since circumcision was believed to be, like baptism in Christianity, the beginning of a new stage of life, it was taken as an occasion for particularly long and grandiose festivals. The festival of the circumcision of the prince Mehmed in 1582, a particularly grandiose one lasting more than fifty days, was described in a magnificent festival-book, the *sinâmî*, illustrated with superb miniatures. People of all avenues of life in the city participated in these festivals.

In this atmosphere mass conversions to Islam occurred and thousands of non-Muslims came to join the circumcised

Ottoman prince. The purpose was to show the wealth and might of the ruler to the whole world. This becomes evident in the fact that foreign rulers were always invited through special envoys. A special kiosk was erected to accommodate the representatives of European princes at the 1582 festival of Prince Mehmed's circumcision. In these festivals everyone was considered to be the guest of the sultan and was served food during the festival. Such details as the permit to plunder the dishes after the public banquets are reminiscent of the Central Asiatic *toy* and *shöten* which had an important ritualistic meaning in the Turco-Mongolian khanates. 'Feeding his people' was considered to be one of the most important duties of a khan. Giving public feasts symbolized it and neglect of it sometimes resulted in rebellion.

Such grandiose festivals required a careful organization and lavish spending. Public entertainment, dinners and fireworks were carefully scheduled and everything took place in perfect order.

An imperial festival for the accession to the throne or for the birth of a prince or for a major military success was organized not only in the capital of the empire but in all cities. The *At Meydanı*, the ancient Roman Hippodrome in Istanbul, was the square in which festivals usually took place in the capital.

An important type of unofficial customary festival in Ottoman society was that organized by handicraft guilds. On the first day of the traditional New Year festival, members of each guild, Muslim and non-Muslim, going out for an excursion celebrated it together. This expressed and renewed the guild brotherhood and solidarity.

OTTOMANS AND WESTERNIZATION

Although the Ottomans borrowed many European cultural elements, this did not result in their assimilation to European culture, mainly because the Ottomans retained their value system which is an intrinsic principle of their culture embodied in the religion of Islam.

Let us study a specific case. Ottomans borrowed firearms as early as the 1390s through the Balkan states, while it appeared in Hungary about 1354 (Petrovich, 1973). By 1378 canons were made in Dubrovnik. In order to resist the Ottoman onslaught the Balkan states made use of firearms from 1380 onward. Ottomans appeared in the western Balkans in 1385 where firearms were already used quite extensively. Cannons would seem to have been used at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Dubrovnik became the major manufacturing centre for firearms and was a supply centre for other Balkan states. Already in 1393 big guns capable of firing shots of 300 pounds were cast in Dubrovnik. A contemporary eyewitness, a German captive at Nicopolis (1396), Schiltberger states that Bayezid I used cannons in his campaign against Karahan in 1397. Arquebuses and hand guns appeared in the Balkans in the 1430s. In the fifteenth century, the makers of guns were mostly foreigners including Italians, Hungarians, Germans and Frenchmen. In making cannons first blacksmiths were employed and over time expert gun-makers took over. Although initially the Ottomans hired foreign experts or employed captives, they themselves learned the art and became quite sophisticated in making cannons and arquebuses. The Hungarian cannon-maker, Urban, hired by Mehmed II, is a well known example. He made history

by producing giant cannons for the Sultan to demolish the walls of Constantinople. Ottoman artillery was among the best in Europe and was responsible for the capture of such fortresses, thought impregnable, as Rhodes and Nicosa.

Throughout Ottoman History, sultans invited foreign experts to join their services. A special chamber of European engineers and specialists called *Efendiyan* was created at the Sultan's palace as early as the sixteenth century. In the Topkapı Palace archives, Leonardo da Vinci's application to come to Istanbul and perform construction works for the Sultan was discovered (Babinger, 1938).

The circumstances under which the Ottomans borrowed the Hussite *Wagenburg* tactic is of particular interest. The Ottomans quickly adopted the tactic which had given John Hunyadi unquestionable superiority over the Ottomans in the field. Consisting of an arrangement of war wagons mounted with guns in a circle like a mobile fortress, this innovation was one of the important factors in the Ottoman victories in the east over the Iranians and the Mamluks. These Muslim rivals of the Ottomans were delayed in equipping their own regiments with firearms. In Iran and India, cannon-makers were mostly from Ottoman territory. Two Ottoman cannon-makers helped Bâbur, the founder of the Mughal Empire in India, gain military superiority over his rivals. Ottoman expertise in making and tactically using firearms gave them a reputation throughout the Arab lands and India such that Ottoman mercenaries called *Rûmî* (Anatolian Turk) were in great demand in all these countries. In their struggle against the Portuguese and Iranians, Ottoman sultans sent soldiery equipped with firearms or experts to the Central Asiatic Khanates, Muslim states in India and to the Atjeh Sultanate in Sumatra in the mid-sixteenth century. Following the same methods as in the making of firearms, Ottomans also had their own shipyards as early as the fourteenth century and by the end of the fifteenth century organized powerful navies to challenge Venetian sea power. In their dockyards of Gallipoli Greeks and later on engineers from Genoa and Dubrovnik worked for them. Ottomans, however, lost the race with Europe in war technology in the seventeenth century. Subsequently, they suffered severe defeats because they were able only to borrow techniques without the cultural and social conditions and institutions specific to the West which secured creativity in such tools.

The French *Encyclopédie* became available to Ottoman students in the Ottoman engineering school, and it is believed that ideas of the French Revolution were not unfamiliar in Turkey at the end of the eighteenth century (Lewis, 1953). The idea of revolution in the sense of fundamental change in the society as understood in modern Europe was conceived in the Ottoman Empire as a fundamental reform, implemented from above through state power. Until 1950 such reforms were introduced exclusively through the efforts of the bureaucracy as necessary expedients for the survival of the state since a civil society in western sense never fully developed in the empire. Thus, the periodization of Ottoman history must be based on its fundamental reforms. Although the empire's fate became closely dependent on the political and economic changes in Europe, particularly in the eighteenth century, its historical evolution cannot be considered in complete parallelism with Europe. However, it is a fact that decisions on fundamental bureaucratic reforms came under pressure from Europe in Ottoman history, a fact which is also true for other countries outside Europe.

OTTOMAN INFLUENCE ON THE EUROPEAN CULTURE AND ECONOMY

While the Ottoman Empire had a strong impact on European politics one can demonstrate that its contribution to the growth of the European economy may have been greater.

In general, mutual cultural borrowing between the Ottoman Muslim East and Christian Europe were frequent and such borrowing became part of the daily life. It is now a commonplace that Ottomans were responsible for the spread of coffee drinking and coffee-houses in Europe. We learn from the Ottoman records that in the Polish city of Kamieniec, there were ten coffee-houses already in the year 1681. But not many people know that the Ottomans introduced into Hungary rice cultivation, that the tulip was introduced to the Low Countries in the middle of the sixteenth century by the German imperial ambassador to Istanbul, Busbecq, and that military bands in European armies derived from the Ottomans. Perhaps more important are the weaving and dyeing techniques and designs which first Italians and then other westerners borrowed from the Middle Easterners in the manufacture of cotton and silk textiles. Silk industries developed in Western European countries only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thanks to the large supplies of cheap and fine raw silk from Iran via Turkey. Also the Levant market place was responsible for the growth of woollen industries in the West. The English, for example, felt the necessity to improve the quality of their woollen manufactures shifting from coarse kerseys to broadcloth, to meet the demand of the Ottoman market in the last decades of the sixteenth century (Willan, 1935).

In the Middle Ages woollen cloth constituted the most important export item from Europe to Asia. Arms and metals including great quantities of gold, silver, tin and copper supplemented the wool cloth exports. European woollens reached Asian markets as far away as China. This trade pattern continued in the period after the Ottomans took control of transit centres in Western Asia and north-east Africa including those in Syria, Egypt, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula in the period 1516-36. Interestingly, as a result of the growing importance of the woollen cloth trade, Venice and Dubrovnik had established their woollen industries for export to Western Asia and the Balkans in the fifteenth century.

The commerce between east and west was based essentially on the exchange of woollen cloth for Indian spices and Iranian silk (Braudel, 1949). In this trade, Venice emerged as the main middleman in the Levant under Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century; and thanks to Ottoman protection, with its grant of trade privileges, they maintained their position in European trade. Since huge cash revenues were obtained for the treasury through customs receipts, the Ottoman government was encouraging this trade. As a sea power in the Mediterranean, Venice built an empire in the eastern Mediterranean occupying and fortifying all strategic points and islands in the region in order to safeguard its trade monopoly in the Levant and the trade routes terminating in Venice. For Western Europe the question was how to break the Venetians' monopoly of Asian trade. When, in 1517, the Ottomans annexing the Arab lands established their rule in the Levant, they tried to maximize their profits.

Although Venice owed the spectacular expansion of its Levant trade to the commercial privileges confirmed by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, periodic conflicts were inevitable since the Ottomans planned their direct control of all Latin colonies in the Levant. The invasion of Cyprus

in 1570 opened a new era in Ottoman-European relations. It was at this juncture that the Ottoman government decided to put an end to the Venetian trade monopoly in its dominions and to open its markets to the western nations, France, England and to the Dutch while Catholic Spain and Austria, the arch enemies of these rising western nations, backed Venice and continued the struggle even after Venice made peace with the Ottomans in 1573. The Ottomans wanted to be totally independent of the Venetian role of middleman in their trade with Europe. The one basic concern was to obtain western woollen cloth and metal supplies directly from the producing countries together with lower prices.

Already under Melmed II, who had pursued a long war against Venice in the years 1463-79, the Ottoman government extended particular favour to Florence which tremendously increased its trade in Turkey (Inalcik, 1994). The famous banking family of the Medici had its agents in Pera, Bursa and Edirne, importing a variety of fine woollen cloth and buying silk. Soon silk industries in Florence overshadowed woollen production. When in 1569 the Ottomans were preparing for the invasion of Cyprus, which was then a Venetian colony on the route to Ottoman Egypt, the Ottomans first extended trade guarantees to the French (Inalcik, 1971). Until then these Western nations were exporting their woollen cloth, peripignans, carcassones, kerseys, and so on through the hands of the Venetians.

The English capitulations granted first in 1580 and then fully in 1583 made it possible for the English to expand and improve their woollen industries at home. In 1590, the Levant Company, the first chartered company, was founded to serve as a major step in the rise of English capitalism. England with its expanding industrial capacity and mercantilistic policy, supported by the invincible *bretani* ships, was ready to challenge the old monopolists of the Levant trade. With the spread of mercantilism, every European nation that wanted to participate in the Levant trade in order to expand its home industries tried to receive a capitulation, or trade privilege, from the Sultan. After good results with the French and the English, the Ottomans encouraged every friendly nation in Europe to gain capitulation guarantees for free-trade within their territories. The Dutch received their capitulations in 1612, but the Habsburgs were not encouraged and waited as late as the eighteenth century to benefit from commercial expansion in the Balkans. The Levant trade, however, was by then dwarfed by the extraordinary expansion of the Atlantic and Indian trade and lost its primacy in world trade. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman capitulations became a lever for the rise of western capitalism in its initial period in Europe. Since Ottoman economic philosophy favoured an economy of plenty at home so as to keep prices low, the government encouraged imports and kept customs rates at a minimum. The maximum rate was 5 per cent *ad valorem* and for the English an even lower rate of 3 per cent was in force so that the English had 'most favoured nation' status in commerce with the Ottoman Empire. Following the same philosophy, the Ottomans taxed the exports of necessities including wheat, cotton, wool, wax, and so on. But in general the Ottoman market was always a free market for European trade while Europeans followed a strict mercantilistic policy of encouraging exports and restricting imports, a policy diametrically opposed to the Ottomans which led to the decline of Ottoman industries, in particular in silk, wool cloth and camelots. Animated by mercantilistic ideas and in competition with other trading nations, European agents in Turkey tried hard to expand

then imports by studying market conditions, and native producers. They also transferred certain technologies and dyeing methods to Europe – for example, in mohairweaving, in red dyeing and in making coloured moroccan.

The rise of cotton industries and the Industrial Revolution in the West is directly linked to the Indian – as well as the Ottoman – cotton trade in Europe (Inalcik, 1987). In cotton industries, Turkey continued to export its cheap cotton products to the European markets, particularly to France in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. White and blue coarse cotton goods exported from Izmir (Smyrna) were in great demand in Marseille from where it was re-exported to Spain to be used as inexpensive clothing for slaves on American plantations and colonies (the origin of blue jeans). The Turkish cotton cloth exports to France reached alarming amounts toward the end of the seventeenth century. Mercantilistic England was as concerned as France when Indian cotton goods such as chinz, calicoes, and so on, so cheap and attractive, began to flood the English markets. The dilemma for western mercantilistic countries was how to compete with the growing demand at home for cheap products from the east. First, around 1700, high tariffs and even outright prohibition of imports were used in order to curb the flight of an immense amount of bullion from the country. The competitive advantage over western countries of Turkey and India were technological – in weaving, dyeing and design – but above all else in low prices since the raw material was produced in Turkey and India and more importantly labour was much cheaper. For France and England, the vital question was how to lower labour costs, a challenge which supported the views of the new liberal economists advocating low tariffs for wheat imports. But in the search for a solution to the most important economic problem of the day, namely the cost of labour, the discovery of mechanical labour provided the answer. In the last analysis, that was the triumph of western superiority in sciences and technology over the pragmatic knowledge of the East.

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16.2

SCIENCES

Sevimi Tekeli

The sixteenth century was the era of splendour for the Ottoman Empire and the scientific activities during this period were at their peak.

Constantinople was conquered (1453) and scientific activities began to flourish in the city under the Ottomans. Mehmed II (1451-81) did not spare any sacrifice to transform Istanbul into a prominent cultural centre of the Islamic World competing with Baghdad and Damascus. There he founded a *madrasa* complex involving scientists and artists from all over the world. Among these were 'Alī Kūshjū (?-1474), the well-known astronomer of the time, Amiriuzes, a Greek geographer and astronomer, Gentile Bellini, the famous painter from Venice, and Cyracus of Ancona, a Humanist and pioneer in the study of ancient epigraphy. Mehmed's Seraglio Library included rare manuscripts in Greek and Latin.

In the following century Sühan Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-66) ordered Sinān (1492?-1588), the prominent architect of the time, to build a complex including a mosque, colleges, a hospital, a pharmacy, libraries and a *imrakkühâne* or an office to determine timing of religious observances. While the University Complex of Mehmed II did not include any teaching on medicine and mathematics, Süleyman's colleges had departments of mathematics and medicine.

From the point of view of history of science the most important event of the sixteenth century was, under the sponsorship of Murad III (1574-93), the foundation of the Istanbul Observatory by the astronomer Takiyy al Dīn, one of the largest built in the sixteenth century. It was comparable to Tycho Brahe's observatory at Uraniborg or that of Ulugh Beg in Samarkand. For the precision of its instruments and the value of the studies conducted by the distinguished astronomers, it is considered one of the best of the time.

Generally the instruments of an observatory are divided into two categories, fixed and portable. A miniature (in a manuscript of Istanbul University Library, no. F.1404 folio 57a under the title *Shehinsheh-nāma*) depicts a group of astronomers working under the guidance of Takiyy al Dīn with a number of portable instruments (see Plates 60 and 61). As to the fixed instruments contemporary sources (*Alā-i Rashadiyya* by Zīj-i Shehinshehiyya, *Sidra al Muntahā* and 'Ala' al Dīn al Manssūr's poem) inform us about them.

A comparison of Takiyy al Dīn's observatory with that of Tycho Brahe is illustrative. In 1576 Tycho Brahe had built an observatory in Uraniborg under the sponsorship of King Frederic II of Denmark. He equipped this observatory with the most advanced instruments of the time which helped him to become one of the most eminent astronomers in that century. In this observatory he made accurate observations leading to the discoveries of Kepler.

What is interesting here is that there is a striking similarity between the instruments employed by Tycho and Takiyy al Dīn. The instruments of the two astronomers can be compared in three groups. The first group comprises those instruments known as constructed by Ptolemy (see Volume III). They are armillary spheres, triquetrum and dioptra. In both observatories these instruments are of a size large enough to indicate the minutes and even the fractions of a minute. The second group consists of those instruments which were utilized for the first time in the Islamic World. These newly discovered instruments include the mural quadrant and the azimuthal semicircle. The mural quadrant, the construction of which is considered a major discovery in the sixteenth century in Europe was built by Tycho as well as by Takiyy al Dīn. The azimuthal quadrant, predecessor of the theodolite is found in both observatories. The third group consist of instruments invented and utilized by Tycho and Takiyy al Dīn. These are the sextant, the wooden quadrant and the observational clock. The sextant is considered among the most important mechanical achievements of the sixteenth century which included clocks used as observational instruments.

On the basis of his observations Takiyy al Dīn prepared astronomical catalogues and wrote a number of books on a variety of issues related to astronomy.

A significant achievement in the observatory was the new method applied for the calculation of solar parameters. Hipparchos (second century BC) used the intervals of the seasons for the calculation of the solar parameters. But the variation of the declination around the tropics in one day rendered difficult the correct determination of the beginning of the seasons. In spite of this difficulty this method had been used for a long time. After Hipparchos Al Beyrūnī (d. 1048), Copernicus (1473-1543) as well as Tycho Brahe and Takiyy al Dīn were interested in this subject and used a new method called three points observation. By using the method Copernicus, Brahe, and Takiyy al Dīn were able to calculate the eccentricity. According to Copernicus it was $1^{\circ}56'$ and according to Brahe $2^{\circ}6'$, and according to Takiyy al Dīn $2^{\circ}4'6''4'''6''''8'''''$. As seen here, Takiyy al Dīn gives a more accurate value. According to Copernicus the annual motion of apogee, is $24''$, to Tycho $45''$ and Takiyy al Dīn $63''$. Its real value is $61''$. As far as practical astronomy is concerned, Takiyy al Dīn's result can be said to be the most precise in the calculation of the solar parameters.

The use of decimal fractions by Takiyy al Dīn was also an advance. Al Khwārazmī (c. 800-850) had described the decimal system originally discovered by Indians. But the application of this system to the fractions started with Ibrāhīm Uqlidisi (tenth century) and continued with Al-Kāshī (?-1437). His

application to astronomical calculations and its fractional use was realized by Taqiyy al Dīn. Thus, some tables of his astronomical catalogues were prepared using the decimal system and decimal fractions. In the west the first scholar who showed the significance of decimal fractions for astronomy in a special treatise, *de thiende*, (1585) was S. Stevin (c. 1590). Taqiyy al Dīn who died earlier seems to precede him.

In the sixteenth century the empire had expanded upon three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe. Interestingly enough at this time the most prominent Ottoman expert in marine geography, the Turkish admiral, Piri Reis (1465-1554) drew up two world maps and wrote his *Kiṭāb-ı Bahriyye* or *The Sea Book* describing the coasts of the Mediterranean. In his first World Map (1513) Piri made use of thirty-four maps, of these twenty had no dates, eight called *Ja'fariya* were maps made by Muslim geographers, five by the Portuguese and one by Columbus. Since the original map of Columbus is lost, the only copy we have today is the map of Piri (see Plate 62). This map is extremely valuable from a historical point of view for two reasons, it is the most accurate and scientific one for the time and it is the only one drawn upon the Columbus map.

In the second world map (1528), drawn fifteen years after his first map, of which today we have only a small portion, he shows the northern parts of the Atlantic Ocean and the newly discovered regions of North and Central America. In this second map, drawings of the coastlines show improvements compared with the first one which contain inaccuracies. This proves that Piri followed new discoveries closely.

As for the *Kiṭāb-ı Bahriyye* Piri says that, no matter how large the scale of a map is, it is still possible to reduce to one single scale and to write a book giving all detailed information about coasts, islands and ports of the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. This was a novelty which *Kiṭāb-ı Bahriyye* contributed to the science of navigation and geography.

During the seventeenth century, while the West began to make great progresses in sciences, the Ottomans did not even manage to equal their achievements of the previous century. Ottoman memorialists Qoçî Bey and Hajjî Khalîfâ underline the decline in sciences and the deterioration in educational institutions.

However, because of their practical usefulness in certain fields some progress was visible. Under the instructions of Sultan Mehmed IV (1648-87), two palace doctors, Sâlih Bî Nâsrullâh (born in 1670) and Hayâtî Zâde Mustafâ Fevzî, wrote medical books introducing latest developments achieved in the West.

In the same century, there were also prominent doctors who continued to practice traditional medicine. Among them the names of Anûr Çelebi, the Chief Doctor of Murad IV and the author of *Amamihhadjal 'Tibb* (Model in Medicine), and Shams al Dīn al Iṭqî, the author of *Tashrîh al Ahdân* (Dissection of Bodies) must be mentioned. This duality in the medical science became more marked in the course of the following centuries.

Again for its practical usefulness geography received special attention in the seventeenth century. Hajjî Khalîfâ (1608-56)

is the first Ottoman writer who attempted to transmit Western scientific progress related particularly to geography. In his *Jihāmunnâ* he admitted that in writing his book Eastern sources failed to provide him with adequate information on the world. He argued that Ptolemy's geography is antiquated and cannot be utilized as a reference book. As was true in medical science these approaches indicate a new orientation in Ottoman scientific interest.

In addition to Hajjî Khalîfâ's works on geography, namely *Jihāmunnâ*, Zihâs Ashûr, mention should be made of his *Kashf az-Zamân*, a bibliographical encyclopedia of Islamic sciences.

In the eighteenth century the reformist statesmen realized that it was of crucial importance to modernize the Ottoman armed forces which were suffering defeats at the hands of Western armies, so new military engineering schools were founded to benefit from the technical progresses of the West.

Also in the eighteenth century in 1726 an official printing press was established in Istanbul by the Hungarian renegade, İbrahim Mûteferrika (1674-1745) in cooperation with an Ottoman bureaucrat Sa'îd Çelebi. In fact, in Istanbul the first printing press had been founded by minorities already in 1493, almost three hundred years earlier. The first book printed by the new Ottoman press was Hajjî Khalîfâ's Geography, *Jihāmunnâ*. Later İbrahim added in his publication a summary of western studies on geography and on astronomy of the century.

Also, one of the important events of this century was the foundation of a translation bureau, with 25 members, by the grand vizier Dâimâd İbrâhîm Pasha (1718-30). It could not, however, fully achieve its plan of transmission of the western sciences into Turkish.

Towards the end of this century, astronomy again gained an important place among the other branches of science, due to the interest shown by Sultan Mustafa III (1757-74). He invited an astrologer from Fez and asked him to write books on modern astronomy as practiced in France. The French *Académie des Sciences* sent the Sultan J. Laland's *Astronomie et Tables Astronomiques*. The first volume of this work was translated by İsmail Chinari, and later by Hüsnî Hüsnî Efendi, into Turkish. The former also translated *Tables* of Cassini into Turkish.

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16.3

THE ARTS

Gönül Öney

The period AD 1500–1800 marks the most glorious era of Ottoman art during which the pomp and circumstance of the Ottoman Court continued, leading to the creation of a multitude of fine works of art and architecture.

Ottoman architecture and the minor arts are extremely innovative, producing novelties and developments in Islamic art by experimenting with new plan types, architectural forms, materials and techniques. Ottoman art presents a unique synthesis, combining the characteristics and experiments of Turkish art of the earlier Seljuk and Emirate Periods of Anatolia with both the contemporary and earlier Islamic art of Western Asia and with the legacies of Byzantine art in Anatolia.

Alongside the court-guided and refined art medium, a folk culture, nurtured by the nomadic traditions of the Turkish tribes, developed and flourished in Anatolia.

ARCHITECTURE

The character of Ottoman architecture is basically eastern, having its roots in Central Asia and Islamic tradition but construction technique and materials conform to the earlier classical and Byzantine practice in Anatolia.

In Ottoman architecture, mainly in mosques, the dome became the dominant element. Obsession with domes to obtain maximum spatial clarity is a basic characteristic of Ottoman style. There were, of course, many earlier Anatolian-Byzantine, Seljuk and Emirate examples of the domed square building. Likewise in Iran, the dome had come to be one of the most common architectural elements from the time of the Zoroastrian fire temples. However, the way the Ottomans emphasized the dome was a new approach in the history of architecture.

The small or large single-domed mosque, where the dome is supported by the outer walls, is the simplest form. This type of small Ottoman mosques is encountered all over the empire from the earliest times.

Although the dome was widely used in the fifteenth century, none of these experiments fully achieved the monumentality of the sixteenth-century grand mosques, mostly built in Istanbul, under the patronage of the sultans. With the gifted Ottoman architect Sinân, the development leading to the great mosque architecture reached its summit. Sinân experimented endlessly with domed spaces. The introduction of the half dome as a major structural element for covering mosques was a new concept which started to develop after the fifteenth century and Sinân reached the pinnacle of success in experimenting with the combined dome system.

Among Sinân's numerous works, the Süleymaniye Mosque (1550–7) is perhaps the most significant, paying just tribute to the glory of the empire during the rule of Süleymân, the Magnificent (see Figure 20). With Süleymaniye, Sinân created a very dynamic space. As in the case of Hagia Sophia (Aya-Sofya) and the earlier Bâyezîd Mosque in Istanbul, the central nave is covered by a central dome and two half domes.

In Hagia Sophia, the side aisles are separated with buttresses, columns and a curtain wall, imparting to the interior a basilical effect. In contrast, the interior of Sinân's Süleymaniye Mosque




Figure 20 Plan of the Süleymaniye Mosque, Istanbul, Turkey (after G. Öney).

is a single whole. The simple harmony of the interior is reflected in the exterior in a more complex manner.

Sinân's masterpiece, the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne (1569–75), epitomizes the climax in architectural harmony in domed buildings. The mastery of balancing all the architectonic elements reflects the culmination of an entire historical development (see Plates 63 and 64).

The sixteenth-seventeenth century mosques in different parts of the empire are smaller variations or imitations of the examples in Istanbul.

At the end of the fifteenth and mainly in the sixteenth century, the changing needs of the Ottomans led to the introduction of a monumental socio-religious complex, the *külliye*, and most of Sinân's masterpieces were a part of these complexes (see Plate 63). These large building complexes consisted of a mosque, several *madrasas*, a Qur'ân (Koran) school, a library, a hospital (*dâmishshifâ*), a hostel (*tâbkhâne*), a public kitchen (*imâret*), even a caravanserai (*kervân-saray*) and the mausolea of the Sultan and his wife.

In the post-Sinân era, during the seventeenth century, mosque architecture developed following the great architect's principles. The architects Davut Aga and Mustafa Aga created variations on the same theme. The Yeni Mosque (1660–3) and the Blue Mosque (Sultan Ahmet Mosque, 1609–16), both in Istanbul, are monumental buildings with refined architectural detail and ingenious solutions (see Plate 66).

Apart from mosque architecture, *madrasas*, hospitals, hostels and public kitchens were the most common public buildings in the so-called Classical Ottoman Period.

In civilian architecture, the *bedestens*, *hans* and caravanserais were functional buildings serving the public. The *bedestens* were dome-covered rectangular halls surrounded by shops for valuable goods. The *hans* in cities were usually two-storeyed buildings with an open courtyard, surrounded by a gallery. They served a double function as a hostel and also as a warehouse.

The Ottoman caravanserais were built on the main commercial routes for caravans, pilgrims and soldiers. They were large and well-equipped buildings with an open court, surrounded by covered halls, a *masjid*, a bath and shops. Caravanserais differed widely in their detailed plans and sizes according to their importance and requirements.

Compared to the monumental mosques and their complexes Classical Ottoman architecture, the palaces were simpler and more modest with their small, kiosk-like building groups. Of these only the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul is today in existence.

Architectural decoration

As seen in the Rüstem Pasha Mosque in Istanbul, the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne, the Hürrem Sultan Mausoleum and the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, extensive use of tile decoration creates a very colourful atmosphere in sixteenth-seventeenth century religious and civil architecture. Tile facing is entirely subordinated to architectural lines. The realistic flower compositions, spring branches and trees, arabesque designs and large *sülûs* (inscriptions) of the famous Iznik tiles represent the high point of Turkish tile art (see Plates 67–69).

Starting from the beginning of the eighteenth century, during the so-called Tulip Period, Ottoman architecture and decorative style reflected the influence of French baroque and rococo, heralding the westernization period in arts and architecture. The so-called 'Turkish Baroque Period'

architecture produced very interesting works like the mosques of Nûri-Osmanîyye (1748–55), Lâleli (1759–63) and Nusretîyye (1822–6), as well as numerous fountains and kiosks in Istanbul.

It is in the nineteenth century that western influence is seen prominently both in the arts and architecture. With the rapid decline of the empire and its growing economic dependence on the West, the pace of westernization accelerated.

Minor arts

Pottery

Ottoman pottery from Iznik and Kütahya was famous all around the empire and in Europe. The so-called blue and white pottery, which was manufactured in great quantities in the fifteenth century, continued in early sixteenth century Ottoman art. Objects such as bowls, plates, pitchers, vases and lamps of the highest quality were produced. Their decoration presented a mixture of Classical Ottoman designs such as naturalistic flowers and leaves and compositions with the cloud and dragon motifs of Chinese Ming Period porcelain.

However, the best known Ottoman pottery is the underglaze painted polychrome ware with the famous red colour having its most beautiful parallels in tiles. The best quality ware was manufactured from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth.

Parallel with the decline in contemporary tile manufacture, there was a rapid deterioration of quality after the middle of the seventeenth century. Production ceased in Iznik in the eighteenth century whereas shops in Kütahya continued their activity to our day.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, high quality ware with fine colours and much freer and vivid designs of folkloric nature began to be produced in Kütahya.

Late Kütahya pottery from the eighteenth century presents an interesting synthesis of the Classical Ottoman style and the free style of the local folk art.

Metalwork

Ottoman silver, brass and tinned copper ware has a special place in Islamic metalwork. Ornate brass candleholders and brass lanterns of gigantic dimensions adorned the Sultan mosques. They were mostly engraved pieces decorated with floral compositions and arabesques and with inscription friezes.

In most collections throughout the world, it is common to come across Ottoman metal military artefacts. Finely decorated horse armour, shields, swords, daggers, helmets and pieces are, with their richly inlaid, engraved or gilded ornamentation, especially valuable. Encrustation with precious stones was also a common technique in Ottoman metal art.

Carpets

The old Turkish carpet tradition woven with the so-called *Gördes* knot (the Turkish double knot) and using natural dyes flourished during the Classical Ottoman Period (see Plate 70). They became famous in Europe and were bought by rich families to adorn their palaces and houses. Some of these carpets appear on Renaissance Period Italian, Flemish and

Dutch paintings. They are particularly common in Hans Holbein's and Lorenzo Lotto's paintings. Thus, they are often referred to as 'Holbein' or 'Lotto' carpets.

From the sixteenth century until the middle of the eighteenth century, a very rich and varied group of carpets attained fame as 'Uşak' carpets, in reference to the western Anatolian town they were produced in. The dominant colours in these large floor carpets were red, blue and yellow. The designs were inspired by the traditional decorative style of the Ottoman Court in Istanbul.

From the second half of the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, small 'palace' carpets with Persian and Mameluk influence became famous and fashionable alongside the traditional Anatolian carpets. Made with the single Iranian *sumeh* knot, these carpets are of a very fine, soft quality resembling velvet and are decorated with floral motifs.

Miniature painting

The Ottomans have a prominent place in the art of Islamic miniature painting. The Ottoman style has a special character of its own and is distinguishable from other schools. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, miniaturists from Cairo, Tabriz, Caucasia and several other provinces of the empire were invited to Istanbul. This gathering of artists of different backgrounds gave way to a multinational trend in miniature art and resulted in a multitude of diversified works during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520–66).

Illustrated manuscripts of Ottoman history and military campaign chronicles by the artist 'Marrakji' Nasuh set a new style during the first half of the sixteenth century. In his major work, *Süleymanname*, depicting events during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, Nasuh presents towns, fortresses and ports with topographical sketches in several volumes (see Plates 71 and 72).

The Ottoman sultans had a chronicler (*shāhnameji*) in the court, whose task was to record contemporary historical events in Persian or Turkish verse in a '*shāhname*'. The *shāhnāms* were illustrated with miniatures in the newly developing Ottoman style. Being prepared through the co-operation of different artists, these works sometimes displayed

a variety of styles. There are several *shāhnames* from the sixteenth century through which the development of the Ottoman miniature style can be followed. Arifi was one of the outstanding masters.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Selim II, in the Classical Period, a new style commenced in miniature art. The palace artists produced a rich collection of *shāhname* miniatures. 'Naqqāsh' Osman was the most prominent miniature artist of the Ottoman Court during this period with many others working under his patronage.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, during the Tulip Period (1718–1830), foreign painters were invited to Istanbul as part of the westernization trend. Through their influence, Western tastes were introduced also to miniatures. Levni, the prominent artist of the period, pioneered this new style in his illustrations, giving them perspective and depth (see Plate 73).

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ARAB LANDS

17.1
SYRIA*Abdul-Karim Rafeq*

OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION; PUBLIC BUILDINGS

The defeat of the Mamlūk Sultanate, which was in control of Syria and Egypt, by the Ottomans in 1516–17, opened the way for the latter to rule most of the Arab lands including Syria for almost four centuries. Syria, known to the Arabs, as *Shām* (the country to the 'north'), comprised roughly the present-day countries of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and the pre-1948 Palestine. Under the Ottomans, it was divided into three provinces (*eyālets*): the province of Damascus (*Shām*), which included the whole of Palestine, the Biqā' Valley and Mount Lebanon; the province of Aleppo and the province of Tripoli. In 1660, a fourth province, Sidon (Sayda), was carved out from the province of Damascus (see Map 20).

The nature and tenor of office of the governors changed over time. In the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, most of the governors in the Syrian provinces were appointed from amongst high Ottoman officials most of whom with military careers behind them. The prestige those governors enjoyed and their tenure in office for periods extending in many cases to five years enabled many of them to build major Ottoman religious monuments in the cities and towns of Syria which still stand today. Sultans Selīm I (1512–20) and Süleymān the Magnificent (1520–66) set the example by building two famous *tekkes* in Damascus which still dominate its landscape. A *tekke* was a complex composed of a mosque, rooms for students and teachers of religion, with extensive living quarters (see Plate 74). Two of the major Ottoman mosques in Damascus, the Darvishiyya mosque and the Sināniyya mosque, were built by governors Darwish Pasha and Sinān Pasha in the latter part of the sixteenth century (see Plates 75 and 76). Aleppo, likewise, prides itself on the Khusrawiyya mosque, and the school attached to it, both of which were built by governor Khosraw Pasha in the 1540s. Like the Tekiyya Sulaymaniyya in Damascus, the Khusrawiyya also was built by the famous Ottoman architect Sinān (see Plate 77). Another major attraction in Aleppo is the Bahramiyya mosque built by governor Bahtam Pasha in the 1580s. Whole villages as well as urban property, mostly belonging to the state, were

assigned as *imāfs* (endowments) to maintain these charitable buildings.

With the decline of Ottoman power in the second half of the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century, the governor's office began to be sold, and the governors frequently changed. No major religious buildings in the style



Map 20 Syria during the Ottoman period (after D. Pipes, *Greater Syria*, Oxford University Press, 1990).

of the sixteenth century were built by them. Indeed, the appointment of governors from amongst persons of local origin, such as the 'Azim in the eighteenth century, brought about a change in the architectural landscape, the governors' interest shifting to sumptuous residences and, occasionally, schools or public baths, but not mosques in the grand style of the sixteenth century. Thus the 'Azim governors built palaces for family residence in Damascus and in their town of origin, Hamali. The palace of As'ad Pasha al-'Azim, who governed Damascus for fourteen years (1743-57), is a major architectural monument in Damascus today.

The flourishing conditions of Syria's economy, especially in the first two centuries of Ottoman rule, caused the building of several caravanserais in Syrian cities at the time.

Economic life

The Ottoman Empire undoubtedly contributed to quicken the pulse of commercial life in Syria. Syrian merchants largely dealing in textiles profited from the large markets which the Ottoman Empire opened to them. The silk and cotton textiles of Aleppo were famous throughout the Ottoman Empire and beyond. Transit trade made headway as Aleppo received the silk of Persia and exported it to Europe mainly through the seaport of Alexandretta. Local manufactures were exported chiefly to Anatolia, but also to other neighbouring countries. European merchants like the English, the French and the Dutch, established themselves mainly in Aleppo and Tripoli during the sixteenth century, sharing with their predecessors from the Italian city-states the flourishing local, regional and long-distance trade of Syria. The commercial privileges ('Capitulations') granted by the Ottomans to European nations facilitated their trade which was done locally partly through barter and partly through import of silver coins. The European consuls, themselves, being merchants and agents for trading companies, such as the English Levant Company (established in Aleppo in the early 1580s) and the *Chambre de Commerce de Marseille* (its consuls established in Aleppo in the 1540s), resided mainly in caravanserais and conducted their commercial business there. Many of these caravanserais, known locally as *khāns* or *qayṣāriyyas* (the latter word from Greek origin), are still to be found in Aleppo today. They were used for marketing valuable commodities and for living quarters for the merchants. Since many governors engaged in trade, they built *khāns* which still carry their names. *Khāns* sometimes carried the name of the commodity marketed in them, such as 'the Soap Khan' (*Khān al-Ṣābūn*). Others were known after the foreigners who resided and traded in them, such as the Khan of the Venetians (*Khān al-Banāḍika*). Unique in their architectural style, the Aleppo *khāns* still define by their location the centres of trade in the city.

The flourishing commercial activity in Syria in general was based largely on the guilds (locally known at the time in the court records as *ṭā'ifas*, 'groups'). The controversy over the origin of the guilds in the Arab-Islamic countries has not still been resolved. No similar corporate bodies with such sophistication in organization and regulations had existed before in these countries. However, under the Ottomans the system was developed to such a degree that it constituted the backbone of the urban economy and society in Syria as elsewhere in that empire.

The guilds performed a variety of functions. They regulated and controlled production, services and marketing. They

enforced a division of labour, organized the distribution of raw materials among their members, guaranteed the quality of products, fixed prices and collected taxes from their members for the government.

Like the European guilds, the Syrian guilds had three ranks. At the top was the master craftsman (Arabic, *ma'allim*, or Persian *ustādh*), authorized to have a workshop of his own. Below him, ranked the journeyman (*ṣānī*) and, at the bottom, the apprentice (*ajīn*). Opening a workshop by a master seems to have been a difficult process since the master needed both a licence, to start a workshop (Arabic *khiḥā*), and the necessary equipment (Turkish *gedik*). Administratively, the guild was controlled by a head (*sheikh*) elected by the elderly members of the craft. He was aided by a number of officials in discharging his duties.

An important aspect of the guilds' organization was their autonomy. They could create or dissolve themselves, merge or separate from each other. To legalize their actions, they usually notified the *shar'ī* judge (*qāḍī*) of their decisions which were registered with the court. The government does not seem to have interfered in the internal affairs of the guilds except in a few cases. The guild of butchers, which was responsible for providing meat to the city and the army, for example, had another head known as *bāsh* (Turkish for 'head'), alongside the *sheikh*. The builders had a *bāsh* at their head, and no *sheikh*. In both guilds, the government seems to have appointed the *bāsh*.

With the consolidation of the role of the guilds in the urban economy of Syria, especially in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, some guilds opposed traditional regulations which restricted their expansion. Quotas of hides delivered to shoe-makers, for instance, were fixed by law and custom despite the growing need for an expanding market. To expand, some guilds created minor related guilds (called *yamak* in Turkish) to retail some of their products, as in the case of the guild of tailors which was attached to the guild of head-gear makers by providing the latter with surplus pieces of cloth for making caps. The attached guild shared in the payment of taxes with the main guild.

Population, society and religion

During the first three centuries of Ottoman rule until c. 1800, Syria appears to have seen no major population increase. Population increased in the second half of the sixteenth century but declined in the following century. Earthquakes and visitations of plague, which occurred not infrequently, took their toll, and so did the high mortality rate among the newly-born. A reduced life-span, which seems to have averaged between thirty and forty years, to judge from the size of families given in the probate inventories, kept the population rather young. Monogamy was dominant, as a corollary perhaps to a reduced life-span. According to the probate inventories which gave detailed information about the heirs and the estates of deceased people, female infants were less numerous than male infants, but the ratio changed in favour of the females upon adolescence, owing perhaps to the power of resistance developed by females after surviving the harsher conditions of their infancy.

According to the fragmentary population estimates, pre-1914 or Greater Syria did not exceed 2 million inhabitants at the time of the Ottoman conquest. Four centuries later, at the beginning of the French and British 'mandates', according to better conducted censuses, Syria had a

population of about 3.5 million, the increase being largely due to the nineteenth-century introduction of quarantine to combat plague, and to better hygienic conditions.

Diversity has been one of the major aspects of Syrian society since ancient times. Minorities, whether Christian or Jewish, or ethnic, such as the Kurds, Turkmens or the Maghāriha (migrants from North Africa), lived in quarters of their own, which sometimes carried their community names. Religious communities tended to gather near their few places of worship; the establishment of new places of worship by the minorities was not allowed up to the nineteenth century. Marriages were confined within the same communities, resulting in their isolation somewhat while common origins and shared poverty among many emigrants to cities fostered common ties among themselves. Not every quarter, however, was restricted to a single community; and there was undoubtedly considerable intermixing of the communities in everyday life in the bazaar area, as their members pursued common professions and were members of the same guilds. For instance, court records in both Aleppo and Damascus mention delegates of elderly Muslim and Jewish members for the guild of druggists (*'aṭṭārīn*). The guilds of builders and tailors included Muslims and Christians and the guilds of bakers had members from all these three communities. Membership in the guild of churchers was, however, solidly Muslim and Jewish because of the religious concern of both communities for having animals slaughtered in a particular ritual.

The rural population were preyed upon alike by tax-farmers, *timar*-holders (holders of land-grants issued to them by the government out of state owned (*mīnī*) land to perform military service), urban creditors, and troops' depredations. The rural population, composed of peasants and nomadic Bedouin, were proud of their style of life, and had a strong sense of being unjustly treated by the rest of society. At the same time, the need to exchange their products brought the townsman and the villager together, despite the difficulties of transport. Seasonal and weekly markets were held in the countryside in which urban traders participated. Specialized markets in the cities also provided to the needs of the rural people.

Peasants tended to desert their villages and swarm into cities' suburbs. As displaced elements there, they contributed to urban instability and also played into the hands of military adventurers or religious free-thinkers (*zindīq*) who challenged the established order. The *timar*-holders tried to pressure the *qadis* to order the fugitive peasants to return to their villages so that their revenue would not be affected; and villagers who did not flee were also anxious to have the fugitives back to share the burden of collective taxes imposed on them. However, several *'Ulamā* from the cities, such as the Damascene Hanafī *muftī* (jurist) Sheikh 'Aḥd al-Ghanī al-Nāḥiṣī, intervened on behalf of the fugitive villagers, saying that the Prophet Muḥammad himself had migrated from Mecca to Medina to be free of persecution by his Meccan opponents. Some *'Ulamā* even incited the peasants to resist and kill their oppressors. Some villagers driven to desperation resorted to banditry by attacking government convoys and supplies.

Religious minorities in the countryside on the flat areas usually lived in villages of mixed population; elsewhere each community, especially in the mountainous regions, such as the Druzes, the Shī'īs and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon usually lived isolated and resisted government attempts at imposing closer control. Their chiefs, in times of peace, were recognized by the government as tax-farmers and sub-governors of their districts.

European missionary activity in Syria during the first three centuries of Ottoman rule was largely limited to Catholic religious orders. Chief among these orders were the Jesuits who were active in Syria from the early seventeenth century. The Maronites were won over by Rome in 1736 when they accepted papal supremacy. A split occurred in 1725 in the Greek Orthodox Church when members who had converted to Catholicism separated from the Antiochene Patriarch of Damascus, chose a local Arab Patriarch and established themselves as the Greek Catholic community. However, neither the mother Greek church nor the Ottoman authorities recognized the new community. Persecuted by both, its members made their way to Egypt where they were engaged in commerce and industry, and later on, in the nineteenth century, also in literature, journalism and administration. Similar splits also occurred in the other Oriental Christian communities in Syria. To the Catholic communities were later added Protestant communities which likewise split off from the Oriental churches in the nineteenth century.

State education in Syria was non-existent during the first three centuries of Ottoman rule. Traditional schools (*madrasas*) used to be founded at the time by religious-minded governors and administrators, who endowed them with *waqfs* (pious endowment) to provide for their maintenance. These *madrasas* taught religious sciences of Islam. Also sophisticated religious topics were taught by qualified *'Ulamā* in the major mosques.

Local challenges to Ottoman power

When the Ottomans conquered Syria in 1516, the people long oppressed by the Mamluks neither supported nor opposed them. After gaining control of Cairo and eliminating the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Ottomans suppressed in 1521 a major revolt by a former mamluk, Jānbadī al-Ghazālī, retained by the Ottomans as governor of Damascus. Stability thereafter reigned throughout the sixteenth century during which the administration was reorganized, Ottoman laws introduced and the main Ottoman architectural monuments built.

A devaluation of the Ottoman unit of silver currency, the *aqche*, came in the wake of the influx of silver and gold from the Americas through Europe. Salaried troops, hurt by the devaluation of their fixed salaries, started imposing extra taxes on the populace to supplement their pay. When the government tried to restrain the tax payers, they rose in revolt. Such a revolt occurred in Syria in the last decade of the sixteenth century, though in a less militant form than elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire.

When Janissary chiefs from Damascus imposed extra taxes on the peasantry in the region of Aleppo in the 1590s, the government executed a number of them, all being of *Rūmī* (Ottoman) or Kurdish origin. Government action against top Janissary chiefs continued sporadically until the 1650s. The consequential vacancies in the Janissary corps of Damascus were then filled by local contingents. This process culminated in 1660 when these, mostly grain merchants from Damascus, took over the Janissary corps in the city, the corps thereafter becoming known as *Yerliyya*, that is, local Janissaries. The Sultan immediately sent fresh Janissary troops from Istanbul to Damascus, known as the *Kapı kulu* Janissaries, that is, slaves of the Porte or Imperial Janissaries. The two corps constantly clashed with each other until the Janissaries were altogether abolished in the empire in 1826. In Aleppo,

the local people were unable to take over the Janissary corps; but there was an alternative source of power in the *Ashtāf* (the descendants of Prophet Muhammad). These remained in conflict with the Janissaries until 1826.

Alongside the conflicts among the troops, Syria witnessed revolts by chieftains, such as the revolt of 'Alī Pasha Janbulak in Aleppo in 1605–7 in alliance with the paramount chief of Mount Lebanon-Fakhr al-Dīn Ma'n II. Fakhr al-Dīn was head of the Qaysi faction which included a cross-section of religious communities banding together against the rival Yemeni faction which also included a similar mix of communities. The two factions represented tribal factionalism inherited from the ancient Arab tribes. Fakhr al-Dīn was eventually eliminated by the Ottomans in 1635, and his heirs surrendered the Emirate in Mount Lebanon to the Shihābs in 1697. The Shihābs were Sunnis, but being Qaysis they were elected by the Qaysi faction to succeed the Druze Ma'nīs, also Qaysis. The Yemeni faction, itself made up of a majority of Druzes, opposed the Qaysis and was worsted in the fighting in 1711. The Yemeni Druzes fled to Mount Hawran in southern Syria, establishing a community, distinct from that of the Qaysi Druzes of Mount Lebanon.

As the Ottoman Empire faced major external challenges in the eighteenth century, local assertiveness within Syria grew. A family of local origin, the 'Azīs assumed the governorship of Damascus, and of other Syrian provinces, for over sixty years at intermittent periods in the eighteenth century. The Ottoman authorities tolerated them especially because the 'Azīm governors ensured security for Hajj pilgrimage that started from Damascus—a major annual event for the Ottoman Empire since tens of thousands of pilgrims from all its northern parts were involved in it. In other cases, the Ottoman authorities simply failed to suppress acts of defiance. The Bedouin tribes of 'Anaza, moving from the Arabian Peninsula into the Syrian desert in the eighteenth century, took control of the trade route with Baghdad. Similarly, due to the fighting between the Yezidiyya and the *Kapı kulu* Janissaries, guild members in Damascus also armed themselves for protection. So did the youth of the city quarters.

Criticism of Ottoman government and practices came from the Syrian 'Ulamā', who represented the intellectual élite at the time. Following the practice of the Ottoman intellectuals, who customarily provided advice (*maẓāhira*) to the Sultans, the Syrian 'ilīm, Ibn 'Alwan recommended to Sultan Selim I (after his conquest of Syria) measures to eradicate ills, promote security and apply the *Shari'a*. Another Syrian 'ilīm and *Shāfi'i* Muftī, Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, wrote in the sixteenth century a multi-volume work enquiring into the causes behind the backwardness of this *Ummā* (Muslim peoples) and prescribing for it the need to imitate the good peoples of the past. The 'Ulamā' also opposed the imposition of fees by the *Shari'a* courts (the orders of the chief Ottoman judge) for court transactions including marriage contracts.

Ottoman rule in Syria met its first serious external challenge with the launching of Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, 1798–9. The Ottoman success at Acre against the French forces in 1799 was made possible only by British support. Hereafter the political and economic intervention of European powers continued to grow until the imposition

of full-scale colonial rule under the 'Mandates' of 1920. The year 1799, therefore, represents the close of the purely Ottoman epoch in Syrian history, and the beginning of its passage into the colonial shadow.

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Sayyar K. Al-Jamil

Iraq lies in the front of the eastern countries. It was singled out for its close cultural, literary and religious relations with many centres and cities such as Iran, Anatolia, Syria, Egypt and Hijaz. It dominated the assemblage of educational galaxy as the hub of Arab, Ottoman and Iranian impact. This was because Iraq was situated on the strategic routes of the world. International commerce passed through Iraq by land and water thus linking East and West (see Map 21).

Mosul and the north of Iraq came under Ottoman control after May 1516, and later Baghdad with the rest of Iraq was brought under Ottoman rule during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent in the years 1534-5 (Longrigg, 1925, pp. 2-12).

The history of Iraqi culture and sciences during the Ottoman era is divided into three principal periods: the direct Turco-Ottoman period in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries; the locally-based Iraqi-Ottoman period in the eighteenth century; the reform period in the nineteenth century.

The first period was an age of chaos and political disharmony in educational and social life in Iraq (Al-'Azzāwī, 1949, p. 23). Trends and movements within the generic mystical current expressed themselves in two main directions: the Turco-Ottoman framework as represented by Bektāshī, Qalandārī, Melamūnī, Mawlawī, Qādirī and Naqshbandī groups which sided with the Ottoman rule; and the Safavid-Iranian framework as represented by Šafavids, Qizilbāshī, Bābā'ī and Ismā'īlī, and so on, which sided with the Šafavid rule and supported it (Dakuki, 1990).

Some of the impact of this duality of thought and allegiance had its reflection on Iraqi writers and poets. These writers called upon the 'ulamā to reinstate religious science to its appropriate status, and advised them to abstain from serving corrupt rulers. Many of those writers and poets expressed their thoughts and poetry in Turkish in the sixteenth century and they were more expressive in that language than in Arabic (Dakuki, 1990).

The increase in the number of religious schools and in private learning contributed to the creation of a new class of scholars and men of letters and students of religious disciplines. There were two main schools of thought which gave rise to several divisions and specializations. The first group was that of religious scholars ('ulamā) and the second was that of poets and men of letters. 'Ulamā represented the traditional Muslim teaching whose main interests were in jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and traditions (*hadith*) as well as the prophet's biography (*siyar*) and that of his companions (*ṣaḥāba*). The scholars in this group devoted their main efforts to commentary (*tafsir*), or clarifications of earlier clarifications of the religious texts. But at the same time they wrote on astronomy, logic, philosophy and rhetoric. Such works were written in Arabic because the


Iraqi scholars did not follow Turkish or Persian scholars in these domains. (Al-'Azzāwī, 1962, 1, pp. 56-91). The second group that contributed to the shaping of intellectual life reflected Ottoman influence and consisted mostly of poets and men of letters who wrote in Turkish or Ottoman-Turkish and Persian besides Arabic. Some of them were distinguishable in their own ethnic cultures, such as the Iraqis: Ridā'ī (d. 1555), Shamsī (d. 1567), Faḍlūlī (Fuzūlī) (d. 1561), Faḍlī' (d. after 1570), 'Ahdī (d. 1593) and Rawḥī (Rūhī) (d. 1605). By the end of the seventeenth century there appeared, for example, Nazmī, Khādimī, Dhīhnī and Kalāmī (fl. seventeenth century) (Gibb, 1900-1; Köprülü, 1926-8).

Some scholars and poets developed an Iraqi-Ottoman personal style with an education of excellent calibre. They differed from the 'ulamā circles in being much more open-minded and less attached to the traditional approaches to teaching and religion. They were influenced by Ottoman and Iranian literature as a result of their ties with the ruling élite. The local group of writers, on the other hand, living among the native population in mosques and hospices, greatly contributed to the establishment of Ottoman literary tradition in Iraq. Faḍlūlī, for instance, was considered one of the leading poets in the Ottoman Empire and wrote extensively in three languages, Arabic, Turkish and Persian (Karahan, 1949, pp. 12, 270).

The confluence of these two groups of writers, the religious scholars and the Ottoman literati, started in Iraq by the mid-seventeenth century, particularly in the field of local histories and biographies. This took place in the wake of the establishment of the first semi-independent local government in Basra under the Efrāsyāb dynasty which ruled the southern part of Iraq (Al-Jamil, 1991, p. 143), where works in Arabic of high literary quality began to appear. This local ruling family fostered literature and learning and some of its members themselves practised scholarship. Under their guidance there emerged several men of letters who combined tradition with contemporary trends. Among enlightened members of this group were Al-Baṣrī (d. seventeenth century); Al-Ḥuwaizī (d. 1664) and Al-Ka'bi (fl. 1683).

In Baghdad and Mosul, the number of new religious and private schools increased considerably which created a new group of scholars and men of letters contributing to the establishment of traditional education albeit without innovation. The lack of creativity may be attributed to the instable political and social situation in Iraq during the seventeenth century.

In this period, Iraqi writers concentrated on religious tradition and biography (Kāhlāla, 1957-61, 3, p. 234; 5, p. 41; 6, p. 200; 8, p. 56), writing Islamic and Ottoman histories based on their own eyewitness observations, as well as using



Map 21 Iraq during the Ottoman period (after S. K. al-Jamil, 1983).

works written in Turkish. Among the Iraqi poets of the period 'Abdul-Bāqī Ibn Murād Al-'Umarī (d. 1697) of Mosul became famous; he met the Grand-vizier Kara Muṣṭafā Pasha (Köprülü) in Istanbul, and taught there for some time (Al-Jamil, 1983, 2, pp. 321-2, 351). Some Iraqi scholars and travellers distinguished themselves in geography.

Among the most outstanding of these during the seventeenth century was Eliyās Ibn Ḥannā Al-Mosulī (fl. 1692) who made a journey to Europe and America. He left Baghdad in 1668, went to Rome via Aleppo, then to France, Spain and America. He visited Panama, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico. Coming back to Rome he spent the rest of his life there and published a book in 1692. He is

considered the first Asian to visit the New World (Rabbat, 1905, pp. 821-1088, 1118-29; 1906, p. 91).

In the eighteenth century Ḥasan Pasha and his son Ahmad Pasha (1704-47) became actual rulers of Iraq. After them their Mamluks ruled over the land until 1831. Under them Iraq witnessed a distinctive era during the eighteenth century. Among distinguished scholars and men of letters of this period mention should be made of Murtaḍā Naẓmī-Zādeh (d. 1723), a famous historian living in Baghdad. The most prominent Iraqi intellectuals of the time were Swaidīs, Raḥbīs, 'Umarīs, Fakhrīs, Hā'irīs and Ḥaidarīs who lived or spent some time in Baghdad, Mosul, Istanbul or Syria (Kalhala, 1957-61, 12, p. 179; 13, p. 95).

From this group Ahmed Wāṣif Al-Baghdādī (d. 1806 or 1807), a poet and polyglot, became the official historian of the Ottoman Empire. In the Sultan's service, he was sent to Russia on a diplomatic mission. His history, *Mahāsin Al-Āḥār*, written in Turkish, is a comprehensive documentary history of the period (Raouf, 1983, pp. 116, 128).

In the same period Rasūl Hāwī Al-Kirkūkī, a distinguished writer and historian (d. 1826), also wrote in Turkish reflecting the official Ottoman view. Another famous author, Muḥammad Al-Swaidī (1785–1830) was a prolific writer, producing twenty-six books on jurisprudence, mysticism and history (Al-'Azzāwī, 1962, 2, p. 48).

We should also mention Dā'ūd Pasha (1774–1851), the famous governor of Baghdad (1818–31) who was greeted by Iraqi scholars as a patron of science and lived up to the title. During his term, Baghdad witnessed a cultural and intellectual renaissance led by an élite of scholars and men of letters ('Uthmān Ibn Sanad, 1991; Al-'Azzāwī, 1962, 2, p. 126). In the same period the Kurds and Arabs became part of the Iraqi élite. Sufism played a fundamental role shaping Iraqi cultural life and originality. Our sources mention three distinct Sufi movements as represented by Qādiriyya, Naqshbandiyya and Rifā'iyya (Al-Janūl, 1988).

Meanwhile in northern Iraq, the local Jalīlī family ruled Mosul in the period 1726–1834. In the period following Nādir Shah's failure at the siege of Mosul, the city became an intellectual centre. In the same period the rule of the Jalīlīs was well established in Mosul (Olson, 1975). Under them a galaxy of men of letters and scholars emerged, greatly influencing the literary revival. Suffice it to say that *Al-Durr al-Makmūr* (Al-Janūl, 1983, 2, pp. 323–508) written in this period by Yāsīn Efendi Al-Khaṭīb Al-'Umārī (1744–1816) contains about 200 biographies of Mosuli men of letters, scholars and Sheikhs of the eighteenth century. Among these were the well-known men of letters, Hasan Abūl-Bāqī (d. 1744), Al-Rawnaqī (d. 1750), Al-Baṣīr (d. 1762), Al-Ghulānī (d. 1772), Al-Ḍafarī (d. 1774), Nashāṭī (d. 1774), and M. Amin Al-Khaṭīb Al-'Umārī (d. 1788).

Al-'Umārī is considered as one of the most outstanding Iraqi historians of the eighteenth century. His works deal with subjects on history, biography, dynastic and local history (Al-Janūl, 1983, 1, pp. 3–145; Kemp, 1980).

In the area of medicine, mention should be made of the widely travelled Mosuli physician Muḥammad Al-'Abdālī (d. 1750). His disciples won fame in medical pursuits and writing. One of the most famous physicians of Iraq, Muḥammad Al-Chalabī (1776–1846), is the author of a book in which he explained the methods and procedures to give smallpox vaccine and the symptoms of the disease as observed in several cases in Mosul (Sā'igh, 1928, pp. 22–3).

During the eighteenth century Mosul witnessed the ideological disputes between the liberal Salafīs and the conservative Sufīs. The 'Salafiyya' religious-intellectual movement was initiated by Sheikh Aḥmad Ibn Al-Kīlā (d. 1759). Mosul then witnessed the activities of missionaries, the French ones in particular who attempted to spread Catholicism. They greatly influenced social as well as cultural life in the country. We must bear in mind that both Muslim and Christian cultures coexisted in Iraq for ages and each one had its distinctive features and tools of action. Many of the monks and priests were well known as scientists, poets, travellers and teachers. They wrote in Arabic. Perhaps the most important among them were the Dominicans in Mosul, active around 1750. They secured medical and scientific

services to the country. They established, for example, a secular school known as 'The School of the Dominican Fathers' from which many scholars and educators graduated (Fiey, 1960, pp. 7–29; Lanza, 1951, p. 21). Many Arabs came to study in Mosul, a city known for scholars specializing in astronomy, mathematics and engineering, among them Abdullāh Al-Suwaīdī (Al-Suwaīdī, n.d.).

General education on the general levels greatly expanded in Iraq, particularly in Mosul which attracted the attention of visitors. An Indian traveller, Mirzā Abū Tālib Khān visited Mosul in 1799, and praised the educational standard of both common people and officials. He says: 'They were educated people and enjoyed high moral standards accompanied by loveable characteristics and openmindedness... Since I left Paris, I have not met with men as illuminated in the mind as them' (Abū Tālib Khān, 1969, p. 359). Making a comparison between their level of education and that of the officials whom he had met in the Ottoman capital he stressed that if the ministers of the Sultan had enjoyed only a tenth of their skill, the empire would not have suffered such reverses (Abū Tālib Khān, 1969).

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17.3

OTTOMAN EGYPT (AD 1517-1798)

'Abdul Rahim 'Abdul Raluman

The defeat inflicted by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, first on Al-Ghūrī at Marj Dābiq in Syria in August 1516, then on Tuman Bey, the last of the Mamluk sultans, at the battle of Al-Rādaniyya in Egypt in January 1517, spelled the end of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt (1250-1517). Egypt's sovereignty over Syria and the Hejaz was broken as these areas, like Egypt itself, became provinces (*mihlās*) of the expanding Ottoman Empire. Contemporary Egyptians deplored the eclipse of Egypt's role in the political life of this region, as she was ruled from Istanbul for the next three centuries (Ibn Iyās, 1961, p. 201) (see Map 22). Yet the Egyptian people seemed to accept this Ottoman domination easily after the sufferings they had endured under the unstable rule of the Mamluks, who had reduced them to poverty and starvation. A brief look at the last days of Mamluk rule will give us some idea of the changes that occurred during this lengthy period of Ottoman rule.

Around the turn of the sixteenth century the Mamluk state faced severe challenges owing to the weakening of its economy, which was largely the result of its inability to defend the Red Sea trade route against the Portuguese who had recently discovered the sea route to India. Ibn Iyās noted, 'During the regime of Al-Ghūrī we endured strange things and suffered more than we could bear. In our time, what we endured of insecurity and highway robbery is sufficient enough (to mention).'

The deterioration of the regime's economic position led to political instability as troops frequently rebelled because the state could no longer afford to pay their salaries. Debased currency began to be circulated officially and the situation was made worse as taxes remained unchanged in the towns and the countryside (Ibn Iyās, 1961, pp. 14, 19). As Egypt's position declined, the Ottoman state that was arising in Asia Minor and the Balkans suddenly turned towards the Arab world, for Sultan Selim sought to preclude a Mamluk-Persian alliance and to punish the Mamluk state for giving political refuge to *amirs* who had fled Selim's court by launching a pre-emptive campaign against the Mamluk Empire (Rafeq, 1968, pp. 96-7).

After Syria, Egypt, the Hejaz and the Yemen had been brought into the Ottoman state the Ottomans assumed the burden of defending the Arab coasts against attacks by the Portuguese. They also assumed a defence against the Spanish who menaced the north-west African coast.


OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION IN EGYPT

During his brief stay in Egypt Sultan Selim was not so much interested in putting order into the Egyptian administration

as he was in restoring stability to the Egyptian economy. After having appointed Kha'ir Bey the first Ottoman governor of his new province, Sultan Selim departed from Egypt in September 1517 (Ibn 'Abd al-Ghannī, 1978, p. 6). It was during Kha'ir Bey's period of office that the first attempts were made to apply the Ottoman system of administration in Egypt. The Mamluk system was practically abolished and the Ottoman system under the supervision of the Hanafī chief judge was installed (el-Nahat, 1979).

The Ottomans were on the verge of transforming the administration after having crushed the rebellion of the second governor, Ahmad Pasha, known as the itairoi (*Al-Khā'im*) (Ibn 'Abd al-Ghannī, 1978, p. 17), when the new Ottoman ruler, Sultān Süleymān I, issued his famous *Qānūnāme-i Mısır*. This fundamental law provided an Ottoman system of regulations for the political, military, civil and economic life of the country. Under this system the governor of Egypt was a *pasha* with the grade of vizier. He was assisted by a number of officials, such as a chief steward, a treasurer, the chief judge and the military organized into several military divisions. Already in the sixteenth century the influence of the Ottoman garrison troops began to increase. From the beginning of the seventeenth century the garrison troops began to exert their independence of the governor and to impose their will upon the populace. Their frequent rebellions caused great suffering to the Egyptians. As the garrisons abandoned their prime duty of safeguarding law and order and became interested only in signing their names in the pay registers to obtain their salaries on a new rank, they fell under influence of the Mamluk factions. The garrisons became so enfeebled and corrupt that they ceased to be a military force. When the French invaded in 1798, for instance, there is no evidence at all that the Ottoman troops put up any resistance (Ahmad, 1978, pp. 61-6). Many of the military functions were actually carried out by Mamluks.

Despite the destruction of Mamluk power by Sultan Selim, the surviving Mamluk *amirs* submitted to Ottoman authority and remained as a ruling element in the provinces, where they held positions as *sansaq beys* and *kāshifs*. Both Sultan Selim and Sultān Süleymān incorporated them into the administration they left behind in Egypt, hoping to use the remaining Mamluks as a balancing element between the governor and the Ottoman garrison troops. Indeed, the first governor of Egypt was Kha'ir Bey, a Mamluk *amir* (al-Ishaqī, AH 1310, p. 135). Mamluk troops were even organized into their own separate corps and given virtual control of the countryside. Mamluk factions, permitted to purchase new recruits by the Ottoman rulers, were therefore able to challenge Ottoman administration throughout the entire



Map 22 Egypt during the Ottoman period (after Zuhdi Saleem).

period of Ottoman rule in Egypt. Mamluks were able to assume some of the highest positions within the bureaucracy and to claim command positions within the garrison corps. Eventually, by the early eighteenth century the leader of the mamluk *beylicate* was more powerful than the governor and took the unofficial title of *sheikh al-balad* (commander of the city). Finally, the Mamluk *sheikh al-balad* 'Alī Bey al-Kabir undertook a revolt in the years 1769–73 that destroyed all but the last vestiges of Ottoman authority in Egypt. His successors, Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey ruled Egypt as an autonomous province until the coming of the French expedition in 1798. (On the regimes of 'Alī Bey and Muḥammad Bey, see Crecelius, 1981.)

ADMINISTRATION OF THE EGYPTIAN COUNTRYSIDE

During the Ottoman period the Egyptian village constituted an administrative and financial unit. There was in every village during the sixteenth century a local administrative apparatus which was responsible for controlling the village and collecting the taxes from the peasants for delivery to the central administration or its tax-farmer (*mutazim*), but from the second half of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century these functions were usurped by the *mutazims* themselves ('Abdul Rahman, 1974, pp. 18, 19, 58, 74). The original apparatus had been composed almost entirely of peasants from the village itself. It was composed of the following officials.

Each village had one or more *sheikhs*, each *sheikh* being head of a family or clan. Sometimes a village might have as many as twenty *sheikhs*, the wealthiest of whom held the title of *sheikh al-nashāyikh*, or *naqaddin* (Baer, 1969, pp. 30-1; Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. a, sijill 17, p. 187; n.d. b). By the eighteenth century this position became hereditary. Its transfer from father to son needed nothing more than the confirmation of the tax-farmer, who usually chose one of the sons of the deceased official as the new *sheikh al-nashāyikh*, whereupon the tax-farmer and the new *sheikh al-nashāyikh* exchanged gifts at a ceremony confirming the deal ('Abdul Rahman, 1974, p. 18; Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. a, sijill 17, pp. 40, 45, 187; see also Ghnrbal, 1953, question 4, p. 39).

The *sheikhs*, whose duties were numerous, had great authority over the peasants. They were responsible for cleaning the canals and sweeping away the dykes at the appropriate time of the growing season. For this operation they had to provide supplies to the workers. They were also responsible for collecting taxes from the peasants for delivery to the tax-farmer(s). They provided for the security of their villages, were responsible for the distribution of land amongst the peasants and for irrigation, and served as judges in resolving disputes which arose among the villagers. They were prominent members of the village's conciliation committees whose opinions carried great weight (*Qāmūnāme-i Mīr*, p. 1; Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. a, sijill 17, p. 186; sijill 1, p. 55). In return for carrying out these duties a piece of land was assigned to them, or they were granted a piece of land exempt from taxation. The tax-farmer of the village frequently received clothes every year.

In reality, the village *sheikh* became a local tyrant, abusing his authority and compelling the peasants to pay a continuing stream of illegal fees which he frequently shared with the tax-collector. We find in the records examples of some village *sheikhs* who accumulated great wealth and who constituted a notable class in the countryside. Some even became tax-farmers themselves. Numerous contemporary sources mention that the village *sheikhs* were hated by the peasants because of their arbitrariness. The *sheikhs* also played an important role in the tribal disputes which occurred in the countryside during this period ('Abdul Rahman, 1974, pp. 21, 23, 182; Ghnrbal, 1953, p. 49).

The official witness (*shāhid*) was an important official in the administration of Egyptian villages because it was his responsibility to register in the official documents all the land of the village, basin by basin and *faddān* by *faddān*. He recorded the name of each peasant who cultivated the land, the area cultivated by each, and the tax each peasant paid. The witness also noted in his record book the names of the *sheikhs* and the name of all the peasants for whom the *sheikhs* was responsible. He also recorded information on the dykes and the canals in the vicinity of the village and the names of those who cleaned their dykes. This information from the witness's record book was forwarded to the tax-collector and formed the basis for tax assessment and collection. The witness was always a member of conciliation committee and the evidence he could provide from his record book was important in solving disputes (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. c, sijill 4619).

The witness was selected by vote by the peasants. Because of the nature of his work he had to be able to read and write and have a knowledge of keeping accounts and of surveying.

According to official documents the *unbāshār* (agent of the tax-farmer) was responsible for appointing the tax-collector (*sarrāf*), or Christian (*uasrānī*) as he was cited in contemporary sources because most of the tax-collectors

were Copts (al-Sharbini, 1890, p. 115). This official levied the fixed taxes according to the information recorded in the witness register, helped the village *sheikhs*, and after paying the required administrative expenditures related to the tax-farm from the sums which he collected from the villagers, delivered the remaining profit, or surplus, to the tax-farmer or his agent (Poljak, 1939, p. 72). According to the records of the religious courts and the *Qāmūnāme-i Mīr*, he also had to conduct land surveys and redistribute land among the peasants in the area under his jurisdiction in an effort to give each peasant an equitable amount of land (*Qāmūnāme-i Mīr*, pp. 12-136; SCA, n.d. a, sijill 120). Some tax-collectors performed their duties honestly, but many others exploited their positions to impose illegal taxes and fees upon the peasants, which earned them the fear and hatred of the peasants. A folk poet made the following statement regarding the fear of those peasants who were unable to pay their state tax.

How common was the fear of imprisonment and beatings for those who were unable to pay the (al-miri). There were peasants who mortgaged their harvest in advance at a lower price, or sold their animals that provided milk for their children, or took jewelry from their wives, sometimes even by force, to pawn or sell outright in order to pay the tax collector ('Abdul Rahman, 1975, p. 262).

In any case, the arrival of the tax-collector in a village brought fear to the peasants and catastrophic consequences for the poor. In addition to the illegal taxes and fees which the tax-collector collected for himself, he received a fixed salary from the tax-farmer in return for the performance of his duties.

Originally the duty of the supervisor (*al-khawāṭir*) was to supervise the cultivation of the *usiya* land assigned to the tax-farmer, but over time his duties were extended to include surveys of the cultivable land and the recording of any alterations made to them, which he presented to the tax-collector and the village *sheikhs*, especially in Upper Egypt, because of the Nile flood. Each village had a supervisor ('Abdul Rahman, 1974, p. 28; Shaw, 1962, pp. 54-5).

The supervisor was required to know the boundaries of the village's land and was responsible for settling disputes among the peasants that involved land or cultivation. Like the witness, he had to know the land basin by basin, *faddān* by *faddān*. He shared in the responsibility of redistributing land among the peasants, looked after their needs, and recruited them for forced labour. He was charged with keeping the irrigation system in his *ihizām* in good condition. According to documents of the religious courts, he had to be a member of conciliation committees to help settle disputes between the peasants and their tax-farmer(s). If he did not perform his functions properly the village *sheikh* could dismiss him and appoint another in his place (SCA, n.d. b, sijill 5, p. 57). If he performed his duties satisfactorily he went at the end of the year to the court to swear in front of the judge that he had fulfilled his duties in a proper manner. The supervisor's position, too, became hereditary, for we find in the religious court documents that the son of the supervisor always became the new supervisor after his father's death. In return for carrying out his duties the supervisor received a fixed salary from the provincial treasury, but like the other village officials he also imposed fees on the helpless peasants (Ghnrbal, 1953, p. 40).

In those cases where the tax-farmer was unable or unwilling to administer his *ihizām* personally, he appointed an agent to represent his interests in each village belonging to his tax-

farm. In those villages where the tax-farm was shared among several tax-farmers, 'administration for all was usually carried out by the agents of the one with the largest interest.' (Shaw, 1968, p. 98). The tax-farmers gave their representatives wide administrative authority. They supervised cultivation and the collection of taxes and received the rents from the peasants by way of the tax-collectors and the village *sheikhs*.

In return for carrying out these duties on behalf of the tax-farmer, the agent received his wages from the tax-farmer, but the records make clear that he also imposed fees for himself on the peasants (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. d, sijills 49, 1605, 1808).

The executor (*al-muṣhidd*) performed the orders of the village *sheikh*. His duty was to bring the peasants together when it was time to collect the taxes and fees (Ghurbal, 1953, pp. 40-1). He therefore knew each peasant of the village by name and where he lived. He also acted as a guide in the village for strangers. It was his onerous task to inform the peasants of the orders of the local or central administration. Sometimes he had to carry out these orders by force, at which time he might drag the peasant by his mustache, hit him, or insult him (al-Jabarti, 1904, vol. 4, p. 207). He had authority over the watchman (*ghaṣīr*), to whom he would give orders to assemble the peasants before the village council or to force the peasants to undertake *corvée* labour. For this reason he was despised by the peasants.

The documents of the religious courts and contemporary sources reveal that there were a number of watchmen (sing., *ghaṣīr*, or *khaṣīr*) in each village. Their duties included guarding the village and its cultivation, preventing robberies and offenses, warning the peasants about bedouin attacks, guarding the dykes against tampering and carrying out the orders of the executor (SCA, n.d. a, sijill 313, p. 325). Although in most cases they seemed to have discharged their duties in an honest manner, we find in the official documents many peasant complaints against some watchmen, many of whom found ways to charge the peasants for fees (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. d, sijills 49, 1605, 1608).

The groom (*al-kallāf*) was appointed originally by the tax-farmer to protect his cattle (Ghurbal, 1953, p. 40) but his duties were later expanded to include all the cattle of the village. He was the village's veterinarian. He received a fixed salary from the tax-farmer, but also took fees from the peasants. In time these fees became customary (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. d, sijills 49, 1605).

The office of the judge '*qādi al-shara'*', which was created during the Ottoman period, was one of the most important offices in the administration of the countryside, for the judge was charged with settling disputes among the peasants. These judges were agents of the chief judge in Cairo who was a Turk sent from Istanbul who had the authority to appoint agents in the different districts to adjudicate cases according to the religious school of Abu Hanīfa (SCA, n.d. c, sijill 2, pp. 165-6). (Sunnī Muslims recognize four interpretations, or schools, of Islamic law. The Ottoman Turks officially adhered to the Hanafī rite.) The judge always had an agent

and a translator, for all the judges in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries were Turks and could not usually speak Arabic (SCA, n.d. c, sijill 5, p. 1; B. Iyās, 1961, p. 165).

The judge had extensive authority over all village officials in his district. Each official had to appear before the judge at the end of each year to swear and register in his record book that he had rendered his service completely (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. a, sijill 1, p. 92; sijill 3, p. 71). He was also charged with resolving disputes arising among the peasants or other inhabitants of his district and had to record his decisions in his registry, a practice that was important should the dispute break out again. He was also in charge of distributing inheritances among heirs and for contracting marriages (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. a, sijill 4, pp. 150-6; n.d. b).

In return for carrying out his duties he received a fee from every litigant. His fee in cases involving inheritance or marriage could vary, sometimes amounting to one-third of the total inheritance (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. a, sijill 2, p. 6). The records reveal that some of the judges carried out their sacred duties in a dishonest manner and became quite wealthy through the large sums they collected for their services (al-Jabarti, 1904, vol. 4, p. 127).

LAND TENURE AND FINANCIAL BURDENS

According to Islamic theories of sovereignty, agricultural land was owned by the state or the Sultan. During the Ottoman period Egypt's agricultural land was divided into three types on the basis of the kind of taxes it paid. These were (1) lands producing taxes for the state, (2) lands endowed for pious religious purposes, and (3) lands allocated to the governor and other high officials.

From the beginning of Ottoman rule in 1517 to 1658 *kharājīyya* (taxable) land was administered through salaried agents (*amīns*). Each agent was given one or more tax-farms to administer. But beginning in 1658 when the *iltizām* system was instituted, land was assigned on a new basis. Some arable land was distributed to peasants who paid a rent to be able to cultivate their crops on the land. The peasant did not own the land, but had the right to continue his cultivation of it as long as he paid the rent and other taxes to the tax-farmer or his agent. He had the right to cultivate the land himself, to rent it or sharecrop it, or to mortgage it for a short time if conditions compelled him to do so. This was one type of land tenure relating to *kharājīyya* land under *iltizām* system.

A second type of *kharājīyya* land was known as *usiya*, or *usiyya* land. This land, which was found in both Upper and Lower Egypt, was allocated to the farmer(s),² and the percentage of this type of land tenure reached 50 per cent or more in many villages.

Under the *iltizām* system the tax-farmer purchased the right to the usufruct of the village from the government, at which time the percentage of *usiya* land was fixed. He leased the *ard*

Name of village	Province	Total area by <i>faddān</i>	<i>Ard al-Filāha</i>	<i>Ard al-usiya</i>	% of <i>usiya</i> land
Mīnya al-Qamh	Sharqiyya	784	480	304	38.8
Mit Bashshar	Sharqiyya	755.5	351	404.5	53.5
Zarzamun	Sharqiyya	2239.33-1/3	2239.33-1/3	-	0
Abu al-Iyāl	Gharbiyya	412	342	70	17.0

See: Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. d, Dafath al-Tarabī, sijills 49; 1605, 1608.

al-filāḥa to the peasants on the basis of the information contained in the official village registers or ordered a new distribution. It should be noted that this type of land was usually designated into three classes (superior, medium and inferior) on the basis of its fertility and productivity. In some cases each of these three classifications was further divided into superior, superior-medium, or superior-inferior designations.

The taxes due on this land were collected by the local agents representing the tax-farmer who delivered the required amount (the price of his lease) to the government in three equal instalments. The difference between the tax paid to the government and the rent which the tax-farmer collected from the peasants, and which was his to keep, came to be known as the *ḥaḍ'īd* (profit) and was much higher than the amount delivered by the tax-farmer to the government ('Abd al-Rahman, 1976). Especially in the eighteenth century, when the heavy financial burdens and the severity of the administrative apparatus were particularly oppressive to the peasant, large areas of village lands fell out of cultivation because the peasants neglected their plots and escaped to other districts. Especially during the years of anarchy much agricultural land fell into disuse and degenerated into desert. This process signalled the bankruptcy of the *iltizām* system and with disturbing frequency tax-farmers returned their *iltizāms* to the government. The government was therefore compelled to create special works' registers to record the mausoleums, asylums for sufis, Qm'ān schools, water basins for animals, al-Azhar facilities, and other benevolent structures which the tyrants constructed as a means of obtaining blessings and to justify their oppression of the peasants.

Endowed land, whose usufruct was devoted to pious purposes, was exempted from state taxes, but did pay a symbolic 'protection tax' which the government collected in return for protection provided by the village administration against the attacks of nomads or other dangers. We find evidence in the documents from the period that the government permitted some tax-farmers to transform parts of their *usiya* lands into *waqf* (*nizāq*) land, which permitted the tax-farmers to enjoy all the usufruct of the land themselves and to pass the land by heredity to their heirs. The government kept a special periodic register called *daftar al-nizāq* to record the extent and expansion of this type of land tenure. In these registers we find a complete description of each piece of land, its location, the names of the people who enjoyed its usufruct and the date that it was transformed into *waqf* land. These registers also record copies of the deeds and decrees concerning these lands.³

Arḍ al-utlāq, or *utlāq* (from the Turkish *otlak*; pasture land) was untaxed government land producing feed for the horses of the governor and the Mamluk *beys*. During the course of the eighteenth century, as the power of the Mamluk *beys* increased at the expense of the government, much of this land was transferred from the governor to the tax-farmers in whose tax-farms it was located and became part of the tax-farmers' *usiya* land. To compensate the governor for the loss of his *utlāq* on pasture land the tax-farmers had to pay him a fee.

We find in addition to these three basic types of land tenure other types of land. Such lands, because of their poor quality or inability to sustain a crop, paid no taxes at all. These lands were small areas compared to the other types mentioned above and were found in only a few of the villages.

This system of land tenure imposed heavy financial burdens, both official and unofficial, upon the peasants. Some of these burdens are:

The *malal-mīrī* was the only official tax imposed on the arable land by the government. Its value was determined on the basis of the quality and productivity of each type of land. This tax was raised through the years until it quadrupled by the end of the eighteenth century (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. e, sijill 183, 468), becoming a heavy burden on the peasants. The time for paying this tax was dreadful for the peasants because of the harsh measures exercised against them in collecting it (al-Sharbīnī, 1890, pp. 125-6).

The *mudāḥf* represented all the increases to the *malal-mīrī* discussed above and was incorporated into it over time. It was imposed three times under the *ihizām* system, in 1688, 1742 and 1760, in order to cover the deficit in the sultan's share of the *mīrī* tax, which resulted from the corruption of the administration and also from the political upheavals and military feuds among the Mamluk *beys*, many of whom postponed payment of the *mīrī* taxes imposed on their tax farms (al-Damurdashi, 1989, pp. 28-9). Therefore the government, in accordance with the system of securities (*taḍammun*) which were imposed by the administration on the villages for the collection of the taxes, imposed a *mudāḥf* on some villages and not on others. In this way some villages had to cover the deficit that occurred in other villages (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. e, sijill 180). Another excuse given for the imposition of the *mudāḥf* was the necessity for the Ottoman Empire to wage war against its enemies. These wars consumed large percentages of the taxes and forced the government to cover this deficit by imposing additional taxes. These are the most important causes for the imposition of *mudāḥf* taxes.

The *ḥaḍ'īd* was the difference between the *mīrī* tax imposed on the land and the rent collected by the tax-farmer from the peasants. According to contemporary documents, the value of the *ḥaḍ'īd* was usually more than twice the *malal-mīrī* during the eighteenth century. We have found that the *mīrī* imposed on one *faddān* was between 66 and 140 *paras*, depending on the quality of the soil. But the documents of the religious courts reveal that the rent of a *faddān* during this same period was between 369 and 600 *paras* (Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. d, sijill 1605, 1608; SCA, n.d. a, sijill 313, p. 325).

The *barānī*, or *'ādāt*, were the fees which the village officials imposed on the peasants for such items as butter, sheep, honey, cheese, cereals, chickens and other farm products. During the eighteenth century they appear to have been imposed in terms of a monetary value and were officially recorded in the tax registers. In fact, the accumulated taxes demanded under *barānī* far exceeded the value of the official *malal-mīrī*. Staggered by these financial burdens, the peasants at the end of the eighteenth century began to abandon their villages. In response, some tax-farmers tried to offer concessions, such as release from the hated *barānī* taxes, to keep the peasants from fleeing, but village administrators still compelled them to pay. As the condition of the peasantry continued to decline no escape was seen from these taxes except through the abolition of the entire system; this was the reform undertaken by Muḥammad 'Alī in the nineteenth century.

The *kashīfiyya* tax was imposed to cover the expenses of the local administration in the provinces, such as the salaries of the *kāshif*, the maintenance of dykes, the digging of canals and the salaries of the local soldiers. Contemporary sources demonstrate that the *kāshif* usually acted arbitrarily in collecting this tax from the villages assigned to him.

It is therefore clear that the peasants suffered a great deal under the tyranny of the *kāshif*, his soldiers and entourage.

The latter did not hesitate to use violence against the peasants to force them to provide them with food and drinks beyond their ability. For these reasons the visit of the *kāshif* to the village was something the peasants detested very much.

THE EFFECTS OF OTTOMAN RULE

The Ottoman administration collected its revenues from Egypt from three basic sources, the land-tax (*Kharāj*), the taxes from customs houses (*kharāj al-jamā'ik*), and miscellaneous sources (*amwāl muntafarika*) (Almad, 1978, p. 321). From these total revenues the Ottoman administration in Egypt paid its expenses, which included salaries given to the governor, his aides and the garrison troops, and all other expenses of administering the affairs of the province (Shaw, 1968). The surplus of income over expenditures was to be dispatched to the central government and the sultan in Istanbul (see Figure 21). The following are examples of the fluctuating size of this 'surplus' which Egypt was expected to produce for the use of the central government (Shaw, 1968, pp. 31-367; 1962, pp. 338-403; Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. f, nos 5249, 2106, 2111).

Year	Total Surplus in paras
1525	16,000,000
1535	20,000,000
1585	24,000,000
1590	20,000,000
1661	15,861,461
1661	30,000,000
1680	19,157,379
1683	22,955,187
1741	23,894,582
1763	17,800,513
1765	20,950,000
1786	35,323,000
1795	11,652,727

Figure 21 Surplus of income over expenditure in Egypt during Ottoman rule.

Even after the shifting of international trade around the Cape of Good Hope, Egypt maintained trade relations with the countries of the Mediterranean world, with the Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen and other Arab states. However, Indian trade through the Red Sea and the Gulf was revived and the Arab cities profited from the revival in the period 1520-1620 (H. Inalick, ed., 1994). But over time the Ottomans could not defend the eastern Mediterranean waters from the attacks of European navies nor could they safeguard the overland trade routes, which were subject to frequent bedouin predation. The subsequent interruption of Egypt's international trade routes forced commerce to become mostly local. Internal trade, too, was affected by the despotism of the administrative apparatus; an impoverished populace could not sustain active domestic trade.

According to governing practice, land was the property of the state and the peasants could only enjoy its usufruct, but we have seen how the peasants were robbed of the fruits of their labour by a tax system that left them with barely enough to survive as a result of the weakening of the Ottoman central control after 1600. The state assigned the produce of the land to Mamluk *amirs*, to garrison officers, to tribal chiefs and even, in the eighteenth century, to *'ulamā* and rich merchants

through tax-farming. As the tax burden became even heavier on the peasants under the *iltizam* system, peasants were forced to abandon their fields and agriculture contracted to a narrow ribbon of cultivation along both banks of the Nile.

During the eighteenth century the political instability arising from the incessant conflicts among the Mamluk *amirs* had a direct impact on agriculture, causing it to contract, and forcing peasants to live in a state of semi-starvation (SCA, n.d. b, no. 3, p. 101; see also Girard, 1942, p. 28; al-Hitia, 1904, p. 177).

As regards industry, besides the local cottage industries related to agriculture in the countryside, there were in the towns factories for making textiles whose workers were organized into guilds. Egypt exported its textile products to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Yet these guilds were another factor, along with the oppression of the Mamluks, in explaining the lack of industrial growth during the Ottoman period (al-Giritli, 1952, p. 22; al-Jaharti, 1904, vol. II, p. 239; see also Baer, 1964; Raymond, 1973-4). In brief, economic conditions were difficult during the Ottoman period.

CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC LIFE

During the period of Ottoman rule *kutub*s were numerous, but these primary schools of the Muslim community limited instruction to the basic principles of reading and writing and to the reciting of the Qur'ān. In the mosques and colleges the religious scholars (*'ulamā*) taught the principles of religion and the learned Azhari scholars produced little more than commentaries of the works of earlier authors. In the biographies of the *'ulamā* which al-Jabarti compiled in his famous history of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries he pointed out the influential role which these scholars played in the cultural and scientific life in Egypt during the Ottoman period. This role became more obvious in the eighteenth century, particularly after the emergence of a recognized leader for al-Azhar in a position known as sheikh al-Azhar. Ottoman policy was to give great significance to al-Azhar and its *'ulamā*, for both played a significant cultural and political role in Egypt.

During the Ottoman period the following subjects were taught at al-Azhar: theological subjects such as interpretations of the holy Qur'ān, traditions of the Prophet, prophetic jurisprudence according to the four schools of religious law, the unity of Allāh, ethics, Arabic language and literature and its related branches. Later, other subjects were taught, such as astronomy, and a few sciences such as physics, biology and mathematics (which included arithmetic, algebra and geometry). Al-Jaharti, Sheikh Ahmad al-Damadhuri and Sheikh Mustafa ibn Muhammad ibn Unis were competent in these fields (al-Jabarti, 1904).

The Ottoman governors paid due respect to and encouraged such scientific and cultural activities undertaken by the scholars of al-Azhar, to the extent that they occasionally held seminars with the *'ulamā* to discuss history and review various studies or new research. Al-Azhar continued to play its role in preserving an Islamic style and culture and students from all over the Islamic world came to study Islamic theology and other subjects with its international faculty of scholars. Students were housed in twenty-six different residential units representing the different regions from which they came.

Several schools were annexed to and supervised by al-Azhar. The purpose of these schools was to prepare students

for study at al-Azhar itself. Examples are al-Mahmudiyya, al-Ashrafiyya, and the *madrasa* of Muḥammad Bey Abn al-Dhahab, each of which was supported by its own religious endowments which funded both the activities of these institutions and their students.

Each school also had its own library (al-Jabarti, 1904, vol. I, pp. 417–18). Like the Ottoman governors, the *Manlik amirs* were keen to endow edifices for the purpose of instructing children to read and write and to memorize the holy Qur'ān. The number of *kuttābs* established in Cairo and other Egyptian towns during the Ottoman period was great indeed, indicating an unflagging attention to the sustenance of Islamic culture and to education.

During the French occupation of Egypt (1798–1801) the *ulama* of al-Azhar were given memberships to one of the governing committees the French created. Despite this courtship by the French, al-Azhar was the centre of the first Cairo revolt on 21 October, 1798 and al-Azhar's scholars and students headed the second Cairo revolt, which provoked French retaliation against al-Azhar, its scholars and students. Upon the evacuation of the French, al-Azhar continued to play its traditional cultural and educational role.

A school of Egyptian historians of the Ottoman centuries has two distinct branches of authors, namely, the *'ahmā* and the *oḡalis* (regimental troops). These two groups of authors have left us a series of interrelated chronicles and biographical dictionaries that provide important information on Egyptian affairs during the Ottoman period. Some of these works have now been published, while others which have attracted the interest of a new generation of scholars will soon be published.

Sufism gained in influence over Egyptian society during the Ottoman period and its various 'rites' spread in the capital, other cities and the countryside. We can observe a number of sufi 'rites' that spread in the Egyptian society. The number is more than eighty. The most important is 'Al Ahmadiyya rite' descended from Mīr Ahmad Al Badawī, 'Al Qadiriyya rite' from Abdul Qādir El-Jailānī and 'Al Refāiyya rite' El Abbās, known as Ibn Refā'iyya.

Sufism introduced into the religious life in Egypt during the Ottoman period a feature of fatalism, and pessimism, and taught the virtues of patience, and quietly enduring injury and oppression.

Another kind of social institution spreading in Egypt during the Ottoman period was that of public recitation. Egyptians liked to hear public recitations and to listen to what was mentioned in 'Alf Laila wa laila' (the Arabian Nights) and 'Antara lhn Shadad' of the Absi tribe, 'Saif Bin The Yazan' and 'Abū Zaid El Hilālī' of the Hilālī tribe, 'Al Zeir Salemi', specially in parties.

There were people who specialized in reciting them. So there was a specialized reciter for each type of lore. Proverbs, and tales of victory and defeat, injustice and oppression were recounted, along with those of champions and heroes.

Love was central to 'Antara' and 'Al-Dāher Baibars' and 'Al Hilālī'. The chanter or reciter was called the 'poet of rebecc' because he was accompanied with a rebecc. The poet of the rebecc was able to recognize the psychological situation of the listeners. So he used to add something that would suit them and the sentiments ('Abdul Rahman, 1974, pp. 230–8) and he played the role of the main and secondary characters of the lore as well (Khorshid, 1984, p. 25).

In the villages farmers used to hold parties and invite 'Al Hilālī' and 'Al Dāher Baibars' reciters; they loved to hear of the 'Baibars' role in war against the crusaders and the resistance

against the 'Tatars' – and they drew an epic picture of the 'Baibars' who represented idealism and supernatural heroism.

The public poet concentrated on points that appealed to the feeling of the attendees. So they might ask him to repeat what he has said once or twice and he had to add items of his own, when he realized where the enthusiasm of the audience lay.

Those poets used folk songs in a colloquial language which described the position of the farmer and his economic and social situation and brought some emotional relief to the Egyptian farmer in that period. Poets had to resort to generating invisible forces when they recited stories of 'Alf laila wa lila', and these invisible forces interfered directly in a lot of attitudes, to assure the Egyptians of the fact of their connections and solidarity in the face of the problems that surrounded them. The poets exploited the psychological state of their listeners to expose the contest between good and bad, and show how good was found to win.

During the Ottoman period different developments related to architecture and fine arts are noticeable. We find several mosques and schools spread all over Cairo, where the mosque was a school at the same time. Ottoman influences were reflected in them because they were built by the Ottoman Pashas who ruled Egypt during this period and by their contemporary *Manlik Amirs*. The Dawood Pasha and Ahmad Pasha mosques, the Masih Pasha mosque, 'Abdin Bey's mosque, Abdul Rahman Katakhda's mosque and Muḥammad Bey Abu El Dhahab's mosque are examples of them. Besides, we find several Khans which were considered commercial corporations and which are still standing. The most famous Khans in Egypt are Khan El Khalili, Khan Jamal El Dein El Dhahabi, Khan El Sharaibi and Khan Mohammad Bey Abu El Dhahab. That is in addition to the Qaysariyya which were roofed markets (the singular is kaysariyya). We also find many aristocratic houses in Jamāliyyah, like Jamal El Dein's in Hausi Khadani street, Al Kredah's, Suhaymū's, Mustafa Jaffar's, Al Selehdar's and the House of Musafer Khanah as well as the House of Ibrahim Karakhda Al Samari in Al Sayyidah Zainab, in addition to hundreds of poor houses which are still located in Cairo, especially in Al Jamalia quarter. Ottoman influences were reflected in all these kinds of architecture in mosaic and decoration.

Ottoman influences on fine arts are central in many tiny industries which the Egyptians produced during the Ottoman period like jewellery, woodwork, furniture, carpers and weapons like swords and guns as well as silver saddles and pottery. These works are accurately distinguished with tiny decorations as historical industries; a large number of these works are still kept in museums ('Abdul Rahman, 1974, pp. 238–40).

NOTES

1 During this period there were two kinds of dykes or bridges (*jusur*), *jusur al-sultaniyya*, for which the government was responsible, and *jusur al-baladiyya*, which the villagers were responsible for maintaining. Abdul Rahman, 1974, pp. 23, 82.

2 Lancrer erroneously reported that *usiya* land did not exist in the region south of Minya, for we have found in the tax records and other contemporary sources that it was indeed established in Upper Egypt south of Minya. We can also correct Lancrer's estimate of the amount of this type of land in each village. Lancrer asserted that *usiya* land did not exceed

10 per cent in any village, but we have found in the records completed under the supervision of the *savants* of the French expedition themselves (Lancret, 1809, p. 471; Abdul Rahman, 1974, p. 79).

3 Dar al-Mahfuzat, n.d. c. *Dafatir al-Rizqat al-Abbasiyya*, sijills 1617, 1619, 1624, 1626. These registers are extremely important for studies of the economic and social history of Egypt during the Ottoman period.

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NORTH AFRICA

Abdeljelil Temimi

The sixteenth century marked a turning-point in the history of North Africa. In the previous century, the endless conflicts between the strife-torn political authorities and the local tribal or religious forces had hastened the pace of disintegration and decline. In Europe, after the capture of Granada in 1492, Spain completed the reconquest of its territory by expelling the Moriscos in 1609 and vied with the Ottoman Turks for control of the Mediterranean. Spain accordingly engaged in an expansionist policy in the Maghrib, which was thereafter at its mercy and that of Portugal. Both countries embarked on a policy of conquest along the North African coasts and experienced little difficulty in gaining a foothold there from the fifteenth century onwards. These conquests made it possible to set up well-armed 'presidios' or trading posts enabling closer control to be exercised over shipping and trade in the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the Ottomans, following their seizure of Constantinople, had continued to extend their influence and their conquests. With their disciplined, well-equipped and powerful army and large fleet, they were the only Muslim power capable of withstanding Spain's ambitions and hence came to be the champions of the Muslim world against the hegemonic aspirations of Spain and Western Christendom in the Mediterranean.

Early in the sixteenth century, there was one fundamental development which was to upset the political and military scheme of things in North Africa. This was the arrival from the Aegean island of Mitylene on the North African scene of the Barbarossa brothers. Although their move had initially been prompted by personal motives, the inevitable result was the emergence of three Ottoman-controlled North African Governorates in Algiers, Tunis and Tripolitania and their conversion to Ottoman ways.

With the Ottoman conquest, it became easier to merge these three Governorates into a single unit and also made it possible to adopt new administrative and military structures modelled on those in force throughout the empire, which were to last until the eighteenth century and later.

The sixteenth century was indeed a period in which there were far-reaching changes in political systems, with continual contacts of both peaceful and bellicose kinds and with embassies being dispatched to both sides of the Mediterranean. The early years of the seventeenth century, on the other hand, were, without question, marked by the immigration of the Moriscos from Andalusia, some 100,000 of whom settled in the Maghrib. These people brought with them a knowledge of Spain and its language, and a command of the techniques involved in a wide range of occupations. They were in many respects a rich source of ideas and new awareness, of wide-ranging development and, above all,

modernization for the Maghrib as a whole. Thanks to their well-adapted agricultural skills, the Moriscos created prosperous Andalusian-style settlements all over the Maghrib on sites that they themselves selected. They gave fresh impetus to craftsmanship, architecture and trade. Their influence on the way of life, food, customs and music of the society of the Maghrib can still be seen right up to the present day. It was a society that was self-absorbed, engrossed in its own moral and religious values and a long way from understanding all the consequences of the workings of the Western world, then in a ferment and caught up in the maelstrom of an intellectual, political, industrial and commercial renaissance.

That being so, and in view of the specific features of the North African countries, it would be useful to sketch in the political and administrative background to each of them.

Morocco was the only country to remain outside the Ottoman orbit. It proved successful in contending both with external threats and with its own internal quarrels. Like the other North African countries, it fell victim to the Spanish expeditions, while it was racked internally by rivalry between the leading families. Maraboutism and religious brotherhoods also had a considerable influence on the domestic upheavals. It is against this background of conflict between rival or hostile fractions that the Sa'dians, who were descendants of the Prophet, took over the leadership of the holy war and by the mid-sixteenth century had become masters of the country and the symbol of its unity. The victory of Ahmad al-Mansûr at the battle of Wadî Makhazan, known as the Battle of the Three Kings, in 1578, assumed a symbolic significance and became a source of national pride. This victory consolidated the alliance between the marabout movement and the Sa'did dynasty, conferring on Ahmad al-Mansûr ('the Victorious') the reputation of a great ruler, respected and cultivated by Ottomans and Europeans alike, who dispatched ambassadors to him throughout his reign (1578-1603). His rule was notable for its political stability, which fostered domestic peace and prosperity, and for its deep religious fervour. His court, at which literature and the arts flourished, was one of the most distinguished of its time.

With his army, which was based on the Ottoman model, al-Mansûr embarked on the conquest of the Sudan, from where gold was brought back by Morocco at the end of the sixteenth century. This was instrumental in making the Moroccan ducat the most highly prized currency and hence in fostering lucrative trade flows. Industrial monopolies grew up and commerce came to occupy an important place in the Moroccan economy. On the death of the sovereign, however, his three sons fought among themselves in their bid to take over power, joining forces with Spain on some occasions and with the Ottomans on others. These fratricidal struggles

reduced the country to a state of almost constant unrest. The seventeenth century in Morocco was a time of instability, when the country was rent by the emergence of political, 'marabout' and religious leaders. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Morocco was split into self-governing principalities warring against one another. Moulay al-Rashid (1664-72), the founder of the Alawite dynasty, imposed his rule over the country by capturing Fez in 1666 and the very powerful Zawia Dila and Marrakesh in 1669, and proclaimed himself Sultan. The Alawite dynasty reached its peak under his successor, Moulay Ismail (1672-1727). Morocco enjoyed domestic peace and unity and was respected beyond its borders. During the rule of Moulay Ismail, the Moroccan kingdom was composed of a federation of tribes administered by a central authority known as the Makhzan, and relied on a powerful army composed of new black 'Abid' slave contingents, which was the only organized regular force and was completely loyal to the ruler of the country. With this army, the ruling power succeeded in putting down the warring tribes, retaking the strongholds and ports controlled by the Christians on the Atlantic coast and repelling the incursions onto Moroccan territory of the restless Ottoman Turks from Algiers. On the death of Moulay Ismail, the country was again unseated until the accession of Sidi Muhammad ibn Abdallah (1757-99), when it regained its political stability but was plunged into a severe economic crisis marked by food shortages and the flight of the urban population and by growing isolation and a decline in trade. This situation attracted foreign merchants and traders, who settled in various parts of the country and set up trading posts (*wikala*) and who, in an endeavour to secure monetary and commercial monopolies over exports and imports, set out to form alliances with the local political forces or the feudal authorities, whose power had been strengthened as a result of the domestic crises.

In spite of the unrest and political instability, the Europeans pursued their lucrative activities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Under the Alawite dynasty, Morocco was present on the diplomatic scene in the East and West alike. It fostered a current of cultural exchanges through the *ritla*, a form of travel narrative, and the very popular pilgrimage to the holy places. The construction of religious or public buildings bears witness to the religious, literary and artistic vitality of this period.

Algiers really came into its own from the sixteenth century onwards, with the arrival of the Ottomans under an exceptional leader, Khayr al-Din Barbarossa, who put down the tribal uprisings and linked Algiers to the Ottoman Empire. An Ottoman presence had been wanted by part of the population of Algiers who had been terrified by the Spanish attacks and in 1519 had addressed a petition to the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I. Khayr al-Din then set about preparing the Algiers Governorate to play an important role in the political and military affairs of the Mediterranean, and the Ottoman administration came to extend over the greater part of Algerian territory. Three beyliks were created, with their headquarters at Constantine in the east of the country, Mazama and subsequently Mascara and Oran in the West, and Medea in the south. These three beyliks were linked to Dar-el-Sultan, the central seat of power represented by a Beylerbeyi, whose task it was to appoint the Beys, maintain order and watch over the interests of the central authority.

Dar-el-Sultan was the seat of power of the Dey, who was appointed by a Diwan, or Council, composed of leading Ottoman Turkish dignitaries and officials, which acted both

as a court and as a council for the militia itself. However, from 1587 onwards, the decline in the influence of the Beylerbeyis paved the way for a series of uprisings and attempts to overthrow the state. The Governorate was then administered by a pasha appointed by the Diwan for three years and formally invested in that office by the Ottoman Sultan. Political, military and economic power was thereafter in the hands of the *odjaks* or janissaries, the Turkish Ottoman military corps, assisted by the Diwan (see Plate 58). The decisions they took had to be ratified by the Dey who, in theory, enjoyed absolute power. This system was not without its drawbacks, for out of the twenty-four Deys who governed from 1670 to 1800, twelve or more were forcibly installed as a result of rioting or rebellions after their predecessors had been assassinated, following which the Sultan formally invested the new Dey.

At the same period, the political and military power of the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis was coming to an end. It had been severely undermined by the decline in its trade in the Mediterranean, the poor agricultural yields from rural areas and the resulting low level of activity in the towns, and the clashes between Spain and the Ottomans along the coast. Hafsid authority no longer extended beyond Tunis and its immediate vicinity and the tribes attempted to remove it. Tunis was reduced to a protectorate in 1535 following the expedition of the Emperor Charles V and was to remain more or less in that state until the arrival of the Ottomans in 1574, when it became an Ottoman province linked to the central state in Istanbul. A new administration was set up, with a pasha as Governor, assisted by a Diwan composed, as in Algiers, of Ottoman Turk officials and soldiers. In 1594, however, the janissaries imposed a Bey with virtually absolute powers. Under the authority of the first three Ottoman Beys of Tunis, Orhan, Youssuf and Usta Murad (1594-1640), the country went through an uneventful period and order was restored even among the normally rebellious tribes. Under the governorship of the Muradite pashas, the country was reorganized and building work was undertaken. However, political disagreements again broke out and unrest spread through the country. Following the fall of the Muradites, Hussein Bin Ali took power in 1705 and was successful in curbing the ambitions of the local chiefs and the Algiers militia. Hussein Bey accordingly established the hereditary Husseinite dynasty, which the Sublime Porte accepted and ratified. During his reign (1705-35), Hussein Bey managed to maintain a finely balanced relationship with the Sublime Porte and gradually acquired a significant measure of political autonomy. He worked at maintaining order and security and at winning the support of the religious dignitaries, especially those in the holy city of Qairawan, thereby creating a climate conducive to local economic recovery and inspiring confidence abroad.

The armed intervention of the Algiers militia brought his rule to end; he was deposed in 1735 and replaced by his nephew, Ali Pasha. The Tunis Governorate then went through a sombre period of conflict between members of the reigning family. Order and confidence in the country were restored with the coming to power of Ali Bin Hussein (1759), and especially Hammuda Pasha (1782).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the political life of the Tunis Governorate was marked by a less anarchical and more stable concept of power, chiefly due to the existence of an official class that was intent on successfully discharging its administrative, political, commercial and military duties and to the remarkable homogeneity of its

population, which was open to compromise and inclined to tolerance. In addition, the system realized the need to make the most of all available skills in administering and developing the country. As a result, local forces occupied an increasingly important place in the political system: the Beylerbeys and subsequently those from the Muradite and, above all, the Husseinite families were careful to recruit advisers, administrators and senior officials from the local dignitaries, the *Kuloglu*, who were the offspring of marriages between Turks and the indigenous population, and even among non-Turks, such as renegades. A whole government aristocracy of differing origins came to be founded in the Governorate, all of whose members eventually merged with the population and identified themselves completely with Tunisian life and its circumstances, which they looked upon as their own. Ottoman influences in the Governorate could be seen in a host of details, starting with architecture, especially for religious purposes, and customs.

The Governorate's administrative structure was the same as in Algiers: the *Diwan* acted as a court but it was also a council for the militia, although its composition was not the same in each case. In addition, the *Diwan* in the three North African regions was required to give its opinion on matters of foreign policy and entered into negotiations with all states. But real political and economic power still lay in the hands of the Ottoman militia whose task it was, with the *Diwan*'s assistance, to maintain order and security and to watch over the interests of the State. The *Diwan*'s decisions were ratified by the Dey or Bey, whose title differed according to the particular Governorate but who fulfilled the same function in acting as the central power, with their word having force of law.

On account of its geographical situation, Tripolitania occupied an important strategic position both for trading with the interior of Africa and for contact with the Mediterranean. Tripoli was governed from its citadel by the Knights of Malta from 1530 to 1551. It fell to an Ottoman offensive led by Murad Agha, who had set up camp with his troops at Tajura, a small town near Tripoli which had been turned into a fortified and well-armed citadel. Turgut Reis, another Ottoman military leader of the period, also distinguished himself in this region by his battles in the Mediterranean against the Spanish fleet and the Italian navy at Mahdia, Djerba and Tripoli. He enjoyed the political and military support of the Sultan, and when Murad Agha died the title of Beylerbey of Tripoli was conferred on him. Turgut Pasha strove to win support from the tribes and their sheikhs and the population at large for the far-reaching decisions he took in administering the country. He acted as an official serving the interests of the highest political and religious authority of the empire. From Tripoli, it became easier to bring the south of the Tunis Governorate and Tripolitania under control. After his death in 1565 at the siege of Malta, Tripolitania continued to be an Ottoman province, in spite of sundry military or anti-Ottoman uprisings led by the militia and local tribes at the end of the sixteenth century.

The three Ottoman Governorates of Algiers, Tunis and Tripolitania were given administrative structures that were consolidated in accordance with a balanced pattern which the Ottoman Turks laid down without arousing any major conflict.

One of the features of the political system set up in the Governorates was the fact that the new rulers kept up long-standing local traditions, especially of Hafsîd origin, that

proved useful and effective in administering the country properly. Similarly, the authorities did not interfere in the internal affairs of the population, but merely dealt with the religious dignitaries in the towns, the sheikhs of the districts and tribes and the leaders of the religious brotherhoods. Education, justice and the administration of religious property (*hubs*) remained firmly in the hands of the completely Arabized indigenous population in the three Ottoman Governorates of North Africa. However, while no pressure was exerted on the deep-seated identity of the population or on their customs, culture or language, real political, military and economic power nevertheless remained in the hands of the Ottomans. Even so, religious allegiance to the authority of the central government in Istanbul was never questioned, as can be seen from the fact that the currency was always embossed with the name of the Sultan, and the *khotba*, or sermon given at the Friday prayers, was also always delivered in the Ottoman Sultan's name despite the distance separating the three Ottoman regions of North Africa from the political decision-making centre of the empire. While the local political authorities might display a measure of independence, or indeed take decisions or action on their own initiative, this in no way represented a policy aimed at secession or at causing a rift in the unity of the empire. The Sultan's sovereignty was always recognized and all sectors of Maghribine society remained deeply attached to the foremost religious authority of the Sultan, even in cases where there were movements of revolt against the power of the military militia in the three Governorates.

In this connection, it is also noteworthy that, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the militia in the three Governorates continued to recruit its members from the poorest, but brave and undisciplined, classes of the Ottoman population of Anatolia.

Although Ottoman authority influenced the political life of the three Ottoman Governorates of Algiers, Tunis and Tripolitania, its impact was most keenly felt in connection with financial matters, since the administration was devoted to conducting population censuses, collecting taxes and recording revenue and expenditure. On the occasion of the investiture or appointment of a new sultan or of a local appointee, the practice in the three Governorates was not so much to pay regular tribute in fixed amounts as to make gifts differing in value from one period to another and consisting of highly sought-after local products or rare foodstuffs, above all of African origin.

The Sublime Porte also called on its Governors in the African Governorates to provide it with naval and military support in its wars against Spain and Russia, although the response tended to vary with the economic situation in the particular Governorate to which the request was made.

The development of the countries of North Africa (now more commonly known as the Maghrib), whether they were Ottoman provinces or not, had many features in common in the Ottoman period. The sixteenth century was a major turning-point in the history of all of them. For almost three centuries, they all went through periods of considerable political instability, often followed by the emergence of a unifying leader.

For instance, from the second half of the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, there was an attempt to set government and its institutions on more stable foundations, for which purpose the state resorted to every means likely to restore order to the country, such as the conclusion of alliances with the main marabout chiefs,

and with leading families and the tribes which had the latter's support, by granting them a number of privileges and above all by fostering a climate of rivalry when dealing with tribal clans and the different local religious forces.

Economic life was dominated by agriculture, with cereals and live-stock forming the bulk of the resources of the North African countries. All the evidence bears out the scale of the exports of North African wheat and other agricultural produce to Europe, for which there was fierce European competition through the different trading posts set up all along the coast. Western travellers have left most interesting descriptions of the region's magnificent agricultural plains, with the undisputed abundance and quality of their crops. This was the case throughout all the countries, which flourished thanks to the wise use of irrigation systems, and it accounts for the fact that the tax levied on crops was one of the prime sources of the revenue of the State and the landowning middle classes.

In point of fact, nine-tenths of the population lived in rural areas and was becoming progressively impoverished under the crushing burden of taxation, to the extent that, in some instances, it gave up tilling the land altogether and concentrated solely on stock-raising in a bid to escape the destitution that had become their lot with the passage of time. At periods of severe drought, this sector of the population was the hardest hit in economic terms.

As a result, the whole range of agricultural output depended on activity on the domestic markets, which went to show the importance of trade flows between rural areas and towns. The towns largely had the monopoly of a wide range of trades, and the Moriscos and the Jews, in particular, created a very large number of occupations which survived and came to dominate urban life. In terms of foreign trade at the end of the eighteenth century, the economy can be seen to have grown, especially in the eastern part of the Algiers Governorate, with the setting-up of foreign companies, and this was regarded as the beginning of a revival. However, the bulk of this trade went to Jews from Leghorn, who held the real power in Algiers, and the hostility of the Western riparian countries had reduced any regular and significant trading activities with the different Mediterranean ports.

Privateering, which extended all through the Mediterranean rather than being confined exclusively to the Maghrib, was a highly esteemed activity in many countries, Christian and Muslim alike. As Fernand Braudel wrote: 'Throughout the Mediterranean, men engaged in hunting, imprisoning, selling and torturing their fellow men'.

Although privateering in the sixteenth century was pursued on religious grounds, in the seventeenth century and especially in the first half of the eighteenth century, the motives were economic and piracy became an attractive proposition that was profitable to the beyliks, the dignitaries of the three Governorates and the leading privateers, who grew rich and amassed considerable fortunes. It is virtually impossible, however, to put a figure to the annual profits from privateering and the revenue accruing to the coffers of the State. The agreements which the three Governorates signed with France, Britain and Spain, among other countries, from the end of the seventeenth century onwards considerably curtailed the scope of privateering and it became insignificant.

Moreover, the Ottoman Governorates stood to gain from being recognized and cultivated by European diplomacy. This is borne out by the agreements signed following the violent bombardments of ports on both sides.

That being said, the most characteristic feature of Maghribine society from the seventeenth century onwards

was its cosmopolitan nature, consisting as it did of the indigenous peoples, Ottoman Turks, Kuloglus, Berbers, Andalusian Moriscos, Jews, Europeans of different nationalities, and slaves, all of whom lived side by side on more or less amicable terms, with each of them defending their own specific or religious features. Coexistence became a widely accepted fact of life and produced rewarding results through the mutual exchanges it fostered. Owing to the fact that the Maghrib was comparatively close to Europe and to the sectors involved in that continent's economic revival in the Mediterranean, it could not avoid or disregard the direct implications of a Mediterranean trading system. Its exports of foodstuffs and finished products and its imports of raw materials were instrumental in boosting its trade not only with Europe but with the Mashrik (the eastern Arab world) and the countries of the Sahara as well. This development enabled it to shake off the lethargy it had displayed in the sixteenth century and join the international economic circuits, while the growth of its economy contributed to the consolidation of the structures of the State and the broadening of its social base.

However, as Europe expanded its trade without having to resort to violence or impose its military presence, it succeeded in extending its domination all along the North African seaboard by setting up a large number of trading posts, whose task it was to adapt the traditional domestic markets and bring them under established trading rules. This policy was perceived as having a decisive impact on the local economies in their interaction with the political and commercial patterns and situations obtaining in the Mediterranean.

Apart from times when there were disturbances, uprisings or bitter power struggles, the Maghrib enjoyed growing economic prosperity, and in spite of changing political fortunes, the vagaries of the weather and epidemics, all the countries of the Maghrib engaged in intensive and sustained trade with the countries round the Mediterranean, as well as with Europe and Western Asia. During this period, the bulk of their exports consisted of cereals (wheat and barley), olive oil, untreated or carded wool, and wax, which were shipped to Europe, primarily to Marseille, Genoa and Leghorn, and also to England, The Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Trade with the Middle East was also significant, since there were flourishing commercial relations between the Maghrib and the Mashrik throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is recorded that there were hundreds of Maghribine merchants, especially in Egypt, with their own urban quarters and *wikala*, while the presence of other Maghribines was reported in the Hejaz, Syria, Asia Minor and Istanbul, where they engaged in highly profitable business activities that were a reflection of the vitality displayed by a movement that was as much cultural as it was economic. In this connection, it should be noted that the Ottoman administrative system subscribed to the principle of the free circulation of people, goods and ideas.

NOTE

In recent years, the view taken of the modern period (1500-1800) in the history of North Africa, which all historians usually call the Maghrib, and the methods used, have both been developing along favourable lines. After having rid themselves of any complexes they might have had, a whole generation of historians and researchers have

endeavoured to turn the spotlight on that period by making use of new Arab and Turkish material, which had long been disregarded, in various dissertations produced in the universities of the Maghrib. In addition, there are many recorded instances of scientific meetings between historians, which have led to the publication of a large number of papers and which warrant the attention of researchers generally.

In adopting this approach, our task is not to give a purely factual account, although the period was one that was rich in unexpected developments, but rather to attempt to set out the broad trends in a general way, which we trust will be consistent with the synoptic view adopted in this volume.

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17.5

ARABIAN PENINSULA

Mohammad Saeed Al-Sha'afi

ARABIA ON THE EVE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Arabian Peninsula was divided into several regional and political units, that is, Hejaz, Nejd, al-Hasa, Yemen and Oman (see Map 23). They were ruled by tribal chiefs. The people were divided into different religious sects. For instance Shī'ī Zaidī in Yemen, Abadī in Oman, Sunnī Shafī'ī in South Yemen and Aden, Sunnī Hanbalī in the middle of the Peninsula, Shī'ī in the western coasts and islands and mixture of these sects in Hejaz. Economic and social life and conditions differed considerably in different regions as well as within a region. A large number of people lived a tribal life (such as the bedouins). Some lived in hamlets as agriculturists. Many lived in cities which were commercial centres and engaged in trade.

From the beginning of the sixteenth century the Arabian Peninsula was subject to many external factors which greatly affected domestic conditions. The Mamluks of Egypt interfered in the western region which culminated in military expedition in an attempt to subdue these regions. The eastern coast was exposed to Portuguese threat; they eventually succeeded in occupying Hormuz in 1507, but they failed to occupy the main land. The Ottomans competed with the Portuguese to control the seas and maritime trade. Thus a struggle ensued between the two during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Safavids of Iran also attempted to control the eastern coast and islands. England and Holland also entered the scene in the region at the end of the century.

The Mamluks controlled the Hejaz indirectly through the Sharif of Mecca. Earlier, in 1495 Shatīf Barakat, succeeded his father Muḥammad Ajlān. He faced a succession problem to which he put an end by 1504, and established dynastic rule.

When Ottoman Sultan Salīm I conquered Egypt in 1517, the chiefs of the major tribes of Hejaz as well as the Sharif of Mecca acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty. This was motivated by three reasons: first, to have Ottoman support against the Portuguese; second, to maintain the regular flow of the revenue of the endowments (*waqfs*) for the two Holy Mosques and people of Mecca and Medina (Madīna); and third, to have an edge over Sharīf's opponents and contestants in the Hejaz. Salīm I accepted the loyalty and assumed the impressive title of Servant of the Holy Cities. He issued a firman appointing Sharīf Barakat to rule Mecca, Medina and rest of the Hejaz, except Jedda where an Ottoman governor was appointed with full authority over the Hejaz, with the understanding that the custom revenue at Jedda be shared between the Ottoman governor and the Sharīf.


From 1539 southern Arabia or Yemen was constituted as an Ottoman province. And by the middle of the sixteenth century, eastern Arabia was conquered and made an Ottoman province of Al-Hasa and administered directly. The fourth region of Arabia was Najd and it remained independent of Ottoman rule as the latter did not have any political or commercial interest in this region of central Arabia.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Much of the Arabian Peninsula being desert or steppe, its economy was mainly based on agriculture and oasis farming, domestic animals, marine resources, trade and pilgrimage. The land is suitable for grazing the camels of the bedouins. Dates are the most important food-crop of Arabia and its cultivation occupy almost 90 per cent of entire agricultural land in the scattered oases of the desert and the steppes. For certain crops the land was irrigated by the *aflaj* or *qanat* system of irrigation. Along the south-western big lands or the coastline of Tihama and Yemen where there was regular rainfall, coffee was grown by adopting a terraced field system on the steep slopes, while wheat, barley, beans, sorghum, pulses, and so on were grown on the cultivated land on the plateau by ploughing. However, for some crops, for example onions, the land was irrigated in the south-western highlands. Tropical fruit trees, for example peach, pear, pomegranate, grape-vine, and so on, were grown in the Oman, Yemen and Tihama coast. In the rocky areas of central and northern Arabia honey was collected. Fishing was practised all along the coast and offshore islands. Sea-food and pearls were obtained.

Camels, horses, mules and donkeys were used in transportation and all except the horse were utilized as pack animals and for drawing ploughs in agriculture. For this last purpose, cattle too were used. Arabian horses were famous for their high quality and were exported. For meat, sheep, goats and cattle were reared. For milk, camels, sheep, goat and cows were reared. Poultry too was developed. The mainstream of Arabia's economy was its trade, both internal and external. Internal trade was restricted to its own raw materials, such as dates, honey, wheat, barley, fruits and vegetables, butter, sea-salt, rock-salt and domestic animals like camel, horse, sheep, goat, mule and donkey, and marine products.

External or foreign trade was three-fold in nature – Arabia's own exports, its imports and transit-trade passing through its ports to eastern or western countries. Some of its raw materials including pearls, and so on, were exported to neighbouring countries. Imports were of produce as well as



Map 23 The Arabian Peninsula in the sixteenth century.

manufactured goods. For instance, its imports from India and Egypt comprised sugar, rice, tea, teak timber, coconut oil, nuts, black pepper, dried ginger and turmeric. The manufactured goods imported from Turkey, Egypt and India comprised woollen cloth and dresses, cotton, quilts, linen for shirts, shoes and slippers, metallic materials, china-ware, knives, glass beads, rosaries, mirrors, muslin, swords, English watches, copies of the Qur'ân, carpets and so on. Some other items were also imported from Europe. As for instance, silk from France, sulphur, red coral, watches and glass beads from Germany and Italy. Tobacco, drugs and carpets came from Persia, wheat, tobacco and carpets from Iraq. Spices generally used in Hejaz, especially by pilgrims, came from the far-off Malay Islands. Foreign transit trade between the East and the West and vice-versa passed through the Red Sea which was the main channel of trade. Two important ports on the Red Sea were Jeddah and Hodeida. African and European countries attached great importance to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade. Hence, a struggle for supremacy ensued between Ottoman and European powers. All the imports of Egypt from India, Yemen and East Asia passed

through Jeddah. Jeddah received a large amount of revenue as customs tax on foreign goods imported for internal consumption as well as passing through its docks to other countries.

Pilgrims coming to Mecca and Medina throughout the year and especially during the Haj season in several thousands boosted the economy of Jeddah, Mecca and Medina. They spent a lot of money on buying food products and luxury items and paying for transportation and accommodation.

During the sixteenth century the economy of the Arabian Peninsula witnessed major changes and improvement as a result of three main events: the Ottoman occupation of Western Arabia and al-Hasa which created a link with Turkey; the establishment of European trade centres at Mocha, Aden, Jeddah, Muscat; and a considerable increase in the influx of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina which brought in more revenue and contributed to an all-round increase in business. These three factors changed Arabia's economy from a subsistence to a market and maritime economy. Though European trading with Arabian ports brought considerable advantages, at the same time it greatly affected Arab navigation and domination of the eastern seas. The Arabs were not able

to compete with the Europeans either in trade or in vessels. The Arabs still used sails. Thus Arab and Muslim navigation had been declining ever since the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean. By 1508 the Portuguese had established complete control over the Persian Gulf and forbade 'native vessels to trade in the Gulf without a pass', which they called *Cartazas*. Their base was Muscat, in Oman. But the weakening of Portuguese power in the second half of the sixteenth century led to a temporary revival of the spice trade through both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Portuguese were eventually ejected from Muscat and the Persian Gulf in 1650. Muscat had maintained trade and cultural relations with China. The Omanis played a major role in the Persian Gulf and were responsible for the extensive slave-trade with East Africa. They also traded with India, Yemen and Persia. Lorincet states that: 'Muscat by 1775 had become the principal entrepot of trade between the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, India, and the Red Sea'. Dates and copper were the principal products of Oman and were exported. At Muscat there was a regular trade in sun-dried and salted fish to India. BahRAIN was the headquarters for the pearl and shell fishing industry. The Gulf has been an important centre of pearl diving and trading for several thousands of years.

Jedda with a well-sheltered natural harbour was an important port of the Hejaz on the eastern coast of the Red Sea, had a strategic position from a commercial point of view; and, as the port of Mecca for pilgrims coming by sea from all over the Islamic world, it also served as the importing port for Hejaz. All imports from Egypt, India, Persia and the East passed through Jedda. Almost all types of merchandise were traded through Jedda both from eastern and western countries. Varnhagen recorded Jedda's trade at the beginning of the sixteenth century. He observed that a large volume of imports passed through Jedda, which included foodstuffs from Egypt, Yemen and Ethiopia, and spices, jewels and textiles from India. From East Africa the merchants of Jedda imported ivory, gold, ambergris and slaves in exchange for metalwork, beads, and so on, which Arabia imported from Asian countries. Oman and Omani Arabs also traded regularly with East Africa.

The struggle for maritime supremacy between the Muslims and the Europeans, resulting in the closure of the Red Sea to Christian shipping, considerably affected the trade through Jedda. During the seventeenth century Jedda regained its past role as the main commercial port. In 1698 Ovington observed that 'Jedda flourishes in a constant traffic from India, Persia, and other parts of Arabia and the Abyssinian shore. Hither the Arabians bring their coffee, which is bought here by the Turks and shipped for the Suez'. The British consular reporting in 1896 observed that a century before, that is, in the late eighteenth century, Jedda was considered

the Queen of the Red Sea, a very considerable centre for trade, and managing a large coasting trade on both coasts; this town by far the most influential, and excepting Mocha for trade, and Suez for shipping, was the only important commercial port, and in fact produce from all round Red Sea used to be collected here for export.

What Burckhardt observed about Jedda in the early nineteenth century is true for the earlier centuries as well. Burckhardt states that Jedda

derives its opulence not only from being the port of Mecca, but it may be considered as that of Egypt, of India, and of Arabia: all the exports of those countries destined for Egypt first passing through the hands of Djedda merchants.

He further states that

At Djedda sales and purchases are made of entire ships' cargoes in the course of half an hour, and the next day the money is paid down. The greater part of the merchandise thus bought is shipped to Suez, and sold at Cairo, where it finds its way into the Mediterranean.

Mecca and Medina and their hinterland were the meeting place for traders, particularly during the pilgrimage season when people from different parts of the world gathered and exchanged their goods, though in smaller quantities. Caravans from all corners of Arabia and outside converged at Mecca and exchanged their commodities in cash or by barter deal.

Mocha was an important trading centre at the extreme south end of Arabia. It was founded in the fourteenth century. But with the introduction of coffee into Arabia it became the principal export centre for coffee and a general emporium of trade with Sana'a, Mecca, Cairo, Alexandria and India. During the early seventeenth century, Mocha exported, besides coffee, incense, myrrh, aloes, senna, ivory, mother-of-pearl, and gold. While it imported crude metals — iron, steel and lead — guns, textiles, and so on, Mocha's trade reached its peak of prosperity during the first half of the seventeenth century, observed Vander Broecks in 1616. The Mocha trade was shared by the Dutch and English East India Companies after 1600, and in the early eighteenth century by the French. The English East India Company established a factory house at Mocha. The Dutch established their factory at Mocha in 1618. The French only hired a building as their factory. A Danish factory also existed for some time during the seventeenth century. Ovington in 1690 mentions Danish ships calling at Mocha.

In eastern Arabia, Al-Hasa's economy was basically agricultural, while trade and commerce had its role in the Gulf region. Since Al-Hasa functioned as a feudal province of the Ottomans, after the latter's occupation in the mid-sixteenth century, provincial taxes on land (*ushr*) were collected from the farmers by the district officials and governors and forwarded to the Ottoman treasury. Besides, fiefs, tax-farms and private properties, parts of the land of the province were assigned in trust (*waqf*) for the maintenance of schools, mosques and other charitable institutions. At Mocha the Europeans were given special concessions for the payment of customs. Usually they did not pay more than 3.5 per cent on incoming and outgoing merchandise, while at Sana'a they paid only 3 per cent. Other nationals, Persian, Indian and others, paid 16 per cent in customs dues. Till the end of the seventeenth century the rate of 3 per cent for the Europeans continued, states Ovington in 1694. By 1709 the customs duty for Europeans was raised to 5 per cent. However, when De Merville on behalf of the French Vessels approached Salih bin Ali, Governor of Mocha, the rate was reduced to 2.25 per cent in the same year. Later on, Ali's successor, Faqi Ahmed, revised the rate to 5 per cent. Hamilton (1712-16) observes that the British paid 3 per cent customs duty. Fifty years later Niebuhr found that Arabs, Turks and Indians paid 8-10 per cent customs while the Europeans paid only 3 per cent. This rate continued until the mid-nineteenth century.

The slave-trade was a flourishing and important business. Slaves were imported from Africa and were engaged in hard manual labour like building and quarrying, for domestic service, and so on. Snouck Hurgronje observed that, despite the restriction and prohibition of the slave-trade in their country of origin, slaves came from British India, and the Dutch East Indies slave market at Mahha was flourishing.

Subsistence

All along the coast of Arabia, fish was the main source of subsistence. Pearl diving was undertaken in the Persian Gulf and coral fishing in the Red Sea. Fish was roughly dried and salted for local consumption. Wheat, rice, flour and spices were imported for the use of the richer classes and for the army. The Bedouins were content mainly with dates and pulses. They also earned by serving the pilgrims and letting their beasts on hire for the conveyance of the pilgrims. They possessed camels, sheep, goats and asses and reared ostriches. The tribal Arabs produced butter and cheese. They also spun cloth for their own use. Camels and horses were bred and exported from Hejaz, Najd and Aden. Arabian horses were famous for their breed and quality. Hejaz grows practically nothing except small quantity of vegetables and grapes. However, specie were exported in large quantities from Hejaz. These coins were acquired from the pilgrims of different countries in exchange for the articles they bought.

Agriculture was practised wherever oases existed. For example, Medina has always been a city of agriculturists. It is surrounded on all sides, except the west, by date plantations and cultivated fields, which extended for several miles. Oasis cultivation was practised in several other parts of Arabia, viz., territory around Mecca, Taif, Najran, Hodeida, Mukalla, Nizwa, Muscat, Sharjah, Hafuf, Qatif, al Kharj, Riyadh, W. Dawasir, Qasim, Aflaj, Aridh, Al Ula, Khubar, Wejli, Tabuk, al Jouf, etc. Within the oases vegetables were grown. Settled cultivation which directly depended on rainfall was practised in the south-western highland, from south of Taif to the vicinity of Aden. In the same region, the cultivation that was carried out partly depended on rain and partly depended on the down-flow of water from the mountains.

Tropical fruits, such as apricot, peach, plum, pear, pomegranate, walnut, quince, fig and grape-vine, were grown in Yemen, at high altitudes between 6,500 and 8,000 feet. Tropical fruits were also grown along the coast of Muscat and its hinterland. Maize was the crop of the lowland and middle altitudes and was cultivated along the coast of Dhufar, Mukalla, Hodeida and the interior of the Aden.

Rice was consumed in large quantity and was largely imported. But rice was also grown in the Oasis of Al Hasa in eastern Arabia where the plentiful supply of water from warm springs rendered its cultivation possible with an elaborate system of irrigation.

Coffee *arabica* is the only spice grown in Arabia. It was grown principally in Yemen, throughout the length of the country from north to south. It flourishes on the steep slopes of the valleys in the western escarpment, usually at an altitude of 4,000-6,500 feet. In Asir also coffee was grown.

Tobacco was principally grown in Aden and its vicinity, south-west of Mukalla, and at other places.

CULTURAL ASPECTS

Islam was the only religion prevalent in Arabia during the period under study; as such, Islamic culture was dominant. Religious aspects extended to encompass the whole of life and daily activity. Daily life started with prayers, performed five times a day. Social issues were also governed by religious tenets, called the *Shari'a*. Prophet Muhammad's traditions and *Shari'a* law guided the conduct of administration and one's daily life. Law was an integral part of the religion. People adopted the practice of dressing according to Islamic

law by covering their body completely, only exposing head and hands, while the women covered their face as well. The head-gear is also typically Islamic. The social structure of Muslims is totally distinct, with Islamic tenets in every walk of their daily life.

For the Muslims, the Qur'an is the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, his messenger and is not imitable. The Qur'an is the best and finest achievement of the Arabic language written in a character in the *genre* of prose. It is unsurpassed in literary eloquence. It has made a far-reaching impact on Arabic literature by way of its original ideas.

The period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century in Arabia is characterized by complete isolation from the external world, though there are a few exceptions. The people of Arabia comprise one unit. Arabia has scores of tribes. In fact it is a tribal society. Different tribes are scattered all over the peninsula. People of the same tribe are found to be residing in different parts. The way of life and traditions of the people in various parts of Arabia are almost the same with some regional variations. As such, for the purpose of our study Arabia is taken as a single unit. We could identify two types of cultural centres - urban and rural. In the case of the former, educated and wealthy people had cultural contacts with the outside world, while in the case of the latter, bedouin tribes were not exposed to cultural contacts and lived in complete cultural isolation and illiteracy.

In some rural villages a few preliminary schools directed by Sheikhs taught the Qur'an and Arabic language to the children. However, education was restricted to the learning of Qur'an.

In Arabia three types of cultures were found. Mecca and Medina in the western province, because of their religious significance and the presence of pilgrims and the province's proximity to Egypt - from which it was sometimes ruled - have been affected by different non-Arabic cultures. However, the south-western portion of the peninsula was less exposed to foreign cultural elements than the two holy cities, though some Turkish influence has been noted at different periods. The middle part of Arabia was isolated from any foreign cultural influence, being further away from the coastal areas. As such, Bedouin life continued to exist. The eastern coast of Arabia was to some extent exposed to outside influences and absorbed several cultural elements from Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and India. The first two countries had more influence because of their proximity on the Gulf, but Turkey was also influential, owing to its political role, and India by way of trade and vast number of pilgrims coming from there.

The cultural influences on Arabian life manifested themselves in the changed terminology adopted during the period in the spheres of religion, and in civil and military titles. Foreign effect was clear in the construction of words in Arabic sentences.

Art and architecture

The arabesque is the chief element of Islamic art. Arabs originally developed the arabesque by adopting ornamental leaf and branch designs. As depiction of human and animal figures was prohibited in Islam, the natural design of the arabesque was adopted throughout for all types of decoration in architecture, such as walls, doors, domes, columns, utensils of glass, porcelain, as well as metal, carpets or rugs, bookbinding, illumination of the Qur'an and other books

and paintings. The arabesque in various colours was popularly adopted in decorating the panels of mosques. The earliest example of it survives in the mosque of the Prophet Muḥammad at Medina. All these aspects of Islamic traditions constitute a distinct Muslim society. And with prayers in congregations five times daily it bonds Muslims socially and evolves a unique society.

Some salient features of the cultural aspects are described here. Mecca and Medina, in Hejaz were the centre of attraction for the entire Muslim world (see Plates 78 and 79). To perform the religious rites of *Umra* and *Hajj*, Muslims thronged to Mecca carrying with them different cultures from different lands, viz., Turkistan, Iran, Syria, Anatolia, Egypt, Africa, India, and other places. Pilgrims brought revenue and contributed to the economic growth of Mecca and its inhabitants. When Hejaz came under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan, the latter sent eminent architects, engineers and decorators from Turkey to Hejaz. Mecca and Medina were built anew on the pattern of Ottoman cities, with plain classical façades, an abundance of cupolas and tall, delicate minarets. The flower-patterned Turkish ceramics were introduced. Holy graves were covered by silk cloths embroidered by the Turkish ladies with floral designs in rose or blue. The arid valley was covered with gardens. In the Turkish fashion, the houses were built with wooden lattices. Many of them, of a later period, still survive. The Ottomans paid special attention to mosques and mausoleums for their construction, decoration, furnishing with carpets and maintenance. New mosques were also built. In Medina several mosques including that at Quba, the first mosque of Islam, were rebuilt and renovated.

Sinân, the famous architect who built the Süleymaniye Mosque at Istanbul, was sent to Mecca by Sulḥân Süleymân I, to plan the mosque at the Kabah. Sinân's plan was implemented later on, dating 1582-5, by the architect Mamed Aga who also rebuilt the courtyard of the Kabah, extending it to 537 × 550 feet. The 19 entrance gates to the Kabah were renovated. The 892 existing columns supporting the porticoes of the courtyard of Kabah were replaced by marble and yellow stone. Columns were erected in between to support the stuccoed stone arches and domes. Five hundred bulbous domes in Ottoman style were built over the porticoes. The interior of these domes were decorated by Abdullah Lufi from Istanbul in 1586-7 with gold motifs and calligraphic compositions. The floors of the porticoes and the courtyard around the Kabah were paved with polychrome marble.

The floods of 1629-30 in Mecca caused the collapse of two corner stones of the Kabah. It was reconstructed by engineers from Istanbul, Ankara and other Turkish cities, under the supervision of a Circassian chamberlain of the Ottoman Sultan. During reconstruction the black stone was under the care of an Indian architect. The new Kabah was built in its previous form, incorporating much of the old masonry.

Sulḥân Süleymân made modifications in the Prophet's mosque at Medina during 1534-5. He rebuilt the north-western minaret and the ceremonial entrance at the south-western corner known as the 'Salutation Gate', with ceramic tiles. Inside the mosque for the first time a *mihrab* was erected in the southern wall. Sulḥân Süleymân also presented a new pulpit. During 1715-16 more modifications were made in the Prophet's mosque. In 1782-3 a new *mihrab* was built on the site of the previous *mihrab*, on the southern wall. It was surmounted by a dome. Again during the mid-nineteenth century extensive alterations and additions were made to the

Prophet's mosque. The Sultan sent from Istanbul able and famous architects, engineers, calligraphers, and skilled workers. Like most Islamic trading towns, Jedda's townscape centred on the port and market (*sūq*), with its strong social and economic functions, while the spiritual and religious life centred on the mosque, the essential institution. Residential architecture at Jedda and also at Mecca and Medina was in traditional, and functional, Hejazi styles common on the coastal plain. Its characteristics were tall structures, a great number of windows and large windows in different shapes and sizes. These wooden windows had a variety of decorative devices in geometric patterns. The doors in teak wood were carved with rich, deeply incised designs, which had stucco relief decoration above, and the door was set into an archway, a semicircular window with ornamental spoke-like radiants (see Plates 80-85).

Jalali and Mirani were the first massive forts in Oman arising out of the requirements of the new ballistic technology. However, they were based on the earlier designs of the pre-gunpowder architecture with the new concept of the tower. Subsequently, in Oman the features of military architecture became part of national consciousness and elements of defensive architecture were used as pure decoration. The towers, which were the defensive system of Omani architecture, became part of Muslim tradition in several neighbouring countries. In the interior of Oman, forts and castles were built at Nizwa and at Jabrin. The domestic houses in Oman became a military prototype and the decorative elements were secondary to the massive volumes of the solid structure.

Engelbert Kaempfer who visited Muscat in 1688 observed that the town had houses covered by plane tree leaves; but much cleaner, nicer and more spacious with their small yards. He further states that the majority of houses were built in stone, and were airy and spacious enough. He found an English Resident of the new East India Company at Muscat, a large residence of the King or Imam, and a lovely Italian edifice which then served as the convent of the Jesuits.

Religious reform

During the eighteenth century in Arabia a religious reform movement was initiated and propagated by one Muḥammed ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb (b. 1703) in order to restore Islam to its original principles as practised by the Prophet Muḥammed, and to repudiate all innovations that have crept into Islam. 'Abdul Wahhāb learnt religious subjects at Mecca and Medina and at 10 years of age he memorized the Qur'ān. He travelled widely in and out of Arabia. Wherever he went he found manifestations of heathen syncretism. 'Abdul Wabbāb embarked on the mission by composing works on the doctrine of God's oneness, in which he vigorously attacked syncretism and stressed the need for a return to the uncorrupted religion of the seventh century. He did not advocate anything new. He only reaffirmed the views of Hanbali scholars of earlier times. The movement met with great success when the ruling family of Sa'ud at al-Dar'iyya welcomed it. Muḥammed ibn Sa'ud and Muḥammed ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb entered into an alliance in 1744 to further the cause of the reform and its reformer. The Sa'udi family took charge of the political affairs while 'Abdul Wahhāb dealt with religious affairs. The doctrine was propagated throughout the peninsula. The main objective of the movement was to reform abuses which had crept into Islam and to disseminate the pure faith among

Muslims, especially the hedonists who were ignorant of true faith. The people had begun to return to their old pre-Islamic beliefs and traditions. They did not believe in resurrection after death. They did not perform prayers, fast during the month of Ramadān or pay the *Zakat* (alms).

In response to 'Abdul Wahhāb's call the settlements of Al-'Aynā, Huraimāla, Dhūmā and Manfūha joined the ranks of the Sa'udi State, while other parts of Najd, especially Riyadh, refused submission, and started hostilities against the Sa'udis. In some parts of Arabia, the movement met opposition and conflict. A number of towns in Najd, including Riyadh, opposed it. Riyadh struggled against Wahhābism for nearly a quarter of a century and gave up in 1773. Even at Mecca it was opposed. When Wahhābī pilgrims preached their doctrines during pilgrimage, the Sharif of Mecca arrested them and held them in confinement. In 1788, when Ghālib ibn Masūd became the Sharif of Mecca, he invited a Wahhābī mission to his court. But the 'Ulamā of Mecca refused to join in a debate. Eventually, hostilities ensued between the Sharif and Wahhābīs in the western reaches of Najd. The bitter war lasted till 1803 when the Wahhābīs succeeded and entered Mecca.

Educational literary aspects

From the early days of Islam learned scholars, theologians and mystics gathered and lived at the two Holy cities of Mecca and Medina to learn about Islamic and other affiliated teachings. Four theological orthodox schools of thought – Shāfi'ī, Hanafī, Hanbali and Maliki – were founded at Mecca. The teachers were the leaders of the congregations in the mosques, and the curriculum included the study of the Qur'ān, the *Hadith*, the Prophet's life and medicine.

The basis of all instruction was the Qur'ān and the Tradition of the Prophet. Simultaneously, the pupils of the high classes were acquainted with Arabic literature and introduced to the various branches of science and other subjects.

There were many schools, both elementary and advanced in their teaching. Young children memorized the Qur'ān. Many libraries endowed with precious manuscripts were established.

Ayub Sabri Pasha, a Turkish officer, wrote a comprehensive history of the two Holy Mosques. A large number of writings, manuals on theology and mysticism were compiled. Works on the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions were written.

An Arabian literary heritage (poetry and prose) is absent, with a few exceptions including the learning of verses because of its literary value. Sometimes these verses have repeatedly been used as evidences for supporting grammatical arguments.

Poetry was written in two forms: satire and romantic (the ghazal). The former flourished in the capital cities of the Caliphate and later in the cities and deserts of Arabia as the multi-thematic ode. Several poets achieved eminence and elegance. Nabatī poetry was transmitted verbally from generation to generation. It was not only Bedouins who recited this kind of verse, but many townsmen and women were also celebrated for their Nabatī poetry. Collections of this poetry that came from different times have been published. The most beneficial collection for this study is the poetry of Rāshid al-Khalāwī, collected by 'Abd-Allāh ibn Khamīs. It is not certain at what time al-Khalāwī flourished. Ibn Khamīs is convinced that the poet lived in the eleventh/seventeenth century. However, Ibn Yūsuf,

who lived in the twelfth/eighteenth century, relates the first part of a verse which al-Khalāwī recited about a well-known event that occurred in the region of al-Washm in AH 1139/AD 1726. Ibn Khamīs mentions that event and records four verses spoken by al-Khalāwī when he heard of that event. This is an indication that al-Khalāwī lived in the first half of the twelfth/eighteenth century. Ibn Khamīs was able to collect a large amount of al-Khalāwī's poetry which dealt with different social aspects of Najd life.

Verses ascribed to other Najdi popular poets of the pre-Wahhābī times include those of Ju'ayyin al-Yazīdī, Rumayzān ibn Ghāshshām, Jāhribn Sayyār and Humaydān al-Shuway'ir, and are scattered in collections, such as *Khiyār mā Yūtaqat min Shi'r al-Nabat*, collected by 'Abd-Allāh al-Jātim, *Dīwān al-Nabat* by Khālid al-Faraj and *Al-Azhār al-Nādiyyah* by Muḥammad Sa'id Kamāl.

In the opinion of a modern historian, popular poetry is useful as an historical source for the study of both the period during which that poetry was recited and also for the previous period. On the one hand, this poetry reflects the different aspects of life that the people of Arabia had lived, for it did not change until recently. On the other hand, popular poetry is helpful whenever historical records are scarce or absent.

In the Yemen there appeared a type of poetry called *Humayt* and it is imperfect from the point of view of grammar. It is characterized by being formed in the style of *Muwashshahat* (Andalus Arabic poetry), *Mosammatat* and *dahait* (poetry composed of couple of verses), its subjects concentrates on wooing.

Prose as an art had deteriorated. The only surviving type of prose is formal correspondence and *Akhwani* (brotherly prose correspondence) and some other *Magmmatat*.

Almad Muḥammad Al-Hammami (1662–1738) wrote poems. He was a poet and wrote more than forty poems, for example, *Al-Asīf Al-Mashhūmah balle Al-Maknah* ('stuffed sea shells with preserved pearls'). About Hasan Ali Jāhri Al-Habī (1638–68), Al-Shawkani says that he was a well known poet. He wrote collections of poems. Mohammad Ali Al-Al-Shawkani (1760–1834) wrote several books, treatises and messages. *Rawdat al-afhar Wa-al-Afham fi Ahwat hal al-Innam Wa-fidat ahazawat dhuri al-Islam* was the work of Husayn Ibn Ghannam (d. 1810). He preserved a large amount of the correspondence of 'Abd al-Wahhāb with his followers and opponents.

Various types of prose were written in archaic language decorated with pompous words and even these words have not been renewed. The writer of message and prose in general had become interested in the shape rather than the subject of his writing.

It is noteworthy that religious messages at the end of this period laid more emphasis on the subject than on the shape and therefore several well-written examples had seen the light. This was due to the religious culture of the writers who were interested in bringing out the full significance of their aims rather than in the style of writing.

Materials written on religious subjects, that is, collections of legal judgements (*Fatāwā*) and other legal documents and biographies of the Najdi 'ulama from the pre-Wahhābī era provide data on political, religious and social conditions.

For relations between Najd and its neighbouring countries – the Hejaz, the eastern coast of Arabia and Iraq – chronicles and other sources from those areas have to be consulted too. On relations between Najd and the Persian Gulf area, materials written in that area and documents of the Bombay government that relate to the Arabian coast and Najd are helpful. Travellers'

reports, notes and accounts, particularly that of Burckhardt, must also be utilized. In short, researchers of the pre-Wahhābī history of Najd must look in every source that might contain information on the subject. However, using sources of such scarcity and diversity calls for a particular carefulness and caution when forming conclusions.

Further, there is another type of poetry which is not based on fluent grammatical language and which is spread among the Bedouins, though its language is imperfect. However, this Bedouin poetry depicts the ways of life of Arabian people during the *Jahiliyyah* period (the period before Prophet Muḥammed's Mission).

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IRAN, ARMENIA AND GEORGIA

I 8. I

IRAN

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IRAN 1501-1629

*Roger M. Savory*RISE OF A SHĪ'Ī STATE IN IRAN AND
NEW ORIENTATION IN ISLAMIC
THOUGHT AND CULTURETHE AGE OF ABBAS THE GREAT
(1588-1629): POLITICAL
CENTRALIZATION, URBANIZATION,
COURT PATRONAGE OF THE ARTS,
RELATIONS WITH EUROPEANS

The creation of the Safavid state in 1501 marks a watershed in Iranian history in a number of ways. First, the whole of the area historically considered to be the heartlands of Iran was reunited under the rule of one Persian king (albeit one who spoke the Azari dialect of Turkish) for the first time since the Arab conquest of Iran more than eight and a half centuries earlier. 'It was the Šafavids who led Iran back on to the stage of world history' (Roemer, 1986, p. 190). During these eight and a half centuries, Iran had been ruled by a succession of Arab caliphs and Turkish and Mongol sultans and khans; only during the period dubbed by Vladimir Minorsky 'the Iranian intermezzo' (AD 946-1055) did a dynasty of Iranian origin hold sway over much of Iran. The restoration of Iranian sovereignty by the Šafavids, within the traditional boundaries of Iran, naturally heightened Iranian national consciousness or *Iranisms*, though this did not constitute 'nationalism' in the modern sense of the term.

Second, the Ithnā 'Asharī rite of Shī'ī Islam was adopted as the official religion of the Šafavid state. The words 'I bear witness that 'Alī is the Beloved of God' (*valī allāh*) were incorporated in the call to prayer (*azān*). This was the first time in the history of Islam that a major Islamic state had

officially made this form of Islam the state religion. The inevitable effect of this policy was to enhance the power, both religious and political, of the *ulamā* or religious classes. The most learned members of the *ulamā*, who held the status of *mujtahid*, held the view that they, not the shah, constituted the legitimate government in an Ithnā 'Asharī state. This view was based in general on the Ithnā 'Asharī Shī'ī millenarian ideal of utopian government by the Twelfth Imām, also known as the Mahdī or Hidden Imām. According to Ithnā 'Asharī political theory, the only legitimate form of the government in an Ithnā 'Asharī state is that of the Twelfth Imām or, in his continuing occultation, that of his representatives on earth, the *mujtahids*. The Twelfth Imām disappeared from earth in AD 873-4; until AD 940 he was represented on earth by a line of four successive *vakīls* (vicegerents); after the death of the fourth *vakīl*, this function devolved upon the *mujtahids*. Thus, by promulgating the policy of making Ithnā 'Asharism the official religion of the state, Shāh Ismā'īl I, the first ruler of the Šafavid dynasty, built into the body politic the potential for conflict between the shahs, representing 'secular' government, and the *mujtahids*, aspiring to theocratic government. Why, then, did he take this step? There are two possibilities: he promulgated Ithnā 'Asharism either out of religious conviction, or out of political expediency, that is, from a desire to differentiate the Šafavid state from its powerful neighbour, the Ottoman Empire. Our own view is that a combination of both these factors led him to take this decision. If the newly created state were to survive in proximity to the Ottoman Empire, which was still in an expansionist phase (in 1517 the whole of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt were incorporated into it), no doubt the militant ideology of Ithnā 'Asharī Shī'ism seemed to offer the best

hope of survival. However, the Šafavid movement (Šafaviyya) which brought Shāh Ismā'il to power in 1501 had not originally been a Shī'ī movement.

The origins of the Šafavids

The origins of the Šafavid family are obscure or, to put it more accurately, were deliberately obscured by Shāh Tahmāsp (1524–76), the second Šafavid king, after the consolidation of the Šafavid state. From the evidence available at the present time, it is certain that the Šafavid family was of indigenous Iranian stock, and not of Turkish ancestry as is sometimes claimed. It is probable that the family originated in Persian Kurdistan, and later moved to Āzerbāijān, where they adopted the Azari form of Turkish spoken there, and eventually settled in the small town of Ardabīl sometime during the eleventh century. There, they devoted themselves to agricultural pursuits, but in the course of time became noted for their abundant piety and zealous religious observance, and began to attract disciples (*murīd*). The family survived the sack of Ardabīl by the Georgians in 1203–4, and in 1252–3 Šafī al-Dīn, the eponymous founder of the Šafavid Order, was born.

The principal source for the life of Šafī al-Dīn is the *Šafvat al-Safā*, a hagiological work compiled only fifteen years after his death. The young Šafī al-Dīn, after a protracted search for a spiritual director (*murshid*) who could analyse his mystical state and satisfy his spiritual needs, arrived in 1276–7 at a small village near the Caspian Sea, where he enrolled as a disciple of Sheikh Zāhid-i Gilāni, then sixty years of age. Šafī al-Dīn married Sheikh Zāhid's daughter and, when the Sheikh died in 1301, succeeded him as the head of the Zāhidiyya Order, henceforth known as the Šafaviyya or Šafavid Order.

The expansion of the Šafavid Order (1301–1501)

Under the leadership of Sheikh Šafī al-Dīn, who was nominally a Sunnī of the Shāfi'ī school, a Sufi Order of purely local significance was transformed into a religious movement whose influence was felt throughout Iran, Syria and Asia Minor, and signs of militant activism became apparent. His son, Šadr al-Dīn Mūsā, who succeeded him on his death in 1334, built the sacred enclosure of the Šafavid family at Ardabīl, and maintained the cohesiveness of the Šafavid Order in the turbulent times which preceded and accompanied the rise to power of Tamerlane. Although little is known about the development of the Order under Khvāja 'Alī (1391–1427) or his successor Ibrāhīm (1427–47), traces of Shī'ī ideology for the first time became apparent under Khvāja 'Alī. As Roemer (p. 196) has pointed out, although no ancestor of Shāh Ismā'il is unambiguously described in the sources as a Shī'ī, the folk Islam cultivated by the early Šafavid leaders was a perfect cover for heterodoxy. One must take into account the connections between the Šafavid *tanīqa* and heterodox Anatolian *tanīqas* such as the Badr al-Dīniyya, the Khalvatiyya, the Bayāniyya and the Qalandārs. These connections facilitated the spread of Šafavid propaganda (*da'wa*) among the Turkmens. The adoption by Haydar of the Sufi 'tāj' for his followers (allegedly in response to instructions received in a dream from 'Alī, the first Shī'ī Imām) is extremely significant, because this 'tāj' was a distinctive form of head-gear with twelve folds commemorating the twelve Imāms of the Ithnā' Asharī Shī'a.

Under the leadership of Junayd (1447–60) and Haydar (1460–88), the Šafavid Order for the first time openly aspired to temporal as well as spiritual authority. Both Junayd and Haydar were killed in battle while trying to wrest political power from contemporary local rulers, and Haydar's son 'Alī was overtaken by Aq Qoyunlu forces as he made for Ardabīl, and was also killed in battle (1494). In the Ottoman Empire, the career of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn affords a striking parallel. Despite the loss of three successive leaders, the Šafavid movement did not lose its revolutionary momentum. 'Alī's younger brother, Ismā'il, then seven years of age, eluded the clutches of the Aq Qoyunlu as a result of the efforts of a small band of devoted followers known as the *ahl-i ikhtisās*, and took refuge in Gilan with the ruler of Lāhijān, Kār Kīā Mirzā 'Alī, who was undoubtedly responsible for strengthening his Shī'ī convictions.

The accession of the Šafavids to power in Iran

Ismā'il spent five years in Gilan. During this time he was visited by his disciples (*murīds*) from Azarbayjan and Asia Minor, and perfected the revolutionary organization of the Šafavid Order. Leaving Gilan in the winter of 1499–1500, he summoned his followers to a rendezvous at Arzinjān in eastern Anatolia in the late summer of 1500. There he was joined by 7,000 men of the Turkmen tribes of the area; these tribes were to become the backbone of the Šafavid army. Imbued with their Babariyya and Qalandāriyya beliefs, the Turkmens had no difficulty in hailing Ismā'il both as their *murshid-i kāmāl* ('perfect spiritual director') and as *pādshāh* ('king'). Because they sported the Sufi 'tāj' with its distinctive scarlet tuft, they were later dubbed *qizilbaş* ('redheads') by their Ottoman foes, and adopted the souhriquet as a mark of pride.¹ First, Ismā'il took revenge on Farrukhyasār, the ruler of Shīrvān, who had defeated and killed both his grandfather Junayd (1460) and, assisted by Aq Qoyunlu troops, his father Haydar (1488). Next, Ismā'il won a decisive battle at Sharū against the Aq Qoyunlu prince Alvand. This victory gave the Šafavids possession of Tabriz, the Aq Qoyunlu capital, and the province of Azarbayjan. Although other Aq Qoyunlu forces remained in the field in the south of Iran, and although it was ten years before Ismā'il had consolidated his rule over the rest of the country, nevertheless the Šafavids, by this victory, had in fact won the struggle for supremacy in Iran which various rival groups had fought to achieve for nearly a century since the death of Tamerlane. In the decade following his victory at Sharū, Ismā'il brought the rest of Iran under Šafavid control. The process culminated in the reconquest of Khurasan, achieved by the crushing defeat at Marv in 1510 of the Özbegs under Muḥammad Shīhānī Khān, who had wrested the province from the grasp of the Timurids in 1507. In the course of subjugating the remaining Aq Qoyunlu forces, Ismā'il also brought Baghdad and the province of 'Irāq-i 'Arah under Šafavid control (1508).

The nature of the Šafavid state from Shāh Ismā'il I to Shāh 'Abbās I

The reign of Shāh Ismā'il I (1501–24), and to a lesser extent that of his successor, Shāh Tahmāsp (1524–76), constitute a formative period in the development of the Šafavid state. Terms which give concrete expression to the concept of the state as a political entity appear regularly in the sources by

the time of Shāh 'Abbās I (1588–1629) (see Plate 86), but during the earlier period the phrase most commonly used is *manāḥik-i maḥnāsa* ('the divinely protected dominions'). This term reflects the traditional view of the shah as the living emanation of the Godhead, the Shadow of God upon earth, a ruler divinely appointed by God. Contemporary Venetian merchants attest that Shāh Ismā'īl was considered to be the emanation of the Godhead, and poems written by Shāh Ismā'īl himself, in the Azari Turkish dialect and under the pen-name of Khaṣṣī, go even further and attribute divine or quasi-divine status to himself. Such statements were more akin to the extremist Shī'ī sects⁴, and to the theory of the Qutb shared by both Sufis and Shī'īs⁵, than to the mainstream theology of Ithnā 'Asharī *mujtahids*. The idea that the ruler was directly appointed by God was itself sufficient to give his rule the nature of absolutism, but it was powerfully reinforced by the two other bases of his power: his function as the representative on earth of the Hidden Imām or Mahdī; and his position as the *murshid-i kāmīl* of the Safavid Order of Sufis. In the Safavid *tarīqa*, the belief in the Qutb, the head of the saintly hierarchy, must have supported Ismā'īl's claim to sovereignty in the two worlds. The *mujtahids* held the view that the Safavid shahs, by claiming to be the representatives on earth of the Twelfth Imām, had usurped a function properly belonging to themselves, and their recognition of this claim on the part of the Safavid kings was never more than tacit. Nevertheless, this aspect of Safavid rule, together with the arrogation by Shāh Ismā'īl of divine or quasi-divine status, gave a theocratic flavour to the early Safavid state.

The third basis of the power of the Safavid shahs was their role as *murshid-i kāmīl* of the Safavid Order. In theory, his followers were his *murīds*, or disciples, and they owed unquestioning obedience to him as their *pīr/sheikh/murshid* ('spiritual guide'). Again, this *pīr-murīd* relationship is attested by contemporary Venetian accounts. In a regular *pīr-murīd* relationship, disobedience on the part of the *murīd* would normally result in expulsion from the order or the doing of penance. Ismā'īl, however, was not only a spiritual director to his followers, but also their *pādīshāh* ('king'). The concept of *qifṣān*, or conduct proper to a Sufi, was transferred to the political plane. Any infringement of this code became not only a sin, in religious terms, but disloyalty to the king and treason against the state, punishable by death. Ismā'īl's crushing defeat at the hands of the Ottomans at the battle of Chāldīran (1514) destroyed the faith of his *murīds* in the invincibility of their *murshid*, and from then on much less emphasis was placed on this special relationship. Up to the time of Shāh 'Abbās I, however, some of the rituals associated with it were preserved, and appeals to the concept of *shāhī-serwī* ('love of the shah') remained a useful tool for the Safavid shahs in times of crisis.

Initially, the administrative system of the Safavid state was a *qizilbāsh*/Persian condominium. From the beginning, there was tension between the existing bureaucracy, staffed by Persians (also termed *Tājiks*), and the new military élite of *qizilbāsh* officers who considered that political power in the state should rightfully lie theirs, because it was their prowess that had brought the Safavids to power. In an effort to bridge the gap between the new (mainly Turkmen) military aristocracy and the old (mainly Persian) bureaucracy, Shāh Ismā'īl created a new office, that of *rakīl-i vafā-i nafīs-i humāyūn*. The *rakīl* was intended to be the Shāh's *alter ego* both in his temporal and in his spiritual capacity, but proved unsuccessful. The holder of the office of *rakīl* necessarily had

to be either a Turkmen or a Persian; if he were the former, the Persians resented the fact that a non-Persian should wield such great power; if he were a Persian, the *qizilbāsh* considered it a dishonour to obey his orders. Of the six Persians who held the office of *rakīl* during the first eighty years of Safavid rule, two were assassinated by the *qizilbāsh*, and a third was put to death by the *qizilbāsh* shortly after the death of Shāh Ismā'īl, at a time when the *qizilbāsh* had assumed control of the state.

There was also tension between the shah and the religious classes, who resented his usurpation of their prerogative to be the representatives of the Hidden Imām on earth. Ismā'īl tried to bring the religious institution under the control of the political institution by making the *ṣadr* (an official who, in the fifteenth century Timurid and Aq Qoyunlu administrations, was the head of the religious institution) a political appointee, but this stratagem barely outlasted its initiator. Early in the reign of Shāh Tahmāsp, we find instances of *mujtahids* effectively influencing the appointment of *ṣadrs*. Under strong rulers, the *mujtahids* were unable or unwilling to assert their authority but, during the period of Safavid decline after Shāh 'Abbās II (1642–66), they virtually took over control of the state.

Tahmāsp, who succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ismā'īl, in 1524, was only ten and a half years of age. For almost ten years, Tahmāsp's authority was usurped by the *qizilbāsh* chiefs, who indulged in inter-tribal warfare oblivious of the fact that by so doing they were placing the Safavid state in jeopardy in the face of the Ottoman threat. When Tahmāsp eventually succeeded in asserting his authority, he introduced a policy which began the process of changing the nature of the Safavid state from a *qizilbāsh*/Persian condominium to that of a multicultural society. Over a period of fifteen years, Tahmāsp conducted three major and a number of minor campaigns in Georgia. From each of these expeditions, large numbers of captives, mainly women and children, were brought back to Iran, and the offspring of unions between these Caucasian women and Persians entered the ranks of the Safavid administration, where they rapidly made their mark. In addition, a number of Georgian nobles voluntarily entered Safavid service, and at least one held a provincial governorate before the end of Tahmāsp's reign. The Georgians who entered Safavid service were known as *ghulāms* ('slaves' [of the Porte]), an obvious analogy with the Ottoman *qapı-qulları* ('slaves of the Porte'); the *ghulāms* renounced their Christian faith, and were given special training designed to fit them either for military service or for employment in the royal household. Though the Safavid state was weakened by internal faction, Tahmāsp succeeded in holding at bay both his arch-enemies, the Ottomans in the west and the Özbeks in the east. Between 1524 and 1538, the Özbeks launched five major attacks on Khorasan and, between 1533 and 1553 the Ottomans, then at the height of their power under Sultan Süleymān the Magnificent, invaded Iran on four occasions. Iran suffered some loss of territory; Baghdad was captured by the Ottomans in 1534, and in 1548 Tahmāsp moved the Safavid capital from Tabriz, which had proved too vulnerable to Ottoman attack, to Qazvin. In 1555, Tahmāsp succeeded in negotiating with the Ottomans the treaty of Amasya, which ushered in a period of more than thirty years of peace.

Shāh Tahmāsp was succeeded by the mentally unstable Ismā'īl II (1576–8) and the weak Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh (1578–88). In the absence of a strong ruler, there was a recrudescence of the factionalism which had marked the first


decade of the reign of Shāh Tahmāsp. This time, however, it was not merely a case of rival *qizilbāsh* tribes striving for control of the state, or even of a repetition of the ongoing struggle for power between Turk and Tājik (though the dichotomy between these two 'founding nations' of the Šafavid state remained as sharp as ever), but a new phenomenon in the development of the Šafavid state, namely, a push for power by members of a new élite, the ambitious and energetic Georgians (joined now by Circassians and Armenians) recently arrived in Iran. The introduction of these new elements, coupled with the decline of *ghulāt* beliefs, led, in the long term, to a decline in the formerly dominant position of the *qizilbāsh*.

The Šafavid state at the height of its power and prosperity under Shāh 'Abbās I (1588–1629)

The attitude of Shāh 'Abbās I toward the *qizilbāsh* was coloured by the experience of his youth and adolescence, when he had been a pawn in the hands of power-hungry *qizilbāsh* chiefs, who switched their allegiance from one prince to another with complete disregard either for the well-being of the state or for personal loyalty. He therefore determined to curb the power of these chiefs in a drastic manner. The *qizilbāsh* troops, however, constituted the only fighting force capable of recovering Šafavid territory overrun by the Ottomans and the Özbeks during the weak rule of the two preceding shahs. To solve the dilemma, 'Abbās created new regiments composed mainly of Georgian,

Armenian and Circassian *ghulāms*. These regiments constituted the nucleus of a standing army – itself an innovation in Iran where, throughout the medieval period, troops had been raised on an *ad hoc* basis from tribal forces. The analogy with the Ottoman janissaries is obvious. The cost of the *qizilbāsh* forces had in the past been defrayed from the revenues levied by provincial governors who were themselves *qizilbāsh* chiefs. The central administration disposed of little in the way of revenue, and so in order to pay his new standing army, 'Abbās removed from *qizilbāsh* control a number of provinces, and brought them under the direct control of the crown. In addition, he sought to weaken the cohesiveness of the *qizilbāsh* tribal organization by transferring groups of *qizilbāsh* belonging to one tribe to the *ulka* ('tribal area') of another. The increased centralization of the administration under 'Abbās I enhanced the status of the Tājik bureaucracy and this, too, derogated from the power of the *qizilbāsh*. As a short-term solution to the *qizilbāsh* problem, 'Abbās's policies had their merits; the reorganized army won resounding victories against both Ottomans and Özbeks, who were driven from Persian soil.

The fame of Shāh 'Abbās I rests not only on his political, military and diplomatic skills, great though these were, but also on his success in raising the Šafavid state to its highest point of economic prosperity and cultural achievement (see Map 24). In contrast to Shāh Tahmāsp, who in 1562 had rebuffed the attempt by Anthony Jenkinson to open up trade with England with the words: 'Oh thou unbeliever, we have no need to have friendship with the unbelievers', 'Abbās I in 1615 granted to the factors of the English East India



Map 24 The Šafavid Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (R. Savory, 1980).

Company a *farrmān* (imperial decree) which ordered his subjects

to kindly receive and entertain the English Frankes or Nation, at what time any of their ships or shipping shall arrive at Jasques (Jask), or any other Ports in our Kingdom; to conduct them and their Merchandize to what place or places they themselves desire; and that you shall see them safely defended about our coasts, from any other Frank or Franks whatsoever.

The Dutch East India Company was not slow in following the English Company's lead. In 1622, the astute 'Abbās used the leverage of these trade privileges to persuade a reluctant English East India Company to provide naval transport for the Persian forces which drove the Portuguese out of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. The Shāh aimed at depriving the Ottomans of the silk trade by diverting silk exports to Bandar 'Abbās.

Encouraged by 'Abbās's policy of religious tolerance, various Catholic Orders opened convents in Isfahān, to which city 'Abbās had moved his capital in 1598, since even Qazvīn had proved too vulnerable to Ottoman attack. Augustinians, Carmélites and Capuchins established missions in Isfahān itself, and Jesuits and Dominicans in the suburb of Julfā. Their presence in turn encouraged merchants, craftsmen and artisans from Europe (but also some from Asia) to settle in Isfahān. Spain, Portugal, France and England sent ambassadors to the court of 'Abbās. The French ambassador was arrested en route by the Ottomans and never reached Iran. The designing of the new capital was an example of urban planning rivalled in modern times only by the work of Baron Haussmann in Paris in the time of Napoléon III, and by that of L'Enfant in Washington. The new city, contiguous with

the ancient one, was planned around two key features: the huge piazza, known as the Maydān-i Shāh or Maydān-i Naqsh-i Jahān, approximately 507 m in length and 158 m in width; and the Chahān Bāgh avenue, which ran south from a point near the Chihil Sotūn palace, crossed the Zāyandeh-rūd river by the Allāhverdi Khān bridge, and continued for another mile and a quarter to the Hāzārjārīh pleasure gardens. Two of the greatest masterpieces of Šāfavid architecture flanked the Maydān-i Shāh: the Masjid-i Shāh, an magnificent mosque complex commissioned by Shāh 'Abbās in 1611, but not completed until after his death in 1629; and the Masjid-i Sheikh Luīfullāh, a private oratory. The interior of the dome of the latter is incomparable in its decorative beauty (see Figure 22).

The development of trade and commerce was a primary goal of 'Abbās I. Internal trade was facilitated by the construction along the main routes (which were themselves improved) of caravanserais, which provided the merchant with overnight accommodation and security for himself, his pack-animals and his merchandise. This was especially the case in the silk-producing Caspian provinces. The *rāhdār*, or road-guards, who collected tolls from commercial caravans, were responsible for the security of travellers on the roads, and contemporary European accounts compare favourably the degree of safety on the highways in Iran with that obtaining in the Ottoman Empire. The Shāh was the largest employer of labour by virtue of the system of royal workshops, thirty-two in number, which gave employment to some 5,000 artisans and craftsmen who constituted a privileged class with job-security for life. Some of these royal workshops existed simply to meet the needs of the royal household, but many were state-owned manufactories, producing all kinds of textiles, brocades and carpets.

Internal commerce was largely in the hands of Jewish and Persian merchants, but to develop Iran's export trade Shāh 'Abbās made use of the international connections of the Armenians, to whom he allocated an entire new suburb of Isfahān, Julfā, and to whose cathedral there he made a subvention (see Plates 87 and 88). Because the Ottoman Empire, with which the Šāfavids were frequently at war, lay astride the traditional trade routes from Iran through Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean ports, and through Anatolia and Istanbul, a new trade route was established from northern Iran, across the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, up the river Volga and thence by land across the Ukraine. Silk, made a royal monopoly by 'Abbās, became a lucrative source of revenue, and most of the silk trade was handled by Armenian merchants, who competed successfully with the merchants of the Dutch and English East India Companies; the overheads of the latter meant that they had to make a gross profit of 60 or 70 per cent in order to produce a reasonable net return on their investment.

Under the patronage of the Šāfavid shahs, the arts and architecture flourished. Shāh Ismā'īl I, carrying on the artistic traditions of the Timurid court at Herāt, moved the Timurid court painter Bihzād to Tabriz to establish a school of painting there. The royal 'library' at Tabriz, of which Bihzād was appointed director in 1522, was in reality an atelier in which craftsmen, under the direction of the *naqqāsh*, produced manuscripts noted for the quality of their calligraphy, illumination, illustration and bindings. These skills, which together constitute the 'art of the book', reached their apogee during the reign of Shāh Tahmāsp, when a unique manuscript, commissioned in 1522 by Ismā'īl for his son, was completed. This work, the *Shāhnāmah-yi Shāh Tahmāspī*, or 'King's Book of Kings', contains more than 250 miniature paintings




Figure 22 Plan of the Royal Square in Isfahān, Iran.
Source: Anthony Welch, *Shah 'Abbās and the Arts of Isfahān*, New York, 1973 (drawn by Michael Willis).

(no other extant manuscript contains more than fourteen). These paintings illustrate the text of the *Shāh-nāmah* of Firdawsī, the Persian national epic, which is itself a masterpiece of the calligrapher's art (see Plate 89). Under 'Abbās I, superb calligraphers such as 'Alī Rizā adorned the architectural masterpieces such as the Masjid-i Shāh and the Masjid-i Sheikh Lutfillāh at Isfahān, and the dome above the tomb of the Imām 'Alī al-Rizā at Mashhad. The traditional style of Safavid painting continued, in the hands of such masters as Rizā 'Abbāsī, but new artists such as Šādiq Beg Afshār produced paintings which broke with Safavid and indeed Islamic tradition and pointed the more realistic schools of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Not only the fine arts, but also crafts, flourished under royal patronage during the Safavid period. Although two of the finest Safavid carpets, the Milan Hunting Carpet, dated 1522-3, and the Ardabil Carpet, dated 1535-6, were produced during the reigns of Ismā'īl I and Tahmāsp respectively, it was 'Abbās I who transformed the manufacture of Persian carpets from the status of a cottage industry to that of a national one. He established carpet factories at Kāshān, Isfahān and elsewhere. Carpets were commissioned not only by the shahs, but by the nobility and European royalty. The export trade was considerable: European paintings attest the presence of large numbers of Persian carpets in Europe by the seventeenth century. Safavid textiles, too, particularly the sumptuous brocades, silks and velvets, found a ready market not only in Europe but in South-East Asia. Iranian potters not only distinguished themselves by the range and inventiveness of their faience tiles, which embellished so many Safavid buildings, but learned from the three hundred Chinese potters whom 'Abbās I brought to Isfahān the secrets of the manufacture of porcelain. Safavid metalwork which, like Safavid painting, was a continuation of the Timurid tradition, has been unjustly neglected until recently.

Conclusion

In a number of ways, the Safavids affected the development of the modern Iranian state: first, they ensured the continuance of various ancient and traditional Persian institutions, and transmitted these in a strengthened, or more 'national', form; second, by imposing *lhnā 'Asharī Shī'ism* on Iran as the official religion of the Safavid state, they enhanced the power of the *mujtahids*. The Safavids thus set in train a struggle for power between the turban and the crown, that is to say, between the proponents of secular government and the proponents of theocratic government; third, they laid the foundations of the alliance between the religious classes (*'ulamā*) and the bazaar which played such an important role both in the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6, and again in the Islamic Revolution of 1979; fourth, the policies introduced by Shāh 'Abbās I conduced to a more centralized administrative system.

The noted French Huguenot Chardin, reviewing the state of Iran some half a century after the death of 'Abbās I in 1629, commented: 'When this great prince ceased to live, Persia ceased to prosper'. Even if this is an overstatement, because Safavid decline did not become rapid until the second half of the seventeenth century, it is true to say that the Safavid state never again achieved the degree of political and military power, of economic prosperity, of artistic distinction, or of internal stability and security, that it reached during the reign of Shāh 'Abbās I.

NOTES

- 1 *Mujtahid*: one who is entitled to exercise *ijihād*, or reasoning by analogy, to resolve disputes on points of religious law.
- 2 I am indebted to Professor Halil Inalcik for information that the *Kizil hork*, or 'red cap', had already been used by Turkmen warriors in the fourteenth century.
- 3 A province lying north of the river Kur on the west coast of the Caspian Sea.
- 4 See article *GHULAT* in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. II, 1963, pp. 1093-5.
- 5 See article *KUTB* in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. V, 1986, pp. 542-6.

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John R. Perry

FROM THE ŠAFAVIDS TO THE QĀJĀRS
(1736-1800): GENERAL TRENDS

The history of Iran from the death of Shāh 'Abbās I to the accession of Āghā Muḥammad Shāh Qājār shows, as might be expected, a strong thread of continuity in the realm of administration, religion, and concepts of national and cultural identity. The Šafavid tripod of empire – the shah, the Shī'a, and the Tūrkmen army (the *qizilbāsh*) – remained constant themes, as ideals to be re-established even when temporarily in abeyance. In practice, however, the five polities representing 'Iran' that succeeded one another during this century and three-quarters had five quite different territorial extents and orientations, four different capital cities, and religious and military policies that contrasted sharply with each other and with those of Shāh 'Abbās: one, for instance, sought to dispense with the Shī'a, while another managed to do without a shah. Yet, as a result of both the continuing Šafavid traditions and of these innovations, the country that emerged at the dawn of the nineteenth century was – in territorial extent and cultural identity – essentially the Iran of today, complete with the unresolved tensions between secular and religious authority.

Before reviewing the events of this period, we should bear in mind a few relevant facts of the political and social traditions and the material culture of the Iranian plateau and adjacent regions that remained constant throughout. From the sixteenth until the nineteenth century (in some cases, until the early twentieth) the whole of the Middle East and Central Asia, and most of India, was ruled by dynasties of Turkic language and Inner Asian pastoral nomadic provenance and/or tradition. In Iran, at least one-third of the populace were nomadic pastoralists. There was little wheeled transportation; the unpaved roads (and the one stone-paved causeway Shāh 'Abbās had built in Mazandaran) were traversed on animal back and on foot. The bulk of the armies of this period comprised tribal cavalry, armed with sword, lance and javelin (*jerid*) and urban or peasant levies armed with matchlock (later, flint-lock) muskets and arquebuses (*jezail*, *jezā'ir*). Field artillery consisted mainly of *zamburaks*, which were six-pounder swivel guns mounted on special camel saddles and fired from a crouched position.

Turkmen bands from the steppe east of the Caspian regularly raided settlements and travellers in northern Khurasan (including pilgrims to Mashhad) and took them to be sold in the slave markets of Khīva and Bukhārā. Arab clans, Iranian warlords and European trading companies (the Portuguese in the sixteenth, the British from the seventeenth and the Dutch in the eighteenth century) vied for control

of ports and islands – and thus of commercial profits – on the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. Cities were walled and their gates guarded and locked at night; tolls were levied on caravans at many points on every major road. Printing or lithography was not introduced into Iran until the nineteenth century, and literacy was strictly the domain of the administrative and religious classes. None of this appears seriously to have compromised the fundamental intellectual and cultural vitality of the region.

The later Šafavids and the Afghan invasion

'Abbās' immediate successors, Šafī and 'Abbās II, expanded his centralizing policy of converting state lands (governed by *qizilbāsh* amirs) into crown property (administered directly by an overseer for the shah); this increased the royal revenue, but at the expense of exposing strategic provinces to rebellion and invasion. Under 'Abbās II the Jews of the empire were required publicly to profess Islam. Some 100,000 are said to have done so, but to have remained secretly faithful to Judaism. Under Shāh Süleymān (1666-94) and Shāh Sulṭān Husain (1694-1722) – outwardly pious, but given to drink and debauchery – the influence of the *mujtahids* increased, and religious persecution was extended to Christians and Sunni Muslims. The *haram* and the vizier also exercised greater control over the shah, who paid less attention to affairs of state. Heavier taxation and other abuses provoked rebellions, and in the empire's most distant and neglected colony, Afghanistan, an insurrection under Mir Vays of the Ghazāy Pathans and his son Mahmūd escalated into an invasion of Iran. The Šafavid forces, poorly paid and indifferently commanded, collapsed; the capital, 'Half the World,' was starved into capitulation after a six-month blockade in 1722.

Despite massacring leading citizens, *qizilbāsh* guards, and all members of the Šafavid royal family who could be found, 'Shāh' Mahmūd and his successor, Ashraf, were unable to impose their rule much beyond the capital. A further threat lay in a Russo-Ottoman agreement to partition Persia's north-west provinces, following which the Ottomans seized Tabriz and the Russians occupied part of the Caspian coast. The continuing popular appeal of the Šafavids was evidenced in the dozen or more pretenders to the throne, both genuine and spurious, who appeared in various provinces during the Afghan occupation and for long after. One of them, Tahmāsh, who had escaped from beleaguered Isfahān, recruited an Afshār freebooter called Nādir-qulī who had formed his own army and now captured the city of Mashhad in the name of

Shāh Tahmāsh II. Within ten years this dynamic general had routed and expelled both the Afghan and the Ottoman invaders, negotiated the Russians' withdrawal, deposed Tahmāsh, and mounted the throne in 1736 as Nādir Shāh.

Nādir Shāh Afshār

The new dynast devoted the next decade to the military conquest of northern Āzərbayān, Iraq, Afghanistan, India and Turkestan (Central Asia), making Mashhad the metropolis of an empire expanding in every direction beyond the boundaries of the essentially conservative Safavid state. He was in fact cumulating the exploits of Timur (Tamerlane), the nomadic world-conqueror of three and a half centuries before. To achieve this, Nādir set out to overturn virtually every principle of Safavid rule. Having removed, as he thought, the Safavid dynasty, he bullied the religious and secular leaders of Iran into declaring the cult of the Shī'a abolished and replaced by a form of Orthodox (Sunnī) Islam, chiefly as a ploy to obtain a truce from the sworn ideological enemy, Ottoman Turkey, and perhaps as a springboard to a greater Islamic empire. He reduced his earlier dependence on *qizilbāsh* troops by recruiting regiments of Sunnī Afghans and Uzbeks from the lands he conquered. But his constant campaigning imposed on all classes of society an intolerable burden of taxation and requisition, enforced by increasingly cruel punishment of defaulters. By 1747 rebellions had broken out everywhere in his over-extended realms. Finally his Persian, Qājār and Afshār officers, suspecting he had ordered his Afghan contingent to massacre them, plucked up courage to murder him in his camp north-west of Mashhad.

Nādir's huge army and empire disintegrated. His successors were soon limited to the impoverished province of Khurasan; Nādir's grandson Shāhrukh Shāh (ultimately deposed by the first Qājār ruler in 1796) was by a double irony a descendant of the Safavid line and for much of his 'reign' a vassal of the first king of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shāh Durrānī. As Ahmad Khan, he had been commander of Nādir's Afghan contingent, which had fought its way back to Qandahār in 1747; he subsequently expanded his new realm to include much of the Mughal Empire in north-west India, which had been fatally weakened by Nādir's invasion and sack of Delhi in 1739.

The enormous booty Nādir had brought from India to Mashhad (including the Peacock Throne and the Kohinoor Diamond) was dissipated among his successors and their clients. Manuscripts and craftsmen are also mentioned as being among the plunder from India, but nothing certain is known of their subsequent fate. 'Afshārid dynasty' is thus a convenient political term for Nādir Shāh and his successors in Mashhad, but bears none of the cultural connotations of 'Timurid' or 'Safavid.' The only new edifices attributed to Nādir are great numbers of *kala-mūtār*, towers in which severed heads or living captives were cemented as a warning to others who might dare to cross him.

The Vakīl, Karīm Khan Zand

With Nādir's death, many of the Iranian tribal contingents he had incorporated in his army or exiled to Khurasan returned west to their ranges in the Zagros. In concert with the pro-Safavid bureaucrats of Isfahān and the other cities of western Iran they expelled Nādir's garrisons. In 1751 a

chieftain of the Zand tribe, Karīm Khan, gained control of the greater part of the old Safavid territories and ruled as *vakīl*, 'representative' of a nominal Safavid shah. Under his wise and moderate direction, the political and economic centre of gravity shifted back to western central Iran, as Armenian and Jewish refugees returned – mainly to his chosen capital, Shiraz – and a truncated version of the commercial network established in Safavid times was revived.

Karīm Khan's contribution to Iran's cultural identity was different from either that of Nādir Shāh or of the Safavids; it was pragmatic, syncretic, and infinitely less traumatic. His power base was, and remained, the Iranian pastoral tribes (Lak, Lur and Kurd) of the Zagros, so that his reign forms a second, brief 'Iranian intermezzo' amid the succession of Turco-Mongol dynasties that culminated in the Qājārs. The surviving components of the *qizilbāsh* tribes were co-opted in subordinate military and provincial commands by dint of marriage alliances and hostages. Instead of opposing head-on the concept of a Safavid shah, which had been Nādir's undoing, Karīm chose quietly to exorcise this still-potent spirit by maintaining a figurehead shah, Ismā'īl III, residing in obscurity in a small town between Shiraz (the new capital) and Isfahān (the old), while he himself ruled as viceroy.

In a truly revolutionary move, however, Karīm styled himself not *vakīl al-dawla*, viceroy of the state, or shah, but *vakīl al-ra'āyā*, viceroy of the [shah's] subjects, that is, the people's representative. This title was that of a traditional Persian ombudsman, an appointee of the shah responsible for investigating and redressing injustice, a post perhaps originating in pre-Islamic times and surviving through the Qājār period. (Throughout these three centuries and beyond, the ancient ideal of the shah as personal dispenser of justice prevailed, though never consistently implemented: Shāh 'Abbās II, for instance, spent five days a week in court.) The Vakīl's religious policy likewise followed popular predilection. He paid lip-service to the Shī'a (evidently firmly rooted among both Persians and Turks of Iran, despite Nādir's attempted counter-reformation) but did not seek the sanction of the *ulama* or pay them the expected subsidies; on the other hand, he is said to have paid allowances to Sufi dervishes.

The Safavid shahs had projected an image combining the divinely-ordained monarch of pre-Islamic times with the master of a Sufi order, and Nādir Shāh had personified the tyrannical master of a secular, Mongol-style militaristic state – each a form of absolutism. Karīm Khan, however, fostered the image of the consensual tribal chieftain, who paid pro forma homage to Shāh and Shī'a while actively respecting the diverse needs of nomad, peasant and townsman, and striving to reconcile them by consultation and compromise. It was a unique experiment, not to be repeated. Popular wisdom in Iran still views Shāh 'Abbās as the greatest ruler, but Karīm Khan as the best.

From the Zands to the Qājārs

On the Vakīl's death in 1779 his kinsmen unleashed a destructive battle for the succession, each posing in turn as the *mā'ūb*, or lieutenant, of one or other of Karīm's young sons: neither they nor the sons bore any title other than *khān* (the conventional honorific title for a tribal chieftain, though already much devalued), demonstrating that the threadbare charisma of the Safavid shah was still entangled in the national psyche. Āghā Muḥammad Khan Qājār, who had been kept in comfort at Karīm Khan's court as a hostage for the

subservience of his tribe, escaped to Asiarāhād (now called Gurān) and built up Qājār power in the north, establishing his capital at Tehān. He recognized that the power vacuum was as much symbolic as actual. In 1796, therefore, having eliminated his Zand rivals in battle, he demonstrated his intent to recover the lost territories of the Šafavid Empire by invading Georgia and sacking Tiflis. Then he returned via the Mughān plain, scene of Nādir's coronation, and there had himself crowned shah. Continuing finally to Ardebīl, ancestral home of the Šafavi family, he ceremonially girded on the sword of the Šafavid shahs.

The next year he was murdered in camp by two of his attendants, a reprise of Nādir's end that he could hardly have intended; however, he had taken care to groom a successor (the first ruler for centuries to do so). The turn of the century saw the Qājār dynasty firmly established as an absolute monarchy in the Turco-Mongol steppe tradition, complete with spurious genealogies ascending to Tīmūr and even Chingiz Khan, backed by ostentatious adherence to the *Shā'a* and an alliance of convenience with the *mujtahids* – but within the approximate boundaries, and with the same metropolis, as present-day Iran.

Arts, crafts and industry

After the fall of Isfahān to the Afghans and the restoration of the Iranian capital successively at Mashhad, Shiraz and Tehran, the volume, continuity and quality of the wares produced in the royal manufactories (*Kārkhāna-yi shāhī*) necessarily declined. Patronage was an individual affair, so production was precariously tied to the fortunes and attitudes of particular rulers and their appointees; an army camp in constant motion was not the best place for painters, weavers, metalworkers (other than swordsmiths), and especially architects, to ply their craft. Many artists emigrated (cf. next sections), others followed the political centre of gravity (from one chronicler of the Zand period, himself trained as a painter, we learn of twenty-seven artists active in Shiraz; about seventeen of these had come from Isfahān).

Karīm Khan Zand's rule at Shiraz (1765–79) provided the only stable centre of reconstruction and recovery during the eighteenth century. The city was embellished with a fine mosque and a covered bazaar (both named for the *Vakīl*), a *divān-khāna* or audience hall and a citadel (*arg*), forming the four sides of an open square similar to (though smaller than) the Royal Square at Isfahān (see Plates 90 and 91). These, and many of the *Vakīl*'s other additions to his capital (caravanserais, bath-houses and gardens) are still standing. Paintings of Karīm and his courtiers on the frieze of a garden pavilion (see Plate 92) and elsewhere show the influence of European characterization and perspective, which had been creeping into Persian portraiture and genre painting since the high Šafavid period.

The manufactures of Iranian cities in post-Šafavid times were somewhat less at the mercy of the recurrent anarchy, though production fluctuated. Kāshān retained its reputation for silk (still Iran's main export) and carpets; Qazvin, Qum and Shiraz, which produced sword blades, musket barrels and the like, and Kerman, which manufactured gunpowder and matchlocks, may even have prospered during the troubles. Shiraz under the Zands produced particularly fine glassware and wine; it was also the chief terminus, via its Gulf port of Bushire, of a revived maritime trade with India, Armenian and European merchants – especially Britain's East India

Company, represented at Bushire and Basra – were also encouraged to revive the networks they had established in Šafavid times. By the turn of the century, European manufactured goods and textiles were beginning to enter Iran both from the Gulf and from Russia in the north.

Religion and popular culture

Perhaps the most significant long-term aspect of the Šafavid imposition of state Shī'ism on Iran, and of the country's consequent self-identification in terms of opposition to its mainly Sunni neighbours, was the hardening of ideological and cultural frontiers between, on the one side, Iran, and on the other, the Ottoman Empire, the Uzbek Khanates of Central Asia and their Iranian (*Tājik*) subjects. This divorce was to be finalized politically in the nineteenth century with the help of British and Russian imperialism. Najaf and Karbalā, in Iraq, have remained the international centres of Shī'i cult and learning, but Qum and Mashhad – the latter especially fostered by the Šafavids as an alternative to the shrines in Ottoman-occupied Iraq – became the foci of a peculiarly Iranian ideology and its priesthood; *en revanche*, Bukhārā evolved into a bastion of strict Sunni orthodoxy. The alienation and loss of vassal states in Afghanistan and Christian Georgia and Armenia accelerated this trend. By the end of the eighteenth century there was considerably less of the two-way intellectual traffic among Persianized Muslims of Western Asia that had mitigated the ravages of the Turk and Mongol migrations; at best, it was commuted to a one-way emigration from Iran. This was to become more pronounced in subsequent centuries, when dissident Iranian clerics and intellectuals frequently fled for refuge – or were deported – to Ottoman Iraq or even Istanbul.

Several techniques of Šafavid religious propaganda have assimilated to the vernacular lore and literature of today's Iran. *Rauzakhurānī*, the euharistic recital of the martyrdom of the Imām Husain at Karbalā that is performed to large and emotional audiences every month of Muharram, originates in readings from the first comprehensive Persian martyrology, the *Rauzat al-Shuhadā'* ('Garden of the Martyrs'); written in 1502, one year after the accession of Shāh Ismā'īl, the work became an indispensable tool of conversion. A related ritual, *ta'ziya* – the verse passion play of the Karbalā tragedy – is not documented in full dramatic form before the turn of the century, but it evidently evolved from the allusive 'trances' (similar to carnival floats) that were carried during Muharram processions in Šafavid Iran. (The word *ta'ziya*, though Arabic in origin, is of Turkish not Persian provenance; and in Muharram processions in India, introduced by emigrants and refugees from post-Šafavid Iran, a similar 'static' stage can be seen in which *ta'ziya* refers to the replica of the martyr's tomb house in procession.)

Certain folk legends of Šafavid hagiographical provenance that are still in the repertoires of professional storytellers show clear signs of having been modified to endow the Imams with the qualities and exploits of pre-Islamic Iranian champions: thus the infant 'Alī is said to have strangled a dragon sent by a hostile sorcerer to kill him in his cradle (cf. Rustam as a toddler eluding an elephant in rut; Hercules strangling serpents in his cradle). Tales from the national epic, especially in its classic versified form, the *Shāhnāma* of Firdawsi, and legends of the Shī'i Imams 'Alī and Husain, were both popular forms of public entertainment in Šafavid times and after.

Language and literature

Just as the Arab evangelists of Islam exerted a strong influence on the Persian language, so did the Turkish-speaking evangelists of *Ithnā-ʿAsharī Shīʿism*. From the Ṣafavid era on, Persian – as the international literary language of eastern Islam – preserved its status in the court literature of the Ottomans, Uzbeks and Indo-Muslims; Turkish in Iran – as the vernacular of an increasingly powerful and mobile élite and their clients – became more prevalent, especially in the capital. Thus the 'Turkish' sultan Selim composed verses in Persian, while his contemporary the 'Persian' Shāh Ismāʿīl composed them in Turkish; a ceremonial 'lofty portal' in Istanbul was called the *Bih-i ʿĀlī* (Persian syntax), while its equivalent at Isfahān was called the *ʿĀlī Qāpū* (Turkish syntax); and from the time of Nādir Shāh on, the title *shāh* was appended after the name of Persian monarchs (as was *mīrzā* 'prince') in accordance with Turkish syntax, whereas up to the Ṣafavids it had preceded the name, in accordance with Persian syntax. The trend continued into Qājār times, when fellow-tribesmen and Turks from Āzerbaijān flocked to the growing metropolis of Tehran.

In other ways, too, the culturally robust and self-conscious Iran of c.1500–1800 seems to have surmounted the political and economic disasters of this formative period by synthesizing elements of long-established high, or court, culture with elements of low, or vernacular, culture (cf. *taʿziya* above). Before the ideological frontiers solidified, a vital Turco-Persian popular culture of the Ṣafavid territories had left its mark throughout the region and beyond. The *ʿāshiq* ('lovelorn'), a wandering minstrel of Āzerbaijān and eastern Anatolia who sang lyrics of love and world-weariness, romantic and heroic ballads, had his repertoire enhanced by Persian and Islamic literary motifs during this period and expanded his purview, by way of the Ṣafavid-dominated court of Georgia, into Armenian literature (Sayat Nova, eighteenth-century Armenian *ashugh*, and Aşık Veysel, in twentieth-century Turkey, are celebrated exemplars of the genre).

The political dangers and economic privations of the Ṣafavid, Afghan and Afshārid period drove thousands of Iranian scholars, writers, sufis and *ulamā* to emigrate. The exile of choice was India, where persianized Muslim rulers at Delhi, in the Deccan, and Bengal, provided refuge and employment: the Mughal emperor Akbar (1556–1605) is said to have had fifty-one poets from Iran at his court. Among the best-known later refugees were Muḥammad Ḥusain Tabrizī, who produced the important Persian dictionary *Burhān-i Qāt* at Hyderabad in 1652; and the poet Sheikh Muḥammad ʿAlī Ḥazīn, author of a historically valuable autobiography, who left Iran in 1734 and died at Benares in 1766. Several of the histories of Iran in this period were written in India by refugees. Such exiles, as well as the *qizilbash* troops and Persian secretaries of Nādir's entourage on his Indian campaign, contributed to the ongoing persianization of the Muslim cultures of northern and central India.

In Iran, the Ṣafavid monarchs and their successors were almost all indifferent to the traditional poetry of court panegyric. This prompted a shift in genres. Encomium (and even more so, elegy) of the Imams was more acceptable, and some of the best of this (by poets such as Muḥtasham and Hātif) was cast in novel strophic forms contrasting with the monorhymes and couplets of the traditional genres. Poets who pursued secular themes eschewed the panegyric ode (*qasīda*) in favour of the lyric *ghazal* and a variety of shorter forms, and if their forms and themes were traditional, their style was innovative. Both in Iran and India (and especially among émigré poets such as Sāʿih and Naẓīrī) there evolved an exuberance of artifice, an almost surrealist delight in imaginatively justifying the juxtaposition of incongruent images, a novelty of expression that did not balk at colloquialisms, known as *sabk-i Hindī* 'the Indian style'.

This was also the age of inventive occasional verse: the *muʿammas* or literary riddle, the *tārikh* or chronogram (in which a date is adduced through the numerical values of letters and words), and the witty epigram, which could be composed and deciphered not only by professional poets but by anyone with a little traditional learning. One such highly stylized genre, in which this vernacularization of high culture is well exemplified, is the *shahr-āshūb* ('public nuisance'), which alludes coyly to the sexual attractiveness of a manual worker or bazaar craftsman or his apprentice by reference to his work or his tools: for example:

The felt-maker spurns my heartfelt supplication,
As with his toe he rolls his mats in the dust.

(Keyvani, 1982)

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18.2

ARMENIA AND GEORGIA

18.2.1

ARMENIA

Parour M. Mouradian

ARMENIA

The ethno-political situation in the Transcaucasian countries, and in the first instance in Armenia, was predetermined by the growing military confrontation between Safavid Iran and the Ottoman sultans (Anon, 1972; Dédéyan, 1982). Transformed into an arena for the never-ending wars between these two powers, and lacking a governing body capable of laying down the law throughout Armenia, the country was threatened with political, economic and ethno-cultural decline. In order to deprive their adversaries of economic and strategic potential and secure the services of new producers of goods, the warring powers deported craftsmen, merchants and farmers to regions far distant from their own country, frequently depopulating cities and large villages, as was the case under Shāh 'Abbās I, in the early part of the seventeenth century. Armenia's traditional possession and use of the land were further broken down by the influx of tribes of nomadic stock-breeders, who were protected by the *qizilbāshs*. The disproportionate taxes levied by these newcomers, the sale of prisoners as slaves, the obligation to abjure their faith and other circumstances constrained whole communities of Armenians to emigrate to different countries (Georgia, Russia, Poland, India, Holland, and so on), where they formed closely knit ethno-religious communities which retained all the aspects of national and cultural life (the establishment of centres of worship and schools, scriptoria, printing works, craft and trading associations, and so on).

Both before and after the peace treaty concluded in 1639 between Iran and Turkey, the Armenian Church was in a situation of relative economic independence and the local feudal lords frequently entrusted their family estates to it, thereby becoming *parons-ter*s (nobles with an ecclesiastical rank). With regard to the political situation, the rulers of Armenia's mountainous regions (Artzakh, Guelakouni, Moks, Karine . . .) retained their rights. As it was the sole institution recognized by all Armenians, the catholicate of Etchmiadzine also assumed the functions of a national governing body. Two factors, that is the presence of Armenian communities in the Western European countries, and the activities of Catholic missionaries in Armenia itself, as well as in the Armenian Diaspora, contributed to the establishment

of regular contacts and diplomatic relations between Etchmiadzine, the catholicates of Aghtamar, Gandzassar and Sis, the patriarchates of Constantinople and Jerusalem on the one hand and on the other, the European nations and in particular the Pope in Rome.

The Armenians' situation changed at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when they were seeking a way of freeing Armenia and restoring its sovereignty, in accordance with the programmes of Israel Ori and, a little later, of Hovsep Eminc (Hovhamissian, 1959). The projects of Peter I and Catherine II appeared realistic, and the Armenians did all they could to help set up the Russian mission (the *catholicos* of Etchmiadzine and Gandzassar, the Meliks of Artzakh, the Lazarev family and Hovsep Argoutian in Russia, the Chahamirian family in India). A draft treaty was prepared in 1783, but the idea of a protectorate was soon afterwards replaced by tsarist Russia's plan to conquer Transcaucasia, including eastern Armenia, which it did within a short space of time.

Despite the political and social vicissitudes of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Armenian history, awareness of its national, ethno-cultural identity was sustained by the vast cultural heritage of the preceding period and by the operation of centres both within and outside the country, which created new monuments to its material and spiritual culture.

Historiography

Sixteenth-century Armenian historiography mainly consists of colophons placed at the end of manuscripts and brief chronicles (Hacopian, 1951, 1956). The authors of the end of the century include Simeon Aparantsi, who wrote a history in verse form of the houses of the Mamikonians and the Pahlavounis. There were several eminent seventeenth-century historiographers (Grigor Daranaghtsi (Kaniakhtsi) (1576–1643) (Daranaghtsi, 1915), Arakel Davrijcisi (who died in 1670) (de Tabriz, 1896) and Zakaria Kanakertsi (1627–99) (Brosset, 1876)), who gave eyewitness accounts of the events they described. With regard to the importance of Armenian sources for the history of other peoples, mention should be made of *The History of the War of Khotyn* by Hovhannes

Kamenetsi (1627), a number of works by Erenik Kemourdjian (1637–95) on the history of Turkey and Istanbul and in particular, his *Journal* for the years 1648–62. A vast geographical territory, its highways and trading centres and the different types of taxes and currency are described in the *Journal* of Zakaria Agoulessi (1630–91) and in the *Armenian Book* for the years 1682–92 of Hovhannes Djoungaetsi, who had travelled to the countries of the Orient (Iran, India, Nepal and Tibet). Additional historical material on trading relations and the voyages of Armenian merchants is provided by several valuable 'travel journals', in particular those of Sarkis Eretz, who visited Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, Pizada Ghapantsi, who travelled to Poland, Italy, France, Spain, England, Denmark and Sweden in the seventeenth century, Hovhannes Aghtamartsi (who travelled to Ethiopia), Khatchatour Kafetsi (Crimea) and Augustin Badjessi (Russia, Poland, Germany, Spain, Italy and Iran). Great powers of observation and an attention to detail characterize the *Voyage* by Siméon Léhasi, who spent twelve years, starting in 1604, visiting countries in both East and West (Léhasi, 1936). An outstanding topographical and historico-geographical document is the *Description of Upper Armenia* (that is the vilayet of Erzerum) by Hacıop Kamenetsi (1622–62). Eighteenth-century historico-geographical works are also rich and varied. The Turkish-Iranian wars in Transcaucasia during the first thirty years of the eighteenth century are described by Abraham Erevantsi and Essai Hassan-Djalaliantz; Abraham Kretatsi's work deals with the history of the period of Nâdir Shâh, that of Khatchatour Djoungaetsi with the *History of the Persians*. The catholicos Simeon Erevantsi (1763–80) was led to draw up a list of the sources dealing with the history of the catholicos's estates; Petros di Sarkis Guilanenz describes the Afghan-Iranian wars of the beginning of the century. Ghoukas Sebastatsi took a keen interest in the wars of liberation waged by David Beg (1722–30), and Movses Baghranian of India lays down the ideological principles of the national liberation movement (Madras, 1773).

This series of historiographical works ends with the *History of Armenia* by Mikael Tchamitchian, a Venetian mekhitarist; this is a standard reference work in three volumes (Vol. I – 1784, Vol. II – 1785, Vol. III – 1786).

Literature

The characteristic feature of sixteenth to eighteenth-century literature was the prevalence of secular themes. Ecclesiastical literature (hymnography, hagiography, dogmatics, exegetics) continued to be written in ancient Armenian, the literary language, whereas Middle Armenian, the spoken tongue, was used for lyric poetry, fables, parables and stories. Alongside the work of recognized poets (Grigoris Aghtamartsi, Koutchak, Hovassap Sebastatsi, Minas, Stepanos and Hacıop Tokhatsi, Khatchgrouz Kafetsi, Martiros Krimetsi, David Saladzorts, Dpir), the poetry of the *ashugh* ('*ashiq*'), or improvising troubadour (Eghaz Hovnatan, Sayat-Nova, and so on) (Sahakian, 1962, 1985–7) takes pride of place. The most popular *genres* included the *hayrenes* (or 'Armenian songs'), which were remarkable for their stylistic restraint, their imagery and in particular their formal perfection. The most prevalent prose *genres* were the traditional ones (parables, stories and romances), but they were enhanced by the addition of topical themes. Poetry was extremely varied, written to glorify heroic exploits, dramatize historical tragedies or relate

discussions of a philosophical nature. The most popular translated or transposed works included the *Great Mirror* and the romance *Paris and Vienna*. One of the prevailing themes in folklore was the nostalgia of the *pandouklu* (wandering exile) driven out from his native land. A typical example of this type of song is 'Kroumk', which remains as popular as ever, even today. National variants of Eastern romances or stories (Persian, Arab, Kurd or Turkish) occupy a special place in sixteenth to eighteenth-century literature. The popularization of literary works was considerably furthered by the establishment of Armenian printing works during the first decades of the sixteenth century (1512) in different European and Asian cities (Venice, Rome, Amsterdam, Constantinople, Leghorn, Levov, Etchmiadzine, New Julfa, Madras and Saint Petersburg). The first Armenian printers included Hacıop Meghapani, Abgar Tokhatsi, Voscan Erevantsi, and Mathios and Ghoukas Vanadetsi, some of whom commissioned European ironmasters and engravers (Robert Grangean in France, Antonin Bertoli in Italy, Christophe van Sigen in the Netherlands) to produce the matrices and illustrations for their books. These early printed works include not only hymn-books, songbooks and psalters, but also a Bible (1666), the *History of Armenia* by Movses Khorenatsi (1695) and the *Universal Map of the World* (Amsterdam, 1695) (Kostanian et al., 1988).

Art and architecture

Extensive town-planning projects (Van, Kars, Baghech, Mouch, Karine, Erzyuka, Erevan) were undertaken as a result of the changing political and economic situation. The growth of trade made it necessary to repair bridges and build new ones (Achtarak – 1664, Erevan – 1679, Ochakan – 1778). During the golden age, places of worship had narthexes or steeples (Etchmiadzine, Aghtamar), and were surrounded by walls that made them resemble fortresses. Among the monuments erected in the countryside at that period, the monastery of Moughni and the churches of Khorvirap and Choghakar bear the seal of originality. Religious architecture mainly consisted of domed buildings and basilicas. The Great Hermitage of Siotmik was founded in the years 1608–10, and the complexes of Lim and Ktourtz a short while later. The most remarkable examples of civil architecture are the palaces of the Meliks of Artzakh (Hasratian, 1985, pp. 103–29). With regard to commemorative architecture, the sixteenth century is famous for the *khachkars* (stone crosses) of Julfa, and the seventeenth for those of Noratourk. The cultural revival also spread to the illumination of manuscripts (Hacıop Djoungaetsi in the seventeenth century), tapestry-making, carving and even frescoes (Mrkouz, Minas, Hovnatan) (Stépanian, 1985, Ghazarian, 1985) (see Plates 87, 88, 93–6). Armenian painters were popular in Turkey, Iran, Russia and Georgia. The artistic heritage of Bogdan Salanov (seventeenth century) considerably influenced the development of Russian painting.

Science

Contacts with the European countries also influenced the development of the scientific disciplines. With regard to medicine, Hovassap, Bonnian and Assar Sebastatsi carried on the traditions of Amirdovlat, especially in pharmacology and anatomy. (For a list of sources and works on the history of science see Anon, 1972, pp. 470–91.) The practice and work

of eighteenth-century doctors-cum-botanists such as Petros Kalantarian, Hovakim Ogoulmukhian and Stepanos Chahrimanian were characterized by the complete mastery and application of European methods. The boundary between chemistry and alchemy was still blurred, though here also break-throughs were achieved. In addition to the original cosmographic work of Isaac Djoughaetsi, the translation of *Cosmography* by Pierre Appien (1621) demonstrates the practical interest shown in cosmography. The achievements of the Armenian school of mathematics, astrology and parallel disciplines were recorded in Avenk Tigranakerts'i's works between the years 1684 and 1719. As regards the history of zoology, the treatise on the *History of animals, wild beasts, birds, fish . . . on land and sea* (1611) by Abraham Polsetsi is an outstanding piece of work.

Trade

Active Armenian communities in East and West in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries played a remarkable role in international trade and also in diplomatic and cultural relations. Some of them, such as the Armenian community in Isfahān (New Julfa, Iran) were granted a special tax-free trading status which fostered a lively trade in goods between Europe (Italy, Portugal, Poland and Russia) and Asia (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China and India). The decree issued in 1617 by Shāh 'Abbās I bestowed on the Armenian merchants of Iran the privilege of the through trade in silk while the East India Company recognized their equal rights in international trade (1688). The political situation changed abruptly at the beginning of the eighteenth century and the Armenian merchants emigrated to other countries (India, Turkey, Russia and Egypt).¹ A considerable proportion of the Armenians of Isfahān emigrated to India, where they formed a large and viable ethno-cultural, commercial and industrial community in Madras. This community, which was in close contact with Russia and Georgia, developed the idea of the restoration of Armenian sovereignty in the shape of a parliamentary republic ruled over by a monarch (plan of 1783). (Seih, 1895, 1906; Abrahamian, 1968.)

Such, briefly, was the contribution of Armenia and the Armenians to the history of the scientific and cultural development of humanity.

NOTE

- 1 See the bibliography of works on the history of the Armenian community of Isfahān in *Documents of Architecture* - 21 *Nar-Djulfā*, 1992, pp. 21-2, Venice.

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The late Akaky Surguladzé

GEORGIAN CULTURE

As far back as the eleventh or twelfth century Georgia's was a highly developed feudal society. The constant incursions of invaders whose social and cultural development was considerably inferior arrested what would have been the normal course of its evolution, and it lagged behind the advanced countries of Western Europe by two centuries before experiencing anew a period of growth.

For centuries the Mongols ravaged and plundered the country. The people fled to the mountains, deserting the towns and villages, and the cultural centres died. At the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Georgia was attacked several times by the hordes of Tamerlane, who mined the economy and culture of the country. From the second half of the fifteenth century onwards, after the capture of Constantinople, the country was entirely surrounded by enemies, and the Turks – once they had seized control of the Black Sea – took over the roads linking Georgia to the West. Matters got more complicated from the sixteenth century on, when Georgia was divided in two spheres of influence between the Turks and the Iranians. The seventeenth century brought to an end the period of the country's dismemberment into different kingdoms or principalities that were often opposed to one another and appealed for help to enemies from abroad. The feudal system (*satavado*) had completely broken down the country's economic unity. Perpetual foreign incursions, internal struggles between feudal lords, the existence of numerous trade barriers and, above all, the destruction of all the resources of the country's economic life could not but adversely affect the development of crafts, commerce, agriculture and culture.

In the mid-seventeenth century, after a long period of social 'glaciation' and the stagnation of productive activity, Georgian culture gradually revived. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries constituted what is known as the 'renaissance period' (not to be confused with the European Renaissance), which was triggered off mainly by a new social class, the middle class, since at that time no new class in Georgia entered the social arena with the intention of becoming predominant. In fact, this renaissance tended to eliminate oriental influence and allowed the traditions of Georgian culture of the classic age to flourish. Georgian culture of the period was marked by the wish to fight for the re-establishment of a united and indivisible Georgia. In literature, national themes gained in importance, new genres became established, secular literature became predominant, a democratic spirit started manifesting itself in both style and ideas, and literary links were forged with nearby countries.

At the end of the seventeenth century national culture found an active champion in King Archil, whose poems and political convictions contributed to the development of patriotic themes in both social thought and literature.

Patriotic fervour also underlay the works of poets such as Temuradze I and Yossif Tbileli. This period was also characterized by a revival of feudal rights and development in the field of medicine and in several branches of art. A multitude of vestiges of the art of this period can be seen. The architecture of monuments, gold-work and murals were of paramount importance; there was a revival of interest in decorative sculpture, which had sunk into oblivion after the eleventh century. At the same time, manuscripts, many of which have survived to this day, displayed very elaborate calligraphy, and books were embellished with many miniatures.

The political ideas prevalent in Europe and Russia had considerable influence on the development of Georgian culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the renowned Georgian historian I. A. Dzavakhishvili pointed out,

what an exceptional époque it was! In the face of such unstinting and persistent work, oriented in the same direction and drawing its essence from a rich and profound source, it would be apt to term this period of Georgian literature 'encyclopedic'. The unique aim of all the great minds of this period was to reap the fruits of the centuries-old creative work of the Georgian people, study them and pass on to posterity a variety of polished works and skills. It was the great and unforgettable King Vakhtang who directed and inspired this great endeavour.

Three important thinkers and men of action dominated the political and ideological movement and culture in the first half of the eighteenth century – King Vakhtang VI, Sulikhan-Saba Orbeliani and Vakhushhti Bagration. Vakhtang's contribution to civilization was, above all, connected with the creation of the first Georgian printing-works soon after the first book in Georgian printed in Russia, *Davituri* (Anthology of Hymns), was published in Moscow in 1705, thanks to the efforts of his uncle, Archil II. The Tiflis printing-works, which was in operation for only four years, produced both secular and religious books; but the most important event in the cultural life of the Georgian people was the publication of Shota Rustaveli's poem 'The Knight in the Tiger's Skin' (or the 'Leopard's' or 'Panther's' Skin) in 1712. In his critical analysis of the poem, Vakhtang laid the foundations of what was to become a veritable scientific exegesis. We also owe him the outstanding critical interpretation of the Georgian manuscript 'Life of Karti'.

A 'commission of scholars' created by him and headed by Beri Egnatashvili devoted itself to a methodical study of the manuscript, supplemented it with new facts and sources, and covered the history of Georgia in the four centuries following the reign of George the Magnificent in the fourteenth century. Vakhtang was also the author of a 'code of laws', and his poetic works are deeply imbued with his ardent wish to reinforce the patriotic spirit of the people and bring about the unification of the strife-riven country.

From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, especially after the centralization measures carried out by Irakli II, the situation became even more favourable to the blossoming of the Georgian culture. Two seminaries, in Tiflis and Telavi, taught – apart from theology – philosophy, mathematics, physics, logic and the Georgian language. The printing of books, especially teaching manuals, was recommenced. The leader of the enlightenment movement was the patriarch Ioan Bagration, a great philosopher and philologist of the times. At Tiflis there were some well-stocked libraries such as those of Bagration, the patriarch Amoue Baratashvili and others who in their writings advocated the restoration of the Georgian State with the help of Russia and Western Europe.

The heights attained by Georgian culture were due largely to the Georgian colony of Moscow, founded by King Archil. In 1724 Vakhtang VI moved to Moscow with his court, and from then on it became an important centre for creative activity where scholars discussed contemporary Russian and European science and culture. The best works – which could be useful to the fatherland – were translated and sent to Georgia. In western Georgia the principal centre of civilization was Gelati.

The foremost exponent of Georgian literature in this period was David Guramishvili. He was, admittedly, separated from his fatherland very early on and never went back, but Georgia remained close to his heart, and no other writer felt its misfortunes more deeply than he did. His literary work, which was in keeping with the rich traditions of twelfth-century Georgian poetry, in turn paved the way for new forms. Among the other major figures in Georgian poetry were Temuradze II, Vissarion Gabashvili (Besiki) Saat Nova. In the Georgian colony of Moscow it was well-known figures like Dm. Saakadzi, G. Gelovani, M. Baratashvili, E. Turkestanishvili, D. Dzavaklishvili, V. and D. Orbeliani, O. Kohlashvili, M. Guramishvili and I. Glashadze who did most to promote national culture.

The second half of the eighteenth century was marked by an increasingly pronounced interest in science. As translations of foreign works became available Georgian society began to have access to the scientific knowledge of the entire world. The people were especially interested in the scientific study of all that concerned their country. In Georgian history the abundant work of Papuna Orbeliani, Oman Khetkheulidze and Seknia Chkheidze continued the work of Vakhtang VI and Vakhushti Bagration. This period also witnessed the renewal of Georgian theatre and a sort of 'awakening' in architecture, with intense construction and restoration activity. Among the most remarkable examples of this are the city of Signachi and its surrounding wall, the Telavi citadel and palace, the tower of Queen Datedzan in Tiflis and the Kolagiri fortress, but it cannot be denied that the art

and architecture of the eighteenth century lacked the splendour and elegance of form of the 'classic' feudal age.

The hostile Islamic world, although it surrounded the country, was unable to destroy the Christian fundamen of Georgian culture. The Georgian writers of the period were highly influenced by Persian literature, but they did not lose their patriotic fervour. Persian and Turkish customs gained a foothold only in the aristocratic milieu, while the masses carefully conserved the old national traditions. The main centres of instruction for the younger generation continued to be monasteries and churches, where they were taught to read and write, copy and multiply literary works and create new works. The number of Italian Catholic missionaries increased, and they founded centres of Western culture in Georgian cities and attracted a part of the Georgian youth to the cities.

The standard and character of Georgian culture are clearly revealed by Georgian folklore (poems, tales and legends). Particular mention should be made of poetry, which continued to have exceptional artistic value and a wide range of themes. (Some examples are 'The Ballad of the Tiger and the Young Man', 'The World at Twilight' and 'The Adolescent of Tavpara'.) It was Georgian poetry that established the basic principle of the Georgian people: 'What animosity destroys, love restores'. In spite of being surrounded by enemies, Georgian culture was far from being isolated: by virtue of its location on the Silk Road, Georgia had contacts with the countries of the East and the West. The Georgians learnt Persian and Turkish, familiarized themselves with the culture of Persia and Turkey, and adopted all that was acceptable to them. The propensity was for Western culture, which had previously been borrowed from Byzantium and was more in keeping with the Christian nature of Georgian culture. A fine example of the union and mutual enrichment of different cultures was Tbilisi, where the Georgians lived peacefully side by side with Armenians, Hebrews and Catholics and other foreigners. Mosques and synagogues were constructed beside Georgian churches. The blending of different cultures gave Tbilisi's culture a singular character, which was remarked on in the notes of foreign travellers.

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century social thought in Georgia was turbulent and preoccupied, above all, with the search for political orientation. Its persistent efforts to join Western Europe being in vain, Georgia increasingly turned to its Christian neighbour in the north and signed a treaty with Russia in 1783. But very early in the nineteenth century the Tsar, disregarding the agreement made, hastened to deprive Georgia of its sovereignty and annexed it.

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CENTRAL ASIA

Galina A. Pugachenkova

After the ruin of the Timurid dynasty on the eve of the sixteenth century vast region of Central Asia stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Pamirs, from Amu Daryā to the Tien Shan mountain ranges was mainly in possession of the Uzbek Khanates. In the sixteenth century the dynasty of the Shaibanids was ruling there, in the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth, the Astarkhanids. In the sixteenth century Khwārazm formed the Khiva Khanate. The territories of contemporary Turkmenistan were conquered by the Uzbek khans and Persian Shahs, the region of Tien Shan and Semirech'ie including in Mughalistan the steppe-state. The structure of the population was mixed and heterogeneous, but primary zones of dwelling of the main ethnic groups: Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Qaraqalpaqs (Karakalpaks), Qırğız (Kirghiz) and Qazaqs (Kazakhs), were already fixed.

The entire period has been marked by non-stop wars, conquests and losses of territories, internecine dissensions in the ruling classes, and rivalry of independent princes, leaders of clans and tribes. The decline of the economy became more serious after the opening of the Great Sea Routes, when the old caravan roads lost their importance and ties with the West were broken.

The role of Muslim clergy was becoming increasingly important in the State development with which khans and independent rulers had to reckon. At the same time the ideology of Islam in the forms of orthodox Sunnism permeated all aspects of modes of life and culture.

The time of Shaibanids and first Astarkhanids was marked by some cultural progress, but at the beginning of the second half of the seventeenth century culture experienced a recession and the eighteenth century was marked by crises in every sphere – social, economic and cultural. As before, the culture of Central Asia in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries had been developing in different levels. It was concentrated at the courts of the rulers in higher society, it was developing among the urban middle class in the town, while its traditional forms were staunchly preserved in the countryside and among the cattle-breeding tribes of the steppes. But the main centres of cultural achievements were still in the big cities – the capital Bukhārā, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khojand, Andijan, Hīšār, Khiva and some others.

Bukhārā retained its position as the leading centre of literature and sciences – an author of the second half of the sixteenth century names 250 writers and cultural workers there. But learning in comparison with the previous century underwent a period of slump. The growing dictates of Muslim clergy over social life confused philosophic thought within

a theological framework, astronomy was replaced by horoscope casting, pure mathematics was replaced by utilitarian aims such as surveying. The only sphere in which practical needs were combined with the development of scientific knowledge was medicine: medical and pharmacological books were rewritten and improved and hospital was built in Bukhārā, where there was a rich medical library and doctors were trained.

Patronage of the arts was still considered the duty of rulers. At the courts of Bukhārā, Samarkand, Shāhnūkhīya (and later in Khiva) there were circles of poets and scholars, musicians and wits who were invited by their masters to *majlis*es, accompanied by lively talks, drinking and revels.

The literature of that epoch was marked by appearance of new and sometimes distinguished names. Besides poetry and prose fictions there were also historical works. Almost every *khān* had his personal well-educated secretary-munshī whose duty was writing chronicles of the reign. Written in high-flown style, sometimes including poetry and complex metaphors, they still contain precious historical information. They include the *Shaibani-nāma* by Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, *Muḥann-nāma-i Bukhārā* by Faḡallāh ibn Rūzbahān Iṣḡahānī, two other 'shaibaniads' – by the poets Bannāi and Shādī, 'Abdullāh-nāma and *Sharaf-nāma-i Shāhī* by Ḥafiz Tanīsh Bukhārā, *History of Subḥān qulī Khān*, *Ta'īl-i-Muqimkhānī* and 'Ubaidullāh-nāma by the tireless Mīr Muḥammad Amīn Bukhārā who had outlived three of those khans.

Along with this kind of official chronicle memoirs made their appearance in the first three decades of the sixteenth century. Zain ud-Dīn Maḥmūd Wāṣifī and Zuhūr ud-Dīn Bābur – persons with complex destinies – are two brilliant representatives of this genre.

Zainud-Dīn Wāṣifī is a tājik poet from Herāt who escaped in 1512 to Central Asia. His book *Wonderful Events* contains episodes of his own adventurous biography and many stories about his contemporaries whom he met.

Bābur's memoirs, *Bābur-nāma*, written in Chaghatay Turkish, the early form of the modern Uzbek language, follows the extraordinary life of that highly educated Timurid prince who founded the dynasty of the Great Mughals. Bābur also left a cycle of *nihā'i* and *ghazals*, which may be also characterized by his depth of thought and expressive style.

The majority of the court poets were busy compiling poems – *qasīdas* in florid style. The most gifted among them were two Uzbek poets. 'Abduwāḥid Khwāja, author of the moral parables in the collection *Gulzār* – 'Flower Garden'

— and Majlisī — author of the romantic poem *Saif ul-Mulūk Mushfiqī*, who was writing in Tājik, has become famous not only for three *divāns* and lyric poems, but also for keen satire.

The seventeenth century is marked by the appearance of several poets from the urban milieu. Some of them belonged to the artisan corporations — so, for instance, the Samarkand poet Fitrat was a master of golden embroidery, and the poet Mulkan a master of architectural decor. The creative work of those authors is characterized by democratic ideas and style: they glorify working people and denounce their oppressors. For example, the outstanding Tājik poet Šaidī Nasafi besides *ghazals*, *qasīdas*, *masnawīs* has created a cycle of poems dedicated to artisans and everyday urban life. In the creative work of the Uzbek poet Turdi from the end of the seventeenth century, one can feel his passionate conviction of the Khan's despotism and the call for his dethronement.

This time of crisis strengthened the role of the dervish orders and encouraged mystical tendencies in creative work. A notable representative of this trend is the gifted poet Šūfi Allāh Yār, whose poem, *The Way of the Just* reflecting the ideas of sufism, was very popular with the people and was widely propagated by the clergy.

As before, in popular urban and rural milieu fairy-tales were widely spread — they were heroic and lyric, moralizing and gay.

As for the nomadic peoples, oral poetry prevailed among them in that period. Narrators — *aqils* and *bakhshī* — were travelling from *aul* to *aul*, telling by heart during long evenings thousand-line stories and tales usually accompanied by the three-string *kobuz*. The subject of these epics was usually traditional stirring verses enriched with new subjects by generations of performers. Such was the Qirgīz *Manas*, the hero of which accomplishes glorious feats of valour, defeating enemies and strengthening the Muslim Faith. Such was the Tūrkmen *Kār-oghli*, where the epic hero with his body-guard protects the people, overcoming enemies, supporting all victims and oppressed. *Qirg-qiz* was especially popular with the Qazaqlar people, where the fight of heroes against the oppressors is shown through the fates of the people. A characteristic literary form of the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries was the so-called 'dastān' — 'small epos', where prose alternates with poetry, and not only heroic deeds, but also the thoughts and feelings of their personages find their reflection. The eighteenth century is marked in Tūrkmenia by appearance of Makhtūm Qulī. Sympathy for the fate of the Tūrkmen people, emotional richness, philosophic depth, perfection of poetic form and imaginative folk language are characteristic of his creative work, which coincided with the most gloomy period of Central Asian medieval history.

Hand-written books mainly met the demand for literature and science. In many libraries (*kitāb-khāna*), especially those belonging to the courts, a great number of manuscripts were preserved and new copies were made from them. Highly skilled calligraphers (*kātib*), decorators and specialists in gilding (*muṣṭahhib*), miniature painters (*naqqāsh*) were united into special workshops. Among calligraphers working in Bukhārā there was Suhān 'Alī Mashhadī — 'the sultan of calligraphers' — who escaped from Herāt, and one of the most prominent calligraphers — Mīr 'Alī Herawī. Among local masters of the sixteenth century there were Darwīsh Muḥammad Bukhārī author of a treatise on handwriting, Mīr Ḥusain Qulangi Bukhārī, Muḥammad Ḥusain Samarkandī, Hamidānī, and in the seventeenth century — the most famous calligraphers — Mīr Šālih and 'Arabshah.

Along with luxurious manuscripts, created for the rulers and their entourage, there were also workshops in small towns copying books for common consumers.

Miniature painting was the most interesting aspect of the art of book-making of that time. Miniatures were used not only for the decoration of literary and historic manuscripts, but were made on separate lists and later together with exquisite samples of calligraphy — *qit'a* were blocked into special albums — *munaxxa'* (see Plates 97 and 98).

Local schools of Central Asian miniaturists were formed with centres in Bukhārā, Samarkand and for some time Shāhrīkhāya.

The miniatures of the beginning of the sixteenth century are marked by clear construction of non-mulifigured scenes, modest landscape, restrained colour, while the figures are of the Tājik and Uzbek ethnic type. The second decade of the sixteenth century was marked by the appearance in Bukhārā of many calligraphers, ornamentalists and miniaturists who escaped from Herāt, bringing with them the traditions of school of Bihzād with its lyric poetic subjects, its exquisite manner of writing and its rich colour. We know of signed works of one of those masters — Maḥmūd *Muzahhib*. The middle of the century shows us a mixture of the two trends. The second half of the century is characterized by an interest in the subjects from everyday life and the images of lovely girls and handsome boys — master 'Ahdullāh from Bukhārā belongs to this genre.

The end of the sixteenth century and first half of the seventeenth century, are marked by the formation of a new individual style by a number of artists. Such was Muḥammad Murād Samarkandī, whose illustrations to the copy of *Shāh-nāma* are characterized by dynamism and the psychological tension of non mulifigured scenes, reaching its effect by clear composition and expressive rich colour. Around 1600 he was working at the court of Emperor Akbar, where later in the time of Jāhangīr, there worked and lived another prominent Central Asian master, Muḥammad Nādir Samarkandī.

The seventeenth century, continuing the tradition, enriched Central Asian miniatures with baroque passion, expressed in the bold bend of the figures, the curves of the trees and branches, and the contrast sounding of colours. Other authors seem to return to classic Kāmalud-Dīn Bihzād style. A galaxy of talented miniaturists — Muḥammad-Muqīm, 'Awaz Muḥammad, Mullā Bihzād, Muḥammad Sālim and Hājī Geday — were working in Bukhārā during the reign of 'Ahdul 'azīz Khān II (1645–80), who was a patron of poetry and fine arts. Perfect design, clear composition and rich colour characterize their work, but despite these general features of style each master had his personal manner of painting, while some of them underwent the influence of the Indian school of miniature painting.

The creation of illuminated manuscripts continued up to the beginning of the eighteenth century, but they were already marked by the signs of decline.

The musical culture of the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries reached high standards. It was developing in two main directions, professional, concentrating in big cities, and popular, including many strata of the urban and rural population. There was no strict border between them: they were enriching each other. There existed different musical instruments — string, pizzicato, bow, pulsatile and wind. Musical performance even in an orchestra was monodic and one-voice.

In professional music the peak of theoretical and practical activity was reached at Samarkand and Bukhārā. This was

the time of formation of the system in music — *maqam shū'ubīya*, *āwāz*, and so on. This system has become the basis of *Bukhārāshash-maqām* — a big cycle of musical compositions, which combined, besides classics, a lot of folk music of the Tajik and Uzbek peoples. Several theoretical works appeared, one by Najm ud-Dīn Kawākibī, musician and theorist from sixteenth-century Bukhārā. Darvīsh 'Alī Changī was the most popular among performers. He was not only skilled in playing many different musical instruments, but also wrote theoretical works, one of them entitled *Risāla-i Ahisāqi* ('Treatise on Music'), containing rich material on the musical life of Central Asian cities of the fifteenth–seventeenth centuries.

Music and singing accompanied different rituals and ceremonies. Their characteristic feature was a close connection with poetry — the poetic classics of the Orient and folklore. This was also typical of the semi-nomad peoples — Türkmens, Qūgīz, Qaraqalpaq, where *aqın* performed great epic compositions and *dastāns* mainly playing musical instruments accompanied themselves.

Theatrical culture also spread at that time. Actors (male and female) and dancers entertained the nobility. Popular spectators were enjoying performances of wits — *maskharabāz*, puppet-theatres and marionettes, circus masters — as well as rope-walkers, jugglers and animal trainers, who showed their skill at fairs.

One of the important spheres of creative activity was architecture. The sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century were marked by the appearance of a great number of monumental buildings (both religious and secular) in big cities. The architectural principles and types worked out in the time of Timurids and perfected later were still dominant in building practice. These buildings were marked by huge forms and were decorated with tiles. Yard, centric and portal-cupola composition prevailed. Among them Islamic buildings included Friday mosques (*jāmi*) in the big cities, high religious schools (*madrasa*), dervish's dwellings (*khānaqāh*) and mausoleums; among civil buildings, palaces, *karwān-sarāy* (*hans* — caravanserais) and bazaars.

Using general typological schemes, architects varied them according to the kind of the building, enriching the harmony, trying to find variants of forms, and enhancing their composition with the details of decor.

Sketches and plans by a sixteenth-century architect from Bukhārā prove that there existed a kind of typological project for monumental buildings at that time. They show perfect constructions and plans for *khānaqāh*, *karwān-sarāy*, *ribāt*, waterpools and *sardāba*.

Principles of town-building are the highest achievement of sixteenth–seventeenth century architecture. When creating new buildings, architects were concerned with their harmonious interrelation with the existing architectural environment (see Plates 99–102). Sometimes buildings face each other or are situated on the same axis (*Qūsh-madrasa*, the *Uigh-Beg madrasa* and the 'Abdul 'azīz Kbān madrasa in Bukhārā), sometimes they form a square between them (*Pāy-i Kalān* in Bukhārā). The three-side construction planning principle is used in the arrangement of square space (*Registān* in Samarkand), or waterpool (*Lab-i Hauz* in Bukhārā).

Family necropolises have their peculiar features: in the course of centuries mausoleums, mosques and sepulchral mounds (*dakhma*) and groups of burial grounds (*Chahār-Bakī* in Bukhārā, Sultān Sa'ādāt in Termez) were constructed there. Large-scale architectural constructions remained

traditional. But in arrangement of interiors one can observe an active creative search.

The interiors of the huge cupola buildings are most impressive: the transition from the square base into the cupola is realized by inter-crossing arches, over and behind which there are spacious rows of sails and stalactites of complex structure.

Ornamental decor using glazed tiles plays an important role in the decoration of official buildings, while carved and painted gypsum (*gīna*, *chaspaq*) and colourful ornamental painting are used for the decoration of interiors. Their style remains as before: geometric, stylized floral and epigraphic motifs.

Time has not preserved many names of architects, builders and artists. In the sixteenth century architect Ghulām Husain, we know of the mosaic master Bāyazīd Pūrānī and the Bukhārā carpenter Durrulgarī. In the seventeenth century in Samarkand the Shū Dār madrasa was created by the architect 'Abduljabbār, the master Muḥammad 'Abbās and the stone-carver Hasan Samarkandī. The architect Dūst Muḥammad built the Khwāja Aḥmād madrasa. The Bukharian 'Aḥdul 'azīz Kbān madrasa was built by the court architect Muḥammad Šālīh and decorated by the painter and calligrapher Maulānī Muḥammad Anūr and mosaic master Mīn Khāqān. It is interesting that in the seventeenth century during creation of the famous Tāj Mahal where many local and foreign masters were working together, these included Muḥammad Sharīf from Samarkand who made the top decoration of the main cupola (*qubba*), and Ata Muḥammad from Bukhārā, an ornamental engraving master (maybe a painter also).

Mass-produced kinds of applied arts had a widely dispersed professional basis in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries in the workshops of urban and rural artisans, as well as in nomad areas. Glazed ceramics were still widely used in everyday life, but their quality was declining. Artistic metalwork was produced on a very high level — metal vessels and armour of exquisite form, covered with ornament and chasing and inlaid work. Jewellery, especially for women, was also widespread, differing by region and characteristic of definite ethnic groups. Central Asian textiles, of cotton, silk and mixed fibres, were traditional objects of export. Nomad peoples made decorated thick felt, stamped leather and high quality carpets. Qūgīz carpets were well known, but the best quality carpets were Türkmen, famous for their design, similar in style but very individual in pattern from one tribe to another.

The rural population and the inhabitants of the steppe became the custodians of folk creative traditions when they were vanishing from the cities of Central Asia in the eighteenth century.

Only on the eve of the nineteenth century when the country was on the threshold of modernity was a new page opened in the history of Central Asian culture.

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SOUTH ASIA

20.1
INDIA*Ifan Habib*

ECONOMY

It is difficult to be certain about the size and rate of growth of population before pre-Partition India's first census (1872). Moreland (1920, pp. 19–21) produced an estimate of 100 million for 1605. More recent estimates founded on closer scrutiny of the statistical evidence tend to place the total population c.1595 within the range of 136 to 150 million (Moosvi, 1987a, pp. 395–406). For 1800, Mahalanobis and Bhattacharya (1969) offer a figure of 207 million. The inferable compound annual rate of the growth of Indian population 1600–1800, at about 0.2 per cent, though modest, was by no means low when compared with the rates estimated for European countries for about the same period.

It is certain that the factor keeping down the rate of population growth in India, as in other parts of the pre-modern world, was a high death rate. The average expectation of life in 1872–81 was only 24.6 years (and due to decline still further), thanks to colonial conditions; it is unlikely that it was much longer in 1595. Famines and epidemics periodically killed off large numbers. The famine of 1556 in Northern India, 1630–2 in Gujarat and the Deccan, 1671 in Bihar and 1702–4 in the Deccan probably carried away millions of people; and smaller famines are recorded throughout our period (Habib, 1963, pp. 100–10).

With a population possibly no more than a half of what it contained in 1901, India had a much larger area under forest and scrub. Not only textual references to forests, but the recorded ranges of habitats of animals such as wild elephants, now contracted to a few isolated pockets, also show how large the forest cover was in earlier times.


The forest provided the source of many occupations, such as collection of charcoal, firewood, timber, lac, wild silks, honey and animal skins, so that Maddison's (1971, p. 33) estimate of the contribution of the tribal sector (mainly based on gathering activities) as 10 per cent of the labouring force, does not seem to be unreasonable. The forest economy, though seemingly primitive, was partly sustained by the requirements of manufactures. Timber went to carpenters, wood-carvers and shipwrights; lac to lacquer-ware makers,

wild silk to reelers and weavers; and charcoal to iron miners and smelters.

To the degree that forest and waste were so much more extensive the area under cultivation was smaller, though contemporaries, unable to make a comparison with later times, often thought India to be a densely cultivated country (see Map 25). In regions where statistics make it possible to attempt comparisons of the gross area sown, such area in c.1595 was about 58 per cent of what it was in c.1910 in Gujarat, 50 per cent in Uttar Pradesh and 40 per cent in the Panjab (Moosvi, 1987a, pp. 39–66; cf. Habib, 1963, pp. 10–22). It may be assumed that about 1595 the better quality of land would have been selected for ploughing and a larger area of pastoral grounds was available to sustain cattle. The average yield per hectare should then have been higher in Mughal India than around 1900, if other factors had remained the same.

The change in other factors between 1600 and 1900 was seemingly small. The extent of use of manure underwent no known change. Irrigation probably improved owing to the canals laid out by the British in the nineteenth century; but much land was previously irrigated too, either by canals or wells. Indeed, streams and lakes dammed with 'ancients', and canals derived from them, formed an important source of irrigation in southern India and the Deccan (Buchanan, 1807); and the Mughals laid out some magnificent works like the West Yamuna Canal in the north (Habib, 1963, pp. 31–6). In the alluvial plains, the underground water was tapped by wells in 1600 as in 1900, but at levels much closer to the ground than today; and it was drawn out by three major devices based on the lever, the pulley and the chain of pots with pin-drum gearing. Cattle was used to work the latter two devices. In extensive tracts, however, agriculture still remained essentially dependent on rain.

The *Ā'in-i Akbarī* (1595) gives revenue rates for 19 crops of the spring harvest and 25 of the autumn cultivated in practically all the revenue circles of Agra province. Similar long lists of crops for the two harvests are also recorded for other provinces. Tobacco and maize were introduced in the seventeenth century, chili and groundnuts later. Sericulture,



Map 25 Economic map of South Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (after I. Habib, *Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Delhi,

unknown in Bengal before the fifteenth century, underwent spectacular growth in Mughal times making Bengal in the seventeenth century one of the world's great suppliers of silk. Among the fruits, pineapple was introduced in the same century, and grafted varieties of the indigenous mango began to be developed by the Portuguese. On the other hand, dye-crops, notably indigo, have disappeared within this century, causing a notable gap in the peasant's crop inventory.

Agriculture was closely allied with the pastoral sector, since cattle, used for drawing the plough and for water-lift, were crucial for agricultural pursuits. The more extensive wastes probably enabled a larger number of cattle to be maintained per head of population than in c. 1900; and this is reflected in the cheapness of *ghi*, or clarified butter, in relation to wheat, during the seventeenth century. Cattle were, however, not a source of meat for a very large section of the rural population owing to religious inhibitions. (For the preceding three paragraphs, see Habib, 1963, pp. 36-57, 118-22; 1982a, pp. 217-24).

Agriculture was generally carried on by individual peasants, and there is little evidence of communal cultivation. In fact, a considerable degree of peasant differentiation existed, there being persons who possessed large fields, raised many crops and employed labourers and servants, paying them in cash and kind. These upper cultivators, who were often the village headmen, shaded off into the class of *zamindars* who were in part 'proprietors' of the land and in part intermediaries in revenue-collection. At the bottom of rural society was a large class of landless labourers, the bulk of them 'immouchables', often excluded by the *fiat* of caste hierarchy from occupying land and setting up as peasants. They could well have fortified over a quarter of the rural population.

While the village had to provide for itself largely from its own produce, much of the agricultural production had to be put on the market in order to pay the land-revenue in money. The cash nexus for tax-payment was quite widespread in Mughal India (Habib, 1963, pp. 236-40), and this necessarily implied that either the peasant or the intermediary (for example, *zamindar*) had to sell the crop to obtain money to meet the tax-demand.

A central fact of Indian economy, then, was, the land-tax. By its very size - it often amounted in value to half the produce - it accounted for the bulk of the surplus produce and corresponded to what in societies with full-fledged property in land would be deemed 'rent'. The magnitude of the tax varied with the productivity and minimum costs of peasant subsistence in the different regions; but Mughal taxation was systematic enough to make certain general statements possible.

The tax (*māl*, *kharāj*) was set as a share of the actual produce, and so, in the simplest arrangements, it was a portion of the crop taken upon harvest. When such a division could not be made without loss and difficulty by an administration concerned with large areas, the revenue was assessed by *kankūt*, that is, by measuring the land under each crop, working out the yield (*rai*) per unit of area at harvest time by sample cuttings, multiplying the *rai* by the measured area, and then calculating the tax-share out of the gross yield so estimated. Sher Shāh (r. 1540-5) established a schedule of fixed *rai*'s, so that it could be determined beforehand what a peasant had to pay in tax if he raised a particular crop. The tax was still set in kind, and it had to be converted into money by commutation at local prices. Akbar (r. 1556-1605) promulgated the *zabt* system in its final form: money rates were fixed on each unit of area (*bigha*) according to the crop

cultivated, the schedules containing these rates applicable year after year (*dastīrs*). The *zabt* system, though established over a large area from the Panjab to Awadh, was by no means universal even in this region; and often the annual revenue demand was simply repeated, without remeasurement, upon the village as a whole. In the Deccan, revenue was based on plough counts; in Kashmir, fixed quantities of grain were taken; in Bengal, amounts of money were fixed on villages by custom or inspection. Changes took place in the seventeenth century: measurement was extended to the Deccan in the 1650s, while in North India *zabt* possibly lost much ground to *kankūt*, if not to simple crop-sharing (Habib, 1963, pp. 190-242).

When the Mughal regime decayed, the rent-tax equivalence still continued, to be inherited by the British. The theory that land-revenue was really rent taken by the King as proprietor of the land was maintained by a succession of European travellers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Bernier being its most notable exponent. Though this was not asserted by official writers such as Abū'l Fazl, who rather deemed land-tax to be the 'remuneration of sovereignty', the size of land-tax made it the crucial element in surplus-appropriation. On it rested the vast establishments of the Mughal ruling class and the urban economy that flourished to meet its needs and those of its dependents.

Though pre-colonial India was principally an agricultural country, it had a vast craft sector, whose total production might have been modest, compared with that of later industrial societies, but which nevertheless generated, owing to low productivity, a great deal of employment. Iron mining was widespread; there were copper mines in Rajasthan and diamond mines in Golkunda; and salt was mined in western Panjab. Agricultural products were turned into manufactures in the villages and towns for different markets; but textiles dwarfed all other products, undoubtedly employing the largest number of people after agriculture (Raychaudhuri, 1982, pp. 269-77).

The artisan's position in the economy varied. There was, first, the hereditary artisan in the village, who met the needs of the villagers and obtained, besides customary payments for specific work, permanent allotments of village lands (Fukazawa, 1991, pp. 199-244). He was thus an essential cog in the wheel of the Indian 'village community'. But when the artisan looked for customers outside the village, he had to enter the market as a competitive producer. The weavers, for example, would then bring their wares produced in the villages to a *peṛh* (fair or market) for sale to merchants. Or, they might set up their looms in towns or cities. Here particular merchants could oblige them to work for them alone by offering advances; and, in case the materials for work were expensive (for example, silk), a kind of putting-out system could develop. Finally, for the still more expensive craft products, merchants and the King and nobles would set up *kārkhānas* (workshops), where the artisans worked as wage-earners. Since the royal and aristocratic *kārkhānas* did not produce for the market, it will not be correct to see them as commercial enterprises, but the merchants' *kārkhānas* could perhaps qualify as quasi-capitalist undertakings (Raychaudhuri, 1982, pp. 279-81).

The conditions of inland transport in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century India were little different from those in other parts of the world. Rivers served as natural arteries for traffic on barges; on land, ox-carts were used. Outside the Deccan and eastern India, camels provided a competitive means of conveyance. Large herds of bullocks were used to

convey foodgrains and goods of bulk by the semi-nomadic *banjāras*, their animals grazing along the routes they passed through. Naturally enough, land transport costs were high. Conveying wheat by camel from Agra to Surat (a map-distance of about 550 miles) cost four times its nominal price at Agra; conveying white sugar, a high-cost item, about half its price. Road tolls and other taxes on the way further enhanced costs.

Transport and travel were aided along the main routes by a system of *sarāis* or inns ('choultries' in south India), situated at about a day's journey from each other. These were built by both public and private effort, and they varied from splendid masonry structures, many still surviving, to mud-built quadrangles, that now largely maintain a ghost-like existence in place-names. Smaller rivers were sometimes crossed on masonry bridges (Deloche, 1984), but the larger rivers were all unbridged, forcing travellers to use fords or ferries.

Quick conveyance of persons as well as of correspondence was maintained by the administration through stations for remounts (*dāk chauki*), and runners (*moonts*). Indian merchants and bankers maintained their own couriers; and there were private 'bazar qāshids', apparently carrying to particular places letters entrusted to them by any person desirous of using their services (Farooque, 1977, pp. 125–63). Conditions of security varied, but the insurance rates quoted in our sources are fairly moderate, suggesting that trade and communications along the major routes at least were not subject to very high risks (Habib, 1995, p. 224).

Trade was assisted by trimetallic money of great uniformity and purity based on the silver *rupee* (178 grains Troy, increased later to 180) which the Mughal emperors issued from their mints scattered all over their empire. It was open to everyone to get his bullion stamped into coin at the mint, the freshly minted coin bearing a premium over the older coins. Coinages based on the gold *hūm* ('pagoda') prevailed in South India, until the Mughal rupee began to supplant it from late seventeenth century, the process being completed under the British regime. In the seventeenth century copper tended to be confined to small payments only; and cowries served as fractional pieces for still smaller transactions. The values of all the coins in the different metals were established by market forces, with no official ratios being set after Akbar's time. The silver rupee substantially declined in value in relation to gold money, and, still more, to copper, in the course of the seventeenth century (Richards, 1987).

An extensive system of commercial credit existed, in which deposit-banking, prevalence of a market rate of interest and circulation of bills (*hurdās*) played a notable part. Insurance helped to make discounting of bills a safer business, so also the rule that those who discounted a bill became jointly responsible for its final discharge to the last holder. The 'bill-money' (*ūṇṭh*) began replacing cash in commercial transactions; but how extensive its use was cannot be determined. Compared with Europe interest rates were high; and, within the country, rates in South India and Bengal were higher than in North India and Gujarat. The interest rates fell all over India about the middle of the seventeenth century, as part apparently of a global phenomenon (Habib, 1995, p. 228).

Commerce was carried on largely in conditions of 'free-trade' but occasionally hampered by local, illegal monopolies. The administration generally permitted everyone to trade; but the profession of bankers (*sarāfs*, *malājāns*) and merchants was largely confined to particular castes, notably the *banjyas*

in North India. This was not as restrictive as otherwise might it have been, because the universal institution of brokerage, in which the *hanyas* specialized, enabled outsiders to make use of the caste network. Small and big merchants jostled together here as in contemporary Europe; the bigger merchants (*sāṁs*) had their factors (*byapāns*, *gumāstas*) at many distant places (Raychaudhuri, 1982, pp. 239–44; Dasgupta, 1979; Arasaratnam, 1986). It is not easy in this light to agree with Steensgaard's (1974, pp. 15 ff.) extension to India of van Lenn's thesis which postulates a large volume of commerce in the aggregate, conducted in millions of small units by 'pedlars'.

The history of colonialism in Asia may be well dated from 1498 when Vasco da Gama, having rounded the Cape of Good Hope, appeared at Calicut. In the first half of the sixteenth century the Portuguese were able gravely to damage Indian oceanic trade with the Red Sea and the Gulf, but after 1550 their power began to rest more and more on tribute, official and private, levied upon Asian sea-borne commerce; and the older lines of India's trade with Europe through the Levant now revived.

The arrival of the Dutch soon after 1600 introduced a fresh factor of disturbance, the new intruders proving to be far more successful in subduing local populations in South-East Asia and in Sri Lanka. Much of the commercial success of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) rested, not so much on its efficient, large enterprise, as on the large amounts of capital it obtained out of the taxes and tribute of its territorial empire. The English, though not lacking in willingness to resort to force, still lacked a territorial basis in South-East Asia and so focused more on India, where both they and the Dutch had largely to compete under conditions of free-trade.

By 1650, Indian merchants began once again to recover their share of Indian Ocean and Indo-European commerce, partly because of an extensive construction of ships modelled on European vessels (Habib, 1980a, pp. 14–16). Until almost 1700, the Red Sea remained the main channel of Indo-European trade despite the growing volume of cargo carried by ships of the Dutch, English and French East India Companies. The total volume of trade between India and Europe greatly increased during this period. Its composition also changed: spices and indigo, the original staples of this commerce, were left behind by textiles, that is, muslin, calico and chintz, and Bengal silk. In return, India obtained large quantities of silver and, on a much smaller scale, gold, the silver mainly originating from the Spanish mines in America.

The influx of American silver from Europe into India in the latter half of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth century came both through the Levant and round the Cape of Good Hope. There were other channels and sources too: American silver coming over the Pacific via Manila, and silver from Japan; but these flows, despite momentary strengths, remained secondary. It seems that there was a heavy influx of silver in the last quarter of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the next, then a decline, and thereafter a gradual recovery; it is indeed possible that between 1500 and 1650 India received about 6,000 metric tons of silver. Much of the early influx of silver might have been absorbed by an expansion of the Mughal silver coinage to replace copper money; but after 1615, prices began to rise as the influx continued. Between 1615 and 1705 per capita silver stock in India is estimated to have risen by 24 per cent, while the silver price of gold rose by 33 per cent, and that of copper by 110.4 per cent (Moosvi, 1987b). For a period of ninety years these increases seem moderate, and it is, therefore, possible that the case of an

extension of the Price Revolution to India may have been a little overstated.

'The common people', Pelsaert (c.1626) observed, lived in 'poverty so great and miserable that the life of the people can be depicted or accurately described only as the home of stark want and the dwelling place of bitter woe' (Moreland and Geyl, 1925, p. 60). Details from contemporary descriptions generally confirm this observation. The ordinary people ate inferior grains, hardly any meat; men and women both had scanty clothing; their huts were of walls of mud or reeds, and roofed with thatch or tiles; and a mud granary, a cot or two, a few earthen pots with perhaps a copper vessel, made up the furniture and utensils of a household (Moreland, 1920, pp. 265-81; Habib, 1963, pp. 90-9).

It is a sombre commentary on what happened under colonial rule that miserable as the conditions of the Indian poor were about 1600, they were probably no more desperate than they were about 1900. A painstaking comparison of urban wages at Agra in 1595 with those around 1900, in real terms, even reveals that the unskilled town labourer in 1595 was better-off in respect of food, though he could buy less cloth and other manufactures (Moosvi, 1987a, pp. 331-48).

The 'middle classes' had, of course, an easier life and higher standards of consumption. Cavalrymen and clerks were gentlemen who had attendants and servants to look after them (Habib, 1995, pp. 206-8). The real contrast lay, however, with the higher nobility, owing to the vast concentration of revenue-income in a few hands at the top (Moosvi, 1987a, pp. 221-3; Qaisar, 1967), the size of domestic establishments and the degree of splendour grew with each higher *mansab* or rank. The nobles built houses containing front halls (*diwānkhāna*), rear courtyards for their women, and gardens with waterworks; they had large harems, served by enormous kitchens and levies of attendants, slaves and eunuchs; and stables of horses, elephants and animals of chase. Incidental to such large expenditure was their interest in commerce as a means of enhancing their income; and so some of them, including queens, princesses and princes, built or bought ships and arranged for their cargoes. (Ali, 1966, pp. 154-70). But the support they gave to the urban economy was not mainly by such investments: it was essentially extended by the large demand for craft-goods and services that they and their dependants created, despite their own small numbers.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Early British enquiries, notably Buchanan's (1807) survey of South India, 1800-1, which contained descriptions of village organization, became the basis for the first perceptions of the 'Indian Village Community'. Much has been written on it since, with Baden-Powell (1896) arguing that it was really based on joint inherited property, and Wiser (1936) that it represented a customary network of servant-customer relationships.

Assuredly, within the Indian villages, a 'community' as an egalitarian institution is hardly to be looked for. First, there was an almost universal division between the *khurid-kāsh*, or village inhabitants proper, and the *pāikāsh*, outside cultivators coming from other villages. Our documents, then, introduce us to numerous villagers, who designate themselves *panch* or *muqaddam* and dispose of, by sale or transfer, the uncultivated lands of the village. Presumably rights over unoccupied lands were thus vested in a group of influential

villagers (the *kahāntān*, 'big men'). They also managed the financial pool (*ḥiṣṭā*): tax-shares from all peasants were collected and paid into this pool; and, besides the tax payable to the State, 'village expenses', like headmen's fees, expenses on travellers, and so on, were met from it (Mukherji and Habib, 1990; Habib, 1963, pp. 124-8). Small parcels of land were assigned to village artisans, menials and servants (called the *watan* of the *baluās* in eighteenth-century Maharashtra), and such lands do not seem to have been traditionally taxed. In return for such allotments, the beneficiaries were expected to serve the village, though doubtless with special attention paid to the *panch*, or leading men (Fukazawa, 1991, pp. 199-244). In the documents the *panch* are found sometimes to be homogeneous in terms of caste, at others heterogeneous (Hindus and Muslims, for example, appearing together among the *panch*). Artisans and servants belonged to different occupational castes. The 'untouchable' castes provided the bulk of the rural proletariat that colonial India inherited. In Kerala, they supplied a class of full-fledged agrarian slaves.

Individual farming and production for the market necessarily introduced differentiation; and this was probably accentuated by the control over wasteland and tax-collection by the *panch* or headmen. They were thus able to cultivate large areas of land and grow a number of crops by the help of wage-labourers.

Indian rural society contained a large class of hereditary claimants to superior rights of various sorts over peasant-held land. Their local names varied, but the Mughal administration tended to use for them the designation of *zamīndār*, which term in the course of the seventeenth century it made universal. The *zamīndārs* included, at one end, autonomous chiefs, and, at the other, persons who were practically indistinguishable from village headmen. Within this range, certain common features were found among most of the *zamīndārs*: their rights comprised partly customary cesses and exactions levied on peasants and other villages (*mālikāna*) and partly allowances out of land-tax, paid in cash or tax-free land (*nānkān*). They were, therefore, not really proprietors, since their claim did not amount to rent, and, compared with the land-revenue, accounted for a much smaller portion of the surplus (around a fifth to a third of it in Northern India). In some areas, though, they claimed the right to evict peasants and settle new ones. The *zamīndārs'* rights were traditionally established by the forcible acquisition of dominance by particular clans or castes; and so caste affiliation and control over retainers were often essential adjuncts to their position. Yet by Mughal times their rights were almost everywhere saleable; and so money could greatly alter the caste-configuration of *zamīndār* rights. One can see from the *Ā'in-i Akbarī's* detailed list of *zamīndār* castes, given for each locality (*pargana*), that most *zamīndārs* in Northern India, at the end of the sixteenth century, belonged to Hindu upper castes, notably the Rajput clans; and that their retainers, horse and foot, numbered about 4.5 million.

The major beneficiaries of the 'tax-rent' in the Mughal Empire and contemporary Indian states were the King and his nobility, which was in only a small part recruited from the ranks of the *zamīndārs*. The Mughal emperors treated all nobles and lesser notables as their paid employees, determining their pay (*ʿālāq*) according to their ranks (*mansabs*), and making over to them assignments (*jāgīrs*) of areas whose estimated tax income (*jama*) equalled their pay. Only occasionally was part of the salary paid them in money (*naqd*) from the Imperial treasury. As their ranks and postings changed, the *jāgīrs* too were shifted, the average period of

Pie-modern Indian society at all levels was undoubtedly oppressive to women. Women carried water, spun yarn, milled corn and helped in agricultural operations. Women of certain castes also went around hawking milk, ghee and other wares. In Bengal it was even said that the main burden of work was borne by women. Yet in most Hindu communities they had only limited rights of inheritance, and were often married in infancy, the marriages being consummated even before puberty. It was the parents of the groom who in ordinary cases received the dowry. In many of the peasant and pastoral castes, such as Jats, Ahirs and Mewatis, widows could be compulsorily married, either to their husbands' brothers or to strangers against bride-price. Women's claims to inheritance among lower classes were often disregarded. In Bengal if a peasant or stranger died without leaving a son, his wife and daughters were seized as chattel for the benefit of the royal fiscal administration, the *jāgirdār* or the dominant *zamindār* of the area (Habib, 1963, p. 246).

Women of higher castes had presumably greater leisure, but suffered as well from severe handicaps. One was the strict imposition of seclusion. That women in the Ahom kingdom (Assam), including queens, could appear in public without covering their faces and heads was cited as a strange thing, to be duly recorded in Mughal histories. Widow remarriage among upper castes was absolutely prohibited, and the fearful practice of *sati*, or immolation of the widow, was practised among the Rajput ruling groups and certain other high castes. The Mughal administration pursued a policy of discouraging *sati*, but *satis* still took place, two or three times a week at the capital, Agra, c. 1626 (Moreland and Geyl, 1925, pp. 78–80). On the other hand, we know of widows and other women who owned not only movable possessions, but also *zamindārīs*, obtained presumably by inheritance (Habib, 1963, p. 153). A matrilinear system prevailed among certain high castes in Kerala.

In the middle and upper strata of Muslim society, Muslim law seems to have operated fairly effectively. This permitted up to four wives and any number of concubines to a man. That there was some resentment against this male right is shown by certain marriage contracts negotiated at Surat in the first half of the seventeenth century where the wives obliged the husbands not to remarry or maintain concubines. The contracts sought to prevent the husband from badly beating up their wives and to ensure to the wives a minimum subsistence (Moosvi, 1992). Pre-puberty marriages, though permitted, appear to have been less common among Muslims; widow remarriage, though legally permitted, was also not common. Muslim women of higher classes observed practically complete seclusion. The women could claim a dower (*mahr*) for themselves from their husbands as settled in the marriage contract and also inherit, though in shares much smaller than those of the male members of the family. It is interesting that emperor Akbar expressed unhappiness at this lack of equity, and demanded more than a full share for the daughter. He also forbade pre-puberty marriages (Habib, 1993).

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

At the close of the fifteenth century, India was divided into a number of kingdoms. The Lodi empire in Northern India, had absorbed the kingdom of Jaunpur, and under Sultan Sikandar (1489–1517) it extended from the Indus to Bihar.

The same Sultan transferred the capital from Delhi to Agra. Another kingdom which obtained considerable power was that of Gujarat (capital: Ahmadabad), then ruled by its famous Sultan, Mahmūd Begura (1459–1511). The neighbouring kingdom of Malwa was subsequently annexed by Gujarat (1531–2). In the extreme north, Kashmir retained its independence. In Rajasthan, Mewar was the strongest power, notably under Rānā Sangrām Singh (1508–28). In the east, Bengal enjoyed a long-remembered peace under 'Alīuddīn Husain Shāh (1493–1519), with Gaur as the capital.

In the south, the once powerful Bahmanī kingdom (capital: Bidar) covering much of Maharashtra and Andhra, with a portion of Karnataka, had gone into decline and was in the process of being parcelled out into the kingdoms of Nizām Shāhs (Ahmadnagar), 'Imād Shāhs (Berar), 'Adil Shāhs (Bijapur), Barīd Shāhs (Bidar) and Qutb Shāhs (Golkonda). The Vijayanagara Empire embraced most of South India; its famous emperor Krishnadeva Rāya (1509–29) has left behind palatial monuments and great irrigation tanks.

The first half of the sixteenth century saw a struggle for hegemony in Northern India, marked first by the establishment of the Mughal (Timurid) Empire (1526–40) under Bābur and Humāyūn and then the regime of the Sūrs (1540–56). Bābur, of whom we know so much from his wonderful memoirs, was driven away from his homeland, Ferghana, by the Uzbeks, established himself at Kabul (1504), and then, invading India, overthrew the Lodi Empire at the battle of Panipat (1526). He subsequently defeated a hostile confederacy under Rānā Sangrām Singh at Khanua (1527). Bābur used artillery, including guns and muskets, to great effect in both these battles. His son Humāyūn (1530–40, 1555–6) successfully met the challenge from Bahādūr Shāh of Gujarat (1526–37), but lost to the Afghan leader, Sher Shāh Sūr, who drove him into exile in 1540 (Williams, 1918; Prasad, 1956) (see Map 26).

Sher Shāh (1540–5) succeeded in establishing an empire extending from the Salt Range to Bengal. He centralized administrative functioning, introduced the horse-branding system to enforce strict maintenance of cavalry, measured the land to have the revenue assessed properly, enforced law and order with a heavy hand and paid special attention to the security of the routes. He reformed the coinage, instituting a system of trimetallism, with coins minted in gold, silver and copper: the silver *rūpiya* (rupee), originally of 178 grains troy of practically pure silver, was his invention. His use of the local language ('Hindi') in administration was a measure of his practical sense. Though his nobility and troops consisted mainly of Afghans settled in India, he made considerable efforts to win allies in other sections of the population (Quinn-Jones, 1965). His work was largely continued by his successor Islām Shāh (1545–54), who, however, hastened the collapse of the Sūr empire by his constant conflict with influential Afghan nobles.

Fortune ultimately favoured the Mughals: in 1555 Humāyūn returned from his exile in Iran and Afghanistan. Though he died the following year, the last hopes of the Sūrs were extinguished at the second battle of Panipat (1556). From this point onwards the Mughal Empire was set on its course of rapid expansion in Northern India under Humāyūn's son, Akbar (r. 1556–1605).

The parallel struggle for hegemony in the south was far less conclusive. Under the Vijayanagara emperor, Sadaseva Rāya (1546–67), all real power passed into the hands of his minister Rāna Rāja. The latter obtained much success against the successor states of the Bahmanī Empire, but the tables

were turned at the battle of Talikota or Rakshasa-Tangadi (1565) (Heras, 1980). The continuing dissensions among the victors enabled the Vijayanagara Empire to survive under the Aravidu dynasty, with a transfer of its capital to Penugonda; but henceforth no southern state could aspire to hegemony over the entire peninsula.

A new power arose, destructive for Indian ports and sea-borne commerce, that of the Portuguese. In 1498 Vasco da Gama anchored with three small vessels at Calicut, an event followed soon with the foundation of the Portuguese Estado da Índia, with its main seat at Goa, conquered by Albuquerque in 1510. The spirited resistance the Portuguese encountered on the Malabar coast is recorded in the *Tuhfat al-Mujāhidīn*, written in 1583.

From a mere glance at the chronology of military events in his reign, it would become obvious that Akbar was a great conqueror. Acquisition of control over Rajasthan was marked by the storming of Chittor (main fortress of Mewar) in 1568. The conquest of Gujarat followed in 1572–73, and then Bengal (1576), Kabul (1585), Kashmir (1586), Sind (1592), Orissa (1592), and Qandahar (1595). He succeeded in making the boundaries of his empire march along the Hindukush Mountains, and thereafter he alternately threatened the Uzbeks and the Šafavids.

In the last decade of his reign Akbar initiated an effort to expand into the Deccan. Berar was annexed in 1596, Ahmadnagar in 1600, Khandesh in 1601. By the time he died (1605), the enterprise had run into some difficulty particularly in the Ahmadnagar area, where a new leader, the Ethiopian commander Malik 'Ambar, was successful in organizing resistance.

Akbar gave the Mughal Empire its immensely systematic and centralized structure which contributed not a little to its success and relatively long duration. In 1574 he fused the nobility, bureaucracy and military commanders into a single 'service', by assigning to each member of it a numerical rank (*mansab*) from 10 to 5,000 and still higher numbers to indicate his status, salary and size of military contingent. Theoretically, each officer could rise from the lowest to highest ranks or be assigned any duty or office without additional remuneration; and practically all offices, except the purely religious, were filled by holders of *mansabs*. Promotions and demotions were henceforth made by additions or reductions of *mansabs*. Towards the close of Akbar's reign a second (*sawār*) rank was added to indicate the size of the cavalry contingent the rank-holder was expected to maintain.

This systematization of state service greatly assisted Akbar's endeavour to enlarge the ethnic base of his nobility. At the beginning of his reign, his nobility consisted mainly of Turani (Central Asian) and Khurasani (Persian) nobles. From as early as 1561 he began to admit Rajput chiefs; and subsequently they were allowed to hold their ancestral domains in lieu of salary due to them against their initial *mansabs*. At the same time members of the Hindu 'intellectual' and accountant castes were also promoted, a famous example being his finance minister Todar Mal. The Indian Muslims too obtained high positions. But his effort to bring the nobles under close control, by taking away their *jāgīrs* (territorial assignments) and putting them on cash pay, along with strict branding and muster regulations, contributed to the very serious rebellion in 1580. Its suppression was accompanied by some concessions, notably, the restoration of the system of *jāgīrs*, which however remained subject to regular transfer.

The institution of *ṣubās* or provinces into which the empire was divided in 1580 completed the process of systematization

of central and provincial administration. The important feature of this organization was a multiplicity of chains of command, all emanating from the emperor. There were three important ministers at the centre, the *Dauā-i A'lā* (finance minister, also in control of assignment of *jāgīrs*), the *Mir Bakshi* (minister in charge of grant of *mansabs*, postings, verification of contingents, and intelligence) and *Ṣadr-us-Sudūr* (in charge of revenue grants). They had their corresponding subordinates in the provinces (*dāwān*, *bakshi* and *ṣadr*) answerable directly to them, and not to the governor (*ṣipahsālār/nāzīm*) of the *ṣiba* (province), who was appointed by the emperor and reported directly to him. The *sarkārs*, into which each *ṣiba* was divided, often coincided with jurisdictions of *faujḍārs* (commandants) and *karoris* (imperial revenue-collectors). An effort was made to establish a fairly uniform system of local administration by having at the level of the *pargana*, or small sub-district, three semi-hereditary officers, the *qāwīngō* (keeper of revenue records), the *chaudhūrī* (in charge of revenue collection) and the *qāzī* (judge). Persian was made the language of administration throughout, except for village accounts, for which local languages were used.


For purposes of revenue administration, the empire was divided into two kinds of territory: *khālīṣa shāhīṣa*, where the taxes were collected for the imperial treasury, and *jāgīrs*, where they were collected by *mansab*-holders in lieu of cash salary. The *jāgīrs* were regularly transferred, the assignments being made by use of officially established figures of expected net income, termed *naqdī* or *jama'*. Much of the statistical endeavours of Akbar's administration were designed to work out realistic *jama'* figures, ultimately arrived at in 1580–1 upon the basis of ten years' experience. The regulations by which land-tax and other cesses were to be collected in the *khālīṣa* and *jāgīrs* were largely the same, and Akbar's administration strove to enlarge the area of measurement and fix cash revenue rates on each unit of area, varying with the crop.

Akbar, though formally unlettered, was a man of diverse intellectual interests. He came to believe in the goal of *Sulh-i Kitāb*, 'Absolute Peace', which it was the duty of the sovereign to establish by tolerating different creeds and schools of thought. This provided rationalization for a policy he had already followed on empirical grounds, that of forming an ethnically composite nobility. The poll-tax (*jizya*) on non-Muslims was abolished in 1564 and, finally, in 1580. Innovative practices like the *jharoka darshan* (the early morning public sight of the emperor) were now introduced with the object of broadening the acceptance of the empire as part of popular faith. (On Akbar see biography by Srivastava, 1973; also Moosvi, 1994. For administrative measures: Hasan, 1936; Saran, 1941; Aziz, 1942; Habib, 1963, pp. 90–316.)


Akbar had three fairly able successors in Jahāngīr (r. 1605–27), Shāhjahān (1628–58) and Aurangzeb (1659–1707), much as their characters varied. (For their biographies see Prasad, 1962; Saksena, 1958; Sarkar, 1954). Under them the territorial expansion continued, though at a much reduced pace.

Jahāngīr found it hard to maintain the boundary in the Deccan that he had inherited, finding in Malik 'Ambar of Ahmadnagar (d. 1626) a redoubtable opponent. But by 1636 the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was finally obliterated. In 1656–7 in two separate wars, considerable territory was seized from Golkunda and Bijapur. Under Aurangzeb, Bijapur was finally annexed in 1686, and Golkunda the next year.

In the east the territory of the present Bangladesh was thoroughly brought under control during Jahāngīr's reign.



Map 26 The Mughal Empire and its provinces in 1605 (after I. Habib, *Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Delhi, 1982/1986, redrawn by F. Habib).



During the early years of Aurangzeb's reign, large parts of Assam were seized from the Ahom kingdom (1662-3) and Chittagong was taken from Aracan (1666).

It was only in Afghanistan that the Mughals failed to improve their position. Qandahar was lost to the Safavids (1622), recovered (1638) and finally lost (1649). Three costly campaigns (1649, 1652, 1653) to drive out the Persians proved futile. In the north an ambitious expedition to conquer Northern Afghanistan (1646-7) from the Uzbeks was also unsuccessful.

Akbar's three successors broadly maintained the principles of administration bequeathed by him. Centralized control continued and so did the *mansab* and *jāgīr* system. Only towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign did a crisis develop owing to the grant of *mansabs* exceeding the capacity of *jāgīrs* to meet pay claims generated by them. The composite nature of the nobility was maintained, though the Iranian element, especially under Jahāngīr, whose politically influential queen, Nūr-Jahān (d. 1645) was a Persian, gained in influence, while the Rajputs lost some ground though they remained important. Religious policy was seriously modified only by Aurangzeb, whose reimposition of the *jizya* in 1679 marked the culmination of earlier measures of religious discrimination. However, even Aurangzeb continued appointing Rajputs to high *mansabs*, and under him the Marathas accounted for a sizeable number within the nobility (Ali, 1966).

In the latter half of the seventeenth century the rise of the Maratha chieftain Shivaji was to prove a portentous circumstance. Shivaji began to acquire independent power in western Maharashtra on the borderland between the Mughal and Bijapur territories. His sack of Surat (1664) was followed by an enforced accommodation with the Mughals that proved abortive; and in 1674 Shivaji crowned himself at Raigarh. By the time he died (1680), he had carved for himself a kingdom comprising a long belt along the western coast, and a detached portion in Tamilnadu. He owed much of his success to his use of Maratha peasant-soldiers (*hargis*). He established the system of *chauth* or quarter of the revenue exacted from the existing authorities as price of security from his attacks. Within his own kingdom (*shivajiya*) he attempted to build a regular administration modelled after that of the Deccan Sultanates; taxation within it was by no means light (Sarkar, 1952).

Shivaji's death saw a momentary eclipse of the polity he had founded, as his son Shambhaji was captured and executed by Aurangzeb (1689). His other son, Rāja Rām (d. 1700) became a fugitive when the Mughals overran the Maratha possessions in Tamilnadu in the 1690s. There was a revival of Maratha power under the regency of Rāja Rām's widow Tārābāi, and large areas passed under the control of different bands of troops led by Maratha *sardars* (chiefs), who enlarged their resources by a rigorous collection of *chauth*, failing which they subjected the territory to plunder. By the time Aurangzeb died, after having been in the Deccan continuously since 1681, much of his work lay in ruins as Maratha armies broke through the cordons of his troops again and again.

The decline of the Mughal Empire is conventionally deemed to begin from Aurangzeb's death (1707), though symptoms of it, seen in agrarian disturbances and difficulties in *jāgīr*-assignments, had become visible earlier. Aurangzeb's successors made certain concessions to reduce discontent. The *jizya* was abolished in 1713. Bahādur Shāh (1707-12) released Shambhaji's son Sāhu (d. 1748) to placate the Marathas; and the Rajput princes began to be given higher ranks and offered governorships. However, internal dissensions at the court mounted, intensified by armed conflicts

between rival claimants at each succession. Muḥammad Shāh's reign (1719-48) saw a gradual loosening of central authority as governors increasingly became autonomous. This was especially the case with the vicereignty of the Deccan, and the *nazims* of Bengal and Awadh. Emergent local 'corporate groups' with their 'innovative' methods of self-enrichment, like tax-farming (Bayly, 1983; Alam, 1986), sapped the inner vitality of Mughal administration.

Moreover, the passing away of the supremacy of mounted archers in the face of the rising potency of firearms made the Mughal *mansab* system obsolete as a framework of military organization. The Marathas established their authority over Gujarat and Malwa (1737), although the emperor's nominal suzerainty continued to be acknowledged. Soon after, the empire was shattered by the Persian invasion under Nādir Shāh: Delhi was sacked and denuded of its treasures (1739), and the Mughal possessions beyond the Indus (*suba* Kabul) and Sind were lost. There were Sikh risings in the Panjab, the Rohilla chiefs established themselves to the east of Delhi, and the Jāts under their ruler Sītārajmal (1756-63) to the south; and all remaining control over the provinces was lost.

The first half of the eighteenth century saw the rapid emergence of Maratha power. This took place under the nominal authority of the rulers of Shivaji's line (the *chhatrapatis*), and the active management of their principal ministers, the Peshwās, whose office became hereditary. A succession of able Peshwās, Bālaji Vishwanāth (in office, 1714-20), Bājī Rāo I (1720-40), Bālaji Bājī Rāo (1740-61) and Mādhav Rāo (1761-72), imposed their writ over the *sardars*, made over the conquered territories to their own nominees and relentlessly extended the circle of areas on which *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, the twin levies amounting together to over a third of the total revenue-collection, were imposed. In this enterprise the Peshwās combined professed loyalties to two sovereigns, the *Chhatrapati* and the *Pādishāh* (the Mughal Emperor). Under the tradition of local chieftaincies (*zamindāris*) in which the Maratha leaders were steeped, every office or authority tended to become hereditary or run in families. This weakened centralized power within the Maratha polity, and made it more of a 'confederacy' than of an empire, especially after the great defeat the Marathas suffered at the hands of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, at Panipat (1761). The Mughal emperor remained under their control from 1771 to 1803, when with all their weaknesses exposed in the second Anglo-Maratha War, they lost Delhi to the British. In spite of its lack of systematization, the Maratha administration had the capacity to reconcile diverse local elements, and followed a largely liberal religious policy (Satdesai, 1948; Sen, 1925, 1958).

There has been a debate for a long time, certainly since Bernier, as to whether the Mughal Empire was a state in the same sense as contemporary European states. Bernier believed that while European states had as their main function the protection of private property, in India, and, indeed, in Asia in general, the sovereign being himself the proprietor, the destruction of all private property appeared to be the chief function of the state. To this he attributed all the ills from which the Asian economies and societies suffered, notably the intense oppression committed by those whose own capacity to extort was only temporary, since it was derived from the sovereign who might deprive them of it any moment. Although the Mughal sovereign did not actually make the claim to universal landownership attributed to him by Bernier and others, the size of the land-tax was indeed such as to absorb the larger part of the surplus. The practical

result was that for tax-collection purposes alone the state had to acquaint itself with conditions of agriculture in detail and attempt its improvement, a situation which had no parallel in contemporary European states, these tasks being performed there by the large estate-owners. Marx therefore, perceived in the Mughal Empire a system of 'Asiatic despotism', based on tax-rent, which was different from the *laissez-faire* state principally because of its concern for protection of agriculture by irrigation and other means. Yet we must remember that outside the fiscal system the Mughal state interfered little with the structure of property rights subsisting on secondary claims to the agrarian surplus, or with urban property and commerce. Its legislative action was on a far more modest scale than that of Tudor parliaments, since the emperor did not profess to change religious or customary laws. Even in the famous and abortive *mal'azar* of 1579 only the right of interpretation of Islamic law was claimed for the sovereign. Only where the customary laws were in conflict with each other, did the state enjoy discretion (thus the prohibition of cow-slaughter in accordance with Hindu custom in certain areas under Akbar and Jahāngīr, and the imposition of *jizya* on Hindus in accordance with Muslim law by Aurangzeb). A notable exception was the prohibition of forcible *sa'it*, where simple humanity rather than any direct injunction of religion was the source of inspiration.

There has recently been some questioning also of the nature of the empire that the Mughals constructed. It has been suggested that there was a wide discrepancy between the nominal claims to authority and the actual exercise of power, much in actual fact resting on accommodation and compromise (Wink, 1986). While accommodation and compromise are inescapable in any political system, it would appear that the Mughals succeeded in even systematizing and universalizing the space within which concessions could be given (for example, grants of *manzabs* to chiefs, while demarcating the area held by them in *zawā'idārān*), and those where there was complete enforcement of Imperial authority. Nor can one see much difference between the 'core' (supposedly the zone around the capital cities, Agra and Delhi) and the 'periphery' in the great days of the empire: the *jāgīrs* were as regularly transferred in Sind and Berār as in the Agra province. Nor was the incidence of taxation different between the central and distant provinces.

The breakdown of the Mughal Empire has also been the subject of much reflection. Its decline was simultaneous with that of the Ottoman Empire, the Safavids and the Uzbek Khanate, the Qing Empire following a century later. If Barthold had been correct in ascribing the rise of these empires to gunpowder, one may argue that the further development and spread of firearms and the increasing obsolescence of cavalry could be responsible for the loss of superiority by the Imperial armies. The rising economic strength of Europe might also have diverted trade and undermined the economic stability of these empires in ways which are yet to be studied. But there were internal contradictions too within the political structure which worked to undermine it once they could no longer be reconciled.

The first major conflict of interest was between the Mughal ruling class and the *zawā'idārān*. The former was part of the despotic machinery of the empire and a major claimant to the 'tax-rent'; the latter a hereditary class possessing customary shares in the produce and demanding a share in the land-tax. Both classes possessed armed power to reinforce their claims. Mughal imperial policy was directed in a large measure to keep the *zawā'idār* class in an alliance based on a common

exploitation of the peasantry, in which the *zawā'idārān* could be used as instruments of tax-collection. Concessions to them alternated with forcible measures to exact their obedience. Mughal religious policy can be seen therefore partly as a means to this end, the *zawā'idārān* being the most important Hindu class to be either reconciled or repressed. The alliance between the two ruling classes was, however, by nature unstable; and the *zawā'idārān*, given their armed power, naturally sought all opportunities which would enlarge their resources.

Any weakening of Mughal power was, therefore, bound to result in a shift in the loyalty of *zawā'idārān*. Further, if an agrarian crisis developed, and collection of land-tax from an impoverished peasantry became more difficult, the *zawā'idārān* were more likely to resist a full realization of the land-tax, since that would now be at the expense of their own share. *Zawā'idār* uprisings in such circumstances would become more frequent than before.

The second crucial contradiction was between the Imperial system and the peasantry. During Aurangzeb's early years (the 1660s), Bernier saw an increasing, relentless pressure upon the peasantry; Aurangzeb's *famān* to Rasikdās (1666) draws a picture of declining agriculture and oppressive taxation; and the flight of peasantry from the land forms the context of the *famān* to Muḥammad Hāshim (1668-9).

It is important to consider how far the uprisings which shook the Mughal Empire in its later days had their roots in the two sources of conflict we have outlined. The Marāṭhā revolt partook mostly of a *zawā'idār* character in that its *sardārs* came from the class of local chieftains and hereditary potentates (*desāīs*, *deshmukhs*); and the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhī* had their origins in *zawā'idār* claims. Much of the failure of the Marāṭhās to construct a centralized regime was due to this cause. But in recruiting the *bagīs*, the Marāṭhās might well have been assisted by agrarian distress, owing to which 'the peasants, providing themselves with horses and arms, joined the Marāṭhās.' The distress itself was accentuated by the rival demands of the Mughal *jāgīrdārān* and the Marāṭhās.

In the Jāt revolt near Agra, peasant uprisings seem to have coalesced into a caste revolt under *zawā'idār* leadership. In other peasant revolts, religion rather than caste or *zawā'idār* leadership provided the unifying bond so necessary for gaining even limited success. Thus the Satnāmīs, a community of peasants and petty traders, who raised a serious rebellion in Haryana in 1672, belonged to a fiercely monotheistic sect of the Kabīr movement. The Sikhs, who began a rebellion in the Panjab under Guru Gohind Singh (1666-1708), were in large part peasants (Jats), so that in 1709 their leader Banda was able to lead into the field 'an innumerable army of men, like ants and locusts, belonging to the low castes of the Hindus and ready to die'. Here too a monotheistic religion bound the lowly rebels together. Unlike the Satnāmīs, the Sikhs were ultimately to triumph; whereupon their leaders, often of low-class origins, sought to become *zawā'idārān*, and Ranjit Singh, the great ruler of the Panjab (d. 1839), assumed the title of Maharaja, the acme of the ambitions of any Rajput prince. (The argument above mainly follows Habib, 1963, pp. 317-51; for a different view of the uprisings, see Alam, 1986, pp. 134ff.)

RELIGION

The coexistence of Hinduism and Islam is the most remarkable aspect of religious life in Mughal India. This very observation, however, tends to obscure the fact that Hinduism

was not a religion in the same ('semitic') sense as Islam. The unique work on the religions of the world, *Dabistān-i Mazāhib* (written c.1653), notes that 'among the Hindus there are numerous religions, and countless faiths and customs'. It was equally true, however, that, having developed in mutual interaction and debate and expressed largely in the same language (Sanskrit), the different beliefs seemed to be orbiting within the same stellar system.

The Mughal period witnessed a continuing aversion of almost all the different elements of Higher or Orthodox Hinduism. There was a notable exposition of Mīmāṃsā philosophy in Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa's *Mīmāṃsāyodaya* (c.1600). The Mīmāṃsā school upheld the automatic functioning of the system of transmigration of souls in life-cycles, the station in each life being the result of deeds (*karma*) in the previous cycles. The *Dabistān-i Mazāhib* reports the 'common belief' among the Hindus now was that though there was one Creator, the created beings in their lives remained bound by the influence of their own deeds.

The emphasis on *karma* was the key to *dharma* or prescribed conduct of the *smṛiti* schools. In this field the traditional doctrine continued to be reasserted in digests, commentaries and elaborations. Vāchस्पति (c.1510) wrote the *Vivādachintāmaṇi* in Mithila (Bihar). In Bengal, c.1567, Raghonandana of Navadvip wrote his twenty-eight treatises, the *Smṛitiratna*, which became the standard authority on ritual and inheritance. The *Nirṇayasindhu* of Kamalākara Bhāṭṭa (1612) obtained legal and religious authority in Maharashtra. An encyclopaedic legal work, the *Vṛāṇṇadaya* was compiled by Mura Miśra in the reign of Jahāngīr (1605-27). These works did not generally make any noteworthy deviations from positions adopted in respect of the supremacy of the Brahman and the caste-rules as defined by the earlier *Smṛitis*. If anything, they rather elaborated the restrictions imposed on the lower castes and on women.

In Vedānta, the pantheistic tradition bequeathed by Śaṅkarachārya was influential enough to produce a number of texts. While Sadānanda in his *Vedāntasāra* (c.1500) exhibits an admixture of Sāṅkhya principles (of Duality), Vijñānabhikṣu (c.1650) in the *Sāṅkhyasāra* admitted the truth of Vedānta, professing to see the Sāṅkhya Duality as no more than one aspect of the Truth. A similar reconciliation of Vedānta with Śaivite beliefs seems to have been developed by Appaya Dikṣita (1520-92) of Vellore.

Tāntrik literature received considerable additions during this period. Mahādhara of Varanasi wrote the *Mantramahodadhī* in 1589. In Bengal Pūrṇānanda (fl. 1571) wrote treatises on philosophy and magic rites; in the next century, Kṛṣṇānanda Āgamavāgīśa of Navadvip wrote the authoritative textbook, *Tāntrasāra*.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, however, essentially the centuries of *Vaiṣṇavism*. In the Hindi region the Rāma cult had its greatest propagator in Tulsīdās who in his *Rāmcharitmānas* gave a popular garb to the original *Rāmāyaṇa*. Tulsīdās was a firm believer in the *dharmaśāstra* and he regarded the popular monotheistic cults with their low-caste (*Śūdra*) leaders as signs of the degradation of the Dark Age (*kalijug*). Yet this was not the main message of his work. In his fervent verses of devotion and portrayal of a just Rāma, the incarnated deity became God, Who was personal yet formless.

The expression was still more emotional when the object of *bhakti* or devotion was Viṣṇu's incarnation as Kṛṣṇa. Chaitanya (1485-1533), a Brahman priest of Navadvip (Bengal), initiated a cult of Kṛṣṇa and his female lover

Rādhā, in which the devotee pictured himself a companion of Kṛṣṇa, re-enacting in his mind His 'manifest' sports (*līlas*). While Chaitanya had his followers mainly in Bengal, he left very active successors, the *gaurāṅgīs*, at Vrindaban near Mathura, who in a series of Sanskrit works gave a philosophical basis to the cult and outlined its ritual. Though the devotees followed the caste ritual, the right of worship was not denied to the lower classes; and the Sahajīya sect (eighteenth century) rejected the *smṛitis*' prescriptions and introduced *śāktic* and *tāntric* practices. In Assam, a Vaiṣṇava sect was founded by Śaṅkaradeva (d. 1568), who avoided image-worship and emphasized an Absolute, Personal God, to Whom all devotion is to be directed in the form of love for Kṛṣṇa.

Vallabhachārya (d. 1531) and his son Vithalāhī (d. 1576) propagated a religion of grace (*pushtimarga*); and Sūrdās, owing allegiance to this sect, wrote *Sūr-sarāvalī* (1545) in which the sports of Kṛṣṇa with Rādhā and others were described as manifestations of the Lord's supreme powers. The sect obtained some popularity in Gujarat and Rajasthan. The Rādhā-vallabhīs owed their foundation to Hita Harivāṇśa (d. 1553) and assigned to Rādhā the more crucial position in the Duality of Divinity.

The Vaiṣṇavite movement in Maharashtra contained both unitarian and conservative elements. Eknāth (d. 1599), a Brahman, expounded the principle of *bhakti* and allowed all castes as well as women to assemble and join in the ecstasy of devotional chants (*kīrtan*). Tukārām (d. 1649), a Śūdra peasant, might possibly have been influenced by the Chaitanya sect; yet, his God (*Vijñān*) tends to be closer to the Rām of Kabīr the monotheist: he sings of the possibility of recourse to God by a devotee, howsoever lowly in status, and does not hesitate to use the word Allāh for his God (Abbott, 1932). Quite different in approach was Rāmdās (d. 1681), who combined the propagation of the worship of Rāma as God with the upholding of the *dharma* ('the Maharashtra Dharma'), that is, maintenance of 'the holiness of the Brahman and deities'. He organized *maths* or centres of ascetics, and was patronized by Shivājī, the Marāṭhā ruler (d. 1680) (Deming, 1928).

In Karnataka, the Dāsakūṭa movement seems formally to have belonged to Mādhvachārya's system. It originated with Śrīpadarāya (d. 1492), but was mainly spread by his disciple Vyāsarāya (d. 1539). The songs of the sect in Kannada show ecstatic attachment to the deity Viṅghala. A disciple of Vyāsarāya, Kanakadās was a shepherd (*Kunbi*) by caste, and in his popular compositions insisted on the access of the lowly to the Lord.

Logic and dialectics (*nyāya* and *tarka*) continued to attract attention through commentaries and textbooks. The Navadvip schools produced Raghuṇātha Śrīromaṇī's commentary (c.1500) on Gaṅgesha; and on this Gadhādara (c.1700) in turn commented. Sāṅkara Miśra in *Upaśāra* (c.1600) commented on the *nyāya-sūtra*. Among textbooks, Annan Bhāṭṭa wrote *Tarkasāmagraha* (c.1585) and Jagadīśa the *Tarkānṛta* (c.1700). There was much obscurity and scholasticism in this literature; and all the schools were now 'fully theistic' (Keith, 1920, pp. 485-6).

The survival in sufficient strength of the materialist ideas of the Chārvākas, described in the *Dabistān-i Mazāhib*, is of considerable interest: the Chārvākas believed that only the world perceived by the senses was real; 'whether one becomes high or low results from the nature of the world', and not from divine direction; and there is no Creator nor gods, nor any truth in the Vedas.

The main area of strength of Jainism during this period was Gujarat, though Jain communities were found elsewhere too. Jain religious literature was composed in Gujarati, Kannada and other languages, but much of it was repetitive or hagiological. The Jain version of dialectics was set out by Yastovijayaji in *Jaina tarka-bhāṣā*, c.1670. Both the sects of the Jains, the Śvētāmbara and Digambara, flourished in the Vijayanagara Empire (Devi, 1990, pp. 159–74). The Jain laity was increasingly confined to 'the *banya* and *bhora* castes of tradesmen and men taking to service' (*Dharmān-i-Magdhūh*).

A change of substantive proportions in the Indian mode of religious thought was marked by the preaching of the weaver Kabīr (d. 1518) of Varanasi. One could, on the one hand, see in his compositions a distilling of Nāth-yogic, even Tāntric beliefs to obtain an egalitarian monotheism, parallel to the Islamic (Vaudeville, 1974); or see, alternatively, a rigorous acceptance of the logic of the monotheism of Islam, while rejecting its theology, the exposition being necessarily offered in a language that those outside the culture of Islam could understand (Chand, 1963, pp. 143 ff). Strong arguments can be urged in favour of both views; but, however the result came about, the achievement was outstanding.

Kabīr propounded an absolute monotheism that rejected image-worship and ritual. Service to God is the true means of salvation—love, though not absent, is clearly a subordinate element (cf. Eliot, 1921, II, p. 262). This weakens any argument that Kabīr belonged either to Vaiṣṇav *bhakti* or Islamic sufism. He insists that by a man's faith and work in this life alone would he be judged by God. But if Kabīr warns of punishment, he also rejects a heaven where one's desires would be fulfilled. Kabīr pours scorn on the concepts of purity and pollution, the laws of the *śūfis* and the caste system. He does not seek a reconciliation between Hinduism and Islam, since his monotheism is so absolute that he cannot but reject both the faiths and their ritual.

Kabīr's audience was the common man, the artisan, the peasant, the village headman: his similes and metaphors came from their life and travails; and his language was the tongue that they spoke. The different dialects of Hindi have left their imprint on his original Awadhi, as he or his verses travelled about. Following him too came a procession of his peers, lowly like him, seeking God in the land of Homo Hierarchicus.

While the shadowy Nāndev of Maharashtra, a calico-printer, certainly preceded Kabīr, the evidence of their compositions show that Ravidās (or Rāidās), the worker in hides, and Sain, the barber, regarded Kabīr as their precursor. A similar position with regard to him was adopted by Dādū, the cotton-carder (d. 1603), who obtained considerable following in Rajasthan (cf. Orr, 1947). A little later (1657) there appeared the Satnāmī sect, again showing some allegiance to Kabīr, and counting among its followers 'peasants and tradesmen with small capital' in Haryana (Habib, 1963, pp. 342–4).

The sects of the followers of these teachers were called *panth*; in time, in spite of preserving the anti-ritualistic compositions of their founders, these tended to develop a ritual of their own and to introduce notions and institutions taken from traditional religion, notably the ascription of avatar status to their original preceptors, and a caste-like entity to the monotheistic community itself. Even a Brahman parentage would be sought for Kabīr, and counting among its followers 'peasants and tradesmen with small capital' in Haryana (Habib, 1963, pp. 342–4).

Our period saw the rise of Sikhism, now one of the recognized religions of the world. It began as a sect (*panth*) of the followers of Nānak (1469–1539), of the Khatri

(accountant and mercantile) caste of the Panjab, more or less on the pattern of other sects of the contemporary monotheistic movement. The *Gurū Granth Sāhib*, the scripture of the Sikhs, compiled by Arjan in 1604, includes not only the compositions of Nānak and the succeeding *gurīs*, but also those of Nāndev, Kabīr and Ravidās and other *bhagats* (saints).

Nānak believed in One God, and saw an intensely personal relationship between Him and the devotee, who would penitently remember, serve and love Him and await His grace in return. God was formless and omnipresent and could not be represented in a physical form. Nānak strongly emphasized ethical conduct, and condemned arrogance of birth, caste and the cult of pollution by touch. The salvation to be aimed at was *urwān* or *sach khand*, the true abode, when man at last realizes God.

It is not clear to what extent Nānak gave an organizational form to his sect. But two processes appeared soon enough. First, a line of *gurīs*, or spiritual successors was established, who were seen as incarnations (*mahalla*) of the same perfect spirit; total obedience to the *Gurū* was expected from each disciple, the *Sikh-Gurū*, whence the abbreviated name Sikh. The second was the expansion of the sect among the Jats or peasants of the Panjab; the *Gurīs* were all Khatri, but their principal lieutenants, the *uansads*, were mostly Jats.

These two developments provided ground for a third, especially after the martyrdom of Gurū Arjan (1606): a conflict with the Mughal authorities and aspiration to military power by the *Gurīs*, reaching its apex under the tenth and last Gurū, Gobind Singh (1666–1708). He sought to weld his followers into a militant community by prescribing a common baptism for all and appointing the items everyone had to carry, that were part of the public bearing of a professional soldier of the time.

Immediately after Gobind Singh's death at Nander in the Deccan (1708), his disciple Banda came to the North and raised a massive plebeian rebellion, in which Sikhs and low-caste converts joined along with discontented *zamindārs*. The rebellion was ultimately suppressed, and Banda was executed (1716). A period of demoralization and division followed, but as Mughal power declined, the Sikh *dals* and *misals* (groups) grew, led by individual chiefs (*sardārs*), who organized troops of increasingly professional mounted musketeers. Many of the chiefs came from peasant or artisan stock, like their foremost leader at this time, Jassa Singh, originally a carpenter or wine-distiller. A semblance of unity in success was sought to be maintained by the tradition of an annual 'sabat *Khālṣa*' at Chak Gurū (Amaritsar); but dissensions grew apace, and each chief tended to carve out a separate territory for himself. The process was at last checked by Ranjit Singh (1780–1839), who established a traditional kingdom in the Panjab, ostensibly in the name of the *Khālṣa*.

Islam in India remained ideologically so closely linked to the main currents of Islamic thought transmitted through Arabic and Persian that it would not perhaps be wholly correct to speak of an 'Indian Islam'. Such specificities as arose from the Indian cultural and social environment were derived essentially from, first, a closer association with Persian than with Arabic, so that traditions established in Iran and Central Asia exercised greater influence than those in Arab countries. Second, the continued coexistence with Hinduism brought into focus the problem of assessing non-Muslim faiths and beliefs. Sufism or Muslim mysticism, with its 'chains' (*śūshlahs*) came from Iran and Central Asia, yet its votaries could not but observe a close parallel to 'ishq (love for God) in Indian *bhakti* (cf. Mujeeh, 1967; Ahmad, 1964).

A radical questioning and reshaping of belief began when sufism opened the doors to the quasi-pantheistic doctrines and speculations of Ibn al-'Arabī (d. Damascus, 1240). It may be justly held that Ibn al-'Arabī's views were a bold but logical elaboration of the sufi concept of communion with God (*ḥuṣṣā*). With him Separation, from being unnatural, became illusory, and the communion, from being the ultimate object, became the only eternal Reality. His doctrine made its way into India directly through his Arabic works and indirectly through the Persian poetry of Rūmī and Jāmī. By the latter half of the fourteenth century, the concept had begun to influence sufi circles, and, despite opposition, steadily gained adherents (Rizvi, 1965, pp. 43ff.). For a country like India, where coexistence with Hinduism was a reality, Ibn al-'Arabī's doctrines seemed to offer a persuasive explanation of diversity that rationalized as well as promoted a spirit of tolerance. Alongside this there was the proposition of the Perfect Man, in which Ibn al-'Arabī idealized the mystic guide (*sheikh*). This vision inevitably supplemented or reinforced the popular belief in *mahdī*, the reformer and redeemer coming in advance of the Day of Judgement. The two concepts could influence each other, and as the close of the first millennium of Islam drew near (AH 1000/AD 1592), they produced a millenary wave.

The Mahdawī movement was the first indication of the new intellectual turbulence. Saiyid Muḥammad of Jamnā (d. 1505), a well-travelled scholar, proclaimed himself Mahdī. The hope for redemption by following the Mahdī's message and his call for ethical conduct continued to win followers for his sect, which began to found communities (*dā'irās*) at various places. Theologians firelessly denounced them; Sheikh 'Alī, a notable Mahdawī, was executed at their instance by Islām Shāh in 1550. But the sect survived (Rizvi, 1965, pp. 68-134).

In the last quarter of the sixteenth century there arose a sect in Afghanistan with similar millenary tendencies, except that its founder Bāyazīd (Miyān Raushan) (d. 1585) claimed that he was a Prophet (*nabi*), and not a Mahdī, and received God's revelations through Gabriel. He emphasized strict ethics and, believing in a pantheistic mysticism, envisioned *ṣukūnat*, where the self merged with God. His followers, the Rāshanīyas, formed a militant sect among the Afghans, in whose language (Pushtu) one version of his Book *Khair-i Bayān* was composed. The militancy led to a long war with the Mughals during which the sect was suppressed.

The great upheaval in thought that was to come under Akbar (emperor, 1556-1605) had its origins partly at least in the same two intellectual impulses of pantheism and the Messiah-cult. Akbar's religious interests initially lay within traditional Islam. Then Sheikh Tājuddīn instructed him in the thought of Ibn al-'Arabī. Mubārak (d. 1593) gained influence too; and not only had he read Ibn al-'Arabī, but he had also been suspected of Mahdawī inclinations. Akbar himself could be seen as a reformer for the millennium. A major reflection of this concept was found in the *maḥzar* of 1579, a statement signed by leading Muslim theologians at the court, declaring Akbar to be a just Sultan, and as such holding his interpretation of Muslim law to be binding on all Muslims.

The growing influence of pantheism, however, soon took matters far beyond the rather modest and sectarian position assigned to the emperor in the *maḥzar*. The triumph of the pantheistic doctrine was greatly assisted by the discussions that took place before Akbar among representatives of various religions, at the *'ibādāt-khāna* (house of prayer) constructed

at Fatehpur Sikri in 1574-5. These discussions and debates, which, in their scope, were perhaps without precedent in history, involved Muslim divines, Sunnī and Shī'ī; ṣūfīs and rational scholars (*hakīms*); Brahmans, other Hindu recluses, Jains, Parsis and Christians (Jesuits), whose first mission reached the court in 1580. These discussions convinced Akbar that no single interpretation of Islam was correct and further that no single religion could alone be true. It was for him, as the chosen man of God, to assist in the universal realization of Absolute Peace (*Ṣulḥ-i Kul*) in order to prevent strife among the various sects. For a comprehension of this and the further belief that both 'religion and the world' were illusory, it was important to organize an élite corps of disciples (*ṣadāt-gazīnān*), for whom were prescribed total submission to the imperial preceptor and certain principles and mode of conduct. Akbar's principal spokesman was Mubārak's son, Abū'l Faḥl (1551-1602), who gives us the most authoritative statement of Akbar's beliefs in the *Ā'in-i Akbarī*. The term *Dīn-i Ilāhī* ('Divine Faith') used by some modern historians for Akbar's 'religion' has no sanction in any statement by Akbar or Abū'l Faḥl, and is an unlikely designation in itself since Akbar and his court-circle were not prepared to accept the reality of *dīn* (religion) at all.

The policy of equal treatment of all religions (as distinct from a simple policy of tolerance) that Akbar enforced, permitting freedom of religious expression, conversion and construction of places of worship for all, was a logical consequence of his mature religious views. It was, perhaps, again a policy for which it was not easy to find a parallel in the contemporary world - a fact underlined with great pride by Akbar's son, Jahāngīr. But it would be equally valid to argue that pantheism was essentially not the cause, but the rationalization of a measure whose political utility was constantly borne upon him. After all, from early in his reign Akbar had embarked on the induction of a large Hindu element in his nobility and bureaucracy. Abū'l Faḥl says, indeed, that sovereignty partakes of 'divine light', and the sovereign, like God, is *patem* to all humanity; it is therefore his function to ensure that 'out of differences of religion, there does not arise the dust of antipathy.'

Akbar's promotion of pantheism left a deep imprint on Islamic thought in India. Externally, it initiated a movement among Muslims for the study of Brahmanical texts and of Vedānta. Akbar initiated a series of translations of Sanskrit works, among which the religious literature included the *Atharva-veda*, the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. In the *Ā'in-i Akbarī*, Abū'l Faḥl was able to give a fairly cogent and accurate description of the various Hindu systems of philosophy, theology and law, based on a fresh scrutiny of the texts through translations made 'after much difficulty'. It once again exhibited the common ground found between Islam and Hinduism, by locating the presence of monotheism in the latter; and there is a greater appreciation of the logic of the *Karma* doctrine. With Jahāngīr comes the definite identification of Vedānta with *taṣawwuf* (mysticism), presumably because both were now pantheistic.

Islam's recognition of Hinduism reached its culmination in Prince Dārā Shukoh (1615-59). Dārā began his intellectual career with an ever-growing immersion in Muslim mysticism through attachment to the Qādiriya order of Miān Mīr (d. 1635). From here his interest shifted to Vedānta, marked, first, by the composition (1654-5) of the *Majma' 'al-Bahrain* ('the mingling of two oceans') in which he explains the major terms and concepts used in Hindu spiritual discourse. He had the *Yogarāśishṭha* translated in 1655. In 1657 came what

was, from the philosophical point of view, the most important effort; a Persian translation of fifty-two *Upanishads*, under the title *Sinm-i Asnā*, the Great Secret.

Indicative of the spirit of the times is the *Dalāyat-nā-i Maṣūbīh*, written c.1653 by 'Mohaḍ'. He set out to give a truthful, unbiased account of all religions, and so deals in his work with the Parsis, Hindus, Buddhists (Tibetan), Jews, Christians and Muslims, along with different sects within each religious tradition. His linguistic equipment was considerable; and it is doubtful whether a work of this quality and sweep existed in any other language at this time.

The freedom of religious discussion accorded to all under Akbar undoubtedly assisted in the transformation of Shī'ism from a 'heresy' into a recognized variant of Islam in India. Qāzi Nūrullāh Shustarī (1549–1610) was the first *ḥunā* 'Asharī Shī'ī theologian in India to have left important writings. Disdaining *taqiyya* (dissimulation), expressly on account of freedom accorded under Akbar, he openly defended Shī'ī positions against Sunni criticisms. He died in 1610 and is considered a Shī'ī martyr. Though the details of the incident are obscure, it was not a part of any persecution of the Shī'īs (Rizvi, 1965, pp. 314–23). Immigrants from Iran, who were mostly Shī'īs, held high offices in the Mughal empire; and Shī'ī observances were publicly held. Haidarabad in the Deccan in the sixteenth century and Lucknow and Faizabad in North India in the eighteenth, became important centres of Shī'ī learning.

Orthodoxy responded in various ways to challenges from the free airing of views hitherto thought to be unacceptably heterodox. How complex the responses could be is shown by the ideas of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindī (1564–1624). His strong attachment to the Sharī'a was displayed in his hostility to Akbar's policies of tolerance and in his bitter opposition to Hindus and Shī'īs. He became (1600) a disciple of the Naqshbandī mystic Bāqī Billāh (d. 1603); and from this point onwards he was increasingly concerned with Ibn al-'Arabī's theories of Unity of Existence and the Perfect Man. He contested the ultimate truth of the first; but the second was fully incorporated in his concept of the *qaiyūm* ('the maintainer'). As possessor of gnosis (*ʿirfān*), the *qaiyūm* attains a function assigned previously to prophets. This function is identified with yet another – the rejuvenation of Islam, which takes place at the hands of a renovator (*mujaḥḥid*) of the second millennium. It was clear to his disciples that both the offices of *qaiyūm* and *mujaḥḥid* were united in Sheikh Ahmad himself (Friedmann, 1971). Predictably these ideas invited criticism and suspicion; and Jahāngīr had Sirhindī briefly imprisoned (1619).

There was by the side of an essentially mystical revivalism, a restatement of the orthodox position in terms of the Islam of Ghazālī's conception, a combination of Law (*Sharī'a*) and Mysticism (*Tarīqa*). The restatement was by definition unoriginal, though much learning and care often went into it. 'Abdul Haqq Muhakkidī (1551–1642) was a prolific writer on Muslim Law and the Prophet's sayings. Yet he fully accepted the sufi tradition, being the author of a volume of biographies of Indian mystics; and he inherited from his father a sympathy for Ibn al-'Arabī's theories and for even Kabīr (Rizvi, 1965, pp. 151–75).

Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1659–1707) generally supported traditional and legal Islam. This was particularly shown by his commissioning of the massive work *Fatāwā-i 'Ālaḥgīrī*, prepared in Arabic by Sheikh Nizām with the assistance of many scholars and designed to be a comprehensive compendium of jurists' opinions on detailed matters, carefully arranged by subjects.

The decline of the Mughal Empire brought forth an important Muslim thinker and jurist, Shāh Walīullāh (1702–62). He was undoubtedly exceptional in reflecting on oppression of peasants and craftsmen as factors behind the decline of the empire. He therefore linked the enforcement of the various elements of the Sharī'a to particular social needs, though these were rather naively formulated. On other matters such as Shī'īs, he took an orthodox position, translating Sirhindī's polemical anti-Shī'ī tract into Arabic; and he was fairly harsh on non-Muslims who were to be the hewers of wood and drawers of water under a *Sharī'a* regime. He accepted the sufi heritage of Islam and claimed to be a spiritual guide (*murshid*) himself. He propounded an 'inspired' reconciliation of Ibn al-'Arabī's pantheism with Sirhindī's theory and like the latter, claimed to receive divine enlightenment (*kashf*) (Rizvi, 1982). Shāh Walīullāh and his son 'Abdul 'Azīz (1746–1824) and their writings were held in great esteem by the Indian 'Wahhābīs', who in the nineteenth century were to play such an important role in the resistance to British rule.

The sixteenth century saw the arrival of Catholic Christianity in India. Syrian Christian and Jewish communities had long lived on the Kerala coast, the Red Sea trade keeping their contacts with eastern Christendom and Judaism alive. With the arrival of the Portuguese, Catholic missionary activity began, especially under Francis Xavier (1506–52). Another Jesuit, Robert de Nobili (1577–1656), tried the innovation of presenting Christianity in an Indian garb. Much use was made by the Jesuits of the printing-press and literature in Indian languages. Goa became an archdiocese in 1557. The decline of Portuguese power adversely affected Catholic activity, and in 1653 a number of Syrian Christian communities in Kerala returned to their older allegiance to Antioch. The first Lutheran missionaries, under Danish patronage, arrived in 1706 at Tranquebar (Tamilnadu), and Ziegenhals translated the four Gospels into Tamil in 1714.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The dominant scientific tradition in India during the sixteenth century was the Graeco-Arabic one. Its dominant branches were Astronomy (with Mathematics and Geography as necessary appendages) and Medicine. The Sanskrit sciences also continued to be pursued, and at the court of Emperor Akbar (1556–1605), there was a conscious attempt to study them. In Abū'l Faḍl's *Ā'in-i Akbarī* (c.1595–6), the last portion was devoted to a survey of Indian sciences, comparable in width, if not in depth, with Alberuni's great description some 550 years earlier.

In a celebrated passage Abū'l Faḍl lists the following subjects, which Akbar prescribed for scholars to learn at school: ethics, arithmetic, accountancy, agriculture, mensuration, geometry, astronomy, geonancy, household management, art of government, medicine, logic, physical sciences, mathematics, knowledge of the divine and history; and 'Indian sciences', namely, *Vyākaran*, *Nyāya*, *Vedānta*, and *Putanījali* (grammar, logic, Vedāntic philosophy and yoga). Although Abū'l Faḍl claims that these subjects reinvigorated the *madrasas* (schools), there is no evidence that all of these were in fact taught together anywhere. The *madrasas* continued to be concerned principally with Muslim theology and its vast literature. Sciences like astronomy and medicine, though essentially transmitted through texts, were probably passed down in families or taught by individual practitioners to assistants or pupils.

By the sixteenth century direct access to the Greek works, even in Arabic translations, seems to have become fairly limited. Yet Abū'l Faḡl does claim knowledge of these texts, and Ptolemy and Galen remained the fundamental authorities for astronomy and medicine. Thomas Roe in 1616 recognized that 'the moulas' at the Mughal court 'knew somewhat in Philosophy and Mathematicks, are great Astrologers, and can talk of Aristotle, Euclide, Averroes, and other Authors'. What is of much interest is the positive impulse that was now given to scientific effort.

In the field of botany and zoology, this is manifest in the observation and experimentation that marked Jahāngīr's interest in these subjects. Abū'l Faḡl paid much attention to technological devices (thus his very important descriptions of distillation processes, including that of liquor distillation). His interest in geography, as manifested in the very careful account of the different provinces of the Mughal Empire, continued a tradition already strong in Islamic learning. But the close attention he paid to statistics of all kinds is remarkable. In the *ʿĀ'in-i-Akbarī* we do not simply have sundry figures, but extensive tabulations of prices, wages, revenue-rates, assessed area, total revenues, censuses of armed retainers, horses and elephants, and so on; there seems to have been no precedent for such presentation of statistics on this scale in India. Considerable attention was now given to mathematics and astronomy. Faḡhullāh Shīrāzī (d. 1588), a Persian immigrant, was asked by Akbar to devise an accurate solar calendar, the *ilākī*, which was proclaimed by decree in 1584 (Alvi and Rahman, 1968).

The seventeenth century did not fulfil the promise, held out in Akbar's reign (1556–1605), of the development of scientific interests. By and large, science continued to be confined to traditional limits without much innovation. A noteworthy achievement was Šādiq Isfahānī's atlas (compiled, Jaipur, 1647) of the eastern hemisphere, in thirty-three sheets, based on a simple non-perspective cylindrical projection. But these sheets did not show any European influence, and even at the Mughal Court, Mercator's *Maps of the World* presented to Jahāngīr in 1617 failed to elicit any interest (Habib, 1977, pp. 122–34).

A similar lack of response was shown to European medicine and surgery. Indian medicine of the Graeco-Arabic tradition (*Tibb-i Yūnānī*) was almost identical in its practice with contemporary Persian medicine, there being a continuous influx of physicians from Iran into India. Āyurvedic medicine had long been recognized as a parallel and effective system. It seems that there was a tendency to regard European medicine too in a similar light. Dānishmand Khān, the scholarly Mughal noble, had François Bernier at Delhi (1659–66) explain to him at length Harvey's and Jean Pacquet's discoveries. But despite Dānishmand Khān's display of curiosity, and the repute of European medicine-men, there does not seem to have been any attempt to adopt any element of European medical practice in the *tibb* tradition, beyond a certain amount of interest in new drugs introduced by the Europeans (cf. Pearson, 1989).

In many ways the astronomical work of Sawāi Jai Singh (d. 1743), a noble at the Mughal court and the ruler of Amber, reflected the best in Indian science and also its essential weaknesses. He built observatories at Delhi, Jaipur, Ujjain, Marwar and Varanasi. Here large masonry 'instruments' were set up on the assumption that the smaller wooden or metallic ones like astrolabes gave too large a margin of error (Kaye, 1918). He learnt of the accuracy of European observation, obtained de La Hire's tables (from which he

reproduced a refraction table) and also used a telescope. The results of his observations were recorded in his major work *Zīj-i Muḥammadshāhī*, 1734. But the fame of Jai Singh's universe remained firmly Aristotelian and Ptolemaic. He was so little concerned with fundamentals that in his own work he often borrows whole passages from Ulugh Beg's *zīj*, (1437–8). The complete ignorance of the Copernican theory raises the question whether the main thrust of his effort was only to determine the correct moments of particular positions of the heavenly bodies, which suggests an astrological preoccupation, rather than a purely scientific one.

In India's premodern age, technology was either outside the acceptable domain of the scientist, or just on the fringe of it, where he could dabble in alchemy or fanciful devices. It is, therefore, not surprising that the number of inventions or improvements in production technology which could be ascribed to scientists in Mughal India is fairly small.

Among such few inventions those based on gear-wheels may be mentioned first. In the earlier years of the sixteenth century Bābur had described the method of water-lift based on pin-drum gearing. It is frequently pictured by Mughal painters. Pin-drum gearing of this sort was the central mechanical device in some interesting inventions that are ascribed to Akbar's wisdom by the official historian, but were perhaps partly the product of the ingenuity of Faḡhullāh Shīrāzī. There were built a machine for cleaning a number of gun-barrels simultaneously, and also a wagon-mill; and a complicated system of water-lift by series of gear-wheels was installed at Fatehpur Sikri by Akbar himself. Akbar also invented the device of cooling water by the use of saltpetre, henceforth a common Indian practice. The royal inventiveness extended to musketry, a hand-gun being produced in Akbar's arsenal, in which the movement of the trigger produced a discharge of the pellet, without use of the match (a wheel-lock?). A singular invention was that of ship's camel, as early as 1596, to take a seagoing ship built at Lahore down the river to the sea (Habib, 1992).

In the same reign and in the next century, grafting seems to have been much promoted by the Court, thereby enabling sweet cherry to be brought to Kashmir, and improving the quality of oranges in the Indian plains (Habib, 1980a, p. 5).

Some important mechanical devices are noticed for the first time in our period, but without any claim for their invention being made by anyone: most of them were almost certainly adopted or diffused by unknown craftsmen.

Pre-eminent among these was the screw, in its Indian form, described 1666, made by wire-soldering, and not through cutting grooves. Another tool described about the same time, was a manually driven double-wheel belt-drill for cutting diamonds, a replacement at last of the classical bow-drill (Habib, 1980a, pp. 27–8; 1980b, pp. 33–4).

In civil engineering the ability to construct bulbous domes (reaching the acme of success in the famous Taj Mahal), marked a notable advance in the state of skill (imported from Central Asia, but further improved) in arcuate construction. In shipbuilding there was a veritable revolution during the seventeenth century, the old seagoing 'junks' being replaced by vessels successfully modelled after Dutch and English ships (Habib, 1980a, pp. 13–15).

There is little to support the suggestion that cloth-printing arrived in India during the seventeenth century. It seems, on the contrary, that it was a much older industry in India, and that it was from India in this century that it went in the reverse direction, carrying to Iran the Hindī terms for printing and printed cloth (*dhāpā/dhāp* and *dhūnt/dhūt*). The English

textile-printing industry of the eighteenth century also in the beginning had Indian textile-printing for its model (Habib, 1985, pp. 217–20).

All this is noteworthy; but when one looks at what was happening to European technology during the same period one cannot fail to recognize the slow pace of technological change in India. Illustrations of stagnation are legion. Agricultural tools continued to be the same, made almost entirely of wood, with the most sparing use of iron; only the further diffusion of water-lift by geared wheels and sugar-milling by wooden rollers probably represented some amount of change in certain areas.

In metallurgy, the lack of ability to produce cast iron, attributable to a failure to develop bellows of sufficient power, remained an obvious drawback. Owing to a similar lack of ability to harness animal power for driving cutting tools, Indians could not produce strong screws, nuts and bolts and metal gear-wheels. Mechanical clocks could not therefore be manufactured. All this had effect even on artillery, in whose development the state was usually keenly interested. It would seem that throughout the seventeenth and even early eighteenth century the matchlock remained the common weapon in Indian armies (Habib, 1980a, pp. 16–32).

In civil engineering, despite the scale and brilliant design of many Mughal buildings, there was persistence with traditional prejudice: thus the view that the pier-width and arch-span should be nearly equal dominated bridge-building, although European engineers had much earlier seen the futility of such broad piers.

The lack of interest in the printing-press has long been cited as one example of the Indian inability to accept a momentous invention which could have had far-ranging consequences for Indian culture. One can hardly enlarge on the baneful consequences of this failure.

It could possibly be said that some of the hesitation to accept technological innovation arose out of the existence of cheap skilled labour in India. But it is difficult altogether to ignore the possibility that the ideological factor, producing a lack of sense of curiosity in matters of science and mechanics, had also much to do with India's failure to keep abreast of Europe in that critical area.

FINE ARTS

The most visible contribution to Indian culture and to world art that the Mughals in India made was in the realm of architecture (Brown, 1968, chs xvii–xxi; Koch, 1991; Asher, 1992). The combination of scale and detail was breath-taking and has seldom been surpassed. In its technique and design, Mughal architecture drew on various elements. Much was continued from the Sultanate architecture, with its insistence on arch, dome and vault. In addition, however, the Mughals drew liberally upon the so-called provincial styles, that is, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Malwa, Sharqi and Bengal. Finally, there were the new fashions of architecture brought from Central Asia and Iran, symbolized by the bulbous dome, *pietra dura* work, the rectangular garden and a love for flowing water. But Mughal architecture was not just a synthesis; perhaps the most fascinating of its features was its spirit of experimentation and innovation. Akbar's palace-city of Fatehpur Sikri is a brilliant exhibition of this: here by simultaneously playing with arcuate and trabeate forms are created buildings of great artistic charm and beauty. The Taj Mahal, the greatest Mughal monument, encompasses

practically every architectural virtue that the Mughals had for long sought and now finally achieved (see Plate 103).

After the building activity at Agra and Delhi of the first two Mughal rulers, Bābur (1526–30) and Humāyūn (1530–56), there was the brief but rich interlude of the Śūr dynasty (1540–56), in which the Purānī Qil'a at Delhi and the tombs at Sahasrām (Bihar) were built. These were mainly in the tradition of the 'Afghan' phase of Sultanate architecture, though the surrounding of the mausoleum by a large tank, as at Sahasrām, was an interesting innovation.

Mughal architecture found its first true representative in the tomb of Humāyūn at Delhi (built, c. 1564), a domed building with kiosks and cupolas (*dihātīs*) set on a large platform, and surrounded by a rectangular walled garden, which is served by straight, criss-crossing water courses. Almost simultaneously Akbar was rebuilding the fort at Agra and finding in red sandstone his principal material. At Fatehpur Sikri, laid out chiefly in the 1570s, red sandstone again predominates; but neither the material nor civil engineering seems to set limits to the artistic conception here. His effort to synthesize the arcuate with the trabeate was probably not due to any conscious desire at reconciling the 'Muslim' with the 'Hindu' style, recognized as such. Essentially the reason was aesthetic: variety attracted him, not uniformity; by setting differently conceived structures in loose symmetry, he created a masterpiece. The great mosque, dominated by the greatest of Mughal gateways, the Buland Darwaza, sets the alignment for the extensive palace-complex with many courtyards and tanks. The river Utangan was dammed to provide water which was lifted by water-wheels and taken to the complex and to its tanks by aqueducts.

Akbar's own mausoleum at Sikandra, near Agra, innovative again with its storeys of colonnades and a marble top storey, was completed under his son Jahāngīr (1605–27). The use of marble now became more popular, and the exquisite tomb of 'Īmānuddaula (d. 1622) at Agra, showing much Persian influence, is an important representative of the transition.

The tomb that Shāhjahān (1628–58) built for his wife, Mumtāz Mahal, at Agra, has now become known all over the world as 'Taj Mahal'. Set on the bank of the Yamuna, it was made part of a carefully planned minor city, with shops and a caravanserai, all arranged on a strictly geometrical, rectangular pattern. The main building is flanked by two buildings in red sandstone, which as well as the monumental gateway, are noteworthy in their own right. The water-channel and pathway from the gate to the tomb, with the park around, are essential to the beauty of the whole. We have then the marble structure itself, with its large platform, four free-standing minarets at each of its corners, the great bulbous dome rising in the centre over a large front, the latter representing a Mughal recessed gateway, and four subordinate cupolas which keep their place by not rising above the base of the dome. Its *pietra dura* work, the rare semi-precious stones used in it, and the exquisite marble carving drew on the skills of many craftsmen.

Shāhjahān also built extensively within the Agra fort. But it is his buildings at Delhi which, perhaps a little unfairly, tend to draw away our attention from his work there. The Red Fort and the Jāmi' Masjid at Delhi were part of a large planned city, Shāhjahānabad, which was walled around before it was fully built. The Jāmi' Masjid is undoubtedly the greatest of the Mughal mosques and displays that judicious mixture of marble with sandstone and the care for proportion, which mark all of Shāhjahān's work.

The long reign of Aurangzeb (1659–1707) saw much building activity, but of little importance in the history of

architectural style. The two buildings of note are his Badshahi mosque at Lahore, and the tomb of Rābī'a Daurānī at Aurangabad, the latter a conscious copy of the Taj Mahal.

Mughal architecture is not to be judged only by the buildings we have mentioned. Srinagar, Lahore, Ajmer, Allahabad and Raj Mahal have important monuments from Akbar's reign alone. Moreover, the buildings of the Mughal style are not confined merely to forts, palaces, mosques and tombs.

The temple of Govind-dev at Vrindaban, near Mathura, built in 1590 by Akbar's noble Mān Singh is fully in the Mughal style, the massive building domed and vaulted, the main hall in the form of a cross with galleries set above, curiously like a church. The influence of Mughal style in temple-construction, is also manifest in Bīr Singh's temple of Chatuthhuj built in Jahāngīr's reign (1605-27).

The Mughals built many bridges, notably the great bridge over the Gomati river at Jampur (1568-9), and also numerous caravanserais, which were massive rectangular structures with courtyards, verandahs and cells (see Plate 104). The Mughals' greatest feat in civil engineering seems to have been the West Yamuna Canal, built by Shāhjahān. Over 150 miles in length, it ran through deep cuts and over massive masonry aqueducts to provide water to Delhi from a level much above that of the Yamuna there.

The Mughals naturally attracted imitations of their architecture. The most successful were the rulers of Amber, who built the palace-complex at Amber (seventeenth century) and the new city of Jaipur (eighteenth century), in eastern Rajasthan.

The splendor of Mughal architecture should not make us forget the architecture of the Deccan Sultanates during their last phase (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The famous Chār Minār at Hyderabad (built, 1591) is a triumphal gateway with four sides and four openings, surmounted by storeys of colonnades, and four massive towers at each corner (see Plate 105). At Bijapur the Gol Gumbad, the tomb of Muḥammad 'Adil Shāh (d. 1656), manages to achieve the largest true dome in India without spoiling the proportions of the building. For South Indian architecture of the entire Vijayanagara period, see vol. IV.

Painting is the other realm in which the Mughals have won international recognition. Mughal miniature painting, done mainly on paper, was in the beginning a branch of Persian art, with its emphasis on the line, precision of detail and deliberate eschewing of perspective. Its first two masters, 'Abdu's Samad and Mīr Sayyid 'Alī, came to India with Humāyūn, on his return in 1555-6.

Out of this Persian core, Akbar created a new and vibrant school, by establishing a large atelier that undertook the illustration of the *Hamzanāma* in the 1560s. This work was followed by the illustration of a number of other manuscripts throughout his reign; and, for this, painters were recruited from various parts of India, so that influences of the existing indigenous schools of Malwa, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Gwalior and Kashmir began to be reflected. At the same time the virtue of detailed work, the glory of Persian art, was rigorously retained. Of the painters, Abū'l Faḍl gives us a list, praising especially the brilliance of Daswant; and the written ascriptions on the miniatures in the surviving manuscript volumes introduce us to many more. Composite paintings, where portraits are drawn by one painter, the rest by another – sometimes even three painters are involved – is a particular feature of Akbar's atelier. The emphasis on realism (in portraiture as well as in scenic or historical detail) seems to have emanated from Akbar himself almost from the beginning.

In his later years, Akbar also became interested in European painting; and not only were Christian themes introduced, but other features of Renaissance painting found their way into Mughal art, notably, realism in proportion and perspective.

Jahāngīr's reign in many ways marked the apex of Mughal painting. The main vehicle of painting shifted from illustrated manuscripts to albums and individual portraits. Jahāngīr was especially interested in the portraits of individuals and the depictions of birds and animals, trees and flowers. In the latter sphere, Maṣūm was the master. How far Mughal painting could succeed in evoking feeling is shown by the *Portrait of a Dying Man*, drawn by an anonymous painter commissioned by Jahāngīr (see Plate 106).

Under Shāhjahān (1628-59), and particularly under the patronage of Dārā Shukoh, Mughal painting reached its full maturity, though it undoubtedly lost in volume of output and effusiveness. Bichitr's *Blind Singers*, showing ordinary men in an ordinary wayside scene, is undoubtedly one of the masterpieces of Mughal art, its realism reminding one so powerfully of Renaissance painting, while the attention given to the minutest detail is in the classical Mughal tradition (see Plate 107).

It is not correct to say that the Mughal painters confined themselves to scenes of battles, hunting, sessions and celebrations of the Imperial Court, and assemblies of religious men. Yet these undoubtedly do account for a large number of Mughal miniatures. Like Persian painting, Mughal painting was essentially secular, being intended not for the devout, but for the cultured. (On Mughal painting, see Brown, 1924; Beach, 1992; Venna, 1994.)

As the influence of court painting spread, through ateliers of nobles and the imitating free-lance 'bazaar' painters, it ultimately (eighteenth century) threw off branches in the form of provincial styles, with uneven results (the Patna School, the Awadh School and so on). In Rajasthan and the Western Himalayas, the Rajput and Pahari schools came into existence, in which devotional painting, especially depicting *Krishna līlās*, became increasingly prominent.

Finally, Indian classical music entered a richly productive phase in the Mughal period. The theory of Indian music, as given in Sanskrit texts, was well understood: Abū'l Faḍl gives a summary of it in the *Ā'in-i Akbarī*, and he records the names of thirty-six masters, of both vocal and instrumental music, employed by Akbar: the great Tansen was one of them. *Dhrupad* was the favoured composition and Nāyak Bakhshū (fl. 1520) was its recognized master. By early sixteenth century, the *khayāl* had also evolved, permitting much greater freedom for improvisation.

LITERATURE

Literature in Persian and Sanskrit, being those of languages which ordinary people did not speak anywhere in India, belonged exclusively to High Culture, and may, therefore, be conveniently considered separately from literatures in the spoken languages.

Persian was not only the language of higher administration in the Mughal Empire and the Deccan Sultanates, but had also spread to the courts of the Rajput states. Even when it was not directly used, its vocabulary and idiom heavily influenced the language of official records, as may be seen from seventeenth century official documents in Rajasthani and Marathi. There is no doubt that Persian came also to affect literary traditions of many Indian languages: a new

language, Urdu, with its rich literature, sprang from the interaction of Persian with Hindi dialects.

The Indian contribution to Persian lexicography included Injū's *Farhang-i Jahāngīrī* (1608-9) and 'Abdu'r Rashīd's *Farhang-i Rashīdī* (1653-4). Tek Chand 'Bahār'sī *Bulbūr-i 'Ajam* (1739-40, revised, 1749) is perhaps the most authoritative of all pre-modern Persian dictionaries; 'Bahār' quotes poets and prose-works, arranged in a historical order, under each article to establish sense and altered usage down to his own times.

Among Indian prose-writers, Abū'l Fazl (1551-1602) is the dominant figure. Author of majestic and highly ornate prose which is constantly rescued from triteness by provocative reflection, Abū'l Fazl was long recognized as the model for anyone affecting a style. Today he is held in esteem far more for the content of his work, his painstakingly compiled history of Akbar (in the *Akbar-nāma*) and his description of Mughal administration, the Mughal Empire and the cultural tradition of India (in the *Ā'in-i Akbarī*). Of the *Akbar-nāma* there were imitations, notably, the imperial histories of Shāhjahān's reign (Lāhorī and Wāriṣ, *Pādshāh-nāma*) and the first decade of Aurangzēbi's reign (Muḥammad Kāzīm, *Ālimgīr-nāma*). Of the *Ā'in-i Akbarī* there were simply no imitations; no-one apparently had the same encompassing interest in science, statistics, geography and culture.

A separate genre was added to historiography with the *Memoirs of Bābur* (d. 1530), originally in Chaghatay Turkī (in which it barely survived), but made a part of Persian literature with Abdu'r Rahīm's literal translation (1588-9). Jahāngīr's memoirs (covering the period 1605-23) match Bābur's in simplicity of style, frankness and interest in natural history and arts, but, of course, lack the romance inherent in Bābur's adventures. Detailed regional histories, of which Mīr Ma'gūm's history of Sind (1599-1600) and 'Alī Muḥammad Khān's history of Gujārat (*Mīrāt-i Ahmadi*, 1761) are the best representatives, comprised yet another class. Then, there were general histories of India, of which Nizāmuddīn Ahmad's *Tahqīq-i Akbarī* (1592-3) became the model. Muḥammad Qāsim Firīshṭa's *Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī* (1606-7, revised, 1609-10), was a compilation from varied and carefully collected sources, and deservedly acquired a high reputation. 'Abdul Qādir Badā'ūn's *Muntakhbat Tawārīkh* (1596), formally belonging to this class, is important for its very lively though partisan criticism of Akbar and his policies. Finally, there were biographies, especially collections of biographies of nobles, scholars, poets and religious divines. The greatest work of this kind compiled in India is undoubtedly Shāh-nawāz Khān's *Mu'āzzin-i Umamī*, a massive biographical dictionary of Mughal nobility, begun in 1742 and completed in 1768-9.

Religious literature constitutes a large portion of what was written in Persian in India, but for this reference may be made to the section on Religion in this chapter.

The Indian contribution to Persian poetry continued to be important, though perhaps not spectacular. In spite of the attempt to keep to the standard style of classical Persian, it was inevitable that poetry in India should be influenced by Indian words and idioms and even ideas. 'Urī (d. 1590) and Faizī (d. 1595) obtained considerable recognition outside India: 'Urī's lyrics and narrative verse (*maghnawī*) met with particular acclaim. Faizī was admired for his difficult constructions and florid style, but the present-day critic is perhaps more attracted by his adoption of an Indian tale, *Nal-Damayan*, for composing a *maghnawī*. The poet Šā'ih (d. 1677-8), who lived for many years in India before returning to Iran, must be shared between the two countries.

There is little reason for the belief that Sanskrit literature retreated to the south owing to 'Muslim rule'. There was considerable output in that language within the limits of the Mughal Empire. Much of Sanskrit writing continued to be in the religious sphere, and we have already referred to many works of this period written in it on religious philosophy and law. In other fields too, there was a sizeable amount of composition. A 'voluminous writer', Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa (c. 1700) wrote a commentary on Kaiyata's commentary on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the great ancient text on Sanskrit grammar.

On poetics Shāhjahān's court poet Jagannātha Paṇḍita wrote his monumental *Rasagūṇidhara*; he redefined poetry as 'sound expressing a sense which is the object of a contemplation producing transcendental pleasure' (Keith, 1920, p. 397).

A species of literature which continued to find practitioners was historical *kāvya* or poetry. The rather pedestrian continuations of Kalhaṇa's great metrical history of Kashmir closed with Prājya Bhaṭṭa and Suka's *Rājāvalīpanīkī*, late in Akbar's reign. The court panegyrists of the Mughals as well as of Rajput and Marāṭhā rulers also went on writing in the same rather decadent though classical tradition.

Tales, fables and legends continued to be composed in Sanskrit. Ballālasena (sixteenth century) wrote a collection of 'witty' legends about King Bhoja's court in the *Bhojaprabandha*. In the next century Nārāyaṇa composed the metrical *Svāhāsudhākanṭhanuṇī* describing the idyllic loves of the fire-god Agni's wife Svāhā and the Moon. The science of sexual love had its representative too in Kalyāṇamalla's *Anuṅgarāga* (sixteenth century).

Scientific literature in Sanskrit was enriched by works transmitting Graeco-Arabic sciences. Akbar's astronomer, Nilakaṇṭha, wrote the *Tājikanīlakṣaṇṭhī*, an astrological treatise (1587). In 1643 Vedāngaraya compiled the *Pīrāsī-prākāśh*, a Persian-Sanskrit glossary of astronomical terms. In early eighteenth century, enjoying the patronage of Sawāi Jai Singh, Samratā Jagannātha translated into Sanskrit Ptolemy's *Ahmagest*, and Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, from their Arabic or Persian versions.

Our period saw the maturing of the literatures of a large number of spoken languages. Modern literary Hindi began to evolve out of dialects which first developed their own literatures. These comprised verses of a popular character like the verses of Kabīr with their pithy monotheistic message (c. 1500); but for the more literary tastes there was the metrical romance *Padmāvat* of Malik Muḥammad Jāyasī (c. 1540). Both were in the Awadhī dialect. So too Tulsīdās's *Rāmcharitmānas* (c. 1570), a literary, devotional and immensely popular version of the *Rāmāyaṇa* epic. In the Western Hindi dialect of Braj, we have, on the one hand, the popular devotional lyrics on Kṛishṇa and his dalliances, by Śrīdās (c. 1550), and, on the other, the highly literary poems of Akbar's noble Abdu'r Rahīm (fl. 1600) and the *Sar'sai* of Bihārī Lāl (1662). Hindi itself acquired its standard literary prose at the hands of two men, Sadāsukhlāl (fl. 1780) and Inshā Allāh Khān 'Inshā' (d. 1818), the latter also an Urdu poet who employed Hindi prose to write on secular themes.

In the closely related language, Panjabi, the verses of Nānak (fl. 1520) and the *gnāns* who succeeded him, were collected into the *Gurū Granth Sāhib* by Arjan (d. 1606). The secular literary tradition in Panjabi possibly saw its greatest achievement in Wāriṣ Shāh's tragic romance, *Hir-Ranjha* (eighteenth century).

The Mughal court and armies tended to bring together people speaking various Hindi dialects, and out of an

admixture of these (including Panjabi), a common language of the camp and bazar came to be created. Urdu may be said to have evolved when verses in this mixed language began to be composed in literary forms borrowed from Persian. This attempt was first made in the Deccan Sultanates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of this 'Dakhinī' style Muḥammad Qulī Qūsh Shāh (d. 1612) was a notable figure. The transformation of this into standard Urdu reputedly began with the arrival of the Gujarati-born poet 'Wali' at Delhi (1723). The language now flowered in the satirical verses of 'Saudī' (d. 1780–c) and the lyrics of 'Mīr' (d. 1810). These poets drew on the entire imagery of Persian literature as well as its tradition of scepticism, and began to give to Urdu a certain rigour in idiom and words; in course of time this effort made its own contribution to that substratum of common speech (outside of the various dialects) which both literary Hindi (in Devanagari script) and Urdu (in Arabic script) share and draw upon. (Saksena, 1940.)

The known history of Kashmiri literature begins with the verses of Habībā Khānūn (fl. 1600), a village girl and the wife of an exiled ruler of Kashmir. Similarly, Pushtu, the language of the Afghan people, was first treated as a vehicle for the written word when Bāyazīd Raishan (fl. 1580) wrote his religious text *Khairi'ī Bayān* in that language. In the next century Khwush-lāl Khatak (fl. 1670), a Mughal official turned rebel, became one of the great poets of Pushtu and a symbol, later, of the Afghan spirit of independence.

Bengali literature can be traced to a time well before the sixteenth century, but there is no doubt that it received its major impulses now. Brindāvandās's *Chaitanyamanṅgal* (c. 1540) is a long narrative poem about a semi-divine religious figure, described in lyrical terms. Kṛṣṇadās Kavirāj's *Chaitanyacharitamṛta* (c. 1595) is a biography and compendium of Vaiṣṇava faith. Much poetry was produced on the loves of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, especially in a variant of Bengali called Brajbūli. Of his last Govinddās Kavirāj (fl. 1600) was a notable master.

The Śaivite tradition contributed to Bengali literature in the shape of Mukundram Chakravarti's great narrative poem *Chandimangal* (c. 1589). About 1649 Rūprām composed an autobiographical poem, the *Dharmamangal*. Rāmeshwar Bhattacharya's *Śivasankīrtan* is a remarkable poem in which god Śiva appears not as Lord but as a poor peasant. Bharatchandra Ray (d. 1760), a versatile poet, introduced the historical romance into Bengali with his *Mahāsukha*; and his erotic romance *Vidyasundarī* enjoyed much influence. He freely used Persian and Hindi words and idioms (Sen, 1960).

In the related language, Assamese, there were two notable developments, the Vaiṣṇavite *bhakti* poetry inaugurated by Śankaradeva (d. 1548) and the adoption of the tradition of *buranjis*, or historical chronicles, from the immigrant Ahom language (related to Thai). In Orīya (of Orissa), there was a continuation of the tradition of Purāṇic *kāvya*, or poems narrating legends, and a growth of *bhakti* poetry. Rāmachandra Patnaik (c. 1600) wrote *Hunarali*, a metrical romance where the hero and heroine came from the ranks of ordinary people.

Gujarati had in Bhalan (d. 1554) a writer who by his translation of Bāṇa's *Kādambarī* emphasized allegiance to classical Sanskrit; he also composed devotional songs on Kṛṣṇa and his amours. His contemporary Mīrābhāī was the authoress of devotional songs in Gujarati, Rajasthani and Braj, while Narasittha Mehta wrote devotional poetry in a more philosophical strain. Akho (d. 1674) expounded Advaita philosophy in his *Akheṭita*. But perhaps the most outstanding Gujarati poet was Premānand (d. 1724) who wrote narrative poems of great power.

Marathi literature was dominated by the popular devotional verses of the monothistic Tukārām (d. 1650) and the more orthodox Rāmdās (d. 1682). Mukteshwar (d. 1690) composed the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* in more literary Marathi. The techniques of Sanskrit poetry are still more apparent in the narrative poetry of Shridhar (d. 1729). The historical chronicles (*bakhars*) begin from the seventeenth century.

Telugu literature (of Andhra), in its higher forms, benefited greatly from the patronage of the court of Vijayanagara. To the patronage of Kṛṣṇadevarāya (r. 1509–29) is attributed the flowering of the *prabandhas* or metrical romances. His court poet Allasani Peddanna composed *Mam-charitra*, a rich description of romance and passion. Kṛṣṇadevarāya himself provided in his *Amuktamalyada* a metrical collection of worldly and religious counsels. Pingali Surana was the acknowledged master of word-play and double meaning, seen in his *Kahipumdayama*. Bhatin Murti wrote a work on poetics, the *Kīrtiyālaikarikā-saigrala*. In the seventeenth century there was considerable production of Telugu literature at the courts of the Qūsh Shāh and the South Indian nayakates. A species of Telugu drama called *yakshaganas* became popular at Thanjavur.

In Kannada (language of Karnataka) there was the work of the Jain poet Ratnakara Vamī, whose *Bharatesa Vaibhava* (1557) is an immensely long metrical work. Of Śaivite poets, 'Sarvajna' (c. 1600) is remarkable for the humanism shown in his *rachanas*. Chikkadeva Rāya of Mysore (r. 1672–1704) was a generous patron of Kannada literature. A poetess at his court, Sanchi Honamma, is noteworthy for her *Hadibadeya Dhanna*, where she protests against women being considered as inferior to men. Kannada also developed a certain amount of scientific literature, comprising works on grammar, lexicography, medicine, and mathematics. Bala Vaidya Cheluvā's *Kannada Lilāvati* (1715) is a work on mathematics.

Tamil literature of the period seems to have been heavily dominated by Śaivite works. In the sixteenth century Varathunga composed *Pannottarakundam*. His cousin Athivaraman has left behind aphorisms in the *Vetrivarkai*, many now part of Tamil popular wisdom. Vaiṣṇavite *bhakti* lyrics are prominently represented by Pillaippetrumal's *Aṣṭaprabandham*.

One interesting development was the contribution to Tamil prose made by Christian missionaries, notably Robert de Nobili (in India 1606–56) and Beschi ('Vīrama-Muni') (1680–1742), the latter authoring works of didactic fable, story and novel, especially the *Vaṇṇu-Kathai* and *Pirannarthu-Cūru-Kathai*. Printing in Tamil also began under missionary auspices, with the Kūsthava *Vedopadesam*, printed at Vaipukkottai (1677).

Though Malayalam had separated from Tamil as the language of Kerala much earlier, it was the sixteenth century which marked the beginning of its literature, the two great pioneer works being Thunchathu Ezhuthachan's *Adhyatma Rāmāyaṇam* and *Mahābhārata*. The dance-drama (*attakkatha*) developed as a form specific to Malayalam; the apex in this sphere was reached in the eighteenth century with Unnayi Varyar's *Nahdharitum Attakkatha*. (See Majumdar, 1974, pp. 584–606, and O'Malley, 1941, for South Indian literatures.)

COLONIAL REGIME, THE FIRST PHASE, 1757–1813

In the century preceding 1757, the Asian trade of Europe carried round the Cape of Good Hope increased enormously.

During 1661–70, the trade of the French East India Company (formed 1664) was as yet insignificant; and the combined annual imports from Asia of the Dutch and English Companies amounted to but 4.7 million pesos. During the decade 1741–50, the combined Asian imports of the three Companies exceeded 15.8 million pesos. Within this expansion, the share of the English East India Company increased most of all; during 1721–30, the value of its Asian imports for the first time surpassed that of the Dutch Company's imports; and the value of its Asian imports was 3.3 times that of the French Company during the 1740s (Bittel in Tracy, 1990, pp. 112, 169, 171). Though the role of personalities, like Dupleix and Clive, was important, the sheer weight of quantities in the Anglo-French struggle was, therefore, against the French; and they were the ultimate losers in the three Carnatic Wars (1746–8; 1749–54; 1757–61). The Dutch similarly lost out in 1759 in a conflict on the Hugli River (Bengal), and the English control over the Indian Ocean was henceforth unchallenged.

The English Company's Asian imports in 1750 totalling £1.01 million in value were drawn, to the extent of more than seven-tenths, from India (half from Bengal alone). To pay for these imports the Company had to export treasure (gold and silver) of practically equivalent value, the commodity-component of exports to Asia being only £0.28 million (Chaudhuri, 1978, pp. 507–12). This severe imbalance in its trade induced the Company and its servants in the east to seek to pay for Asian commodities, first, by local extortion, and tribute from Indian rulers, and, then, after territorial acquisition, out of taxes. That Bengal should become the major area of such two-stage conquest was, perhaps, inevitable, seeing the region's central position in the Company's trade: Plassey (1757) marked the first stage, and the battle of Buxar (1764), the second. After 1757 the Company no longer needed to export treasure to India; and after 1765 the grant of Diwani in its expanding purchases of Indian commodities were financed almost entirely of taxes raised in India.

The Company's successes against Indian powers are not to be explained solely by its financial resources. The advantage lay mainly in the military sphere. Already before the end of the seventeenth century, it had become noticeable that the Mughal army, based on cavalry, with artillery and musketry for mere supports, would not be able to face European troops. In 1746 the French showed at Mylapore how a small number of local infantry, drilled in European style and using fast-firing flint-locks, could put to rout a whole mass of Mughal cavalry. Of this success Plassey was a mere repetition.

Given such military superiority of the English, the Indian states tended to divide into two groups. There were those which sought the protection of British power as well as its aid against neighbours, such as Awadh and Hyderabad. Awadh made its initial arrangement with the Company in 1765 and gained Rohilkhand by its aid in 1774. In 1801, however, it lost half of its territory by an imposed Subsidiary treaty. Wellesley inaugurated his system of 'subsidiary alliances' with a treaty with the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1798.

The other set of rulers consisted of those who endeavoured to imitate the European military style in order to improve their position *vis-à-vis* the English as well as other Indian states. Of this Mysore offered the most notable example. Its ruler Haidar 'Ali, who rose to supreme power in 1761, owed much of his success to a combination of Mughal cavalry with European-style infantry and weapons manufactured with the aid of the French. He established a fairly centralized

government; and after his death his son Tipu (r. 1782–99) continued the system, while also trying to develop commerce and local manufactures with government assistance. He received the Jacobin Club at Srirangapatnam, his capital, and planted the tree of liberty (1797). This quasi-modern state was involved in four bitter conflicts with the English (1767–9, 1780–4, 1790–2, 1799), which ended with its destruction and the death of Tipu in battle (Sinha, 1949; Hasan, 1971).

As the Marāṭhā polity disintegrated mainly under internal pressures, there was a tendency among its major chiefs to enlarge their territories or tributary zones by enhancing their military prowess. The first Anglo-Marāṭhā War, ending in 1782, made clear to observant Marāṭhā chiefs the immense advantage that troops organized according to the European fashion might give them. Māhādījī Sindhiā (d. 1794) drew upon the services of European officers to train and command brigades to give him a paramount position in much of northern and central India. However, the effort, unsupported by modernization in any other field, had little chance of success against the English, who duly subjugated all the Marāṭhā states in the Second and Third Marāṭhā Wars (1803–5, 1817–19).

The expansion of British dominions and zone of paramountcy in India was unaffected by the contrary professions in Pitt's India Act (1784). This enactment laid down the basic contours of the structure of the Company's government in India and the control of the British Ministry over the Company's Court of Directors, seeking thereby to meet the deficiencies of the Regulating Act of 1773. The next legislation of importance was the Charter Act of 1813, which threw India open to 'Free Trade' and thereby marked the completion of the Company's transformation from a mercantile firm into a self-perpetuating, profit-making body of rulers of the largest colony in the world.

The large empire had a 'supreme' government under the Governor-General and his Council at Calcutta. Northern India, placed under the Presidency of Bengal, was under the direct control of the Governor-General. The peninsula was shared by the two Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, each with a Governor and Council. The Company's forces (totalling, in 1782, over 115,000 men, 90 per cent of them Indian sepoys) were divided into three armies, based on each Presidency, but the Bengal Army was much the largest. The tendency, since the Regulating Act of 1773, had been to increase the powers of the Governor-General over the other two Presidencies, and by 1813 much centralization had been achieved. In London power was shared between the Court of Directors of the Company, which had vast powers of patronage, and the Board of Control, a sub-committee of the British cabinet, whose directions in a large field the Court of Directors had to accept.

The English Company became heir to the fiscal claims of its predecessors in its expanding domains. From 1757, but especially with the acquisition of *dākhān* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by the Company in 1765, the maximization of revenue became the corner-stone of the Company's policy. The attempt to raise the revenue constantly even in the face of the massive famine of 1770, during the so-called Double Government (1765–72), was continued during the succeeding decades through the auctioning of revenue-farms. A stable income was sought to be secured through a Permanent Settlement (1793) with the *zamīndārs* treating the assessments of 1790–1 as perpetual (Guha, 1982). Because of the continuing fall in prices, the settlement hurt many *zamīndārs* most severely, and promoted a natural tendency towards

subinfeudation. When prices rose after 1805, the *zamindars'* position improved, and their gradual conversion into full landed proprietors began. But there was no corresponding improvement in agricultural prosperity or in trade, from which Cornwallis had hoped to obtain alternative sources of taxation for the Company. The Company, therefore, lost its enthusiasm for the Permanent Settlement and subsequent arrangements in other areas tended to turn to other methods of tax-collection, based on variable assessments.

The taxes collected in the Company's name, together with other forms of private income or wealth, such as the Plassey Plunder, the Carnatic Debts, the exaction of bribes and 'gifts', and profits from monopolies which flowed into the hands of the Company's officers or other Englishmen, constituted the source for the Drain of Wealth or Tribute which became so major and constant a feature of the relationship between India and Britain during the period of colonialism. In three years (1766-8) Bengal had to export £1.20 million worth of goods uncovered by imports. The annual average official and private Drain of Wealth to Britain during the decade, 1783-4 to 1792-3, has been estimated at £1.78 million by Furber (1951, pp. 313-16), using the most conservative criteria. But according to an official estimate of the time India annually lost £4.93 million through unpaid export surpluses during the decade 1780-90 (Chandhuri, 1983, p. 817). By 1801 the annual gap between exports from the Indies to Britain and imports therefrom was around the level of £4.2 million according to British customs statistics (Habib, 1976).

In the exports by which this massive 'Tribute' from India was realized, cotton textiles ('piece-goods') occupied the first place, followed by indigo and raw silk (Chandhuri, 1983, p. 821). Export of silver to China also began, enabling the Company to obtain Chinese tea and silk. This diversion of commodities from internal to external markets with no returns obtained caused that 'languor' to descend on internal commerce, of which Cornwallis spoke (1790) and which he rightly attributed to 'Tribute payment'. The first phase of 'de-industrialization' set in as local demand, previously generated by internal expenditure out of tax-revenues, collapsed.

The English Industrial Revolution created a crisis for this system of tribute payments by, first of all, appropriating the external markets of Indian textiles. The piece-goods that could be exported from India underwent a sharp decline after 1802-3. With the Charter Act of 1813, the Indian market itself was opened up for English textiles. As our period closed (1813), the problem of tribute-realization was entering a phase of great instability; the solution was to be discovered ultimately in the forced export of opium in China, which brought the two largest countries of Asia in the coils of the famous 'triangular' relationship with Britain. But in 1813 the Opium War was still some twenty-five years away.

With the destructive effects of British colonialism came haltingly what Marx called its unintended 'regenerating' effects, consisting principally of an extension of modern humanism and science to India.

If India had to be governed and exploited, it had first to be explored and studied. So came the great maps of Eastern India by the Surveyor General, James Rennell, in his *Bengal Atlas* (1781). Economic and social surveys soon followed, notably, Francis Buchanan's *Journey from Madras, &c.*, a three-volume survey of South India (1800-1), and then several volumes of his surveys of different districts of Eastern India, carried on till 1812. There began, for similar reasons, much collection of information about Indian culture, languages

and literatures. William Jones founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, and the society became a major clearing house for academic work on India and other countries. In 1786, he announced his discovery of the Indo-European family of languages. H. T. Colebrooke continued the orientalist tradition and was able to give in 1805 a critical account of the Vedas. To teach Indian languages to the Company's officials, the College of Fort William was founded in 1800.

The Orientalist endeavour could not, however, remain confined to European readership. When in 1778 the Government established a press to print books, in Nagari type used for Sanskrit, Bengali and other Indian languages, the monks introduced the printed word to Bengali readership. Persian type was also used, and one of the early books so printed is the *Dabistān-i Mazāhib*, Calcutta, 1809. John Gilchrist, Principal of the Fort William College, compiled a dictionary of Urdu, and patronized the preparation of many works in Urdu prose.

The missionary urge to spread Christianity had similar cultural consequences. The Baptist Mission at Serampore established by W. Carey in 1800 printed the New Testament in Bengali (1801). It also published the *Rāmāyana of Kṛtīvas* (1802-3). Hindi and Marathi too benefited from Carey's activities; he himself produced a Marathi grammar in 1805.

If the ground was being thus laid for the germination of modern thought, it was still too early in 1813 for substantive results to appear. But Rām Mohan Roy (1774-1833) had already begun to shape his ideas under the intellectual excitement of access to English, and the challenge of the missionaries. In 1803-4 he proclaimed his allegiance simultaneously to an uncompromising monotheism and to Reason in a Persian tract, *Tuhfa-i Muwahhidin*; these two principles were to be his constant guide in the remaining thirty years of his life, during which he was to help assemble the first building blocks of modern India.

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20.2

SRI LANKA

Leslie Gunawardana

The period from the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, which witnessed the establishment of Portuguese and Dutch rule over the coastal regions of the island represents a radical transition in the history of Sri Lanka. It was during these centuries that decisive initial steps were taken toward the incorporation of the island into the emerging world economy. Accompanying these processes were major developments in the field of culture which included the introduction of Catholic and Protestant forms of the Christian faith and the beginnings of the penetration of the influences of the Portuguese and Dutch languages as well as of the classical European languages. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the island was divided into three small kingdoms under the ruling families of Kōtte, Kandy and Nallū in the Jaffna peninsula. A fourth kingdom, that of Sitāvaka, emerged in the sixteenth century but disappeared within a few decades. By the beginning of the third decade of the seventeenth century, only the kingdom of Kandy remained, and the territories of the other kingdoms had been brought under Portuguese rule, which was itself supplanted by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) by the middle of the century. The Kandyan kingdom with its capital located in the central highlands was active at the centre of resistance, first to Portuguese power, and subsequently to the Dutch (Arasaratnam, 1958; Goonewardena, 1958) (see Plate 108). Dutch rule ended in 1795 with the British occupation, the island becoming a British crown colony in 1798; the British also extinguished the kingdom of Kandy in 1815.

The sophisticated hydraulic civilization of an earlier era had collapsed by this time, and the agricultural production had begun again to depend on small- and medium-scale reservoirs in the northern, north-central and eastern plains of the island which together are commonly called the 'Dry Zone'. In the central highlands and the south-western plains cultivation depended largely on natural precipitation. Rained commercial crops such as cinnamon and arecanuts (*Areca catechu* L., Palmac) had become important items in the export trade, these being brought to the coastal trade centres on pack animals. Products of the gem-mines in the central highlands and pearl fisheries on the north-western coast constituted some of the less bulky but high value items of this trade.

The production processes of these trade items did not involve highly complex technologies. Arecanuts were exported in natural form, as gathered from the trees, except for limited amounts which were cured in 'mud' or dried for use in betel-chewing. Cinnamon grew mostly in the wild and, despite attempts at cultivating cinnamon by European colonial authorities, the wild form appears to have been the main source of supply for the trade. Apart from collecting,

the processing, which included 'peeling' or scraping and drying, did demand a moderately skilled labour force, especially to ensure speedy completion of these tasks. Recruiting workers from the indigenous population for processes related to the production of cinnamon for export was difficult. Immigrants from India, including weavers, had to be pressed into this line of service. Working in the gem-mines and the pearl fisheries both demanded a high level of physical fitness and endurance. Miners were drawn from the local population, but diving for pearls was seasonal and a good number of the divers came from South India and even from lands further away to take part in these operations. Considerable skill was required of those involved in the recognition of gemstones and the grading of the quality of both gemstones and pearls. However, 'value-adding' in terms of cutting and polishing the gems or setting gems and pearls in jewellery does not appear to have preceded export. Thus gems and pearls, too, were exported very much in their natural state as they had been in the preceding centuries. Apart from these items, exports also included spices, lacquer work, coconut oil, ropes of coconut fibre and such products of the sea as *dhunks* and *curries*. Elephants were among the most important items of export during the period. There was a consistently high demand in South Asia, especially in Bengal and Golconda, for elephants from Sri Lanka, owing to the high rating ascribed to them for their reliability and prowess in performance as 'engines of war'.

The link between trade and agriculture, which began to develop significantly during this period, is particularly evident from two new cash crops encouraged by the Dutch colonial administrators. These were tobacco, the plant from the New World, and coffee with its close associations with the Arabs. Tobacco cultivation thrived in the northern Jaffna peninsula. The local producers mastered the art of both the cultivation of the tobacco plant and the curing of its leaves. Their produce found good markets in the kingdom of Travancore in South India as well as in South-East Asia, especially at Aceh and Malayan ports. Coffee was grown over a much wider area in the island. Production rose sharply in the first half of the eighteenth century, and its quality was found to be so remarkably high that it could compete with even Arabian coffee. While a substantial proportion of the produce was exported to Europe, markets were found in Iran as well as in India. However, prospects for the growth of coffee cultivation in Sri Lanka ran into a serious snag with the phenomenal expansion of coffee production in Java, another base of Dutch power in Asia, and, in the context of what was perceived as over-production, the decision of the VOC officials was to curb its expansion in Sri Lanka (Arasaratnam, 1995).

A change of crucial significance witnessed during this period pertained to the nature and patterns of trade. Prior to the arrival of the European colonial powers in the Indian Ocean, the trade in the area was dominated by parallel and overlapping networks in which merchants of Arab, Gujarati, Bengali, Kerala and Tamilnad origins, including adherents of Muslim as well as Hindu faiths, played important roles. The sea-faring craft used by them varied from the *cattamaran* (Tamil *kattamaran*) and the single masted *dhoni* to vessels of considerably large proportions which could transport, in addition to the crew, such heavy and bulky items as elephants. Among the owners of trading vessels in the region were large-scale entrepreneurs such as Misgal of Calicut who sent his ships as far as Iran and Yemen in the west and China in the east (Gunawardana, 1987). Some of the families of merchants involved in external trade had been settled in the island for generations. They had been gradually absorbed into the local population, and had, as in the case of Alagakkonâras, gained access to centres of power. The Alagakkonâra family acquired such political power that they became *de facto* rulers of a part of the island (Kulasuriya, 1976). Thus among the upper strata in local society were families with interests in external trade. Such circumstances had favoured the continuation of a shipbuilding tradition. Even as far back as the thirteenth century, a Sri Lankan ruler had offered to build twenty ships each year for the Mamelûk Sultans of Egypt (Codrington, 1919). The traditions of local rulers sending ships to trade in the ports of South India had continued well into the middle decades of the fifteenth century (Gunawardana, 1987). The regional trade networks handled export items as well as imports to the island such as rice, textiles, sugar, dried fish, vegetable oils and timber from the ports of the Indian subcontinent.

Apart from the links with European centres of trade which progressively grew stronger during the three centuries under review, some of the crucial transformations during this period stemmed from attempts made by the Portuguese, and more systematically by the Dutch, to take control of the trade of the Indian Ocean. The mechanism of control was the system of 'passes', enforced by fast armed ships which patrolled the seas to seize and confiscate vessels which had not obtained permission or which carried prohibited goods. The ships with mounted guns which appeared in the sixteenth century represented a new phenomenon in the Indian Ocean. Their fire power and relatively high speeds helped the execution of this policy of control which began to undermine the more open trade competition of an earlier era. One of the effects of this policy was the drastic diminution of the role of Sri Lankan shipping in foreign trade; it has been reported that there was no Sri Lankan shipping in the foreign trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (De Silva, 1972; Arasaratnam, 1995). With the expansion of Dutch power over the entire coastal region in 1766 the participation of the Kandyan court in the trade with South India virtually came to an end. It was only in the coastal trade around the island that local maritime traders could survive in business.

The enforcement of the policy of excluding Indian merchants from the island's trade, however, ran into difficulties, especially because of the hold they wielded over such vital commodities as rice needed in Sri Lanka. By the end of the seventeenth century the VOC officials realized that it was imperative to shift from a policy of seeking monopolies and levying high duties to one of issuing 'passes'

to more ships and reducing the customs' levies. During the early part of the eighteenth century, merchants from Bengal and the northern parts of peninsular India carried on a brisk trade in Sri Lankan ports. Even though traders from the South Coromandel were still operating under restrictions, their role could not be curtailed (Arasaratnam, 1986). Similarly, traders from the Maldives Islands retained their importance as suppliers of specialized fish products which were very much in demand in Sri Lankan cuisine. The policy of strengthening the trade links between the island and the European market, as evident in the restriction of the sale of cinnamon in Asian markets to one-fifth of the island's total production and the diversion of four-fifths to Europe, set on the move new patterns of trade. On the other hand, these three centuries witnessed a general expansion of the island's trade. Under such conditions the involvement of the rural population in the production of cash crops provided an impetus to processes of monetization. Copper coins of small denomination, issued by the VOC as well as by South Asian kingdoms, came into increasing use among agricultural producers, enabling wider opportunities for exchange transactions. The strong political and commercial links with Europe characteristic of this age paved the way for the introduction into the island of European legal codes and procedures. The VOC established their judicial courts in the area under its rule and introduced Roman-Dutch law.

Though opportunities for the development of Sri Lankan shipping were severely restricted, this was yet a period of development for shipping in the Indian Ocean in general. Fast types of vessels with European rigging, such as the famed *caravela* with its high poop and lateen sails, began to operate in the region. Progress achieved in developing increasingly accurate charts of the seas represented noteworthy contributions to the development of navigation in Asia. Paradoxically, these developments helped the Kandyan kingdom to improve its relations with other Asian kingdoms such as those of Arakan and Ayuthia and even to obtain assistance from them to revive Buddhism in the island. This was also a period when attention was paid to the development of inland waterways for transport. The VOC developed three major canal systems in the western, southern and eastern parts of the island. The western system which linked the city of Colombo with Kalpitiya to its north and Bentota to its south was the most complex. The second in order of complexity was the eastern system which linked the commercial centre of Batticaloa with the Vanderloos Bay to the north and the minor port of Sammanthurai to its south. The southern system linked the city of Mâlara with the township of Vâligama. While the three canal systems testify to the high level of technology attained by the hydraulic engineers employed by the VOC, the chain of forts it erected in the island demonstrate the matching level of skill displayed by the military engineers. Though forts had been built for centuries before this time, and later on, those built during VOC rule stand out on consideration of both technical qualities and aesthetic appeal.

In the development of technology during this period one of the most noteworthy areas of change appears to have been related to warfare. The use of guns, smaller firearms as well as cannon, was introduced by the Portuguese and spread within a remarkably short period since the rulers of local kingdoms quickly grasped the significance of this new technology. Owing to the feasibility of centralizing storage and control, guns represented a strategic resource conducive

to the growth of the power of the rulers. Further, without this resource the very survival of the local kingdoms was under threat. The new military technology created a demand for specialists recruited from among the Europeans. During the reign of Rājasingha II (1635–87) a Dutchman was appointed the chief of the department of artisans employed in the royal workshops of Kandy. The Englishman Richard Vanthani, placed in charge of all ordnance, with 970 soldiers under him, was evidently another highly regarded specialist in the Kandyan kingdom (Knox, 1989). Under the direction of such specialists the island's metal workers developed a capacity for the production of guns, especially handguns which acquired a wide reputation for their quality.

The introduction of printing represents one of the most significant developments in the field of technology. The first decade of the eighteenth century witnessed the earliest attempts at printing using wooden typeface. In 1734 the VOC administration established the first printing press which was used to meet the requirements of missionaries as well as administrators. A book of prayers in Sinhala was published in 1737 (Perera, 1962). The first printed books in Tamil appeared not long afterwards. Tamil catechisms were published in 1744 and 1748 and a Tamil translation of the Gospels in 1748 (Kuiper, 1969). Thus it may be said that, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the first steps toward the age of books for masses had been taken in Sri Lanka.

Determined missionary activities from 1505 resulted in the expansion of Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant. Catholicism which spread especially in the coastal areas of the island during the period of Portuguese rule faced persecution during the subsequent Dutch administration of these areas, but most adherents remained loyal to their faith (Boudens, 1957). Catholicism had found converts even among the ruling families of local kingdoms, including Don Juan Dharmapala, the ruler of Kōne (1551–97), and Dona Catherine who became the queen of Kandy. The Protestant clergy were better organized, using their schools to propagate the faith, and the VOC not only supported their missionary work but also sought to suppress Catholicism. During these times of persecution, there were migrations of Catholics to settle down within the Kandyan kingdom.

Religious practices associated with the worship of Śiva and Viṣṇu spread widely during this period, in the kingdom of Sīhāva whose ruler Rājasingha (1581–93) was a devotee of Śiva, and, later on, within the Kandyan kingdom. On the other hand, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represented a period of decline for Buddhism. The earnest efforts of the kings of Kandy, and the assistance they received from monks of the kingdoms of Arakan and Ayutthia, helped to bring about a revival of Buddhism which became noticeable in the latter half of the eighteenth century (see Plates 109 and 110). This resurgence is particularly associated with Saranankara, an erudite scholar and dynamic leader who guided it as the hierarch of the community of Buddhist monks in the island (Dewaraja, 1988).

The revival of Buddhism stimulated a vibrant tradition of painting and literary activities which appear to have been mobilized for the propagation of the Buddhist world view (Holt, 1996). However, the period is also remarkable for the number of literary works which cannot be easily categorized as writings inspired by Buddhism. While the ongoing military conflicts provided the material and inspiration for a popular literary genre, the 'war poems' (*hatani karu*), books written during this period included eulogies and biographical works, annals, grammars and erotic works. South Indian influence

became increasingly evident in loan words and poetic techniques, and some of the Sinhala books were translations from Tamil. Writings of Christian inspiration represent a new literary category in both Sinhala and Tamil (Peiris, 1943; Kuiper, 1969). They were mostly translations of basic canonical texts, but among them are to be seen some writings of a polemical nature targeting both Buddhism and Hinduism. Jacome Gonçalves, a polemicist, is particularly noteworthy as an author who produced writings in both the Sinhala and Tamil languages (Perera, 1942). Even before the beginning of the sixteenth century, the patronage extended by the kings of Nallūr had ushered in a tradition of Tamil literary activity which produced several noteworthy works including translations from Sanskrit of poetical as well as technical writings. This tradition which was largely of Śaivite inspiration continued beside the Christian literary tradition. The first chronicle of Jaffna, the *Yālpāna Vaipavanālai* (De Silva, 1956), is best described as a product of that tradition, though it was at the request of the Dutch Governor Diederik van Dornburg (1734–6) that the author produced this work.

A noteworthy aspect of the European impact was the system of schools which functioned in a systematic manner during Dutch rule, and avenues for the study of European classical languages and secular subjects such as Geography, History and Mathematics were made available, even if to a numerically limited group (van Goor, 1978). The penetration of European linguistic influences at a popular level was evident in the appearance of words borrowed from Portuguese and Dutch in both Sinhala and Tamil. Apart from music associated with religious ritual, new forms of secular music and musical instruments were introduced during this period. Elements of European dress were adopted by the uppermost stratum of the local population, and its influence is evident even in the regalia of the Kandyan kingdom. The changing tastes of the times are exemplified by the Kandyan king Narendrasinha whose predilection for 'Neurenberger goods, pictures, paintings, portraits, representations of sea battles' and snuff was noted by the Dutch Governor Simons (1914, p. 11). Characteristic of this period were the new possibilities for the transoceanic expansion of cultural influences opened up by developments in navigation across the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. In this respect cuisine provides a striking example. The introduction of red pepper (*Capiscum annuum* L. Solanaceae) from the Americas, which virtually displaced the local ingredient black pepper (*Piper nigrum* L. Piperaceae), was to bring about a radical change in both culinary practice and popular preferences regarding tastes in food.

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20.3

NEPAL

Irfan Habib

It is, perhaps, no more than an accident that the period assigned to this volume accords well with a reasonable periodization of Nepalese history, where the post-medieval period begins with the decline of the Malla kingdom and ends with the unification of Nepal under the Gorkhas. By 1480, when Jayakashamalla (r. 1428–80), under whom the Malla kingdom of Nepal reached its zenith, died, several of the distinctive features of Nepalese culture may be thought to have emerged. The Valley's Newari language (of the Tibeto-Burman family) had begun to be used in Sanskrit-style inscriptions; the caste system, with numerous vocational and other 'castes' (with rules of endogamy and pollution), set in an hierarchical order, was now well established; the arrangement traditionally ascribed to Jayasrihimalla (d. 1393); and, finally, Śaivite and Vaiṣṇavite cults had long won over the ruling class, though Buddhism survived with a contracting extent of influence among the lower strata (Pevich, 1958).

The division of the Malla kingdom by Jayakashamalla before his death (1480) inaugurated a long history of political division, with three separate kingdoms being established at Kathmandu, Patan and Bhairah, situated within a few miles of each other within the Nepal Valley (drained by Bagmati R.). The history of the three kingdoms can be reconstructed on the basis of inscriptions and later chronicles (see Regmi, 1966, for the most detailed treatment).

In the beginning, Kathmandu was the most powerful of the three principalities. Its ruler Mahendramalla (1560–74) began to issue a silver coin (*Mahendramalla*), thus ending a seven-century long mindless phase. Pratāpamalla (r. 1641–74) was, perhaps, the most colourful ruler of the line. Relations with the Mughal Empire and other countries had created a cosmopolitan atmosphere enough for him to claim knowledge of fifteen scripts, including Devanagari, Persian, Arabic and Roman, examples of which he then proceeds to give in a multi-script inscription (Landon, 1928, I, p. 45). He laid claims to being a poet and artist, and professed devotion to both Vaiṣṇavite and Śaivite lores. He also claimed military successes against his neighbours.

The information on the economy of Nepal during the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries is gathered mainly from inscriptions and the records of the Catholic missionaries. Though the plough was not used, the valley was still well cultivated with the use of a spade with iron blade. Handicrafts, especially metal crafts, wool-weaving and masonry, were sufficiently widespread to create a fairly large urban population. In 1740 the three cities reportedly had a total of 54,000 houses, Patan the largest being credited with 24,000. Even if this traditional figure was exaggerated and more likely to represent inhabitants than houses (cf. Buchanan, 1819, p. 209), a population of even 60,000 in the

three towns suggested a respectable level of urbanization, seeing that the Valley possessed in 1920 a total population of only 367,000.

Unfortunately, the features of the agrarian system are not very clear. Since land grants to temples and individuals were made by the rulers as well as members of the royal family and ministers, one might infer that large tracts were assigned, as service grants (*jāgīrs*) or *hīn* (grant without obligation) to princes and high officers, while the ruler himself drew revenues for himself from a large territory. Regmi (1966, p. 511) believes that the mass of people were small peasants, often, like 'serfs', tied to the poteries and temples, only a few having their own lands.

The Nepal valley is rich in Brahmanical temples of the Malla period. They use stone and brick but no cementing mortar. The temples have a distinct style of their own, rising in tiers with out-hanging pyramidal roofs; but the *śikhara*-style temples, with tall single towers, also became popular. Of the former type, one can cite Pratāpamalla's Kavinidhār temple, built in 1672, a huge four-storey structure, and the five-roof temple at Bhairah built by its ruler Bhūpatāndramalla (r. 1696–1722) in 1702; to the latter type belongs the temple of Krishna in Palace Square at Patan, built in 1637 by Siddhinarasīdharmalla (r. 1620–61). The Buddhist *vihāras*, none of which, among the extant ones, go beyond the fifteenth century, are numerous as well, but obviously could not draw heavily on royal patronage. The great Buddhist monument of Svayambhūnātha was constructed in a much earlier age; so too the *stupa* of Banddhanaṭha.

Priestly and courtly interest in Sanskrit continued, original works on astronomy, medicine, ritual music and dance being composed, besides some literary texts. But the number of works on similar subjects in Newari, often with much admixture of Sanskrit, was much larger. The Nepal courts also patronized Maithili, the language of the southern lowlands (Moring, Terai), in which a number of plays were composed. A new language, Parbatiya (ancestor to modern Nepali), an 'Indo-Aryan' language like Maithili, but allied to Hindi, begins to appear in the Nepal valley in inscriptions of the latter half of the seventeenth century: it had been spreading from western Nepal.

The Parbatiya (or Gorkhali) language was spoken by the rulers of Gorkha, a town in the Sapt Gandak basin, to the west of the Valley. The rulers claimed to be Rajput immigrants from Udaipur in India's Rajasthan. Under the Gorkha ruler Prithvinārāyan (d. 1771), a doggedly aggressive policy was pursued, from his occupation of Nuakot at the threshold of the Valley in 1754 to his seizure in 1768–9 of Kathmandu and its two rival cities. A successful skirmish with the English

in 1767 probably led Prithvināyān to begin drilling his troops and introduce flint muskets ('fire-locks') to replace matchlocks (Buchanan, 1819, p. 246). Locally made, and relatively crude, the flint-locks probably still gave Gorkha infantry a great advantage over their opponents.

In spite of a check received from a Chinese invasion in 1792, in reprisal for a Gorkha raid into Tibet in 1790, the Gorkha rulers succeeded in subjugating or extirpating all local principalities within the present-day limits of Nepal; and they extended their sway over a broad belt in the Indian Himalayas westward, up to the Sutlej, reaching the extreme limit of expansion by 1803.

With the coup in 1804 by Bhimsen Thapa began the regime of the all-powerful Prime Ministers of the Thapa family – the so-called Rānās. The English mounted an invasion of Nepal in the War of 1814–16, which resulted in the Gorkhas conceding, after fierce resistance, the western half of their kingdom, but saving their independence.

Kirkpatrick (1811) and Buchanan (1819), the latter of whom visited the country in 1802–3, have left valuable accounts of Nepal under the then recently established Gorkha regime. Owing to the vigorous pursuit of aggrandisement by the Gorkha ruling class, the country was strongly centralized, its territories being redistributed in large part among the ruler, princes and members of the Prime Minister's families (the Rānās), as *jāgīrs* (administrative or tax-assignments) and *bars* (tax-free hereditary estates). Its control over the low-lying Terai belt in the south, which probably contained a third of Nepal's population, gave the Gorkha

regime large additional revenues. Much of the tax or rent was still paid in kind, the assessments in 'the crown-lands' being 'perpetually' fixed in terms of grain, though money payments too were in vogue. Nepal continued to profit by the India-China trade through Nepal and Tibet, though its decline by 1802–3 was more due, perhaps, to the diversion of India's external trade through 'Trihune' to England, than to any special 'rapacity' of the Gorkha regime (Buchanan, 1819, pp. 212–13). Nepal's own exports consisted largely of iron, copper and drugs.

The cultural impact of the Gorkha regime was mainly to make the *Parbatiya* (modern Nepali) the official language thereby displacing *Newari* from this position. The Gorkha regime generally followed, from the beginning, a policy of isolation from European influences, and no process of economic or cultural modernization was initiated. Nevertheless, owing to the political unification, one necessary condition for the emergence of Nepal as a nation had been created.

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SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The late Denys Lombard

Towards the end of the fifteenth century, as travellers from Europe and especially Italy were going there in greater numbers, the cultural map of what since the Second World War we have become used to calling 'South-East Asia' looked remarkably different from how it was to appear in the nineteenth century. Basically, a few promising clusters of settlements could be distinguished, a few kingdoms built up around the planned development of vast expanses of rice fields and based on more or less the same model. This model was strongly marked by Buddhist ideology, which had been spreading throughout Eastern Asia, by both land and sea, for more than a thousand years, and which in different places was tinged with either Hindu cosmology or Confucian ethics. The kingdom's centre was usually an agricultural estate, a town in microcosm, with a geometric layout like a *mandala*, organized around the royal palace, which acted as focal point. The ruler, on whom the world turned, carried out the rituals meant to maintain harmony between his subjects and the cosmos and, as demiurge, was responsible for the success of the harvests. Both at the court and in the provinces he was assisted by a body of civil servants who looked after irrigation work and tax-collection and by a large number of Buddhist and Hindu priests, to whom he gave generous favours but who in return had to recognize his spiritual leadership and take part in the land measures he advocated.

This model – with major variants – was particularly common in eastern Java (near Mojopahit), the Meanamhasin (near Chiengmai in the north and Ayuthia in the south), Cambodia (around Phnom Penh), the upper Irrawaddy (around Ava), Arakan (around Mraug U) and especially the Red River Delta around Thăng-long (Hanoi), where King Lê Thành-tông (1460–97) had just given a boost to agriculture and reorganized the mandarinat. All these kingdoms used writing for their administrative needs as a matter of course; the text of charters was carved in stone or engraved on copper plates, and clerks everywhere kept archives, which unfortunately for history have disappeared. In Viet Nam Chinese ideograms were used side by side with the characters called *nôm*, written on paper with a brush, that portrayed the vernacular language. Elsewhere, in Myanmar (Burma), Siam, Cambodia, Java and Bali, the systems of writing, all phonetic, were derived from Indian syllabaries, and the symbols were inscribed with a pointed tool on *borassus* palm leaves, a cheap material that lasted little longer than half a century. There are none of these documents on Luzon island – although a copper engraving has just been found near Laguna de Bay – but archaeologists have still been able to

make out what were once areas of intensive farming, especially near the site of what would later become the city of Manila.

We should not imagine these various kingdoms as adjoining areas: the modern concept of borders did not yet exist and would only evolve very slowly. As yet they were only clearings and could be painstakingly hacked out of the tropical and equatorial forest only by means of sturdy iron tools. The forest, whose bewitching presence can still be felt in the epic tales related by the Javanese shadow theatre, hemmed in the cultivated land on all sides. It was vital for two reasons: the crops that could be gathered there, such as exotic wood, cane, resins and medicinal plants, and its semi-nomadic inhabitants who provided a valuable source of labour. The population of South-East Asia at this period was still very low (15 million, at a rough estimate) in relation to the rice-growing projects under way. As the forest clearance continued, the wandering tribes regarded as 'primitives' (*man* in Sino-Vietnamese, *kha* in Thai, *sakay* in Malay) by the people who lived in the clearings were brought in to settle and acculturate there. In fact, these 'natural' reserves had no longer been sufficient for some time, and the kings used to launch major expeditions against their neighbours' land to capture the settled inhabitants and deport them to their own rural areas. After an attack on Angkor in 1393, for instance, the Siamese brought home no fewer than 70,000 prisoners. This type of raid was to become increasingly common.

However, the history of South-East Asia cannot be explained simply in terms of these agrarian projects or the kingdoms' growing need for human labour. A long-term phenomenon, the intensification of trade on a large scale had been at work for more than a century. New ports had sprung up, such as Pasai (northern Sumatra) in the thirteenth century, Gresik (eastern Java) in the fourteenth century, and especially Brunei (northern Borneo), Ternate (the Moluccas), Pegu (lower Myanmar) and Malacca (Malay Peninsula), all of which flourished in the fifteenth century and constituted an indication of this new trend. For a long time the region, rich in natural resources, was complementary to India and China, countries with old cultures where land clearance had started much earlier and that wanted to export their manufactured produce (cotton fabric from India and silks and pottery from China). However, since the failure of the great Eurasian melting-pot the Mughals had attempted to establish – and more specifically since the advance of the Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries – it appears that the Central Asia route had become more difficult for traders, which

benefited the Indian Ocean sea route, well known to the Arabs from the tenth or eleventh century onwards.

This trend, closely linked to the Eurasian economic situation and discernible as early as the fifteenth century, when the Sultanate of Malacca was seen as the 'emporium of Asia', was soon to be reinforced by a major new factor: the opening by Magellan, in 1521, of the Pacific route. Because of this 'discovery' – just as significant as that of Columbus thirty years earlier – Cebu and the Visayas, and later Luzon, would be linked to the distant Spanish trading posts in Mexico, and an American horizon with a vast future ahead would be revealed to the eastern side of Asia. Manila, after a period as a minor Muslim trading post on the ancient north-south route linking China and the Moluccas, was to become the westernmost bridgehead of Christianity and also a major centre of trade between the Old and New Worlds. Not only would Mexican dollars (silver from the Potosi mines on its way to the Chinese market) pass through here, but also – and probably more important – the new plants from America that were gradually to revolutionize agriculture in eastern Asia.

This general intensification meant that maritime trade from other major ports would flourish, and new districts for traders to carry on their activities would grow up on the edge of some agricultural towns. First of all, we should mention the many sultanates of the East Indies that would continue to multiply right up to the nineteenth century, from the tip of Aceh to the Sulu Islands and at Mindanao and Patani, at the junction of the Thai and Malay cultures, Hoi-an, far from Hué, in central Viet Nam, and in the eighteenth century Hà-tiên, where the Khmer and Vietnamese worlds met. There was also the new district of Ke-cho' ('the market'), each of whose streets specialized in a different trade, growing up near Hanoi, and those developing near Pegu and Ayuthia. To these new suburbs came foreigners from far away (China, India or Europe) or from another part of the region (Cochin-China, now part of Viet Nam, Pegu, Java, Bali or Macassar), or people from the countryside who had broken with the old hierarchies and were eager to be among the new customers, or else prisoners captured on some distant shore and used as servants. The increasingly widespread use of money meant that large personal fortunes were built up, and the idea of value itself developed.

It was slightly easier for people to travel, and some of them became used to a cosmopolitan atmosphere. The region, which had previously been cut off from the rest of the world despite the common denominator of 'Indianization', was tending to become organized around an internal sea functioning increasingly like the Mediterranean. Three networks were being installed and, through competition, would work together to turn integration to their own advantage. These were the Chinese, Muslim and Christian networks.

The first of these was the oldest and probably the best organized. Since at least the Song era Chinese traders from the southern provinces (Fujian and Guangdong) had been taking a strong interest in trade in the 'southern seas' (*Nanyang*) and travelling to South-East Asia to sell copper coins, pig iron and pottery in exchange for forest produce. Small permanent communities were reported at Angkor from the thirteenth century and at Gresik (east Java) in the fourteenth century, but the tide of emigration was stepped up at the start of the fifteenth century, when Admiral Zheng He launched seven major reconnaissance expeditions, on the emperor's orders, and crossed the Indian Ocean to the African

coast. There was a further influx towards the end of the Ming era (1644), when the continental establishment set up by Manchu began to bother free-traders and drove them to settle overseas.

Far from forming a homogeneous group, these emigrants were very varied, and their first allegiance was to their language, region of origin or family. At least four such groups can be recognized: the *Hakkien*, who came from the south of Fujian province (the towns of Quanzhou, Zhangzhou and Amoy), the Cantonese, from Guangdong province, and the *Hakka* and the *Tenchia*, also from Guangdong province, the first group from the Meixian region and the second from the Chaozhou region. But all these emigrants felt they belonged to the same culture, used the same writing and worshipped the same major divinities, which were either Buddhist, such as Guanyin, Daoist, such as Guan di, or Mazu, the protector of sea-faring people.

All those who left China were keen on adventure, and many were in disagreement with imperial laws. They took with them a taste for enterprise, a sense of mutual assistance and a strong spirit of partnership. Naturally, many of them were to be found both in big business and in the redistribution sector, where they introduced the abacus and the beam scale as well as the custom of keeping shops open round the clock. They also took an interest in the copper mines of Myanmar and Viet Nam and the tin mines of Bangka Island (to the south-east of Sumatra). Some of peasant origin tried to develop plantation crops: pepper from the sixteenth century and sugar-cane slightly later (Europeans would take up this idea of agriculture aimed specifically at export in the eighteenth century), while others devoted themselves to rice growing or introduced new market-garden crops and plants from America that had been brought to Fujian via Manila. Many of them were craft-workers and brought with them their techniques, working with silver or gold, iron, tin or wood. The cabinet-makers, most of whom came from Canton (and were recognizable from the fact that they all worshipped the same patron saint, the master carpenter Lu Ban), helped to spread the use of new kinds of furniture, such as tables and chairs, which made a significant change in everyday customs. Needles, imported from China, gave rise to the spread of the stitched garment at the expense of the draped garment, the use of which was well documented in earlier periods.

At the same time, the Muslim network was developing rapidly and without excluding others, because often, especially in the beginning, the Chinese merchants themselves originated from the ancient Islamized communities of Canton (ninth century) or Quanzhou (eleventh century). Tombstone inscriptions, a practice that grew up as Islam spread a new conception of death, help us to pinpoint the appearance of the first communities and to follow their progress, first on the coast and then along the maritime routes – and in some cases inland, where merchant missionaries (*nuhaligh*) ventured, introducing the new religion while carrying on their business. A few of them were Shi'is. A Malay version of the story of Mohamed Hanafiyah, the companion of Husain, was recorded in Malacca at the start of the sixteenth century, and a large Persian community lived in Siam in the seventeenth century. However, the vast majority of the newcomers were Sunni Muslims, and if we discount a few traces of Hanafism in some legal documents we can say that nearly all were Shafi'is.

The effectiveness of the mystical orders (*tunk* or *tarekat*) should be emphasized here. Such orders played a vital role

in the second expansion of Islam (following the taking of Baghdad by the Muslims in 1258) and were found throughout the Muslim world. In South-East Asia the most common were the Qādiriyyah (founded in Baghdad), the Shāfi'iyyah and the Khalwatiyyah, who arrived via India or Khorassan in north-east Iran. These brotherhoods were composed of a large group of disciples and a master (*sheikh*) whose role was that of moral leader. Some of these disciples travelled from place to place, bringing people together and reassuring simple folk by reciting litanies (*dhikr*). Most importantly, the brotherhoods allowed an enormous network of individuals willing to provide mutual assistance to be set up from town to town and from village to village.

Alongside the *tarekat* Islam introduced another institution: the sultanate. Its chief source of inspiration for this seems to have been the Ottoman Empire, whose renown following the taking of Egypt by Sultan Selim in 1517 spread throughout the Indian Ocean. The prestige of 'Rūm' (the second 'Rome') spread as far as South-East Asia, and a document of 1548 informs us that the Sultan of Demak – (on the northern coast of central Java) was putting himself forward as 'a second Turk'. Here, though, the 'sultanate' was far from being a territorial conviction, a grouping of provinces that were more or less united: it was more of a trading centre that included a few small neighbouring ports. Its strength lay in its navy, and power was wielded by the chief merchants, in a manner reminiscent more of Venice than of Constantinople. 'The Sultan is the chief merchant of his lands', a French traveller passing through Aceh said in about 1620. This was an important development in a part of the world where until then politics had been almost exclusively the prerogative of the rice-farming rulers.

The third network consisted of Europeans, all Christians and known locally by the generic term of 'Franks', although there were deep divisions among them. At the start of the sixteenth century the first Spaniards and Portuguese turned up, still filled with the crusading spirit (in the Philippines, they were to call their new Muslim adversaries *Moro*), but the fight against the 'infidel' was not enough to unite them. What is striking about the Europeans compared to the other two networks is the extreme disparity of their efforts. By dividing up the world at Tordesillas in 1494 the papacy had attempted to restrict the competition for a while, but soon the Portuguese were setting themselves against the Spanish (although the two monarchies were united from 1580 to 1640), and the Spanish took up against the Dutch, who in 1602 set up a company (the VOC) to handle trade in the East Indies and shortly afterwards managed to free themselves from the trusteeship of Madrid. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the English and French also became involved and, despite the hostility of their predecessors, tried to open 'lodges', but – as in India – their interests were to lie in constant conflict.

These differences were apparent in the areas of religion and culture also. Generally speaking, the Calvinists preferred to deal with Muslims or 'pagans' rather than 'papists'. They were not yet interested in converting people, and the VOC sent out only the few ministers needed to look after its trading-post residents. The Catholics, on the other hand, were more eager to spread their faith and their language, which prompted them, especially in Luzon, to conduct a policy of 'acculturation' before the term was coined. There again however, despite the papal decision giving 'patronage' (the right to oversee all missions) to the King of Portugal, a hidden rivalry grew up between the various orders, Jesuits,

Dominicans and Augustines, each of which sought to determine its area of influence from the sixteenth century onwards. A group founded in Paris in 1664, 'Les Messieurs des Missions étrangères', would also attempt to build up its own network from its base in Siam.

It is easy to understand how these three major networks, Chinese, Muslim and Christian, with varying degrees of internal homogeneity and often in competition with one another, were able to achieve a level of cultural integration, especially in the towns, while making the social set-up more complicated. More generally, the link in trade that brought people together tended to amalgamate the various regional cultures, while at the same time leading them to emphasize their differences. Faced with the challenge of these new trading communities whose ideologies all questioned to a greater or lesser extent the cosmological foundations of the ancient agricultural societies, the old kingdoms neither failed to react nor reacted in the same way. One of them, Mojopahit, caved in under the pressure (to reappear in another form some 80 years later), but another, Viet Nam, managed to control what was happening and to reduce its consequences to a minimum. Other states suffered the effects of the new communities to varying degrees and came up with interesting solutions.

Before looking at these varying reactions in more detail we should perhaps mention our sources, which at the turn of the fifteenth century were undergoing fundamental changes, further proof of the upheavals taking place in the region. Viet Nam remained faithful to ideograms and the making of inscriptions, but the *nôm* characters were more widely used, and printing began to appear. The changes were much more radical in the former Indianized kingdoms, where characters were no longer engraved on stone or copper, depriving us of one of our most reliable sources. In order to reconstruct the history of these states we have instead numerous 'literary' writings, mythical or legendary tales that were still often inspired by distant Indian models or else 'chronicles' (Burmese *yazawin*, Siamese *pongswadan*, Javanese *babad*) and, being intended to justify a dynasty, gave a different picture of the past each time. These writings, the oldest dating back possibly to the sixteenth century, have come down to us thanks to scribes who copied them on one new *horizon* leaves from generation to generation, and none of the manuscripts available today is older than the nineteenth century. Meanwhile the sultanates, inspired by Islam, were producing a mass of literature, mostly written in Malay, often intended to be edifying and characterized by greater rationality. These manuscripts were written on paper, a more resistant medium now being imported from the West – in a script adapted from the Arabic alphabet and known as *jawi*.

In this respect, the great importance of foreign sources should be stressed. Chinese sources were relatively meagre (literature being of only slight interest to the diaspora of merchants), but sources in European languages are abundant, not to say superabundant. First the Portuguese and Spanish, as early as the sixteenth century, and then later the Dutch, English and French and even the Germans (some of whom had joined the Dutch trading company) produced a huge quantity of stories, reports and maps, of which only a fraction were published at the time. It was not until 1944 that the *Sima Oriental* was published; it was the first – and a very detailed – description of the region, written in Malacca in 1512 by the Portuguese Tomé Pires. A gradual and thorough search of the archives in Lisbon, Seville and The Hague has allowed us to build up a reliable chronology and to study

the development of the trade networks and port communities. For the history of agricultural communities – and especially their attitudes – we are obliged to return to native literary sources, because in general European observers described them only from a distance.

VIET NAM: FIDELITY TO THE AGRICULTURAL MODEL

The case of Viet Nam is especially interesting because the agricultural state there reacted very strongly to the challenge of the merchants. Threatened both by China in the north and Champa to the south, the court of Thăng-long developed an early form of 'nationalism' that led it to glorify its ancestral lands and to distrust 'foreigners', whether they were soldiers or traders. Champa, on the other hand, based mainly on its port capitals – Anurāvaṇī, in the region where Đà-nẵng now stands, and Vijaya, near what is now Bình-dinh – seems to have always taken part in the long-distance trade that linked Western Asia to China from the ninth or tenth century. In any event, after Vijaya was taken by the armies of King Lê Thánh tông in 1471 many Islamized Chams fled towards other trading posts of South-East Asia (Surabaya, in eastern Java, Malacca and Aceh), and there is reason to believe that the Vietnamese victory put a stop to their business. Endorsing the old Confucian distrust for trade, Lê Thánh tông liked to condemn 'those who travel over hill and dale, by river and sea, to fill their houses with gold and use their language to deceive or sell others'. Although less famous and less fortunate than Lê Thánh tông, his successors remained faithful to the same principle.

After the 'peak' at the end of the fifteenth century the Red River Delta region was to go through a period of agricultural unrest and political crisis, which in concrete terms gave rise to the 'usurpation' of 1527. After sixty-five years of fighting the Lê were restored to the throne in 1592 and returned to their palace at Thăng-long. Their victory was largely symbolic, however, for the appearance of a new focal point in the recently-conquered south made cohesion difficult and encouraged the governors' ambitions. In fact, the kingdom was to split into two halves, each under the control of a *chúa* or lord, a position not unlike that of the *shōgun* in Japan, who wielded the real power while the emperors embodied the charisma. The Trịnh family took power in the north (setting up residence at Thăng-long), and the Nguyễn in the south (establishing themselves at Phú-xuân, or Huế, in 1687), while both acknowledged the nominal sovereignty of the Lê. To protect their southern territory the Nguyễn built a wall at Đông-Hải, between the 17th and 18th parallels, and the two enemies waged a murderous war until 1672. This was followed by more than a century of peace, until the Tây-sơn revolt in about 1780 paved the way for reunification.

In the north, the Trịnh had to watch out not only for the Nguyễn and the Chinese, but also for partisans of the Lê, who had many supporters in the rural areas. They strengthened the agricultural foundations of their power, improved the tax system by introducing new taxes (such as the salt tax) and increased the size of their army and navy. Taking literary examinations as their model, they also set up military examinations to help them select their officers better. As any expansion to the south had become impossible they turned their attention to the West, towards the Laotians, from whom they demanded tribute. Private property

ownership was on the increase, as were private fortunes, but the State took care to keep their expansion in check. New mines were worked by Chinese entrepreneurs – but strictly on lease; a few Europeans – mainly Dutch – were given permission to begin trading, as long as they did not leave Phó-hiến, near what is now Hring-yên, south of Hanoi, an area that attracted also Chinese, Japanese, Malays and Siamese.

In the south, the Nguyễn were acting according to the same principles, basing their power on agriculture. They introduced literary examinations in 1646 and built a temple to Confucius (Van-miêu) in the outskirts of Huế. Conditions were quite different, however: in contrast to the 'hemmed-in' countryside of the north, where the layout and use of land was fixed by more than a thousand years of history, the south opened onto the coastal plains of the centre (which the last Cham princes were to relinquish in 1692) – especially the vast plains of the Mekong delta, a huge border zone nominally part of Cambodia but still with only a few small Khmer towns (such as Preah Nokor, which was to become Saigon). In these circumstances, the *chúa* could hardly be as strict as those in the north and merely encouraged the 'course of history' that was extending their territory and turning it into a 'rice basket'. The poor peasants of the provinces near Huế, who were given generous tracts of the new land, were soon joined by Chinese immigrants fleeing the rule of the Manchu. Mac C'iu and his followers arrived in the region from Guangdong, settled in the extreme west near the Cambodian border and opened up the region of Hà-tiên. In 1679 two generals faithful to the Ming brought their soldiers and settled at Mỹ and at Biên-hòa. Private property developed, and the economy became monetarized even faster than in the north; similarly, the presence of foreign traders was a more sensitive issue. The Nguyễn had relations with the Portuguese in Macan (from whom they bought weapons) and received missionaries fairly favourably, but here again foreigners had to stay in one place: Faifo (or Hoi-an), south of the present town of Đà-nẵng. This 'open port' was inhabited at the time by Chinese and Japanese and was also the home of the first Europeans. The true commercial spirit would develop only much later, with the decline of state control and the gradual development of Saigon Cho-Lon.

In both the north and the south culture (*văn*) remained the prerogative of the mandarins. These 'scholars', recruited through examinations but forming a coherent social group, were responsible for the sound management of the kingdom and possessed the knowledge needed for the task. Nurtured on the Confucian classics and passionately interested in history (they wrote the chronicles), they also took an interest in science and technology and wrote in classical Chinese. In the eighteenth century Lê Hu'ân Trác produced a huge medical survey in sixty-six volumes; another who symbolized this encyclopaedic breadth of outlook was the prolific Lê Quý-Dôn, poet, philosopher and historian. On the sidelines of this 'great tradition', however, nonconformist literature, often written in Vietnamese using *nôm* characters, was starting to develop. These works were still produced by scholars, but they were outlawed scholars who, like Nguyễn Bình Khiêm (1491–1587), alone in his retreat 'White Clouds', devoted themselves to criticizing society and denouncing injustice. In the eighteenth century several women also took up their pens to express an early wish for emancipation, and the novel in verse, telling of thwarted love, made its appearance. By way of contrast, ordinary people beset by everyday worries sought refuge in Buddhism, which enjoyed a renewal. New sects flourished – sometimes linked to the temples of

Guangdong – and gave rise to an expansion in remarkable forms of religious art, such as the Bút-tháp temple in the north and the Thiên-Mu pagoda, near Huế (see Plate 111).

WEST OF VIET NAM: RIVALRY BETWEEN THE TWO MODELS

In the centre and west of the Indochinese peninsula the agricultural kingdoms maintained a constant rivalry. The clearings were enlarged, but unlike what was happening in the Red River Delta, where population growth seems to have been sufficient to keep up the move southwards, the labour shortage was acutely felt everywhere. In Thai society (in the centre) and Burmese society (in the west) the rulers' policy was to try to take the inhabitants of neighbouring states prisoner in order to increase their workforce. This meant that war was on the agenda, and some progress was therefore made in military techniques. The use of firearms, documented well before the arrival of the first Portuguese, began to spread, and strategists made increasing use of hundreds, sometimes even thousands, of combat elephants, which were caught in neighbouring forests and skilfully trained. Siege techniques also developed at this period.

In the Menam basin, where the Siamese had settled in the thirteenth century, the main clearings were centred on Chiangmai, in the north (in the region known as Lanna) and – especially – round the capital, Ayuthia, founded in 1350 on a river island some 80 km from the sea. Other less important centres included the provincial capitals of Kamphaengphet, Phitsanulok and Nakhon Rachasima. In the north the Laotians, who were also Thai-speaking, strengthened their settlements near the central section of the Mekong, around Luang Prabang and Vientiane in the Lanxang region. In the south-east the ancient Khmer Kingdom, centred on Lovék, became a medium region, covered both by Siamese, who took Angkor in 1431, and – soon afterwards – by the Vietnamese as they settled in the Mekong delta. In the south Siamese influence was felt up to the borders of Malay territory, on the distant shores of Nakhon Sritthammarat and Patani. In the west the Burmese were expanding their territory, starting with the Thai-speaking Shan states. The memory of the glorious kingdom of Pagan (eleventh to thirteenth century) lived on around Ava, on the upper Irrawaddy, and Taungu, in the Sinang valley. Nearer the sea, Pegu in the south, not far from what is now Rangoon, and Mrauk U in the west near Akyab kept up older local traditions, those of Môn in Pegu and of Arakan in Mrauk U.

The struggle for domination in this complex setting was to last for nearly three centuries, marked by many turns and reversals. Broadly, however, the period falls into three major stages. In the sixteenth century the focal point was clearly in the west, where the Burmese lords of Taungu managed to build up a huge empire by subjugating both the Môn and the Thais. They conquered Pegu in 1538 and made their capital there, then Ava and the Shan states, moved on to capture Chiangmai in 1558; then, after threatening Luang Prabang, captured and sacked Ayuthia in 1569. The major figure of this expansion is King Bayinnaung (1551–81), whose power, according to one European traveller, was greater than that of the Great Turk. He was said to have more than a million soldiers and 4,000 elephants, enormous wealth and a palace covered in gold.

Before the end of the century, however, the Siamese came back in force. King Naresuan went on the offensive and

defeated the Burmese at Nong Sarai (west of Ayuthia) in 1593. Shortly afterwards he attacked the Cambodians and destroyed Lovék. The Arakanese took Pegu in 1599 and brought back to Mrauk U a good part of the booty the Burmese had taken from Ayuthia thirty years earlier. Ambitions then subsided for a time, and the main feature of the seventeenth century was the development of the Thai kingdoms. The kings of Siam – Song Thai (1610–28), Prasat Thong (1629–55) and Phra Narai (1656–88) – rebuilt and embellished Ayuthia while keeping up the pressure on Chiangmai, Myanma and Cambodia (whose new capital was at Oudong) with varying degrees of success. Further north, the kingdom of Viet Nam was also at the height of its glory during the long reign of King Suryawongsa (1637–94). 'Surya' means sun, and historians have compared him to King Louis XIV of France, 'the Sun King'.

During the first half of the eighteenth century the kingdoms appear for a while to be roughly balanced, even though each of them had its own major problems, such as the secession of the south Laotian province of Champassak in 1736, a revolt by the Chinese community of Ayuthia in 1734, a palace revolt in Cambodia in 1736 and a revolt by the Môn in Pegu in 1740. Hanuony returned to the whole region in 1752 after King Alaungpaya came to the throne in Myanmar, rebelled against the Môn and was eager to follow up the exploits of King Bayinnaung. In 1753 his armies took Ava and Luang Prabang, then Dagon (Rangoon) in 1755, Pegu in 1757 and Manipur (in the north-west, near India) in 1758. After penetrating Siam and besieging Ayuthia he died suddenly in 1760, leaving to his second son Hsinbyushin the glory of taking the Siamese capital and depopulating it for the second time (1767). Myanmar, having fought off four Chinese attacks launched in the north between 1766 and 1769 and reconquered Arakan in 1782, again emerged as the major power of the region for a time.

The chronology of these territorial and demographic rivalries should not let us forget the more subtle workings of the trading networks. The capitals of Mrauk U, Pegu and Ayuthia were all quite close to the coast and participated to a greater or lesser extent in shaping the destiny of the ports they controlled: Chittagong and Ramu in Arakan and Martaban, Syriam and Bassein in lower Myanmar, as well as Chantaburi, Nakhon Sritthammarat, Songkhla and Tenasserim, which were all governed by Ayuthia. Nowhere were the Buddhist rulers able to maintain such strict control over the traders as in Viet Nam.

In Arakan, where the influence of Islam went back a long way, the Buddhist kings also had Muslim names and had medals struck in Persian. They had a large fleet (some 200 ships according to a 1569 report), with which they went trading or raiding in Bengal, and when the Portuguese arrived in the region the kings, far from seeking to cut back their ambitions, made them a part of their activities. One of these adventurers, Felipe de Brito, was made governor of Syriam when the Arakanese took the town in 1599. In Lower Myanmar the Môn, who had often rebelled against the Burmese, had for some time turned their interests seawards, exporting mostly rice, rubies and musk from the area near the Sino-Tibetan border and large earthenware jars called *martabans* (after the port where they were loaded). Thanks to the teak forests of the hinterland, Pegu had excellent shipbuilding facilities, and all the foreign captains came to have their ships refitted or build there. After the Portuguese, other Europeans came to Pegu and especially Syriam – the English and Dutch in the seventeenth century and even the

French in the eighteenth century, although Alauwpaya chased them out in 1756.

The effects of the 'trading model' were perhaps even more clearly visible in Siam, where the Portuguese signed a trade treaty in 1518 and a small community of Japanese merchants and soldiers was set up in Ayutthia at the end of the sixteenth century. It was chiefly in the seventeenth century, however, that the kings began to build up an astonishing network of international relations. The court sent an ambassador to the Netherlands in 1608; one to Aceh, in 1613; three to Japan, in 1621, 1623 and 1629; one to Manila, in 1636; and two to France, in 1684 and 1686. This 'openness' is even more clearly discernable in the layout of the capital itself. Drawn up by a French draughtsman in about 1685, it shows the actual royal city, its palace and many temples isolated on a long island in the Menam, surrounded by a whole series of foreign neighbourhoods inhabited by immigrant tradesmen: from China, Japan, Pegu, Cochin China, Malaya, Macassar and Portugal. The Chevalier de Chaumont, Louis XIV's ambassador, commented around the same period:

There is no oriental city where more different nationalities can be seen than in the capital of Siam, and where more different nationalities can be seen than in the capital of Siam, and where so many different languages are spoken.

But things went even further. Far from staying on the sidelines, these foreigners, both Muslims and Christians, played a decisive political role, especially in the second half of the seventeenth century. The Persians were the first to become involved: a group was formed in 1602; they controlled the position of a foreign minister after Prah Narai came to power; and the arrival in 1685 of an ambassador of the Shah of Persia strengthened their situation. However, at this juncture the king changed his mind: he stopped relying on the Shi'is and put his trust in the Christians. It was during this period that Phaulkon was a minister. This adventurer of Greek origin who had been converted to Catholicism played the Europe card: ambassadors were exchanged with the French court at Versailles, and French officers enlisted in the Siamese army. In 1688 it was the Muslims' turn to join the power struggle again where the Macassarese of Ayutthia rebelled in an attempt to put a prince of their persuasion on the throne. Although they failed, the Europeans' popularity plummeted as a result of the incident, and in the next century it would be the Chinese, most of them from Chaozhou, who would exert the most influence. When the Qing Empire felt obliged to start importing rice to prevent famine in 1726 extensive trading was developed with Siam, 'state' trading that benefited the Sino-Thais, who practically had a monopoly of the business, as much as the crown.

The same rivalries are discernible on a smaller scale in Cambodia. Around the end of the sixteenth century it was the scene of a fierce struggle between Malays and Cham Muslims on one side and Portuguese and Spanish adventurers on the other. Diogo Veloso, a contemporary of Felipe de Brito, went to Manila to ask the Governor-General of the Philippines for help, in an attempt to win the king's favour, but he and his companions were eventually massacred by Muslims in Phnom Penh in 1599. In the century that followed King Chan (1642-59) took power with the backing of the same Malays and Chams - he even converted to Islam and took the name of Ibrahim. In 1643 he turned against the Dutch and massacred employees of their trading company who had settled in Cambodia. This rivalry is found as far away as Laos, and when the first Dutch envoy, G. van

Wuysthoff, reached Vientiane in 1641 he found 'Moorish merchants' with 'many cartloads of fabrics' they had brought to sell in exchange for benzoin, lac and gold.

Despite these often implacable wars all the regions dealt with here, from Arakan to the Mekong and from the border with Yunnan province to the Isthmus of Kra, developed the same ideology impregnated with Theravāda Buddhism. As in Viet Nam, there was no real break with previous centuries: this 'old' form of Buddhism (*Theravāda* means 'doctrine of the elders') was already well documented at Arakan around the start of the period dealt with here, at Pagan in the eleventh to thirteenth century, and in the first Thai states in the thirteenth to fifteenth century. This form of Buddhism, which stresses the life of the historic figure of the Buddha and the importance of individual salvation, tended to make greater progress in the south and east at the expense of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which is more influenced by Hinduism and had provided a reference for the Khmer empire. In fact, a degree of syncretism took place between the Hindu concept of the *devarāja* ('king of the gods') found at Angkor, for instance, and that of the *dharmarāja* ('king of dharma', that is natural law) made famous by Emperor Aśoka in India and the great Buddhist kings of Ceylon. The clergy began following the rules of the *Tripitaka*, the sacred texts of Theravāda Buddhism, and Pali replaced Sanskrit as the language of religion, but the kings retained a few Brahman priests (known as *bakhu* in Cambodia), who continued to perform the rituals ensuring harmony with the cosmos.

The focal point for culture was the court, where the king continued to guarantee stability and to provide the driving force behind 'refinement'. From time to time he appeared before his subjects (and the foreign ambassadors who described the scene) like some celestial vision, sitting on a raised platform behind a curtain that was pulled back for a few brief moments. The rest of the while he lived in his private apartments, protected by his female guards, going out only to hunt elephants in the forest. Sometimes the king himself was a good poet (like Prah Narai), but in any case most famous writers were members of his circle, among his family or close companions. These were the authors of official poetry (like the *man-gibi* in Myanmar), romantic poetry, novels in verse and scenarios adapted from the *Rāmāyana* for performance by the court theatre (like the *Rāmakerti* in Cambodia). The sovereign's prestige was greatly enhanced by the regalia he owned, which served as tangible signs of his charisma: statues of the Buddha, which were particularly popular, and white elephants, which moved from one capital to another according to political changes. Around the end of the eighteenth century, for instance, the 'Great Image' of Arakan was 'deported' to Myanmar, and the Emerald Buddha of Laos transferred to Siam.

King Bayinnaung reached the peak of his glory at Pegu in 1576, when he was given one of the Buddha's teeth, a famous relic that had previously been kept in Sri Lanka. In 1623 King Song Tham had the great joy of learning that a footprint of the Buddha had been discovered at Saraburi, some 70 km from Ayutthia, a site that would later become a major place of pilgrimage. This intensely religious atmosphere sometimes verged on the obsessive and even the pathological. In 1634 King Thirithudhamma of Arakan, on the advice of a 'Muslim' wise man, put several thousand people to death in order to prepare an invulnerability potion, and the following year the King of Siam, Prasat Thong, had a large number of suspects executed because something had gone wrong with the cremation of one of his daughters.

The conquering activities of kings were offset, however, by the monks' total abnegation of the world, which made for a fundamental complementarity in as much as in all Buddhist societies every man must at some time in his life withdraw to a monastery and live on alms before returning to the outside world. The sovereign was constantly giving favours to the church, and in return for his gifts of land and the stūpas he had built to house relics, the church reinforced his renown and supported his power. Many prominent monks were also men of letters, and the great pagodas all had a special building that was used as a library. Here the monks studied and copied the sacred texts in Pali and also wrote original works in vernacular languages: uplifting tales adapted from the *Jātaka* or 'former lives' of the Buddha, or historic chronicles like the first great Burmese chronicle, *Yazawingyan*, written in about 1520 by a monk named Thi-lawun-tha. Many of the monks were itinerant and helped to maintain a form of unity in a world torn apart by wars. In this way the influence of the Burmese monks was strongly felt for some time in the Shan country and as far away as Chiengmai and Laos. Van Wyntsthoft, speaking about the Kingdom of Vienniane in 1641, said: 'Nowhere are there such rich churches . . . science is much more advanced, and because of this priests from Camhodia and Siam come every year and stay 10 or 12 years to finish their studies'.

IN THE ARCHIPELAGO: THE TRADING MODEL TRIUMPHS

In contrast to the ponderousness of the agricultural traditions and the ideologies supporting them, a great number of trading cities grew up on the islands of South-East Asia, almost all of them based on maritime trade. They often attempted to annex rival ports but were not really interested in systematically controlling the hinterland. It is quite remarkable that this model spread to regions that had until then remained 'on the sidelines of history', from Sumatra to the Moluccas and even Mindanao – a vast area that if superimposed on a map of Europe would stretch from Portugal to the heart of Russia. Two large areas had a particular attraction for foreign ships: the Straits of Malacca in the west, where pepper cultivation was flourishing in various places nearby (Sumatra, the Malay peninsula and western Java), and the Moluccas in the east, a spice-growing area where traders came to buy cloves and nutmeg in particular.

The Sultanate of Malacca, the fifteenth century's most powerful sultanate, fell into the hands of the Portuguese in 1511, but far from slowing down the process this ostensibly Christian victory actually contributed to the success of several other rival cities and the expansion of the new religion that now moved all of them: Islam. Almost immediately afterwards the port of Aceh (now Banda Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra) began to develop under Alauddin Riayat Shah al-Kahar (1539–71) (see Plate 112). Business was also booming in Banten on the northern coast of western Java, where Islam had been the major religion since 1527 and which the first Dutch sailors described around the end of the sixteenth century as an important port and a major exporter of pepper. In central Java, the Muslim port of Japara (near what is now Semarang), launched a naval expedition against Malacca in 1513, with little result it must be said, despite the deployment of a huge ship capable of transporting a thousand of men and much admired by the Portuguese. Soon afterwards the Sultanate of Demak, also near what is now Semarang, was

at the height of its influence, taking control of the old rice-growing state of Mojopahit in 1527 and inspiring fear both in the ports of eastern Java and in those of the island of Lombok. Further north, the Sultanate of Brunei, whose power was described by Magellan's companions in 1521, extended its control along a large part of the northern coast of the island of Borneo (which on European maps took its name from Brunei) and began a push eastward by sending *mutabighi* to Mindanao and the Sulu islands. In the east the focal point was Ternate, where Sultan Babullah (1570–84) overcame Portuguese manoeuvres and retained control of the spice islands.

For a large part of the seventeenth century fortune continued to smile on the great sultanates of the west (see Plate 112). The Sultanate of Aceh, especially after the sea-faring expeditions of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607–36), known as the new Alexander of Macedonia (or commonly known as Alexander the Great), controlled not only the west coast of Sumatra (where he obtained gold and pepper) but also various small sultanates on the Malay peninsula, such as Johor, Pahang and Kedih (where he sometimes destroyed pepper plantations to keep up prices). The Sultanate of Banten (see Plate 113), another major supplier of pepper, also went through a period of expansion under Sultan Ageng (the 'Great Sultan'), who was nevertheless obliged to yield to the Dutch trading company when it took the town in 1682. In the central part of the archipelago the major power was Macassar, whose princes embraced Islam in 1607 after being visited by several Portuguese missionaries and which managed to resist the Dutch until 1666. The Sultans of Macassar, who believed in free-trade, took advantage of their favourable geographical position by selling the spices their ships brought back from the Moluccas to traders from China, Golkunda and Goa. In the north-east, at the mouth of the River Piliangi on the island of Mindanao, the Sultanate of Maguindano flourished under Sultan Kudarat (d. 1671), controlling a major trade network halfway between the interests of the Spanish in Manila, who built the fort of Zamboanga in 1635, and the Dutch in Batavia, who had taken over from the Portuguese in the Moluccas and had settled in Ambon.

The fall of Macassar in 1666 followed by that of Banten in 1682 did not in any way mean that the Dutch trading company was to control the whole area and that the sultanate model would disappear. Just as the fall of Malacca had stimulated trade in other Muslim ports, that of Macassar would give rise to a large 'diaspora' of Bugis adventurers and a revival of the Muslim networks, especially near the Straits of Malacca. In the west, in addition to Aceh, which was a major centre of activity throughout the eighteenth century, other sultanates worth mention are the tin-exporting Sultanate of Perak on the Malay peninsula, the Sultanate of Palembang in south-east Sumatra, based on the ancient Kingdom of Śrīvijaya, which was known to Arab travellers as early as the eleventh century, and the Sultanate of Riau on a small island next to what is now Singapore, where a few Bugis princes threatening to reconquer Malacca had settled. In the centre of the picture, on the large island of Borneo, the influence of the Sultan of Brunei was fading, while the Sultanate of Banjarmasin was gaining power in the south. In the east, on the old sea route linking the Moluccas to China, the Sultanate of Jolo, in the Sulu archipelago, was flourishing, and the bustling activity there was admired by English traveller Thomas Forrest in 1775.

All these new trading cities had one thing in common: they were no longer built according to a plan with a geometric

layout and specific orientation, like the old agricultural cities. The urban fabric was made up of various adjoining districts installed on both banks of an estuary (*kuah* in Malay), which provided fresh water and a useful route for shipping and gave direct access to the land upriver that supplied the necessary wood and also some food plants for gathering. Each district (the Malay word *kampung*, whose first meaning is village, acquired this new sense) brought together foreigners from the same region and was run by a leader, who was often the richest merchant of the group. In more than one port could be found not only the *Kampung Melayn* (Malay district) but also the *Kampung Jawa*, where the Javanese settled, the *Kampung Bugis*, home to people from southern Celebes, the *Kampung Pegu*, for Peguans from lower Myanmar, the *Kampung Cina*, or Chinese quarter, forerunner of many other *Chinatowns*, and the *Kampung Keling*, or Indian quarter, whose inhabitants came from Kalinga, now Orissa. The sultan's palace was no longer in the centre, as in the time of the *rājā*, and the real heart of the city was around the port, which was controlled by a new type of civil servant, the *syahbandar* (from a Persian word meaning head of port), and in the chief markets (*pasir* in Malay), where business was conducted. These new types of town, reminiscent of Italian and Flemish Renaissance cities, were only the outer signs of a far-reaching social upheaval linked to the development of a monetary economy and to the reorganization of the system of dependencies.

Apart from a few abortive attempts in Java and the striking of a small gold coin in the port of Pasai in the fourteenth century, the archipelago knew practically nothing about the technique of minting money and from the eleventh century onwards used mainly the copper coins exported by China. From the fifteenth – and especially the sixteenth – century many of the sultanates mentioned above decided to strike their own coinage (see Figure 23). Aceh and Macassar made fine gold coins called *mas*, and Banten, Patani, Kedah and Perak made coins known as *tash* (cf. the Sanskrit *karshā*) from tin or an alloy. Even more significant than this gradual increase in the amount of currency available was the appearance of

new concepts such as capital, interest, deposit, bankruptcy and liability, which are found in legal documents from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (especially the collections of laws or *undang-undang*) and reveal a growing curiosity about the business of dealing in money. An interesting maritime code written in 1676 in the Bugis language by one Amanna Gappa, a lawyer from Celebes, defines the various types of trading partnerships and shows how some people entrusted their money to ships' captains (*nakhoda*), who undertook to invest it profitably overseas. The burden of risk varied, as did the sharing of the profits, according to the type of initial contract.

The development of a monetary economy shook up the old social order at the same time as the new ports were stimulating geographic mobility. A period of intense intermixing followed. At the top, there emerged a new social élite – the *orang kaya*, who were both the 'upper class' and the 'wealthy people', since the word *kaya* was losing its etymological meaning connoting height and superiority and acquiring the sense of wealth, which it has kept since. Around these notables, whose prestige was directly linked to the number of 'men' they had, new clienteles emerged, especially owing to the new custom that forced bankrupt debtors to go into the service of their creditors. Among these many 'clients' – automatically described as 'slaves' by the first European observers by analogy with Islamized Mediterranean societies they happened to have known – there were well-trusted men who might end up as ministers or generals, bodyguards (like the *Mamluks* in Egypt during the same period) and skilled craftsmen, as well as humble servants, who were indeed forced to do hard labour. The *undang-undang* specified the status of the *abdi*, or dependant, and this status was far superior to that of a slave under Roman law. In many seventeenth-century Malay texts that show how the society of these sultanates saw itself there is no mention of *abdi* but of a sort of 'social community' described as *orang banyak* (masses) or *rakyat* (people), with at the foot of the list a small group of poor or humble folk (*fakir miskin*), who are always spoken of with sympathy and held up as examples because of their ascetic life-style.

At the same time a new concept of the state was growing up. It was no longer seen as a microcosm seeking harmony with the natural order but as a human machine based on a sort of 'social contract', although the term itself was not used. 'The king may well be resolute and well-informed', says one document, 'but if his ministers and people (*rakyat*) are not in agreement the country will not know peace; fire cannot burn if there is no wood to put on it'. So the sovereign was no longer above other people, only the first among them, and at prayer times he bowed down with them in the same direction. There were limits he must not go beyond, and a fine seventeenth-century text, *The Crown of Kings*, analyzes the ideas of tyranny and abuse of power and goes as far as admitting the possibility of insubordination if despotism becomes excessive. In order to exert his power the sultan gathered around him a few *orang kaya* to advise him: a prime minister, who was also head of the treasury, an admiral, a chief of police and, naturally, a judge (*kadi*).

Even more important perhaps were the profound changes taking place in people's attitudes that show the growth of a kind of modernity. The new ideas that are emerging include that of the individual (*niás* or *diri* in Malay). Previously, hierarchical constraints had meant people existed only according to a strict order, at the unchangeable level decided by their birth. The idea of a person was slowly making its

MONNOYES

D'or & d'argent du Roy d'Achen, avec celles d'or du Roy de Macassar ou de Celebes; & celles d'argent & de cuivre du Roy de Camboya.

N^o. 1. & N^o. 2. C'est la monnoye d'or du Roy d'Achen en l'île de Sumatra. Le sultan en est le seul maître, & son nom est gravé sur le revers. L'once est divisée en quatre grains. Cette pièce pèse 17 grains, & vaut 100 sols de la monnoye de France.

N^o. 3. & N^o. 4. C'est la petite monnoye d'or du même Roy, laquelle est d'essai de poids & de titre. Comme l'autre est divisée en quatre grains, celle-ci en est divisée en deux. Elle pèse 8 grains, & vaut 50 sols de la monnoye de France.

N^o. 5. & N^o. 6. C'est la monnoye d'or du Roy de Macassar ou de Celebes. Cette pièce pèse douze grains, & les Hollandais la prennent pour un florin de leur monnoye, ce qui ferait de la monnoye portugaise 100 sols de la monnoye de France. L'once en est divisée en quatre grains.

N^o. 7. & N^o. 8. C'est la monnoye d'argent du Roy de Camboya, de bon argent, & qui pèse deux grains. La pièce vaut 100 sols de la monnoye de France, & le Roy s'en fait pour sa propre consommation. Il est gravé d'un d'or dans son revers, mais il n'est pas pour sa propre consommation, & il se négocie au poids de même que l'argent, comme l'on fait dans la Chine.

N^o. 9. & N^o. 10. C'est la monnoye de cuivre du Roy de Camboya. Le Roy de Java, le Roy de Siam & les Rois des îles Malagasi ne font point d'autre monnoye que des pièces de cuivre de la même forme & de même poids. Pour ce qui est des monnoyes d'argent des autres Rois, elles sont toutes de la même forme & de même poids.



Figure 23 1-8: minted gold and pewter coins from the Sultanates of Aceh, Macassar and Celebes; 9-10: silver and copper coinage from the Sultanate of Cambodia.

Source: *La monnaie/Extraits des voyages de Tavarin* by D. Lombard.

way forward through reflection on the transitory nature of this world, the shortness of life and the importance of the last judgement. A poem entitled the *Poem of the Ship* (*Syair Perahu*) compares each of us to a sailor on board ship who must cling to God as to a tiller in order to survive the storm and come safely to port. People were thenceforth masters and mistresses of their fate, and it was up to them to steer their boat with the appropriate instruments.

Another characteristic of these urban societies was their tendency to develop a new conception of time and space. The individual, gradually learning to modify his relationship with others, was also modifying his relationship with the world. The notion of space, previously conceived as a *mandala*, that is according to the simple shape of a geometric figure with cosmological powers, became more complex and varied until it became the heterogeneous, unpredictable geographical space implicitly accepted by all modern societies. The pure forms of the ideal diagram – a central point with four points of the compass – gradually faded to give way to the truer contours of shorelines, an asymmetric and uncertain line, but the only one that would allow real voyages. The conception of time, called by the new term *waktu* that had been borrowed from Arabic, was also evolving. From the heterogeneous, qualitative meaning it once had, it was tending to become more consistent and uniform, and less attention was paid to the sequence of lucky and unlucky days. Instead of fixed and concentric it became linear, aligning itself on two basic moments: the creation of the world and, even more important, the end of the world, which by setting a time limit on everything gave drama and morality to the present. Not only did the new trading cities become part of the *ummat* (the whole of the Islamized world) by adopting the Muslim calendar; they also developed a new interest in history. At some royal courts (Macassar and Bima for instance), the secretaries kept a daily record of events; and at Aceh in the seventeenth century Nuruddin ar-Raniri wrote the *Garden of the Sultans* (*Bustan us-Salatun*), a vast survey of knowledge that includes an attempt to recount the history of the world.

IN CENTRAL JAVA: RE-EMERGENCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL MODEL

The case of Java is particularly interesting because it is in sharp contrast to the trade model that seemed to be having its day throughout the rest of the archipelago. Central Java, from the eighth to the tenth century and then eastern Java, from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, had witnessed the rise of large agricultural kingdoms but – as we have just seen – the most recent of these, Mojopahit, fell to the Sultanate of Demak. After 1527 there were no states inland, and for more than half a century all we hear about are the trading cities on the north coast. Around 1580, however, the centre of the island woke up, forest clearance started again and the lords of Mataram founded their first capital at Kota Gede (the 'Great City', near what is now Jogjakarta). The new government deliberately attempted to revive the great tradition of Mojopahit, assembling a body of civil servants – the *priyayi* or 'younger brothers' of the sovereign – granting privileges to the princes of royal blood, restoring a land-tax (usually paid in rice) and reorganizing a court, reviving many rituals inspired by the old royal religion. At the same time, the government adopted the new religion practised by the coastal towns; built mosques and decided to use the Muslim

computation of the calendar, although with quite a few changes.

The 'founder' of the new dynasty of Mataram was Senapati, who defeated his rivals in 1586, strengthened the army (his name means 'head of the troops'), started to collect Javanese lands and threatened the trading posts on the coast. His grandson Mas Rangsaug (1613–45), who towards the end of his life took the title of Sultan Agung or Great Sultan (not to be confused with Sultan Ageng of Banten), continued the same policy. He attacked Madura in 1624 and Surabaya in 1625, each time deporting thousands of prisoners to central Java (which recalls the major transfers of manpower that took place on the Indochinese peninsula). In 1628 and again in 1629 he sent his generals to attack Batavia, but the Dutch managed to hold on, with some difficulty. Some time later, around the middle of the century, his successor Amangkurat I, also tried to force the ports to ban free enterprise and practise state-controlled trading under the supervision of his agents.

In the end, however, the Dutch company managed to acquire the north coast ports (Cirebon, Semarang and Surabaya), thus gaining control of all foreign trade. Mataram, cut off from the sea, concentrated on agriculture, growing cotton, sugar-cane, indigo and tobacco as well as rice. After various civil wars, known as wars of succession, the Treaty of Giyanti of 1755 divided the kingdom between the two branches of the dynasty and restored a lasting peace. There were now two main courts, that of the *Sunan* in Surakarta and that of the Sultans in Jogjakarta. Both towns, about 60 kilometres apart, were laid out in the chequered design inherited from the old agricultural model, with the palace right in the centre. Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century and up until 1825 peace allowed the countryside to flourish, and the population even started to increase. A new social group made its appearance – the sikep, rich peasants who now owned their land and employed others to cultivate it.

Culturally, Java was the scene of astonishing syncretism. Islam, which on the coast had operated as a network ideology, adapted to agricultural constraints and fitted in with the demands of a territorial monarchy. In the capital, the great west-facing mosque became one of the symbolic structures of the palatial architecture, and the old rituals of harmony took on shades of Islam (such as when the great pre-Islamic festival of social cohesion, *ngarabeg*, came to fall on the same day as *muhad*, which commemorates the birth of the Prophet in the Muslim calendar). The scenarios of the *wayang* (shadow theatre) and the works of the court poets continued to draw inspiration from Indian mythology, and in the countryside the local religion based on intercessory saints (whose tombs or *kramat* were worshipped) is often observed at the older holy sites.

THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: MALACCA, MANILA AND BATAVIA

Before 1800 only three European powers were able to exert any lasting influence in the region: first the Portuguese, who started settling in Malacca in 1511, then in Timor and Solor, and in Macau in 1556; followed by the Spanish, who settled in Cebu in 1565 and in Manila in 1571, eventually controlling all the island of Luzon and the Visayas from these two bridge-heads; and lastly the Dutch, who settled in Batavia in 1619, in the Moluccas shortly afterwards, in Malacca in 1642 (thus cutting through the Portuguese route linking Goa to Macau),

in Macassar in 1666 and in Banten in 1682, and who extended their control on the north coast of Java as well as a few small parts of Sumatra. The English and French sent quite a lot of traders to the region and even a few ambassadors (plus some missionaries in the case of the French), but they had only short-term accommodation there. Their political influence really began to be felt only right at the end of the eighteenth century, when the English company set up a trading post in Penang in 1786 and chased the Dutch out of Malacca in 1795, and when Mgr Pigneau de Béhaine, a missionary at the court of Huế, pressed the Versailles government to intervene in Vietnamese affairs.

It should be pointed out that the Europeans first got a foothold where the trading model was prevalent and where it was easier to slip into the existing networks. In Malacca, Manila and Batavia there were formerly Muslim trading posts, from which the newcomers dislodged the original occupants. It is well known that this occurred in Malacca, which in the fifteenth century had been the seat of a great sultanate, but it is no less clear that in Manila in 1571 a group of Muslim traders led by Raja Suleiman barricaded themselves inside a fortalice and resisted Legaspi's Spaniards for a time, while in Jakarta, a port subservient to the Sultanate of Banten, the Dutch of J. P. Coen had to expel the 'infidels' before 'founding' the city of Batavia, which was to become the centre of their Asian network.

It should also be borne in mind that these three European nations were far from having the same type of influence in the region. There were the Catholics and the Protestants on opposite sides of course: the Spanish and the Portuguese seeking to absorb the 'gemiles' and spread their language and religion through missionary orders (see Plate 114), and the Dutch, who were less concerned with their customers' 'salvation' and had much less influence on the societies with which they came into contact. But it is possible to split the Europeans up differently, and in a way that may be even more enlightening, into the Portuguese and Dutch *networks* on the one hand, and Spanish *territorial* construction on the other. And in this way we return once more to the contrasting trading and agricultural models that attracted our attention in the beginning.

In Malacca, the Portuguese merely took over the trading site they had conquered, and the town remained divided into different ethnic districts as before. A cosmopolitan town of the same kind grew up in Batavia, with its Chinese, Balinese, Ambonese, Macassarese and Morish *kampung*, all grouped around the *casteel*, the fortalice housing trading company officials and their servants. Like the other sultanate city seats, these two were largely unconcerned about the hinterland, except perhaps the city's immediate outskirts, and lived solely according to the distant trading posts with which they were linked: Goa and Macau for the Portuguese, Colombo, Amihon and Deshima for the Dutch. By way of contrast, the Spanish city of Manila, although it did look towards both Acapulco and the ports of Fujian province, also claimed to be the capital of a huge expanse of agricultural land, which was soon divided and distributed, just as other provinces of the New World had been, and was governed by both a religious and an administrative hierarchy. Five provincial towns acted as links with the central government, each built around a central *plaza*, near which were situated the governor's palace and the church. These were Vigan, Nueva Segovia (now Cagayan) and Nueva Caceres (now Naga) on the island of Luzon, and Cebu and Arevalo (now Iloilo) in the Visayan Islands.

As a result of these basic differences western influence was naturally much stronger in the Philippines than anywhere else. Printing was introduced in Manila in 1593, and soon a number of colleges seeking to spread the best of contemporary Western knowledge were established. For instance, the Jesuits founded the San Ignacio college in 1589, and the Dominicans the Santo Tomas college in 1616. The educational efforts of the Portuguese, for whom the most important centres were Macau and especially Goa, and of the Dutch, who began to set up higher-education establishments only in the twentieth century, seem quite derisory in comparison. One case stands out as unusual: that of the Sultanate of Macassar, situated roughly midway between Manila and Batavia, which around the middle of the seventeenth century took an interest in Western sciences (as did the Chinese at about the same time). The best-known figure in this respect is Prince Pattingalloang (d. 1654), who had learnt Portuguese, Spanish and even Latin and had a fine library of books and atlases in these languages. He had studied mathematics, astronomy and geography and, as a devoted Muslim, liked to discuss religion with visiting missionaries. He ordered from The Netherlands various optical instruments and a huge armillary sphere made by the Blaesus and delivered by the Dutch trading company in 1651.

The contrast between Manila and Batavia, although marked in the seventeenth century, tended to fade during the century that followed. The decline in the spice trade and the adverse effects of competition from the Chinese – whom the Europeans did not hesitate to eliminate physically on occasion (10,000 were killed in Batavia in 1740, and 6,000 in Manila in 1762) – meant the Dutch began to consider the possibility of exploiting their land to better advantage. Inspired both by the Enlightenment and by physiocracy, some governors introduced 'enlightened' reforms aimed at getting a better return from the countryside (Von Imhoff in Java, from 1743 to 1750, and Basco y Vargas in Luzon, from 1778 to 1787). Scholary societies were formed (in Batavia in 1778 and Manila in 1781), bringing together settlers of goodwill and aiming to boost profits by dint of one 'scientific' study after another. In 1788 the Spanish obtained a monopoly in tobacco, with a system of enforced cultivation – which the Dutch copied much later, in 1830.

DECLINE OF EUROPEAN INFLUENCE TOWARDS THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

There is nothing at the end of the eighteenth century to suggest that the European networks were expanding; quite the opposite, and while historians may tend to stress the study of these networks it is only because of their success in the centuries that followed. The Dutch company's profits were plummeting, and an observer commented in 1770: 'Once the company traded with Cochin China, Tonkin, Siam, Pegu and Arakan – but nowadays it no longer does.' The old 'Manila galleon' monopoly linking Manila and Mexico was maintained until 1815, even though it was a barrier to free-trade and prevented the Spanish from looking more towards Asia. These problems worsened once the Netherlands and Spain were caught up in the upheaval caused by the French Revolution and involved in the blockade imposed by the Napoleonic Empire.

These increased difficulties seem to have given rise to fresh activity among the Asian networks. Thomas Forrest, quoted

earlier, spoke of their vitality, both in the Sulu islands and at Aceh. It was also at this period that the Sultanate of Palembang was growing up under Sultan Muhammad Baha'uddin (1774-1804), the Sultanates of Siak and Banjarmasin and especially the Sultanate of Riau, at the entrance to the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese continued to pursue their business, either in collaboration with the sultans or on their own account. At Bangka, where tin was discovered in about 1710, the Sultans of Palembang entrusted mining to the Chinese. In western Borneo, not far from Pontianak, where gold was plentiful, Hakka miners established in 1775 a small republic that lasted for a century.

Even more significant were the changes taking place on the Indochinese peninsula, where two major new powers that would be talked about for a long time were growing up: Siam and Viet Nam. Shortly after the sacking of Ayuthia by the Burmese in 1767 the Siamese underwent a revival on the initiative of general Taksin. Mainly owing to the Chakri family, who installed a new dynasty, they founded a new capital destined for a great future - Bangkok - and tried to gather under its leadership all the Thai-speaking peoples. At the same time, the reunification of Viet Nam was taking place, first following the revolt of the Tay-so'n, whose leaders, from the south, pushed back the Siamese, retook Hanoi and defeated the Chinese in 1789, and then thanks to the heir of the Ch'ua in the south, Gia-long, who defeated the Tay-so'n, re-established the capital at Hué and restructured an empire that spread from the Chinese border to the frontier with Cambodia.

This was the new situation the Europeans would find themselves confronted with when they returned to the region in force following the Treaty of Vienna.

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CHINA

Wang Sizhi

THE ERA AND THE SITUATION

Territory covered by China during the Ming and Qing eras: internal differences

China is in East Asia, on the western shore of the Pacific Ocean. Between 1500 and 1800, the period covered by the Ming and Qing dynasties, China's territory stretched to Korea in the east, Viet Nam, Laos and Myanmar in the south, Nepal, Bhutan, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the south-west, Burut and Kazakhstan in the west and north-west.

From east to west and from north to south, relief and climate vary enormously. Altitude is much higher in the west than in the east; the Qinghai-Xizang plateau is called the 'roof of the world'. South-western and north-western China feature many high mountains, extensive deserts and poor natural conditions. There is very little arable land, and the soil is sterile.

From north to south, China covers two climatic regions: one temperate and the other tropical. The climate and physical geography vary greatly from north to south. In the border regions, conditions are relatively harsh, and much better in the interior of the country and on the coast. During the Ming and Qing eras, the frontier regions were sparsely populated and quite isolated. The social economy was very backward. The coastal areas, on the other hand, were heavily populated, with efficient communication, and were very developed both culturally and in terms of the social economy. As a result, an imbalance in the country's economic development emerged.

The administration and development of frontier regions by the Ming and Qing governments

China is a country made up of many nationalities – more than fifty in all. The Han are the largest nationality, accounting for more than 90 per cent of the country's population. Most members of the national minorities live in the border regions. The national minorities have their own ways and customs, their own religions and their own social systems, which are different from those of the Han. During the Ming and Qing periods, those in power governed and administered these regions with military and administrative bodies created in accordance with local specificities (see Maps 27 and 28).

A national geographical map was drawn in the reigns of Kangxi (1667–1723) and Qianlong (1736–95). Kangxi's *Huangyu quanlan tu* (Complete Overview of the Imperial Territory) was drawn by government envoys having done local surveys. This was a first in old China. Qianlong's


Huangyu quanlan (Complete Atlas of the Imperial Territory) on the other hand, was drawn on the basis of Kangxi's map, and also took into account surveys of Xinjiang and the area to the west of Xinjiang. Errors in the previous map were also rectified. Emperor Qianlong ordered detailed surveys of Xinjiang, and a careful revision of the map. The surveys took six years, from 1755 to 1760. After the final edition of the *Huangyu quanlan* (Complete Atlas of the Imperial Territory) was completed, the emperor ordered the French missionary P. Michael Benoist to engrave the map on 104 sheets of copper, in 13 rows. In 1760, the map was printed for the first time. Under Qianlong, there were four printed issues in all (see Plate 115).

Transport

'From Beijing, to the four corners of the country, relay posts were set up.' There were two types of relay posts: one type for the rivers and the other for land routes travelled on horseback. Their role was to forward mail and provide food and shelter for mandarins on official business. The relay post chief's task was: 'forwarding of mail, receiving travelling mandarins, looking after horses and boats, cooking and accommodation.' The services offered varied in accordance with the travellers' status. Military information received in urgent treatment, and was carried at a speed of 400 to 600 li in a single day. Messengers carrying urgent military messages changed horses at each post, and remained on the road day and night. The relay posts were under the authority of the Ministry of War.

The Grand Canal was the main artery for north-south traffic during the Ming and Qing. In 605, emperor Yangdi of the Sui began work on the canal, and this work was continued by the dynasties that followed. In 1600, the Ming government put 90,000 people to work on a project to make the canal wider and deeper. It was not only used to transport several hundred million *jin* (million piculs) in grain taxes collected by the government in the south, it was also the main route for trade and cultural exchanges between north and south. On their six southern tours, the emperors Kangxi and Qianlong travelled on the Grand Canal. The Canal brought unprecedented progress to the large cities along its length.

The Yangzi was the main artery for east-west traffic. Grains and other cargo from Sichuan were first transported on the Yangzi to Hunan and Hubei, and then to other areas of the south along the Yangzi. Salt produced in the areas around the Huai River was transported on the Yangzi from Yihui (Jiangsu) to Hankou (Hubei), where it was sold to distributors.



Map 27 The Ming period (after *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 7: *The Ming Dynasty 1368–1644*, Part 1, Cambridge, 1988, p. xxiv).

Vessels with capacities of up to 500 tonnes were used to carry salt. Hankou (Wuchang fu), a city located midway along the length of the Yangzi, became a hub of north-south and east-west transport. Traffic on the Yangzi was so heavy that the river was thick with the masts of boats. According to the section on transport in *Qingshi gao* (Draft of Qing History), the journey from Beijing to the frontier regions lasted a minimum of several months, which greatly limited trade and cultural exchanges, as well as the exchange of information.

POPULATION AND ECONOMY

Population

China experienced two major population shifts between the sixteenth century and the early nineteenth century. The first was a sudden drop in population corresponding with the war years of the early Qing (around 1626–62). The second was a significant increase in population in the eighteenth century, at the height of the Qing dynasty (1720–92). During the rest of the period covered by these two dynasties, the population increased at a regular rhythm.

It is very difficult to establish any precise figures for the population during these three centuries, because demographic statistics were often inexact. The recording of statistics was sometimes interrupted because of wars or natural disasters. During these disaster years, a large proportion of the mobile population disappeared from the records. In an attempt to pay less tax (especially the 'head tax'), many families concealed their true size. In addition, the backward demographic techniques used by the governments make the task of conducting research on the history of population enormously difficult. For example, under the reigns of the Qing emperors Shunzhi (1644–62) and Kangxi (1662–1723), head taxes were paid on the number of adults (16–60 years old). For this reason, the government was more interested in the number of adults than in the population as a whole, and statistics reflected this. The keeping of genuine demographic statistics began only in the Qing era, in the reign of Qianlong (1736–96). It is thus impossible to know what the population of China was in the first centuries of the Qing; it can only be estimated on the basis of figures available.

Opposite is a table showing the number of adults for this period (sources: government documents) as well as the total population based on experts' estimates (see Figure 24):



Map 28 The Qing period (after *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10: *Late Ching 1800-1911*, Part 1, Cambridge, 1978, p. xii).

Under the Ming (1500-1626)

Year	Initial Population	Estimated Population
1500	50,858,937	92,745,000
1520	60,606,220	94,242,000
1542	63,401,252	93,638,000
1562	63,654,248	96,782,000
1602	56,305,050	98,780,000
1626	51,655,459	99,873,000

Under the Qing (1646-1734)

Year	Number of Adults	Estimated Population
1646		88,486,000
1661	19,137,652	91,178,000
1682	19,432,353	95,413,000
1702	20,411,380	100,628,000
1722	25,763,498	124,103,000
1734	27,355,462	131,771,000

Under the Qing (1741-1800)

Year	Initial Population	Estimated Population
1741	143,411,559	159,601,000
1762	200,472,461	210,389,000
1782	281,822,675	288,305,000
1800	295,237,311	299,961,000

Figure 24 Populations under the Ming and Qing dynasties, 1500-1800

Source: Government documents.

It is very difficult to know anything about population distribution or density during these 300 years, just as it is difficult to know the population of the country as a whole. In general, population was concentrated in the south, especially the south-east. These areas accounted for a steadily increasing proportion of the national population.

In the mid-seventeenth century, war caused a significant drop in the populations of several regions. For example, in Sichuan, the population went from 3,561,243 in 1626 to 958,196 in 1661, that is fewer than two inhabitants per square kilometre. Other regions such as Hunan, Guangxi and Zhejiang also experienced significant decreases in population. Only after China was unified under the Qing dynasty and the political situation stabilized did the population stabilize and begin to increase.

Under the Qing population distribution was such that two-thirds of the population was concentrated in the following regions: Sichuan, Hunan and Hubei, around the upper reaches of the Yangzi, which accounted for a quarter of the national population; Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangxi, along the lower reaches of the Yangzi, which accounted for 23 per cent; Henan, Hebei and Shandong in northern China, which accounted for one-fifth. In terms of breakdown between North and South, the 14 provinces of the south accounted for two-thirds of the country's population and the provinces of the north accounted for the remaining third.

There were many waves of migration under the Ming and Qing, when populations were forced to leave their homes to go and settle in other regions. This was brought about by the annexation of land, natural disasters, the wars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and excessively rapid population increases resulting in land shortages. According to estimates based on statistics, in 1661 the national population was 91,178,000, and there were 549,257,700 mu of farm land (1 mu = 0.0667 ha), that is 6.1 mu per person. In 1806 the population exceeded 300 million, and the amount of farm land per person decreased to 2.37 mu. Given the productivity of the time, between three and five mu per person were needed to provide the population with sufficient food. 'With arable land very limited, and the population having increased too rapidly, it has become impossible to live in ease and tranquillity.' Things were difficult for the entire country.

During the Ming and Qing eras, peasants who had lost their land came to the cities to become artisans or labourers, or went abroad – for example to the Malay archipelago – to seek a living. But most went to less populated areas like Sichuan, Mongolia, Xinjiang and the North-east, and to the remote, mountainous areas of certain provinces to develop previously uncultivated land. In the early Qing dynasty, peasants headed to sparsely populated Sichuan, attracted by its rich soil. Between 1743 and 1748, 243,000 peasants from Hunan entered Sichuan through Guizhou. According to estimates, at least 100,000 families from Hunan and Hubei left for Sichuan. Thus, the expression 'Hubei and Hunan fill up Sichuan' was coined. This massive immigration resulted, over a century, in increasing Sichuan's population by 8 million, making it one of the most populous provinces of the country. Those who migrated to Xinjiang, Mongolia and the North-east developed the frontier regions, reinforced defence and alleviated the dilemma of overpopulation and scarcity of land.

Agriculture

In ancient China, agriculture was the most important sector of production, and was accorded priority status by all dynasties. In the late Ming dynasty, economic policies generally imitated those which had been applied previously. In 1581, under the reign of Wanli, tax reforms were carried out and the taxes of those peasants with the least land were reduced, a measure which contributed to the stability and development of agricultural production.

Other reforms were made to the tax system, with the objective of decreasing taxes. In 1712, a decree was published to the effect that 'never again should additional taxes be paid for new adults'. In 1723, a new policy on taxes was implemented: land was distributed in accordance with the number of adults, and taxes were paid in accordance with the amount of land possessed. In addition, the government granted tax exemptions on a large scale.

Two economic policies applied over quite a long period under the Qing were the encouragement of the cultivation of waste land through a system of rewards, and the construction of hydraulic works. In order to provide more farm land, the government encouraged peasants to work previously uncultivated land, awarding bonuses for this. A decree stipulated that any *shengyuan* (licentiate), land owner or simple peasant having worked too *qing* (1 *qing* = 6.6667 ha) of previously uncultivated land and possessing intellectual knowledge could be nominated as a candidate for chief of the district. In 1669, the law on the *geng ming tian* (changing

the title-deeds of land) was enacted. Land that had belonged to the former Ming feudal state was distributed to the peasants who worked it, increasing their motivation.

These agricultural policies under the Ming and Qing proved very effective, and agricultural production developed significantly.

Production techniques were improved. They concentrated on careful ploughing and intensive ploughing, the rational and diversified use of natural fertilisers including soya cakes and night soil. They acquired better tools, and progress was made in hydraulic irrigation. Windmills and bullock carts were widely used, resulting in increased agricultural production. Let us take the example of rice, the main cereal crop during the Qing dynasty in the region south of the Yangzi. Each mu produced a yield of 2 to 3 *dan* (1 *dan* = 100 litres), sometimes even 5 to 6 *dan* – much more than during the Song (960–1279) and Yuan (1206–1368) dynasties.

Progress was also made in the selection and improvement of crop varieties. Under the Ming, double harvest rice appeared in Fujian, Zhejiang and other provinces. Triple harvest rice appeared in Guangdong. In some northern provinces like Hebei, rice was grown over extensive areas. The most important event was the introduction of a number of foreign crops: groundnuts from America were introduced via the Malay archipelago, and maize and tobacco were introduced from the Philippines.

By the eighteenth century, maize and sweet potatoes, introduced from the Philippines in the early Ming dynasty, were grown throughout the country. Up to the mid-eighteenth century, sweet potatoes were primarily grown in the south. Because the south was very heavily populated, land was scarce and grain production was insufficient. Maize was also an option for farmers, offering a high yield and taking up less land. This new crop got the support of Emperor Qianlong himself. He called upon local governors to encourage farmers to grow sweet potatoes in order to meet the people's food needs and prevent famine. Sweet potatoes thus became more and more common throughout the north. In Shandong, they were intensively grown almost everywhere. The inhabitants used them as a substitute for grains, or in addition to grains and vegetables. Sweet potatoes thus became a speciality of this province.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the structure of Chinese agriculture was as follows: wheat, rice and other grains were grown throughout the country. Rice was more commonly grown in the south and wheat was more widely cultivated in the north. The provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan were the main producers of grains for the market. Much of their production was sold in the large cities and their outlying areas. Cash crops were numerous and widely grown throughout the country. They included sugar cane, produced mainly in Fujian, Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Guangdong and Guangxi; tea, produced mainly in Fujian, Zhejiang and in the Yangzi and Pearl River basins; market garden crops in the areas outside the cities; tobacco, first grown in Fujian and Guangdong and later grown in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong; and cotton, which was grown all over the country, from north to south (see Plate 116).

In comparison with the situation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the agricultural structure of the eighteenth century featured the following characteristics:

- (a) A rapid increase in the area used to grow sweet potatoes and grains such as maize.

- (b) Southern crops such as rice and water chestnuts gradually spread to the north. In the early eighteenth century, an excellent variety of rice called 'west of Beijing rice' was grown outside Beijing. In 1704, under the Qing, rice was planted in the fields of the low-lying lands in Tianjin, Fengrun and Baodi. By 1727, this experiment was very successful, and the region became the north's 'land of fish and rice' (This expression is generally used to refer to very rich areas in the south.)
- (c) A shift in the major grain producing regions. Up to the eighteenth century, Jiangsu and Zhejiang were the main grain producing provinces. Under the Song dynasty (960–1279), it was said that 'a good harvest in Jiangsu and Zhejiang was enough for the whole country'. In the eighteenth century, the increased cultivation of cash crops had a major impact on grain production. These regions experienced substantial demographic growth, and became more and more heavily populated. Instead of selling their grain to other areas, they were forced to buy grain. During this period, regardless of the harvest, the city of Suzhou in Jiangsu had to buy several hundred millions of litres of rice every year. At the same time, other regions – Hubei, Hunan and Sichuan – began growing grain for the market. In the early eighteenth century, the provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong were forced to buy rice from Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. The south-east was most dependent on grains from Hubei and Hunan. If shipments from these two provinces were only slightly late, prices immediately rose in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Sometimes, serious unrest resulted. It would have been appropriate to say that 'a good harvest in Hubei and Hunan was enough for the whole country'. Not only did these two provinces become major grain producing regions, they also became transport hubs for the grain market. Rice produced in Sichuan, around the upper reaches of the Yangzi, was generally transported to provinces in the south-east and elsewhere via Hankou (Hubei). In the eighteenth century, Sichuan became a well known as a grain producing region. Chongqing, in the east of the province, was a major grain market. Merchants bought grain there, shipped it on the Yangzi to Hankou and then sold it all over the country. At the time, people said that the grain of Jiangsu and Zhejiang was provided by Hubei and Hunan, which were themselves dependent on Sichuan for supply.

Manual trades

Traditional Chinese manual trades comprised many branches. The most important ones were textiles, salt production and metallurgy.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Chinese textile sector experienced very significant development. Towards the end of the Ming, one could find at the market in Suzhou (Jiangsu) all types of looms for weaving different types of fabrics: silk chiffon, raw silk cloth, gauze, silk gauze, silk cloth, cotton cloth, and so on. Artisans used these to manufacture many types of fabrics, and yield increased considerably.

Nanjing, Suzhou (Jiangsu) and Hangzhou (Zhejiang) were the main centres of the textile industry during the Ming era. The government had textile plants built there which made products only for the Imperial Palace, and brought the most skilled weavers there to make silk for the Imperial court. A complete range of high quality products existed, and there

was a great demand for them.

Apart from these three cities, textile manufacturing also flourished in various cities and towns of the south-east.

The textile industry also developed in the countryside. In the provinces of Jiangsu, Sichuan and Shandong, peasants not only worked the land but made textiles as well. Many applied themselves to spinning cotton thread and weaving. Some peasants also spun linen thread. In the more remote areas, the peasants made textiles for their own use only, but those in the outlying areas of the cities and in the south-east manufactured textiles for the market.

There were three sectors of salt production: sea salt, salt extracted from well water and salt extracted from inland salt marshes. The first type of salt was produced in the coastal areas, the second in Sichuan and Yunnan and the third in Shanxi and other provinces. At the time, there were nine salt producing areas in the country. These were also the places where the salt was sold. This activity occupied large numbers of people, and the different tasks were very distinctly divided. Salt merchants possessed great wealth, and the salt tax accounted for a large proportion of government income.

Copper, iron and coal were mined. The most famous copper mines were in Yunnan. In 1705, the government stationed officials at the sites to collect taxes and supervise production. This was the start of government administration of copper mining. Iron mining and casting activity was concentrated in Guangdong and Shaanxi. In Foshan (Guangdong), the main metallurgical centre, there were dozens of metallurgy workshops employing thousands of workers. Their products – wire and cast iron pots – were sold all over the country. It is significant that during this period many workshops were not government run. In 1753, Guangdong had sixty-four workshops run by businessmen. This reveals a new tendency in the Chinese economy.

Coal mining was at its height in the middle and end of the eighteenth century. In 1740, the Qing government announced that anyone mining coal would be exempt from taxation. The number of mines grew very rapidly thereafter.

Apart from textile manufacture, salt production and mining, other sectors of activity developed to varying degrees between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

With the development of manual trades, the specialties of certain cities became famous throughout the country. Hangzhou was known for its fans, silk thread, flour, rice, tobacco and scissors. Ningbo became famous for its gilded lacquer objects, which embodied the traditional know-how of earlier generations as well as techniques from abroad. Guangzhou and Chaozhou in Guangdong province were known for their ivory sculptures, their pewter utensils and their rattan products, which were sold throughout the country. Two in every ten urban families made a living from making rattan objects.

Trade

Under the Ming and Qing, the tradition of emphasizing agriculture to the detriment of trade remained quite influential. The Qing emperor Yongzheng said: 'Agriculture is the basic occupation of the world, whereas industry and trade are less important.' He advised local mandarins to tell the peasants of the importance of agriculture, so that they would be proud of their occupation. Nevertheless, over the 300 years between 1500 and 1800, trade developed remarkably. In particular, a close relationship was established

between the peasants and the market. This new relationship featured the following characteristics:

- (a) In certain regions, some of the peasants gradually abandoned the land to go into business. This was seen mainly in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui and Shanxi.
- (b) The development of auxiliary farming activities. From the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, some landowner-traders, who had both land and capital, hired labour for production and sold their goods on the market.
- (c) More and more auxiliary farm products were traded. In the production model of ancient China, the men worked in the fields and the women worked the looms. As agricultural production increased, surplus production was sold on the market and trade came to exist in the Chinese countryside on a large scale.

As economic activity developed under the Ming and the Qing, powerful, wealthy businesses gradually emerged and began to play a role in the economy. After the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the different sectors of trade in China was controlled by large corporations. The main groups were those of Anhui, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Jiangyue, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The businessmen of Shanxi were specialized mainly in the financial market, and had offices throughout the country. They provided banking services and collected money and grains on behalf of the government. The Guangdong merchants, who were granted exclusive status and privileges by the government, specialized in foreign trade. The Anhui corporation had large amounts of capital, and their activities included salt and pawnbroking as well as trade in tea and wood.

The emergence of foreign trade was unquestionably one of the most important events of these 300 years.

Up to the sixteenth century, China's main foreign trading partners were countries of East Asia such as Korea, Japan, Annam (currently in Viet Nam), the Philippines, and so on. In general, relations between China and foreign countries were stable and harmonious.

After the advent of the Qing dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century, the anti-Qing forces headed by Zheng Chenggong (1624-62) occupied Taiwan. In 1656, the Qing government officially prohibited traders from exercising commercial activities overseas. Those who violated this law were killed and their goods confiscated. In 1661, another decree ordered the inhabitants of the coastal areas of Fujian and Guangdong to move 30 to 50 li inland. The purpose of this was to cut off communication between the mainland and Zheng's naval forces.

Although both these laws were enacted as part of China's internal policy, they had the negative effect of completely cutting off China's foreign trade. It was only in 1683, when the Qing recovered Taiwan, that these two laws were rescinded and foreign trade resumed.

In 1683, for the purposes of foreign trade, the Qing government established four customs offices: one in Guangzhou (Guangdong), one in Zhangzhou (Fujian), one in Ningbo (Zhejiang) and one in Yantai (then Jiangnan, now Jiangsu and Anhui). In order to encourage foreign trade, the emperor Kangxi ordered the reduction or exemption of taxes levied on foreign merchant ships. Great numbers of foreign ships began arriving on China's coasts, and China's foreign trade began to thrive once more.

In 1717, afraid that people might meet at sea and plot revolt against the government, Kangxi had forbidden Chinese

ships to go to the Malay archipelago to trade. This ban was lifted ten years later.

From the mid to late eighteenth century, China's foreign trade experienced unprecedented growth. The government, fearing foreign invasion and revolt by its people, adopted a policy of total restriction – a closed door policy. Three of the four customs offices were closed. Only the one in Guangzhou remained open for foreign trade. Restrictions were applied to the numbers of foreign ships allowed to dock and to the types of cargo they were allowed to bring. The activities of foreign merchants in China were restricted, and they were prohibited from dealing directly with their Chinese counterparts. All business was to be handled through the Corporation of Chinese Merchants. This Corporation set customs duties and the prices of imported and exported goods, and controlled the buying and selling of these goods.

Despite all of these restrictions, trade grew with foreign countries¹: The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Britain, France and the United States. The first three had begun trading with China under the Ming. The first English ships had reached China's coast in 1637. French ships had arrived in Guangzhou in 1660. America did not send its first ships until 1784, but by the end of the eighteenth century was already China's second most important trading partner.

It is interesting to note that before the Opium War (1839-42), the balance of trade was always very favourable to China. The table below shows receipts for trade between Guangzhou and the West in 1792 (in *tael* of silver) (see Figure 25):

Countries or Companies	Imports	Exports
East India Company	2,775,119	4,566,299
Private ships of this Company arriving in:		
Hong Kong	1,608,544	968,632
Spain	10,458	
Denmark	3,276	228,653
Sweden	66,457	279,003
France	49,120	361,925
Holland	342,330	536,812
United States	109,816	317,270
Genoa	54,130	86,780

Figure 25 Trade between Guangzhou and the West in 1792.

As can be seen from this table, over a single year, China had a foreign trade surplus of 2.4 million *tael* of silver.

At the time, England was China's biggest trading partner, accounting for 50 per cent of total trade. The value of Chinese goods exported to England was higher than the total value of Chinese exports to the other countries. This meant that more money came into China from England than from anywhere else. Between 1710 and 1759, following the alliance of the old and new East India Companies, an estimated 26,833,614 pounds sterling in gold and silver flowed into the East (mainly China) from England. Of this total, only 9,248,306 was in exchange for merchandise. A Qing mandarin wrote: 'The foreign ships, which always waited for the monsoon in May and June, were loaded with little merchandise but much silver.'

In the eighteenth century, conflicts between China and the western countries became more obvious. They concerned three areas:

- (a) The conflict between the desire of the Europeans and the Americans to expand their trade, and the closed door

policy practised under the Qing. As the western powers tried to encroach on China's sovereignty, China defended its independence, its sovereignty and its dignity. The following example was typical of what was happening.

In 1793, a special messenger of the English government addressed a set of demands to the Chinese government: that a permanent ambassador should be sent; that an island near Zhushan be made available to English merchants and that land near Guangzhou be ceded for the use of English merchants; that taxes on English merchants be reduced or abolished for goods transported from Guangdong to Macao by inland waterways. Obviously, these demands were categorically rejected. In response to the demand for land, the emperor Qianlong replied: 'The celestial dynasty and the celestial land have been recorded in the books. The national territory has its borders which must be respected. Even an island or a sandbank belongs to someone. This favour especially shall not be granted.'

- (b) Conflicts caused by the Qing governments' ignorance of the outside world. From their celestial empire, the Qing governments scorned all other countries and considered normal trade activities as a favour granted to foreign countries. Foreign envoys were expected to kneel before the emperor.
- (c) The conflict caused by the illegal import of opium into China and China's struggle against opium. With the aim of tipping the trade balance in their favour, English merchants used opium to try to open China's doors. In 1727, England sent its first 200 crates of opium to China. Each weighed 132 pounds. In 1767, a thousand crates of opium were imported. In 1729, the Chinese government issued a decree banning the smoking and sale of opium. In 1796, opium imports were banned. In 1800, these decrees were formally reiterated. Still, the foreign merchants, in particular the English, scoffed at China's laws. Between 1795 and 1799, they sent 4,124 crates of opium to China. In 1800, 4,370 crates were sent. Opium imports drained money out of China, and the price of silver rose swiftly. The mental and physical health of the opium smokers were seriously affected. Under these circumstances, the Chinese people unanimously and urgently called for the prohibition of opium. Finally, the Opium War with England broke out.

Estimate of economic conditions during this period

In the 300 years between 1500 and 1800, China's social economy experienced two periods of prosperity. The first was in the early sixteenth century, when the Ming implemented a set of policies aimed at lightening the burden of the people, increasing stability, developing production and restoring vitality. This prosperity was a result, in particular, of the economic growth which first appeared in southern China in the fifteenth century. The period was characterized by an increase in population and in farm land, technical progress in small-scale industry and the development of trade. Unfortunately, these successes were spoiled by corrupt governments and social unrest. The second period of prosperity began in the eighteenth century, under the reign of Kangxi. It was thus called 'the golden age under Kangxi'. On a purely economic level, it was a repetition of what had happened in the fifteenth century. However, significant progress was made in various areas, including the development

of frontier regions, the maximization of land-use, the development of more and more comprehensive tools, the improvement of production techniques, the development of a commercial economy, better selection of farm crops and the introduction of new varieties. In all of these areas, progress greatly surpassed that of all of the dynasties prior to the Ming. In the final 100 years, China began to have contacts with Europe and America, especially in the form of trade. Obviously, there were ups and downs, as well as some conflicts. But this marked the beginning of ancient China's relationship with the contemporary outside world. Although modern science and technology did not develop in China, and the industrial revolution did not take place there, history nevertheless marched on.

SOCIETY

Manchu privilege

From the time the Qing unified the country in 1644, the Manchus enjoyed various privileges over other ethnic groups.

On a political level, the Manchu nobility, headed by the emperor, controlled the key institutions of central power. The principle of 'Manchus first' was institutionalized at every level of political life.

On an economic level, as soon as the Qing had crossed the passes and penetrated into the interior of the country, they occupied Han lands in and around Beijing and distributed them to the mandarins and soldiers of the Qing Banners. They then hired or forced the Han to work the land.

Under the law, Manchu criminals could be tried only by military courts under the authority of the Manchu army. When a nobleman or a member of the Imperial clan was concerned, he was tried in the residence of his family. If a Manchu and a Han were on opposite sides in a lawsuit, the case might be tried by the local court. However, this court did not have the authority to pronounce the verdict, but had to transmit the evidence to the Manchu legal authority.

High ranking civil servants

In ancient China, mandarins and their private collaborators belonged to a privileged class. They enjoyed a high degree of social status and were very influential. There were differences between mandarins and private collaborators. A mandarin had official seals. A private collaborator was appointed by a mandarin to advise him. Under the Ming and the Qing, mandarins were classified according to nine ranks. Each rank was divided into grades: a principal grade and a secondary grade, so that there were eighteen grades in all. Mandarins from the second rank upwards were top level civil servants. Those between the second and fourth ranks were considered middle level. Those below the fourth rank were low level. The mandarins were selected principally from among successful candidates in the official examinations, the students of the Imperial College in Beijing and the élite of the successful examination candidates presented for entrance to the Imperial College. One could also become a mandarin by buying one's way in, by being recommended or by heredity. Most mandarins, however, were selected by examination. Under the Ming and the Qing, each mandarin could call upon several private collaborators, even several dozen, for assistance and advice. Mandarins also hired full-

time messengers to serve them. In politics, the mandarins' decisions and behaviour could be influenced to some degree, sometimes decisively, by his subordinates.

During the Ming, mandarins' monthly salaries ranged from 87 *dan* of rice (1 *dan* = 100 litres) for a mandarin of the first rank and the principal grade, to five *dan* of rice for a mandarin of the ninth rank. The Qing followed the same system that had been used by the Ming, but reduced the amounts; a mandarin of the first rank and the principal grade in Beijing received only 180 *tael* of silver and 90 *dan* of rice a year; not much for a mandarin of this level. In the early seventeenth century, the salary system was reformed, so that the mandarins received a large sum of silver in addition to their salaries: 20,000 *tael* each year for a governor general, 15,000 *tael* for a provincial governor, 1,000 or 2,000 *tael* for local civil servants (prefecture or county). This enabled them to live comfortably, to meet their families' needs and to pay their counsellors and messengers.

Mandarins were dispensed from the obligation to perform *corvée*. Under the Ming a mandarin of the first rank and of the principal grade in Beijing enjoyed a tax reduction equal to 3 *dan* of grain and was exempted from paying the head tax on the first thirty adults of his household. A civil servant of the ninth rank had his taxes reduced by 6 *dan* of grain and was exempted from paying the head tax on six adults. Under the Qing, tax reductions were much more limited: only the civil servant (and not his family) enjoyed tax exemptions.

Under the law, various privileges were granted to mandarins. These included commutation of sentences, exemption from corporal punishment and the right to redeem one's sentence in silver or grain.

The mandarin could also bequeath his rights to his descendants. He could leave his noble title to his wife, his child or his parents. His descendants were also assured of becoming mandarins through a system of special privileges.

Landownership system and rural society

There was no change in the system of landownership during these 300 years. The Imperial family, the nobles, retired and serving mandarins, landlords and peasants were the principal owners of land during this period. Some Daoist monasteries and temples, as well as some merchants and artisans, also owned some land.

Under the Ming, the lands belonging to the Imperial family were called the 'Imperial farms'. These were at their peak in the sixteenth century. In 1514, these farms covered 37,000 *qing* (1 *qing* = 6.6667 *ha*), a ten-fold increase over the area of such farms a few years previously. These farms were worked under a tenant farming system. Under the Qing, the Imperial farms were managed by the accountants of the Imperial Treasury and were spread throughout the empire: near the capital, in Shengjing, Jilin, and so on. There were about a thousand of them, covering an area of 3,930,000 *mu* (1 *mu* = 0.0667 *ha*) and equalling 0.5 per cent of the farm land owned by all of the other classes of the country. At first, slave-labour was used in the Imperial farms. Slaves worked under the supervision of farm foremen, and had to provide the Imperial family with grain, vegetables and fruits, or pay an equivalent sum in silver. Gradually, slavery was replaced by sharecropping. Freed slaves became farmers, and rented Imperial land.

Under the Ming and the Qing, noblemen, like princes and rulers, had a special political position, as did their relatives

bearing the same surname and their relatives by marriage. They had great quantities of land.

It is true that the Imperial family, the noblemen and the mandarins owned vast quantities of land. However, most of the land still belonged to the people, who could be divided into various categories:

(a) Landlords belonging to the common people. These people had no titles and no particular political status. They were not mandarins. Their land holdings ranged from several dozen *mu* to 1 million *mu*. In general, they owned around 100 *mu* of land. They used salaried labour and tenant farmers to farm the land. In the first instance, labour was hired and the landlord provided tools to the salaried workers responsible for production, and paid them a salary. Sometimes, they also received food and housing. With the tenant farming system, land was rented to tenants who farmed it and paid the landlord for the right to occupy it.

Rent was paid as either a percentage or a fixed amount. Under the first system, the farmer gave the landlord a fixed percentage of harvested grain. Under the second system, an amount was determined in advance, and this was paid by the farmer to the landlord, regardless of the size of the harvest. Rent was paid either in kind or in silver. In the eighteenth century, in the southern Chinese countryside, the percentage system of paying land rent gave way to the quota system, and payment in kind replaced payment in silver.

(b) Peasants who owned or part-owned land. These people's land holdings were small, and the number of this type of landowner was a key factor in the functioning of China's feudal economy. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the prosperity of the Qing was largely due to a series of policies such as encouraging the cultivation of previously uncultivated land and the transfer of landownership — which resulted in many peasants becoming peasant landowners. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the other hand, natural disasters and to an even greater extent land annexation were directly responsible for social unrest. Peasants who were owners or part-owners of land lost their land and were left hungry and cold. Eventually, they rebelled against the social order of the time.

Under the Ming and the Qing, agriculture was the main sector of production. Most of the people lived in the countryside. In many provinces, villages were populated by members of clans bearing the same surname, and people tended to live in extended families. Many great and sometimes very powerful families were to be found in the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hunan, Anhui and Shandong. Over the generations, certain clans came to encompass thousands, even tens of thousands of households, and they could trace their lineage very far. Many villages bore the name of an important family.

In this clan-ruled society, the clan chiefs were honoured and respected. They naturally came to be governors of sorts. The clan chiefs were elected on the basis of rank among the generations, age, reputation, virtues and the rules they held. Those clan members who had performed illustrious deeds or who had good reputations — whether or not they were mandarins — also enjoyed a respected position in society.

Peasants who were landowners or part-owners of land, together with tenant farmers, made up the majority of rural inhabitants. Their social position was not very high. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, salaried employees

were in a position of inequality in relation to their employers. In the eighteenth century, the number of free workers rose very swiftly. In 1790, the government announced that farm workers would have the same rights as other free workers. In the countryside, slaves occupied the lowest social position. In the late Ming dynasty, slaves in Hunan and Hubei, whose condition was passed from father to son, worked the land of others, as did the enslaved farm workers of Zhejiang, southern Anhui, Fujian and Guangdong. After the Qing crossed the Shanhaiguan pass and penetrated the interior of the country, slavery became very prevalent. 'In the mandarins' homes, there were many slaves.' Slaves were exiled criminals, prisoners of war, adversaries who had surrendered and people who had sold themselves into slavery. Once they became slaves, they had no personal freedom whatsoever. 'There was a clear division between them and their masters.' Legally, 'slaves were inferior, on the same level as animals'. They were not free to marry as they chose, and the enslaved condition was passed on from generation to generation. In the eighteenth century, the government enforced a law allowing some slaves to become *baixing* (common people), and the number of slaves diminished.

During the Ming and the Qing, the migrant population was very large, and scattered throughout the country. In the sixteenth century, many of these people headed for mountainous regions like Jingxiang to develop waste lands. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they went to Sichuan, Inner Mongolia and the North-east, as well as to the remote cities and regions of certain provinces. Among the migrant population, clan authority was less strong, social differences less important and the notion of geographical origin less dominant than in traditional rural society.

Cities, trade and small-scale industry

China's old, established cities owed their development to political and military factors and were used by central governments as bases from which to exercise their supreme power over their immense territory. From the Tang and Song dynasties onward, and especially during the Ming and the Qing, cities were political centres and also played the role of regulating the economy and developing culture. Urban ways of life tended to reflect the rest of society.

The development of cities over this 300 year period was marked by the flourishing small and medium sized towns (*zhen*). In Jiangsu, Hangzhou and Huzhou, where the commercial economy was highly developed, small towns appeared and grew into cities.

The small and medium sized towns served to link the large cities with the countryside. Commercially traded agricultural products (grains and other crops) were centralized in these towns. Merchants and local government authorities purchased the products and dispatched them to other regions where they were sold. Everyday manufactured goods such as salt and dyes also poured into the towns, to be sold later in rural areas on a wholesale or retail basis. The towns also organized cultural activities, so that peasants coming to market could attend operas, buy books and new year pictures and consult fortune-tellers. Often, peasants from different areas arranged in advance to meet in a nearby town.

The large cities played a more complex political, economic and cultural role than the towns. The main large cities of the time were as follows. Nanjing, also called Jinling or Jiangning, was the national capital at the beginning of the

Ming dynasty. The city's walls had a total length of some 67 li: 20 li from north to south and 11 li from west to east. This city of 500,000 inhabitants was known for its industrial and commercial activities, which covered around a hundred sectors, including copper, silk, dyeing, carpentry, paper fans and oil pressing (see Plate 17).

Beijing was the centre of politics and culture under the Ming and Qing dynasties. It consisted of an outer walled city, an inner walled city and the Forbidden City. The walls of the inner city's walls had a total length of 40 li; those of the external city measured 28 li (from the south-west to south-east corners of the inner walled city). The Forbidden City, where the Emperor lived, covered an area of approximately 720,000 m². The mandarins and noblemen lived in the Interior City, and the Outer City was occupied by commercial and industrial activities. The Outer City had countless shops and businesses, and was crowded with restaurants and tea shops. Luxury goods such as cloisonné, jade and carved lacquer objects were developed in Beijing for use by the mandarins and noblemen (see Plate 18).

Yangzhou was served by the Grand Canal and the Yangzi, and thanks to its favourable geographical location it soon became a commercial city specialized in the trade of salt and timber. It reached the height of its development in the eighteenth century. In order to receive the emperors Kangxi and Qianlong when they made their tours of the south, the local governments and merchants carried out major construction projects. Yangzhou became famous for its wide streets and admirable architecture. Rich merchants also flocked to Yangzhou.

Guangzhou was China's gateway to foreign trade under the Qing, as well as the political and economic centre of southern China. In the eighteenth century, the city's foreign trade activity thrived, and several dozen foreign merchant ships arrived in Guangzhou harbour every year (the record was eighty-three). The Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi, who had his headquarters in Guangzhou, was responsible for the civil administration of the two provinces as well as for defending the coast against invaders.

During this period, the development of the frontier regions and the garrisoning of troops in these areas resulted in the appearance of border towns in the north-east, the north-west and Inner Mongolia. These towns included Aihui (Heilongjiang) and Yili (Xinjiang). The presence of the troops and their families attracted artisans and traders, and industrial and commercial activities were established. Some of these towns even became regional economic centres.

However, merchants in China were not considered socially respectable during this period. They came after the mandarins, farmers and manufacturers in terms of social status, as trade was seen as a secondary occupation. Some merchants bribed mandarins with large sums of money in the hope of raising their social position. Others bought titles or mandarin status. They frequented scholars in an attempt to display their distinction, or donated huge sums of money in times of flood, war or when the emperor was visiting, in order to demonstrate their loyalty and good faith. In 1784, when the emperor Qianlong was touring in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the salt merchants of Anhui donated a million tael of silver. They also had palaces and roads built, and presented the emperor with gifts of jewellery. As a reward, the emperor granted them titles and privileges, thus satisfying their desire for greater honour and social position.

Unlike the merchants, who used their contacts with influential people to climb the social ladder, the artisans kept

to themselves. Methods of production were in the process of radical change. Artisans who had worked independently began producing goods in workshops under the direction of employers. Employers and employees were linked by a contract of sorts, but the traditional relationship of individual dependency did not exist. Workers were paid according to their qualifications, their techniques, how much they produced and the quality of their products. It was also during this time that the labour market began to take shape. In seventeenth century Suzhou, there were many unemployed artisans seeking jobs every day.

In the factories, conflicts between employers and workers grew, and the workers' protests and calls for more rest multiplied. The local government always sided with the employers in these cases, and used its power to put down the workers. Today, we know that the workers' demands for more rest reflected the fact that striking was forbidden at the time. At the same time, the merchants and manufacturers of the cities were often victims of the bureaucrats' demands. Sometimes, workers and employers got together to resist government despotism, and their protests turned into citizens' movements.

Women

During these 300 years, women remained as dependent on men as they had been in previous times, and were severely repressed by Confucian moral tradition.

The tradition of parents marrying off their children in accordance with their own wishes continued to prevail. Many marriages were not for love, but were arranged. Family tragedies were common, and women were the most unfortunate victims.

Women were unfairly treated in matters of inheritance. Women themselves were often treated as chattels by their husbands, who could do what they wished with them. Husbands often put their wives into bonded labour, or even sold them. Zhao Yi, a specialist in history, wrote:

In Gansu, poor husbands rented their wives out to others. The man who rented the wife of another man was often too poor to get married, or his wife was sterile. Thus, in order to perpetuate the family, he rented the wife of someone else for a fixed period, after which he returned the woman to her husband.

Under the Ming and the Qing, the law allowed widows to remarry. However, public opinion and various policies encouraged women to remain forever faithful to their deceased husbands.

Social division and social mobility

Confucianism preached respect to persons who were older or of a superior generation. Children counted for little. In ancient China, society – apart from the imperial family, the nobility and the bureaucracy – was divided into four classes: scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants, who were known as the 'four peoples'. These four social classes made up the bulk of the national population. At the bottom of society were performers, lowly people, domestic servants and slaves. Because of their lowly status they were scorned by society, and could not interact with respectable people. Monks had a certain social status. The 'four peoples' corresponded to the division of labour into four orders, reflecting the

government's level of esteem for each class. The scholars were the intellectual, scientific and cultural class of the era. They supplied the bureaucracy, and were therefore respected. The emperor Qianlong said this about them: 'The scholars are highly esteemed by the State, because they are virtuous. One day, they will occupy very important positions.' This was why the scholars ranked first, in front of the other three social classes, and were respected by society. The expression 'the scholar's career is the only noble one, and all other occupations are inferior to this' reflects the esteem in which scholars were held by the people at this time.

Confucianists emphasized that food was the people's first necessity, and believed that peace and prosperity would reign when every family had sufficient food and clothing and when all the people were both well fed and well educated. As a result, they held agriculture in esteem, and encouraged people to devote themselves to that which was essential: farming. They also believed that those who devoted themselves to agricultural production should be appreciated, because agriculture was the essential thing on which a State was founded, and that artisans and merchants, instead of working at the essential task (agriculture) were grasping and superficial and were therefore to be disdained. The Confucianists were for using every political measure to restrict the activities of these artisans and merchants. But the economy could not do without artisans and merchants, especially under the Ming and the Qing, with the development of the market economy and the scarcity of land in the countryside. Some of the peasants in certain areas became artisans, and commerce became an irrepressible historical trend.

Under the Ming and Qing dynasties, the 'four peoples' system of the division of occupations and social classes was not totally rigid. In reality, there was always some mobility between the four classes. The scholar class was not, strictly speaking, an independent class. One could not become a scholar through inheritance. People of other social classes who studied and passed the official examinations could become part of the scholar class, and could even have careers in the civil service. Inversely, failed or disillusioned scholars might be reduced to becoming farmers, artisans or merchants. The government did nothing to stop this. Moreover, under the Ming and the Qing, artisans and merchants often bought land and became landlords. They could also buy their way into the bureaucracy, or obtain a title for a large sum of money or through donations. Large numbers of peasants left their own land and became small traders or salaried farm workers.

Ancient Chinese society, based principally on four social classes: scholars, farmers, artisans and merchants, was very different from western society in the Middle Ages. In feudal Europe, there was a clear distinction between those who governed and those who were governed. The division between the feudal lords and the hereditary serfs was never crossed. The State's power was distributed among the feudal lords occupying successive ranks under the king. Each lord enjoyed total administrative, financial, legal and military power over his domain. There was no real professional body of administrative bureaucrats. In China, the opposite situation prevailed. Those with wealth or land were not necessarily political rulers. The entire country was governed by administrative civil servants under the emperor. Political matters were settled in accordance with the laws and regulations. The length of a civil servant's term was limited, and only in exceptional cases could one become a civil servant through inheritance. The four social classes were not rigidly separate, but there was some mobility between them. In

theory, anyone, no matter what his social position, could become a mandarin if he passed the official examinations and if he was determined to achieve merit and glory. We can thus see that traditional Chinese society had its own internal structure, which was different from that of feudal Europe.

POLITICS

Organization of the central government

Under the Ming and Qing dynasties, the central government was organized according to the same political model as in previous dynasties, with certain modifications.

Ancient China was ruled by a monarchic regime, in which the emperor was above all powers of the State. The emperor was at the head of the Ming and Qing governments, in which the Cabinet was responsible for relaying reports to the emperor and for transmitting the emperor's decrees and edicts. Under the Ming, the Cabinet held all executive powers and was hierarchically superior to the Six Ministries. Attached to the central government were the *Ducha yuan* (Censorate) and the *Linke jishizhong* (Supervising Secretaries of the Six Offices of Scrutiny, the bodies responsible for supervising and inspecting the work of civil services and the administrative departments). The central government also established the *Tongzheng si* (Office of Transmission) and the *Dali si* (Court of Judicial Review), responsible for the affairs of the Imperial Court and the Imperial Family.

During the Qing era, the central government established new administrative bodies: the *Jinji du* (Grand Council) empowered by the State in all military and administrative matters and substantially limiting the powers of the Cabinet; the *Lifan yuan* (Court of Colonial Affairs), responsible for affairs concerning national minorities like the Mongols, as well as for certain diplomatic affairs; and the *Baqi dutong yamen* (Supervising Office for the Eight Banners), responsible for the affairs of the Eight Banners of the Manchus, the Mongols and the Han.

The most important organs of the Ming and Qing governments were the Cabinet (for the Qing, the Grand Council), the Six Ministries and the Censorate. These organs shared responsibility for the State's administrative and military affairs, and took their orders directly from the emperor.

The emperors

In the 300 years from 1500 to 1800, China experienced rule by two dynasties: the Ming and the Qing. From 1500 to 1800 thirteen emperors ruled China. Sixteen emperors sat on the throne during the Ming dynasty, which ruled China for 277 years (1368–1644); in the 268 years of the Qing (1644–1911) dynasty, ten emperors succeeded one another.

The emperors of every Chinese dynasty claimed that they ruled the empire with the Mandate of Heaven. They were called 'Sons of Heaven', which indicated that they ruled over the people in obedience to an order from Heaven. All the power of the State was with the emperor: personnel, civil service, legislation, courts, civil affairs, finance and military affairs. The emperor Qianlong said: *Qianlong di duan*: the emperor alone represents the authority of the State. Civil servants of every echelon had to obey his orders. To ensure that submission to the emperor would become second nature to mandarins, loyalty to the emperor became one of the

essential rules of conduct, to be complied with totally by all civil servants and all the people of the country. However, in actual political life, the emperor might be so incompetent or so debauched, or indeed so young when he ascended the throne, that imperial power sometimes fell into the hands of other people. During the Ming era, power was usurped for a certain period by mandarins and eunuchs.

There were many different types of imperial decrees, with a great variety of names. The terms most commonly used were *zhao* (edict), *shangyu* (imperial instruction) and *zhupi* (vermilion endorsement), so called because only the emperor had the right to use ink of that colour. They were used to issue the most important imperial military and administrative decrees. The other means were used for appointing high ranking civil servants, for conferring titles of nobility and for organizing ceremonies.

When administrative bodies or civil servants had memoranda or reports to give to the emperor, the Cabinet or the Grand Council (under the Qing) examined them first. Once ratified by the emperor, they became imperial edicts. The Qing emperors were very involved in the affairs of the government, and personally ratified all reports. Today, many documents of this type, some classified chronologically, are preserved at the No 1 First Historical Archives of China.

Once on the throne, the emperor remained there for the rest of his life. Only a crown prince could succeed him. The Ming followed the system of succession used by previous dynasties, that is only the eldest son of the legitimate wife (the empress) could be the crown prince. If he died young, the eldest grandson of the legitimate wife ascended the throne. If the emperor had no such grandson, one of his other sons would succeed him on the throne, in order of age. If the crown prince was designated when the emperor was still on the throne, he was referred to as the heir apparent. During the Qing era, the old system of succession was modified in accordance with Manchu specificities. When the emperor Yongzheng mounted the throne, he rescinded this system and replaced it with a system whereby the heir apparent was secretly designated. The emperor himself selected his heir from his sons. He could be the son of his legitimate wife or the son of a concubine, as the emperor willed. When the emperor had designated his heir, he wrote the name twice. One copy was kept carefully in a special silk box, which was hidden at the top of the palace. The other was kept on the emperor's person at all times, to be checked in case of need. If the emperor selected an heir whom he later decided was unsuitable, he could choose another from his sons. This was the decision of the emperor alone: no one else could intervene. The choice of the emperor was to be kept secret. The Qing abolished the 2,000 year old system under which the eldest son of the legitimate wife inherited the throne. This was a positive development, since under the old system, the eldest son of the empress was automatically the heir apparent, regardless of his competence or morals. With the system established by the Qing, the emperor could choose his heir apparent on the basis of competence. As a result, the emperor's sons, in the hope of being designated to succeed to the throne, were more careful in the way in which they behaved and spoke, and made an effort to improve themselves. Moreover, the new system of secretly designating the heir apparent alleviated the conflicts which invariably arose over the dispute for the throne. Thus, after Yongzheng, the emperors' sons no longer became involved in disputes over succession and efforts to oust one another from the throne.

The Cabinet and the Six Ministries

The Cabinet formed the core of the administrative machine which supported the emperor in running State affairs. The Cabinet's functions were as follows: taking part in debates on affairs of State, proclaiming imperial edicts and supporting the emperor in running the country. The Cabinet's role also included 'maintaining general balance'. It was the core of the whole administrative machine, and was also responsible for organizing ceremonies and assigning tasks to the competent mandarins.

One reason why the Cabinet was so powerful was that it was responsible for ratifying, on the emperor's behalf, the reports submitted by various bodies and by mandarins of all ranks. This process was referred to as *piao ni*, *piao zhi*, or *tiao zhi* (adding a slip for (the emperor's) decision). When reports came in, they were first processed by members of the Cabinet, who noted their opinions on a piece of paper which they attached to the cover of the reports before giving them to the emperor. Thus, 'reports arriving from various departments might be submitted to the emperor after ratification by the Cabinet, or they might remain in a drawer forever – it was the Cabinet that decided. Therefore, the Cabinet had extremely great powers.' The *piao ni* system was the reflection of the way in which power was concentrated with the Cabinet.

The *Da xueshi* (lit. 'Great Scholars'; the members of the Cabinet) were above all mandarins of the civil service. They enjoyed a great deal of respect and prestige. All were ranked according to their jurisdictions and their titles were represented by the names of the *dian* (halls) and *ge* (pavilions) where they discharged their duties. Thus we have *Wenjian ge da xueshi* (Great Scholar of the Pavilion of the Ocean of Literature), *Baohe dian da xueshi* (Great Scholar of the Hall of Preserving Harmony), and so on. The *Da xueshi* assisted the emperor in running the affairs of State, and were often summoned by the emperor. They were also called *Fuchen* (Ministers of State), or mandarins of the first principal rank.

Under the Ming and Qing, the adoption of the Cabinet system entailed the suppression of the prime ministerial posts. Thus, powers were more concentrated, but as most of the Ming emperors were undistinguished and incompetent, the *Da xueshi* often had genuine power. They were classified as *Shoufu* (Senior Excellency), *Cifu* (Secondary Excellency) and *Qiaifu* (Regular Excellency). The position of *Shoufu* was 'nearly equivalent to that of the prime minister of the Han and the Tang dynasties, and only in the Ming era did the post of prime minister cease to exist'. In fact, the *Shoufu* were prime ministers. Zhang Juzheng was such a 'prime minister', and achieved great fame under the reign of the Ming emperor Wanli. Towards the end of the Ming, the emperors became more and more negligent of State affairs. They excessively indulged their eunuchs and trusted them blindly. Some emperors went so far as to allow high ranking eunuchs to *si li jian*, that is, to 'ratify reports'. In this way, eunuchs sometimes controlled the Cabinet.

During the Qing era, the Cabinet came to have much less power. The Manchu founders of the dynasty were already familiar with the Council of Ministers, which discussed all administrative and military affairs before submitting them to the emperor's final decision. The emperor Kangxi established the *Nan shufang* (lit. southern library), responsible exclusively for drafting important imperial decrees (*ji zhi*). Thus, the power to process imperial orders was divided. The emperor Yongzheng established the Grand Council, which directly

transmitted imperial edicts and assumed the State's administrative and military powers. The Cabinet no longer had any real power, but officially was still the body by which the entire country was administered.

Towards the end of the Qing, compelled by the revolutionary wave, the Court announced that it was preparing the conversion to a republic. In 1911 the Cabinet and the Grand Council were suppressed, and the government set up a responsible Cabinet along the lines of the western (Western European) model. The Cabinet system of ancient China, whose role under the Ming and Qing was to assist the emperor, came to an end.

Under the Ming and Qing, the Six Ministries, which were administrative bodies of the central government, were the Ministry of Civil Service, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rites, the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Public Works.

The Six Ministries, established during the Sui period (581–618) and the early Tang period (early seventh century), were responsible for a portion of the administrative affairs of the State. The ministries were headed by *Shangshu* (ministers) and their deputies, known as *Shilang* (vice ministers). Under the Qing, each ministry had a Manchu minister and a Han minister, and two Manchu vice ministers (left and right) and two Han vice ministers.

The Ministry of Civil Service, which administered all the country's civil servants, was above the five other ministries. 'It carries out the orders of the government concerning civil servants, in order to support the emperor in governing all the people.' Although it would be called the Ministry of Personnel today, under the imperial regime, true power in administering personnel lay with the emperor, who appointed and removed high ranking civil servants. Local mandarins were appointed and removed by the governors general and the governors. The Ministry of Civil Service simply approved or rejected the decision, in accordance with the relevant regulations.

The Ministry of Finance was responsible for matters concerning finance, economy, territory, land, the civil register and taxes for the entire country, as well as the remuneration of civil servants. The Ministry of Finance was also in charge of selecting ladies-in-waiting for the Court.

The Ministry of Rites was in charge of organizing all religious ceremonies, weddings, nuptial rites and funerals. It received envoys from foreign countries and administered scholastic affairs and the official examinations.

The Ministry of War was responsible for appointing, removing, qualifying, promoting and demoting officers throughout the land. It administered the military staff and was in charge of training and examinations. It was also responsible for the chain of relay posts through which military information was transmitted.

Judicial and investigative power was exercised jointly by the Ministry of Justice, the *Ducha yuan* (Censorate) and the *Dali si* (Court of Judicial Review). The Ministry of Justice pronounced sentences, verified the names of sentences, examined decrees, handled important criminal matters and oversaw the implementation of the government's orders to prisons. With the *Ducha yuan* and the *Dali si*, it examined rulings handed down by the lower courts to ensure that they were just.

The Ministry of Public Works was in charge of civil engineering and hydraulic engineering projects, the manufacture of arms, munitions and military equipment, as well as of mining and textiles. 'The administration of official

industry, government orders and the expenditures of the workshops came under the attributions of this ministry.' It was also in charge of standardizing weights, measures and coinage.

Eunuchs

Eunuchs existed from the earliest dynasties of ancient China. At first, they were servants of the Court. Some remained with the emperor, the empress and the concubines, and others served at Court, in the *yamen* or in the *chu* (offices). Under the Ming, the eunuchs were distributed among twenty-four *yamen*. Under the Qing, the *yamen* were replaced by *chu*. Towards the end of the Ming dynasty, there were some 100,000 eunuchs, ranked in accordance with a strict hierarchy. Most eunuchs belonged to the lowest rank. They did various types of work, were very poorly paid and lived lives of drudgery. Some eunuchs of superior rank managed to win the emperor's favour, and sometimes came to be extremely tyrannical. Near the end of the Ming dynasty, influential groups were formed among the eunuchs, who became involved in political struggles with disastrous results.

In order to gain power, a eunuch first had to win the favour and trust of the emperor. From the middle of the Ming dynasty, most emperors were lax in the administration of State affairs. Wei Zhongxian, a famous eunuch of the Ming dynasty, stopped at nothing to win the favour and trust of the emperor. He became extremely powerful and influential. He was referred to as '9,000 years' ('10,000 years' was a name reserved for the emperor) and was considered as the 'second emperor'. Some eunuchs abused the emperor's trust and usurped his power, transmitting forged imperial edicts. They formed groups among themselves and exerted a cruel and greedy influence in politics.

Despotic eunuchs were responsible for fierce struggles between different factions in the central government. Under the reign of Tianqi (1621-8), the Donglin affair was the doing of Wei Zhongxian. Anyone who did not obey him was accused of being a member of the Donglin party. As a result, dozens of upright civil servants, including Yang Lian and Zuo Guangdou, died in prison unjustly, and dozens of others were removed from their posts. The various government departments were almost completely emptied of their employees. Wei Zhongxian and the eunuchs close to him took over all of the important posts in the central government as well as in local governments. They amassed wealth without the least scruple. Wang Zhen had some sixty silver storerooms. Liu Jian had 2.5 million tael of gold, 50 million tael of silver, quantities of jewels and precious objects as well as property holdings. The task of managing his fortune and property was comparable to running local government.

The Qing took this lesson to heart. Shunzhi, the first Qing emperor, said: 'The fall of the Ming dynasty was brought about in part by the appointment of eunuchs to important posts.' He solemnly prohibited eunuchs from becoming involved in the affairs of State, and ruled that they would be confined to the palace as the emperor's domestic servants. Towards the end of the Qing, however, the Empress Dowager Ci Xi came to trust the eunuch Li Lianying and entrusted him with important matters. Although some eunuchs did come to have a certain amount of power, they did not dare to commit the kinds of extreme abuses that were known under the Ming.

Receipts and expenditures of the central government

Under the Ming and Qing dynasties, the government's receipts were principally from the land-tax, the head tax, the salt tax and customs duties, known as *zhenggong* (regular contributions). Under the Qing, the State also received income in the form of different kinds of contributions. In 1724, the emperor Yongzheng also stipulated that the so-called 'fire-loss' money (*huohao*) would be included in the government's receipts, and would be used partly to pay civil servants. The term refers to a small surcharge that taxpayers had to supply in order to compensate for the cost of transport of the tax money and for the slight loss of silver due to smelting small coins into silver ingots.

Land-tax was paid in accordance with the amount of cultivated land. Official statistics show that at the beginning of the Ming dynasty there were 8,501,000 *qing* of cultivated land. By the end of the sixteenth century, this figure had dropped: under the reign of Hongzhi (1488-1506), there were only 6,220,000 *qing* of cultivated land. This decrease resulted from rich and powerful families appropriating other people's land by force and then underdeclaring the actual amount of land in their possession in order to pay less tax. These families thus became increasingly wealthy, and the State became increasingly poorer. The amount of land-tax collected by the State fell considerably. Under the reign of Wanli, the *Daxueshi* Zhang Juzheng instituted reforms which involved conducting a national land survey. The survey revealed a total of 7,103,976 *qing* of land, or 800,000 *qing* more than during the reign of Hongzhi.

Under the reign of Wanli, the following taxes were collected: summer taxes, which consisted of 4,605,000 *dan* of rice and wheat, of which 923,000 *dan* were transported to the capital and the rest to the provinces, 51,900 ingots of silver and 26,600 lengths of raw silk; autumn taxes, which consisted of 22,033,000 *dan* of rice, of which 1,362,000 *dan* were for the capital and the rest for the provinces, and 23,600 silver ingots.

In 1581, Zhang Juzheng implemented the reforms based on the survey of land. He instituted a new taxation system called *yitiao bian* (lit. 'a single whip'), under which land tax, corvée and payments in kind from local tribes were merged into a single tax, payable in silver. When necessary, the government hired paid labour to replace corvée labour. In Suzhou, Hangzhou, Songjiang, Jiaxing and Huzhou, however, land-tax was still paid in kind in order to ensure that the Imperial Family and the mandarins were supplied with food. The sum of silver corresponding to the corvée was calculated on a county-wide basis collected by the heads of the counties. It was thus said that 'everything went through the county chiefs'.

The application of the *yitiao bian* system simplified procedures and to a certain extent limited tax fraud by local despots and embezzlement of taxes by mandarins. It also lightened the burden of peasants, poor people and merchants.

In ancient China, from the Tang dynasty to the first Ming emperors, there were always two types of taxes. The *yitiao bian* system marked a turning point in the Chinese tax and corvée system. This new system continued to be applied into the early Qing dynasty, and later underwent significant reforms.

In 1712 the government announced that the head tax would no longer be levied on people born thereafter. The decree stipulated that the number of adults counted for the

year 1711 would provide the basis for the head tax, and that any increase in the population would not be taken into account. The amount of the head tax was thus fixed permanently. This policy was significant in the history of China's taxation and corvée system, and at the same time had the positive effect of increasing the population and thus the labour supply. The fixation of the head tax provided the basis for a later policy in which the amount of head tax paid corresponded to the amount of land owned. In 1724, the tax and corvée system was further reformed: the sum of money fixed for the head tax in 1712 would be based on the amount of land, and would be collected at the same time as the land-tax. Both types of taxes were to be paid together by landowners.

Under the reign of Kangxi, prior to the implementation of the policy of a combined land-tax and head tax, the annual receipts of the Qing government were: 6,340,000 *dan* of rice, wheat and soybeans; 26,340,000 tael of silver in the way of salt taxes and head taxes and 2 million tael of silver in customs duties, for a total of 31,000,000 tael of silver. In 1776, after the head tax and land-tax were merged and the *huo hao* had become part of the State's receipts, the government's receipts, including head tax, land-tax, salt tax, customs duties and *huo hao* amounted to 45,550,000 tael of silver. In addition to this, gifts, which were another source of government receipts, amounted to around 3 million tael annually.

The main government expenditures under the Ming and the Qing were the salaries of civil servants and military personnel.

Thus, for example, in the year 1766 the total government expenditures amounted to 33,090,000 taels of silver, of which 23,290,000 taels, or more than two-thirds, were spent on the salaries of the military and civil service. Yet in that year the balance was favourable, with a surplus of 15 million tael. Such a large surplus reflected the social and economic prosperity of the middle of Qianlong's reign.

The Ming government was heavily burdened by the privileges accorded to the Imperial Family and by enormous military expenditures. In the early Ming dynasty, a prince received 50,000 *dan* of rice and a large amount in strings of cash, plus various types of silk cloth, grass cloth, fine salt and fodder. A princess received an astonishing allowance. A prince's son received almost as much as a princess. These allowances were reduced for a certain period, but from the middle of the Ming dynasty onwards, the Imperial Family grew so large that the expenditures for their allowances became tremendous. For example, Prince Jin of Shanxi was single when he was granted his title, and received an annual allowance of 10,000 *dan* of rice. Later, his children and grandchildren multiplied so fast that soon 2,851 people, ranging in rank from Prince of the Second Rank (the prince's son) to Lieutenant, were receiving allowances amounting to 870,000 *dan* of rice – 80 times the original amount. The family of Prince Zhou of Kaifeng (Henan), whose title was granted in the early Ming dynasty, had grown by the middle of the Ming dynasty to comprise 37 Princes of the Second Rank, 212 *fu* *guo* generals, 244 *feng* *guo* generals and countless persons with ranks under that of Lieutenant. Mandarins' salaries, ranging from 1,000 *dan* of rice for a mandarin of the First Principal Rank to 75 *dan* of rice for a mandarin of the Ninth Rank, also added up to an enormous figure. Near the end of the Ming, military spending became very substantial. Numerous wars and conflicts put a serious strain on finances. As a result, land-taxes were constantly raised in order to pay various military expenses. The additional taxes

were called: *hao xiang* (additional expenses for the war in Liaodong against the Lamei Jin), *jiao xiang* (military expenditures for the war against the peasant army of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong) and *zhu xiang*. These three types of expenditures required 20 million tael in additional taxes. Wei Yinzhou, the Imperial Censor, said: 'The increase in military spending resulted in the spread of a harmful influence throughout the country and in deepening the people's discontent'. In the end, the Ming dynasty fell. Before the advent of the Qing dynasty, the government announced that these three additional taxes would be abolished. In reality, however, they continued to exist under other names, for example, the *hao xiang* was replaced by the *jin li yin* (nine dimes of silver surcharge).

The army

The army was an important element of the State's power. The Ming and Qing armies differed quite significantly in terms of size.

Under the Ming, a national defence code was implemented. Wei (major garrison) and *suo* (other garrisons) were established everywhere, from the capital to the remotest districts. The highest military authority of each province was the Regional Headquarters (*Du zhi ni shi*). At the beginning of the Ming, the army comprised 1,600,000 officers and men. In 1501, according to Li Mengyang, the Vice Minister of Finance, the army numbered 2,700,000 officers and men. Military personnel under the Ming had a separate civil register. The soldier's status was hereditary, and everyone in the military was under the authority of the *Da du du fu* (Chief Military Command).

At first, all *wei*, *suo* and *Du zhi ni shi* were under the authority of the central government's *Da du du fu*. Later, the *Da du du fu* was abandoned and replaced by five *Du du fu* (Military Commands; centre, left, right, forward and rear). They were commanded by left and right *Du du*, who administered the *wei*, *suo* and *Du zhi ni si* of the capital and the whole country. However, the *Du du* did not command the army – only the emperor had this power. In the event of war, the emperor gave the order to the generals to go to the front with *wei* and *suo* troops. When the war was over, the generals handed over their seals and their authority to command the army, and the soldiers returned to their garrisons. The Ministry of War was responsible for appointing, removing, promoting and transferring officers, and was in charge of training troops. However, only the emperor had the power to command the army.

The Qing army was made up of the Eight Banners and the *liyung* (Green Banners), plus soldiers from national minority tribes in frontier regions. The Eight Banners made up the core of the Qing army. The Eight Manchu Banners, the Eight Mongol Banners – which were the two largest corps – and the Eight Han Banners accounted for 200,000 men. The Eight Banners were divided into two sections. One section guarded the capital and the Imperial Palace, and the other section was distributed throughout major garrison towns.

Each of the three Eight Banner corps had a *Dutong* (commander) and two deputies *Dutong*. At the central level, there were twenty-four *Baqi Dutong yamen* (Bureau of commanders of the Eight Banners) who administered military affairs and affairs of the Eight Banners and commanded the troops in times of war.

The Eight Banners operated mainly as cavalry troops. A cavalry battalion (called *xiao qi ying* or *najia*) consisted of forty Han soldiers, twenty Manchu soldiers and twenty Mongol soldiers, headed by a *Dutong*. These battalions formed an armed force of more than 2,800 soldiers. The Han Banners also had an artillery division.

Generals were appointed to strategic areas where Eight Banners garrison troops were stationed. There were generals in Jiangning, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Jizhou, Ningxia, Chengdu, Guangzhou and Fengtian. Together, they had 55,000 soldiers under their command. In the frontier regions such as Jilin, Heilongjiang, Yili and Kuldud, the highest military authorities were also generals.

The Qing also had a standing army of exclusively Han *liying*, totalling 600,000 men.

This army had been created from the divisions of the Ming army. Its organic structure was different from that of the Eight Banner forces, being divided into three sections: one for the capital, one for the administrative provinces and one for the frontier regions.

Under the Qing, the capital was guarded exclusively by the Eight Banners – never by the *liying*. Under the Qing, however, a capital patrol force was formed on the basis of the Ming policing system, and this force was manned by five divisions of *liying* led by the commander of the capital garrisons. This patrol force consisted of 10,000 men.

In the rest of the country, in each or every two or three provinces, military zones were established and manned by *liying* under the command of the Governor General or the Governor. In each province, the military chief was the *Tidu*. As general of the military zone, he commanded several *zhen* (divisions), each of which were led by a *Zongbingguan*. The *Tidu* and the *Zongbingguan* were under the command of the Governor General or the Governor. Governors and Governors General did not directly command the armies – they were controlled by the *Tidu* and the *Zongbingguan*. There was thus a system of checks and balances between the civil mandarins and the military officers, which prevented one from being excessively dominated by the other and thus unable to command. Under the Ming, the standing army consisted of 1,300,000 soldiers. Under the Qing, the Eight Banner corps plus the *liying* totalled only 800,000.

Local administration

Under the Ming and the Qing, local administration was on four levels: *sheng* (province), *dao* (circuit), *fu* (prefecture) and *xian* (county). In some regions, the administrative system was based on the *zhen*, itself divided into two levels: *zhili zhen* or 'directly administered' *zhen* – smaller than a prefecture but larger than a county – and *shuzhen* – the equivalent of a county. The county level of administration was currently referred to as *zhenxian*.

Following a major reform, the provincial administrative system under the Ming comprised three *si* (bureaux): one in charge of taxes, one in charge of justice and one in charge of military affairs. The three bureaux had equal power, and each reported directly to the central government rather than to a provincial chief. Starting in the middle of the Ming dynasty, the government sent senior civil servants to deal with the heavy military workload. They went by the title of *Zongdu* (governor general) if they were in charge of several provinces and *Xunfu* (local governor) in one province and were in charge of co-ordinating military affairs and supply.

These governors were given authority over the three bureaux – at first as a temporary measure. The two titles eventually became institutionalized within the hierarchy and the governors became provincial chiefs. However, according to the laws on local administration, provincial affairs were still managed by the three bureaux.

After the Qing government had institutionalized the two titles, the *Zongdu* became the chief administrator of several provinces and the *Xunfu* the chief of one province. Both had the status of territorial governors, with the *Zongdu* holding the rank of Minister of War and the Second that of Vice Minister of War. They were thus in a position to command the *liying* of the province. Each also had his own troops, known as *dubiao* (Governor General's Command) and *xunbiao* (Governor's Command) respectively. They had authority over the civil administration and taxation bureaux as well as over the justice bureau. There were also governor generals assigned to specific major projects, for example, a governor general in charge of the canal and a governor general in charge of the river transport of grain.

Under the province came the prefecture, and under it the counties. Under district level, there were various structures and bodies such as the *xing* (township), the *bao* (Security Group), the *fang* (Precinct), and so on.

Conflicts between the government and the population

After the fifteenth century, conflicts between the population and the Ming government radically increased, because the number of government officials grew from 20,000 at the beginning of the Ming to more than 100,000 under the reign of Chenghua (1465–88). The amount spent on civil servants' salaries increased severalfold, and the civil service became increasingly corrupt and wasteful. The misappropriation of military supplies and the embezzlement of money intended for military salaries were frequent occurrences. Military expenditures grew so huge that they greatly exceeded State receipts. According to the Finance Minister's report, in 1553, the deficit reached more than 3 million tael. The government therefore decided to raise taxes, and the bureaucrats took advantage of this to fill their own pockets once more. This situation caused people to rebel. In 1627, the famous peasant war led by Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong was waged. Their army attacked and occupied Beijing in 1644. This was the end of the Ming dynasty. The Qing army in the north-east crossed the Shanhaiguan pass and conquered Li Zicheng's peasant army. The Qing dynasty was thus established.

The people were openly opposed to the Qing government.

Under the reign of Kangxi, a new means of entering the top ranks of the bureaucracy, involving contributions or donations, was introduced. All sorts of people could buy their way into the mandarin rank. This was looked on as a sort of investment. Corruption and extortion were the methods used to make good on this investment. During the reign of Qianlong, corruption among civil servants was so serious that in certain provinces they formed groups and embezzled fantastic sums. The year 1777 was marked by the Wang Danwang affair. Wang Danwang was a *buzheng shi* (Provincial Administration Commissioner) in Gansu province. He embezzled more than a million tael. Twenty-two other civil servants were involved in the affair – each had embezzled sums in excess of 22,000 tael. All were condemned to death. Under the reign of Qianlong, several

dozen governors and department heads were sentenced to death on corruption charges. A renowned Qing scholar, Hong Liangji, knew a great deal about official corruption. He said that the county chiefs openly stated: 'If I double or triple taxes, it is to cover the expenses of my departments. My superior takes half, and I take the other half.' Because the civil service was corrupt from top to bottom, county chiefs were not afraid to commit any evil they wanted, knowing that the governors and the department heads would support them, and that they in turn would be covered by their superiors, the central government. The *da xueshi* He Shen, a favourite of emperor Qianlong, was the biggest embezzler of the era. Yao Yuanzhi, a Qing scholar, explained: Governors did everything they could to form ties with influential men in order to gain their protection. Their obsequious attitude to He Shen was an example of this. This may have been why the people suffered. The courts also swindled people: once a common man walked through the door of the courthouse, he would soon be squeezed of his last copper. There was a saying among the people that: 'Whoever goes to court after being robbed will be robbed again.'

These greedy, corrupt civil servants grew rich from the sweat of the people. The great embezzler Zheng Yuanbao, a department head from Hubei, employed two theatre troupes in his home, so that they could perform for him day and night. Wu He, the Governor General of Shaanxi and Gansu, did nothing but drink and dance with his hewitching concubines. When he was brought to trial, he was tried along with prostitutes, much to the amusement of the public. Popular uprisings began to occur everywhere, and secret societies and religious sects flourished. In 1796, the White Lotus Society organized a very large popular uprising in Sichuan and Shaanxi, which called itself a 'popular uprising against the threat of the mandarins'. This uprising, which shook the emperor Jiaqing himself, went on for several years and was finally suppressed by the Qing army, which experienced considerable casualties. Among the dead were some twenty first and second rank commanders and more than 400 other officers. The cost to the army was 200 million taels, or the equivalent of five years' worth of State receipts. The government's finances were already in crisis, and this uprising marked the point of no return for the Qing dynasty.

Comparison of the political principles of the Ming and Qing governments

The Ming and Qing governments had certain similarities and certain differences with regard to their broad internal and foreign policies.

Both governed the country on the basis of Confucian moral and political theories. Kangxi emphasized the philosophy of principles, and was called 'the emperor of principles'. To ensure that the thought and actions of the mandarins and the people complied with these norms, both dynasties 'repressed subversive writings where cultural policy was concerned.' There were many instances of people being put on trial on such grounds. Repression was most severe during the early Ming and under the reigns of Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong of the Qing dynasty, and was most severe of all under Qianlong. Once the trial began, not only the author and his family, but everyone involved in the book from prefacing it to printing it, and even anyone to whom it gave credit was subject to legal action. The accused, no

matter where they were, were arrested and punished for serious crimes. The accused and his accomplices were executed by having their limbs cut off. Their grandfathers, fathers, sons, grandsons, brothers, uncles and nephews over 16 were executed – even if they were sick or disabled. Their mothers, daughters, wives and concubines, as well as their sons' wives and concubines and boys under 15, became slaves to illustrious families. The offending books were destroyed. This cruel repression totally prevented people from expressing their thoughts. Gong Zizhen, a renowned Qing scholar, said: 'The result of this repression of subversive writings was that ten thousand horses stood mute' (an expression denoting apathy). In the cultural sphere, the Qing governments compiled and catalogued a great number of books in the form of 'publications of the emperor'. Ancient books such as *Siku quanshu* (Complete Library in Four Sections) were preserved and catalogued. However, at the same time, they destroyed large numbers of books which did not conform to the policies of the ruling class.

The Qing dynasty was founded by the Manchus, who practised a policy of granting privileges to Manchus to the detriment of the Han Chinese. The Ming dynasty, founded by Han Chinese, considered the Manchus in the north-east of the country 'eastern barbarians'. The Mongols in the north were called 'western barbarians'. The two dynasties differed greatly in terms of their policies towards the Mongols.

All along the Great Wall, at Liaodong, Jizhou, Xianfu, Datong, Yansui, Ningxia, Guyuan and Gansu, the Ming installed large numbers of armed troops commanded by generals, to fight off any incursions by Mongols or Manchus. All of this changed under the Qing. In that the Qing had had the aid of the Mongol forces in conquering the Ming army, the two nationalities had very close relations. The Qing's policy towards the Mongols was based on pacification. This was achieved through intermarriage, the award of titles, favours, confederation, and so on, as well as through the system of leagues and banners. The government was able to gain the Mongols' support in this way. The emperor Kangxi said: 'In former times, Shi Huangdi of the Qin (221–207 BC) built the Great Wall for the defence of the country. All I have to do is grant a few favours to the Mongols – this is more effective than the Great Wall.' Qianlong described his government's principles on minorities as follows: 'To govern a tribal population, one must use privilege and dissuasion, and make them feel my authority. This is the best method.' When dealing with the Mongol and Tibetan minorities, the government respected their customs, encouraging Tibetan Buddhism and endeavouring to gain the trust of the highest ranks of the clergy in order to get the local population to submit to their rule. Qianlong said: 'Religion and religious submission form a natural defence.' The Qing's policy on minorities was much more intelligent, and thus more effective, than that practised by the Ming.

In its relations with other countries, the Qing government applied a closed door policy – first because China was an autarchy, but there were also deeper political reasons. The Manchu rulers were afraid that if foreigners were allowed to come into contact with the Chinese, they would support them in their opposition to Manchu domination. They felt that 'the population was already restless enough, and if foreign traders came in, there would definitely be incidents.' They thus preached 'prevention against foreigners' and 'separation between Chinese and foreigners'. In Guangzhou and in other trading ports, very detailed and complex regulations were established, including the 'Five Precautions Against

Foreigners', 'Regulations for Trading with Foreign Countries' and 'Regulations for Protection against Foreigners'. All of these regulations were aimed at minimizing contact between Chinese and foreigners. Those who went abroad to do business were also subject to strict rules. The Qing government held itself to be a celestial dynasty, and the rest of the planet to be *wai yi* (foreign barbarians). They believed that foreigners who came to China should submit to the celestial dynasty. In 1793, a British delegation headed by Lord Macartney visited China. In his letter to the King which he handed to the delegation, Qianlong wrote: 'The celestial dynasty has a great wealth of goods; it does not need foreign merchandise and so does not need trade.' 'This was a refusal to Britain's request that China open its doors to trade.'

This closed door policy limited China's dealings with other countries, so that China remained ignorant of the development of the world outside. The severe repression of subversive writings killed all thought. There was room only for the Great Qing. The Qing clung to its habits, as the Qing philosopher Wei Yuan explained, 'A dynasty established for 200 years does not know its direction, and knows even less where it will end up.' China's total ignorance of the outside world was surely one of the reasons for its underdevelopment.

SCIENCE AND CULTURE

The scholar class, social and intellectual trends

In ancient China, scholars (this refers to intellectuals with certain qualifications and social status) occupied quite an important position. Their customs, thought and behaviour exerted a vital influence on the other social classes.

Throughout this 300 year period, scholars were trained and educated in accordance with the following system.

The central authorities created the Imperial College in Beijing, which was also called the 'National School', the 'Higher School' or *Bijong* (lit. 'Circular Moat'). The last of these names originated from the fact that at the Imperial College, on the rectangular platform, a round pavilion was built. This pavilion was surrounded by a pond, and it was here that the instructors held their lectures; thence the name *Bijong*. An inspection by the emperor was referred to as *lin yong* (coming to [Bi] yong). This was the occasion for a grand ceremony, attended by the descendants of sages, *jinshi*, *juren*, *gongsheng* and *jiansheng* (graduates of different ranks: metropolitan, provincial and local), the students and teachers of the Imperial College and of Beijing's other official schools. The assistant director of the Imperial College started by delivering a lecture on the Confucian classics. The emperor then made a speech, which was called *yuhui* (Emperor's Speech). The *yuhui* was printed by the Imperial College and distributed to the teachers and students of all of the provincial schools. The duties of the functionaries of the Imperial College also included offering a sacrifice to Confucius on the first of each month of the lunar calendar.

As the highest level in the land, the Imperial College recruited its students from the children of noblemen and government servants, and from the best candidates presented by local schools. The students of this College could take the official examinations to qualify as *juren* or *jinshi*, or to become mandarins.

Outside the capital, provincial, prefectural and county schools were established. Entry was on a competitive basis,

and those admitted were known as *shengyuan*. The number of *shengyuan* varied from one school to the next, from a handful to several dozen. The *shengyuan* were categorized according to their scores, and the various categories received different treatment.

Those who were not admitted to local schools and who did not qualify as *shengyuan* were called *nang* or *tongsheng*, whatever their age (*tong* = child). The *tongsheng* continued their studies at *shexue* (schools established in the cantons) or at *zongxue* (schools founded by important families). Some poor scholars founded private schools as a means of making a living. These schools were called *sishu*.

The *shuyuan* (academies), schools where Confucian scholars carried out research or pursued further studies, also had a teaching vocation, and complemented the other schools.

By this time, learning had become very widespread. Many reading primers were printed and distributed. These included *Sanzijing* (the Confucian 'Three Character Classic', a primer made up of lines consisting of three characters), *Nüerjing* (the Women's Classic) and *Baijiaxing* (the One Hundred Family Names). This was made possible by the progress of printing technology. In the fourteenth century, moveable copper type was brought to China from Korea. In the eighteenth century, moveable wooden type was invented in China, resulting in more efficient, higher quality printing. From the sixteenth century to the beginning of the ninth century, books were sold all over China, in the countryside as well as in the cities. Books sold included works on medicine and pharmacy, novels, books on fortune-telling and geomancy, as well as collections of poems and reading primers.

During this period, the schools were closely involved in the official examinations by which the government selected its civil servants and counsellors. There were two types of official examinations: *chang ke* (ordinary section) and *te ke* (special section). The former took place every three years, and were also called *zeng ke* (normal section) (see Plate 119).

Under the Ming and the Qing, the *bagen wen* (an eight component literary style) was imposed in official examinations. Examination questions were taken from the Four Books of the Confucian school (*Si shu*) and the Five Classics (*Wu jing*). The *Si shu* were: *Lunyu* (The Analects of Confucius), *Mengzi* (The Works of Mencius), *Daxue* (The Great Learning) and *Zhongyong* (The Invariable Centre). The Five Classics were: *Shijing* (Book of Songs), *Zhou yi* (also called *Yijing*, the Book of Changes), *Shangshu* (or *Shun jing*, the Book of Documents), *Chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals) and *Liji* (Book of Rites). The candidates' essays were to be based on the interpretations of Song dynasty Confucian scholars and written in accordance with a fixed framework and development procedure. In this way, the scholars' dissertations were severely restricted.

Te ke, the second type of official examination, was not held at fixed intervals, but when the emperor decreed. These examinations were thus known as *En ke* (Examinations of Grace). Under the Ming, only the *Zeng ke* existed; the *En ke* were established under the Qing.

Between 1500 and 1800, scientific and social trends were characterized by three periods: in the sixteenth century, the *Xinxue* (School of the Mind), represented by Wang Shouren (1472-1528); the radical political and social ideas of the seventeenth century, represented by Gu Yanwu (1613-82), Huang Zongxi (1610-95) and Wang Fuzhi (1619-92); the *Kaoju* or 'Philological' school of the eighteenth century represented by Hui Dong (1697-1758) and Dai Zhen (1723-77).

Wang Shouren was from Yuyao, in Zhejiang. He was also known as Wang Yangming. He was appointed governor of Ningbo, then Minister of War in Nanjing. He was the most influential philosopher of the middle and late Ming dynasty. He led scholarly circles in Guizhou, Jiangxi and Zhejiang. His pupils anthologized his writings and speeches in the *Complete Works of Wang Wencheng* (Wencheng, 'Cultured and Perfect', being his posthumous honorific name). The essence of Wang Yangming's philosophy can be summed up as follows: 'The heart (or *xin* 'mind') means reason, and induces awareness.' Wang Yangming believed that the mind – man's inner movement – was the original source of the universe: 'where thought exists, so do beings'. From there, he went on to present his philosophical theme: 'There is no being, and no reason, apart from the mind.' According to him, the 'reason' of objective things existed only in the minds of people. To understand the reasons of the mind, it was necessary to 'induce awareness': 'natural reason is awareness'. But reason was in opposition to human desires, and was 'disturbed' by material wants. He stressed therefore that 'human desires would have to go', so that 'natural reason would remain'. He gave a new explanation to the Confucian principle of *ge ni zhi zhi*, usually interpreted as 'to investigate (*ge*) things and to advance one's knowledge'. According to him, *ge* meant 'to correct'. 'Ge means to correct; to correct that which is incorrect, which means renouncing evil, and returning to that which is correct, which is doing good.' He called upon people to renounce evil and willingly to do good. He said that all anyone had to do to become a sage was to 'have a pure mind, like natural reason, and to abandon completely one's personal desires.'

After establishing its own system, Wang's *Xinxue* school rose rapidly. But in the middle and late sixteenth century, his disciples began to differ on the explanation of *zhiliang zhi* (Provoking Awareness), and the *Xinxue* school split into several schools. The most important one was the *Qingzhou* school, represented by Wang Gen. This school developed Wang Yangming's doctrine that 'Every man is capable of becoming a sage' much further. It held that the sage's doctrine was, for the people, food when they were hungry and warm clothing when they were cold. Thus, awareness was a moral conception which could be understood and known without having to think about it and without having to learn it. Differences in this awareness were the subject of heterodox doctrines. The mysterious nature ascribed to awareness by Wang Yangming disappeared. Some radical scholars of this new school proposed the 'theory of the rationality of material desires'. According to this theory it was impossible for man to be without desire. It openly contradicted the traditional philosophy of the repression of desire. With the development of this new doctrine, the heterodox thinker Li Zhi (1527–1602) emerged. His ideas were characterized by a rejection of tradition and the teaching of rituals.

In the seventeenth century, Chinese thought took a great step forward. The peasant revolts and the arrival of the Qing banners in the central plain dealt a heavy blow to the Ming mandarins. People thought long and hard about the causes of the fall of the State and the loss of power. From this deep reflection was born a new constructive theory. Its main characteristics were as follows:

- (a) It was severely critical of the dominant traditional philosophy. Scholars felt that the neo-Confucian philosophy of the Song and Ming eras (in particular Wang's *Xinxue* school) had many defects, which had

brought on the weakening and then the decline of the Ming dynasty. Master Wang Fuzhi criticized it as a doctrine prejudicial to the State. Criticism was focused mainly on two points. First, the Ming scholars had not thoroughly studied the classic writings of the preceding dynasties: 'Instead of reading these books, they cast them aside and held forth without foundation'. Second, their empty words had the effect of making the real situation worse. They did not attempt to solve any real social problems. Although this philosophy was in name the official doctrine of the Qing, in truth it occupied a much less important place than before, having been severely attacked and criticized by intellectuals at the beginning of the Qing dynasty.

- (b) The despotism of the traditional monarchic regime was called into question and criticized. Huang Zongxi, in his renowned work *Mingyi daifang lu* (Unsolved Questions of a Twilight Age), listed the acts of violence committed by high ranking government officials, and criticized their attitude of considering the power of the State as their personal prerogative, and their readiness to use their power to satisfy their own fabulous desires. Naturally, the people looked on them as enemies and called them tyrants. Huang Zongxi suggested measures that would limit monarchical power: increasing the power of the prime minister, and allowing him to call upon sages to supplement the hereditary system of the emperors. He proposed that the mandarins of prefectural and county schools should be empowered to inspect and correct local administration. He also called for replacing 'the imperial laws' established by the emperor alone with 'State laws', and for preventing the emperor from 'governing according to his will' through legislative means. Gu Yanwu, another thinker of this period, also felt that a 'government by everyone' should be substituted for the 'government by a single person', and that the competences of the prefectures and counties should be expanded so as to achieve balance between local power and the power of the emperor.
- (c) The deployment of *Hua Yi Zhi Fang Lun* (discussions about the relations between the Chinese and their foreign rulers). At the start of the Qing dynasty, the arrival of the Qing banners in the interior of the country deeply shook the Han Chinese, who had always been proud of their 'middle kingdom'. The threat to 'change China by resorting to things foreign' spurred traditional nationalist ideology. Gu Yanwu believed that a distinction should be drawn between 'the State' and 'the Empire of China'. The State was the dynasty, which bore only a family name, and was synonymous with political power. The Empire of China, on the other hand, belonged to all of the Chinese people and was representative of their culture. 'When a dynasty is lost, the State falls; when rites are lost, culture disappears.' 'Defending the state is the duty of the emperor and his ministers, and the mandarins are there to assist him. Defending the nation is the duty of all the people' (see Plate 120).
- (d) Materialist philosophy and the conception of applied research. The philosophers of this era were unable to propose a new philosophical scope. However, they did contribute new materialist explanations to existing realities. Wang Fuzhi was representative of this tendency. According to him, the essence of the world was material *qi* (air). *Qi* was a substance of all changing material. He proposed the philosophical theory that 'reason existed in *qi*', which was in opposition to the ideas of other philosophers. According

to the orthodox interpretation of the Song masters Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi (the 'Cheng-Zhu school'), 'Reason existed before *qi*.' According to its rival, the 'Lu Wang' school, or 'School of the Mind': 'There is no being apart from the mind.' He believed that the world consisted only of matter, that 'there would be no reason without matter'. He also believed that the movement of matter was absolute, that remaining static was actually one of the forms of this movement, and that 'the static state implied movement, and movement does not exclude being static'. His conception of simple materialism was in agreement with the ideas of change and development.

Having learned their lesson from the pretentious style of the empty words of the late Ming philosophers, the radical thinkers insisted that the main objective of research and study was application in life. Some thinkers even proposed concrete principles concerning national government. Contrary to the traditions of privilege under which trade was treated as inferior to agriculture, Wang Zongyi and Tang Zhen considered crafts and commerce as major occupations. The only way to emerge from poverty was to increase production and boost trade. Other scholars proposed measures for the control of annexation and land distribution.

In the eighteenth century, the Manchus became increasingly sinicized. Subversive writings were severely condemned, and the Qing dynasty experienced growing prosperity. It was in this context that textual criticism, characterized by commentaries on ancient writings, emerged and developed rapidly. Some of the scholars of this new school, represented by Hui Dong and Dai Zhen, respected and firmly defended the books of the Han era (207 BC-AD 220).

Hui Dong came from the Wuxian district of Jiangsu. He began his research with the study of ancient writings, interpreting ancient texts on the basis of pronunciation as the way of knowing the original meaning of the classics. Hui Dong and his disciples admired the classics written by the Han scholars, and recommended the study of these works. They accepted these writings completely, casting away nothing. This is why their doctrine, even though it recommends the promotion of Han teachings under the Qing, appears jumbled, disorganized and devoid of any attempt to differentiate the true from the false. Because the most important members of this school were from Jiangsu, it was also called the 'Wu' Current ('Wu' being an ancient name of the province Jiangsu).

In addition to the 'Wu' Current, there was the 'Wan Current', represented by Dai Zhen, who was a Qing dynasty scholar studying the Han dynasty. Compared to Hui Dong, Dai's approach to research was more philosophical. He was against the Confucian doctrine of the Song era, which counselled that 'human desires should depart, and natural reason should remain'. He felt that human desires were natural, physical desires, and that it was impossible to make them disappear. Guided by reason, desire could develop in accordance with certain laws. When desires were satisfied rationally, virtue and goodness would result. Dai Zhen and his disciples did not blindly accept Han Confucianism. Their research was full of originality, achieved success and resulted in a more thorough development of the study of the Han dynasty. Because most of its members were from Anhui, the school came to be known as the 'Wan Current' ('Wan' being an ancient name of Anhui province).

The 'Wu' and 'Wan Currents' did not oppose each other, but were both outstanding in textual criticism. The scholars

of both currents were each other's teachers and friends. If there were differences between them, it was that the 'Wu' Current was concerned mainly with the study of the *Shangshu* and the *Zhou yi*, whereas the 'Wan' Current emphasized philology and divination, and its scholars mainly studied the three classics dealing with ceremonies: the *Yili*, the *Zhouli* and the *Liji*. The 'Wu' Current urged a return to ancient times; only the Han was important. The 'Wan' Current, on the other hand, stressed the importance of rigour and precision. Different though their styles of research were, both had a contribution to make.

Cultural policy

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ming governments were preoccupied by internal troubles and the threat of foreign invasion. Cultural policies were often those which had already been applied in previous eras, and showed little originality. After unifying the country and achieving a thriving social economy, the Qing wanted to renew its cultural policy. Under the government's organization, books were written on a great scale. The best known were *Gujin tushu jicheng* (Compendium of Ancient and Contemporary Books) and *Siku quanshu* (Complete Library in Four Sections) (see Plate 121).

Writing the *Gujin tushu jicheng* began under Kangxi and was completed under Yongzheng. This enormous work consisted of numerous sections, and was made up of many types of books. It featured extracts and abridgements of various types of books and dictionaries, arranged in order. Despite the great care taken, not every book was recorded in this encyclopedia. It was divided into six main sections and thirty-two categories. The encyclopedia consisted of 10,000 chapters.

The writing of the *Siku quanshu* began in 1773 under Qianlong, and was completed 13 years later in 1787 in the reign of the same emperor. In this complete bibliography, practically every important classical work was copied in full. These works were divided into four main categories – classics, history, philosophy and miscellaneous – and forty-four orders. Its 79,070 volumes contained the reproductions of 3,457 books. This was truly the most important compilation in the history of China. There are seven original transcriptions and one copy, which are preserved in Beijing, Chengde, Shenyang and the south-east of the country.

The development of thought and culture was most greatly hindered by the condemnation of subversive writings. In the early Ming dynasty, such sanctions were rare, and were rarer still in the middle years of this dynasty. The Qing dynasty was very sensitive to the threat of popular revolt – especially by the Han Chinese – and the government forcefully put down any words or actions against the Qing. Unjustified accusations were very common. The condemnation of subversive writings was most severe under the reign of Qianlong. Most of the time, the problems arose from excessively literal interpretations or hearsay. The stern repression of subversive writings terrorized intellectual circles. Many scholars decided to devote themselves entirely to classical books and the critical study of texts. As a result, Chinese culture was classified and systematized to an extent never achieved before, and a synthesis of sorts was achieved. However, new ideologies and new styles of scholarship were slow in emerging.

Literature, art and book collecting

During the Ming and Qing eras, the novel was the most successful form of literature. In the sixteenth century, two famous novels were written: *Xiyouji* (Travels to the Western Regions) and *Jin ping mei*. The former was written by Wu Chengen (1500–82). Taking a very well known folk tale – the story of the famous seventh century Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang who goes to India to find the Buddhist scriptures – as his starting point, the author created a highly imaginative, polished piece of writing. The novel became a masterpiece in the history of literature. The three disciples who accompany Tang (the master) on his journey became familiar characters known to everyone. In recounting their journey, which was filled with every sort of trial, the author explained the Buddhist doctrines. Their combats and struggles reflect life. The author of *Jin ping mei* called himself *Niao Xiao Sheng* of Lanling (Yixian district of Shandong). His true name remains unknown. A wood block edition of this novel appeared before 1606. It is a lively, colorful account of the experiences of the ambitious Xi Menqing. The novel mirrored Chinese society, in particular the tastes, lifestyle and behaviour of city dwellers.

Short story collections appeared in the early seventeenth century. These included 'The Three Tales' (three collections of fictional tales): *Yu shi ming yan* ('Clear words to instruct the world'), *Jing shi tong yan* ('Penetrating words to startle the world') and *Xing shi heng yan* ('Lasting words to awaken the world'). Compiled by Feng Menglong (1575–1646), they comprise 120 short stories. There were also the two 'pai': *Chen ke pai an jingqi* and *Er ke pai an jingqi* [Both mean: 'Stories Prompting the Reader to Strike the Table in Surprise'], written by Ling Mengchu. Because these books were lost, it is impossible to know how many volumes they comprised. The short stories of these five anthologies depicted the lives of city dwellers and the political situation of the Song and Ming eras.

One of the renowned literary creations of the late seventeenth century was *Liaozhai zhiyi*, 'Fantasy Tales of the Liao Studio' by Pu Songling (1640–1715). The style was akin to legend, and the author took real life as the basis for bizarre, grisly stories of demons and gods. Many of the tales feature complicated plots and lively images. It is a masterpiece, and also offers a social dimension (see Plates 122 and 123).

In the eighteenth century, the most renowned classic Chinese novel, *Honglou meng* (Dream of the Red Chamber, or Dreams of Red Mansions), appeared. Although we do not know the year in which its author, Cao Xueqin, was born, it is thought that he lived roughly between 1715 and 1763. The Cao family belonged to the Eight Qing Banners, and were *baoyi* (bondsmen) to the imperial family. For some time, they had an illustrious reputation. When Cao Xueqin was very young, his family became involved in quarrels between different factions within the imperial family, and was attacked many times. Things then went downhill for the family. *Honglou meng* was written under conditions of deprivation and poverty. The main thread of the story concerns the tragic love between Jia Baoyu, the son of a prince, and Ling Daiyu, a young lady from a noble family. It traces the itinerary of a great noble family, the Jia, from prosperity to decline. Social conditions, human feelings and the manners of the time were described powerfully and in great detail. This novel is therefore considered to be an encyclopedia of feudal Chinese society. Indeed, the story of

Honglou meng had a parallel with actual events: the fall of the Jia family was, in a way, a prophecy of the disastrous decline of the Qing, and the rebellious character of Jia Baoyu had much in common with the thinking of the radical intellectuals of the time about life, society and politics, and with their feelings of indignation and moroseness.

It is generally thought that Cao Xueqin wrote only the first eighty chapters of the book and that the final forty chapters were written by another author, Gao E. Total agreement has not been reached, however, especially with regard to the exact number of chapters written by the other author.

Poetry also flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the poetry of this period cannot be compared with that of the Tang and Song dynasties, it greatly surpassed that of the Ming.

Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, traditional Chinese opera climbed progressively towards its peak. During the Ming era, under the reign of Jiajing (1522–67), Wei Liangfu of Kunshan created the *Kunqu* opera. This new genre of opera from the south used the tunes of northern opera. It enjoyed great popularity with the masses and quickly spread throughout the region. Under the reign of Wanli (1573–1619), Tang Xianzu (1550–1617) created the masterpiece of *Kunqu* opera, *Madam ring* (Pavilion of Peonies), which recounted the trials experienced by a young couple seeking the freedom to marry and live happily.

The most celebrated traditional opera creations of the Qing dynasty were *Changsheng dian* (The Hall of Longevity), by Hong Sheng (1645–1704), and *Taohua shan* (The Peach Blossom Fan) by Kong Shangren (1648–1718). The former told the story of the Tang emperor Ming Huang's (618–907) love for his concubine Yang Yuhuan, and depicted the intense and complex social conflict in China before and after the rebellion of An Lushan (AD 755–63) (An Shi troubles). The latter, written by a 64th generation descendant of Confucius, was also a love story – this time between the scholar Hou Fengyu and a famous prostitute called Li Xiangjun. The opera depicted the rise and fall of the 'Southern Ming' (the exiled Ming court that for many years resisted the Manchu invaders). The author's 'portrayal of the emotions of separation and reunion was the reflection of the prosperity and decline of the country'. Audiences were deeply moved.

During the Qing era, there were two types of traditional opera. At first, the Beijing stage was dominated by *Cepuqing* and *Kunqu* opera. Later, local opera genres such as *Qingqiang* emerged. The year 1790 saw the arrival of Hui troupes, which generally used the *Erhuang* melodies. These troops modified the *Qingqiang* style, creating the *Xipi* style. The blending of these two styles resulted in *Pihuang*, from which emerged the famous Beijing opera.

Over these 300 years, pictorial art continued to flourish. In the late Ming dynasty, 'scholarly painting' emerged as a common practice, led by Dong Qichang (1555–1636). These paintings were characterized by their graceful ink work and absence of grandeur. There were many schools of painting under the Qing, and many talented painters. Most imitated ancient painters. The most original painters were *Bada Shanren* of the early Qing and the 'Eight Eccentrics of Yangzhou' of the mid Qing. The real name of *Bada Shanren* (c. 1662–1705), a descendant of the Ming imperial family, was Zhu Da. After the fall of the Ming, he renounced the world to become a Buddhist monk. He later became a Daoist. His paintings of landscapes, flowers and birds demonstrate the use of many brush and ink techniques, but he never strictly confined himself to any one technique. His paintings have a bleak,

sail quality, and sometimes reflect an ethereal atmosphere. The 'Eight Eccentrics' lived in Yangzhou in the eighteenth century. Their names were Wang Shishen, Huang Shen, Jing Long, Gao Xiang, Li Chan, Zhieng Xie, Li Fangying and Luo Ping. All of them either had unhappy official careers or had chosen to renounce their official careers and to withdraw from the world. Because they all spent a long time in Yangzhou, their painting styles were quite similar. Instead of limiting themselves to previously established practices, they sought original ideas. Their paintings were of flowers, birds, bamboo, orchids, people and landscapes.

Engraving and the making of new year prints thrived under the Ming and the Qing. At the time, many books were illustrated. New printing techniques rendered engravings more lively and more attractive. The main places of manufacture of new year prints were Taohuawu in Suzhou, Yanglingqin in Tianjing, Weixian in Shandong and Zhuxianzhen in Henan. New year prints depicted a wide variety of themes, featured bright, beautiful colours and sold very well. For example, a single shop in Yanglingqin, called Dai Zhenglian, printed a million new year prints a year at its peak. The fame of these prints greatly surpassed that of ordinary scholarly painting.

Calligraphy was another aspect of traditional Chinese art. During the Ming era, calligraphers were more concerned with aesthetic effect than with originality. Two calligraphers, Xu Wei (1521-93) and Huang Daozhou (1585-1646), were the exceptions to this rule. Xu Wei mainly practised an open, spirited cursive style of calligraphy. Without adhering to any ready-made formulas, he tried to give his work elegance and charm. The calligraphy of Huang Daozhou, on the other hand, is forthright and natural, exuding power and grace.

The Qing era was marked by a renaissance of calligraphy. Almost everyone, from the emperor to the mandarin, practised calligraphy. Before the nineteenth century, the fashion was to practise calligraphy using models. People set about trying to imitate the great calligraphers Wang Xizhi and Wang Xianzhi. The most successful calligraphers of the time were Zheng Xie and Deng Shihou. Zheng Xie was one of the eight Yangzhou painters, the so-called 'eccentrics'. He brought together the four main styles of calligraphy: *zhengshu* (the regular 'model script'), *caoshu* (the very cursive 'grass script'), *lishu* (the ancient 'clerk's script'), and *zhuanshu* (the archaic 'seal script'). Using the model script and clerk's script styles as his foundation, he borrowed painting techniques and applied them to calligraphy. He made sure that the tops and bottoms of the ideograms matched, that they were the right size and that the characters were properly spaced and squarely positioned. As a result, his calligraphy featured a complete, rhythmic structure, with distinct principal and secondary parts. Zheng Shihou (1743-1805) excelled in the seal script style of calligraphy. In his practice of the seal script style, he borrowed techniques of the clerk's script style. Conversely, he practised the clerk's script style with techniques borrowed from seal script. Thus, his vigorous style of calligraphy featured square shaped characters and characters with curved strokes. Zheng's energetic, open, majestic cursive and 'grass' calligraphy were greatly admired by his contemporaries.

Much progress was made in Chinese ceramic art between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.

From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, painted ceramics were characterized by dense designs and motifs and rich, sparkling colours like red, light green, yellow, brown and violet, with the emphasis on red.

It should be noted that during the reign of the Ming emperor Hongzhi (1488-1508), the workers of Jingdezhen, a porcelain producing centre in Jiangxi, perfected firing techniques. Their speciality was yellow enamel work. The colour was a true yellow, and these workers achieved the most outstanding technical level in the history of yellow enamel work fired at low temperatures. Yellow was a special colour, used only for instruments employed in sacrifices in the ancestral temple of the imperial family. The reign of the Qing emperor Kangxi saw the development of blue and black enamel work, which enhanced the pictorial effect of the painted motifs on porcelain objects.

Chinese scholars held reading in great respect, and the tradition of book collecting goes back a long way. Between 1561 and 1566, the book collector Fan Qing (1506-85) built the Tianyige pavilion-library, which was surrounded by water to protect it from fire. A typical example of a library of old China, the top floor comprised six halls separated from one another by bookshelves. The lower floor had six independent rooms. Under the Qing, the emperor Qianlong decreed the construction of seven pavilion-libraries to house the *Siku quanshu*. All were built in accordance with the Tianyige model. The Tianyige library contained 70,000 *juan* (chapters), including local annals, reference works, poetry, essays and lithographs. Thanks to the very strict administration of the library, the *juan* are in very good condition 400 years later. The Qing collectors amassed rich libraries. That of Wang Xian (1721-71) consisted of 65,000 *juan*; that of Yun Mei of 40,000 *juan*; that of Bi Yuan of more than 20,000 *juan*. Unfortunately, the Tianyige collection was one of the very few which survived through the generations, owing to failure to take measures to preserve the books as well as to other reasons.

Science and technology

Science and technology developed very slowly in China over this 300 year period.

In the field of agronomy, the publication of *Nong zheng quanshu* (Encyclopedia of Agronomy) was one of the major events of the seventeenth century. The author, Xu Guangqi (1562-1633), wrote in great detail about farm instruments, pedology, hydraulics, seed selection, fruit tree grafting, silkworm growing, and so on, and reproduced writings on agronomy from previous dynasties. In the early eighteenth century, under the Qing, *Guang qunfang pu* was published, an enormous work on botany comprising 100 *juan* and dealing with grain, mulberry, hemp, fruit trees and vegetables. Each plant's appearance and characteristics and cultivation methods were explained. In 1742, the seventy-eight *juan* *Shoushi tongkao*, a thorough account of meteorology, pedology, sericulture, and so on, was written. All of the three above-mentioned works had a major influence on the development of Chinese agriculture.

Some excellent books on traditional Chinese medicine were also published during this period. Li Shizhen (1518-93) spent twenty-six years writing his pharmacological book *Bencao gangmu* (Categories of Medicinal Herbs). The author summarized the accumulated experiences of his predecessors, and presented more than 1,800 remedies in this book: 1,192 using plants, 340 using animal products and 357 using mineral substances. He explained the methods by which each remedy was made, what each one looked and smelled like, as well as the formula for each one. Even today, this work is held in great

esteem by the medical profession. *Yizong jingjian*, a ninety-juan work on clinical medicine, was written under the supervision of Wu Qian. This work assembled the theories of the various earlier schools, in their edited and revised versions. The author systematically explained the method of comparative diagnosis and treatment for every branch of medicine. This comprehensive work, enriched with illustrations and rhyming formulas, is a major reference work for clinical medicine. During the same period, extensive collections and guides on medicine were published. These included the 520-volume *Yibu qianli*, which was part of the *Gujin mishi jicheng* (Compendium of Ancient and Contemporary Books). The *Yibu qianli* was a compilation of some one hundred books on medicine, from the *Neijing* (Classic of Internal Medicine) of the second century BC to books published in the early Qing period. These were valuable reference books, rich in content and featuring systematic explanations of the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of the various branches of medicine.

During this period, western achievements were introduced into Chinese astronomy. In 1645, the Qing government published the *Shixian li* (Imperial Almanac), drawn up by the missionary Johann Adam Schall von Bell. Its structure was that of the Chinese calendar, but its calculations were based on western geometry, and it introduced new concepts like latitude and longitude, time differences and atmospheric pressure. In the early period of Kangxi's reign, this Almanac was withdrawn, but it was restored after a short time.

Wang Xiehan (1628-82) was the most renowned astronomer of the Qing era. In his monograph on astronomy, *Xian tian xingfa*, he presented a new technique for the calculation of the azimuth angle of the first and last contacts of an eclipse.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, western mathematical science inspired renowned Chinese mathematicians such as Mei Wending and Ming Antu. Mei (1633-1721) carried out a thorough study of the principles of trigonometry, and proposed methods for calculating the volumes of equivalent surfaces. With his book *Ge yuan wuli jiefu* (Simplified Method for Calculating the Secant of a Circle and the Number Pi), the Mongol mathematician Ming Antu (1692-1765) made a great contribution to research on trigonometry and the number Pi.

Near the end of Kangxi's reign, the Qing government supervised the writing of *Shuli jingyan*. This was a compilation of western calculation methods introduced into China between the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Qing periods. It also presented the quinessence of Chinese mathematics based on surviving writings. It was a sort of encyclopedia of the highest standard of Chinese mathematics of the era.

After the 1720s, a great number of ancient mathematical monographs were discovered and catalogued by Chinese scientists. These included *Haidao sanqitong* and *Jinzhong suanxue*. As a result, lost mathematical theories and methods were rediscovered.

After the seventeenth century, western geographical concepts were introduced to China. In 1708, the Qing government organized a team of European missionaries and Chinese scholars to conduct a national topographical survey. The project took ten years to complete. In 1718, the *Huangyu quanlan* (Complete Overview of the Imperial Territory) was published. The map was drawn using trapezoidal projection, to a scale of 1:1,400,000. This was the first detailed national map drawn in China using modern scientific methods and on the basis of local surveys. At the time, this map ranked number one in the world in terms of precision. In 1760, the Qing Court revised this atlas, correcting a few errors

concerning Tibet and adding the map of Xinjiang and the regions west of Lake Balkash. The new map was called the *Huangyu quanlan* (Complete Atlas of the Imperial Territory), or the *Qianlong tianxi yutu* (Qianlong Atlas of the Imperial Household Department). This map was more complete and more detailed than that of the emperor Kangxi.

Progress was also achieved in manufacturing techniques. In the seventeenth century, the famous scientist Song Yingxing wrote *Tiangong kai wu*. This book presented experiments in agricultural production, and emphasized small scale production techniques in sectors such as textiles, salt, copper and cast iron, coal mining and oil. It explains in minute detail the production process and technical procedures used in all of these sectors, from the raw materials to the finished product. It also includes many excellent illustrations.

Architecture continued to develop, and the imperial parks were examples of the highest levels of architecture. The palace of Yuanming yuan, extended in 1772, became a gigantic imperial park with an area of nearly 350 ha. Much of the area was occupied by lakes, with streams running between the large and small lakes. On the shores of the lakes were man-made hills, pavilions and gazebos. Western style structures and fountains were designed and built under the missionaries' supervision. The more than forty reconstituted structures were completely representative of ancient Chinese park and garden architecture. In 1860, during the Second Opium War, the Yuanming yuan palace was burned and destroyed by British and French allied troops. Construction began in 1703 of another imperial summer residence, the mountain residence in Chengde, north-east of Beijing, and went on for more than eighty years. The residence, which covered about 540 ha, featured reconstitutions of the natural geographical scenery of different regions of the country, as well as the plants characterizing each region from north to south. Mountain ranges were surrounded by lakes with rippling water. Around the residence, there were many magnificent temples whose architecture combined the styles of various Chinese nationalities and demonstrated the richness and variety of China's religious art.

However, China was far behind Western Europe where technology was concerned. The west's post-renaissance scientific revolution had no counterpart in China. The industrial revolution which began in England in the eighteenth century made it clear, from the point of view of industry, how far behind Chinese science was. Scientists today are still puzzled by the historical causes of this slowness. Those interested in trying to understand this question should consider the following points of view.

First, the emphasis in China has traditionally been on human relations, to the detriment of natural phenomena. Intellectuals were interested only in relations between people, or between people and society. Their only concern was satisfactory social and human order, and they totally neglected the natural world.

Second, Confucianism was the only school of thought tolerated within the context of cultural authoritarianism which had existed since the Han dynasty (207 BC-AD 220). Other schools were cast aside, which greatly limited the intellectual scope of the people. Under the Qing, subversive writings were severely suppressed, which further impeded freedom of thought.

Third, traditional pragmatism hindered the development of scientific theories. China's agriculture-based culture resulted in a pragmatic attitude. People were only interested in techniques which had some connection to their everyday

lives, that is architecture, food and farm tools. The pursuit of theories which were of no use to society and which did not further the people's efforts was considered superfluous and worthy only of disdain. This explains the success of technology and the relative lack of theoretical research in ancient China. In this way, the potential for technological development was reduced.

Finally, belief in the 'celestial dynasty' stood in the way of technological exchanges with foreign countries, and slowed technological progress. The Chinese were deeply convinced of their own cultural superiority, and had no desire to obtain new knowledge.

Obviously, in the context of the autarkic economic system, new knowledge and technology were not essential for everyday life. The way of life remained unchanged for generations, and attitudes naturally became ultra-conservative. As a result, many new instruments and techniques were lost. In comparison with the situation in the west, this was a stifling era for science.

Religion and cultural exchange

Over this 300-year period, religion in China underwent few changes, either in terms of form or break-down. Buddhism and Daoism remained the principal religions. In some coastal areas and in regions occupied by national minorities, Islam and Catholicism were also practised. Under the Ming and the Qing, Buddhism remained divided into various schools. The major schools included *Chan* and *Jingtu*, as well as *Tiantai* and *Huayan*. (The 'intuitional' Chan or Meditation School (in the west generally known by its Japanese name 'Zen'), the devotional 'Pure Land' (*Jingtu*) school, as well as the older scholastic Tiantai and Huayan schools.)

Tibetan Buddhism underwent a major upheaval in the fifteenth century, with the founding of the Yellow Sect by Tsongkhapa. From the seventeenth century, this school enjoyed absolute precedence in Tibet, and its influence spread to Mongolia. It became these two regions' common religion. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Fifth Dalai Lama was very warmly received by the Qing government in Beijing. In 1653, the Qing government officially recognized the leading role played by Lamaism in the Tibetan and Mongolian regions. It was then that 'Dalai Lama' became an official title. In 1751, the Qing government decreed that the Dalai Lama and the central government representative should exercise local power jointly. In 1793, the Qing government implemented the 'golden vase lottery' system: when the Dalai or the Panchen Lama died, all the outstanding children selected as candidates to become his reincarnation had their names and birth dates inscribed on ivory tiles. All the tiles were put into a golden vase sent specially by the central government for this purpose, and the successor was designated by a lottery conducted under the supervision of the central government representative.

Daoism also flourished in the seventeenth century. The emperor Jiajing (1522-66) himself was a practising Daoist. Renowned Daoists were received at the Forbidden City to discuss affairs of State. Politics and religion were very closely linked.

The Ming dynasty was also a very productive period for Daoist writing. In 1445 and 1607 respectively, the first and second volumes of the *Daocang* (Daoist Canon) were published. The *Daocang* was a compilation of some 1,500 Daoist works, and made a major contribution to the

preservation and dissemination of Daoist scriptures. At the same time, Daoist literature, instruction and novels in praise of Daoist magic, was also widely disseminated. The number of practising Daoists increased significantly.

Under the Qing, Daoism lost considerable status. Zhang Tianshi, the 'Heavenly Master', the hereditary Daoist leader of the *Zhengyi* school, was denied the right to be called by his title *Zhenren* (Immortal). His rank was reduced from Second Principal Rank to Fifth Rank. In 1739, he was forbidden to preach. From then on, Daoism continued to decline.

Under the Ming and Qing, Buddhism and Daoism were very important in the spiritual life of the Chinese people. There were temples and monasteries everywhere. Believers practised Buddhist and Daoist worship as a way of warding off disaster and in the hope that their families would be blessed with good fortune.

Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism were the three schools of philosophical thought of ancient China. Their differences, as well as their influence on one another, contributed to the richness and complexity of Chinese culture.

In the late Ming dynasty, Islam was introduced to China, with the Chinese translation of the Qur'an, the Islamic calendar, the Islamic system and Islamic philosophy.

In the late eighteenth century, fighting in Gansu between Islamic and neo-Islamic factions was the source of serious social disturbances.

In north-western China, the alms distributed by Muslims in accordance with Islamic law were appropriated by the *Ahong* who, instead of being elected as before, acquired their positions through heredity. This caused discontent among ordinary Muslims. In 1761, the Muslim Ma Mingxian, returned to China after a long sojourn in Central Asia. He founded the neo-Islamic school and reformed the old system. He had a massive following of Muslims, but was opposed by the *Ahong* of Didao (now Linxia) and Hezhon. The two sides engaged in armed clashes. The Qing government took the side of the *Ahong*. Confronted with this situation, the neo-Islamicists organized armed revolts twice, in 1781 and in 1784, both of which were suppressed by the Qing army. Although Ma Mingxing was killed, the influence of the *Ahong* in this region was finally weakened.

Catholicism came to China by an overland route during the Yuan dynasty (1206-1368). With the fall of the Mongol Empire and the rise of the Tujue, a Turkic people of Central Asia, there was a 200-year interruption in the development of this religion. In the sixteenth century, it was reintroduced to China, this time arriving by sea.

The missionaries belonged to the Society of Jesus. In 1580, the Italian missionary Michele Ruggieri arrived in Guangzhou. A year later, Matteo Ricci (Li Madou) arrived in Macao. Other missionaries arrived in China later, including the German Johann Adam Schall von Bell, the Belgian Ferdinand Verbiest, the Italian P. Julius Aleni, and so on. During this period, all missionaries had Chinese names to facilitate dealings with the mandarins. Thus, Catholicism spread in China. In the 1730s, there were some thirty Catholic churches and around 300,000 baptized believers. Beijing had three Catholic churches and a Catholic school.

For quite a long while, the Qing governments adopted a relatively respectful attitude towards the missionaries, and allowed them to exercise their activities freely. The year after they came to Beijing, the Qing government made the missionaries' calendar the 'imperial almanac' and appointed Johann Adam Schall von Bell as head of the Imperial Astronomical Bureau. During the reign of Kangxi, the

missionary Ferdinand Verbiest was appointed head of the Imperial Astronomical Bureau. On his recommendation, many Jesuit missionaries came to Beijing and were appointed to various government posts. Some were even involved in the political and diplomatic activities of the Qing government.

During this period, the missionaries played a role in communication and cultural interchanges between East and West. They revealed the rapid developments of modern science to the Chinese. Thanks to them, certain fields of western science were introduced to China, including astronomy, mathematics, geography, physics, medicine and hydraulics. Renowned Chinese scientists who studied western science included Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao, Yang Tingjun, Wei Shangjie, Zhu Zongyan, Xu Kechen, and so on. Also during this period, missionaries were appointed to the Imperial court. They included P. Thomas Pereira, Jean-François Gerbillon, Joachim Bouvet, and so on. They took part in astronomy research and in the calculation of the astronomical calendar. They redesigned the Beijing observatory, made new astronomical instruments, introduced European renaissance arts and worked in the areas of music, painting and sculpture. They taught the workers of the court workshops to make chiming clocks. Others taught the emperor Kangxi mathematics, astronomy and physics, and helped the Court to design the geographical map of the country. They crossed various provinces and carried out local surveys in order to complete the *Huangya quanlan tu* (Complete Overview of the Imperial Territory) and the *Qianlong Atlas of the Imperial Household Department*.

The missionaries also wrote extensively on science and religion. The contemporary scholar Xu Zongze has published a *Summary of Works translated by the Members of the Society of Jesus during the Ming and Qing*, listing several hundreds of Chinese works published by the Jesuits and their Chinese collaborators. The missionaries also drafted many detailed reports for the Vatican on the situation in China and on Chinese culture and history. The Italian Martino Martini wrote a ten-chapter *History of China*, published in Amsterdam in 1659 along with the *New Atlas of China* of which the notes alone were over 200 pages long. This work introduced Chinese culture, history and geography to Europe. Some missionaries introduced the west to Confucianism and Buddhism – which had a positive effect on European intellectuals.

However, it should be noted that the scientific knowledge introduced by the missionaries was mainly intended to serve religion. This knowledge was fragmentary, and sometimes even obsolete in Europe. Moreover, certain missionaries took advantage of the trust of the Ming court to exercise illegal activities. For example, the *Huangya quanlan tu* (Complete Overview of the Imperial Territory) was intended to be a secret map – but shortly after it was completed it was seen in Paris. In the eighteenth century, during the Nerchinsk negotiations between China and Imperial Russia, the missionary¹ who was acting as interpreter revealed China's strategic secrets to the Russians in an attempt to curry favour and to obtain advantages. Some missionaries intervened in China's internal politics.

The principal reason that led China to ban Catholicism was the deterioration of relations with the Vatican. In 1705, the Pope forbade Chinese Catholics to worship Confucius or their ancestors. He admonished the missionaries not to let there be any confusion between God and Heaven – which was venerated by the Chinese. This aroused the displeasure of the Imperial government. The emperor Kangxi told the Pope's envoy:

The ceremony in memory of Confucius is to show respect to the saints, and the ceremony for the memory of ancestors is to show gratitude to them, whereas the worship of Heaven is a widespread principle throughout the world. We cannot abandon our moral values or our customs. Westerners must not ask the Chinese to behave in accordance with the Bible, just as the Chinese do not require foreigners to behave in accordance with the Four Books and the Five Classics.

The Vatican rejected the Chinese position. In 1715, the Pope reminded missionaries in East Asia to obey Rome or he severely punished. In 1720, the Pope's special envoy arrived in Beijing to convey the Pope's orders. All the missionaries in China obeyed. As a result, the Chinese government announced a ban on the preaching of Catholicism. Starting in 1724, all the missionaries left for Macao, except for a few who were authorized to remain in Beijing in service to the Imperial Palace or the Imperial Astronomical Bureau. The churches were closed and Catholicism in China came to a complete stop.

It should be noted that the Qing government's ban on Catholicism also had to do with fear of European invasion. In July 1724, the emperor Yongzheng, who had inexorably prohibited Catholicism, told the missionary Dominique Parrennin:

I know that your aim is to make the Chinese Catholics. And what am I then to become? A subject of your country? Your disciples see only you, they listen only to you. I have nothing to fear today, but when hundreds, even thousands of foreign ships begin to arrive, there will be trouble.

The interruption of the missionaries' activities in China marked the cooling of the first major cultural exchanges between China and Europe. The experience nevertheless provided inspiration and knowledge for the future.

EDITORS' NOTE

As the contributors' typescripts were communicated to the Members of the International Commission, Professor Tikhvinsky sent the following comments which we reproduce as endnotes below.

1 Trade between China and Russia: until the middle of the seventeenth century the trade was in the hands of Central Asia merchants whose caravans from China arrived at Tobolsk, Tara, Surgut and Tomsk. After the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 – the first Chinese treaty with a European power – the Russian government and Russian Merchants took over the caravan trade with China which was profitable. The value of Chinese goods – cotton and silk textile, porcelain, and so on, increased from 14.5 thousand roubles in 1690 to 57 thousand roubles in 1696. From 1695 to 1762 the government of Russia had the monopoly on the trade with China, including valuable furs like sable, silver fox, and so on. After the opening of five Chinese ports to foreign trade in 1842 after the first Anglo-Chinese (Opium) War the overland caravan trade diminished.

2 Activities of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Beijing established by Peter I of Russia before his death in 1725 and Emperor Kang Xi of China: its members stayed in the Chinese capital five to ten years. Some of them became world famous specialists in Chinese, Manchu, Mongol languages, history and culture like Yakimovich, Vasily Vasiliev, and others. Until the Beijing Treaty of 1860 the members of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission conducted important diplomatic

functions. The head of the last twentieth Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, Archbishop Victor, left China for Russia in 1952.

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JAPAN AND KOREA

23. I
JAPAN*Akira Hayami*

While 1492 was not in itself a year of particular significance in Japan's history, it roughly marked the start of the greatest transformation Japan had ever experienced. A transformation with many facets – political, economic, social and cultural – that was to continue through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, it was this transformation that set the guidelines for creating the special characteristics of modern Japan.

In short, prior to that transformation, the main elements constituting Japan were greatly influenced by systems and culture either in China or originally brought over from China. Japan was in many respects a member of the 'Chinese World Order', and a very faithful member at that. Again, prior to that transformation, there was, first, no clear distinction in Japan between the religious and the secular; second, political power and economic wealth were often to be found in the hands of the same individual. Thus, in the religious sphere, 'art' would be for the benefit of Buddhism, while in the political sphere, shoguns wielding political power would invest in their own foreign trade operations.

However, after the transformation, not only was Japan divorced from the 'Chinese World Order', but the values constituting its society were separate and independent. Subsequently these started interacting with each other to produce a society having pluralistic values. Inhabitants of the Japanese Archipelago became worldly as opposed to religious, and formed social groups based on a mentality emphasizing economic values. In this sense, one is justified in calling it 'a great transformation' when looking at Japan from a historical perspective (Hayami, 1986).

Of course, a transformation of this nature did not come about overnight. One might say 100 to 200 years were required. Moreover, it did not progress simultaneously throughout the entire Japanese land mass. It varied in nature from region to region, and the sequence of the various facets was not the same everywhere. Thus it at times involved an incoherent state that could be called a temporary state of confusion, *chaos* or *crisis*. In this context, the new experience of diverse (outward and inward) international relationships added an extra dimension, making the situation more and more complex.

Below, we discuss how this transformation came about and the Tokugawa Japan that was the final result.

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY – JAPAN
WHEN THE TRANSFORMATION BEGAN

First let us consider the political administration and land administration aspects of the situation prevailing in the sixteenth century when the transformation began.

In pre-sixteenth century Japan, neither the political system nor the land administration system were simple. There was instability, and in some cases coexistence of systems having mutually incompatible principles. However, in the circumstances none of the political power players had the power to create a new system – a situation that continued up until the country became embroiled in the great confusion of the *Sengoku* period (Warring States period) that began in the latter half of the fifteenth century (1467–1573).

Though there were still vestiges of the *Ritsuryō* authority and *shōen* authority centred on Kyoto in central Japan in the *Sengoku* period, there were also upstart petty local lords at the local level, and political control became weak. One aspect of this was the explosion of economic activity, which was not limited to regional commerce, since foreign trade also developed through traders in port cities such as Sakai and Hyogo. Also, with the inflow of money from China, farmers did not have to work just to feed themselves and make their annual tax contribution, but also began to work to produce for the market. This economic development took place in a 'bottom up' direction.

In the towns, a self-governing system based on the upper urban classes was established. The existent enfeebled political authority was not allowed to intervene, with people guaranteeing their own economic activity themselves. Even in the villages, it was found that in the face of the political vacuum, communes called *so* were established and autonomous social groups based on a hierarchy with the temples and shrines as a nucleus grew up (Tonomura, 1992).

These autonomous organizations that grew up in central Japan from the latter half of the fifteenth century and through the sixteenth century were historically speaking extremely exceptional for Japan in that they were the result of the development of economic activity in the absence of strong political authority. It was just when such autonomous organizations started spreading from central Japan to the remoter regions that a new political authority from elsewhere established itself in the central zone and mipped the populist organization of society in the bud.

In contrast, in the outlying regions, the *Sengoku* daimyo (Civil War period local lords), exercising power locally and independently *vis-à-vis* both the Ashikaga Shogunate and the *Ritsuryō* establishment, continued to grow. Using their military might, they fought with the neighboring lords, extended their territory, and used brute power to eradicate the various traditional systems. Besides laying down the law of the land on their own, they then initiated 'top down' economic development by establishing irrigation and water-use facilities, building roads and bridges, and developing mines. However, social construction on that basis left the social structure in its traditional form. Thus two types of farming enterprise coexisted. The first were large-scale businesses based on *dogo* (powerful provincial or village landowners) with great recourse to forced labour. The second were small farms normally based on a husband and wife unit. In either case they were producing exclusively to feed themselves and pay their annual tax. The *dogo* in normal times lived in the village to supervise agricultural business. For short periods, they sometimes had to rush off with at the head of all their clan to partake in a campaign on behalf of their lord and master. The *Sengoku* daimyo tried to extend their power, keeping things as they were and without attempting to change this existing form of farming family.

Once these *Sengoku* daimyo in outlying areas achieved a balance of power, they set their sights on achieving national hegemony, and started to seek to advance into central Japan. This was because it was the centre of political power and because economic wealth was concentrated there. However, just then, they found a force had developed right in their path. This was a force that had grown up in the zone between the centre and the outlying regions. It was a new form of 'territorial lord system' that had been able cleverly to absorb the economy that had developed in a 'bottom up' direction, free from the framework of traditional political rule. The special feature of this system was the separation of soldiering and agriculture. This consisted of having the warriors segregated from the farmers and obliged to live grouped together in one place. Thus a professional army was created with the peasants concentrating on agriculture. The dual benefits derived from this separation of the roles were great military power and high agricultural productivity in the fief.

Very conveniently for those with the newly found power, a new weapon had come to hand. It was the gun – brought in by Portuguese landing on an island in the southern part of Japan in 1543 and in next to no time produced in Japan. However, the first person to use it effectively in battle was Oda Nobunaga (1534–82) from the intermediate zone lying between central Japan and the outlying regions, who had established a standing army on the warrior/peasant separation principle. He had managed to build this up into a small but potent force by carrying out massed battle training. The method he devised for using the guns was to have three rows of men lined up in 'steps' firing in rotation, so that the marchlock gun was used as efficiently as possible, taking into

account the time required for 'firing', 'cleaning' and 'loading' in the case of such a weapon. Use of this firing method was some seventy years in advance of Europe (Parker, 1988). A typical example of success using this method can be seen in the Nagashino battle of 1575, where a small force was able to overcome the cavalry of *Sengoku* daimyo Takeda, which at the time had a fearsome reputation throughout Japan.

Oda Nobunaga overcame the surrounding *Sengoku* daimyo one after another. In 1570 he finally entered Kyoto and drove out the Shogun. Although he had reached the final phase marking the end of the long *Sengoku* period (Warring States period), he himself was assassinated by a vassal in Kyoto in 1582. Oda Nobunaga was succeeded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98) who destroyed the said assassin's force within a few days. By appropriating Oda Nobunaga's newly created military power and his new system for taxation and administration described below, Toyotomi Hideyoshi was able to pacify the whole of Japan over a period of just eight years, building a large castle at Osaka and bringing the economy of highly developed central Japan under his control (see Map 29).

The new system for taxation and administration established by Hideyoshi was subsequently taken over by the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) and became the foundation for Japan's administrative system prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868. This form of administration was something now called the *kokudaka* system (assessment tax base system), whereby farmland and residential land were measured 'field by field' and 'parcel by parcel' and an evaluation made in accordance with the grade of the land. This evaluation was the base for levying the annual tax. The term '*kokudaka* system' also derives from this. However, in many cases the evaluation does not indicate a quantity in terms of money, but in terms of a volume of rice (*koku* is a unit for measuring rice by volume and *daka* means amount). Furthermore, in the case of villages, this was calculated not on the basis of the single individual's estimated land holding but with respect to the total *kokudaka* for the whole village. Thus, the person responsible for paying the annual tax was not the individual but the village as a whole. Thus one might go as far as to say that the problem of who actually paid what did not involve the local lord. However, this *kokudaka* system (replacing the levying of an annual tax that had existed from the seventh century) was a system peculiar to Japan. At least, at its inception one can say that it functioned as a device for establishing a stable political authority. A key feature of administration via this *kokudaka* system was that it enabled the Shogunate to switch the postings of the daimyos. To be more specific, under the *kokudaka* system of administration, each daimyo was classified in terms of the *kokudaka* which should be his due in accordance with his family ranking. He could then be posted to any fief in Japan assessed at that level. Although transfers from one posting to another did not often occur in practice, the daimyo was always conscious that his being 'local lord' of a given area of land was arbitrary. As a result the daimyo's relationship with his fief and its people was rendered tenuous. This means that the local lord or fiefdom system in Tokugawa Japan cannot be explained in terms of the concept of feudalism as established in Europe.

Of course, as explained below, this *kokudaka* system of administration also had defects. However, these very defects had positive aspects over the long term by enriching a certain fraction of those being governed – notably some of the farmers and merchants. This situation deriving from the *kokudaka* system was to become an important condition for



Map 29 Map of Japan (after A. Hayami).

making Tokugawa society one of the types where politics and the economy were separate.

SO CALLED 'ISOLATION' – ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPAN- CENTRED WORLD ORDER

Another singular aspect of sixteenth and seventeenth century Japan is the tremendous fluctuation in its international relations. The movements in international relations during this period, which was to conclude with the generally misunderstood 'isolation' or closed-door policy, were actually closely linked to the history of Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, one should not take the word 'isolation' too literally, as recent studies are making clear (Toby, 1984).

Japanese merchants were able to engage in trade freely.

However, up until about the middle of the sixteenth century, one cannot ignore the traditional China trade, such as that carried out by the Ashikaga Shogunate. The shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu sought a monopoly over the Ming China trade. He was granted Japanese King status by the Ming Emperor, becoming a member of the Ming 'Chinese World Order'. However, this trade, consisting of importing copper coins from China, was very profitable at a time when coins were not being minted in Japan. Naturally this lucrative trade finally came to be covered by the daimyo holding the real power and their attempts at usurping the right to this trading monopoly made it one of the political triggers for the strife during the *Sengoku* period. However, it simultaneously played an economic role, stimulating development by providing a circulation element for the money economy that was gradually developing in central Japan. This licensed trade authorized by the Ashikaga Shogunate heralded the

interruption of relations at State level with Ming China. Thereafter, relations between Japan and China were to continue for three centuries without any inter-governmental agreement.

With this situation prevailing, the people finally to come on the scene were the Europeans. The Portuguese came to Japan by chance in the 1540s. However, they were already aware that Japan offered better prospects than any other place they had been to as regards achieving their twin goals in advancing overseas—that is trading and spreading Christianity. For Japan up to that time had no monotheist faith representing a tough opponent for Christianity; its people were seeking spiritual stability because of the continuous fighting, while the guns that had been brought in were avidly sought and fought over by *Seigoku* daimyo. Furthermore, as there was no formal trade between Japan and China and there was a differential in the value of gold and silver between the two countries, so that an enormous profit could be made merely by exporting silver from Japan (where it was cheap) and exchanging it for gold in China. Macao was the transit point for the two-way trade between Japan and China, the main items being silver from Japan and raw silk and woven silk from China.

In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the opening of silver mines in Japan proceeded at a great pace and a considerable amount of silver was produced. Its fame was such that it is even alluded to in *Os Lusíadas*, the epic poem by the world-famous Portuguese poet, Camões (Camões, 1963).

Since the daimyos in western Japan found they were able to profit economically when they engaged in trade in their fief, they vied for visits by the Portuguese boats, and therefore allowed the proselytizing of Christianity within their fief. Some even became 'Christian daimyos', being baptized themselves. The success of Christianity in western Japan was such that there were even reports that Christians amounted to as many as 20 per cent of the total population. In the final years of the sixteenth century, the missionary movement reached central Japan. A period had arrived in Japan that could be called the *Christian Century* (Boxer, 1951).

However, at the end of the sixteenth century, Japan's national unification was progressing. In particular, with the coming to power of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Japan's international relations were suddenly transfigured. Firstly, in the process of unifying the country, Hideyoshi learnt that some land in Nagasaki had been donated to the Jesuits by a Christian daimyo. As well as confiscating it, he issued an order expelling all missionaries from the country on the grounds that Christianity was not only not needed in Japan, but harmful as well. Admittedly, this order was not carried out strictly. Besides which there was the matter of Hideyoshi's curiosity which made him subsequently often meet the envoy from Portugal seeking to get evangelization restarted.

At around that time, evangelization in Japan was faced with a new situation in that the Franciscans and Dominicans—with the backing of the Spanish crown—had begun proselytizing. Using Manila in the Philippines as a base, Spain began seriously to advance into Asia with the support of Philip II who was also King of Portugal. Hearing that the propagation of Christianity in Japan was going relatively well, they sent a succession of missionaries. For them, the Jesuits who had taken precedence were the real enemy, and they took every opportunity to say bad things about each other. When these rumours reached the receptive ears of Hideyoshi, who was already adopting an anti-Christian stance, they were enough to bring about an incident involving

the arrest and execution of the missionaries. This was where the period of difficulties for Christianity began (Elison, 1973).

Of all of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's international ventures, the invasion of Korea was the one that had the greatest effect within the country and externally. As soon as Hideyoshi had gained control of the whole of Japan in 1590, he immediately began to look abroad to expand the territory under his jurisdiction. Looking at it from today, this reckless action seems to have no rational explanation. Hideyoshi's dream was to build a dominant sphere in East Asia from Korea and China to the Philippines. He was due to start by attacking China, and asked the Korean government to allow his troops to pass through that country. Naturally they were not going to accede to this request, and in April of 1592 his force landed in Korea. At the time, Yi Dynasty Korea was a civilian state without an army worthy of the name. So in the summer of that year, Hideyoshi's forces advanced from Seoul to Pyongyang. Yi asked Korea's suzerain state, Ming China, to send reinforcements, and as Ming China responded favourably, it became a war between the Japanese and Ming military with Korea as the stage. In addition, as the Koreans were inflicting defeats on the Japanese at sea, the Japanese army's advance was halted.

In these circumstances, the war became a stalemate. An attempt at peace also ended in failure, and in the end the war was to continue up until the death of Hideyoshi in 1598.

While Hideyoshi's Korean invasion brought about the financial impoverishment of the daimyo who had to dwell troops, conversely it increased the relative strength of the Tokugawa family who did not send troops. Furthermore, the loyalty of the daimyo themselves to the Toyotomi house following the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi became even more questionable because the heir was young and no proper system for ensuring the succession had been set up.

What brought things to a head was perhaps that Japan had been excommunicated from the Chinese World Order centred on China. The fact that Japan had fought with the army of the Chinese World Order's suzerain state meant that Japan was completely ignoring its position as a state owing allegiance. If China had at that time had the necessary power, it would without doubt have taken sanctions against Japan. For better or worse, the Ming did not have the strength to do that, so conversely it was being destroyed by one more 'barbarian'. With this state of confusion regarding political authority prevailing on the Chinese mainland, Japan was able to escape from the Chinese World Order without retribution from China.

The Tokugawa administration that took over power from the Hideyoshi administration initially appeared to want to restart country-to-country exchanges with China. Having formal relations with China on a country-to-country basis signified—as regards northern East Asia—entering the Chinese World Order. To this, the Chinese maintained a state of indifference. One reason for this was that they could not simply forgive Japan's barbaric act. Another reason was that the Ming dynasty itself was too concerned with its own crisis to concern itself with Japan. The Tokugawa Shogunate—aware of the political confusion on the Chinese mainland—decisively moved to leave the Chinese World Order once the foundations of their own administration became firmly established with the coming of the 1630s, and at the same time established a World Order centred on Japan (Tohy, 1984).

What complicated the international relations Japan was to have were problems with Europe, and particularly with

regard to Christianity. Ever since the time of Hideyoshi, those holding the reins of power had become progressively more hostile towards Christianity. At the beginning of the Tokugawa administration there appears to have been an aim to have a positive approach towards maintaining relationships with the European countries due to the profit to be derived from trade. However, they knew that in the case of the two Iberian countries, trade and proselytizing were inseparable in their overseas advances. Furthermore, the revolt by Christians in 1630 hardened the Tokugawa Shogunate's attitude, and various measures involving a certain amount of 'overkill' were taken relating to international relations. Not only was Christianity forbidden, and the two Iberian countries proscribed, but foreign travel by Japanese and the return of Japanese already abroad were forbidden. As a result Japan was a closed country; and one that had isolated itself, and not one that had been isolated. However, if one observes Japan's international relations at that time with great attention, one can see that Japan's relations with Europe and choice of a position in northern East Asia, and more particularly with China, proceeded simultaneously. One need not say that the crucial thing for Japan at that moment was the latter (northern East Asia and China). This was because no one then could imagine that Europe would experience a political and economic change that would confer great power on it.

Though this policy forbade Japanese from travelling overseas, trade with Korea and the Ryukyus (*Ryūkyū*) was delegated to the Tsushima clan and to the Satsuma clan respectively. Near Pusan in Korea, Tsushima had the Japanese residential area called the '*Wakunaru*', and it was to there they sailed to carry out trade and negotiations between the two countries (Tashiro, 1981). Similarly, the Satsuma had a '*Ryūkyūan Lodge*' in the Ryukyus, where political negotiations were carried out abroad in addition to the primary purpose which was trading (Sakai, 1968).

It is true that in Tokugawa Japan there was no state with a modern centralized concentration of authority, but it was only one step away. Thus it was an age for which the term 'Early Modern' is appropriate (Hall and Jansen, 1968).

PAX TOKUGAWA

When the Tokugawa took over the government of Japan, what they sought most of all was the stable continuation of their rule. By keeping in mind the good and bad points of the short rule of their predecessors in office, Nohunaga and Hideyoshi, the Tokugawas were able to maintain control over a long period. In order to achieve continuity of rule, the controlling authorities systematized their record keeping. Even though doing so was unbelievably complicated, they tried to maintain legal and political precedence. This maintenance of precedence provided stability of rule in as much as it was able to function in the context of social and economic change.

The Tokugawa Shogunate first of all rendered absolutely powerless people and institutions who might be hostile to them. This included the Imperial Household and nobility, and also the temples and shrines. For example, saying that the emperor's work was scholarship, they only recognized his right to decide the appellation of the year and to give titles to warrior Houses. The nobles were only allowed to carry out official functions effectively devoid of any political content — these being carried out as laid down in the Official Calendar. Thus, although the emperor and nobles were

important from a ceremonial point of view, they did not actually have any political power. Had either Tokugawa Ieyasu or his two precursors really used their power they probably could have eliminated the Imperial Court and nobles at Kyoto by cutting them off at the roots. However, at that juncture they made it clear to the 'ruling' classes and to the public at large that they were the rulers of Japan by 'pinning down' the Kyoto-based emperor and nobles who had anyway over a period of a thousand years only been rulers in name.

The attitude towards temples and shrines was also astute. The Tokugawa Shogunate were well aware of how difficult it was to get control of the situation when dealing politically with groups of people linked by religious faith. Christianity was thoroughly suppressed, while Buddhism was brought within the government system. With Buddhism made 'official' any divergence of view within a religious group was exploited by the Shogunate doing all it could to perpetuate any denominational splits. By intervening forcefully even in the case of the most anodyne incident, they let it be known that the Shogunate could control the religious world too just as it liked.

There was also the 'religious inquisition system', which was originally put into effect in order to eradicate Christianity, whereby all Japanese were decreed to be Buddhist and affiliated with a specific temple of a specific sect. Under this system, the temples came to adopt the attitude that there was no point in tiring themselves out seeking converts since they were guaranteed a set number of believers even without any effort on their part. Buddhist activity in Japanese society lost its momentum, and so much so, that to put it extremely one could argue that it had become 'Funeral Buddhism'.

The Tokugawa Shogunate was a military organization based on a Shogun at the top of a warrior family. Its organization required very strict rules. More than anything, and whatever the level, treason was strictly guarded against and measures taken to prevent it. The daimyo had to send their wives and children to the Shogun's residence at Edo (Tokyo) as hostages, while they themselves had to go back and forward at vast expense to live alternate years at their own base and at Edo. This system was generalized, and was even given the name *sankin kotai* system. In fact, it meant that the daimyo were almost constantly at Edo. Marriage by any of the daimyo's children required permission, in order to preclude the formation of anti-Shogunate alliances that might form through marriage.

The Shogunate had one-quarter of total land in the country, and put the major towns and mines under its direct control. Daimyo in Tokugawa Ieyasu's direct lineage, and accordingly daimyo in whom the most trust could be placed, were allotted fiefs at important places. Also, daimyo who had been vassals before the Tokugawa family took over the country were differentiated from 'daimyo who had sworn allegiance later'. In addition to cleverly posing the daimyo of these two groups throughout the country, the Shogunate made the former responsible for the Shogunate's policy decisions (including the tasks and duties these implied), and gave the latter the burden of large-scale construction works.

In this way, the Tokugawa administration commanded 200 or more daimyo all over the country and posed them to fiefs very much in accordance with their expectations. However, in the event of any trouble the daimyo would be transferred and the size of the fief even reduced. In extreme cases, the family could be eliminated. If we concentrate on this on this aspect, it would seem that the Tokugawa Shogun was 'an

absolutist ruler'. However, from a legislative point of view, the edicts promulgated by the Shogunate may have been put into effect in the directly administered areas, but it was the daimyo's laws that were applied in the daimyo's territory. Thus it was not a matter of laws being applied generally throughout the country. Though the Shogunate had judicial power to cope with disputes arising between persons living in the fiefs of different daimyo, problems restricted to the daimyo's territory fell under his jurisdiction. Looked at in this way, Tokugawa Japan could be said to have been a society with decentralization of authority (see Plate 124).

Although the Tokugawa Shogun had 'Regulations for Samurai' supported by a Confucian ideology, there was a clear distinction between public and private. Since transgression of this rule met with severe punishment, it is said that this had a profound effect on the ethics of later Japanese society (Nakai, 1988). For example, Samurai who sought personal economic gain were severely censured. For that reason, one can reasonably say that not one Samurai of the Tokugawa period became rich. Rather the opposite happened: the level of consumption of the society went up generally, while the income of the Samurai was fixed and in fact decreased in real terms – it not being rare for them to fall into poverty. The fundamental characteristic of the period is apparent from the fact that the warrior classes with political power were actually faced with economic poverty.

The fundamental social system adopted by the Tokugawa Shogunate was the *kokudaka* system mentioned above. The *kokudaka* system had the following two special characteristics.

The first special characteristic was tied to an annual taxation system with the hamlet as unit. In the Tokugawa period, the official responsibility and burden of paying the annual tax was the hamlet's, and not the individual's. This does not directly signify there was no private ownership of land, but to put it extremely, it did mean that the lord of the territory could not have cared less what happened about ownership of land by each individual farmer. What the local lord needed was the annual tax based on the *kokudaka*, and so long as they did not prevent this, he did not interfere in matters such as the private ownership of land by individual farmers. For that reason, it was necessary to wait for the land-reforms such as those introduced soon after the establishment of the Meiji government (1868–1912) for the private ownership of land to be put on a legal basis.

It is somewhat surprising for a society with a developed economy such as that of Japan in the Tokugawa period not to have public guarantees regarding the private ownership of land. To arrive at that situation, the society had to be peaceful and without pillagers. Also the people constituting the village had to have relationships based on mutual trust. As a corollary, it was necessary for 'human goodness' to become a commonly accepted concept. Rights did not depend on a system devised by the state, but on the goodwill of the neighbours. Indeed, this way of thinking is one that permeates the *mentalité* of the present day Japanese.

The second special characteristic was on the economic front, where the productivity of the land rose, but the local lord was not able to increase the *kokudaka* in keeping with this. If the rise in productivity during the Tokugawa period can be considered to be due to the increased yield per unit area of land, one can say that in a society where land productivity is rising, the *kokudaka* system was not a suitable system from the point of view of those levying the annual tax. However, from the point of view of those burdened with the annual tax the reverse is true. This is because the *kokudaka* is a system where

a local lord cannot grab the increase in productivity for himself. In consequence, if the yield per unit area increases due to intensive use of the land, the resultant increase may remain in the hands of the farmer, or at the very least not all end up in the hands of the local lord as annual tax.

On the other hand, the peasants constituting the class being ruled who had had their weapons confiscated, in accordance with the farmer/warrior separation policy applied since Hideyoshi's time, had lost the ability to fight head-on with the samurai armies made up of professional military men. With the samurai concentrated in the cities, and hardly any samurai in the village areas, the peasants were nevertheless able to maintain their own safety and stability in their districts by themselves. All guns, including hunting guns, owned by the peasants had to be declared without exception. Though it depended on the local lord, even daggers and the like could be subject to registration. Thus methods of resistance for the peasants were limited to gathering virtually weaponless in large numbers and showing their demands; or getting the amount they had to contribute as annual tax reduced on some pretext. Although the former are often cited by researchers in the context of riots, one can find in the latter the basic configuration of the period's social movements as represented in the daily conduct of the peasants.

Textbooks say that the peasants of that time were subjected to many constraints including being placed under mutual surveillance based on the *goningumi* system (5-family-unit mutual surveillance); being forced to lead a frugal life in accordance with the laws; not being allowed to buy or sell land; limitations on the type of crops they could grow; and even no freedom of movement. Although one must admit that an abundance of edicts forbidding this and that were promulgated, there was no executive organization to ensure that the peasants kept to them. One might say that these restrictive laws represented what the leaders ideally would have liked, with the reality being quite different. The actual life of the peasants was, it seems, as if there were a complete absence of such restrictive laws. They carried on rationally according to the economic rationality: buying and selling land, producing items from which they expected to make a profit, and even moving. In the event of a lawsuit, the law would be resuscitated, but otherwise it was left dormant.

The merchants in the towns looked at daily life from the standpoint of the ideology of the samurai who saw themselves as the 'rulers' as opposed to the 'ruled'. That is, though they were allotted a social position below that of the farmers according to Confucian philosophy as they made a profit without making anything, they were actually showered with economic privileges, and came to amass social power. Many of present day Japan's *zaibatsu* (industrial and financial conglomerates or combines) that had financial business as a nucleus originated from activities during this period. There was also great disparity between merchants. These ranged from two groups of merchants at the top – the big merchants closely involved in the financial affairs of the Shogunate and daimyo together with the merchants with the power to create credit by distributing promissory notes as if they were money – down to small-time traders doing deals in the street. In the case of the great merchant families, a tradition or code was established, and a ladder for the promotion of the numerous employees institutionalized. Also, since, as a rule, they were allowed to engage freely in their activities, they were able to make maximum profits at that time despite their lowly status in society (according to Confucian values) and even became supporters of culture.

A phenomenon specially characterizing Tokugawa Japan was the increase in population. Taking the country as a whole, and extrapolating from the figures available for one area, the population at the beginning of the seventeenth century was 12 million (± 2 million). According to the first general census carried out in 1721 by the Tokugawa Shogunate, the population had reached 30 million. Though the population stagnated somewhat over almost the next century, it reverted to the upward trend in the nineteenth century, linking up with the population increase of modern times (Hayami, 1971).

Why did the population increase? Evidently, the increase in the seventeenth century was linked with the increase in the area of land under cultivation. During this century, referred to as the 'Great Land Reclamation Period', the bringing under cultivation of flat areas throughout Japan continued apace. In accordance with the new local lord system, the local lords came to have the right to exclusive local lordship rights for a given domain, and set up flood control and irrigation facilities, and succeeded in turning deltas – which up to then had only seen unstable production – into fertile agricultural land. The peasants too were free from social instability, and a family unit centred on husband and wife became an agricultural production unit. Seen from another angle, it represented the formation of a peasant society. With such a family format, the marriage rate also increased, and the number of single persons decreased. A kind of baby boom took place, and an explosive increase in population occurred throughout the country (Hayami and Miyamoto, 1988).

This increase in population was absorbed by the rapidly established towns. For instance, in the seventeenth century, Japan's population increased two and a half times, while that of the towns and cities increased tens of times.

Processes such as the above were limited geographically, but documentation on population does remain to confirm it. Thanks to this documentation one can observe how the old-style households encompassing collateral relatives and a great number of unmarried people gave way to small families made up of direct relatives. Again according to the documentation, this change spread in concentric circles centred on the cities, its speed being roughly 200 m per year (Hayami, 1973b). As towns grew up throughout the country, even that speed was enough for the whole of the country to have become a peasant society by the middle of the eighteenth century with the exception of remote places in the mountains.

The peasants were producers not only of food but also of a large portion of the raw materials for industry. In addition to their traditional production destined to meet their own needs and permit payment of the annual tax, the peasants produced for the market – doing so efficiently and seeking the best way to make a profit. The peasant economy had arrived (Smith, 1959).

The central market for the whole country was indisputable Osaka's Dojima rice market (see Plate 125). There the annual taxation rice (warehouse rice) and rice purchased directly from the farmers (farm rice) were traded amongst the merchants. This trading was not limited to spot goods (spot trading) but also involved futures trading equivalent to present day 'hedging'. It was as if it were playing the role of the present day commodity and stock exchanges (Miyamoto, 1988). Using semaphore, the 'central price' was sent to the top of a nearby mountain, from where the information was transmitted from peak to peak using smoke of different colours. It is said that it reached Edo, a distance of more than

500 km, in 24 hours. There are records showing that all sorts of methods were used to transmit these prices to the rice collection and distribution centres in the areas producing branded rice which had become particularly price-sensitive. Thus it was that the rice prices all over the country fluctuated almost in parallel (Shinbo, 1978; Iwahashi, 1981).

If we look at the commodity distribution route, we see that traders were organized at each level, there being the following levels: traders buying from the producers; local transit traders, central brokers, wholesalers, transit traders at the place of consumption and retailers. Along that route there flowed commodities, money and information. Transactions at the central market were not carried out on a cash basis, but concluded on a credit basis. By creating credit, it was in fact possible to minimize the effect on the money transport. The central merchants with their increasing economic power were able to effect purchases at monopolistic prices by advancing money and so on. Also, around the middle of the eighteenth century when the expansion of the consumer market levelled off with the blunting of the population increase, they showed a tendency to try to exploit their monopoly to maintain their market share even in the area of the sale of goods. The Shogunate's policies, reflecting the economic difficulties of the time, attempted to raise taxes by granting recognition to such monopoly groups. As a result, a kind of guild-like organization called *kabu nakama* rapidly developed (Hauver, 1974) (see Plate 126).

Another example of merchant activity worth mentioning was the 'money-exchanging business'. Although they were called money-changers, their activity could more aptly be described as 'mainly financial'. What happened was due to the complexity of the Shogunate's currency system, for the nature of the currency differed from place to place: in the area of eastern Japan centred on Edo it was gold coins; in the area of western Japan centred on Osaka and Kyoto silver ingots were the fundamental tender. A market rate differing from the official rate of exchange evolved. The bigger problem for the Shogunate and the lords was how to send the money obtained from the sale of the annual taxation rice on the Osaka market to Edo. While there was the problem of the different gold and silver currencies, there was the much greater problem of the risk associated with the transport of large amounts of cash. The people dealing with this problem were the people working in the finance business called *Okunagami* (the Exchangers Union). At the Osaka market they took in the silver the Shogunate and lords had received from the sale of the taxation rice and paid out the equivalent in gold at their Edo branch. Their number included the Mitsui 'company' which has become one of the leading industrial conglomerates in Japan today (see Plate 127).

Conversely, they sought items on the Osaka market that ordinary merchants could not procure on the Edo market and transported them to Edo, selling them for gold at their Edo branches. By accepting the shipper of the goods at the Osaka office, they were able to avoid the trouble of transporting cash.

Many of the leading city banks of present-day Japan can trace their origins to this economic activity during the Edo period. With the explosion of this economic activity, concepts and various systems to achieve economic rationality evolved.

In this way, commerce in the Tokugawa period was to lead the economy as a whole (see Figure 26). This is first because of Japan's complicated topography, which means that every tiny region used its geographically comparative advantage in some aspect to produce special commodities, and this resulted




Figure 26 Tokugawa economy (after A. Hayami). The local lord levied an annual tax in rice or money on the peasants. Any rice not consumed was converted into money; not an 'economic act' as the local lord alone decided its value. However, its value progressively became aligned with market forces, and selling off the rice became an economic act. As the purchase of various products was done at market values, these were also economic acts.

in the need for the expansion of consumer markets in order to trade them. Another factor was that with the establishment of large cities, such as Edo, Osaka and Kyoto, having populations attaining anything from 500,000 to 1 million, the low transaction cost there for commercial activities became a condition for surviving the competition, and the growth of commerce began. Large merchants set out norms to maintain their own family business according to the precepts of the household, sometimes employing anywhere from several dozen to several hundred people. They established the human resources development systems required for a business enterprise. This included systematizing promotions, internal nurturing of cadres, and helping to set people up in business (Saito, 1987). Though books of account were generally of the 'single entry' type, the concept of double-entry bookkeeping was already germinating, and they were totally prepared for the introduction of modern accounting systems brought from the Western World in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Ogura, 1962). Even in farming village society, farmers' mutual financial organizations called 'ko' were established and fulfilled that function perfectly satisfactorily.

The area of manual industry saw very considerable development in such fields as spinning, weaving and food-processing. The spread of raw cotton production from the plains of the main island of Japan to the sandy sea-shore area of the Seto Inland Sea permitted the spread of cotton thread and cotton cloth production. However, this did not become a pole of industrial activity as in England because the fibres of Japanese raw cotton were short and unsuitable for mechanical spinning. In contrast, raw silk was a raw material for high added value silk cloth. Particularly during the eighteenth century, the import of high quality raw silk and silk cloth decreased and the domestic production of raw silk expanded in humid areas in the valleys and at the foot of mountains as an import substitution. The cocoons from which the raw silk is unreeled are the chrysalides of the silkworm. When the silkworms are at the larval stage they consume large quantities of feed consisting of mulberry leaves, so the cultivation of mulberry was the number one problem. The process of unreeling the raw silk from the cocoon was even then done with a silk-reeling device. Often carried out as agricultural by-employment, it developed in places close

to where the cocoons were produced. Furthermore, the process of producing silk cloth from the raw silk was such that the value of the product varied greatly depending on whether there was an expert technician involved or not. As a result the operation could be carried out for instance in the city of Kyoto – far from where the raw silk was produced and on a fair scale for the times. Thus the production of raw silk and silk cloth saw the development of specialization and improvement through competition in many fields, from the production of mulberry, silkworm-egg paper and so on by the farmers to the production of high quality silk cloth by skilled technicians in the cities. Thus when Japan became open to the world market in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it had internationally competitive silk products able to compete with raw silk and silk cloth produced in China.

As opposed to high-class goods such as silk cloth, there was a striped cloth made by blending silk and cotton, which became a mass consumption product in the last half of the Tokugawa period, and whose production spread to everywhere in the land. Thus 'self-sufficiency' was even disappearing from the peasants' cloth.

The food processing industry also developed with much of it being centred on brewery products such as *sake*, *miso* and soy sauce. The production of *sake* traditionally flourished in the vicinity of Osaka and Kyoto, with high class branded products being produced. These products were appreciated in the Edo consumers' market, and a local *sake* produced near Edo was also good price-wise. Thus fermentation techniques reached high technological levels that led on to the modern industry of today.

The pottery industry was another field where development occurred. At the time Toyotomi Hideyoshi was invading Korea, technical knowledge of a high order was gained by summoning Korean potters to Japan to get information. In the western part of Kyushu, ceramics and porcelain of high repute were produced and exported to Europe from Nagasaki through the Dutch East India Company. Also, all kinds of pottery products ranging from crockery and home items used by ordinary people to products used in construction works were produced wherever there were raw materials and fuel.

The forestry industry must also be mentioned. One can easily imagine the vast quantities of wooden materials required

during the initial construction phase of the cities and for large-scale construction works. Even subsequently, consumer markets were established to meet normal requirements for wood, for the construction and maintenance of housing in the cities and for social infrastructure. Wood differs from other products by virtue of being difficult to transport. It therefore had to be transported by water. For this, the wood was either made up into rafts or allowed to float down river as logs to the distribution centres downstream. From there they were forwarded to Edo and Osaka on the sea lanes. In the production areas, initial needs could be met by large-scale felling of the natural forest, but they were faced with the problem of the exhaustion of woods suitable for felling and transportation, and regulations set by the lords of the fief concerning the use of forests and woodland started to be instituted. Specially designated woodlands were established, where the felling of trees by ordinary people came to be forbidden on the grounds that the woodlands belonged to the local lord (Totman, 1989).

Then there were members of the public, often living in regions where wood grew quickly or where transporting it to market was easy, who set up forestry businesses. These forestry businesses did not involve felling the natural forest, but the replanting of trees in areas where they had been felled. This was a tree-nurturing industry. The tree planting and growing industry which appeared from the eighteenth century showed that the forestry industry was economically viable in that form. When one considers that it is necessary to invest over a relatively long period of fifty years from the time of planting to felling, one can see it is not something anyone can do. However, families engaged hereditarily in the forestry business did spring up here and there, with their business continuing in some form even today. At first sight it would appear that the attitude of such local lords and the public to the forestry industry would be different, but in terms of results, both sides wanted to protect Japan's forests and avoid destruction through felling, so in that sense they had much in common. At that time in Japan, wood was virtually the only resource not only for building materials but also for civil engineering projects, boat-building and fuel. If the local lords had not instituted protection policies and if the forestry industry run by the members of the public had not proceeded with the planting of trees, Japan's forests would have been depleted during the Tokugawa period, leaving it covered with bald mountains. Of course one must not forget that Japan had the advantage of an often warm and very humid climate in which trees grow quickly.

The mining industry suffered from a technical bottleneck, with an early falling off of output. With the increasing depth of the tunnels, getting rid of water and supplying air became a problem, and with no external energy it was insoluble. Precious metals such as gold and silver were in most cases mined under the direct control of the Shogunate, with the work being done by convicts. This was known as 'hard labour'.

For copper, there was investment and extraction all over the country by the daimyo and the merchants, and until quite a while later it was exported. Copper extracted at the mines in Shikoku, and then refined in Osaka for shipment to The Netherlands from Nagasaki by The Dutch East India Company in the form of rods had a set role of making prices fluctuate on the European copper market (Glamann, 1978). However, no one in Japan knew this at the time. For iron there was the 'foot bellows iron-making method' with iron sand as the raw material. Since the raw material and charcoal

for fuel were easy to come by, the operation could be carried out almost anywhere. Though large amounts of charcoal were required as fuel, forestry resources were not depleted because trees grew quickly on account of the high temperature and humidity at the latitude where Japan is situated.

Although coal was finally used as fuel in such industries as salt-making at the end of the Edo period, it was not used prior to that.

Overall, mining resources were varied, but quantities were always small. Even if one takes gold, for which Japan was famous in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we find that Japan had become a net importer by the latter half of the eighteenth century. The demand in a pre-industrialized society could only just be met; but with the coming of the age of real industrialization the insufficiency of resources was immediately felt.

From this we can see that even as regards construction materials, instances of the use of mineral resources or large quantities of cut stone were rare, and that construction using wood, earth and stones, and ceramic products was the usual practice. Rather than giant multi-storey buildings, constructions that were low with many complicated features were preferred – together with gardens – whether it were for temples and shrines or for private houses. However, these buildings resist poorly to earthquakes, fires, lightning and damp, so the only available way of storing property safely was in thick-walled earth warehouses. Although anti-fire organizations and thinking about fire-prevention had developed, there was no way to stop a fire when it was dry with a strong wind, so the possibility of cities being totally burnt in almost an instant was a constant threat.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY – STABILITY AND CHANGE

The seventeenth century was truly the 'Great Land Reclamation Period'. Although there are no accurate statistics, the area under cultivation would seem to have increased by close to two times. The population had also increased to somewhere between two and a half to three times its former level. Population growth in the cities was remarkable. It can be seen that cities (roughly 200 in number) with populations of 5,000 or more represented 15 per cent of the total population at the outset of the eighteenth century, with Edo having a population of 1 million, Osaka 500,000, and even Kyoto also with 500,000 (Rozman, 1973).

The important thing was that these cities had an economic function by forming a network between the cities themselves and between the cities and the farming villages. People, goods, money and information went back and forth. Economically, a national economy had been established; people became economy-minded; and it had become a society acting economically. Of course, the level of production technology was low. In agriculture, human-power rather than live-stock was the main source of energy for ploughing the fields. In manual industries, apart from the water-wheel, there really was not any incorporation of external energy. Manual industries that had developed at that time, such as spinning, weaving, mise-making and ceramics-making, all used machines operated by human-power.

However, the development of labour-intensive farm industries and production industries depending on such human-power held the danger of 'reinforcing' labour, and made people hard-working. Of course, this is subject to the

important proviso that extremely hard work over a long period offers the prospect of being rewarded. In societies where all the fruits of hard work over a long period end up in other people's hands, labour is only penal servitude and people would do all they could not to work. In such societies the motivation to work is compulsion. Societies where compulsion is the motivation have very low productivity. However, the situation in Tokugawa Japan was not like that (see Plates 128–130).

In such conditions, extremely hard work was considered not to be 'slave labour' but a virtue because economic gain was obtained exclusively through labour. So among the ordinary people the work ethic of labour being a 'virtue' was born. Moreover, inside the family this concept of work being a virtue passed from parent to child. Outside the family, this began to be taught as a norm to follow in the educational institutions that had sprung up throughout the country from around the eighteenth century, such as the private schools in the cities and the 'temple schools' in the countryside. One may call this an 'industrious' revolution! (Hayami, 1989).

In the world of literature, at the end of the seventeenth century, there was Ihara Saikaku (1642–93) who wrote about the Osaka merchants' activities and their view of the world. In his works he enthusiastically describes the process whereby they became rich through hard work to finally become very rich merchants. The underlying theme of his works is how the common folk seek worldly happiness as an extension of their daily lives. Saikaku's literature was widely read during the Edo era. If one regards the *Genji Monogatari* (*The Tale of Genji*) in the early eleventh century, whose main theme is life at the palace of the nobles, and *Tsuzumegusa* (*Essays in Idleness*) in the fourteenth century, about refusing the present world, as representative of Japanese literature before the seventeenth century, one can see just how great was the change in the people's values and mentality.

With the advent of the eighteenth century following the seventeenth century with its expansion, changes came about in various domains. Firstly, the expansion of the area under cultivation had reached the extreme limit possible with the then technology. Almost all of Japan's arable land (about 15 per cent of the total area) had been put to use. To increase production even further, the only option was to increase production per unit area. At the same time, taking the country as a whole, the population *per se* was close to its ceiling and the urban population ratio had reached its limit. The farmers were forced to utilize the land more intensively, with deep cultivation and heavy fertilizing. Even fish, sardine and herring, were used as a fertilizer after drying and pounding. This stimulated the fishing industry throughout Japan, not only to catch fish as a food but also as a fertilizer. Fishing villages flourished and the fish markets in the urban areas were established with high-spirited call.

Right at the end of the seventeenth century, the supply of mineral resources – which had even had surplus capacity for exports after meeting increasing internal demand – suddenly fell. Not only did exporting become difficult, but what is more, supplying enough to meet the needs for the currency used in Japan became difficult. As a result, in 1696 the Shogunate engaged in a currency debasement operation, reducing the amount of gold or silver in the metal used in minting to 80 per cent of the level it had previously been. From the start of the eighteenth century this debasement process accelerated, so that silver coins struck in 1708 were of extremely bad quality – being, it is said, only 20 per cent pure. Thus, at a stroke, trust was lost in the Japanese gold and silver currencies which

up until then had been the most trusted currency in East Asia, and distributed as a kind of international currency. Finally, the Shogunate again started making high quality currencies, but the amount of precious metal in a money of a given value was lower than before the debasement process started.

Furthermore, in order to meet the increasing demand for currency, non-metallic currency came to be issued by the daimyo. There was a form of currency, called *hansatsu* (domainal paper money) whose distribution was restricted to within the territory. Though the Shogunate's permission was required, it had the following two results in conjunction with the Shogunate's debasement of the currency.

The first result was that from that time on, the people living in Japan ceased to pay attention to the quality of the currency. Especially when debasement first took place, new and old coins were in circulation at the same time and confusion occurred. However, when they got used to it, they accepted low quality coins and *hansatsu*. There is a link between this and the fact that the new Meiji Government was later domestically able to overcome its first financial crisis brought about by the issue of a large quantity of paper money unhacked by precious metal.

The second result was that the Shogunate were denied the exclusive right to issue money, even though the issuing of *hansatsu* was subject to certain conditions. Prior to the issuing of *hansatsu*, the Shogunate held the monopoly regarding the issuing of silver and gold coinage. The Edo Shogunate that had prided itself on having the real power as the central government largely thanks to that monopoly, found that being denied the right to that monopoly was the first step in its downfall. In brief, the Shogunate lost the power to control the economy through the issuing of currency.

Even in the cities, the situation changed radically when the seventeenth century population increase and the associated rise in demand stopped. During the seventeenth century the Shogunate did not interfere at all, on the principle that 'trade should be free'. Powerful merchants gathered in the cities, while a network of wholesalers, brokers and retailers was formed. However, when the increase in demand and increase in population stopped in the eighteenth century, the merchants tried to hold onto their existing share and started to set up exclusive monopoly groupings. The complexities so characteristic of Japan's present-day product distribution system are to be found in the complex distribution-organization established during this period. The Shogunate and even the daimyo were able to procure 'recognition fees' by giving them official recognition. This was to try and compensate for the lack of increase in annual taxation income from the villages then unable to pay more.

In the eighteenth century, many changes took place in the Shogunate and in the daimyo domains. With the various systems institutionalized at the beginning of the Edo period being unable fully to cope with the subsequent changes in situation – and notably those brought about by economic development – there were many cases where revision was inevitable. However, if one looks at it in terms of financial policies one can find a very interesting feature. This is the way the financial expansion and contraction policies repeated in a thirty to forty year cycle. For example, in the middle of that century, the Shogunate carried out a great number of public projects, promoted foreign trade, minted coins in keeping with the needs of the time and approved merchants' associations. In brief, they pursued positive economic policies. However, natural calamities followed, and the persons who

had figured prominently in promoting those policies were dismissed on the grounds that they were against tradition. A conservative faction then grasped the real power. At that juncture, commerce regressed and policies stressing farming were adopted. 'Belt-tightening' and a return to the spirit prevailing at the time the Shogunate was established was stressed. But the already developed market economy would not allow the pursuance of retrenchment policies, and the promoter of those policies retired in disgrace and expansionist policies were reverted to.

Finally, this wave motion must have repeated itself with a certain amplitude between limits. On the one hand, there was the accepted principle underlying the formation of the *pax Tokugawa*, and defying it to return to a simply self-sufficient society was impossible so a market economy had to be allowed to a certain degree. On the other hand, they could not threaten the *pax Tokugawa* by permitting the spontaneous development of the market economy. As a result, there were pendulum-like swings between retrenchment policies and expansionist policies, or between spiritualism and materialism. The conservative factions and progressive factions were battling it out everywhere, with inter-personal battle lines drawn.

Also, at this time the Shogunate's policies did not extend throughout the country, and daimyo were able to pursue the policies independently of the Shogunate. There were many instances of the lords implementing expansionist policies while the Shogunate was adopting retrenchment policies. Consequently, the Shogunate's policies rarely fully achieved their objectives. Very often they simply terminated prematurely half-way, and the cyclic movement repeated itself.

Following the re-coinage operation in the 1730s, for about one century prices remained almost stable. The annual interest rate remained unchanged at about 10 per cent. One can say that economically, long-term stable conditions lasted. In that sense one can think of this period as being a *histoire immobile* period. However, this was only the superficial appearance; in fact changes were taking place internally.

For example, let us take the question of the population. It is said that Japan's population levelled off at about 30 million. The generally accepted view used to be that this stagnation was caused by the farmers resorting to birth control because of poverty. But there is another view that it represented the farmers' 'positive' means of increasing their standard of living (Hanley and Yamamura, 1977). However, what must be borne in mind is that there were great differences from region to region. In northern Japan, eastern Japan and in the vicinity of the big cities the population decreased, but in south-west Japan the population increased slowly but surely.

The decrease in population in northern Japan and eastern Japan in the latter half of the eighteenth century can be explained by the cold weather conditions. Furthermore, cold temperatures continued to prevail during the (rice) maturing period in the summers for successive years. The impact of this cold weather was particularly great because much of the land in question had been brought into cultivation during the period of great expansion in the seventeenth century and was land close to the 'northern limit' for rice cultivation. Japanese agriculture consisted essentially of rice cultivation and with the technology available at the time, northern Japan had a northern limit for rice cultivation which therefore made it particularly sensitive to low temperatures in summer and not possible to find alternatives. Although historical

documents tend to exaggerate when they mention hunger, the population in this area twice went down by 20 per cent because of cold weather – that is in 1756 and 1783. It took a long time for it to recover. Examination of the population trend for this region, shows that over the Edo era the peak was at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and that the population in the Meiji Restoration period (1868) did not return to the peak level.

There are cases where the fall in population was directly caused by hunger, such as where people actually died of hunger. However, in many cases people died because the decrease in nutrition during famines reduced people's resistance to disease. Ironically, in Northern Japan early marriage was the custom, and the average age of marriage for girls was around 15 years old. If couples continued to procreate throughout their lives they would have more than ten children. In fact, only three or four infants would grow into adults, because the marriage would sometimes be terminated through the death of one of the partners or because of the high infant mortality rate. During periods of famine and subsequently, there might well be a force at work making people try to limit the population. Although the marriage age became a little higher in this region, direct population control, usually by abortion or infanticide, had become a custom. Some of the daimyo became so worried that the population recovery was not going well that they strictly prohibited abortion and infanticide, and undertook a survey of pregnant women to preclude it. They even adopted a policy of giving subsidies to help those who gave birth bring up the child.

Furthermore, the population in the vicinity of Edo, Kyoto and Osaka did not increase because of the many people migrating to the big cities. This phenomenon can be explained by the urban 'graveyard' theory. That is to say, the urban mortality is higher than the fertility. Without considerable migration from the countryside they could not maintain their population levels. Other factors are involved in addition to mortality and fertility. They are imbalance of the sexes; a high ratio of single people; residential instability, and so on. Anyway, as the population replication ratio in the city was negative, migration from the surrounding farming villages was surely necessary. The high population density in the cities meant that once an epidemic disease struck, the chances of dying were much greater than in the countryside. In big cities like Edo, people's daily food was often such that (good) taste was given precedence over nutritional value. Lack of vitamin B and of minerals often led to symptoms similar to beriberi, and even to the extent that this was referred to as the 'Edo sickness'.

Migration to the city from the countryside was important. According to research on rural populations, one can see that there was very considerable migration. This did not always represent people intending to become permanent residents; often it was just people migrating for temporary work. According to a case study in one village located between Kyoto/Osaka and Nagoya with a population of 100,000 at that time: of the men and women having attained 10 years of age, 50 per cent of the men and 60 per cent of the women left for temporary labour migration. Both men and women of 13 and 14 years of age left the village to go to the city, and continued working there for twelve or thirteen years, after which half of the men and two-thirds of the women returned to the village. Men and women who did not return might have died in the city before then, or have decided to stay on permanently.

This the phenomenon of temporary labour migration controlled the village population in two ways. The first was that those deciding to stay permanently in the city or dying while working away from home represented a direct factor reducing the absolute population of the villages. The second was that the men and women who returned from working away from home married late with a consequent reduction in offspring. If one considers the difference in average female marriage age, between the returnees and those having stayed in the village as being about five years and representing a difference of about two children, the degree of population limitation occurring as the indirect effect of working away from home – that means a kind of indirect population regulation effect – may be surprising (Hayami, 1992).

Therefore, the presence or absence of such a regulatory action – that means the presence or absence of a city in the vicinity to absorb the population – produces big differences in the population trends, and moreover in the relation between population and society in the regions in question. In central Japan where the population regulation action worked – there are big cities and also a higher ratio of urban population – population pressure was relatively weak, and so the degree of social instability was relatively low. In contrast, in western Japan where there were no big cities and the urban population ratio was lower, it became a factor in making population increase continue. Later, population pressure built up and was to become a cause of social instability.

Though based on a limited geographical area, a study of the average longevity indicates that at the beginning of the Edo era, it was roughly 30 years, and that half of live-birth offspring were dead by the age of 10. In the latter part of the Edo era, life expectancy in normal times had risen by close to ten years, and the child death rate was two-thirds of that at the beginning (Hayami, 1973b). In the context of the period prior to the introduction of modern health-care and public hygiene, it is difficult to see any other reason for this improvement in anything other than in improved living conditions.

The clothes worn by ordinary people, changed to cotton from the previous 'mixed' fibre. The mixed fibre cloths were 'unhealthy' in that they could only be coarsely woven, lacked resistance, behaved poorly with regard to the cold and humidity, and could not be washed often. In contrast, clothes made from cotton do not have these drawbacks. They wash well, and have high resistance to moisture. Even this brought about revolutionary progress in the lives of the people, since clothing was, like housing and food, of key importance in their lives.

Although specifically forbidden by law, the wearing of clothes made of silk became generalized on festive occasions. Also, to produce the raw materials for making cotton, raw silk and flax, various industries such as spinning and weaving developed throughout the country subject to local conditions. The production of raw cotton was concentrated around the sandy areas, like those in the vicinity of Osaka or the coast around the Seto Inland Sea. Raw silk was mostly produced in eastern Japan on gentle slopes near where the mulberry trees grew. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the amount of silk cloth imported from China had decreased and the demand for domestically produced raw silk and silk cloth grew. As a result a good quality product with high added value began to be produced widely as a local speciality. For dyeing the cloth, production of safflower and Japanese indigo was started in specified places, also as a local speciality.

As regards food, there is lack of data, but it seems that rice-based food had become generalized, with animal protein coming from chicken eggs. Fish was dried and salted and one can find traces of fish merchants even in the most remote places. The development of the brewing industry was remarkable and *sake*, *miso* and soy sauce could be found in most kitchens. An essential ingredient was salt and its production by the new 'salt firm method' in the Seto Inland Sea went ahead. It is said that the Seto Inland Sea area alone produced 4.5 million *koku* (1 *koku* = approx. 180 litres). With the commandments of the Buddhist religion saying meat should be avoided, the only meat might be the occasional chicken, so nutrition in the Japanese meal was mainly centred on carbohydrates. Caloric intake was rather low.

In eighteenth century Japan people could enjoy continuous peace and it was a period when development of various aspects of 'consumer' life occurred (Hanley, 1990). For example, in the publishing sphere, the religious books and highly academic books published in large quantities in the seventeenth century gave way to newly compiled and published material. This included dictionaries, literature, maps, travel books, geography books, encyclopaedias and directories. The publishing centre of Japan, which up to then had been Kyoto and Osaka, shifted to Edo in the course of that century.

Travel, ostensibly to visit temples and shrines, became organized, and a travel industry became established with intermediaries gathering clients together and arranging accommodation on a contract basis in tourist spots. As regards communications, two large private postal companies provided a country-wide service, though most of their operations were between Edo and Kyoto/Osaka. Thus even before Japan became a modern country, it had a domestic communications network.

Transportation by water had limited possibilities in Japan because of the topography. It was developed to its maximum, and included an inland network for the distribution of goods. However, maritime transport was very developed.

Between Edo and Osaka two maritime transport groups were in severe competition. Another busy route to Osaka was a roundabout route via the Japan Sea and the Seto Inland Sea. As far as the transportation of goods was concerned, the development of coastal transportation routes in the Edo period meant that the needs of markets established throughout Japan could be met. Japanese sailing ships had no centre-board and weak keels, so sailing into the wind was difficult and there were many shipwrecks in consequence. The construction of large ocean-going sailing ships did not come about because the Japanese themselves were not allowed to engage in overseas trade.

In contrast, road transportation for cargoes was poor, and apart from in a few areas, transportation facilities were never used by the general public. And since the Shogunate's policy was not to build permanent bridges across the large rivers, ordinary people could only travel by foot.

As regards eating and drinking, high-class *ryōtei* (special Japanese restaurants) sprang up in the three major cities and in big cities built around castles. For the ordinary people, establishments serving light meals and tea appeared. Thus the cities and sightseeing spots became very convenient. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, this was accompanied by the production of local specialities in many places. These often were cakes or other delicacies. Thus a food culture was established, and was reckoned to be 'one of the pleasures of life'.

Facilities for the ordinary people's amusement were mainly concentrated in the cities; they include all the amusements so characteristic of present Japan such as theatrical plays, *sumo* (Japanese wrestling), *raku-go* (comic story-telling), *nanin-bushi* (narrative ballad), *kodan* (serious story-telling). The town citizenry would have their favourites, and followed the doings of popular performers avidly. Competitive games such as *go* and *shogi* (Japanese chess) became the most popular of these. However, 'poetry games' just like *mikusa-zukushi* that were half-educational, half-play were popular. These often involved using parts of famous poems as a starting point for a group of competitors to invent additional parts, thus producing a game in which contestants would learn the original poem (see Plate 131).

Also, during this period, practising *kyōka* (31-syllable verse), *haikai* (17-syllable verse), calligraphy, flower arrangement, the tea ceremony, traditional dancing, and musical instruments such as the *koto* or *shamisen*, became part of a proper education, and particularly for girls. Mastering these came to be seen as the proper accomplishment for a cultured girl. Becoming an instructor in such a field came to be regarded as a proper profession, and such instructors came to represent a set proportion of the citizens of the cities.

However, the ultimate in amusement was going to the 'amusement quarters'. In Japan the amusement quarter was not just a brothel quarter. People also went there to enjoy high-level conversation with cultured women, and to eat and drink. A great feature of these establishments was that people could really relax because, once inside, differentiation between samurai and ordinary people, between rich and poor, disappeared, and only differentiation between those with 'class' (amusing themselves in style) and the uncouth boors remained. These 'amusement quarters' sprang up in the large castle towns as well as in the three major cities.

To conclude, in eighteenth century Japan, a consumer culture, which had not existed in the seventeenth century and before, developed just like the social system and economic systems. Although these developments started in the cities, they soon spread throughout the country due to the daily human exchange between cities and the countryside, and between the centre and outlying regions. Upper class farmers could even achieve the same high standard of intellectual life as city residents. It can be summed up as an age of mass culture. Of course this does not mean a total absence of high culture (Keyes, 1988; Mason, 1992; Nishi, Hozumi and Tortori, 1985; Noma and Wehbe, 1966; Schneider, 1973; Swan, 1979). Artists exclusively hired by the daimyo produced highly artistic works, and some nobles even became patrons of artists though they themselves were not rich. However, if one had to choose a single phrase to sum up the character of the art and literature of the Edo period one would have to say it was 'popular'.

For better or worse, it produced the prototype for the cultural state of present-day Japan. It was something developed independently, without influence of the Western World, and after having broken free from the influence of China. Would it not be appropriate to consider it as being a form of new cultural creation?

Writing like this may give the impression that Tokugawa Japan was some kind of paradise. In fact, it was not necessarily so by any means. In the shadow of this prosperity there lay much discrimination, which had always existed, but only really became apparent during this period. For instance, those in charge of slaughtering (animals) or handling leather products – who were discriminated against because Buddhist

philosophy said these tasks should be avoided – were forcibly cut off from ordinary people and even obliged to form their own villages besides being allotted the lowest rank in society. Another example can be seen in the sacrifice of the indigenous Ainu tribe in Japan's northern island of Hokkaido when the Japanese came to extend their sovereignty effectively to them. Notwithstanding the Great Revolt at the end of the seventeenth century, the Ainu lost their land, and were forced to work for the Japanese under harsh conditions. Without doubt their population decreased considerably.

Japan also lost much through the developments in the Edo period described above. First, isolation meant that the people the Japanese encountered in their daily lives were limited to Japanese. A mode of communication between people having a common language and the same customs developed, but as they had no chance to be in contact with people not sharing the same language and customs, they became very bad at international negotiation. The effect can still be seen today.

The Japanese developed a flair for coexisting in society, while making the most of restricted territory and limited resources. But when they left the territory, they found their ability to act freely to have diminished. One could say that the present nature of the Japanese – namely, to be good at operating systematically in groups, but to be not good at individualistic activities – was a product of those days.

These may be perceived as problems in terms of the values of the West which took the lead in forming modern society. However, as no one at that time could predict the course of history, the development of Japan in the Edo period should perhaps be regarded as having been a genuine cultural creation that should be judged in its own right.

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23.2

KOREA

Tae-Jin Yi

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE RISE OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Korean society enjoyed a period of new economic prosperity in the sixteenth century so pronounced that a proclivity toward luxury itself emerged as a social issue. The roots of this affluence can be traced back to a fundamental alteration in farming practice that had begun in the fourteenth century: a switch from the traditional fallow field system to the use of continuous cultivation. From its origin in agriculturally favoured areas the new method spread widely, and by the middle of the fifteenth century the transition was basically complete. As agriculture in the sixteenth century built upon this achievement and further developed, commerce itself was stimulated to fresh development, in turn leading to the generation of unprecedented wealth.

In the midst of these important changes in agricultural techniques there was also a great political change. This was the founding of the Chosŏn dynasty in 1392,¹ which rose after the collapse of the Koryŏ dynasty, which had reigned since the tenth century. This great political transformation was brought about by the changes in societal structure caused by the development of agricultural techniques (see Plate 132).

The precise impetus for the momentous transformation in fourteenth-century agriculture is unclear. Certainly it was not the result of economic development, for the economy was in a miserable state. Korea at the time had been the hapless object of crippling interference from the vast Mongol Empire, especially Mongol-controlled Yuan China, for almost a century. It would seem that the first steps of this agricultural innovation occurred in the midst of concerted efforts by Koreans to devise strategies that would help extricate themselves from this situation. Among those in elite circles – including the king, his officials, and the literati – there were many who shared the same conviction: in order to set the nation right it was imperative to reduce the burden of suffering on the part of the peasants. This group experimented with a variety of policies to implement this ideal, including those designed to rid Korea of Yuan interference and to reform problematic institutions, together with a program to raise agricultural productivity. These literati and leaders who showed new interest in the lives of the commoners were known as the 'Newly Risen High Officials.' Having based their political ideology on Neo-Confucianism obtained from Yuan China, these literati tried to achieve their goals of public welfare through systematic efforts towards the realization of a Confucian society.

Of course, this is not to say that efforts to enhance the productivity of agriculture had been lacking in the past.

However, previously there had been a severe limitation on the size of the agricultural labour-force that had impeded any government attempt to stimulate technical innovation. This manpower shortage stemmed from an extremely low rate of population growth, which in turn was related to a high rate of infant mortality. There is evidence, for example, that even among members of the aristocratic class the average number of children surviving to adulthood was fewer than three. This being the case, it is difficult to imagine the corresponding figure for ordinary peasants could have been more than two on the average. Since the agricultural labour force was influenced by the size of the population, conditions were far from ripe for a push toward agricultural innovation. The more pressing medical problem of reducing child mortality had to take precedence over those in agriculture.

Efforts to meet this medical challenge were vigorously pursued at the national level from the eleventh century. In practice this involved, for example, such activities as the periodic acquisition of relevant advanced medical knowledge at home and abroad – especially from China – and the production and wide distribution of special digests on pediatrics, obstetrics, and gynaecology to the literate class. By the first half of the thirteenth century such projects had proved highly successful. Korea medical practice had caught up with that in China and new medical skills involving the use of indigenous drugs had been established. Although for roughly half a century incessant warfare with the Mongols prevented the wide dissemination of these new medical skills, termed 'local medicine', in the fourteenth century they began to be spread widely by the government as well as by individual literati. As a result of such efforts Korea entered a new phase of demography: new policies regarding population increase were taken up by the government in formal court debates. At this time, there were many scholars who were knowledgeable both in agriculture and medicine. Accordingly, from the middle of the fourteenth century the central government displayed a fresh approach to such issues by stressing to officials sent out from the centre that among their duties as local governors were the enhancement of economic prosperity through the promotion of agriculture and sericulture, and the furthering of an increase in the population.

This new trend toward a burgeoning population that began in the latter half of the fourteenth century opened the way for a sustained annual rate of population growth of 0.40 per cent and higher during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The population, which amounted to some 5.7 million in 1400, showed a high rate of growth by surpassing in 1511 a total of 10 million (see Figure 27). The dissemination of the techniques of local medicine that had begun in the fourteenth




Figure 27 Estimated population and annual rates of population growth during the Yi dynasty (the population figures given in this study may be somewhat on the high side, but to date no other standard treatment of the topic exists).

Source: Kwon T'ae-hwan and Sin Yong-ha, *Chosŏn wangjo sidae ingu du'ch'ŏng e kwannhan ilsŏn* (A Discussion Concerning Estimation of the Population of Chosŏn Dynasty Korea), *Tongja munhwa* 14, Tongja Munhwa Yŏn'guso, Seoul Tachakkyo, p. 324, table 4.)

century continued on into the fifteenth century as well. The earliest work on local medicine, *Hyangyak kukkippang*, was reprinted and widely distributed. Additionally, in 1433 the medical text *Hyangyak chipsŏnghang* was completed. This was a comprehensive compilation of all the successful techniques of local medicine that had been developed since the preparation of earlier such compendia. It was no accident that just prior to the compilation of this new medical text had been the compilation in 1430 of *Nimsa chiksol*, an important work on agriculture that surveyed in an orderly fashion new farming techniques in use in agriculturally advanced regions of Korea. Because medical and agricultural technology had been developed in tandem, the two, seemingly disparate, fields bore fruit at almost the same time.

The spread of the practice of continuous cultivation provoked many changes in Korean agriculture. First, there was a general tendency for farm land to shift from higher ground to lower. Because the fallow field system had depended to a great degree on the use of slash-and-burn cultivation, there had been a preference for upland sites. This was especially so in the case of non-rice agriculture. In contrast, continuous field farming involved the use of fertilizer, such as ash and human excrement, and so provided no compelling need to favor high ground. Indeed, farming on the uplands only meant greater effort expended in coming and going. This major change in agricultural practice has left a vivid trail in the historical sources: flatland previously only used for horse pasture or military drill grounds being taken for new farm land; active land reclamation from the sea pursued to the limits of available technology along the south-west coast of Korea, famed for its sharp tidal variation.

The most important transformation wrought by the move to the lowlands for farming was the increase in the proportion

of wetlands usage. According to an early fifteenth-century land survey of the total acreage of land under cultivation, the ratio of dry field to wet fields was 7:3. However, in areas where the practice of agriculture had fundamentally changed in the fourteenth century, the situation was different. For example, in the case of districts in coastal areas with much flat land, the ratio of dry land to wet land was 1:1. Rice farming had come to be the preferred use of land in the newly cultivated areas having flat land.

As in the field of agriculture, during the fifteenth century, there were epoch-making developments in the field of astronomy. King Sejong (r. 1418-50), the fourth monarch of the Chosŏn dynasty, personally directed the research efforts in astronomy, as well as in agriculture and medicine, and obtained significant results. The main purpose of this astronomical research was to obtain accurate measurements of latitude and time relative to the Chosŏn royal palace in order to create a Chosŏn calendar. The king felt that as a ruler he should supervise the agricultural administration and ensure that his officials and subjects were able to plant during the optimal planting season. Therefore, he felt that it was both inconceivable and disgraceful that his country could not produce its own calendar but was forced to use the Chinese planting calendar year after year. He was keenly aware of the fact that under Confucian political ideology it was the Mandate of Heaven that as a monarch his duty was to ensure that his subjects did not lack food. After nearly ten years of careful latitudinal and chronological measurements, as well as intensive research into Chinese and Islamic calendar-making methodology, a national calendar specific to Korea was completed which was so precise that it measured one year to be 365.2425 days and one month to be 29.530593 days.

Rice cultivation in the fifteenth century, as portrayed in *Nongsa dhiksol*, evinced a decided preference for the direct broadcast method of planing. This technique involved the direct spreading of seeds onto the main field, in sharp contrast to that of transplantation, in which rice seedlings were raised in a separate seedbed before transplantation to the main field. There were two variations to the broadcast method: one, the wet-field broadcast method, involved the spreading of seeds onto the main field after it had first been flooded with water, while the other, the dry-field direct broadcast method, was a simple spreading of seeds onto fields with no water. While the direct broadcast method was not inferior to the transplantation method in terms of productivity per unit land, it had the disadvantage of requiring much effort to weed the fields. Yet, this method was still practised widely, due to a lack of adequate irrigation facilities.

The Korean peninsula is faced with a climate that is very dry during the springtime, when planting is done. In the fifteenth century, under these conditions and with the paucity of irrigation facilities, it was difficult to adopt the transplantation method of rice cultivation. What irrigation there was in traditional Korea at this time fell into two broad categories. The first involved the damming of streams in mountain valleys and using the water that collected in the reservoirs so formed, while the second was accomplished by damming a lower stream and the channelling the water through lateral waterways to fields. In the fifteenth century, as yet only the former method was used. This limitation of irrigation facilities considerably restricted the spread of the increasingly preferred wet-field farming. The frequent droughts were a source of major concern for King Sejong, who had devoted himself to the production of the national calendar. The earlier half of the fifteenth century was a time of frequent drought. Due to his inability to devise effective counter-measures for the yearly impending droughts, Sejong's father, King T'aejong (r. 1400-18) had assumed responsibility for the droughts, blaming them on his own shortcomings as a monarch, and had abdicated the throne in favour of his son. Accordingly, Sejong's oldest son, the Crown Prince, became greatly interested in the study of droughts and floods and after intensive effort, in the twenty-third year of Sejong's reign (1441), he invented a rain-gauge. This rain-gauge was distributed to the officials of each administrative district, who were required to record the exact time and amount of rainfall each time it rained. While this rain-gauge, the first of its kind in the world, did not immediately limit the damage caused by drought, the information on the amount of rainfall was used to determine the amount of land-tax that was paid by each administrative district.

The economy of fifteenth century Chosŏn was based on agriculture. The king, his royal court, and his administrative officials concentrated their efforts on the development of agricultural techniques and agriculture. However, in order to succeed in this, they needed the support of the common people thus requiring a means by which they could inform the public of their intent and plans instead of making demands unilaterally. As a result of this, the Korean alphabet, called the *hannin chŏngŭm* or the 'proper sounds to instruct the people,' was developed. This linguistically advanced alphabet was invented under the direct leadership of Sejong. Because it was difficult for commoners to learn the Chinese characters utilized by the upper classes, the new alphabet was designed to be easily learnable. Initially the new alphabet was used to translate the sections of texts written in Chinese characters

which were most essential to commoners — primarily on agriculture, medicine, and Confucian ethics.

The situation in Korean agriculture in the sixteenth century may be described as follows. The fallow field method had almost disappeared, even in the northern regions where general conditions for farming were less favourable. In the southern provinces, where much agricultural pioneering had been done, paddy agriculture was preferred and the direct water broadcast method was widely practised, due to the development of dam and water-way irrigation. The expansion in the acreage of paddy land continued, enhanced by the beginning of land reclamation projects in coastal areas of the south-west.

The development of agriculture brought with it an enhancement of commerce. The markets, embedded in a changing rural society, began to develop in earnest in the sixteenth century. Of course, this is not to say that there had not been rural markets previously: there had been standing markets as far back as the twelfth century in provincial administrative centres. These markets had persisted as sites for commercial transactions controlled by powerful local élite. But in the thirteenth century all traces of such markets disappeared in the general social chaos of the time. In the fifteenth century there still remained only a limited number of standing markets, found solely in the capital and in provincial administrative centres, while the commerce of other areas was handled by travelling markets. Beginning around the end of the fifteenth century this static picture changed dramatically, as new markets opened in regions most advanced agriculturally and then spread rapidly across the nation in the first half of the sixteenth century. This onset of fresh development of markets took place against the backdrop of major economic changes in rural society. Advances in agricultural technology had increased economic power in the countryside to the point where even small peasants could sell surplus commodities at markets. Following this expansion in the market system there came to be two or more markets per local administrative area and the system of fixed market days became established.

The cultivation of cotton and the production of cotton cloth, which had begun to spread at the end of the fourteenth century, contributed greatly to the development of these new markets. Cotton cultivation in Korea began at the end of the fourteenth century when an official brought cotton seeds back from a trip to China. The area under cultivation originally was limited to southern regions, but gradually expanded northward. Cotton cloth proved to be beneficial to the common people by improving their clothing. Up until this time, ordinary people had used woven hemp for winter clothing since they could not afford animal leather or expensive silk and as a result suffered greatly during the winter. Cotton cloth provided warmer woven cloth and lining, and thus made a dramatic impact on the lives of commoners. Cotton cloth, a valuable commodity in itself, played an additional and highly important role — as a medium of exchange. Up to the first half of the fifteenth century hemp cloth had served as the preferred medium of commercial transactions, but by the end of the century cotton had supplanted it in this role. As a consequence the monetary function of cotton as the basic currency in Korea was strengthened and it thereby exerted a great influence on the development of commerce.

Korean commerce also received a boost in the sixteenth century as it became linked with the expansion of international trade in East Asia. This trade had been stagnant,

even up to the early fifteenth century, due to the restriction of maritime activities by the first Ming emperor, Taizu (r. 1368-98). With the subsequent shift in economic policy taken by the Yong-lo emperor (r. 1403-24), especially in his decision to develop the Kiang-nan silver mines, commodity circulation was revitalized and international trade also began to evince fresh vigour. This trade involved the export from China of popular goods such as silk and porcelain, with silver used as a means of settlement. As a result, great volumes of silver flowed into China from abroad. Additionally, the adoption by the Ming government in the latter half of the fifteenth century of a local tax payable in silver appears to have increased the demand for that metal even more.

Korea, too, imported Chinese silk cloth as well as silk thread. Not only were these goods desired in the domestic market, but they were purchased for re-export as well, since Korean merchants served as middlemen for great quantities of silk sold to Japanese. Korea also exported its own cotton cloth and grain to Japan, for at the time the Japanese had not yet begun cultivating cotton and needed large quantities of it for such things as sail and for various military purposes. Japan for its part sold Korea such items as copper, spices, and dyestuffs.

The role of middleman was a highly profitable one for Korean merchants. Accordingly they were strong advocates of a policy of increasing the supply of silver available for purchases from China. One important turning point in the development of new silver mines was the discovery of a method of separating silver from lead in the early sixteenth century by artisans attached to the Korean court. This technology was transmitted to Japan where it spurred *dainyo* in the Warring States Period to pursue actively their own development of silver mines. As a result, by the middle of the sixteenth century, silver produced in Japan began to flow into Korea in large quantities.

The above account of trade among the three nations in East Asia presents a picture of active development, against a backdrop of domestic economic growth in each of the three countries. Yet there was a darker side to the picture as well, for considerable friction over the terms of international trade existed. The situation was further complicated by the entry of Western merchants into East Asian trade from the sixteenth century. The Japanese, for instance, found themselves subject to increasing limitations in trade through intermediaries with China following the arrival of Portuguese merchants, and they created disturbances in China's coastal areas. In Korea as well, the Japanese merchants harboured resentment due to the limits placed on the quantity of exports by the Korean side. This led, for example, to a sizable riot in 1510 fomented by Japanese merchants residing in Korea. Such a phenomenon of frustration over trade leading to violence foretold the possibility of the full-scale military attack by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98) in 1592.

The continuous development of agriculture during the sixteenth century as well as the new development of commercial industry and international trade led to a great increase in societal wealth. While these changes were significant in themselves, they were also important in that fierce disagreements arose over the acquisition and distribution of this new wealth and led to political turmoil in the upper class. The upper class was divided into those who aggressively used their positions and influence to acquire more wealth, and those who did not. The former were mostly from families based in the capital area who had maintained high positions since the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty,

while the latter were mainly small and middle-sized landlords from provincial areas. The former concentrated on their own personal self-interests, while the latter focused on following Confucian orthodoxy and criticizing the former for their wrongdoings. Unable to refute the latter's attacks upon their wrongdoings, the former were forced to use political means to suppress the opposition. As a result, during the sixteenth century, there were several major purges of the literati. However, while the literati suffered greatly, they did retain some influence. Furthermore, as the rural landlords benefited greatly from the continuous agricultural developments of the sixteenth century and amassed greater wealth, their opportunities for advanced education increased, making their faction a political power.

At the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty in the fifteenth century, schools were established – the *hakjang*, or the Four City Schools, in the capital area and the *hyanggyo* or County schools within each administrative unit. Altogether, there were 400 students in the City schools, and 14,950 students in the County schools. If the population figure for the fifteenth century of 6 million is accurate, then the number of students represented 3 per cent of the population. Nominally, both of these schools were geared towards the civil service examination designed to select government officials. However, of the students who passed the first stage of the examination, the quota for those from the City schools was 200, or 50 per cent of the total number of students, whereas the quota for those students from the County schools was less than 5 per cent. In other words, the chances of those students from the County schools of passing the first stage of the examination were extremely slim. The curriculum for these schools was not fixed. While it was possible for those students who were attending the City schools to study the *Four Books* and *Five Classics* of China, which were required for the civil service examination, students in the County schools were only able to study texts on Confucian self-cultivation such as the *Elementary Learning*, the *Practical Realization of the Three Bonds*, the *Classic of Filial Duty*, and *Family Rites*. In theory, even the children of commoners were able to attend the County schools, but in reality it was prohibitively expensive. In terms of the civil service examination, there was no doubt that it was advantageous for the children of those in the established bureaucracy in the capital area to pass the examination under the early education system. For those who had passed the first stage of the examination of the civil service examination, in order to pass the final stage, it was mandatory that they attend the *Songgyun'gwan*, the National Confucian Academy. However, a small number of students from the City schools were allowed to enter the National Confucian Academy without having passed the initial examination.

Among students from the provincial areas who had passed, there were more who attended private schools called *sdang* than those from the public County schools. As the number of private academies increased to the point where they exerted considerable political influence, these schools developed into the larger and more systemized *sdwon*, private academies whose ideology was based on the Neo-Confucian doctrines of Zhu Xi. These academies, which had emerged in the middle of the sixteenth century, numbered nearly 200 by the end of the seventeenth century. While it was possible to study the *Four Books* and the *Five Classics* of China at these academies, passing the examination was not their primary purpose. The primary intention of the academies was to study Confucianism as an academic pursuit; classes were

taught mainly through seminars. With the development of the academies, a class of scholarly intellectuals emerged and coalesced in opposition to the ruling bureaucrats. These intellectual élites, residing in the provincial areas, contributed to the balanced development of rural society by spreading the high culture of the upper class to rural areas. The upper class at this time consisted of the nobility, civil service examination passers and candidates and these students who were studying at the *shwon*. While their number cannot be determined statistically, studies of seventeenth household registers show that around 12 per cent of the households can be considered upper class. Since the Chosŏn dynasty government was a highly centralized bureaucracy from its inception, the likelihood of bureaucrats acting arbitrarily was high. This likelihood became reality as corruption grew widespread amidst the economic prosperity of the sixteenth century. Accordingly, there were increasing calls for self-cultivation through scholarly discipline in order for one to nurture oneself into a statesman capable of translating justice into actions. As a result of such social needs, Neo-Confucianism based on the doctrines of Zhu Xi flourished, mainly through these academies, and moralistic tendencies were strengthened.

OVERCOMING 'CRISIS' IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The economic boom in Korea during the sixteenth century was gradually fading by latter half of the century: the extravagant life-style and exploitative behaviour on the part of those in power had begun to take their toll. There were a number of reform proposals put forth to stem this tide of decline, but the invasion in the fourth month of 1592 by the Japanese army dealt a mortal blow to such efforts. On top of this massive destruction due to the ravages of war came a threat to the economy from an entirely different quarter, for the invasion was followed directly by the world-wide climatic disaster known as the 'Little Ice Age.' Its impact on the Korean peninsula ushered in a decades-long period of perennial crisis. Not only did the natural disaster of the Little Ice Age bleed away the capability of Koreans to recover readily from war-time damage, but also it helped provoke further warfare from a different direction. On two occasions in the next half-century Jurchen tribesmen resident in the area just north of Korea, i.e. the Manchus, would launch invasions into Korea, thereby worsening an already bleak situation.

There is no evidence connecting the Japanese invasion in 1592 to the phenomenon of the Little Ice Age. However, beginning several years before the invasion there were continuous instances of drought and starvation in Korea, though not to a severe extent. After the initial invasion, in 1593-4 there were two successive years of poor harvests: the strange weather of the Little Ice Age had begun fully to manifest itself.

Among the explanations offered in recent years for the Japanese invasion are those that locate its root cause in problems of sixteenth-century trade in East Asia; such theories have gained increasing credibility among Japanese and Korean historians. The gist of this line of thinking runs as follows. In each of the three countries of East Asia, the relative importance of international trade had become so great that it exerted strong influence on the economic base of the ruling class. Under such conditions, as Japan entered the latter part

of the sixteenth century, it was, on the one hand, facing limitations in the volume of trade permitted by China and Korea, and on the other hand, it was also confronted by a multitude of difficulties from middleman trade, whose control Portuguese merchants had seized. So, as a remedy Japan dreamed of a conquest of the original production site of the goods they imported, and mustered the force to realize it.

Once in Korea the Japanese army pressed hard on the heels of the Koreans for about ten months. However, their advance became bogged down in P'yongyang, about 650 km north of the beach where they had landed. Originally the Japanese army had planned to supply military provisions via sea lanes for their troops on the long route to China. However, this plan fell into difficulties from the start due to defeat after defeat in naval battles. Efforts on land to provision their army were also rendered very difficult by attacks from Korean guerilla forces. Under such conditions the Japanese army was unable to advance further and had to turn its military might to the task of obtaining provisions.

After the arrival of Ming forces in support of Korea in the second month of 1593, the military situation of the Japanese became all the more unfavourable. Faced with battle fronts in both the south and the north, they abandoned strategic locations such as P'yongyang and Seoul, and retreated southward to coastal regions, where they erected fortifications and dug in for a prolonged campaign. In 1597, in an effort to regain a military advantage, they increased their troop strength and launched a major attack. Ultimately this attempt failed as well, and following the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1598 the Japanese withdrew all their forces.

The intention on the part of Japan to invade China proper, was blocked in the end by the joint battle front of the Korean and Ming Chinese forces. However, during the seven long years of the military campaign, the Japanese did succeed in realizing, at least partially, their desired ends. During the course of the war the Japanese took as prisoners some 100,000 Koreans, some of whom they used in Japan as labourers and personal slaves of the Japanese officers, but the great majority of whom were handed over to slave-merchants, both Japanese and Portuguese. The Japanese daimyo used the proceeds of the sale of Chosŏn prisoners as slaves to purchase muskets and Chinese goods brought in by the Portuguese.

The Japanese army also focused special attention on capturing Korean potters. Porcelain was an important Chinese export item in the international trade of sixteenth century. The seizing of Korean artisans by Japanese officers, done with no regard for the individual quality of their pottery, stemmed from a calculation that in the future Japan could use them to get by without importing Chinese porcelain. This, too, was an action designed to realize part of their original goals for starting the war.

Chosŏn, which had suffered a massive blow to its society and economy across the board from the Japanese attack, subsequently fell into even more difficult straits due to the invasion of the Manchus. The Manchus had settled across Manchuria and had begun to unite in 1589 under their leader, Nurhaci (1559-1626). When this process had been completed to an extent, it was followed by a policy of southward expansion. This southern push of the Manchus stemmed from a desire for land more favourably suited to agriculture. In the past, during periods when the northern peoples were active - such as the eleventh century for the Khitan, the twelfth century for the Jurchen, and the thirteenth century for the Mongols - their interest for the most part had centred on gaining control of commercial might, especially that of

the trade routes between China and the western regions. However, the Manchus in the fifteenth century had made considerable progress in their agricultural life through the active acquisition of farm tools from Korea and China. By the end of the sixteenth century this agricultural development had advanced to the extent that among Koreans it had become common knowledge that in Manchuria, too, the purchase of foodstuffs with cotton cloth was possible.

With this growth in agriculture came a corresponding change in Manchu life-style from that of nomadic herdsmen to a more sedentary one, and the achievement of a politically unified rule was facilitated. As the scale of the political system became greater, a need arose for more farmland to provide an expanded tax-base providing greater tax-revenue. The move south by the Manchus in the seventeenth century arose fundamentally from these conditions. Additionally, just at this time the Little Ice Age arrived, damaging agriculture and thereby making a push south even more inevitable. The higher the latitude, the more severe the damage of the climatic changes were; contemporary Korean records (the *Sillok*) reveal that the damage was especially great in areas north of the thirty-ninth parallel. As the climate as a whole grew colder, repeated bouts of drought and flooding ensued.

The unusual climate had already provoked the Manchus to act in an unusual manner in the early 1600s. At this time, there were reports in Korea from the northern provinces relating how increasingly the Manchus were coming in search of food and warning that if these cases were not dealt with satisfactorily then an invasion could be expected. There were also instances of small-scale Manchu incursions and subsequent punitive expeditions by the Koreans in response. However, it would seem that at the time Nurhaci had no intention of extending his rule outside Manchuria.

In 1616 he was crowned emperor and declared his state to be the 'Latter Chin', and in 1619 in the battle of Sarhu his troops crushed a great Ming army. However, he showed no special sign of following his victory up with a drive south into China proper. In 1625, even as he performed the major task of transferring the national capital, he selected as its site a location in central Manchuria, clearly satisfied with establishing an empire in Manchuria.

The push southward into China began in earnest following Nurhaci's death in 1626, with the ascension to the throne of his son Hong Taiji (temple name: Taizong; r. 1626-43). Unlike Nurhaci, Hong Taiji was a strong advocate of expansionism. His pro-war policies had been restrained by Nurhaci, but with his rise to the position of emperor he obtained the opportunity to act.

Additionally, climatic changes resulted in the worst conditions for agriculture in the 1620s, and this was all the more favourable to his expansionism. In 1626 one Korean official reported that the number of people from the Liaotung area, both Manchu and Chinese, who had come to the north-west province of Korea asking for food reached 200,000 to 300,000 and offered his opinion that it would be difficult to hope for peace in the north-west if no policy were developed to help alleviate their starvation.

The new secure tax-base desired by the Manchus was China. But in order to proceed into China they first had to remove the threat to their rear flank presented by Korea, the traditional ally of Ming China. In the first month of 1627, just after he was named emperor, Hong Taiji mobilized a force of some 30,000 and sought a promise that Korea would not threaten his territory from the rear. Faced with the Manchu invasion, the Korean king, together with his court,

fled to a nearby island from which they made preparations for a lengthy war. However, peace negotiations progressed with unexpected ease and after about three months the Manchu army withdrew. Because their target was solely China, they had no desire for a prolonged conflict with Korea.

There was a second invasion by the Manchus in the twelfth month of 1636. Gathering the forces remaining after a full-scale invasion of Mongolia and just before pressing toward Beijing, Hong Taiji decided to remove the anxiety over the need to protect his rear flank and again invaded. The military forces marshalled on this occasion totalled 200,000 men, a vast increase from the former invasion. Facing such a massive army the Korean monarch could hold out no longer than two months.

The scale of the damage inflicted on Korea by foreign invasions and natural disasters can be plainly seen in demographic statistics of the period. In the above-cited study on population trends in the Chosŏn dynasty, it was determined that in the period from 1592, the year the Japanese invasions began, to 1636, the year of the second of the two invasions launched by the Manchus, the annual rate of population increase sank from 0.40 per cent to between -2.58 per cent and -2.20 per cent. The total population, which had reached the level of 14 million in 1591, fell to around 10.6 million by the 1630s. The researchers found that the annual rate of population growth of 0.40 per cent or better, which had been quite stable in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, reappeared in 1651. However, even though this earlier rate of population growth was regained, it would only be in 1679 that Korea would once again attain the population level of 14 million that it had possessed on the eve of the Japanese invasion.

Although Korean society of the seventeenth century was faced with this near-constant state of 'crisis', there was no collapse of the established political order. It is true that in 1623 there was a major political disturbance: a coup d'état that deposed the king then ruling. However, this political manoeuvre not only did not result in a change in the dynasty itself or in the ruling class but, what is even more striking, the moral justification given for the coup was not the social crisis, but rather the perceived immoral nature of the regime in power.

One of the important aspects of Korean history in the seventeenth century may be recognized in the fact that the crises to the nation presented by natural disasters and foreign invasions were, from beginning to end, dealt with through moralism. This moralism based on the doctrines of Zhu Xi had already begun to be notable in the sixteenth century. The social misbehaviour and political malfeasance generated by the economic prosperity of the day led to an even greater emphasis on a moral critique countering it. The leaders of the 1623 coup, as well, inveighed against the ruling group for the immorality they perceived in the foreign and domestic policies it had adopted. Thus, the justifications for their act were that: (1) the king and his officials, when faced with a growing threat from the Manchus, had not maintained the relationship of trust with Ming China, which had sent troops in support of Korea during the Japanese invasion; (2) the regime had acted against morality by imprisoning the Queen-Mother and killing a prince, all for the sake of eliminating a perceived threat to its own security.

The new ruling group, having succeeded in ousting the king, was unable to avoid armed conflict with the Manchus, given its avowedly pro-Ming policy. After suffering two

bouts of invasion, in the end it also faced the galling humiliation of submitting to armed might. Yet, domestically there were no major repercussions. The ordeals at the hands of the foreigners were by no means light, but because of the rock-solid stability of the moral faith of the ruling class and the solidarity it provided them, there were few internal disturbances. Ideologically the seventeenth century marked the zenith of Neo-Confucianism in Korea. Among the various schools of Neo-Confucianism, that of ritual studies was especially prominent, a fact doubly interesting in that even in China there had been little development in this school. This is indicative of the high degree of fervour in the pursuit of moralism by Koreans.

The seventeenth century also witnessed the introduction of Western culture and scholarship to Korea. Officials sent to Ming China came into contact with Western missionaries and acquired such items as maps of Europe, texts on Catholicism, muskets, telescopes, alarm clocks, and texts on astronomy. Also, in 1627 some Dutch sailors were shipwrecked on an island off the southern coast thereby becoming the first Westerners to set foot on Korean soil. However, it was difficult for the fragmentary knowledge gleaned in such a manner to bring about any conclusive change. The first half of the seventeenth century was a time of crisis, and moreover, the faith of the literati and officials in Neo-Confucianism was stronger at that time than during any other period. Nonetheless, among the Western items brought back by the emissaries to Beijing, the calendar and the alarm clock proved to be of the utmost interest since they could be useful during this period of continuous natural disasters.

By the 1630s, the Western missionaries in Beijing were able to prove to Chinese political leaders that Western astronomy and calendrical law were superior to their own by correctly predicting eclipses. Therefore, in 1644 the newly risen Qing dynasty adopted the Western calendar system. Chosŏn was also influenced by this decision and in 1654 began using a lunar calendar obtained from Qing China based on Western calendrical law. In 1669, the royal court presented two astrolabes with clocks attached to them to the king. The astrolabes themselves were identical, but the clocks attached to them differed. One used the traditional water-clock, while the other used the Western alarm clock, utilizing two pendulums and multiple gears and cogs. The latter device was historically significant in that it was the first item produced by Koreans based on Western culture. However, of these two devices, which were constantly being used at court, it was the traditional water-clock device which was favoured by the king and his ministers. This was due to the king's belief that the natural principles underlying the traditional device legitimized his existence as the embodiment of heaven's will. In any case, except for this astrolabe, there are no other records of devices based upon the Western alarm clock at this time.

FRESH PROSPERITY AND THE GROWTH OF POPULAR SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Little Ice Age continued on into the latter part of the seventeenth century. Yet, compared to the first fifty years of the century, the disasters brought on by it declined in frequency and they were not exacerbated by warfare from foreign invasion; the damage was far less severe. This is illustrated in demographic trends as well. In general there

was a high annual rate of growth of over 1 per cent, although in the 1660s and 1690s there were also periods when it dipped to between 0.10 per cent to -1.77 per cent. This trend continued into the eighteenth century and the population expanded from around 14,350,000 in 1700 to some 18,650,000 in 1750. Subsequently, it declined somewhat through 1765 to 17,680,000 but then rose once more, reaching 18 million again in 1776 and 18,440,000 by 1800. The eighteenth century was a rare age of economic prosperity as well as population growth for not only Korea but all of East Asia.

Policy responses to the disasters were devised not long after their onset. A special office for relief, for example, was established in 1626 as a comprehensive policy measure, and was made solely responsible for relief efforts. A measure was proposed in the late 1600s designed to lighten the tax-burden of the populace by transforming the former tribute-tax into a land-tax. However, this policy could not be fully or effectively implemented due to the disruptions of natural disaster and foreign invasion. In the 1650s the proposal was re-enacted and during the next half century the new system known as the *taedong-pap* or 'uniform land-tax law' was implemented district by district throughout the land. There were many difficulties involved with its implementation since the new system required a cadastral survey of all arable land. One development of this system was the practice of government officials using the rice obtained from this new land-tax to acquire needed goods from approved commercial entrepreneurs; this spurred the development of commerce and the handicraft industry.

One notable event in eighteenth century agriculture was the full-scale dissemination of the transplantation method of rice agriculture. Compared with the direct broadcast method, transplantation involves little difference in productivity per unit land, but has the advantage of requiring much less labour to remove weeds. While the direct broadcast method demands weeding on five to six occasions, only two to three are necessary when using transplantation. However, transplantation involves a great disadvantage: if the fields are not well-supplied with irrigation facilities, then there is the danger of crop failure. For this reason, in the fifteenth century it had been the position of the royal court, if anything, to ban transplantation. The attainment of a degree of security in the irrigation system was not, however, responsible for bringing about the spread of transplantation. In the sixteenth century with a switch to dam and water-way irrigation methods there were many new water-channels developed, but only the direct wet broadcast method grew in popularity, while there was not particular progress in the spread of the use of transplantation. As mentioned above, in the sixteenth century the population expanded, and the effectiveness of the major strength of the transplantation method – its reduction of labour requirement – was not all that apparent.

It was not until the latter part of the seventeenth century during the process of economic recovery that the dissemination of the transplantation method began, becoming more and more widespread in the eighteenth century. This dissemination was the result of a keenly felt need to reduce agricultural labour due to the sharp drop in population caused by the unprecedented natural disasters of the early part of the seventeenth century. The crises of the seventeenth century brought with them much social damage and suffering, but they also bestowed this valuable achievement. This recognition of the reduction in the agricultural labour-force was the foundation of the ensuing expansion of commercial agriculture.

Profits from international trade also played a major role in the economic revival of the latter seventeenth century. Although the profits gained in the intermediary trade between Japan and China were suspended for a time during the bouts of warfare, they revived from the mid-seventeenth century onward. In 1603 Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), the founder of the new *bakufu*, stressed to the Koreans that he himself had absolutely nothing to do with the invasions launched by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and requested that relations be restored. Since Ming China refused official relations with Japan, the *bakufu* was strongly impelled to establish ties with Korea, for it represented the sole route to commercial exchange with the continent. The Chosŏn government, in approaching this request by Japan, sternly demanded an apology for the invasions, and adopting diplomatic flexibility, permitted a re-establishment of relations in 1609. Subsequently, the formal Korean *t'ongsinsa* missions to Japan exerted no little influence on Japanese culture during their travels there. Not only this, but Korea merchants reaped great profits as middlemen in the trade in raw and processed silk from China that passed through the warehouses of the reopened Japanese mission in Korea. The volume of exports of raw silk to Japan at the end of the seventeenth century comprised 60-70 per cent of total Korean exports, and the silver from Japan used to pay for it was on the order of 400,000 to 500,000 yang (Chinese *liang*) a year. This amount represented several times that paid in the direct maritime trade between China and Nagasaki. Since the profit margin for Koreans in this intermediary trade was at least 300 per cent, huge profits were obtained, and these contributed greatly to the expansion of domestic commercial capital.

Profits from this intermediary trade were, however, confronted with a grave crisis in 1684 when Qing China and Tokugawa Japan established relations. The direct sale of Chinese raw silk to Japan could only mean the decline of intermediary trade. In fact, with the 1720s, the volume of trade began to decrease noticeably. The *bakufu*, spurred by declining levels in silver being mined, encouraged the domestic production of silk, and began to restrict the outflow of silver abroad. Korean merchants, faced with this situation, developed ginseng (Korean *insan*) as a new export item. Ginseng, even up to the present, is a product no less popular than silk. However, there were limits to its supply, since the roots of wild-growing herbs had to be found in the mountains and transported to the cities. In order to overcome such limitations, the experimental cultivation of ginseng was attempted nation-wide and proved to be successful. Of those who experimented, the merchants of Kaesŏng proved to be the most successful. These merchants, by investing heavily in the creation of ginseng fields, succeeded to such an extent that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Kaesŏng, which previously had no ties to ginseng, became the nation's largest producer. The successful cultivation of ginseng improved Chosŏn's status in East Asian trade relations.

Economic development brought many changes in the realm of the people's livelihood as well. Commercial and industrial development was necessarily accompanied by urban development. The population of the city of Seoul at the beginning of the twentieth century hovered around 200,000. This level, in fact, first appeared in a census in 1669. In previous censuses taken in 1648 and 1657, the population had totaled no more than 80,000 to 90,000 but in the 1669 census it doubled to 194,000. This sudden increase may well be attributed to errors in recording, but in reality, it more likely reflects changes in the socio-economic conditions of

the latter half of the seventeenth century. It was only natural that the peasants whose farming villages had suffered so greatly from natural disasters would cluster to the capital city, where they were more likely to obtain relief aid and employment. Therefore, it was no coincidence that the corvée labour service, utilized by the central bureaucracy to undertake public works such as the construction of royal tombs, was gradually replaced by a 'stand-in' labour system, wherein peasants were hired to serve the compulsory labour obligations of others. This urbanization was evident not only in the capital, but also in the major centres of the provincial areas. The construction of a new city (Hwasŏng; Suwŏn at present) on a site 100 km south of the capital at the behest of the king is a prime example of the urban development of this period. Not only were great merchants from across Korea encouraged to relocate to this new city, which had been built with the intention of creating a new political, military, and economic centre, and located at an important nexus of transportation, but this site also achieved fame for its introduction of Western techniques of fortress construction.

As the state of crisis began to subside in the late seventeenth century, there was also a considerable advance in understanding of the West. Experts were sent to Beijing on multiple occasions to master the principles underlying Western calendrical law, and the number of scholars who readily accepted Western notions that the earth was round and spun by itself gradually increased. The Liulichang area of Beijing became a place where new information was supplied to curious Korean intellectuals who were members of official government missions. All this knowledge concerning the West changed former preconceptions in Korea of East Asia representing the entire world, with China at its centre. However, this is not to say that the faith in the superiority of Chinese culture centred on Confucianism collapsed. There was also the powerful emergence of a new understanding of Korea's role in the Confucian tradition: following the Qing conquest of China, Korea was now the bastion of true Confucianism.

Yet, it is a fact that many changes occurred within Confucianism as well. With the development of commerce and industry and a change in world-view, there could only be a transformation within Confucian thought as well. While there was not a complete abandonment of moralism, there were voices maintaining that scholarship should make practical contributions. This was a result of society at large having become so varied that it was difficult to tolerate only discussions of the Confucian classics. Among the writings of scholars, apart from those giving a universalistic treatment of Confucian classics, there was also a sudden increase of works on specific themes dealing with Korean history and important issues of the day. There were also changes in the arts of painting and calligraphy, as painters preferred more realistic depictions of landscapes, and calligraphers emphasized newer styles of brushwork. This genre of realistic landscape painting called *Qingyongsansuwha* was begun by Chŏng Sŏn (1676-1759), who was active for nearly fifty years starting from the end of the seventeenth century, and whose paintings captured the scenic beauty of such subjects as Mount Kumkang and the capital city.

The economic changes of the times brought about many changes in the social order. Those who were newly wealthy as a result of the development of agriculture or commerce wanted to become political leaders of their own communities, in the very least. Accordingly, increasing friction arose between these newly rich and the existing ruling class who

were centred around the *schon* and tried to maintain the Confucian social order. Even among the ruling class, who until that time were landlords in common, it was impossible to coexist and cooperate peacefully as some had a new interest in the development of commerce. The division of the upper class led to numerous fierce struggles and to a political crisis. This political chaos could only be controlled by the king.

During the eighteenth century, kings Yongjo (r. 1724–76) and Ch'ongjo (r. 1776–1800), who ruled not only in name but with authority, centred their efforts on the establishment of a new political system. In sixteenth and seventeenth century politics, the ruling class of landlords, both great and small, was divided into several political factions, hindering the ability of the royal court to act. As a result, monarchical authority at this time was relatively weak. Even during the reign of Yongjo, the remnants of this influence were very strong, and in transition royal authority was somewhat compromised by the political policies. However, after this period, Ch'ongjo, in addressing this political problem, negated this political system. In its place, he tried his best to establish absolute authority in himself and embody the virtue of a Confucian holy king. His concept and pursuit of the 'perfect' man was very similar to the ideas of the European monarchs during the Age of Enlightenment. For example, he felt that even though everyone was a human, the fact that slaves were treated like personal property was wrong, and he planned a sweeping reform of the slave system. While the actual reform of the slave system was limited to public slaves due to his sudden death, this plan to reform the slave system, which he considered a feudal anachronism, was reflective of his ruling philosophy based on the reconsideration of Confucian political ideology. Among his royal court members, there were many famous literati appointed who would later be known as Practical Learning Scholars. In fact, Ch'ongjo himself was the foremost of these practical scholars.

During the reign of Ch'ongjo in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Chosŏn witnessed the rapid spread of Catholicism. Among the literati, there were many who became converts as a result of their initial interest in Western learning, and among the common people, by the eighteenth century there were tens of thousands of believers. In the history of the Catholic church, there is no other instance of churches being founded before the actual arrival of priests. Those scholars who became converted through their interest in Western learning at first did not consider Catholicism as contrary to Confucianism nor denying the existence of the king. The common people, who had long suffered under feudal authority, were most attracted to the tenet that all people were equal. King Ch'ongjo considered this pursuit of equality by the common people to be equally as important as his own secret plan for the sweeping reform of the slave system. While Ch'ongjo did not support Catholicism, he did not consider it as a dangerous influence. When it was suggested that he suppress Catholicism, his response was that the popular spread of Catholicism was due to the deficiencies of orthodox learning and repeated efforts should be made

to promote orthodoxy. However, this lenient treatment of Catholicism soon ended with his death. Soon after, his political opponents quickly seized power and began the harsh oppression of Catholicism. Knowing that many of those in Ch'ongjo's inner circle were sympathetic to Catholicism if not believers, the new leaders did not waste this opportunity to break the influence of the former inner circle.

During the eighteenth century, the role and status of the common people improved greatly. This social change was reflected in the genre of paintings of that time. While paintings from earlier periods tended to be dull and monotonous since they were intended to be instructional, the paintings of the eighteenth century showed clear changes, depicting the various aspects of the common people's lives both realistically and romantically. The painters who best exemplify this period, Kim Hongdo and Shin Yunbok (see Plate 133), have each left a number of unique works. The former depicted the occupations and leisure activities of the common people in a humorous manner, while the latter painted the various scenes of love among the common people, including *kisaeng*, Korean geisha. However, these vivid images of the common people reflected in the eighteenth-century paintings gave way to images of angry mobs with farm instruments in hand as weapons, rioting because of political misdeeds by the upper class in the nineteenth century. After the death of Ch'ongjo, power transferred to his relatives, who used royal authority for the interests of a limited few. They controlled national resources and severely exploited the common people, which led to riots protesting against such mistreatment throughout the nation. They were handicapped, though, by a lack of political influence and intellectual leaders, although their own awareness was heightened during these riots. This situation did not improve much even during the arrival of Western Powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

NOTE

- 1 The Chosŏn dynasty (AD 1392–1896) was the third dynasty to rule the Korean peninsula. The first dynasty was Unified Shilla (669–935), the second was the Koryŏ dynasty (936–1392).

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THE TIBETAN CULTURAL AREA

Anne-Marie Blondeau

In Tibet, the period covered by the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was marked by great political instability, along with what might be termed a sort of classic achievement in terms of civilization. While the sixteenth century shows no break with the preceding age, a considerable upheaval occurs in the mid-seventeenth with the coming to power of the Dalai Lamas; this modified the structure of government, and gradually imposed, along with centralization in the State, the intellectual and spiritual supremacy of their own school, the Gelugpa.

THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

Ever since the thirteenth century, successive priestly hegemonies, under the sway of the various religious leaders of Tibetan Buddhism's different schools, had contended for power, and each had managed to find support among the various Mongol tribal chiefs, descendants of Genghis Qan (Chinggis Khān), who in turn often seized on such a pretext of helping this or that Tibetan protégé in order to settle their own rivalries on Tibetan soil. Tibet's religious hierarchy thus set up an ambiguous political system: whereby Tibet's religious Master, endowed with spiritual power, would ally himself to a foreign disciple and at the same time protector for civil affairs.

At the close of the fifteenth century, those established in power were the Phamodrupa, whose seat was in Ü, the Central Province; but they were seriously weakened by internal rivalries and also by the rebellion of the governor of Rinpung in the more western province of Tsang, over which he had set up his sway – a secular one (1481). The line of these governors of Tsang was in turn eliminated in 1565 by one of their own officers, who proceeded to found a dynasty of his own: the Princes of Tsang.

Such often bloody contention between two political powers was moreover reinforced by religious rivalry: between the ancient and snobbishly provided-for school of the Karmapa (who however never assumed power themselves), supported by the governors – later Princes – of Tsang, and the more recent school of the Gelugpa, founded by Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), which enjoyed an immediate flowering in the province of Ü where it took root under the patronage of the Phamodrupa and their vassals in the area of Lhasa. The success scored by this school, owing to the striking personality of its founder and the ideal of monastic life which he offered to his contemporaries, no doubt explains the resentment of the older schools which, for the most part, no longer observed so strictly the discipline of their rules.

Skirmishes and endless struggles thus took up the entire sixteenth century and also the first half of the seventeenth, with each party now carrying the day, now losing ground.

In the middle of the sixteenth century, just as the Gelugpa found themselves in narrow straits, they secured an outside ally in the person of Altan Qan (Khān), prince of the Qalqa Mongols. This lord, impressed by the personality of a lama from the monastery of Drepung, Sōnam Gyatso (1543–88), the third incarnation of an eminent disciple of Tsongkhapa, invited him to his court, was converted to his creed and ordered his subjects to relinquish their shamanistic beliefs and practices and instead adopt Buddhism as preached by the Gelugpa; this was the beginning of the conversion of the Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism, and also the starting-point of the influence of the Gelugpa in Mongolia to the detriment of other schools which had managed to establish a few older foundations in the country. In the course of this visit, the Tibetan Master and Altan Qan exchanged honorific titles, and Altan Qan bestowed upon Sōnam Gyatso that of *Dalai Lama*, that is, 'Lama who is an Ocean (of Wisdom)' – a title retroactively applied to the two previous incarnations of this religious dignitary, who thus himself became known, as a result, as the Third Dalai Lama. As of this day, too, began the uninterrupted flow of Mongols to Lhasa, either as pilgrims or to be ordained and taught in one of the three great Gelugpa university-monasteries in the region: Drepung, Ganden and Sera. Most opportunely as well, when Sōnam Gyatso died, one of the descendants of Altan Qan was recognized as his reincarnation, and was duly led to Lhasa and so enthroned as the Fourth Dalai Lama (Yonten Gyatso, 1589–1647).

In Tibet itself, however, the Gelugpa found themselves in such critical straits that this Fourth Dalai Lama's own reincarnation, as recognized in the person of Nawang Lozang Gyatso (1617–82), was not made publicly known until 1622. This Fifth Dalai Lama, in turn, sought assistance from the Mongol tribes. In 1638, Gushri Qan (Khān), leader of the Qoshot Mongols, acknowledged a Patron–Priest link between himself and the Fifth Dalai Lama: as his Protector he launched an expedition which ended in 1642 with the defeat of the Prince of Tsang and the capture of his capital. Hard upon this, in a splendid ceremony, the Mongol leader made an offer of all Tibet to the Fifth Dalai Lama, who responded by acclaiming Gushri Qan with the title of King in accordance with Buddhist Law. While the reins of government in effect henceforth passed into the hands of the Dalai Lama assisted by a regent, military authority rested with Gushri Qan and his descendants.

The Fifth Dalai Lama displayed remarkable statesmanship. He reorganized the administration through the creation of two parallel groups of officials: one secular, to deal with civil

matters, the other monastic, to address religious affairs. He thereby brought about that system of government defined by Tibetans themselves as 'one uniting the temporal and religious powers', and which lasted, under the more or less effective authority of successive Dalai Lamas, down to 1959. Symbolically to mark the restoration of a strong Tibetan State, the Fifth Dalai Lama decided on the transfer of his residence and seat of government, the monastery of Diepung, to the hill of Marpo near Lhasa, to which tradition attributed the site of the palace of the first Tibetan emperor, Songtsen Gampo, in the seventh century. Here, in 1645, the pontiff laid the foundations of the Potala, a mirror-image of the Mountain-Heaven of the *Bodhisattva* Avalokiteshvara of which he, the Fifth Dalai Lama, and all the line of Dalai Lamas, were recognized as the emanation.

In the preceding year, the Manchus had put an end to the Ming Dynasty in China and founded the new dynasty of the Qing. As early as 1649, the Manchu emperor sent an invitation to the Fifth Dalai Lama to pay a visit to Beijing (the visit finally occurred in 1652-3). So great was the prestige of the Tibetan pontiff amongst the Mongol tribes that the Manchu emperors came to request his intervention throughout the duration of his reign to help soothe the constantly recurring unrest among these tribes.

Despite the odd provincial revolts and more or less successful military expeditions against Bhutan and Ladakh, the Fifth Dalai Lama enjoyed a reign of relative domestic peace. Trouble resumed after 1696, when both the Chinese emperor, Kangxi, and the Mongols learned that the late Dalai Lama's last regent, Sangye Gyatso, had concealed the death of his overlord in 1682 and ruled in his name for nearly fifteen years. The claims of the Sixth Dalai Lama enthroned by this regent were also disputed. First the Qoshot Mongols then the Dzungars unleashed violence in central Tibet. The Qoshots killed the Regent and deposed the Dalai Lama, who died on his way to exile; the Dzungars sacked Lhasa in a punitive expedition (1717). Finally Emperor Kangxi sent troops to escort to Lhasa the child recognized as the Seventh Dalai Lama (Kelzang Gyatso, 1708-57), and to expel the Dzungars. This was the first time a Chinese army was dispatched to central Tibet, and the beginning of what has come to be called, by custom, the Qing 'Protectorate' over Tibet. Kangxi established a civil government (or cabinet) made up of four members from Tibetan noble families, and appointed to Lhasa two representatives of his own, the Ambans. Rivalries between members of this same government, however, sparked fresh civil war. The minister Pholhane emerged as victor in 1728. His hold on power lasted until his death in 1747, and during his spell of rule at least, Tibet knew peace. But when his son, on succeeding him, rashly plotted with the Dzungars, he was murdered by the Chinese Ambans who were then executed by the Tibetans in turn. Thereupon Emperor Qianlong sent a punitive expedition; he restored the Dalai Lama as head of the government, and set up a new cabinet of four members, while he now garrisoned a troop of about 2,000 Chinese soldiers in Lhasa to protect the Ambans. Qianlong thus gave permanent form to the 'hierarchical' structure of the Tibetan government, which was to survive down to modern times.

During part of this period, a number of Western observers brought back reports on the Tibet of the Dalai Lamas: these were Catholic missionaries, both Jesuit and Capuchin. The Jesuits first established a mission in western Tibet, then tried to the same in Tsang; but their longest-lived mission was in Lhasa, which benefited from the presence of Ippolito Desideri,

who proved himself a shrewd observer remarkably devoid of bias, between 1716 and 1722. The Capuchins, for their part, had set up a mission in Lhasa as early as 1707, no doubt with the support of a small community of Armenian merchants then residing in the city. Both Jesuits and Capuchins had been permitted to dwell in the city and to practise their cult. But probably because they showed themselves less open-minded than the Jesuits, and were far more aggressive in the way they sought to propagate their creed, the Capuchins were held responsible for a crime of lese-majesty committed by a Tibetan convert, and were forced to quit Tibet in 1745. They would be the last Westerners to enter Lhasa for a long time: under pressure from the Qing who again intervened militarily in Tibet in 1792 – but this time in response to a request from the Tibetans themselves to help repel a Nepalese army of the Gurkha king – the country was forbidden to all foreigners. It should in any case be noted that the Jesuits in Tibet in no way enjoyed the rôle or range of influence comparable to what their brethren attained at the Qing court.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES

Tibetan society, while neither immobile nor uniform from one region to another, did show great stability in its structures. Made up as it was of different social classes, it has been compared to Western feudal societies.

In the sixteenth century, the country was politically fragmented and parcelled out amongst various religious lords whose support came from the noble families, a number of which descended from those of the old Empire. These religious lords, along with the priestly class as a whole, made up the highest rank, a rank which Tibetans were taught to consider in the light of Buddhist doctrine as the 'Third Jewel' to which all reverence and tributary gifts were due – a rank, indeed, of equal standing to the Buddha and his Law. In addition to being the only centres of learning, the monasteries, even before the centuries under consideration here, had already become the main economic power in the country. Endowed with domains that were often immense, these monasteries extended their influence even further, establishing networks of monasteries on lands presented to them as gifts by local lords, complete with serfs, share-croppers and nomad herdsmen to work them. The monasteries employed stewards to oversee the management of such wealth: this included taxes to be raised, corvée labour to be enforced and even loans to be recovered at extortionary rates, usually for seed lent out when crops failed. The population of the monasteries was continually on the increase, since custom laid down that each family should give at least one of their offspring to monastic life. The monasteries themselves perpetuated social differences, since each family had to contribute according to its means to the upkeep of its son or daughter who was a monk or nun. Still, entering an order did yield the sole extant possibility of rising in the social scale: either through such personal merit as might allow a child from the most humble background to attain the highest priestly dignities, or through recognition of a given individual as the reincarnation of some illustrious cleric.

Next to the clergy, the nobles occupied the summit of the social pyramid, although, as representatives of the laity, their power was at least in theory subordinate to that of the priesthood. In sixteenth-century practice, however, great lords were seen high-handedly to summon famous divines

to their courts, whether to be sought or initiated by them, to have them carry out propitiatory rites, or to hear them engage in rheological debate; again we find the same ambiguity governing the link between a given Master and his Disciple who might, at the same time, be his Protector – as in the occurrences of this outlined above. Nobility necessarily implied a fief, and as long as political power passed from one religious school to another, noblemen – save those officers who served at the courts of the high religious dignitaries – resided on their estates as virtually independent lords. From the time of the enthronement of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the centralization of the State in Lhasa, some nobles did build residences in the capital and so formed great families which regularly filled the highest offices in the realm. But contrary to the Western system, a rather rapid turnover in the stock of noble families might be noted here, what with the demotion of some of them, the promotion of others for services rendered to the State, or the rise of still others through kinship with a given Dalai Lama. In addition, with the exception of those owners of a few very great estates who preserved their independence down to the recent past, most local lords saw their status eventually downgraded to that of mere petty landowners or virtual country squires. Enjoying full exemption from taxes, the nobles' only duty towards the State – beyond possible participation in its administration – lay in providing it with soldiers in case of need. Those who worked on such nobles' lands owed them tithes and free labour – added on of course to all the taxes and labour which these peasants also had to tender to the local monastery and to the State. The population thus lay crushed under the most various impositions; and if a given master were a cruel one to boot, then the incentive for some to flee might become very great.

Tibet enjoyed no middle class. The people formed an indistinct Third Estate including farmers, herdsmen and craftsmen alike (except for blacksmiths and corpse carriers, each considered as members of an 'evil' class to be set apart). To the people's number might be added the foreign craftsmen and traders, mainly the Newar merchants, goldsmiths and silversmiths from Nepal, who made up a permanent little colony in Lhasa, to be joined towards the end of the seventeenth century by Muslim merchants from Kashmir who, in turn, dealt in large-scale trade with Ladakh and India.

Due to a lack of specific studies in the literature, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent the situation of the common people evolved between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, as compared with what Western travellers began to describe from the outset of the nineteenth century. Sharp debate has been joined among specialists to determine the precise meaning of those Tibetan terms used to describe the common people. Were they outright slaves or serfs or subjects? Such issues cannot be easily settled, since they involve our fitting English terms to a very complex system of constraints and obligations.

CULTURAL LIFE

As will have been readily noted in all that has preceded, Buddhism dominated all sectors of Tibetan life. The conversion of the Tibetans was a lengthy process stretching from about the seventh to the twelfth century, during which Buddhism as inherited from India gradually integrated a host of native beliefs and practices, while an original form of art slowly emerged which, however, still preserved the stamp

of various foreign influences from Nepal, Kashmir, Central Asia and China. In the sixteenth century, even though the common people continued to observe – as some partly still do – a number of cults that remained foreign to Buddhism and which were therefore often condemned or despised by the clergy, still the Tibetans as a whole were fervent Buddhists who did not doubt the orthodoxy of their own religious practices. Even the Bönpos, who openly laid claim to the legacy of a pre-Buddhist faith and so made up an opposition school, still adopted the philosophical and ethical views of Buddhism, and came under the increasing influence of the Gelugpa school, to the extent of creating a course of study directly copied on Gelugpa models as early as the seventeenth century. Given the hold of the priests on Tibetan civilization, we remain as a consequence rather poorly informed as to the more properly popular forms of culture such as the people's customs, songs, dances, the recitation of the *Epic of Gesar* by bards, tales and proverbs . . . Indeed we are here in a position to deal only with the higher culture of the learned. Even so, as early as the sixteenth century and at any rate by the seventeenth, the learned tradition did make use of more popular cultural forms to serve as so many vehicles for the preaching of Buddhism; the *Epic* was thus notably set to writing and given a Buddhist framework and message. Such 'ideologically correct' versions of the *Epic* were taken up again in turn by the bards, so that it has become impossible today to uncover the primitive layer of this immense narrative cycle.

To grasp the extent of the priesthood's hold on all fields of learning and culture, we have to understand that monastic training involved the mastery of, or at least initiation in, the 'ten sciences'. Some of these 'sciences' were properly rheological and sacred, although others would be regarded in the West as secular, including grammar, poetics, the more scholarly sorts of dance and theatre, medicine, astrology and the 'science of making' (*la science du faire*) to borrow A. Chayet's expression (1994) – that is to say the fine arts, calligraphy, painting and sculpture. The fact is that in the Tibetan view, all arts and crafts served to revere the Buddha and his doctrine: thus images were supports for his Body; books, for his Word; and votive monuments, or *stūpas*, for his Thought (see Plate 134).

From the fifteenth century on, woodblock printing as imported from China contributed considerably to the spread of books, which until then had remained in manuscript. Used at first to reproduce the voluminous Buddhist Canon, the technique spread even to the smaller monasteries, each of which boasted at least a few woodblocks with which to print pious images or prayers for the use of pilgrims. Some monasteries however developed enormous presses, whence, along with copies of the Canon, might be obtained collections of holy writings and the complete works of the Great Masters. These Masters were often remarkable polymaths whose writings, impressive for their sheer volume, might include biographies and sometimes even autobiographies, as well as works of historiography, philosophy and exegesis, notes on ritual, letters, poems, in addition to treatises on medicine, astrology, iconographic titles, and so on.

In the field of sacred art, whether in painting or in sculpture, the fifteenth century was the truly great age, although the sixteenth century also boasted major artists whose manner gave birth to such new schools of painting as those of Menri and Gari, the latter belonging to the circle of the Karmapa. It should indeed be noted that the various schools of art, and especially those of painting, more often than not sprang up

in close connection with the counts of the priest-lords. Nor should this be cause for surprise: the wealth of the religious dignitaries impelled them to seek out talented artists to execute those paintings in fresco or on movable cloth by which Tibetans chose to cover the walls of their monasteries and private chapels, or to fashion – most usually in metal – the statues and reliquaries with which they adorned their altars. The literature bears witness not only to the ritual objects and furnishings of the temples or to the tooled covers of sacred books, but also to the domestic vessels and furniture which displayed much the same richness and might be true works of art in themselves, although few such objects, unfortunately, have actually come down to us.

As protectors of the arts, both the Fifth Dalai Lama and his regent, Sangye Gyatso, wielded decisive influence in the seventeenth century. This particular Dalai Lama, as we have seen, was a statesman – but also, and to a much greater extent, a scholar and a mystic: the accounts of his visions, preserved in manuscript form, abundantly testify to this. With his interest in history in general and keen awareness of the history of painting in particular, not to mention his grasp of medicine and astrology, his sharp superior mind saw through the foibles of the clergy and cut through the various contradictions in tradition. Such contradictions he wished to correct; and in light of his own knowledge of Sanskrit, he would have had his monks apply themselves anew to learn the holy language in which India's Buddhist texts had first been written. The Fifth Dalai Lama thus made known to his regent his displeasure not only with the discrepancies he noted among the various extant medical traditions, but also with the poor textual transmission of the most basic treatise of them all, the *Gyüzhî* – and so gave the regent orders to have a correct text finally edited and a coherent treatise on medicine composed. These writings in turn served as textbooks for the school of medicine founded by the regent on a hill near the Potala, and also as reference works for all Tibetan physicians down to our own times. The regent moreover ordered illustrations for these texts to be made into a series of paintings for his newly founded school of medicine, and these pictures, too, became reference works – copies of which came to be in demand as far away as Mongolia.

But the major work sponsored by the Fifth Dalai Lama, both as a builder and as a patron of the arts, was of course the Potala: this represents the most perfect achievement of Tibet's powerful military architecture. Although then still a far cry from the complex which contemporary photographs have made so famous – for the regent was yet to add the mausoleum of the Fifth Dalai Lama to which further mausolea for successive pontiffs were joined as time went on – the Potala in its initial state was nevertheless already quite an imposing mass, as we can see in a drawing made by the Jesuit Gruber (see Plate 135). To adorn not only this structure but also the many buildings he ordered restored in and around the capital, especially Lhasa's main temple, the Jokhang, the Fifth Dalai Lama called upon the most famous artists, notably those of the 'new' Menri school whose output had attained unequalled subtlety of line and delicacy in colour. The regent hardly lagged far behind in such matters, and in turn also ordered many new works of art after the death of the Dalai Lama.

The reign of this Fifth Dalai Lama, and the supremacy since then enjoyed by the Gelugpa school, doubly influenced all Tibetan culture and so brought about a true classicism, both in intellectual life and in artistic production – a trend in learning and art which tended throughout central Tibet

in the course of the eighteenth century to align itself, on Gelugpa dominant models and, to become standardized. Only the eastern province of Kham seems to have preserved any real originality, at least in those works which have come down to us, for the Gelugpa influence, it is true, made itself much less felt in this area.

The Gelugpa model became the prevailing norm throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in those forms of Tibetan culture which influentially spread to China and Mongolia. While political considerations might have underlain the creation of copies of the Potala and other great Tibetan monuments as set up in the Summer Palace of the Qing emperors at Jehol – and perhaps also had something to do with the erection of the monastery of Yung-ho-kung within the walls of the Imperial Palace in Beijing – the conversion of the Mongols, at any rate, was sincere, and their borrowings from Tibetan culture hence entirely natural. The Mongols sought monastic training in Tibet, and quite a few abbots and learned brethren in Tibetan monasteries were themselves actually Mongols. Just as naturally, the Mongols also adopted Tibet's monastic 'sciences' together with their literary and artistic forms. Mongol productions rarely reached the level of their Tibetan models; this however, renders all the more precious those remarkable works which were wrought by the celebrated Jetsündampa Hutuktu (Zanabazar, 1635–1723) and his disciples (see Plate 136).

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NORTH AMERICA

Jack P. Greene

When Columbus sailed into the New World in 1492, a large and culturally diverse population inhabited the area now encompassed by the United States and Canada. Descendants of people who had migrated across the Bering Strait at least 25,000 years before and had subsequently scattered throughout North and South America, these Indians, as they came to be called by Europeans, had previously had at most only sporadic contact with non-American peoples. The encounter that began with Columbus initiated a process that simultaneously would radically alter their many worlds and produce the new cultural entity that Europeans called America.

Precisely how many Amerindians there were continues to be a subject of intense scholarly debate. For nearly a century before the 1960s, scholars tended to think that their numbers were small, most people accepting the 1934 estimate of the anthropologist A. L. Kroeber of a total population for the area north of present-day Mexico of 1,041,480. During the last thirty years, however, other scholars have revised these estimates upward. Most scholars reject the largest of these figures, 18,022,000, made by Henry Dobyns, also an anthropologist, in 1983. But continuing research at a variety of archaeological sites seems to suggest that the number of Amerindians in 1492 was several times greater than the figure Kroeber posited and may well have been as high as 9 million to 12 million.

Whatever the actual size of the Amerindian population on the eve of contact, both documentary and archaeological researchers agree that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, fell victim to European diseases within a few decades of their respective initial contacts. Without inherited immunities to smallpox, measles, influenza, and other Old World disorders, most Amerindian populations continued their precipitous declines until well into the seventeenth century. By the time Europeans made sustained efforts at intensive settlement on the North American mainland at the beginning of the seventeenth century, this demographic catastrophe had reduced population densities in some areas to a small fraction of what they had been a hundred years earlier. Throughout the period covered by this chapter disease continued to take a heavy toll of Amerindian peoples (see Plate 137).

On the assumption that any given physical environment gives rise to similar cultural traits among those who inhabit it, scholars have conventionally employed the analytic device of the *cultural region* to describe this diverse Amerindian population. The most widely used scheme of classification divides the area north of Mexico into ten separate regions.

In the order in which they came into sustained contact with Europeans, these are the Southeast, Southwest, Northeast, California, Northwest Coast, Subarctic, Great Plains, Great Basin, and Arctic. During the first three centuries of European penetration into North America, however, only those Amerindians residing in the first three of these areas, the Southeast, Southwest, and Northeast, underwent intense and prolonged contact with Europeans, albeit during the last half of the eighteenth century, Spanish advances from the south and Russian encroachments from the north brought both the California and Northwest Coast areas into what would turn out to be continuous interaction with European cultures, while French trading activities had a similar effect upon the peoples who resided in the eastern portions of the Great Plains.

Of the three principal cultural regions encountered by Europeans in North America between 1500 and 1800, the Southeast covered a vast area of diverse ecological zones stretching west from the Atlantic Ocean to eastern portions of present-day Texas and north from the Gulf of Mexico up the valley of the Mississippi River to its junction with the Ohio River and then east across the Appalachian Mountains to the western areas of present-day Virginia and Maryland. This region contained more than fifty separate groups identified by place of occupation and language. The predominant languages of the area belonged to the Muskogean family. Among the larger groups living in this area, several of which came together after European settlement, were the Alibamas, Catawbas, Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, Natchez, and Seminoles. Living most of the year in agricultural villages, they supplemented their diets by seasonal hunting, fishing, and gathering.

An equally large area reaching from central Mexico north through most of present-day New Mexico and Arizona and including portions of south-west Texas and south-eastern California, the Southwest included at least as many specific groups. Some of these, including Pueblo peoples such as the Hopi and Zuni, also lived in villages and engaged in the most highly developed agriculture practised anywhere in aboriginal North America. Others, including the Apaches and Navajos, were seasonal nomads who supported themselves by hunting or raiding. Most of the inhabitants of this area spoke languages that fell into one of three broad families: the Athapasean, Uto-Aztec, or Yuman.

The Northeast, extending from the Atlantic Ocean west across the Mississippi River and from present-day eastern

North Carolina north to the St Lawrence River valley in the east and beyond the Great Lakes in the west, also contained more than fifty known groups, including the Micmacs, Abenakis, Algonquians, Iroquois, Delawares, Powhatans, and Hurons. Although they engaged in considerable agricultural activity, they derived most of their food from the animals and plants of the forests and coastal areas. Their languages belonged mostly to one of two main families, the Algonquian and the Iroquoian.

In all three areas, Amerindians were organized into a wide array of socio-economic, cultural, and political units of varying size and complexity. These units ranged from small bands to large tribes to extensive chiefdoms or confederacies. In general, smaller bands tended to be characteristic of areas that relied primarily on hunting, while larger units were more often found among groups who were either deeply involved in settled agriculture or relied on a mixture of economic activities for their subsistence. Correlations also existed between size of units and complexity of political and social organization. Tribes, chiefdoms, and confederacies required more elaborate institutional structures and exhibited more hierarchical social structures and more complex kinship and property-holding arrangements than bands. Even the most complex confederacies in North America, however, bore but slight resemblance to the early modern European territorial state. With an extraordinary diversity of religious beliefs and practices, Amerindians also lacked a common religious culture of the kind that linked together the societies of most of Western Europe.

Indeed, by the standards of early modern Europe, Amerindian societies and cultures in North America everywhere seemed to be socially more egalitarian, politically more simple, and technologically and materially less advanced than all but the outer fringes of Europe. With few exceptions, Amerindians were masters at translating local materials – wood, bark, stone, clay, reeds, skins, or plant fibres – into utilitarian objects such as boats, baskets, textiles, and tools, and many of these were often of great beauty. But Amerindians had no metal weapons, made no practical uses of the wheel, had domesticated few animals, and, in North America, had no animal power except that supplied by dogs. They had no alphabet or writing except for pictorial glyphs and pictographs.

Except for the flat-roofed rectangular mud pueblos found in a few areas of the Southwest, Amerindian housing also seemed to be more primitive – less substantial and less permanent – than that found in all but the least settled parts of Europe. Ranging from the round thatched houses in the Southeast, to the domed thatched or hide wigwams of the Southwest, the barrel-roofed rectangular longhouses of the Northeast, and the movable conical skin tepees of the northern regions of the Northeast, the Great Plains, and the Great Basin, housing was nowhere constructed of stone. To European eyes, clothing seemed to be similarly primitive, that made from animal hides and furs predominating in woodland and hunting regions and a combination of skin clothing and clothing made from fabrics woven from cotton and various other plant fibres being characteristic of areas of settled agriculture (see Plates 138–143).

For a century after 1492, European activity in North America was sporadic. With the support of the English crown, John Cabot, an Italian mariner, seems to have been the first European in early modern times to have encountered the continent. In 1497 while trying to reach Asia, he coasted along some portions of the north-eastern part of the continent,

probably either Cape Breton or Newfoundland. Four years later in 1501, the Portuguese sent Gaspar Corte-Real to the same area, where his expedition kidnapped and brought back to Portugal fifty Indians for sale as slaves. A quarter century later in 1524, another Italian, Giovanni da Verrazano, sailing under the auspices of the French government, explored much of the North American coast from present-day Georgia north to Cape Breton, while ten years later Jacques Cartier, also in the service of the French, visited the gulf and river of St Lawrence and with Jean Roberval in 1541–2 tried unsuccessfully to establish an outpost in that area. Although fishermen from England, France, and Portugal annually frequented the fish-rich seas around Newfoundland, as they had perhaps been doing even before, none of these early exploratory ventures eventuated in the establishment of any permanent bases of European occupation anywhere on the continent during the sixteenth century.

Operating out of established bases in the Caribbean, the Spanish were the first to do so. In 1521, Juan Ponce de León, conqueror of Puerto Rico, tried to establish a Spanish base in Florida, which he had first visited in 1513, but was driven off and mortally wounded by Amerindians, and in 1526 Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón also lost his life in a second and similarly unsuccessful attempt farther north in present-day Georgia.

These early failures did not discourage other Spanish conquistadors from exploring the continent in search of riches. In 1519, Alonso Álvarez de Pineda sailed round the Gulf of Mexico from the tip of Florida to Veracruz. In 1528, Pánfilo de Narváez led a large expedition of 400 men in an abortive effort to conquer part of the Gulf region. A few of the survivors of this expedition, led by Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, wandered through Texas and the south-west for eight years before they finally reached Mexico in 1536. Inspired by Cabeza de Vaca's reports of his wanderings, Francisco Vázquez de Coronado explored extensively in the south-west in 1540–2, while Hernando de Soto undertook a similar expedition in the south-east in 1539–42.

Between 1492 and 1560, Europeans had thus gathered a lot of information and bartered with, plundered, or fought with many Amerindians, but they had not established economic or religious hegemony over a single inch of North America. Only after 1560 did they slowly begin to move beyond this early exploratory or seafaring stage of contact to conquer strategic sites and establish viable commercial outposts on the continent. In response to French Huguenot attempts led by Jean Ribault and René de Laudonnière to plant a settlement at the mouth of the St John's River in present-day northern Florida, Philip II in 1565 authorized Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to destroy the French outpost and establish a proprietary colony on the mainland.

Menéndez succeeded in both objectives. Formidable resistance from local Amerindians and attacks by French and English corsairs forced the Spanish to pull back from all but one of their outposts by 1587. Yet, the beachhead Menéndez founded at St Augustine in 1565 managed to survive and become the capital of Florida, the first permanent European colony in North America. Valuing the settlement for its strategic situation at the northern end of the Bahama Channel through which Spanish treasure fleets sailed on their way to Spain, the Spanish crown resigned itself to subsidizing the *presidio*, missionaries, and allied Amerindian caciques.

As military reprisals and Amerindian depopulation rendered Florida more secure, Franciscan missionaries enjoyed considerable success, establishing some thirty-eight missions in existing Amerindian towns in a broad band

stretching 300 miles westward from St Augustine to the rich agricultural Amerindian province of Apalache around present-day Tallahassee and 100 miles northward along the Atlantic coast into present-day Georgia. By co-opting local caciques, the Spanish managed to secure Amerindian recognition of their hegemony and with it tribute, labour, and a sphere of influence for trade. By the mid-seventeenth century, exports of ranch products, deerskins, and provisions provided the foundations for a viable local economy. With only 700 inhabitants of European descent, however, Florida, after a full century of existence as a Spanish settlement, remained little more than a defensive outpost on the far north-eastern periphery of the Hispanic American Empire, the presidio at St Augustine serving as a base for the protection of a few Spanish farmers, ranchers, traders, and missionaries and 26,000 Christian Amerindians in an extensive rural hinterland.

Within a few years after the establishment of Florida, the Spanish also began to push north from Mexico into the south-west. During the late sixteenth century, Franciscan missionaries set up a string of missions in that area, a process that in 1610 led to the founding of Santa Fe as the capital of New Mexico, the second Spanish colony established in the area now occupied by the United States. By the end of the seventeenth century, New Mexico had a Spanish and mixed blood population of between 1,500 and 2,000. During the eighteenth century, the Spanish established an extensive network of missions and *presidios* stretching from eastern Texas west to California and, along the west coast, north as far as San Francisco.

From time during the last forty years of the sixteenth century, both the English and French governments sponsored American ventures. The English commissioned two separate efforts, first by Martin Frobisher in 1576–8 and then by John Davis in 1585–7, to find a north-west passage to the Orient, while Sir Humphrey Gilbert and his half-brother Sir Walter Raleigh thrice tried unsuccessfully in the 1580s to establish English outposts in North America. Gilbert in Newfoundland in 1583 and Raleigh along the coast of present-day North Carolina in 1585 and 1587. Throughout the 1570s and 1580s, the French manifested a continuing interest in the St Lawrence River area, where their traders made annual visits to exchange European goods for furs and skins brought to the coast by Amerindians. But they too failed to establish a permanent base.

During the first six decades of the seventeenth century, however, France, England, The Netherlands, and Sweden all managed to move beyond the exploratory phase to secure an established foothold in eastern North America. The principal result of these early efforts was to provide each of the powers involved with one or more specific spheres of influence in eastern North America. The French operated in the broad area north of the Bay of Fundy and up the St Lawrence River valley to the Great Lakes, the English around Chesapeake Bay and in New England, the Dutch in the Hudson River valley, and, for a brief period between 1638 and their conquest by the Dutch in 1655, the Swedes in the Delaware River valley.

In two respects, all of these efforts in North America – during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, the French in Acadia and Quebec, the English in Virginia and New England, and the Dutch in New Netherlands, and, in the late 1630s, the Swedes in New Sweden – strongly resembled both the first Spanish colonies in North America and the many attempts by their sponsoring nations to establish

trading posts elsewhere in the world outside Europe during the late sixteenth century. First, they were established under the auspices of private companies or individuals acting under the authority of charters or licenses from their home governments. Second, they were initially only small-scale commercial and military outposts intended to serve as *entrepôts* for trade with Amerindian populations or centres for manufactures of local materials that employed the labour of those populations. Their primary purpose was to organize and exploit existing peoples and resources.

Although their founders all expressed the intention of bringing European civility and Christianity to Amerindians, they mostly did not, in the beginning, necessarily think that the bases they established would require either the displacement of Amerindians or substantial settlement by Europeans (see Plate 144). In this scheme, North America could have remained an Amerindian country, albeit one dominated and culturally and socio-economically reformulated by Europeans.

In conception, these early European enclaves in North America thus differed substantially from the main Iberian initiatives in the New World. The population of Hispanic and Luso America during the early seventeenth century continued to be heavily Amerindian. They constituted as much as three-quarters to four-fifths of the whole. It also contained more blacks, mulattoes, and *mestizos* than whites. From very early on, however, their settlements had attracted thousands of Spaniards and smaller numbers of Portuguese from the Old World. As many as 0.5 million Spaniards and 50–60,000 Portuguese emigrated to America during the 150 years before 1650, and by that date the number of whites in Hispanic America had reached about 635,000 or 6.3 per cent of the inhabitants and in Portuguese Brazil about 70,000 or 7.4 per cent of the population.

By contrast in North America, only the English emigrated in significant numbers before 1660, and then only after the early settlers in Virginia, founded in 1607, had successfully cultivated tobacco in the 1610s and found Amerindians unwilling to provide the labour needed to produce it. To supply these labour needs or in the hope of sharing in tobacco profits, as many as 50,000 English people migrated between 1615 and 1660 to Virginia and its neighbouring Chesapeake colony, Maryland, founded in 1634.

This figure represented about a fifth of a large-scale overseas emigration of between 240,000 and 295,000 that left England and Scotland during these same years. Of this number, 70,000 to 100,000 went to the new English plantations established in Ulster and Munster in Ireland after 1603; 3,000 to 4,000 to the western Atlantic island of Bermuda starting in 1612; 20,000 to 25,000 to the New England colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Haven beginning in 1620; and, also starting in the 1620s, 110,000 to 135,000 to the West Indian colonies of Barbados, St Kitts, Antigua, Nevis, Montserrat, and Jamaica, which the English conquered from the Spanish in 1655.

The result of these movements of people was the establishment of significant aggregations of English people in America. By 1660, about 100,000 people of English descent lived on the western side of the Atlantic: 3,500 in Bermuda, nearly 34,000 in the Chesapeake, over 33,000 in the West Indies, and at least 32,500 in New England. At the same time, the Dutch and Swedish settlements on the Hudson and Delaware Rivers contained fewer than 10,000 people of European extraction, while no more than 2,500 to 3,000 French people lived in the whole of Acadia and Canada and

just 8,000 to 10,000 in the several French West Indian island colonies, the most important of which were Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St Kitts, which the French shared with the English. Before 1660, both the Dutch and French North American colonies were far more interested in trading, principally for furs, with local Amerindians than in promoting settlement.

As the two principal areas of European settlement on the North American mainland, the English colonies around the Chesapeake and in New England represented two distinct patterns of settlement. Like most other early regions of English overseas settlement during the early modern era, the Chesapeake underwent a long and uncertain search for sustenance, stability, and definition. The emergence of tobacco as a highly profitable staple produced for European markets at once provided a viable economic base and encouraged settlers to focus narrowly on the pursuit of individual gain. Scattering themselves widely over the landscape on the soils best suited to growing tobacco, they engaged in ruthless exploitation of bound labour imported mostly through a system of indentured servitude in which, in return for passage to America and the promise of land at the end of their terms, English men and women bound themselves to work four to seven years for a master.

Organized largely for the purpose of enabling individuals to improve their material circumstances in the broad field for ambition that English people saw in America, the highly exploitative society that emerged in the Chesapeake was labour-intensive, dispersed, secular, market-oriented, and composed mostly of single men. With few families and a high death rate, population grew slowly and mostly through immigration. With wealth increasingly concentrated in the hands of the most successful planters, significant social distinctions based largely on wealth rapidly developed. At the same time, however, the fragility of life and fortune and the modest social backgrounds of most of the successful meant that political and social authority was weak and the potential for social discord considerable.

By contrast, the Puritan colonies of New England, begun with the small outpost at Plymouth in 1620, enjoyed almost instantaneous success with a massive migration in the 1630s motivated very largely by the desire to escape the religious impurity of old England and establish a religious commonwealth that might serve as a model for the rest of the Christian world. Migrating largely in families, New England colonists mostly settled in small agricultural communities, engaged in mixed subsistence farming, and, especially in comparison with other contemporary English colonizing ventures, exhibited a less thoroughly material and more profoundly religious and communal orientation. Never developing a profitable staple crop, the society they created generated few large fortunes and was far more egalitarian in terms of the distribution of wealth than the societies of any other English colonies or of England itself. With a benign disease-free environment and a high birth rate, New England experienced rapid natural population growth. With a large number of visible lay and clerical leaders among the immigrants, authority was strong and the potential for social discord remarkably low.

The half century after 1660 witnessed a broad expansion of European activity in North America and the West Indies. Seizing control in 1664 of New Netherlands from the Dutch, who thereafter managed to retain only some small footholds in America in the West Indies, the English established six new colonies on the North American mainland between

1664 and 1681: New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania in the area between the Chesapeake and New England, and North Carolina and South Carolina in the vast region between Virginia and Spanish Florida. At the same time, the French consolidated their hold on the St Lawrence River area and established colonies in St Domingue on the western half of the island of Hispaniola and along the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

The new English colonies after 1660 were all initially sponsored by proprietors: individuals or groups who received grants of land and governmental powers from the English crown in return for extending English authority in America. The several sponsors of these colonies all hoped to turn them to their own profit. Like the early leaders of the Massachusetts Bay colony who hoped to create a New Jerusalem in New England or the Calvert family who proposed to create in Maryland, the first successful English proprietary colony, the sort of well-ordered society that had long since disappeared from the social landscape of England, these new proprietors also saw their domains as unoccupied and unorganized spaces in which new societies, free from the imperfections and restraints of the Old World might be created.

These social experiments took a variety of forms. In New York, the Duke of York, the future James II, sought to implement the kind of absolutist policy that Louis XIV was then fashioning in France and that James's brother Charles II would have preferred for England. James Harrington's semi-utopian tract *Ocean* inspired early plans for organizing the Carolinas in the 1670s, and those plans, along with contemporary ones for New Jersey, were at least partly the work of Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, and his secretary John Locke. Also influenced by Harrington, William Penn, in the 1680s, envisioned his new colony of Pennsylvania as a holy experiment that, solidly founded on principles of religious toleration and balanced government, would be free of religious and civil embroilments.

With the exception of the Puritan experiment in New England, which managed to perpetuate itself through the better part of two generations, all of these social experiments failed very quickly, but the societies that grew out of their ruins did exceptionally well. In general, they followed the Chesapeake, rather than the New England, model of colonization, showing a marked material and secular orientation and slowly moving from a state of disorganized simplicity to more elaborate and orderly societies with viable economies and coherent polities.

In the process, territorial and demographic growth in British North America was extraordinarily impressive. By 1710, the English occupied an area 50–100 miles wide along the entire Atlantic coast from Maine south to present-day Georgia and had a population of European origin that was close to 300,000. The free population of the four New England colonies had expanded to around 112,500 and that of the two Chesapeake colonies to about 90,000. Particularly successful in attracting immigrants not just from England and Wales but from continental Europe, the four middle colonies from Delaware north to New York had a white population of about 63,000, while the Carolinas contained around 21,000, at least some of whom had migrated from the West Indies, where white population between 1660 and 1710 actually declined by about a fifth to around 27,500.

These figures were all supplemented by substantial numbers of African immigrants, the vast majority of whom were chattel slaves brought to the New World by enterprising traders seeking to cash in on an insatiable demand for labour among

American planters (see Plate 145). Such slavery had existed on a large scale in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies from the middle of the sixteenth century, and the English first began to employ black slaves in large numbers with the success of sugar cultivation in Barbados and other West Indian colonies beginning about 1640. By 1660, England's West Indian colonies already contained nearly 66,000 black slaves, and this figure jumped to nearly 134,000 by 1710. Importing blacks on a vast scale only after 1680, the Chesapeake colonies had about 31,000 in 1710. At the same date, the Carolinas had about 5,000 slaves, the middle colonies just over 6,000, and the New England colonies around 2,500. With another 4,000 whites and 2,800 blacks living in the small Atlantic island colony of Bermuda, the combined white and black populations in British America in 1710 was just about a half million.

These expanding enclaves of English and African settlement presented the English government with a formidable problem that was common to all the new European imperial states during the early modern era: how in a widely extended polity of the kind represented by these new transatlantic empires the metropolitan centre could establish effective authority over distant peripheries. Like most European colonial enterprises in America during their earliest phases, English colonization involved an enormous devolution of authority outward from London to the new polities established in America and to the people who presided over them. However, as the colonies increased in extent and population through the last half of the seventeenth century and as their value as sources of raw materials and markets for English manufactures became more apparent, metropolitan commercial and political leaders began to demand stronger economic and political controls. Between 1650 and 1696, Parliament responded to these demands by enacting a series of navigation acts for the purpose of establishing a national monopoly of colonial trade. Initially, these measures encountered considerable resistance from the semi-autonomous polities that had grown up in America, but by the early decades of the eighteenth century resistance had generally given way to compliance in most areas of colonial trade.

During the half century beginning about 1675, the metropolitan government sought to achieve similar results in the political realm. This effort involved two principal goals. First was the largely successful effort to take the colonies out of private hands. Previously, the English Crown had assumed control of Virginia in 1624, retained authority over Jamaica after its capture in 1655, and taken over administration of Barbados and the Leeward Islands in 1663. After 1675, metropolitan authorities pursued this policy more aggressively. By 1730 only five colonies, the corporate or self-governing colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island and the proprietary colonies of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, remained in private hands.

The second goal, to restrict the self-governing powers of the colonies while enhancing royal authority over their internal affairs, proved far more difficult to achieve. Sporadic campaigns to weaken the authority of the elected representative assemblies that had developed in every colony to make laws and levy taxes had relatively little effect. Those bodies not only continued throughout the colonial period to enjoy most of the wide-ranging law-making powers they had exercised during their early histories but often increased their authority over the internal affairs of the colonies, as they credibly assumed the status of provincial parliaments in the burgeoning polities over which they presided.

The French pursued similar policies with regard to their American colonies at the same time. Under the direction of Jean-Baptiste Colbert in the mid-1660s, the French crown successfully moved to take control of all colonies from the private companies and groups previously responsible for them and to subject them to the same sort of commercial regulations being exercised by the English over their colonies at the same time. These centralizing policies were accompanied by efforts designed to stimulate the growth of the colonies and to make the French North American colonies complementary to those in the West Indies, where, following the model established by the English in Barbados, the French by the early decades of the eighteenth century had established thriving colonies based upon sugar production in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St Domingue, to which the French had gained undisputed title from the Spanish in 1697. By 1690, the French West Indies contained about 20,000 whites and at least 30,000 blacks, the numbers of whom grew to around 250,000 over the next half century.

In contrast to their experience in the West Indies, the spread of French influence in North America, unlike that of the English, was extensive rather than intensive. Colbert's efforts to transform Canada into an agricultural province that, presided over by a stable seigneurial regime, would be both self-supporting and able to satisfy the voracious demand of the French West Indies for foodstuffs and timber enjoyed only modest success. By the 1680s, settlers had managed to bring much of the land along the St Lawrence Valley as far west as Montreal into agricultural production, but they never managed to produce enough to provide more than a fraction of the needs of the West Indians. Moreover, notwithstanding considerable expenditures from the royal treasury for military expenses and sponsored immigration, the number of people of European descent in Canada remained small, about 10,000 in 1680 and just over 19,000 in 1714. At the same time, the Atlantic colony of Acadia remained very thinly populated. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, it was finally ceded to Britain and renamed Nova Scotia.

Throughout these years, Canada remained primarily a military outpost whose principal economic activity continued to be the fur trade with the Amerindians. The resulting orientation denoted a continental empire that stood at marked variance with that being created in the adjacent English colonies. With burgeoning imported European and African populations, the English mostly tried to segregate themselves from Amerindians, who, usually treated by the English as little more than obstacles to settlement, tended, when resistance proved ineffective, to retreat inland before the advance of English occupation. With far fewer numbers and more interested in trading with than eliminating or removing existing native populations, the French, like the Spanish in the Southwest at the same time, scattered themselves over a vast territory, at once intermingling with Amerindians and establishing a far flung series of trading *entrepôts* and strategic and missionary outposts that, while they provided the French with what they could interpret as nominal authority, left Amerindians in effective control.

By the early eighteenth century, the energetic pursuit of furs and soils had extended French influence throughout an enormous area drained by the St Lawrence and Mississippi Rivers (see Plate 146). Between 1673 and 1700, they established posts from Niagara to Michilimackinac and Detroit on the Great Lakes, and in the following decade they set up small establishments in the Illinois country at Cahokia and Kaskaskia. Although these and subsequent posts were

mainly nodes in a vast commercial and missionary network linking Canada in the north with the struggling new colony of Louisiana, they involved some limited agricultural settlement. But their small French populations, like that of Canada itself, contained significant proportions of soldiers as well as mobile traders and a few missionaries.

For both the French and British North American colonies, the half century between 1713 and 1763 witnessed a powerful acceleration of earlier trends. Despite opposition from English, Spanish, and Amerindians, the French managed to establish a secure foothold along the Gulf of Mexico and the lower Mississippi with scattered posts at Biloxi, Mobile, New Orleans, and Natchez. Although they made some attempt to introduce an agricultural regime into Louisiana, the main economic activity in this region was the Amerindian trade. Like the Spanish population in Florida, which had reached only 2,700 by 1760, the French population in the south remained small, just over 4,000 in 1746 and no more than 8,000 in 1763. Though it received few immigrants, Canada's development was far more impressive, its French population climbing to about 45,000 in 1740 and 65,000 in 1763. Yet, Canada remained a sparsely settled colony heavily dependent on the fur trade and large metropolitan subsidies for defence. In this large riverine empire, another 2-3,000 Frenchmen were widely dispersed over the Illinois country in 1763.

Over the same period, the territorial expansion and demographic and economic growth in the British colonies increased dramatically. The acquisition of Nova Scotia in 1713 and the establishment of Georgia in 1732 gave the British control of the whole of the eastern seaboard north of Florida, and settlement spread rapidly through the middle decades of the eighteenth century. By the 1760s, one long continuum of settlement stretched from Maine to Georgia and reached inland for more than 150 miles.

To a considerable extent, this impressive territorial expansion was a product of phenomenal demographic growth. By 1760 the non-Amerindian population of British North America had increased to over 1.6 million, roughly three-fourths of whom were white. As much as a fifth of this increase came from continuing immigration, especially from Britain and Germany, but most of it was a consequence of vigorous natural increase. A far higher proportion of the growth of the black population, which in 1760 constituted about a fourth of the whole, was the result of forced importations from Africa and the West Indies. Yet, in contrast to slaves in the West Indian and all other European slave colonies to the south, North American blacks registered strong natural growth, albeit at a rate somewhat below that achieved by whites.

The economic performance of the British colonies was extraordinary. Every available indicator – numbers of slaves, rising levels of personal wealth, volume of agricultural production, amount of exports, value of imports from Britain, quantities shipped in the coastal trade – suggests powerful growth. The most recent estimates suggest that, for British North America as a whole, the gross national product multiplied about twenty-five times between 1650 and 1770, increasing at an annual average rate of about 3.2 per cent and producing among the free population a standard of living and levels of per capita wealth that may well have been higher than that achieved for any portion of the western world up to that time. Primarily the result of a combination of the demands for food and other commodities on the part of the burgeoning population and in expanding overseas markets for colonial products, this remarkable economic growth accelerated markedly after 1740.

This impressive growth supported more and more complex societies in each of four increasingly well-articulated regions. In 1760, the two oldest regions, the Chesapeake and New England, were the most densely settled. With over 31 per cent of that population, the Chesapeake colonies were still heavily involved in producing tobacco with slave labour but had slowly developed a more diverse economy that exported grains, lumber products, foodstuffs, and iron. With nearly 29 per cent of the population, New England still had a mixed farming and sea-faring economy that was deeply involved in fishing, lumbering, and the carrying trade. With almost 27 per cent of the population, the middle colonies also principally engaged in mixed farming and exported large amounts of grain and other agricultural products to Europe and the West Indies. With the remaining 13-14 per cent of the population, the lower southern colonies were deeply involved in staple agriculture, particularly rice and indigo.

From the beginning, the societies of the middle colonies and the lower south had been ethnically and religiously more diverse than those of the Chesapeake and New England, albeit both the older regions, especially the Chesapeake, became far more pluralistic through the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Slavery was far more important in the southern colonies, the percentage of black slaves in the population in 1760 falling from 44 per cent in the lower south, to 40 per cent in the Chesapeake, 7 per cent in the middle colonies, and 1 per cent in New England.

Although a declining proportion of the expanding population of each of these regions lived in towns, substantial urbanization occurred in all of them through the middle decades of the eighteenth century. By 1775, Philadelphia may have had 40,000 inhabitants, New York 25,000, Boston around 15,000, Charleston and Newport between 9,000 and 12,000, Baltimore and Norfolk around 6,000, and another dozen towns between 3,000 and 5,000. In addition to these large trading centres, as many as fifty other places had between 500 and 3,000 people and served as commercial, processing, communications, and financial centres for extensive rural hinterlands.

Growth was also accompanied by the development of an ever larger range of social institutions, and more deeply established, in both rural and urban areas and by a major expansion of political resources. Social institutions included families and kinship groups; artisanal establishments and stores; local judicial and administrative institutions; churches; transportation facilities, including roads, bridges, ferries, and a few canals; and a variety of cultural institutions, including book publishers, social clubs, and leisure and improvement associations. In the political realm by the 1740s and 1750s all but the newest colonies of Georgia and Nova Scotia had vigorous traditions of internal self-government and viable institutions presided over by coherent and authoritative political élites with broad public support and extensive experience in coping with the socio-economic and other problems peculiar to their societies.

As a consequence of these developments, the regional societies of colonial British America developed more sharply articulated occupational and social structures and thereby more and more came to resemble Old World societies. Yet, emerging social hierarchies were all much less finely developed and more open than in Britain, and colonial élites, which nowhere represented more than 1-2 per cent of the total free population, had none of the special legal privileges enjoyed by European aristocracies. If, moreover, colonial societies were less open than they had been in earlier

generations, they contained an extraordinarily large number of families of independent middling status, which was proportionately substantially more numerous than in any other contemporary Western society. The widespread independence enjoyed by this group and those both above and below it was, of course, to an important extent built on the widespread exploitation of the labour of a variety of social dependents, including indentured servants as well as black slaves, all but a few of the latter excluded by their permanent enslavement from any significant share in the material returns provided by these rapidly expanding societies.

Even in New England, where religious considerations had been so powerful during early generations, the orientation of these prosperous and still deeply exploitative societies was heavily secular. The pursuit of individual happiness through the achievement and enjoyment of personal independence was far and away the most visible and powerful cultural imperative. This orientation helped to foster a broad religious toleration throughout the colonies but did not prevent many colonists from responding positively to the appeals of the religious evangelicalism that coursed through the Anglo-American world through the middle decades of the eighteenth century or from developing a more deeply religious culture following a second wave of evangelical fervour at the end of the century.

Throughout the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century, cultural bonds between the colonies and Britain remained both intimate and powerful. Emerging élites especially looked to Britain as the model of what they hoped their societies would become. As those societies acquired the requisite social density and economic wherewithal, influential leaders sought to recreate in America as many of what they deemed to be the desirable aspects of British culture as could be sustained in the circumstances in which they found themselves. In the process, they created in older settled areas at least the rudiments of a genteel anglicized culture that put a high premium on metropolitan consumer goods; cultivated the latest fashions from London; supported such cultural institutions as newspapers, magazines, libraries, learned societies, schools, and colleges; and even produced a small number of scientists, literary figures, and artists.

By the standards of the more urbanized areas of England and Scotland, these achievements were unimpressive. Yet, in the most densely populated, longest settled, and most prosperous areas they led to the development of anglicized cultural zones that exhibited a significant degree of metropolitanization. These zones contrasted significantly with the crude, new, and often partially Indianized societies then being established in the most distant peripheries of settlement, with the still heavily African cultures of the slave quarters, and with the still extremely different societies of neighbouring Amerindians. Especially among the less affluent elements of the free population, who sometimes displayed considerable hostility to the genteel refinements pursued by their more affluent neighbours, these zones also retained powerful elements of the vernacular cultures, the local customs and traditions, that in every colonial region had early emerged out of a combination of folk habits brought from Britain, Europe, and Africa, practices borrowed from Amerindians, and devices developed to enable the inhabitants to function effectively amidst the peculiar conditions encountered and created in the colonies.

Mid-century wars powerfully revealed the growing importance of the North American colonies to rival nations in Europe. To a much greater extent than during the earlier

round of wars between 1689 and 1713, North America became a significant area of contention during the wars that lasted, with a brief respite between 1748 and 1754, for nearly a quarter of a century beginning in 1739. At the conclusion of those wars, Britain emerged as the dominant power in Europe and North America. By the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the French abandoned all its North American claims, ceding Canada and the eastern half of Louisiana to Britain and the western half of Louisiana to Spain, which in turn ceded Florida to Britain, which now exerted a control over the whole of North America east of the Mississippi River that was contested only by resident Amerindians.

Both to help pay for the cost of these wars and to secure tighter metropolitan controls over these increasingly valuable colonies, the British government undertook a series of measures, following the peace, that elicited widespread opposition in the colonies. During a dozen years of wrangling, the metropolitan government refused either to accede to colonial demands for exemption from taxation by the British Parliament or to recognize colonial claims for an equal enjoyment of all the rights of Englishmen and autonomy over the internal affairs of the colonies. In 1775-6, thousands of colonists rose in arms to resist efforts to use force to secure colonial compliance with metropolitan measures, and in July 1776, the thirteen colonies from Georgia to New Hampshire declared their independence, adopted republican governments, undertook a common war effort to force British troops and ships out of North America, and moved to form a national confederation among themselves. Following eight years of war, the new United States of America, with considerable aid from France, was successful in its quest for independence, which Britain acknowledged by the Treaty of Paris in 1783.

That document divided North America among the United States, Spain, and Britain. The United States held title to the entire area east of the Mississippi and south of the Great Lakes except for Florida, which was returned to Spain. In addition to Florida, Spain had all the territory west of the Mississippi, albeit the Russians had established trading posts in the extreme north-west. Britain retained only the thinly settled colonies of Nova Scotia, St John (now Prince Edward Island), Newfoundland, and Canada. Perhaps as many as a quarter or a third of the inhabitants of the revolting colonies had opposed their independence and actively sided with Britain during the War for Independence. During the early 1780s thousands of these migrated to British North America, thereby providing considerable population growth in those colonies and the impetus for the formation of new British colonies in New Brunswick and Upper Canada in the 1780s and 1790s.

Although it led to the militant rejection of monarchy in favour of republicanism, the American Revolution, as it was referred to by American leaders and their European admirers, did not produce a sharp break for the thirteen new United States. The war and its aftermath temporarily slowed the powerful territorial, demographic, and economic expansion they had exhibited since early in the eighteenth century, and it would take more than another century before they would become economically independent of Britain. But they continued to manifest most of the same socio-economic and cultural trends they had exhibited throughout their histories. The weakness of the Articles of Confederation, the limited central government the states adopted during the war, produced a movement for a stronger national union that led in 1787-8 to the contrivance and adoption of the Federal

Constitution, which in turn provided a framework that would eventually enable the United States to create a viable national government.

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 LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

26.1

LATIN AMERICA

26.1.1

MEXICO

Silvio Zavala
*edited by Peter Burke***THE GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING**

Although its territory is dominated by mountains, what Cortés called 'New Spain' (including New Mexico, Texas, Arizona and Upper California) is a land of contrasts, especially where water is concerned. There are regions of high rainfall, generally the lowlands, and very dry regions in the highlands, especially to the north. The most important attempts to modify this physical setting made in the colonial period were directed towards the development of redistribution of water resources, including the draining of the valley of Mexico and the water-wheels and diversions of streams frequently found in rural areas.

Like water, vegetation was distributed very unevenly. Apart from the arid areas, New Spain had a much richer vegetation than that of present-day Mexico, with vast coniferous forests spreading over the Central Plateau and impenetrable areas of humid forests in the south-east. The high demand for wood for mining and construction led to the destruction of the trees in the Central Plateau, while cattle-raising led to the degradation of the environment in the Mixteca and in Nuevo León.

DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST

The discovery and conquest of the Antilles was the prelude to that of the American *Tierra Firme*. Christopher Columbus sailed from Puerto de Palos (Spain) on 3 August 1492,

followed the Canary islands route, and in about two and a half months, on 12 October his three famous ships reached the small island of Guanahani in the Antilles.

Columbus wrote with enthusiasm about the beauty of the newly discovered peoples and their lands. However, for him the Indians represented resources yielding returns. Initially, the *conquistadores* attempted to base themselves on the scholastic doctrine of the just war against the 'infidels'. In the Antilles, the Carib peoples (believed to be cannibals) were enslaved in order to work in the fields and the mines of Española [Hispaniola] and Cúba. They worked alongside the inhabitants of the 'useless' islands (so-called because they lacked gold), and those of the major islands, subject to what were known as *repartimientos* or *encomiendas*. In other words, Indians – like the infidel Moors in the Iberian peninsula – might be granted to individuals and owe them services.

On the other hand, according to Francisco de Vitoria and the theologians and jurists of Salamanca, the persons and goods of these infidels were protected by natural rights [*derecho de gentes*]. They were free and could only be sold if they were captured in a just war. The Dominicans of Española went even further by declaring the Spanish settlers' treatment of the Indians to be an offence against human nature, charity and justice. It was in Española, in 1511, that Fray Antonio de Montesinos, despite the protests of the Spanish settlers and of Diego Columbus, governor of the island, delivered his famous sermon publicizing these ideas. Although the sermon vexed the authorities, the Dominicans of Española made common cause with Montesinos and took the case to

the court. The point of view of the settlers was defended by the Franciscan Fray Antonio del Espinal.

The controversy continued for some time. In 1516 the Spanish Regent, Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros, sent three Jeronymite friars to Española to plead for the freedom of the Indians. Following the bull *Sublimis Deus* in 1537 and the 'New Laws' of 1542-3, the principle of the personal liberty of the Indians prevailed. The Dominican Fray Bartolomé de las Casas argued that the colonizers ought to rely on the free will of the native peoples, and the defence of the Indians influenced the regulations concerning discoveries, conquests and settlements.

On 10 February 1519, Hernán Cortés left Cuba with eleven ships, 508 soldiers, 209 sailors, together with horses and artillery. Although he was licensed only to exchange goods with the natives, he founded the city of Vera Cruz. The council (*cabildo*) of the city elected him captain-general of the army which would penetrate the lands of the Mexicas. In this way a direct link was created between Antillean and continental history. The men who left the Antilles to conquer and populate the lands which they called *Tierra Firme* brought with them the material elements to which they had become accustomed in the tropics. These elements included the crops and cattle brought over from Europe, the Spanish tradition of central and local government, the sugar industry, African slave-labour, and the practice of intermarriage. In short, a world of European origins but already adapted to the American environment.

SETTLEMENT AND COLONIZATION

The first Europeans from the Antilles who set foot on Mexican territory, under the command of Francisco Hernández de Córdoba (1517) and Juan de Grijalva (1518), did not establish themselves there. From February 1519 onward, Hernán Cortés began to explore Mexican territory. He arrived at the island of Cozumel and the coasts of what he called Yucatán, Tabasco and Vera Cruz, including the small island of Ulúa. Upon hearing of the existence in the interior of a great empire and rich lands, and disregarding the instructions received from the governor of Cuba, Diego Velázquez, Cortés took it upon himself to penetrate, reconnoitre and conquer that empire. To this end, in April 1519, he founded a settlement opposite Ulúa named Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz ('Rich Town of the True Cross'). Although it was relocated several times, this was the first Spanish settlement with its own town council and also the base of the subsequent contacts between Mexico and the outside world.

Great Tenochtitlán, Mexico, was the seat of the Aztec state; it was taken on 13 August 1521 by the Spanish *conquistadores*. After seventy-five days of intense lake warfare between the thirteen brigantines of the Spaniards and the canoes of the defenders, with laborious progress on land by foot-soldiers and horsemen, the brave Aztec defender, Cuauhtémoc, was taken prisoner. Hernán Cortés decided to convert the Tenochca city, which dated from 1325, into the capital of New Spain. From it he sent out expeditions, some of which led to the foundation of towns of a European type, even when they were located in well-established Indian centres such as Tepeaca (renamed Segura de la Frontera).

In the following years, in the course of exploration and settlement various captains founded towns which tended to become permanent, as in the case of San Miguel de Culiacán, founded in the north-west part of Mexico by Nuño de Guzmán and his companions in 1531, and of the first

Guadalajara in 1532. The Montejos founded various centres, including Mérida in 1542. Mexico City was the centre of attraction for settlers who arrived continuously for the next three centuries. From it set out the colonizers of the rest of the territory.

In the north, a number of towns were founded by expeditions attracted by the large expanses of land suitable for cattle-raising and rich in mines. These towns included Acámbaro (1526) and San Juan del Río, which sprang up on the banks of the River Lerma, the natural frontier between agricultural peoples and bellicose Indian gatherers. However, this border was constantly pushed northward in order to set up new towns which would serve as way stations on the road to the mines of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, and so on.

Southward the mines were also poles of attraction. Indeed, before the northern mines were exploited, those of the Silver Sierra were opened up—Sultepec, Temascaltepec, Zacualpan, Taxco, Pachuca and Real del Monte. Some of these were mixed settlements of Indians and Spaniards.

In 1531 Puebla de los Angeles was founded, a city of Spanish settlers despite its construction with the help of Indian labour. In the Michoacán region, Valladolid was founded in 1541 by Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza. These two cities, Puebla and Valladolid, reveal the policy of creating urban centres primarily for the use of Spaniards, locating them away from long-established, neighbouring Indian settlements, like Tlaxcala, Tzinzuntzan and Patzcuaro. All the same, the new cities relied on the economic support of the surrounding Indian population.

Indian settlements tended to be scattered, except for a few large agglomerations. The Spanish state wished to impose its presence and hold a triple sway over the native peoples—political, economic and religious. In the Antilles, the idea emerged of grouping the Indians in communities in which that sway would be effective. From there the idea passed to Mexico, Guatemala and Peru, where Indians were forced to live in settlements situated within the reach of civil and ecclesiastical authorities. This process began in the middle of the sixteenth century and continued for about a hundred years.

Owing to serious epidemics, the number of Indians declined sharply in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Historians disagree about the population of New Spain on the eve of the conquest, estimates varying between 5 and 25 million. Even if the lower figure is the true one, the decline of the Indian population was catastrophic (see Plate 137).

With the expansion of the European as well as the Creole and *mestizo* population, new urban centres were created in the north and also to the west. Besides founding Valladolid, viceroy Mendoza ordered Guadalajara to be moved, in 1542, to its present location. Upon the discovery of the mines of Zacatecas in 1546, numerous settlers were quickly attracted. On the road to the north and the west important towns were founded between 1547 and 1576, notably Querétaro, San Miguel, San Felipe, Santa María de Los Lagos, Celaya, Chamacero, Aguascalientes, Zamora and León. All of these towns followed a Hispanic pattern in which the Creole element prevailed. However, a black and mulatto population was brought over to work in urban centres, mining camps, *haciendas* (farms) and *estancias* (ranches), while Filipinos and other Asians were employed in some workshops and in domestic service.

In the north of New Spain, colonization was hampered not only by the aridity of the soil but also by the resistance offered by the Chichimecan Indians. Hence Indians from

Michoacán and Tlaxcala with their traditions of horticulture and crafts played an important role in colonization. After 1590, when the Chichimecan war ended, new urban centres sprang up, such as Parras, Cuatro Ciénegas, Saltillo in Coahuila, Monterrey, Salamanca, Parral, Cadereyta and many others. In order to defend these towns, a front line of fortified posts or *presidios* was created.

The coastal plains had few inhabitants because of their insalubrious climate and the danger of raids by pirates. In Acapulco, the fort of San Diego was built to defend the population and the riches which arrived on the galleons from Manila.

The largest centre was Mexico City, with a population of about 60,000 Spaniards and 26,000 *mestizos* and *mullatos* in 1790, not counting tributary Indians. Next came Puebla, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Valladolid, Guadalajara and Zacatecas. Other towns did not exceed a thousand *vecinos*, about 5,000 people.

COMMUNICATIONS

When the Spaniards arrived in New Spain, they found Indian trails. Pre-Hispanic Mexico lacked beasts of burden, but the transport of goods was undertaken by professional porters [*tlamemes*]. Heavy objects were moved by rolling them on the trunks of large trees. The horse was brought over by the Spaniards and its use was restricted by law, but not in practice, to the *conquistador* class. Later, mules were brought over and their number swiftly multiplied. It was also in the sixteenth century that Sebastián de Aparicio, a future saint, introduced the *caneleta*, a long narrow cart, into New Spain, in order to lighten the Indians' labour. He organized a lucrative trade between Puebla, Texcoco and Mexico City, and later between Mexico City, Veracruz and Zacatecas, and even became concerned with building roads for these vehicles. Once a year, wagon trains and caravans of carts travelled to the distant northern part of New Spain, transporting men, tools, arms and various kinds of merchandise. Carriages were introduced into New Spain at the close of the sixteenth century. They were so popular that Philip II prohibited them, alarmed by the rise of luxury in the colonies. However, the number of carriages continued to rise for the remainder of the period. The network of roads improved during the eighteenth century.

Indigenous water transport included rafts and canoes. Mexico City was crisscrossed by numerous channels, so that it was possible to move about the city in light canoes. Indians who lived in coastal areas, the Mayas for example, constructed large canoes in which they may have travelled as far as the Caribbean. After the arrival of the Spaniards, the needs of trade, dominion and defence required the establishment of shipyards. If Cortés failed in his aim of opening up communication with Asia, on account of the difficulty of the return voyage, his efforts contributed to the exploration of Lower California and the west coasts of the Viceroyalty of New Spain.

The discovery of pearl sandbanks in Lower California moved private entrepreneurs and the government to construct ships in the Pacific over the next century. Afterward, the Californian missions and the need to explore America's north-west required the establishment of a shipyard on the coast of New Galicia. From the commercial point of view the most important port was Acapulco, for it was from there that ships arrived from Central America, the South Pacific and the Orient. The Acapulco-Manila trade became regular once the route for the return trip was discovered by Andrés

Urdaneta in 1565. The 'Manila Galleons' or 'China Naos' were large ships employed to transport immigrants and a considerable amount of Asian merchandise to New Spain. On the return voyage, they left loaded with silver.

European merchandise came to New Spain by way of Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico. In the early seventeenth century, a service of courier-ships, leaving twice a year, was established in order to carry documents safely between the Peninsula and New Spain.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

In order to defend its American possessions from the challenge of its European rivals, Spain established a protectionist system which tended to isolate the new territories. In the first half of the sixteenth century, Spain's economic interest in the new lands was focused on the treasure accumulated by the ancient Indian civilizations, on the search for gold, and on the extraction of tribute and labour from the native peoples.

This first phase of the New Spanish economy was ended by the catastrophic decline in the Indian population, which was devastated by epidemics, and by the discovery of rich silver mines. From 1560 the extraction of silver became the principal industry of New Spain. A network of roads was created connecting mining centres with farms, ranches, and towns in the interior. In this way a new organization of products, men and territory came to be established for the benefit of the metropolis and the world system dominated by merchant capital. New towns were founded, as we have seen. In the countryside, much of which had been depopulated following the epidemics, a revolution occurred, owing to the arrival of European settlers, plants and animals – cows, horses, donkeys, goats, sheep, pigs and chickens – which multiplied in a few years. By modifying the use of the soil, property, techniques of cultivation, labour systems, transport, diet, and the relation between the countryside and the city, this revolution transformed New Spain into a diversified economy. The Indians were obliged to render personal service until 1632, and they continued to help in the exploitation of the mines. In the cities, craft guilds which followed Spanish models were founded.

In 1592, the Crown established the *Consulado* ('Consulate') of merchants of Mexico City and granted it the monopoly of imports from Spain and exports to it. In other words, the *Consulado* received the greatest benefit from the economic relation between the viceroyalty and the metropolis. Its members were soon able to amass enormous fortunes, and to supply credit to miners, farmers, craftsmen and small entrepreneurs. In other words, they were central to the process of capital accumulation.

The second half of the eighteenth century was a boom period for New Spain. The mines were producing two-thirds of world silver. Mexico City was the largest city in the Americas, with a population of 112,000 in 1790. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Bourbon administration imposed a new economic policy. In order to obtain greater benefits from its colonies and to turn the state into the dynamo of economic change, the Bourbons transferred the wealth of the viceroyalty to the metropolis via taxes, loans and donations.

In the middle of the seventeenth century the black slave population numbered more than 100,000 and was larger than that of the Spaniards themselves. The Indian population was about 1 million, rising to 3.5 million in 1810. By this time the mixed groups numbered nearly 1.5 million, divided into

the *mestizos* (the product of cross-breeding between European and Indian groups) and the 'castes' (resulting from the mixture of Europeans and Indians with Blacks and Asians). The Creoles (born in New Spain but of Spanish descent) numbered a million in 1810, while the European population did not exceed 80,000 persons.

In the colonial situation this ethnic diversity became a social stratification. Peninsular Spaniards were at the top of the social pyramid, monopolizing power and wealth and enjoying the highest social status. Next came the Creoles. Originally they were proud of their Hispanic origin but as they were increasingly relegated to a second-class place in their own country they became more and more hostile to the peninsular group and more and more identified with the territory, customs and traditions of the land in which they were born. In other words they became Americans and as such they claimed the right to govern their native land. The situation of the *mestizos* was more unstable.

The Indians were the group which bore the brunt of the violent transformations imposed by the conquest and the colonization, decimated by epidemics and deprived of their traditional forms of religious, political and economic organization. They might have disappeared altogether had it not been for the intervention of the religious orders, which fought for the introduction of special laws on their behalf. The *reducciones* (Indian settlements with their own land, government, churches, laws and finances) and the right of recourse to a special court gave the Indian population the material and legal base for reproducing themselves and maintaining their community traditions. Considered as minors and separated – spatially, legally and culturally – from the rest of society, they made their settlements the centre of the world, creating a new peasant culture which fused Indian traditions with Catholic religious values and a community economy which was complementary to the mercantile economy.

At the bottom of the social scale came the castes. The members of this group carried a stigma which prevented them from holding any public office, from benefiting from the privileges of the Creoles or from availing themselves of the defences which protected the Indians. From this sector came many of the workers needed by the new economy in the countryside and the city. It was the most mobile social group, the creator of the new popular culture emerging in the urban centres and mining camps, in the sugar plantations and in the cattle ranches.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

In 1528, the first *audiencia*, or court, began to function and to listen to the grievances to which the regime of Cortés had given rise. In 1535, with the arrival of the first viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, functions were defined and the hierarchy of the authorities was established. The functions were five: justice, administration, military command, finance and the affairs of the Church. The first was the responsibility of the *Audiencia*, the others that of the viceroy.

The provinces, which multiplied in number (about 40 in 1570, but about 200 in the eighteenth century) were administered by *corregidores* and *alcaldes mayores*. At a still more local level, the Spanish model of administration, with its councils, mayors, elders and constables, was introduced not only into cities but into Indian villages as well, despite the legal separation between the so-called 'republic of Spaniards' and 'republic of Indians'.

In the eighteenth century, under the Bourbon regime, various reforms were introduced following the model of European 'enlightened despotism'. The power of the religious orders was limited, religious instruction was secularized, and the Jesuits were expelled from Mexico. The *Ordinance of Intendants* of 1763, following the model already adopted in Spain itself, abolished the *corregidores* and *alcaldes mayores* and divided New Spain into twelve intendancies, thus giving the regions more autonomy but allowing the intendants to exercise more control over local communities. The participation of Creoles in the judiciary, the administration, and in higher education was severely limited. New taxes were introduced and old ones collected more efficiently than before.

These policies provoked hostile reactions ranging from pamphlets and lawsuits to riots. The most violent protests were the riots against the expulsion of the Jesuits (the majority of whom were Mexican-born), resulting in the execution of eighty-three participants (mainly Indians) and the banishment of more than 700 more. Creole officials also opposed the viceroy, and eight of them were exiled to Spain. The attitude of the government was summed up in the viceroy's proclamation of 1767:

Let the subjects of the great monarch who occupies the throne of Spain learn once and for all that they were born to keep silent and obey, not to discuss or offer their opinion about the high affairs of government.

The subjects, of course, did nothing of the kind, and continued to protest. Following Napoleon's invasion of the Peninsula and the abdication of the Bourbons, the war of independence broke out in 1810.

RELIGION

In this society dominated by inequality and the difference between the several ethnic groups, the main unifying force was that of religion. As we have seen, Spanish dominion over the Indies was justified by the commitment to Christianize the 'infidels'. The Spanish monarchs assumed this commitment with zeal, and entrusted the task of evangelization to the mendicant orders, the Franciscans, who were the first to arrive in 1523, the Dominicans (1526) and the Augustinians (1533). They all established convents in the valley of Mexico and the neighbouring areas (see Map 30). After this the principle of non-interference was adopted, according to which the Dominicans had the monopoly of missions in the present states of Oaxaca and Chiapas; the Augustinians occupied part of what is now the state of Hidalgo, the valley of Toluca, and Michoacán; while the Franciscans had the greatest number of convents, extending to the extreme north and the Yucatán peninsula. The friars used images, music and theatre as teaching aids, as well as learning the languages of the Indians in order to spread the Gospel more effectively.

The hierarchical organization of the secular clergy was established with the foundation of the archdiocese of Mexico and several suffragan bishoprics. The first prelates belonged to the religious orders. After 1568, however, the secular clergy became increasingly important. The friars continued to be in charge of the missions to the Indians, but cities with a large Spanish population were serviced by the secular clergy.

In the course of the sixteenth century, a number of meetings of the clergy were held to discuss the problems arising from the work of spreading the faith and the decisions taken at the Council of Trent (see Chapter 12) and affecting the



Map 10 The spiritual conquest of Mexico: outline of the dissemination of convent foundations c.1570 (after R. Ricard, 1933).

whole Church. Initially these meetings took the form of chapters of friars, but the secular clergy, including the bishops, took an increasingly important part, notably in the three provincial councils of 1555, 1565 and 1585.

In 1572, the Jesuits first became active in New Spain, opening schools, building churches, organizing sodalities and missions in which they preached in rural areas or in poor quarters of the cities. The missions to Indians in the northern regions were most intense in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The material base supporting these large-scale operations included farms, ranches, and sugar plantations given to the orders by private individuals. After 1600 the early missionary ardour declined but the Church continued to exercise great influence. In the eighteenth century, the reforms associated with the Enlightenment reduced the privileges of the religious orders. The Jesuits, who by this time numbered 680, were expelled in 1767.

The most important question, and at the same time the most difficult to answer, is not so much that of the geographical expansion of Christianity in New Spain as that of its penetration into the minds and hearts and the daily life of the newly converted, and conversely, that of the survival of pre-Hispanic religion.

The Inquisition, established in 1571, attempted to enforce orthodoxy. In the late sixteenth century it was most concerned with the unorthodox mystics known as the *alumbrados*. In the seventeenth century it turned its attention to people like the architect Melchior Pérez de Soto, who cast horoscopes and owned forbidden books, and in the late eighteenth century to what is regarded as the atheistical ideas of the Enlightenment. In 1789, for instance, the inquisitors drew up a list of the prohibited books discovered in the library of the late bishop of Puebla; they included works by Voltaire and Rousseau, the *Encyclopédie*, and the *History of the Indies* by the Abbé Raynal.

However, the Indians did not fall within the Inquisition's jurisdiction. It is therefore necessary to have recourse to other sources to discover that what the clergy called 'idolatry' or 'superstition', in other words traditional images, beliefs and practices, from the cult of ancestors to techniques of healing, were far from having been rooted out in the course of the sixteenth century. They went underground (the images were literally buried in the earth). The traditional religious culture survived in secret, or in domestic rituals, or in remote areas, or it interacted with Catholicism, transforming it as well as being transformed in the process.

For the Indians, with their tradition of polytheism, it was not difficult to admit Christ into their pantheon. The legend of the Indian god Quetzalcóatl was merged with the legend of St Thomas the apostle. The famous Virgin of Guadalupe, a great centre of pilgrimage, was perceived in terms of the Mexican mother-goddess Tonantzin. As often happens in situations of culture contact, the new ideas penetrated most deeply when they corresponded (or were perceived to correspond) to elements of local traditions.

EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE

The friars were also the pioneers in the foundation of educational institutions. In 1526 a Franciscan lay brother, Pedro de Gante, set up in Texcoco the first school of arts and crafts for Indians. Ten years later the Colegio de Santa Cruz de Tlatelolco was founded, an institution of higher learning for the sons of the Indian *caciques* (chiefs), teaching Latin, rhetoric, philosophy and Indian medicine (see Plate 147). A few years later, however, the government began to withdraw its support from this college and gave it instead to the University of Mexico, which catered for young men of Spanish descent. The University was founded in 1551 (a few

months after the University of San Marcos in Lima), and inaugurated in 1553. The faculties of Theology and Canon Law, which trained priests, attracted more students than the faculties of Civil Law and medicine.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, there were Jesuit schools in twenty-one cities and villas of New Spain, preparing young men for university. Elementary schools were founded by the Jesuits and the Berhlehemines, while in 1786 the first free municipal school was founded in Mexico City. Girls were educated at home, in convents, and in the eighteenth century, in colleges such as Las Vizcainas and the Colegio de la Enseñanza, again in Mexico City.

'Language was always the companion of empire', wrote the Spanish humanist Antonio de Nebrija in 1492. He was thinking primarily of ancient Rome, but his phrase turned out to be a prophecy of one of the main features of the Spanish monarchy's policy towards the Indies. The need to teach Castilian to the Indians was mentioned in royal ordinances from the very beginning of the American enterprise. Since the friars were responsible for evangelization, they were entrusted with linguistic instruction as well. However, they chose to learn the languages of the Indians instead of demanding that their converts learn Spanish. Hence the abundance of vocabularies, grammars and catechisms in Indian languages (over a hundred of them between 1524 and 1572). To simplify the task of instruction the missionaries tended to rely on a lingua franca, accessible to all, usually Nahuatl (or in the Yucatán peninsula, Mayan), Nahuatl and other Indian languages such as Zapotecan and Otomian were taught in the seminaries of a number of dioceses.

The advantage of this system, from the friars' point of view, was to protect the Indians with a language barrier against the bad example of the Spaniards, and to reinforce their own position as intermediaries between the Indians and the government. Despite repeated insistence on the part of the monarch, the teaching of Spanish to the Indians was repeatedly delayed. From 1754 onwards, however, by royal decree, Spanish schools were founded in hundreds of Indian villages, supported by community funds. By the end of the colonial period, most of the inhabitants of the cities and many workers on farms and in mines were able to speak and understand Spanish, while the Indians living in rural communities tended to preserve their own languages.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The development of science in the colonial period can be divided into five phases. The first phase, from 1521 to 1570, is that of the diffusion and reception of ancient and medieval European science, including the physics of Aristotle, the astronomy of Ptolemy and the anatomy of Galen. It was also a period of diffusion of European technology, with the foundation of guilds of chairmakers (1549), painters (1557), and so on, the introduction of the sugar industry, by Cortés himself, and the construction of aqueducts and artificial lakes. For example, the Franciscan Francisco de Tembleque supervised the building of an aqueduct at Cempoala, in the present state of Hidalgo, while the Augustinian Diego de Chávez was in charge of the artificial lake created at Ymiria in 1548.

Indigenous science, especially botany and zoology, was studied by missionaries such as Bernardo de Sahagún and José de Acosta. The *Herbario Cruz-Badiano*, which dates from this period, records a vast amount of pre-Hispanic botanical

information. One might therefore speak of the cross-fertilization of European and American knowledge. In the case of technology too, innovation was sometimes the result of a combination of European and local elements. In the case of mining, for example, tools such the winch were modified by the Indians, who had their own technological traditions.

From 1556 onwards a new process of great importance emerged, that of obtaining silver by 'amalgamation' with the aid of mercury, and improvements continued to be made in mining techniques throughout the period. In similar fashion the system of grinding sugar-cane was improved and mechanized.

The first scientific texts prepared in Mexico date from the period 1570-1630. They were mainly concerned with medicine and astronomy, and they gradually began to adopt some of the new hypotheses associated with Vesalius, Copernicus and others. In 1580 a chair of medicine was founded at the University of Mexico. Academic medicine included anatomical, physiological, pathological, therapeutic, clinical and surgical studies. Hospitals were set up not only in the capital but also in provincial cities such as Puebla and Oaxaca. Juan de Barrios and Enrico Martínez (who was also a naturalist, an engineer and an astronomer) attempted to adapt the concepts of European medicine to the climatic and geographical conditions of New Spain. It was in this period that a German immigrant, Heinrich Martin, better known as Enrico Martínez, carried out an important if ultimately unsuccessful work of hydraulic engineering in order to protect Mexico City from the floods to which it was subject.

The third phase, 1630-80, was the one in which New Spain was opened up to the ideas of the European Scientific Revolution. These ideas can be seen at work in engineering, mathematics and astronomy. In this development an important part was played by the first lecturer in 'Astronomy and Mathematics' in the University, the Mercedarian Diego Rodríguez, who spread the knowledge of the heliocentric theory and Kepler's laws. Among the achievements of Rodríguez were the construction of precision instruments, the calculation of the longitude of the capital and the precise determination of the geographical coordinates of Mexico City and Oaxaca.

At much the same time appeared treatises attempting to give a scientific explanation for the process of making silver by amalgamation. Improvements in agriculture were made by Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, the independent-minded professor of mathematics and astronomy at the University of Mexico and a remarkable polymath who was active as an engineer, a poet, a historian and a geographer, as well as conducting a controversy about the nature of comets with the European Jesuit Francisco Kino, in which the Mexican defended the heliocentric thesis.

In the period 1680-1750, the advances in physics and chemistry began to be disseminated through Jesuit schools. It is possible to find physicists who break with the ideas of Aristotle (Alejandro Fahian, for example) and chemists (such as Alexo de Orrio) who adopt the new theories. Important observations were made of comets and eclipses, some by a woman, Doña Francisca Gonzaga. Valuable works on surveying and mining were produced by José Sáenz de Escobar. In the early eighteenth century, the Real Casa de Moneda in Mexico City became the world's leading mint, employing more than a thousand workers. New techniques were developed in assaying, washing, minting and so on. When Alexander von Humboldt visited the Real Casa de

Moneda in 1803, he declared that it produced in fifteen days what all the mints of Europe produced in a year.

In the final phase, from 1750 onwards, the science of the European Enlightenment began to spread in Mexico, including the new taxonomic theories in botany and zoology and the new nomenclature in chemistry (a Spanish translation of Lavoisier's study of chemistry was published in Mexico in 1797).

A Botanical Garden was opened in 1788 and the first lecture on modern botany was delivered by Vicente Cervantes, a scholar from Spain who introduced the system of Linnaeus into Mexico. Cervantes was criticized for this by the Creole José Antonio Alzate y Ramírez, a pioneer of scientific journalism (founder of the *Diario literario de México*) and a fervent patriot who defended the retention of the local tradition of plant classification. The royal botanic expedition led by the Creole José Mariano Mocino and the Spaniard Martín de Sessé (Director of the Royal Botanical Garden) led to the classification of 4,000 species of Mexican flora, while other expeditions produced more exact maps of the territory of New Spain.

Technological developments were also important in this period. For example, the filing lathe was invented by José Ortiz de Castro in 1774, making it possible for the mint to produce perfectly circular coins, while the automatic shutter for water-pumps was invented by the many-sided Alzate y Ramírez. The new foundations of the age included the Royal School of Surgery and the Royal School of Mining (1783). Like botany, mining was an object of controversy at this time. The appointment of a Spanish director, Fausto de Elhuyar, for the School of Mining, was criticized by Creoles and so was the European method for the amalgamation of silver, so-called 'Born method', on the grounds that the local 'paño method' was better suited to Mexican conditions.

ART AND ARCHITECTURE

The arts of colonial Mexico are not only splendid achievements in themselves but expressions of the culture, a culture of colonialism and ethnic mixing.

Before the Conquest there was a flourishing tradition of wall-painting, illuminated manuscripts and feather mosaics. When the friars arrived they soon began to import religious paintings and prints from Europe, in particular from the Spanish Netherlands and from Italy, in order to assist the process of evangelization. Some European painters came to Mexico, notably the Fleming Simon Pereyns, who arrived in 1566. However, many of the religious paintings of the period were carried out by Indian artists, and the result is a style which draws on local traditions of representation as well as on European perspective and *chiaroscuro*. In the seventeenth century the paintings of Mexican-born artists such as José Juárez are recognizably baroque.

The survival of Aztec artistic traditions is even more clear in the case of stone carving, in the so-called *tequitqui* style, as in the case of the decoration of the unfinished open chapel at Tlalmanalco (see Plate 148). These indigenous traditions were gradually assimilated into the European baroque style which spread via European artists, via imported altarpieces, and above all via engravings, especially prints from Flanders. In the eighteenth century, there was a shift to the lighter rococo style, once again disseminated by means of prints, and once again modified by local sculptors, notably those of Querétaro.

The major works of architecture may be viewed as responses to various aspects of government policy. It has been argued, for example, that Renaissance architecture in Spanish America both represented and reinforced the Spanish sense of cultural superiority over the Indians.

In the early years of the colony, the cities embodied a demonstration of the conquest and the consequent imposition of a new religion and a new political system. The plan of the colonial city was usually that of a grid, with a central square or *plaza* around which were constructed the main buildings housing the civil and ecclesiastical authorities – the cathedral, the Palacio de Gobierno, the Ayuntamiento – as well as the houses of prominent individuals. This gridiron plan expressed the architectural ideals of the Italian renaissance, but at the same time it followed local traditions, notably that of Tenochtitlán. It was followed all over New Spain with the exception of the mining centres, such as Zacatecas and Guanajuato.

The viceregal government was naturally concerned with the need to defend the frontiers and the coasts. Hence the construction of Uliá Castle, for example, the fortifications of Veracruz and San Diego Castle in Acapulco. These fortresses tended to follow Italian and French models, for example the Renaissance bastion.

Colonial churches and convents combined military with ecclesiastical functions. In the case of an uprising, or an attack by hostile Indians, they could be used as fortresses in which the friars and their flocks could take refuge. A striking example of such a fortress church is the Franciscan house at Tepeaca (Puebla), which was built between 1543 and 1580. Others are the Augustinian convent of Acolman in the state of Mexico, and Valladolid. The main roads leading to Mexico City were flanked by Franciscan convents at Atlancatepec, Calpan, Calpulalpan, and so on. Dominican convents could be found along the road from Mexico City to Oaxaca. In the Yucatán peninsula, the so-called 'route of the convents' runs from Mérida to Oxkutzcab.

Churches and convents also bear testimony to the work of evangelization undertaken by the mendicant orders. For example, the friars built 'open chapels', in other words altars in the open air allowing a large congregation to stand in the courtyard in order to see and hear Mass and other rituals. The sheer number of churches built in New Spain in the colonial period – about 12,000 of them altogether – is an impressive testimony to the effort put into spreading the gospel, as well as to the labour of thousands of Indian workers.

The Franciscan convents have their own hallmarks. They are generally massive and austere, without decoration. As more money became available and the Indian workers were trained, church buildings became more ornate. The Augustinians, for example, favoured façades in the so-called 'plateresque' style (itself a blend of Gothic and Renaissance with Moorish elements), while the Jesuits constructed grandiose buildings such as the Colegio de San Ildefonso in Mexico City and the baroque convent of Tepozotlán. In the early eighteenth century the 'Churrigueresque' style was introduced from Spain, modified by the traditions and interpretations of the local Indian craftsmen. Among the most remarkable buildings of the mid-eighteenth century is the girls' school, Las Vizcainas, designed by Pedro Bueno and built between 1734 and 1753, with its giant pilasters and elaborate, unclassical window frames (see Plate 149). In this case and many others, the use of local materials, such as *tezontle* (red pumice, a porous igneous rock), gave Mexican buildings a distinctive appearance.

In the late eighteenth century, royal edicts, inspired by the ideals of the Enlightenment, forbade the construction of churches in any style but the neo-classical. Other public buildings, such as the Mining Palace and the Granary of Guanajuato, were also designed in this style.

LITERATURE AND LEARNING

The ideas as well as the art of the Renaissance were quickly disseminated in New Spain. In 1539, the first press to operate on the American continent was established in Mexico with the support of the viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, and the bishop, Fray Juan de Zumárraga. The earliest treatise on doctrine printed in Mexico, the *Breve Doctrina* (1541) was a summary by Zumárraga of two treatises by Erasmus (whose works would soon be outlawed in Spain itself).

A friend of Zumárraga's, the judge (and later bishop) Vasco de Quiroga, was an admirer of the English humanist Thomas More and recommended the Spanish Crown to follow the ideas described in More's *Utopia* in the organization of Indian cities in New Spain, as Quiroga himself did in his two model villages of Santa Fe, where property was held in common and the working day limited to six hours.

Another Humanist active in New Spain was Francisco Cervantes de Salazar, professor of rhetoric at the University of Mexico, who described the university, the city and its surroundings in three Latin dialogues published in 1554 for the use of the students. The praises of Mexico City were also the subject of a poem by Bernardo de Balbuena, *Grandeza mexicana* (1604).

The friars, such as Toribio de Motolinia and Bernardo de Sahagún, who recorded and studied the traditions of the indigenous civilization which their compatriots had done their best to wipe out, are sometimes described as proto-ethnologists. However, they also have a place in a Renaissance tradition, that of the study of 'antiquities', in other words the beliefs, customs, rituals and daily life of a particular people. Sahagún, for example, was doing for the Aztecs what Flavio Biondo (following classical models) had done for ancient Rome, and what Claude Fauchet was doing at much the same time for the Gauls and the Franks. The tradition was continued by Don Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxóchitl, a scholar descendant from an Indian chief, a great collector of pre-Hispanic manuscripts and the author of a history of the Chichimecans.

Other friars, such as the Franciscans Gerónimo de Mendieta and Juan de Torquemada, were historians of the Mexican church who presented its past and future in terms of the ideas developed in the later Middle Ages by the Italian Cistercian Joachim of Fiore, according to whom the conversion of the last of the heathen would usher in the millennium.

For an idea of the literary culture of seventeenth-century Mexico it may be useful to look at one reader and two writers. The architect Pérez de Soto had collected some 1,600 volumes at the time of his arrest by the Inquisition in 1655. About a third of these books were religious (the works of St Teresa of Avila, St John of the Cross, Luis de Granada, and so on). About a fifth of the books were fiction, a genre still dominated by the romance of chivalry.

The two leading writers of the period were Carlos de Sigüenza, (whose scientific achievements have already been mentioned), and his friend Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz.

Sigüenza, a nephew of the great Góngora, was himself a poet. In 1662, at the age of seventeen, he published a poem called *The Indian Spring* [*Primavera Indiana*] in praise of the Virgin of Guadalupe, adapting the millenarian themes presented by Mendieta and Torquemada to local traditions. Torquemada had described the Aztec god Quetzalcóatl as a demon. Sigüenza, on the other hand, identified Quetzalcóatl with St Thomas, the apostle of the Indies, thus giving a positive value to the Mexican past. Sigüenza inherited Ixtlilxóchitl's manuscripts, continued his studies of Aztec hieroglyphics, and like him wrote a history of the Chichimecans. He excavated at Teotihuacán in order to compare Mexican with Egyptian pyramids, and he synchronized the Aztec system of time reckoning with the chronologies of the classical world. The pride in the achievements of the pre-Hispanic period which inspired so much of Sigüenza's work may be illustrated most vividly from a triumphal arch he designed for the official entry of a new viceroy, an arch decorated with the images of Aztec rulers.

Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1651-95), a Jeronymine nun and a poet, became a legend in her own day, in Spain and America alike, known as the 'Phoenix of Mexico, the tenth muse', and 'adored as a goddess' by 'popular superstition', as Doña Leonor puts it in Sor Juana's play *Las empeñas de una casa*. Like Sigüenza, she was a Creole who identified herself with the Indian past, peopling her plays with Indians, referring to local dances and on occasion writing in a mixture of Nahuatl and Spanish.

At the end of the period, the Jesuit Francisco Javier Clavijero employed his exile in Italy (following the expulsion of his order from Mexico) by writing a history which went still further in this direction. The *Ancient History of Mexico* (first published in Italian in 1780), was described by the author, a Creole, as a 'history of Mexico written by a Mexican'. It was not only a history of pre-Columbian culture but an apologia for it, which compared the Aztec rulers to Roman emperors and the Spanish destruction of Mexico City to the Roman destruction of Jerusalem. A good deal of the changes in the culture of New Spain over the three centuries 1492-1789 may be summed up in the contrast between Cortés and Clavijero.

NOTE

- 1 Prepared by Peter Burke from material supplied by a team from the Colegio de Mexico, directed by Silvio Zavala and coordinated by Elias Trabulsi.

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Franklin Pease García-Yrigoyen

CONQUEST AND SETTLEMENT

On 26 July 1533 the Inca Emperor Atahualpa was executed at Cajamarca. So ended the first stage of the European invasion of the Andes. For some years Francisco Pizarro and his followers had been organizing successive expeditions south of Panama. As soon as he found a more thickly populated area, well-organized and with signs of wealth – Tawantinsuyu, the Inca Empire – a *capitulación* concluded between him and the Spanish Crown established the rules of conquest and colonization (Toledo, Spain, 1529). Pizarro's following totalled just over 100 Spaniards, who shared the riches plundered in Cajamarca, Cuzco and elsewhere – riches which originated in the 'ransom' the Spaniards alleged Atahualpa had offered to pay.

The Inca Emperor dead, the Spaniards settled in Cuzco. It was only in 1535 that they were to found Lima and establish the future capital (see Plate 150). Under their colonization policy the indigenous population was divided up between *encomiendas*, whose holders each received a certain number of inhabitants from whom they could obtain labour and tribute. The holder was master. However, this was not slavery but a means of controlling and using the work force (Zavala, 1973, 97, 177, *passim*). Every Spanish city comprised holders of *encomiendas* as citizens, as well as other residents. The former constituted the chief economic and social force of the early colony. The *encomiendas* assumed such great importance that they shaped the first period of Spanish rule in the Andes. It was through them that authority was exercised and partly through them that the population was evangelized, holders of *encomiendas* being bound to facilitate this process. They supported the Spanish metropolitan authority, settled its towns and exercised other functions. For a little more than a decade they were the absolute masters of Peru (of the Kingdom of New Castile) and during that time some of the foremost cities of the Spaniards were founded. The holders of *encomiendas* purchased property in the towns and in rural areas and set up trading and mining concerns (Lockhart, 1981 and 1969; Trelles, 1982). They were not just the landowning class which they have often been made out to be.

This society went into crisis when the teachings of Las Casas undermined its legal bases. The holders of *encomiendas* then found themselves up against the Crown, which had adopted the views of Las Casas and promulgated the New Laws of 1542. When this occurred, disputes within the Andean expedition itself led to the assassination of Francisco Pizarro (1541) and hence to the first civil war. The New Laws had patent effects in Peru: their advent coincided with

the arrival of the first Viceroy (1541) and the beginning of the rebellion of the holders of *encomiendas* led by Gonzalo Pizarro. It was just when this conflict began that the Potosí mines were discovered and they quickly became the economic core of the Spanish Empire in the Viceroyalty of Peru.

Between 1545 and 1548 the holders of *encomiendas* continued to resist: they considered that since they had 'won the land' for the Crown, it should respect their rights. When they rebelled, the Crown decided to install a civil authority and, after the rout of the uprising, Pedro de la Gasca set about organizing this service. The rebellion permanently weakened the holders of *encomiendas*. The Crown did not ruin them: it extended their rights for one more generation after that of the first owner ('for a lifetime'), thus abolishing what they were standing up for, that is, the perpetuity of the *encomiendas*. As a result, the profits were gradually converted into a salary paid by the Crown, with very diverse effects on the social group concerned.

In 1569 the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo consolidated an administrative reform which heralded a later colonial period and gradually put an end to the *encomiendas*. Tribute was not levied by their holders after 1565, when the *Corregimientos de Indias*, or New Laws of the Indies, were introduced. Under Toledo the territorial control of the Peruvian Viceroyalty was taken in hand more unambiguously and the official taxation system was confirmed, as also the declining status of the holders of *encomiendas*, then salaried. With Toledo an early period of colonization came to a close, the holders of *encomiendas* stepped back and wide powers were concentrated in the hands of an expanding peninsular bureaucracy. In less than fifty years the western expanses of South America comprising the Viceroyalty of Peru formed an important part of Spain's colonial empire.

PERU AND THE SPANISH EMPIRE

The American empire of the Habsburgs was fully constituted once the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru were set up. Both were administered largely from metropolitan Spain, through the Council of the Indies in regard to political matters and the House of Trade in Seville in regard to commerce. This council was responsible for nominating viceroys and members of the royal *audiencias*, or high courts, as also the governors and captains general of territorial division. The *corregidores*, or royal officials who administered towns, were appointed by the Council, although a limited number of appointments remained in the hands of each viceroy. In the

sixteenth century administration was slow and it did not improve, but got worse, in the following century. Only in the eighteenth century was there a relative improvement due to an extensive series of reforms introduced by the Bourbons. In fact the Viceroy of Peru enjoyed considerable autonomy in Toledo's time, but this situation did not continue and communication between the metropolitan and the viceregal administration was lengthy and slow. This contributed to the relative autonomy of certain local officials, especially those who administered Indian towns, the *Corregidores de indios*. Although their conduct was subject to judicial review, it was easy for them to take advantage of their functions, particularly by increasing taxation or engaging in illicit transactions with the Andean population.

Very often the metropolitan administration had only a vague idea of what was going on in America. With the hardening of an increasingly bureaucratic system, to which a section of the Spanish nobility was party, most of the rulings of the Council of the Indies resulted in laborious and confused judicial proceedings leading to belated decisions. This contributed to the popular belief that the King was blameless and the source of all benefits, whereas the local authorities were generally corrupt and responsible for the oppression of the people. Actually this oppression was a consequence of the very complexity of the administrative system, the distances involved and the slowness of the decision-making process. As a result, provisional rulings remained in force over long periods and thus undermined people's confidence in justice.

When the *conquistadores* who held *encomiendas* were replaced by officials, peninsular direction prevailed over local administration for quite a while. It may be thought that there was a conflict of interests between the holders of *encomiendas* – the first Creoles – and the changing Spanish officials. The latter took longer to become assimilated in Creole society, but in the eighteenth century they could regard themselves as the Creole élite for they had gained control of a large part of the administrative apparatus with the increasing number of Creoles in the *audiencias*, or high courts. Creoles predominated in the eighteenth century and Creole-metropolitan alliances were particularly significant in the formation of an élite separate from that of peninsular Spain (Lohmann Villena, 1974). These same Creole-metropolitan groups were the ones which, in the last years of the eighteenth century, formed a part of the enlightened sectors (whose views were reflected, in Lima, in the *Mercurio Peruano*, 1791–5) and constituted an élite anticipating the changes of the first part of the nineteenth century which led to independence. They were open to the influences of the French and American revolutions. They had a new conception of Peru and prepared the way for the idea of a nation which the Creole republic of the early nineteenth century could call its own.

The Andean population, for its part, also endeavoured to establish its identity, maintaining its ethnic specificity, intensified by its identification with the 'república de indios', or Indian republic, bodied forth by the colonial regime. This Indian republic presupposed a specific identity as opposed to the Spanish republic. This legal fiction left out of account ethnic structures which existed before the Incas and which survived the crises produced by colonization. However, while the Andeans continued to be aware of their ethnic identity, they acquired historical significance, for the Incas brought to mind a 'glorious past' to be looked back on admiringly and also rehabilitated. This was more evident in the uprisings of the eighteenth century, especially the Tupac

Amaru uprising, although it was just one of a whole series of movements spanning the century. This historical significance was made explicit of course through mythical qualities which were precisely those which made possible the rehabilitation of the Inca Emperor. Owing to the influence of evangelization, this rehabilitation was to take the form of Messianism (Pease, 1984a, 1984b, 1992a, 1992b; O'Phelan Godoy, 1985; Flores Galindo, 1987).

MINING AND EXPORTING TO A WORLD MARKET

As early as the sixteenth century, as we know, a world economy was taking shape and America quickly entered it through the colonial system. During the first decade of colonization Peru exported metals that had been plundered, while shipping lines were established to communicate with Mexico (Borah, 1975), at the same time as those connecting the new colony with the mother country were established. These predominated, reducing the importance of regional communications by water. The exchange of resources of the land was organized between Peru and Mexico, at ports of call as yet not thoroughly explored. Right from the early days of the Spanish invasion the peninsular Spaniards, and then specifically the holders of *encomiendas* and the officials, engaged actively in trade, imposing very high prices (Telles, 1982, *passim*).

In 1545, when the silver mines were discovered at Potosí, the Viceroyalty of Peru became a regular exporter of raw materials and the initial pattern of the economy changed. Mining thus assumed increasing importance and the urban settlements organized around it became trading centres (see Plate 151). Trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was concentrated for the most part in the vicinity of the routes converging on the mining centre of Potosí – Arequipa (Cuzco), the Lake Titicaca Basin, Chancas, Potosí. Huge resources were invested in mining in this area of southern or upper Peru. These routes also served for exports (Bakewell, 1984; Cole, 1985; Harris et al., 1987; Glave, 1989).

In 1563 the mercury mines of Huancavelica were discovered, thus making it possible to produce silver by amalgamation. This process quickly replaced smelting (Lohmann Villena, 1949). As a result, the output of Peru's silver industry was increased and from the middle of the 1570s to well into the seventeenth century the Viceroyalty of Peru produced more silver than did that of Mexico. Subsequently there was a serious depression and Potosí lost its supremacy. During the eighteenth century silver production increased in other parts of Peru, in the northern regions of the Peruvian Andes in particular, where the Hualgayoc mine was the principal one. Then the same thing occurred with the Cerro de Pasco mine in central Peru, whose output in the early nineteenth century was to equal Potosí's highest yield (Fisher, 1977, 1979).

Exporting silver was a complicated affair and increased its cost. Every year Peruvian silver was shipped by the 'Armada del Mar del Sur', or 'south sea fleet', from the ports of Arica and Callao to Panama City, where it was taken across the Isthmus to wait for the fleet that would sail from the port of Nombre de Dios (subsequently from that of Portobelo). The Atlantic Fleet with its military escort came into service in the early 1540s. As knowledge of suitable routes and their climatic conditions improved, the routes or the convoys changed and were diversified. On the one hand, there was

the fleet of New Spain and, on the other, the 'Flota de Tierra Firme', or 'mainland fleet', which served the Viceroyalty of Peru.

During the sixteenth century Peruvian metals entered Spain via Seville. To begin with, the whole of the shipment used to go into the Castilian treasury, but by the end of the century there was more and more smuggling. It started at the mines themselves and continued all the way to the Spanish port. The causes are to be found both in the sequestration of assets by the Spanish State, which paid the expropriated in soft currency, and in the higher prices obtained for silver on the European market. During the following century shipments of metals decreased, while the contraband trade increased.

The second half of the eighteenth century saw great changes. Royal decrees changed South America's territorial and political divisions. The Viceroyalty of Peru shrank with the incorporation of the *Quito Audiencia*, or Council of State, in the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739 and that of *Chiriquí* in the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1776. In the last third of the century the introduction of the 'intendant' system altered the political set-up in the Viceroyalty.

Also in the eighteenth century, transatlantic trade increased and in the second half of the century the laws that liberalized American trade favoured the opening of new sea routes and of new Spanish ports, at the same time boosting some areas of inter-American trade. Free-trade made possible an increase in Spain's exports to America. In so far as Spain's imports were concerned, Peru occupied third place among the exporting American countries, just after Mexico and the Caribbean islands, headed by Cuba, as pointed out by the British historian John Fisher (1988). Fisher has also indicated that Peru imported more than it exported, possibly because part of the silver intended to pay for imports went out via Buenos Aires and not via Callao (*ibid.*). He concludes that the trade balance was favourable to Peru to the extent of more than 1 million pesos (of 1790). This casts doubt on previously accepted assertions to the effect that the freeing of trade and the establishment of other Viceroyalties seriously prejudiced Peru's economy.

A BELEAGUERED PEOPLE

The first consequence of the Spanish invasion was undoubtedly the collapse of Tawantinsuyu, or the Inca Empire, although it persisted in the altered local political set-up. At the beginning of the invasion, in Cajamarca, the Spaniards regarded Atahualpa as an illegitimate ruler so as to legitimize the conquest by the overthrowing of a tyrant. In the 1570s, any Andean authority was potentially illegitimate and the authorities appointed by the ethnic groups themselves were gradually replaced by others appointed by the colonial administration.

What the conquest did not put an end to was the organization of the ethnic groups, which existed before Tawantinsuyu. The ethnic units were undoubtedly affected by the imposition of the colonial system, which changed the manner of administering the people and their access to resources; delimited doubtfully as a 'province', according to European criteria, a territory for what was seen as a common ethnic group; and sought to break up the hereditary structure of authority. However, the determination of the ethnic groups to maintain their structure, altered though it was, so that they could continue to live according to their own

standards in spite of their subjection to colonial legislation, is evident throughout colonial history.

The second important consequence was the serious demographic crisis which began in the sixteenth century. The number of inhabitants is said to have dropped considerably. David Cook estimated that in 1530 there were some 9 million in the territory of present-day Peru and that their number had decreased to some 600,000 by about 1620 (Cook, 1981, p. 114, *passim*). Although the figures are open to question, the imported epidemics which proliferated were largely responsible, for they decimated the population as early as the 1520s, when Peru was struck by an epidemic of smallpox, concurrently with measles from Panama. Reference is made to at least eighteen epidemics in various parts of Peru in the sixteenth century – some doubtless affecting a wide area (Polo, 1907; Dobyns, 1963; Sánchez Albornoz, 1977).

The population appears to have begun to recuperate in the seventeenth century, when there was a noticeable change in the patterns of residence, 'forasteros', or newcomers, increasing in contrast with the 'natives' in the colonial mission settlements. These newcomers did not pay tribute under the taxation system established in the time of the Viceroy Toledo. This is one of the factors which favoured their increase during the seventeenth century, indicating a halt in the demographic decline towards the middle of that century. The population could be said to have been steadily increasing at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Sánchez Albornoz, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983).

Emigrants from Spain were not very numerous as compared with earlier figures. The *Catálogo de Papeles a Indias* in which Spaniards desiring to travel to America were supposed to register is known to contain the names of some 15,000 persons. This is certainly not a large figure, but it must be borne in mind that this *Catálogo* was based on a list of travel permits which was never complete. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Spanish population in America may have risen to 150,000 and towards 1630 may have reached 300,000. Further increases in these figures occurred in the eighteenth century. They never compared with the figures for the local population, however.

The colony incorporated African and even Asian settlers, though very few of the latter. Early in the seventeenth century (1613) a 'Japanese Indian' was registered in Lima among the builders of a bridge in that city. Just over 100 Asians were living in Lima at the time. Many of the persons registered as Asians may actually have been Filipinos, who came to the Andes with the galleons plying between Acapulco and Manila. However, they also came from the Portuguese colonies incorporated after the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns.

Immigrants in America and the Andes came from Africa too – largely from Guinea and Angola. Although there were Africans in the Andes in the early stages of Spain's presence, the actual trade seems to have gained momentum in the 1570s. Most of them were brought in from Africa via Panama. These were the *bozales*, or pure Africans, who were not culturally integrated. There were also migrants who accompanied their masters from other lands, including Spain. The total number is difficult to estimate, but the United States historian Bowser, for instance, said that there were up to 30,000 in Peru in 1640. Originally it was thought that they might replace the indigenous population, which was speedily decreasing in the sixteenth century. It was soon realized that this would be impossible because of the difficulty in adapting to the altitude. Finally, the slaves were concentrated

on *haciendas*, or estates, along the coast and in cities nearby (Sánchez Albornoz, 1977; Bowser, 1974).

The colonial economy in the Viceroyalty of Peru was based on the use of Andean labour in the mines under the *mit'a* system. This system, which involved working in rotation as required, applied to all work before the Spanish invasion. In the 1570s it was made compulsory in the mining industry and provided Andean labour essentially for Potosí and Huancavelica. The provinces subjected to the *mit'a* were steadily drained of their populations while the demographic crisis continued. In fact the *mit'a* applied not only to the mining industry, but to many sectors of activity in the lands of the Spaniards: urban sectors – chiefly building – the textile industry, coca production, and so on (Cole, 1985; Crespo, 1956, 1970; Sánchez Albornoz, 1988).

The taxation system was consolidated as from the 'general call' on the population put into effect when Toledo was Viceroy. From then onwards the taxation system introduced in the time of Pedro de la Gasca, President of the *Audiencia*, or Council of State, of Lima, who defeated Gonzalo Pizarro (1549–50), lapsed. The assessments fixed the amounts which the Andeans were to pay to the crown and the forms and times of payment. Finally, to facilitate the collection of taxes, the control of the population and its evangelization, population centres were built in accordance with Spanish standards for the inhabitants of the mission settlements. These were first established along the coast two decades earlier. Just before Toledo, the jurist Juan de Matienzo included an ideal plan for a mission settlement in his *Gobierno del Perú* (the government of Peru), (1567). However, these settlements flourished in the 1570s when Toledo was Governor. Thus were established the principles of government and the colonial economy. They were not to be changed until more than one hundred years later, when the tax reforms of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata were introduced in the 1680s. *Mit'a*, mission settlement and tribute were thus the heaviest burdens borne by the Andean population in the colonial era. In fact it was tantamount to over-taxation, undoubtedly aggravated by the excesses of the *corregidores*, or local officials.

In the first half of the seventeenth century it became evident that colonial revenue was decreasing considerably. Silver production dropped, taxation yielded less and colonial administration was costing more, just when the Spanish State needed more money to be able to afford its European policy. In the second half of the century the administration pressed to restore the taxation system and increase returns. These caught up after the Viceroy Duque de la Palata organized a fresh general call on the Viceroyalty and amended the taxation policies. This call made it possible to include many Andean inhabitants in the taxpayer lists. The number of taxpayers was increased even more by the abolishing of the tax exemptions previously granted to *forasteros*, or new settlers, *mestizos* and other categories.

The introduction of ownership and the establishment of mission settlements for the indigenous inhabitants (which limited their access to lands and changed population patterns) resulted in a loss of land under cultivation. Before the Spanish invasion, the Andeans lived under a system in which the population was in the main dispersed and not concentrated. This was necessary chiefly because of the conditions, which demanded a 'pluri-ecological' production. In some regions, in the south of the Viceroyalty, for instance, the distances separating the different crop areas of an ethnic group might represent a journey of up to 20 days on foot (Murra, 1975; Masuda et al., 1985; Pease, 1989). The organization of the

mission settlements meant a limitation of this ecological control, with the resulting decrease in resources. The decrease will be found to be even more considerable if the population declines and the *mit'a* are taken into account, for they reduced the labour force available for agriculture. It could be argued that it was only when the demographic crisis was checked that resources were restored, partially at least.

On the other hand, the emergence of a market in the Andes immediately after the Spanish invasion and the setting up of the corresponding networks, such as the one connected with the silver-mining industry, prompted some of the Andeans to engage in trade in these areas. Other economic patterns changed at the time, since there are signs that Andean populations grew rich. This is a question for further study. It suggests that in the seventeenth century, when the colonial state went through difficult periods the Andean population might have achieved a degree of economic growth, in contrast to what happened in periods of colonial prosperity. *Cunus* and other important Andeans of the seventeenth century handled large amounts of money, usually from trade, but circumstances were very probably precarious given the colonial situation. In spite of everything, it is very likely that the economic consequences of the establishment of the colonial regime differed greatly from one region of the Andes to another (Assadourian, 1979; Saignes, 1985; Harris et al., 1987; Pease, 1988, 1989, 1992b; Glave, 1989).

Merchants from the south of the Viceroyalty entered into agreements with muleteers and carriers, who had started up as a result of the activity of the mining industry and had then diversified into other activities such as the importation of mules. In the eighteenth century there was an Andean economy linked up with the Spanish market economy. This has led to the supposition that the uprisings of that century might have been closely related to a growth crisis and a reshuffle of ethnic organizations and not just widespread poverty due to the sixteenth-century invasion (Flores Galindo, 1976a, 1977). However, the administration obviously increased the pressure of taxation on the Andean population. The tax changes introduced by Duque de la Palata in the 1680s were appreciated in their time. Subsequently, the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century included a policy of more efficient and increased multiple taxation, which greatly affected the population. This explains the continual uprisings of fiscal origin, the evolving of a messianic ideology by the Andean population, and the growing awareness on the part of their leaders of the role they had to play. It should be borne in mind that *mestizos* and even Spaniards joined in this movement along with the Andeans (Rowe, 1955; Flores Galindo, 1976b; Pease, 1984a, 1992a; O'Phelan Godoy, 1985; Morner and Trelles, 1986).

CULTURAL INTEGRATION AND RESISTANCE

Spanish colonization brought about striking cultural changes in the Andes (see Plate 151). At the time of the events in Cajamarca, communication between Spaniards and Andeans was difficult and uncertain. The young Andeans who had accompanied Pizarro on his expedition of conquest and who remained in Cajamarca had been abducted by the Spaniards on an earlier expedition and carried off to Spain, so they were in a position to translate words, if not concepts, particularly concepts such as God, Church, Monarchy and the like used in indictments such as the '*requerimiento*'. They

also had difficulty in translating concepts such as 'money' into a language in which it did not exist. Many of the disagreements between Spaniards and Andeans mentioned by chroniclers in their works may have been silly misunderstandings recorded in Andean oral versions. The Spaniards began to learn the Andean languages and the Andean men learnt Spanish. Many were the moves and counter moves around the question as to whether evangelization should be carried out in one language or in other languages. Eventually, Spanish prevailed, though the Andean languages were in daily use in evangelization.

Another area in which exchanges were important was the history set down by the chroniclers on the basis of the mythical reports and descriptions of rituals which they heard (Pease, 1989, ch. 1). While writing a history of the Incas, they incorporated an historical interpretation of their own time and an historical and eschatological vista of the future. The Andean population assimilated knowledge forming part of the cultural background of the Europeans and their historicized explanations of the origin, development and destiny of the world. Many of these explanations resulted in the Andeans expressing their mythical explanations in different terms. Cultural integration was quick. European elements are readily discernible in the early seventeenth-century writings of the Andean chronicler Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala (Adorno, 1989; Pease, 1989b). Even then, bilingualism was a reality. Guamán Poma represented himself as a kind of 'teacher of cultural integration'; he spoke Spanish, was a writer, perhaps an interpreter, and was bicultural as well as bilingual. Andean writers were to be found as early as the sixteenth century. They were bilingual, of course, though their Spanish was an Andean Spanish, which is of interest to specialists today (Rivarola, 1987).

The picture which the vanquished drew of the events of the sixteenth century, for instance, differed from purely European accounts. Their picture of the conquest took on a visibly traumatic character. In colonial Andean accounts, for example, it was reported that in Cajamarca only the Andeans spoke, while the Spaniards just moved their lips without uttering a sound. This was their explanation of the well-known lack of communication at the outset (Lara, 1957; Pease, 1989b, 1990). Another well-known example is that Andean accounts always refer to the *beheading* of Atahualpa, whereas the Spanish chroniclers state that he was garrotted. Nevertheless, there are sixteenth-century Spanish documents – not chronicles – which refer to the beheading of the Inca Emperor. This version is more consistent with the later Andean tradition. It is only in recent times that studies have begun to be made of the attitudes of Andeans and Spaniards to one another and that the differences in the way of regarding the other party have in every case become apparent.

Evangelization started with the Spanish invasion. At first the friars predominated. Based in rural monasteries, they introduced into the Andes ideas widespread in some orders, such as the messianic schemata propagated in Europe by the followers of the Calabrian Abbot Joachim of Fiore. His influence may be seen in post-Hispanic Andean mythology (Fuenzalida, 1977). Stories from the Bible and from popular European mythology were passed on: not only did the Amazons migrate to the American plains, but mermaids peopled Andean carvings, especially in the churches of the Lake Titicaca Basin and other areas in the south. Even characters from picturesque novels, such as Pedro de Urdemales, or from tales of chivalry such as *Los doce pares de Francia*, found their way into the Andean oral tradition.

Andean theatrical performances were common throughout the colony – perhaps a survival of the machinery of earlier times (rituals?) explaining the past or the present. The Inca Emperor was one of the principal characters in these plays, which may even have been related to subversive activities, as was proved to be so in certain cases in the eighteenth century. In such cases not only was the Inca Emperor invoked and personified by the leaders, but it was sometimes evident even to the Spaniards that the *curacas* or Andean officials playing the part in processions or stage performances were actually leaders of uprisings (Pease, 1994).

A crisis occurred during the early period of evangelization when the Church introduced the changes decided by the Council of Trent. As a result, evangelization was carried out by the priests, under the control of the bishops. This curtailed the privileges of the mendicant orders and gave rise to conflicts right up to the end of the sixteenth century. The idea has been put forward that during the seventeenth century evangelization crystallized in the Andes and led to the emergence of an Andean Christianity (Marzal, 1983). This process is supposed to have taken place immediately after the great campaign waged by the Archbishop of Lima to stamp out the idolatry of the Andean peoples in his archbishopric. At the time, the friars happened to be concentrated in urban monasteries and the evangelizing Church ceased to be organized around rural monasteries. Instead, it was organized preferably in parishes under the ecclesiastical authorities. Thus the clergy dominated the friars in the mission field.

Little is known of evangelization at the outset and its effects. The 1583 Council of Lima prohibited and burned the bilingual booklets which the religious orders had been using for evangelization. They were replaced by the *Doctrina cristiana*, the first book to be printed in Peru (1584). Prepared by the Jesuit José de Acosta, it conformed with the definitions of the Council of Trent and was published in Spanish, Quechua and Aymara, testifying to the Church's plurilingual interest.

The effects of cultural integration were already evident at the outset in the Andean resistance movements of the sixteenth century, as for instance the Taqui Oncoy, in which Catholic messianic elements were combined. Messianic tendencies thus became a feature of the religious liberation and salvation movements organized in the Andes from the sixteenth century onwards (Millones, 1990; Ossio, 1973). With time, the Inca Emperor became a messianic figure, a fact evidenced in the seventeenth century and fully documented in the eighteenth. He was presented as a saviour – in some cases he could be confused with Christ – and his memory is thus perpetuated in the myths still current among the Andeans today, although the versions recorded at present do not appear to reflect, necessarily, any messianic activity. In this sense the Inca Emperor was a symbol of Andean identity in colonial times, gradually defined, and efficient mainly in the eighteenth century and its great movements. Tupac Amaru was gradually identified with the popular (and sacred) image of the Inca Emperor (Pease, 1984a, 1984b, 1992).

A long-standing prejudice in the literature has been to consider that active resistance on the part of the Andean population was displayed only on the occasion of the sporadic uprisings recorded. The conquered peoples started resisting in the sixteenth century according to a strategy which they gradually worked out. This resistance included military operations soon after the Spanish invasion (and again in

successive revolts), the organization of religious liberation and salvation movements and eventually the development of a messianic context. Then again, it should be noted that resistance was displayed specifically in the maintaining of their organizational structures and more particularly of the values of reciprocity and redistribution. As before, there was of course a mythical explanation of the world, which included the Spanish invasion too. Present-day Andean versions will say that Atahualpa died because he was unable to read (reading was a European feat): he went over to the other side and this was what started the crisis and collapse of Tawantinsuyu. Other Andean versions will say: 'The Inca (or Emperor) of the Spaniards captured Inkari, his equal', that is, a Spanish divinity vanquished the *Inka*, a God (Arguedas, 1964). The picture of the past which the conquered peoples have built up is mythical of course. It is only in recent years that the assorted elements in this picture have reappeared in studies, particularly in connection with the Andeans' 'dramatization' of specific 'events' (for example, Atahualpa's death). Greater attention should undoubtedly be given to this aspect (Burga, 1988; Millones, 1988). At the same time, oral accounts give evidence of the Andean image of Peru: 'Peru begins in Lake Titicaca, which is the sex of our Mother Earth, and ends in Quito, which is its face. Lima', they say,

in its mouth and Cuzco its beating heart. Its veins are the rivers. However, the good earth (Mother Earth) extends much further. Its right hand could be Spain. Lima is its mouth and so nobody, no Peruvian, wants to speak our language.

(Ortiz Rescaniere, 1973, pp. 146-7).

At the end of the eighteenth century two perhaps diverging trends could be discerned. One led towards Spanish, then Creole and urban life; the other towards the maintaining of a creative continuity on the part of the Andeans, which calls for closer study. These two trends were not of course clear-cut; between them was an area of conflict, cultural integration, and eventually consensus, in which the history of Peru up to independence was made.

NOTE

1 This chapter deals with the Viceroyalty of Peru which comprised the territories of present-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Argentina.

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Laura de Mello e Souza

THE EUROPEAN VISION OF BRAZIL DURING THE PERIOD OF DISCOVERIES - FROM IMAGINARY JOURNEYS TO THE REALITY OF EXPLORATION

The expansion of Western Christianity created a profound upheaval in the collective imagination. Until the twelfth century, the life of the peoples of Europe was characterized by its extremely slow pace and self-centred concept of the universe, only ever breached by *imaginary* journeys to the world of the dead, to the beyond: it was a world where nothing changed. The pilgrimages who brought the Atlantic and Mediterranean cultures into contact with the lands of the Near East dramatically extended the horizons of the inhabitants of Europe, making them aware of the existence of different, and to their minds strange, peoples. The year 1492, when Christopher Columbus arrived in America, marked the end of a period lasting three centuries which men like Marco Polo, Rubruck, Montecorvino and Pian del Carpine had coloured with the tales of their fabulous but *real* journeys.

From Marco Polo to Columbus, these tales blended real, concrete elements and imaginary, fictitious ones. They described mermaids of the kind that had bewitched Ulysses, monsters and dragons of the sort that peopled fairy tales. They spoke of rains which fell on the sailors and caused festering sores, and of foul winds which infected the crews with disease. The cartography of the period reflected this marriage of the real and the imaginary: on medieval maps a certain archipelago was shown called *Bracir*, *Brasil*, *Braxil*, *Braxili* or *Bresilige*, probably a variation of the legendary islands of São Brandão. Elements familiar to the European mental universe were used to describe the unknown regions, as if to soothe fearful imaginations. In his map *Carta de Achaunto* (1500), Pero Vaz de Caminha endowed the new territory with a fabulous river from ancient mythology. Around 1600, Jesuit doctrine made use of prodigious discovery-related events for the purpose of ideological coercion.

For the Portuguese seamen who, less than ten years after Columbus' first journey, laid claim to a large part of South America (1500), 'experience', in the words of Duarte Pacheco Pereira, 'was the mother of all things'. It was experience which taught them that the new lands were not the legendary islands of São Brandão, but rather an unknown and unexplored semi-continent. For more than thirty years they sailed up and down its coast in a series of reconnaissance expeditions. They searched for precious metals, and

momentarily succumbed to the dream of discovering the mythical El Dorado. But, even before the Spaniards had found their covered mountains of silver in Potosí, the Portuguese were busy tilling the soil, planting sugar-cane and selling it at a profit on the European market.

THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COLONY AND THE EVOLVING COLONIAL MENTALITY

Although the Portuguese, unlike the Spaniards, were too woddly wise to believe easily in myths, they did frequently compare Brazil to an Earthly Paradise. The idea became common, especially among religious writers, that the discovery itself was a divine act, and that once the discoverers had mastered the new colony, it was their duty to produce material wealth by exploiting nature, and spiritual wealth by saving souls for God.

The Portuguese used elements from the myth of the Earthly Paradise, but mainly for the purpose of portraying nature. One of the exponents of this edenization of the lands of Brazil was Sebastião da Rocha Pita, in the beginning of the eighteenth century. He painted a lush portrait of the natural beauties of Brazil; for him, Brazil was 'earthly paradise discovered, where the greatest rivers are born and flow, where the climate brings good health, blessed by favorable stars and caressed by the most gentle breezes...'

For the men who took part in the first settlement, however, the comparisons to Eden served a more practical purpose. In this spirit, Pero de Magalhães Gandavo (1576) and Ambrósio Fernandes Brandão (1618) presented the image in a more realistic light. They preached that paradise could indeed be created there, but by the colonists themselves, working the land and producing wealth. Gandavo took care to show the marvels of nature hand-in-hand with human activity; the Brazilian land, as this writer saw it, was 'better for human life than any of the other lands of America'. It was capable of transforming poverty into plenty - a good reason for the poor subjects of the Kingdom to choose it for their home. According to Brandão, the wealth of Brazil only existed due to the work of the colonists: the planting of sugar-cane, the trading of merchandise, the farming of fruit and vegetables, the raising of cattle. Both writers painted a picture of the discovered land which brought images to the European mind of Earthly Paradise, but it was a Garden of Eden tilled and sown by colonists.

However, not all the colonists saw the Brazilian natural environment as a Garden of Eden. Some complained about

the humid climate, the massive downpours, the fast-running rivers full of treacherous waterfalls. Others vociferated against the insects and reptiles, cold and slithering creatures which were the living proof that America harboured lowly forms of life. But, while opinions on nature varied greatly, there was virtual unanimity when it came to Brazil's people.

Although they were at first seen as another form of humanity, Brazilian colonists, and especially Indians and slaves, became gradually confused in the European mind with the monsters of yore. Sixteenth and seventeenth century tales placed American man alongside a pleiad of sea-monsters, with the result that he became gradually animalized, and finally demonized. For Manuel da Nobrega, one of the great proselytizers of the colonization process, the Indians were 'dogs who killed and ate one another', and 'pigs in their evil habits and way of treating one another'; they seemed 'more like wild beasts than rational human beings'. Other Portuguese Jesuits and chroniclers saw Indians as ferocious beasts. It was necessary to brand both Indians and blacks as inferior in order to justify the slavery system on which colonial society was based, with its compulsory labour and total subjection of men, who were frequently reduced to the level of mere things. While the typical inhabitants of the colony were demonized – first the Indians, then the African slaves, and finally the insurgent whites who desired to break the colonial bond – the colonization process was not infrequently likened to a necessary form of purgatory, to a term in hell which would only end when its dwellers had expiated their sins and mended their ways.

With the advent of overseas expansion, European concepts of the purgative function of the ocean crossing became linked to this perception of exile as a form of purification. The hardships of the sea journey, the fear of monsters and storms, the lack of sufficient food and drinking water, the curse of scurvy and the imminence of mutinies created lengthy ordeals for the seamen. Meanwhile, in the mother countries it was believed that the rigours of the journey and the harshness of life in the colonies purified men's characters, cleansing them of the sins they had committed in their previous existences, regenerating them and preparing them to become once more part of society. In this sense, colonization represented a great purifying process in which the colonies played the role of purgatory. This was believed not only by evangelizing priests but also by men such as Gandavo and Nassau, who, in mid seventeenth century, insisted on having the prisoners of Amsterdam brought to Brazil, thus populating the lands of America while cleaning out the mother country of its undesirables. Once they had been dignified by hard and honest labour, many of these men became regenerated and returned, cleansed and prosperous, to their native land.

At once hell, purgatory and heaven, Brazil's image in the minds of Europeans oscillated between one or the other of these states, according to the function of the social group concerned. No one has perhaps ever analyzed the changing nature of this perception better than Andreoni. This Jesuit from Lucca, under the pseudonym of Antonil, wrote a treaty toward the end of the seventeenth century on the Portuguese colony in America entitled *Culture and Opulence of Brazil Due to its Drugs and Mines*, which was promptly confiscated by order of the King in the name of the protection of colonial secrets. 'Brazil is the hell of the blacks, the purgatory of the whites and the paradise of the mulattos and mulattas', he said. The mulatto symbolized miscegenation, which was an inseparable part of slave society in the tropics: after almost three centuries of European occupation, Brazilian colonists

had for the large part become mixed-bloods and were ready to fight for the independence of their homeland, in order to achieve their own form of paradise.

THE CLASH OF CULTURAL AND COLONIAL PROJECTS

During almost half a century, Portugal hesitated as to the most effective colonizing policy to adopt for Brazil. Although East Asia, at that time, imported much more and yielded much greater profits, the American possession was doing quite well in the supply of red dyewood – 'pan-brasil', the brazil tree, for which the country was eventually named – patriots and a certain amount of tobacco and sugar-cane. However, larger investments of men and capital were not yet justified.

But from very early on, pirates, buccanniers and foreign traders threatened Portuguese sovereignty over the Brazilian coast. They bartered with the natives and sailed away with ships full of local products. They rebelled against the Iberian policy of *mare clausum*; in the famous expression of François I, they demanded the striking-out of the clause in Adam's testament which shared the world exclusively between the Portuguese and Spanish monarchs.

It was in this climate that the French twice attempted to create a colony in Brazil, between 1555 and 1560 in the south (Rio de Janeiro), and between 1612 and 1615 in the north (Maranhão). The first, known as *Antarctic France*, had the support of a powerful group of merchants and shipbuilders who were involved with the Protestant cause and devoted to founding Huguenot colonies, such as the one created in Florida. However, this was not just an attempt to found a colony for reformed refugees: in the beginning, it was strongly encouraged by the French Crown and several outstanding Catholic personalities, one of whom was the Duc de Guise. The main player of the whole adventure, Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon, was a Catholic and a Knight of the Order of Malta. However, the most important aspect of *Antarctic France* was not its religious credo but the fact that it was not merely a trading-post, based on barter and excluding any systematic productive activity; in general terms, it represented the desire to perpetuate European order in the New World, as its name clearly expressed. In spite of the collaboration of several indigenous groups – an indispensable condition for survival in the area – the French almost entirely refrained from miscegenating, and thus failed to establish blood ties with the natives, which would have cemented more lasting alliances. The superficial nature of the French undertaking in southern Brazil explains why the Portuguese were successful in definitively driving them out of the region in 1560.

The attempt in the north was undertaken half a century later. *Equinoxial France* was conceived during the reign of Henri IV, who apparently promised the Crown's support for the project. However, after his death it was put in the hands of a colonization company, with official protection being restricted to the granting of patents and a pavilion. The tone of the venture was predominantly Catholic, and four Franciscan missionaries accompanied the expedition. Relations between the Frenchmen and the Indians were friendly, and two of the latter were taken to France by the monk Claude d'Abbeville where they were baptized by the King. The undertaking, which seems to have been essentially colonization-oriented, was brought to an end by the Portuguese-Brazilians, who in 1615 seized control of the whole northern coast.

The stay in Brazilian lands had a crucial effect on the contemporary French mind. Men such as Ronsard and Montaigne found, in the tales told by Thievet and Léry, support for their theories regarding the golden age and the age of innocence of primitive man, which played such an important role in the creation of Rousseau's 'noble savage'.

The Dutch occupation of north-eastern Brazil took place in a quite different historical context. Sugar production had become more organized and profitable, and Portugal was under the domination of Spain – no friend to Holland, which had recently broken away from Spain to form the United Provinces of The Netherlands. The Dutch occupied Bahia in 1624, but were driven out a year later. They then returned to Pernambuco, an important sugar-producing region, which they controlled from 1630 to 1654. The undertaking was coordinated by the Company of the West Indies, and brilliantly administered by Prince Nassau for just over seven years (1637–44).

The Company can be said to have been a pure example of commercial capitalism. Its purpose was not to colonize Pernambuco, but to control the sugar trade, while allowing the Portuguese-Brazilians to continue taking care of production. The Dutch colonial policy, as opposed to the Portuguese 'model' for the colonization of Brazil, put the interests of the traders above those of the planters.

Nassau, however, was a Renaissance-style Humanist, and took a genuine and lively interest in Brazil. He directed his administrative policy toward reproducing the European cultural model in the tropics. He brought with him a full-fledged cultural mission, among whose members were the painters Frans Post and Albert Eckhout, the physician Piso and the naturalist Marcgrav. He created a botanical garden, a zoo and an astronomical observatory from which, for the first time in America, a solar eclipse was observed and described (November 13, 1640). He undertook the development and sanitation of the city of Recife and paved its streets; it was subsequently renamed 'Manicá', and became the main city of South America. Nassau also substituted the Portuguese municipal organization then in effect with the Dutch version, which, once more, reflects the Dutch desire to reproduce the Old World in the tropics. Indeed, the relative inadaptability of the Dutch to colonial conditions greatly contributed to the success of the Portuguese-Brazilian uprising, driving them out after twenty-five years of occupation.

Unlike the French and the Dutch, the Portuguese miscegenated with the Indian women from early on, and continued to do so with the black slaves when the slave-trade from Africa was established in about 1580. This created a population group of its own, mostly mulatto and half-caste in origin, which, although not totally alien to European traditions, strongly identified with the New World, with the daily life of the colony and the cultural relations which were formed in it. The Portuguese Crown's exploitation of Brazil had the effect of strengthening the ties between the white colonists, the mixed-bloods and the colony. The initial preference for barter and the trading-post system gave way, by mid-century, to the organization of labour along capitalistic lines, aimed at the large-scale production of goods able to command high prices on the European market. Even though most of the revenues was spent on trade with the mother country, the Portuguese-Brazilians identified with the colonial wealth strongly, and over the course of time began to struggle to gain control of its productive processes.

While the Portuguese claimed that, like the French and the Dutch, they were constructing a replica of European

society in the tropics, they were in fact creating the conditions for the birth of a society in its own right. 'This Brazil has become a second Portugal', wrote Padre Fernão Cardim at the end of the sixteenth century. But it was Friar Vicente da Salvador who most clearly grasped the significance of the process of substitutions and approximations which the colony's tropical climate and economic basis of slave-labour had made necessary. As he expressed it,

Why should we need wheat flour from Portugal, if we grow our own manioc flour here? Why should we import wine, when we can make liquor from cane juice, which only need be left to ferment two days to intoxicate like grape wine? Why buy olive oil, when we make our own oil from coconuts and palm dates? Why bring in their cloth, when we have cotton, which is easier to weave than linen or wool? Instead of Portuguese almonds, we have our cashew nuts, *et sic de ceteris*.

The Portuguese colonial model made it possible for the small Ihetian kingdom to control its American colony for three centuries. Its strength lay in its relative flexibility in accommodating the host of cultures which made up the colonial population. For authors such as Gilberto Freyre, this was thanks to the Portuguese voyagers' previous contact with the Moors, Jews and Berbers they had come across in North Africa, or to the experience which they acquired in India and China at the same time as they colonized Brazil. For other historians, such as Sergio Buarque de Holanda, evidence exists that it was due to the cultural provincialism of the Portuguese in those times of discovery, which made them small-minded and practical, less apt to be carried away by philosophical conjecture than by the teachings of experience. In any case, their success was not due to a qualitative superiority over the French or Dutch attempts, but to the fact that they had created the *modern* form of colonization, in which the big plantations where tropical products were farmed, the slave-labour of black Africans and the monopoly of trade were brought together to provide the mother country with enormous profits. Ideological coercion played an indispensable role in maintaining the colonial status quo and was cleverly directed according to Portuguese policy, which oscillated between flexible and harshly repressive, according to the moment. A decisive role was played by the Church, with the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition which, with its intolerance for other forms of belief and its long arm, kept the people of the colony in a state of fear for 300 years.

By the end of the colony's first century, the total number of colonists, in the words of Capistrano de Abreu, could be summed up in five figures with room to spare. However they no longer, as Friar Vicente do Salvador complained, clung to the shore like crabs, but had begun to venture into the badlands, the 'sertão', raising cattle and discovering mines of precious metals. Although their social beginnings had been troubled and divisive, by the beginning of the new century the men of the colony, in spite of their insurmountable differences, had begun to feel closer to one another than to the French or Dutch invaders.

RELATIONS AND TENSIONS BETWEEN CULTURAL LEVELS

As part of the missionary objectives of the European religious orders, which by the end of the seventeenth century, in regions such as Pará, had no less than four convents for eighty

non-Indian colonists, it was inevitable that the intellectual life of the Brazilian colony should have been marked by ecclesiastical culture.

The Jesuits provided the guiding force for the first two centuries of Portuguese-Brazilian cultural history. They ran the main teaching establishments, in which a full range of subjects was taught, from the alphabet to Philosophy, Theology and Morality. They dispensed the best instruction available in the colonies, to the point that their schools could aspire to stand on equal footing with the Universities of Coimbra and Evora – as shown by the petition presented in 1662 by the Town Council of Salvador to the Portuguese government. In the absence of the universities such as those which began to function in Spanish America in the mid-sixteenth century – 1551 in Lima and 1553 in Mexico – Brazil's universities and libraries were the schools of its priests. Although they were insignificant when compared to the great schools of Europe, it is nonetheless impressive that in the seventeenth century the Library of the Jesuit School of Maranhão had almost 3,000 volumes, and that the Rio de Janeiro school library had almost 3,500 by the next. The vast amount of knowledge which they harboured nurtured many minds and was directly or indirectly responsible for the best literary works of the beginning of the colonial period.

Other religious orders also played an important role in the training of the colonial élite, by means of their monasteries, schools and libraries. The Benedictine abbeys were noted for the excellence of their books. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Franciscans, intent on keeping abreast of educational progress, applied the philosophical theories of the Enlightenment in their teachings. Taking their cue from the Marquis de Pombal's reform for the University of Coimbra (1776), they went against conventional teaching methods and introduced experimentation in the study of sciences. In this respect, the founding of the Seminário da Graça of Pernambuco in 1798, by Bishop Azeredo Coutinho, marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of colonial education.

In the Universities of Portugal, where the sons of the Brazilian ruling families were educated due to the fact that there were no establishments of the kind in the colony, ecclesiastical culture also played a prominent role. But their numbers were minimal: thirteen Brazilians were recorded as having graduated from the University of Coimbra in the sixteenth century and 353 in the next. (Most of them came from Bahia, a situation which began to change in the eighteenth century, with the growing prominence of the centre-south region of the country: of the 1,752 students who then graduated at Coimbra, 372 were from Bahia, but 445 were from Rio de Janeiro and 347 from Minas Gerais.) The results of the university reform, which stressed scientific studies and allowed the secularization of culture, also had their effect on Brazilians. Many went even further afield to attend other European centres of learning, such as the Universities of Edinburgh and Montpellier. One of the most remarkable fruits of this new order was the *escola mineira*, or literary school of Minas Gerais, which in the late eighteenth century gave the Portuguese language some of its most outstanding literary works.

Outside the monasteries and far from the overseas universities, the Portuguese-Brazilians of the eighteenth century found an outlet for intellectual exchange and activity in the 'academies', which first appeared in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. Members in far-flung parts of the colony corresponded with one another on subjects such as botany,

poetry and history. One of its most striking works was the *History of Portuguese America* by the Bahian author Sebastião da Rocha Pita, an exaltation of Brazilian nature and Portuguese achievement in the tropics. Written in the baroque style then in vogue, it was a forerunner of the 'nativist', or 'Brazilian pride' movement. In 1748, an academy of circumstance was put together in Minas Gerais on the occasion of the appointment of the first bishop to the 'capitania' of the region: the *Auxo Trevo Episcopal*. As part of the festivities, poets declaimed their works in a literary contest before the Academy disbanded. There is evidence that the custom of creating academies of circumstance flourished in eighteenth century Minas Gerais: the diaries left by the expeditionaries who combed the badlands contain references to the *poetas da região*, or 'rural poets', who gathered together to recite their poems for the representatives of the Crown who passed through their regions. Thus lofty European cultural models were able to take root in the daily practices of the remotest areas of the Brazilian badlands.

Colonial society was essentially multi-lingual, Portuguese being the language of the leading classes, the sugar plantation owners and the major traders of the big cities, where there was a constant throng of new arrivals from Portugal.

The entire Brazilian coast was inhabited by indigenous peoples who spoke the language of the Tupinambás, which was quickly learned, domesticated and adapted by the Jesuits to the laws of classical syntax. This was the *general language* of the coastal Tupinambás, known from the seventeenth century on as *língua brasílica* or, in a given context, *language of the land* (the land of Brazil), or again, *language of the sea* (the language spoken on the coast, near the sea). It suited the Jesuits' objectives well: José de Anchieta described it in his *Grammatical Art of the most widely-used language on the Brazilian coast*, published in 1595. It was often said that the success of colonization hinged on the presence of general-language speaking Indians: in regions where other languages were spoken, the system failed to prosper. This 'general language of the coast' began to decline in the seventeenth century, its use being thereafter confined to Maranhão, from where it spread to Amazonia, under the auspices of the Jesuits.

The southern-based *língua geral paulista*, or general language of São Paulo, was spread much more actively than the *língua geral*. Carried by the *nauteucos*, or half-castes of São Paulo who hunted through the badlands for Indians to enslave, it penetrated deep into areas where the Tupi-Guarani Indians to whom it belonged had never set foot, and left its mark on local vocabularies and place-names.

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, when the slave-trade began to boom, several African languages began to be used in the colony. *Bantu*, brought in the seventeenth century, was the language of 65 per cent of the African slaves, and continued to be spoken in Brazil until the nineteenth century. A distant second on the list were the *bene-kwas*, who in number never rose above 24 per cent of the total of slaves, but whose linguistic contributions, principally the Yoruba tongue, still remain alive in Afro-Brazilian religious rituals. There is evidence that a general African language may have been spoken in Brazil, providing a bridge between the slave population's ethnic and linguistic groups. One thing is certain, however: over the centuries, Portuguese and African languages influenced one another greatly, with the most curious linguistic results.

These peculiar linguistic situations may have been at the root of the notion that the Brazilian colonist was in some way different, that life in the colony had a specific nature of

its own. The half-castes of the São Paulo region expressed their hybrid identity by means of the general language of the south, which they are known to have cultivated until its use waned at the beginning of the nineteenth century. They received it from their Indian mothers and transmitted it to their children, even though each generation was in fact whiter than the previous one. It is known that children began to speak Portuguese in school, and that the general language was so widely used that no parish priest in the region could hope to form a flock without a knowledge of it. As Sérgio Buarque de Holanda observed, there were even bizarre cases of typically Portuguese names which received the Tupi augmentative suffix, thus 'creating a picturesque amalgamation of two highly dissimilar languages, which reflected the profound blending of two races and two cultures'. Thus, Pedro Vaz de Barro became *Pedro Vaz Guacu*, Mécia Fernandes was given the name of *Meciucu*, and, because he wore a long coat, or 'casaco', the Governor Antonio da Silva Caldeira Pimental was dubbed 'Casacuçu'.

The African tongues also had a lasting influence on Brazilian Portuguese: as Gilberto Freyre pointed out, they softened and mellowed the harsher tones of mother-country pronunciation. New linguistic syntheses were created, largely lost today due to the fact that the immense majority of slaves was illiterate. In the sixteenth century, when slavery was still in its infancy, a peculiar dialect seems to have sprung up in the slave compounds, mainly composed of *bantu* (*kinshanda* and *kikongo*), which made it possible for the Africans of the compounds and runaway communities – *senzalas* and *quilombos* – to communicate. In the eighteenth century rural dialects appeared, resulting from the amalgamation of African phonic systems and the Portuguese language, for use with whites. The same period saw the birth of the dialects spoken in the mines region, which may have been derived from an creole-based general language. Finally, from the convergence of the mines-region dialects and popular Portuguese, the Yoruba-based urban dialects came into being.

Strategically used by the Jesuits, the indigenous general language of the coast was deprived of its importance by the Marquis de Pombal's laws which, in the second half of the eighteenth century, imposed Portuguese as the spoken language of the colony. The slaves' large numbers inspired such fear that the ruling powers were anxious to discourage the creation of an African general language which might bring the various ethnic groups closer together.

The Portuguese colonists were more flexible than the other Europeans – the French and the Dutch – who attempted to settle in Brazil. The Portuguese adopted the ways of the natives and black slaves in the type of houses they built, the clothes they wore, the food they ate, their manner of fighting, farming, travelling on the rivers, trekking through the 'sertão' or curing diseases and minor afflictions. Over the course of time they created their own versions of these habits, adapting them to European patterns of behaviour. In a process which anthropologists term as *grammaticality*, they selected those indigenous and African habits which bore some sort of similarity with their Portuguese counterparts.

An example of this was the Portuguese keenness for the strange herbal medicine of the Indians, due to its similarity to Portuguese medieval pharmaceutical heritage. Given that the Portuguese believed in the virtues of given substances, such as the bezoar stone, formed in the entrails of ruminants, they found it natural to make the same use of those found in tapirs, alligator heads and wild pigs. When performing phlebotomies, the colonists of São Paulo, for lack of lancets,

used the beaks of birds, the stings of sea rays and the teeth of snakes and fish.

The animal kingdom also provided raw material for the type of clothing which was best suited to the rough life in the bush. In São Paulo shoes were commonly made of deerskin, and shields of tapir skin. From the end of the sixteenth century on, cow-hide was widely used in the north-east for clothing; the poor people and slaves wore coarse cotton woven on primitive looms. The finer textiles, such as velvet, dimasks and lace, worn exclusively by the wealthy, were imported at exorbitant prices, to become heirlooms which were handed down through the generations.

According to the testimony of visitors to the colony, the women of the period were sad creatures. Although they observed Iberian fashions when they went outside, decked out with furls and jewels, while at home they were slovenly and neglectful of their appearance, to the point of following the example of the slave women and going about half-naked in the summer heat. They withered while still young, losing their girlish bloom as soon as they bore their first children. By the age of 30 they were toothless crones.

In Dutch Brazil, European clothes were *de rigueur*; Governor Naxos's subjects wore the fashions painted by Rembrandt or Franz Hals. The Portuguese-Brazilian victory over the French in Maranhão has been attributed to the fact that the Brazilians wore clothes which were better suited to the tropical environment, whereas the French were weighed down by their European costumes, mired in the mud and drowning in the rivers. Their lightly-dressed opponents 'pranced to and fro like deer'.

The wars in the north against the French and in the north-east against the Dutch were felt to be proof of the success of the Brazilian blend of disparate cultural habits, making them an important milestone in the development of the colonial identity. In their way of eating, moving and finding their way through the hush and across the 'sertão', in all their daily habits, the Brazilians owed much to the Indians. By living on cactus plants, roots, samambaia buds, reptiles, roasted ants and other Indian delicacies, they were able to go into the bush for long stretches at a time, whereas the enemies on their heels were forced to return after a few days for lack of victuals. They were able to spend the whole day up to their necks in water, besieged by mosquitoes; Commander von Schkoppe complained that

there is no vantage we can gain over them in the bush, much less dislodge them from their positions. In fact, there is nothing we can win from them without running huge risks and losing a great number of men.

In such an environment, which stripped them of mobility, the European cavalry and artillery were helpless. The *guerra volante*, the 'flying war' or *guerra brasileira* of the Brazilians won the day, because it was based on the ambush tactics so dear to the natives of the land.

While in warfare the frugal habits of the Brazilians were key factors in bringing them victory over the invaders, in peacetime they often worked against them, actually helping to shorten their life expectancy. In the north, in the Amazonian region, eating habits were modelled on Indian traditions, with their skilfulness in catching fresh fish, which, along with the turtle, was the staple diet. However, in the sugar-producing north-east the dominant classes depended largely on salted and preserved food from Europe. Beef, river and ocean fish made up the rest of the local diet, pigs and goats being shunned because they were harmful to the cane

fields. Mutton was thought to be poisonous and the object of a deep-seated aversion. Rice was scarcely farmed at all, and corn was felt to be suitable only for slaves and horses. Nevertheless, corn was widely eaten in the south-east, where it was used as a staple by all social classes, taking the place of manioc flour in the north and north-east of the colony. In the mining region and the São Paulo area, pork was the favourite meat; on expeditions into the 'sertão', it accompanied corn flour and beans in the form of bacon, these being the three main foods which gave sustenance to the raiders.

Bush-clearers and cowboys found shelter in lean-to huts, and when the weather was good they slept outside. The relationship they developed with their environment was similar to that of the native Brazilians. They could guide themselves by signs which were invisible to European eyes: the flight of birds, the tracks of animals, broken branches, bits of leaves. In the Amazonian region and in the São Paulo wilderness, they travelled in river craft which they had learned to build from the Indians.

In the sugar plantations of the north-east, the population lived in the great house and slave compound complex described by Gilberto Freyre in the book which took this ensemble for its name, 'Casa Grande e Senzala'. The great house or 'casa grande' was the home of the master's family; it was simply built, with a verandah from which one usually had a view of most of the property. The 'senzalas' were more like sheds, long buildings which often lacked any form of partitions, in which the plantation slaves were housed. The plantations of the southern part of the country, which became widespread towards the end of the eighteenth century, were somewhat different to the original north-eastern model. In Minas Gerais the standard great house had a space under the main floor which was often used to raise barnyard animals such as pigs. In the towns, the most common building was the standard Portuguese 'sobrado', a two-storey construction with a shop on the street level and the shop-keeper's home on the second. The coastal towns were modelled on a pattern which seems to have been common throughout the whole of the Portuguese Empire, and which still distinguishes the cities of Salvador da Bahia, in Bahia, and São Paulo de Luanda, in Angola: the 'upper city' on the hill, with the administrative buildings and the homes of the wealthy, and the 'lower city' on the port composed of the docks and streets lined with shops. Throughout the colony, the poor built their houses of unbaked bricks and mud-and-wattle; for lack of tiles, the roofs were often made of coconut leaves or 'sapé' grass. The Indian hammock was widely used throughout the entire colony, and, especially in the Brazilian north-east and the São Paulo region, came to replace the bed altogether. Other home furniture was similarly rudimentary; plates, silverware and glasses were rare.

During the three centuries of the colonial period, the people's religious practices became increasingly heterogeneous. The Jesuit missionaries concentrated their efforts on converting the rank-and-file to the gospel, and complained, in their letters to the Company, of the little faith and deplorable habits of the white colonists. From an institutional viewpoint, it is significant that the Council of Trent, with its insistence on the need for discipline, was signed much later than the First Constitutions of the Archbishop dealing with Bahia, at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The shadow of the dreaded visits of the Holy Office from Lisbon created panic among the inhabitants of the colony. Intimidated by the interrogators,

they often confessed to sins committed so long before as to be already half-forgotten.

These misdemeanours were essentially Portuguese in kind, consisting of beliefs, practices and superstitions in every way similar to those of the mother country, and in turn not unlike the religious experiences of the rest of European peoples. The populace were on intimate terms with God, Jesus Christ, the saints and the Virgin, which the Tribunal felt was not only blasphemous but in many cases heretical. Many of the declarations of the colony-dwellers revealed anthropomorphic tendencies and other popular beliefs. For example, God was a weary old man, and his son had phallic attributes similar to those of certain pagan deities: 'blessed be the penis of my Lord Jesus Christ which makes water upon me', a gypsy woman was heard to cry as she stepped over water puddles in the rain. She was chastened for it by the Inquisition.

During the colonial period Europe was convulsed by religious wars, as a result of which Brazil received both large numbers of Protestants fleeing persecution and religious 'wurgados', or turncoats, whose presence undoubtedly inspired many of the discussions which occurred during the Visits as to whether or not Moors and Turks went to Heaven. But the favourite prey of the Portuguese Inquisition in Brazil were the *new Christians*, the Jews who, once converted, were suspected of reverting to the Jewish faith. Many of them were wealthy men, and some ended their days at the stake in Lisbon's Ribeira and Terreiro do Páco.

However, as well as religious deviations of a typically European stamp, the influence of indigenous beliefs was also observed from very early on. In 1592 denunciations were heard of a complex practice which incorporated elements of Christianity and Indian beliefs, called the *Santidade* ('Holiness') of Jaguaripe, for the sugar plantation in which it was created. Many of its adepts were half-castes, bicultural individuals who came and went between the farms and the badlands. They were baptized, confirmed, God-fearing Christians to a man, and yet they thought nothing of scratching their bodies with badger's fangs, painting their skin with 'urucum' dye, and, now and then, eating human flesh in cannibalistic rituals.

As the colonization process took root, indigenous-origin rituals were increasingly relegated to the realm of witchcraft, and accusations of witchcraft were made against magical curing practices, many of which still exist today among the peoples of the Brazilian jungle.

African magical practices did not become widely noticed until the end of the sixteenth century, when the slave-trade became more intensive and systematic. These involved water-divining, pots, jars and other objects linked to the survival and daily life of the slaves, as well as techniques for the casting and wanding off of spells. A large part of these practices was performed individually, but some were organized in ecstatic rites attended by various participants. The best known was the *candomblé*, a syncretic form of Afro-Brazilian religion which goes back at least as far as the seventeenth century, becoming widespread in the eighteenth century. Probably of Bantu origin, it was a remote predecessor of the present-day *candomblé*. Like other syncretic practices, it was persecuted by the religious and lay authorities, although it was often tolerated, if not outrightly supported, by the ruling class, who preferred to allow the blacks to gather for their drum-beating *baques* than see them involved in escape plots or connivance with the runaways in the *quilombos*.

Midway between formal and informal religious practice were the *brotherhoods*, an extremely important feature of

colonial life. These were associations of the guild type, endowed with statutes which were usually modelled on similar groups in Portugal, and which brought together social groups characterized by their wealth or ethnic origin. Thus there were brotherhoods of *good race* – a term applied to the members of the dominant classes – such as the Santíssimo Sacramento or the Ordem Terceira de São Francisco, and brotherhoods of mulattos and negroes, such as Santa Ifigênia or Nossa Senhora do Rosario. Belonging to a brotherhood meant that one was assured of a proper burial, commemorative masses and the honours of a dignified accompaniment by the *brothers*. In Minas Gerais, these associations were of capital importance, given that they built most of the region's major baroque and tococo churches. They also organized the most sumptuous celebrations of the day, such as the festa held in Vila Rica in 1733, which went down in history as the *Triunfo Eucarístico*.

Two seventeenth century authors deserve mention for the fact that they were outspokenly aware of the problems of the Brazilian colony: Gregório de Matos Guerra (1623–96) and Antonio Vieira (1608–97).

Gregório de Matos was a well-educated man, schooled in the humanistic mould and a graduate of the University of Coimbra. He did not settle in Salvador, the city in which he became famous, until he was 50 years of age. An author of both burlesque and religious poems, he was a virulent critic of the customs of his day, and some contemporary scholars tend to see him as being, under his mantle of mockery and sarcasm, deeply nostalgic for the aristocratic European social system. Nevertheless, he described in his poems the intrigues, the readiness to denounce enemies to the colonial authorities, the superficial romances, the prostitution and the turbulent life of seventeenth century Salvador, and he had a keen eye for popular practices as well. He never troubled to print his works, which circulated on hand-scrawled sheets and were recited aloud in the street. They obviously underwent many changes in the process, but had the virtue of providing a cultural outlet for a largely illiterate population, since they could easily be enjoyed by poor men and slaves.

The oral factor was also important in the dissemination of Vieira's best works. These were his sermons, dealing with the major issues of colonial life, such as the expulsion of the Dutch, the evangelization of the negroes and the freedom of the Indians. Vieira was torn between two worlds, being painfully aware of the ambiguities and contradictions of the Portuguese Empire. He was a pugnacious Jesuit schooled in a world of erudition; nevertheless, he made original use of the popular lore of his day, weaving it into the sophisticated convolutions of the obligatory baroque rhetoric to make his messages more familiar and convincing to his flock. He also evoked the Portuguese belief in the messianic return of the slain King Sebastian, when he spoke of the hard times on which the Kingdom had fallen, and he counselled, for its glory to be restored, greater tolerance for the 'new Christians'. To console the slaves for the captivity which they suffered here on Earth, and at the same time to justify their condition, he evoked the inversion principle so dear to popular culture.

In Gregório de Matos and Antonio Vieira, therefore, the main theme is not the natural splendour of the tropics nor the qualities of the warm climate, but *colonial life*, with all its contradictions and the sacrifices it required.

The growing ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of the Portuguese-Brazilians acquired a political dimension with the riots and rebellions which, by mid-seventeenth century, began to alter the normal course of relations with Portugal; struggles

arose between various factions anxious to further their particular interests. In the beginning, there was no conscious pro-Brazilian sentiment nor any intention to separate from Portugal; rather, these disturbances were symptoms that the colonists felt themselves to be different from the inhabitants of Portugal due to the natural characteristics of their environment, for which reason they demanded correspondingly different administrative treatment.

In 1684, the inhabitants of Maranhão mutinied, to defend the interests of the local dominating classes. On the one hand, there was a clash with the Jesuits, who opposed the enslavement of the Indians; on the other, dissatisfaction with the recently-created 'Companhia do Comércio' which had failed to fulfil its promise to supply a given number of black slaves for plantation work each year.

Three decades after the so-called Beckman Revolt, there was more trouble, this time in Pernambuco, between two sectors of the local oligarchy. On one side were the landowners who resided in Olinda, the capital city and bishopric, and on the other were the merchants of neighbouring Recife, who desired to see their town raised to the status of city and capital. The townspeople of Olinda openly challenged the Metropolitan Government, deposed the Governor, and even considered separating from Portugal in order to create a new state.

There were also revolts in Minas Gerais, and here, too, clashes between factions were mixed with opposition to Portuguese rule. Between 1707 and 1709, the first colonists of the gold-producing area, who were mainly from the region of São Paulo, the 'Paulistas', clashed with the *caboabas* or foreign intruders, many of whom were from Portugal and for the most part involved in the supplies trade. Both sides showed defiance for the established authority; one of the *caboaba* leaders, Mameel Nunes Vianna, even proclaimed himself Governor of the region. The Paulistas, for their part, not only rejected the royal envoy's pleas for moderation, but even tried to kill him. Finally Portuguese authority was brought to bear, although without executing the guilty parties – as occurred in the same region ten years later, in 1720, when local potentates, intending to seize control of the recently-installed administrative apparatus of Minas Gerais, rebelled against the Governor's decision to raise the gold tax. One of the participants in the uprising, Filipe dos Santos, was executed without any form of trial, leaving a grim image of Portuguese justice in local memories.

But other types of revolts occurred which were the cause of even greater concern to the Crown. The runaway slaves had settled in the *quilombos*, many of which had become real cities, with their own form of organization which disregarded colonial law. The most famous was the Quilombo de Palmares, in the Serra da Barriga mountains, near Alagoas. It flourished for the better part of the seventeenth century, and grew as large as 27,000 km with nearly 50,000 inhabitants, among whom there were also whites and Indians. Although the inhabitants did not abolish slavery – such being the contradictions of the slavery system – they farmed their own fruit and vegetables, marketing the surplus. In the imaginations of the slaves of north-eastern Brazil, Palmares acquired legendary and heroic proportions, and its very invocation had the effect of a call to rebellion and flight. Reason enough for the colonial authorities finally to destroy it in 1695. The fear of slave insurrection cast its shadow over Brazilian administrators during the entire colonial period, and by the eighteenth century it had become a virtual obsession.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: IN SEARCH OF NEW PATHS

By the eighteenth century the Portuguese-Brazilians had begun to develop the idea that, in spite of the profound ethnic and cultural differences which separated them, they nevertheless made up a whole with an identity of its own, which set them apart from the inhabitants of the mother country. The tough policy of the period, under the guidance of the Marquis de Pombal, attempted to bring the colonial economy under the direct control of the Kingdom, in order to eliminate the increasingly present English riddlement. Politically and culturally, it aspired to impose some kind of unity on a highly complex population which was the result of the interbreeding between whites, Indians and blacks, and given to strange practices of every imaginable kind. In spite of the fact that by the end of the century the colony had become economically diversified and relatively prosperous, Queen Maria I maintained the government's administrative rigidity, forbidding, for example, the manufacture of textiles, and insisting on the need to increase the production of gold being mined in central Brazil.

Ever larger numbers of Brazilians went abroad to study at European universities, and the ideas of the Enlightenment won adepts in the main cities of the colony. Guided by European literary standards, poets and writers began to express the frustration and absurdity of colonial existence, either invoking an idealized Brazilian physical environment – in a process which Antonio Candido de Mello e Souza termed *transfiguration* – or taking a didactic tack with a message of social criticism. It was no accident that men like Cláudio Manuel da Costa, author of the 'transfiguring' poem 'Vila Rica', one of the loveliest pieces of verse in the Portuguese language, Tomás Antonio Gonzaga, with his masterful satire *The Chilean Letters*, and Silva Alvarenga, humorous poet and critic of the Portuguese education system, should have all taken part in dissident movements opposed to the regime, both in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. During this period a reading public emerged, albeit tiny in scale, for the cultural works which were produced in the colony, and a working system was devised for their distribution throughout the country. The fact that bookshops in the interior of Brazil imported foreign works speaks for the interest of literate Brazilians in the writing published in Europe. In Minas Gerais, where the crisis of the colonial system was kindled, there were countless libraries, belonging both to the Church and to laymen. Among the most widely read authors were Montesquieu, Raynal and Voltaire.

It was in Minas Gerais, too, that music and the visual arts most vividly demonstrated the creative abilities of the Portuguese-Brazilians. Religions and popular festivals required the presence of musicians, who were almost always mulattos, and usually members of the brotherhoods. Expeditions into the 'sertão' were accompanied by slave musicians, who played pieces at sunrise and at each rest stop along the way. Composers such as Lobo de Mesquita, Gomes da Rocha and Coelho Neto have left us a legacy of compositions which testify to the high quality of the music they composed. The visual arts were most originally represented in architecture and sculpture, the greatest master of both these disciplines being an authentic genius, Aleijadinho – 'The Little Cripple', as he was known for his club feet. His version of the Portuguese baroque style was airy and light, bordering on rococo. He decorated the façades of his churches with porticos and medallions, delicately carved

in a local soapstone which was extremely easy to work; Aleijadinho's finest sculptural achievement is the group of prophets which stand before the church of Congonhas do Campo (see Plate 152). It is currently believed that at the end of the eighteenth century and under his influence there existed a real school of Minas Gerais artists who, inspired by the European masters, came to discover their own, authentic expression.

As the colonists grew intellectually more independent and resentful of the weight of Portuguese policy – which, in the case of Minas Gerais, made itself most bitterly felt with the ruthless taxation of gold production – they felt increasingly more inclined to take control of the colony and decide their own fate. The prevailing international mood was revolutionary, with examples coming from both sides of the Atlantic: from North America, from France and from Saint Domingue. Around 1788, perhaps even earlier, intellectuals and men linked to the 'capitania' of Minas Gerais began to gather to discuss politics, contemplating the possibility of separation from Portugal and the proclamation of a republic. According to the subsequent denunciations, Tomás Antonio Gonzaga went so far as to write the laws of the new State, inspired by the North American model – as, for that matter, was a large part of the movement's ideology. There were plans to found a university in Vila Rica and to abolish the restrictions which hindered the mining of diamonds (at the time a royal monopoly) and the manufacturing industry. A gunpowder factory was to be built, a Mint created and the mining and processing of iron ore encouraged. There was disagreement as to the emancipation of slaves, since several of the main members of the movement, notably José Alves Maciel, were landowners and possessed large numbers of slaves themselves. A provisional, compromise solution seems to have been made, under which only the slaves born in Brazil would be freed.

The uprising was initially concentrated in Minas Gerais, and then spread through the rest of Brazil. Some of the members of the movement, led by Joaquim Silvério dos Reis, denounced the others, and the culprits were arrested, judged and condemned to exile in Africa. One of them, the poorest of the lot, was hanged and quartered in public, with the parts of his body displayed along the road between Rio de Janeiro, the capital of the Viceroyalty, and Minas Gerais. This man was Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, the part-time dentist popularly known as 'Tiradentes' or Toothpuller. With the advent of the Republic, in 1889, he was elevated to the status of the greatest hero of the new Brazilian nation.

Kenneth Maxwell, currently the leading scholar of the uprising known as the 'Inconfidência Mineira', saw it as an attempt at rebellion which was limited to the dominant groups, the result of the local oligarchy's desire to confirm their roots. However, this position takes no account of the long process of sporadic uprisings going back to the first decade of the century, the effects of which were constantly felt on various fronts: protests of the local authorities against the tax-collector, uprisings of potentates in the distant 'sertão', rumours of slave rebellions, the creation of 'quilombos', subversive ideas conveyed in priestly sermons. Furthermore, Maxwell overlooks the gist of official correspondence which, beginning mid-century, insists over and over again on the imminence of slave uprisings and on the dangerously high number of poor and unoccupied men. In this light the uprising appears to have been the exacerbation of an extremely complicated set of conditions, rather than simply the adventure of a handful of upper-class intellectuals.

Meetings were held in Rio de Janeiro, between the years 1786 and 1794, of a group called the *Sociedade Literária*, the 'Literary Society', which in a fashion was the heir of the already-discussed Academies. But times had changed, and the meetings of the Society gravitated rapidly toward criticism of the monarchy, defence of republicanism, and opposition to Portuguese policy and church-imposed censorship. There were denunciations, as in the Minas Gerais case, as a result of which the Viceroy, the Conde de Resende, ordered that the culprits be brought to trial. There were only ten defendants, the most notable of whom was the poet and teacher of rhetoric Silva Alvarenga. While it was initially feared that these men were 'ill-intentioned men who were attempting, or at least appeared to be attempting, to sow and propagate among these peoples the same principles which transformed the French monarchy', it was finally accepted that there was no proof of conspiracy against any of the defendants and that their crimes were limited to the realm of words, to 'conversations, whether public or private'. Unlike the Minas Gerais trial, there was no mention during the proceedings of a political plan which might run counter to the interests of the colonial system.

Salvador da Bahia was the capital of Brazil until 1763, when it was replaced by Rio de Janeiro, due to the increasing economic importance of the central-southern part of the country. Rio's hinterland was a long-standing sugar-producing area, and the city, which had existed since the colony's beginnings, was home to peoples of many different species. Most prominent was the enormous contingent of slaves, freemen, mulattos and half-castes. At the end of the eighteenth century, the ideas of the French Revolution spread through the city, in the form of pamphlets and books which, dodging the censor, entered the harbour aboard foreign ships.

There is evidence that, from 1792 on, revolutionary principles were the subject of enthusiastic discussions in the city of Salvador. In 1797 a Masonic Lodge was founded under the name of *Knights of the Light*, formed by prominent members of Bahian high society. Private homes also played host to gatherings of educated men, who debated the ideas of the Enlightenment and other matters which aroused the suspicion of the Portuguese Crown. But it was the posters and tracts pasted on the walls of the city which, in 1797, made it clear to the authorities that something serious was afoot: they contained talk of republicanism, freedom, equality, free-trade, punishment of retrograde churchmen and better

salaries for military men, and they upheld France as the model to be followed. Revelation was made of what was considered to be a highly dangerous movement, which transpired to be a group of young conspirators. They were of modest social extraction – tailors, masons, carpenters, soldiers, embroiderers – and some of them were slaves. They were attempting to establish a republic, which was to be proclaimed in Bahia and then spread to the rest of Brazil. Six of the group's members were considered to be the main culprits, and four of them were condemned to death on the gallows: João de Deus, Lucas Dantas, Manuel Faustino and Luís Gonzaga.

The Bahia conspiracy marked the end of a cycle. It confirmed the ideological radicalization of the Portuguese-Brazilians and the widespread influence of libertarian ideas throughout the society. The colonists had evolved from the liberal principles of the American Revolution to the more virulent ideas of the French Revolution which followed in its wake. These ideas spread downward from the wealthy, literate classes to the bottom of the social scale. On every class level, colonial society was eager and hungry for change; and it is especially strange that, in a largely illiterate society such as Brazil, all these phenomena should, to one degree or another, have been marked so strongly by the influence of books and ideas. Old Europe was still able to miseminate the minds of the young colonies, even if this was to result in the colonies turning against Europe.

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THE CARIBBEAN

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THE SPANISH CARIBBEAN

Europeans, spearheaded by Columbus's discovery of the Americas, entered the Americas as a numerical minority. The Spaniards came first, because they were, under Queen Isabella of Castille, the only European state to respond sympathetically to Christopher Columbus's argument that in a spherical world, the spices, the gold and the wonders of the East could be reached by sailing west. Columbus was armed with the relatively new mariner's compass, the astrolabe and quadrant, and equipped with knowledge of the tides; acquainted also with the developments in cartography and navigational experience, the Genoese mariner cast anchor in the Bahamas in October 1492, after a cross-Atlantic passage of sixty-seven days.

This European minority, apart from the tremendous skills they had developed to ply the Ocean Sea, also brought with them a military capability that included cavalry and gunpowder. Taino civilization collapsed before an unheard of military technology. The Tainos had tools which belonged, properly speaking to the neolithic age. Stone axes, knives, lances, bows and arrows were no match for Spanish gunpowder, artillery and cavalry. Even the war-like Aztecs, predominant in Mexico, could not in their religious conception of war successfully confront Cortes's concept of total war.

The Tainos of the Caribbean islands were unable to survive new diseases introduced from Europe. The disease environment was to be 'enriched' by smallpox, diphtheria, typhus and influenza. Smallpox, appearing in the Caribbean between 1518 and 1519, took the lives of one-third of the Taino population of Hispaniola, created destruction in Cuba, and decimated the population of Puerto Rico (see Plate 137). The Spanish Conquest was apocalyptic. Disease accompanied famine and suicide and war.

In Hispaniola, Enriquillo waged war against the Spaniards between 1529 and 1533. In Cuba, between the 1520s and 1550, Indian rebels killed Spaniards, 'peaceful blacks' and Indians, set fire to townships and to 'bohios' and slaughtered cattle.

But like all other Europeans entering the Americas, the Spaniards introduced new value systems, beliefs, habits and customs – in short their culture which was implanted in the Americas along with new technologies.

The Spain left behind by the conquistadors who sailed with Columbus, or who challenged the new American environment, had just completed seven centuries of warfare against Islam which had occupied the country since AD 711. When Islam was finally defeated at Granada in 1492 it left behind imprints on the Spanish language, Spanish architecture

and farming techniques. But it was also a Spain grown militant in its Catholicism through seven centuries of war against the 'infidel' Moors.

Many Spaniards were herdsmen and ranchers. Among those who went to the Americas were carpenters and blacksmiths, masons and bricklayers, tilers, shipwrights, tanners and shoe-makers, technologies that would be essentially new in the Caribbean. Others came from the barren soils of Extremadura where the hardship of life provoked the desire for personal improvement through migration. There were yet others who belonged to the class of *hidalgos* but without the wealth that went with that status. Bankrupt *hidalgos* and commoners who wished to be *hidalgos* boarded ship for the Caribbean, where, it was hoped, a large Indian population would provide the basis for a servile entourage worthy of the most lofty nobleman.

Among migrants are always those who wish to better their lives; and the reports of Columbus, who returned to Europe in 1493, suggested that gold would or could provide a quick road to personal wealth. Bernal Diaz del Castillo, therefore, summarized very well the two complementary poles of Spanish ambition, one material and the other spiritual, when he said: 'I came to serve God and to get rich.'

The demand for gold, later exaggerated in the myth of *El Dorado*, had increased because by the latter half of the fifteenth century the 'value of gold was increasing relative to that of commodities.' The Tainos had worked gold into ceremonial masks for their chiefs and priests and for decorated belts and nose ornaments. The Spanish *vecinos* resorted to searching for gold in the rivers and streams of the islands. In producing river or alluvial gold the sand is washed and then 'riddled in washing pans known as *bateas*.' (Vilar, 1976, p. 66) It was the hapless Taino people, often women, who did the work of panning gold from dawn to dusk, in the way of forced labour, which, being essentially free, reduced the costs of production.

Meanwhile, Taino technology (along with labour) helped to sustain the Spaniards. In the Caribbean tobacco, beans, maize, capsicum, cassava, sweet potatoes, pineapples, guavas, roots and berries and fruits sustained the parasitic new master class. The Tainos had long domesticated these crops, and the cassava staple had been used in a primitive agro-processing procedure to produce bread, which was to become critically important in feeding Spanish expeditions to the mainland from their Caribbean bases. Even as iron tools from Europe superseded the stone tools of the Tainos, the Europeans were to adopt for their use the Taino hammock, the Taino canoe, and to some extent the Taino *bohio* or hut made of thatch and designed to cope with frequent hurricane-force winds from the Caribbean Sea. The Caribbean was, for Spaniards,

at least, a frontier, and Taino technology was vital to ensure the consolidation of Spanish settlement (see Plate 153).

The historian Tessa Cubitt (1995, p.83) has noted that 'at the heart of [Hispanic values] have been the institutions of church and family and a code of behaviour based on personal honour.' The Roman Catholic Church was quickly introduced into the Caribbean, and the Cathedral of Santo Domingo was early constructed with a 'sturdy Gothic structure with Italian Renaissance ornamentation.' While the Cathedral had the spiritual welfare of Spanish settlers mostly in mind, the Roman Catholic Church performed two other functions that were essential to the implantation of Spanish civilization on American/Caribbean soil. The first was to bring the Tainos under the spiritual sway of the Catholic Church, and with that in mind tens of thousands of Tainos were perfunctorily baptized, and taught the basis of Catholic Christianity, the Pater Noster, Ave Maria and Apostle's creed. The second was to protect the Tainos from abuse by the *encomenderos* who had been rewarded with Indian labour – from forty to two hundred Indians depending upon the capital invested and the military risk undertaken by the conquistador. The conquistador, converting himself into an *encomendero*, had the obligation to teach Indians Christianity and to have them baptized within eight days of birth. In exchange, the Indians were to provide nine months of labour. The fact that such provisions, in the Laws of Burgos of 1512, were often ignored, was a source of challenge to churchmen such as the Dominican Friar, Bartolomé de las Casas, who provided scholastic and humanitarian arguments for the protection of the Indians. Las Casas, convinced that the Tainos were people of intelligence who would be 'perfect' if only they worshipped the 'true God' was challenged by Ginés de Sepúlveda who interpreting the writings of travellers to the Indies such as Oviedo, insisted that they were lesser beings, designed on the basis of Aristotelian theory to serve their 'superiors'.

Ethnic questions, central to the definition of the Caribbean and its history, were first raised in the Spanish Caribbean as white Europeans confronted coloured peoples and modified their ideas and philosophical traditions to explain the differences between civilizations that were vastly different in concept. Technological and scientific supremacy of whites over coloureds rapidly became transformed into an ethnic consciousness that defined people's capabilities according to their racial construct.

But the church also brought important social services, the first hospital for the care of the poor was built in 1503, and in Santo Domingo, out of a school in the Dominican Convent, was erected the first University in the Americas in October 1538.

The conquest complete, and the early enthusiasm for conversion declining, proselytization became less assertive. The urge to Christianize blacks had never been as driving a force as that to win Indian souls. The absence of educational institutions, limited religious instruction, and priestly indifference, made possible the continuity of African religious culture, introduced with the arrival of black slaves in the Caribbean in the beginning of the sixteenth century (see Chapter 6.2), which combined with Christianity to produce syncretistic religious expression. African deities became associated with Catholic saints. In this context was to emerge Afro-Christian cults of *santería* in Cuba, *vodún* in Santo Domingo and Haiti, and *Shango* in Trinidad.

Spain introduced an urban civilization. In fact, Conquistadors were expected, as part of their contracts, to found towns and

municipalities. With the growth of mining communities came even more townships.

The discovery of the mainland reversed the situation of the Caribbean as the prime centre for the transfer of Spanish institutions in the Americas. The Spanish population of Hispaniola which had peaked at 40,000 Spaniards, reflecting that island's early importance as administrative capital of the Spanish Empire, had declined to 4,000 by 1528. In Puerto Rico, a 1530 census reported a population of 3,000, half of whom were African slaves, nearly one-third Indian. Population growth in the Spanish Caribbean was to be slow, amounting in Puerto Rico's case to a mere 1.3 per cent per annum for the ensuing 200 years.

The attraction of the larger and more mineral rich mainland did not lead to a complete depopulation of the Caribbean. By the mid-sixteenth century African labour had largely replaced Indian labour in the Caribbean. In reality, the Iberian peninsula had long practised African slavery, so that the use of black servile labour marked yet another continuity in Iberian and American civilization. African labour, though enslaved, had the advantage of African experience in farming. Furthermore, Spanish settlers who had introduced the sugar-cane from the Canaries recognized that in Havana, Matanzas and Pinar del Rio, the sticky, heavy red lands which are easily drained were excellent for sugar, which could be cultivated in that deep soil for year after year. Black soils in Havana and Matanzas were equally good, as were the alluvial plains of Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. Cane demands a good water supply and the tropical type weather conditions of the Caribbean, including an extended dry season, were adequate for cultivation. Growing cane continuously in the same area, or non-stop ratooning (that is allowing cane to grow again from the old roots rather than planting new cane) has the disadvantage of encouraging root and toot-stock diseases, 'as in this case the cane fungus has a continuous habitat' (Deerr, 1911, p. 123).

However, some settlers on Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico and Jamaica moved into sugar production either by investing profits from gold, or by taking advantage of loans and incentives offered by the Spanish Crown. By 1568 there were some 20,000 African slaves on Hispaniola alone, producing sugar which peaked at 713,000 kg in 1570. In 1582, Puerto Rico produced 15,000 arrobas (1 arroba = 11.5 kg), in eleven sugar mills, while Cuba in the last decade of the sixteenth century reached an average of 20,000 arrobas per year, rising to 89,000 arrobas in 1670.

Sugar-cane had been produced in ancient India, Iran and Egypt and was introduced into Spain itself by the Moors. In the new age of expansion initiated by the European settlement of the Americas, it became far easier and more common for technologies to move from one area to another, and from Spain sugar technology moved to the Spanish Canary Islands and from there to Hispaniola and the rest of the Caribbean. It is probable that the first mills used were modeled on tenth century Egyptian edge-roller mill designs, originally intended for use as olive presses. Such devices were inefficient and wasteful of both labour and juice (Mintz, 1985, p. 33). However, in 1515 Canary Island technicians imported a mill with two vertical rollers, usable with either animal or water power (Mintz, 1985, p. 34). By the 1530s Hispaniola had approximately thirty-four mills. In Cuba oxen were widely used, Cuba not having been blessed with powerful rivers. Commonly, the energizing devices for mills rested on water, animal and wind traction, to crush, and boil sugar-cane, separating the crystals from the juice, to make rum and

molasses. Sugar could be either clayed or muscovado. The science of sugar production changed very little from the conquest to the end of the eighteenth century, according to Frank Blackburn.

By the end of the sixteenth century, Spain's pioneering work in commercial sugar production had virtually come to an end. That decline was partly a result of the fall in the size of the African labour force – through smallpox epidemics and revolts – partly because Spain restricted its own market for colonial sugar in the interest of protecting Andalusian sugar producers, and because of competition from other products that enjoyed more viable markets and required less capital.

One such crop was tobacco, indigenous to the Americas, and widely used by the Tainos in their religious rituals. Adopted by Europeans for snuff and as an instrument of leisure, tobacco usage – smoking and snuff – was entrenched among Europeans by the seventeenth century. Unlike sugar which is extensively cultivated, tobacco is intensively cultivated, with maximum attention paid to the good quality of each leaf. It is profitably cultivated on small lots or farms, without the heavy capital investment required by sugar. Tobacco can be chewed or smoked. It enjoyed a local market and was cultivated near to the *bohíos* of the Tainos and the *conucos* of blacks. It was the small Spanish farmer (the *reguero*), however, who spread the cultivation of tobacco over the plains of Cuba, and its commercial success even served to restrain the advance of the cattle industry, in competition for the same lands on the broad *regas*. Cuban tobacco had a prized place on international markets.

This indigenous plant was a source of fascination for Europeans. In 1648 a renowned doctor and teacher at the University of Pavia, Johann Chrysostom Magnen, argued that tobacco has an inherent magic that made it possible for Indians to prophesy. Moreover, tobacco could be used in the arts of divination, with its esoteric, soporific and intoxicating virtues (F. Ortiz, 1940, p. 241). The plant was even considered to have medicinal qualities. On the other hand James I of England issued a tract that condemned tobacco, while Philip II of Spain imposed legal restrictions on the planting and sale of the crop, and in 1606 prohibited the cultivation of tobacco in Cuba and the Americas. The Spanish king's objection does not appear to have been a moral one, but arose out of the reality of the demand for tobacco by illicit English, French and Dutch traders who violated the Spanish commercial monopoly with the empire, a monopoly closely guarded by the *Casa de Contratación* in Seville. This reality is borne out by the fact that in 1614 he lifted the 1606 prohibition against planting, but ordered that the harvests should be sent to Seville, on pain of death (F. Ortiz, 1983, p. 57). Indian priests of the Americas had used tobacco ritually, Catholic priests adopted it without ritual and for sensual pleasure, their finger nails often blackened by the exercise. The jeer of the newspaper *El Diario Cejuelo* was not unjustified: the gods of the Indians had mimicked in the Catholic priests. In France tobacco became known as the *herbe du Grand Prieur* (F. Ortiz, 1940). But the evil weed by 1599 earned in England over \$120 per pound. In 1717, 1721 and again 1723 there were armed rebellions in Cuba led by disgruntled tobacco farmers (*regueros*) and priests who resented the Spanish monopoly over tobacco (F. Ortiz, 1983, p. 57).

The production of tobacco obviously was based on Indian modes of production and, in fact, British historian, Hugh Thomas suggests that many of the *regueros* who have

traditionally been regarded as white Spanish were probably *mestizos* or pure Indians. The introduction of the plough probably made the planting of tobacco more efficient. It was grown from seeds, placed in furrows and covered with cloth to prevent excessive light and heat getting to it. The seedlings were transplanted after about thirty-five days. 'Bunches of leaves are tied together in a bundle (*gavilla*) and left to ferment. The bunches go off to Havana tied in bales' (Thomas, 1971, p. 25).

The Spaniards had been herdsmen in the Iberian peninsula, and transferred these skills to Cuba. There was a greater emphasis on cattle than on sheep in the Caribbean. Again European demand for leather and hides encouraged the cattle-business in the Caribbean. Cattle-hunters also had a market among European smugglers. In Cuba, live-stock producers held their own because of the demand for beef from the garrison of Havana, as well as from the annual *fleets*, and from contraband. High prices for tobacco tended to discourage the further expansion of the cattle industry. Eastern Santo Domingo, however – the *Seibo* – became a major region for cattle. The advantage of a cattle industry is that in a context of labour-shortage the land itself can be worked upon rather than worked in the sense of tilling which requires a greater input of labour. With the depopulation of the Spanish Caribbean land was abundant relative to population.

In Puerto Rico and Hispaniola, the care of cattle and the preparation of meat, hides and tallow for export was entrusted to African slave cowboys either working side by side with their owners, or as peons on the larger enterprises. By 1620 Puerto Rico raised an estimated 100,000 head of cattle. In Hispaniola, the *hateros*, or cattlemen who had successfully taken advantage of generous land grants by the crown, became an identifiable élite. The expansion in the number and size of *hateros* in Hispaniola was boosted by the cattle trade to the western side of the island, conceded to the French in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick. That trade was in turn a result of demand generated by the plantation economy of St Domingue – for so the French called their one-third of Hispaniola.

Europeans had developed an interest in spices, and this interest had been one of the roots of the quest for a passage by sea to the spice-producing lands of the east. Ginger is a product of the Asian tropics. Its dried root is used in medicine as an aromatic stimulant and the green root is a popular condiment. Caribbean conditions were well-suited to this rhizome, and the favourable prices in Europe from the end of the sixteenth century encouraged its production in Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. In Hispaniola, the declining slave labour-force was shifted from sugar to ginger. According to the Puerto Rican historian Altamiracía Ortiz, ginger was a crucial export for Puerto Rico during the first half of the seventeenth century, until Dominican and Brazilian production drove it out of the market.

There was another spice that was indigenous to the Caribbean. Pimento is closely associated with Jamaica, and grows wild in the limestone areas of the island. It can also be found, however, in Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, Cuba and Puerto Rico (Purseglove et al., 1981, p. 286). During the harvest pimento branches are torn from the trees and the berries picked. The trees rebuild themselves well in time for the next harvest. It was once thought that the pimento could be disseminated only by birds, but it has since been found that 'when seeds were planted almost immediately after extraction from fresh, ripe fruits, some seeds germinated in nine or ten days' (ibid., p. 287). Exports of Jamaican pimento

took place as early as 1601, and by 1735, it has been reported, some 438,000 lbs valued at £21,925 were exported to Europe. The presence of pimento in Jamaica had attracted the interest of the Spanish Crown, which became even more reluctant to allow the Columbus family free rein in Jamaica which had been conceded to that family as a *marquisate*.

Of the Spanish Caribbean islands Cuba was the only one to develop a shipbuilding industry. The historian Almagracia Ortiz has observed that 'In the shipyards were built about seventy-five percent of the vessels licensed to participate in the American trade, as well as small merchant ships that brought Cuba's trade to Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Campeche' (A. Ortiz, 1940, p. 52). Even with the decline of the shipbuilding industry – partly because of a shortage of lumber, and the scarcity of materials usually imported from Spain – Cuba's shipyards remained important as repair centres.

The city of Havana enjoyed the most prosperity in the Spanish Caribbean (see Plate 154). From the sixteenth century, it had served as a stopover base for the early *conquistadores* en route to new lands on the American continent. Havana had even replaced Santo Domingo as a port of call for the Spanish galleons. The merchants of Havana profited from a large import trade, linked to Veracruz and Cartagena. Neither San Juan nor Santo Domingo profited from inter-Caribbean trade in the way that Havana did.

Mention has been made of Taino crops that influenced Europe, and of new technologies introduced by Europe, including sugar mills. To these should be added the iron tools of the Europeans, including the machete and hoe which would certainly most quickly have replaced the gardening tools of the Tainos. The circular, straw roofed *bohío* of the Taino became the standard housing of Spanish Caribbean peasants, and the Indian hammock became the bed of the European. Even more spectacular, perhaps, was the Taino canoe, which was quickly adopted by Europeans. And perhaps no group took to the canoe more readily than the buccaneers and pirates. Peter Gethard (1990, p. 148) reports how in 1680 a party of buccaneers in 'sixty-eight canoes and with fifty Indians, went up the river to the *real de minas* of Santa María'. For North America D. H. Stapleton reports that for decades canoes were a fundamental form of settler transport (Stapleton, 1987, p. 4).

Essentially, by the middle of the sixteenth century Spanish hegemony over the Caribbean was complete as far as the Tainos were concerned. The challenge to Spain was to come from other European nations.

THE COMING OF OTHER EUROPEANS

Spain claimed a 'monopoly' of the Americas on the basis of conquest and a 'papal donation' that had divided the 'world' between Spain and Portugal at the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Spain's European competitors, refusing to accept the Papal Donation in principle or in practice, from the early sixteenth century began to raid, or trade illicitly with, the Spanish Empire. Raiding took place especially where Spanish control seemed weakest – the North American mainland, the Guianas and the Caribbean islands.

The challenge to Spain in the Americas emerged partly also because of the desire to challenge Spanish power in Europe – given Spain's dynastic links with the Habsburg Empire and after 1580 the unification of the crowns of Spain and Portugal under Philip II. The more rapid economic


growth of The Netherlands, England and France facilitated penetration. European challenges to Spain and particularly those from the Dutch and English also represented a challenge to the domination of Roman Catholicism. For with the Protestant Reformation, dating from 1517, and the spread of Protestantism in The Netherlands and England, the struggle for domination in the Caribbean was partly expressed in terms of struggles between 'heretics' (the Protestants) and 'believers' (the Spaniards). The rapid growth of capitalism in Amsterdam, and the ownership of one of the finest armies and merchant marines in Europe made the Protestant Dutch a formidable enemy.

The Netherlands had been provinces of Spain, and the national struggle against Spain was intensified by the Protestant/Catholic rivalry. A truce (1609–21) between Spain and her rebellious Protestant Dutch subjects postponed for twelve years the inevitable confrontation, in which a European conflict was transported to Caribbean waters on the basis of the 'principle' of no peace beyond the line. Reacting to the linkage between the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns the Dutch established themselves in Pernambuco (north-east Brazil) in 1630, where they acquired or set up profitable sugar plantations, dependent on African slave-labour. Though they lost Pernambuco in 1654 the Dutch acquired the tiny islands of Saba, St Martin and Curaçao as well as the mainland colonies of Essequibo and Berbice in 1624. The intention was to promote commerce with the Spanish American Empire more aggressively, to encourage private acts of aggression against Spain in the Caribbean and to provide bases from which to defend themselves against Spanish counter-attacks. Curaçao, conquered in 1634, also provided a base for the salt trade, given that Spain had limited Dutch access to the salt-pans of Europe.

Spanish maritime power in the Caribbean was insufficiently undermined by the Dutch to facilitate the occupation of the Windward and Leeward islands by the English and French.

The French co-operated with the English in the settlement of St Kitts (St Christopher), occupied Martinique in 1635 and later took Guadeloupe. The English, basing their strategy, at first, on establishing self-sufficient farming colonies which would have the capacity to defend themselves against Spanish counter-attack, settled Barbados in 1627. In 1635, the English, inspired by Oliver Cromwell's Western Design, seized the weakly defended Jamaica from Spain, who conceded the island formally to England by the Treaty of Madrid in 1670. By the end of the seventeenth century Spain's rivals were entrenched in the Windward and Leeward Islands and in Jamaica. As rivalry increased between the French and English for domination of the Caribbean, islands such as St Lucia and Dominica changed hands at the treaty tables.

The Spanish territorial monopoly and the exclusive Catholic Christian universe were thus broken as Dutch and English Protestants consolidated their new lands in the Caribbean. The French, English and Dutch entrenched their economic power by the planting of colonies focused on slave-produced sugar, by the monopoly of the commerce of their colonies and by neutralizing or eliminating Carib Indians who put up some resistance to European domination in the south and south-east Caribbean. Faced with hurricanes, tropical diseases, uncertainty, at first, of markets for tobacco (1627–31), indigo (1640–5) and cotton (the 1630s), and the uncertainty of adequate labour supplies from Europe, the non-Spanish European colonies not only survived, but became major generators of wealth for their metropolises. French and English visibility in the Caribbean were



Map 31 The West Indies in 1732 (courtesy of the British Library: H. Molls, 1732).

maintained by the use of the ruthless buccaneer corps, armed pirates contracted by the British and French governments to hold at bay the Dutch free-traders and to pin Spain on the defensive in the Caribbean.

When the Spanish, by the Treaty of Madrid, recognized British control of Jamaica and other islands and by the Treaty of Ryswick surrendered the western portion of Hispaniola to the French, the buccaneers were brought to heel to ensure the orderly development of the plantations of the British and French West Indies.

Prior to the introduction of sugar in the English and French Caribbean, white indentured labour had proved adequate for the needs of tobacco, indigo and cotton production. The introduction of sugar, with its extensive agricultural holdings and manufacturing centres, generated a demand for labour that could not be met from metropolitan sources. Furthermore, Dutch links with the African slave-markets in the seventeenth century facilitated the rapid introduction of African slaves. The high mortality of slaves combined with the increasing demand for labour, in the context of the expanding plantation systems, made continuous importation of slaves necessary. Demand was also fuelled by relatively low fertility, a consequence of the high ratio of black males to black females. In Barbados, however, as Barbadian historian Hilary Beckles has noted, the female slave population exceeded the male, probably a result of the recognition of Barbadian planters that 'in the field gangs no significant productivity differential existed between men and women' (Beckles, 1989, p. 5).

Unlike the Spanish Caribbean where only rarely was there a sustained demographic dominance of black over white, the British and French Caribbean saw the population ratio shift in favour of Africans. In Jamaica, which was seized by the British in 1655, from a ratio of roughly one white to one African, the ratio rose to 1:6 in 1703 and to 1:10 in 1739. In St Kitts, the ratio of whites to blacks was 1:8 in 1770.

The sugar revolution consolidated latifundism, pushed land prices upward and converted purely agrarian systems into partial manufacturing systems. As in the Spanish Caribbean in the sixteenth century the technology of production relied on vertical rollers, moved by animal, water or wind power.

But Caribbean economies were never entirely dedicated to sugar production. Jamaica, the largest piece of British real estate in the Caribbean, produced cacao, indigo and for a time cotton and tobacco. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Jamaica and French St Domingue planted coffee as an important plantation crop. In Jamaica there were cattle-pens, while in the island of Montserrat indigo, ginger, cotton, cassava and coffee were produced by 'poor' whites.

Barbados, settled by the British since 1627, in 1651 exported to England 9,525 tons of sugar and in 1730 12,455 tons. Jamaica's total exports to Britain yielded an annual average of £325,000 in 1701-4, and £2,400,000 in 1771-5. The number of sugar refineries in Britain increased from about 30 in 1695 to 120 in 1753, while in the French city of Orléans alone there were 18 in 1677. Trade between France and the French West Indies averaged 30 million livres per year. France, through the Exclusive, and England, through the Navigation Laws, were as jealous of the defence of their commerce as Spain was, though in all cases monopoly was legitimately breached when mutual profit could accrue to rival empires. The British Caribbean - Jamaica and Barbados - were profitable transshipment ports of slaves to the Spanish American market, where traders were paid in specie, while

a substantial amount of trade took place between British and North American ports. The timber, cattle and fishing industries of North America complemented the economies of the Caribbean islands - British and French - which exported rum and molasses to North American markets. The British colonies also from 1731, exchanged their products for Irish flour and corn (see Map 31).

The rivalry for ownership of the Caribbean led to the development of increasingly sophisticated fortifications. In recognition of the military and strategic importance of the Greater Antilles Spanish policy, even before 1570, was to designate military men to be governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The capture of Jamaica, which in theory belonged to the Columbus family, reinforced the need for stronger Spanish defences in the Greater Antilles. The loss of a part of Hispaniola to the French in 1697 added to the urgency for additional fortifications and better-organized military units. Santo Domingo was therefore equipped to protect its land frontier from further French incursions, to the extent that, according to historian Margarita Gascón, Santo Domingo had the high ratio by the 1720s of 127 military men for every 1,000 persons. Spain did ensure that its rivals would be unable to strike successfully at the heart of the Spanish Caribbean by making San Juan and Havana walled cities, with massive fortifications, both designated *El Moro*. The history of the Caribbean, at one level, is the history of the art and science of fortification.

By 1700, Puerto Rico had over twelve infantry companies and a *Buallón Fijo*, Havana, with the still incomplete *El Moro*, in 1594 had abundant artillery and a respectable garrison. The fortifications and general defence of Santo Domingo, Havana and San Juan were paid for by the *situado*, an annual subsidy from the treasury of New Spain. The *situado*, according to Ortiz, amounted to 68 percent of the total value of the royal treasury of San Juan, representing the largest supply of money in the economy. Dominican historian Frank Moya Pons notes that the *situado* was the only source of money in Santo Domingo, while Cuban historian Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez observes that the business of fortification generated important economic activity in Havana, by creating a demand for stone, lime and other materials, as well as the recovery of salaries for slave-labour. Havana became, according to Ortiz, the centre of a large number of military men who spent their salaries in Havana, among other things on cock-fights, card-games and prostitution. In Santo Domingo, the military used their privileged position to develop an illegal trade in cattle across the frontier to French St Domingue. The most powerful cattle-breeders all held military titles.

Not until 1762 did the British succeed in taking and holding Havana - for ten months. Raids by Spain's rivals, until then, were generally beaten off through the combined efforts of the military and the loyal Spanish citizenry. Illegal commerce with rivals had never meant, in the minds of the Spanish citizenry, political disloyalty to Spain. However, the British success in Havana called forth even more rigorous and feverish military reform in the Spanish Caribbean.

Military reform was, however, part of a broader reform of the administrative and commercial system in Spanish America, following the ascent of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne in 1714. The Bourbon reformers actively encouraged the African slave-trade in order to stimulate agriculture and migration of investors. By opening up additional ports in Spain and in the Americas, Spain helped to stimulate trade. In Cuba, 'legal sugar exports', according to historian Allan

Kuethe, increased from an annual average of 2,000 tons between 1764 and 1769 to over 10,000 tons during the 1770s, compared with 80,000 arrobas in 1670. Sugar acreage increased from 10,000 in 1763 to 160,000 by 1796. Between 60,000 and 70,000 slaves were imported into Cuba between 1763 and 1789. The shipbuilding industry revived.

In Santo Domingo, economic growth was stimulated both by the metropolitan reforms and by the demand in St Domingue for live-stock. The trade nurtured both Dominican gentlemen and the plantations of St Domingue until the great slave rebellion of 1791. The Crown promoted the migration of Canary Islanders, a policy which saw the development of new townships during the eighteenth century, and encouraged the free entry of slaves between 1789 and 1791. The sugar plantation system in Santo Domingo began to revive, while the declaration of Montecristi as a free port gave the Dominican authorities the opportunity to collect fees and duties from North American ships. Trade with the plantation economy of Jamaica expanded, facilitated by the declaration of four Jamaican ports as free ports in 1766.

The royal revenues in Cuba averaged, according to Allan Kuethe, 535,404 pesos annually between 1763 and 1775, while over the following decade the yearly average rose to 1,003,745 pesos. In Puerto Rico royal revenues grew from 6,885 pesos in 1758 to 47,500 pesos in 1778.

The end of the eighteenth century saw the Spanish Caribbean with a mixed economy, but with an increased emphasis on sugar production in Cuba. The Spanish policy of *comercio libre*, while serving to expand trade, was still limited in its commitment to free-trade. The Havana Company, the Factoria de Tabacos and the Compania de Cataluña all reasserted monopolistic principle and practice. The latter in 1772 forbade the prosperous frontier trade in cattle. Protests and illegal commerce resulted.

The British and French also made fortifications a part of the Caribbean landscape, their heavy guns pointed out to sea at Fort George in Port Royal, Jamaica and at Brimstone Hill and Fort Charles in St Kitts. In Barbados Richard Dunn reports planters built their houses 'in manner of fortifications', equipped with bulwarks and bastions from which they could pour scalding water upon the attacking servants and slaves! (Dunn, 1972, p. 69).

The Caribbean became a fortress defending each European interest, with each territory representing the cultural features of its own metropolis, and where exchanges of territory took place, reflecting, through language and religion, the diverse influences of Europe.

CARIBBEAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

In the seventeenth century and for most of the eighteenth century the British planter class consciously insisted on maintaining social distance between their 'heathen' slaves and themselves. This distance was especially pronounced in the realm of religion. The Catholic French (through the *Code Noir* in 1685) had provided for the baptism and instruction of slaves in the Christian faith, and Catholic priests, however inadequately, attempted to carry out the provisions. Dominica, ranging in status from French and English to neutral island, was the target of Father Du Tetre's teaching, but among the English and the Dutch, the Anglican and the Dutch Reformed churches, respectively, were unapologetically planter institutions. The effort of Bishop

Porters of London in 1696 to encourage a mission among blacks never got off the ground. Planters argued that to teach heathen slaves Christianity would be to barbarize the Gospel and would create the contradiction of enslaving Christians; and it would undermine the plantation system by offering to slaves a concept of Christian egalitarianism and brotherhood. Anglican clergymen, very much a part of the plantation system of power, enjoyed close relationships with planters, and were themselves sometimes planters. The British Caribbean, altogether secular in its taste, built gorgeous churches for white worshippers who enthusiastically avoided Church going. It is not unreasonable to argue that the ease with which religious toleration emerged in the British West Indies is at least partly attributable to religious indifference. In the Dutch colonies, too, the planters firmly opposed preachers who took an interest in the spiritual welfare of the slaves.

In Barbados, Christopher Codrington's commission to the Society for the Propagation of the Christian Gospel (SPG) to educate slaves failed to convert a single slave between 1717 and 1726. His vision, that educated slaves would become more obedient and disciplined, became more acceptable only during the nineteenth century. The seventeenth and eighteenth century picture is summarized by Dutch sociologist Hannamus Hoetink: 'the unwillingness to convert the slaves into members of the prestigious metropolitan churches produced a religious cleavage in the population which coincided with the social ones' (Hoetink, 1972).

The consequence was that the religious cultural awakening in Britain itself led to the proselytizing work of Moravian, Baptist and Methodist missionaries. African culture – already deeply imbued with the world of spirit and religion – continued to manifest itself in folk medicine: *obeah* (associated with magic and poison) and *myalism*, the antidote to the evils of *obeah*. On the other hand, traditional African usages in the treatment of ailments such as yaws were admitted to be much more efficacious than European medicines. Dr James Thompson reported that 'the effects of his most labored prescriptions had been often superseded by the persevering administration of the black doctors' most simple remedies' (Sheridan, 1991, p. 202).

Religion and medicine were not separate in the minds of Africans. *Myalism*, for example, 'provided specialists – doctors – trained to identify the spirit causing the problem, exorcise it, and prevent a recurrence. All problems, including bodily illness, were thought to stem from spiritual sources and required the performance of appropriate ritual' (Schuler, 1991, p. 296). Underlying the religious conceptions of Africans was the idea that, under ideal circumstances, good prevails absolutely and exclusively.

But culture is not static, and during the nineteenth century in the British Caribbean Christianity and the African religious universe found mutual accommodation. In terms of music, Africans brought with them the *goombay* drum, the *rakau* and other percussion instruments. The exposure of Africans to European musical forms and instrumentation – such as the violin and concertina – enriched musical expression. African dance forms persisted and merged with European forms to create a new synthesis of dance. Concerts and operas were frequently performed in the French colony of St Domingue – at Port-au-Prince, Léogane, Cayes, Jacmel and Cap Français. In that colony, the composer Moulon attempted to incorporate local colour into his work. Blacks and coloureds did not isolate themselves from European

musical expression. In St Domingue, Riviere, a black composer, wrote symphonies, serenades and arias. Joseph Boulogne (1739–79), born in Guadeloupe, studied with the black violinist, Joseph Platon, in St Domingue, and published several symphonies, concertos (for violin), string quartets and sonatas for piano and violin, as well as operas. In Cuba, Esteban Salas y Castro (1725–1803) composed masses, psalms, antiphones, alleluia verses, and other small liturgical works. (Stevenson, 1985, p. 796)

Climatic differences from Europe, new and different crops, new diseases, the exchange of flora and fauna, and the animal exposure to different customs, habits and religious perceptions created a Caribbean universe that had its own distinction. The Caribbean, like the rest of the Americas, became a crucible for cultural and scientific experimentation. In the field of medicine, for example, European doctors, no doubt aware of indigenous or African tradition, began to prescribe medicines concocted from indigenous plants (Sheridan, 1991, p. 202) Dr William Wright undertook medical practice 'with the aim of advancing medical science'. His work on lockjaw and cures for fevers, including puerperal fevers, was outstanding (Sheridan, p. 201). Sir Hans Sloane's work on the natural history of the British Caribbean formed the first collection of the British Museum.

There were, in response to the physical environment of the Caribbean, new orientations in architecture. It took the British over a hundred years to adopt architectural designs well adapted to the tropics. From English style houses in the seventeenth century, notorious for stuffiness and built for cooler climates, they advanced to a vernacular style, which allowed for high roofs, large open verandahs, arcades and high windows. The Spaniards had more quickly adapted the bungalow idea, building homes to ensure maximum coolness and defence from hurricanes.

Public buildings in the Spanish Caribbean never attained the baroque magnificence of the Spanish mainland, but there were, in Cuba, several churches of architectural interest such as the Cathedral at Santiago built in the sixteenth century or the monastery of St Domingo. In Havana itself there were several 'grandees' houses resembling those of Seville, with large courtyards, carved mudéjar ceilings and heavy doors'. (Thomas, 1971, p. 17). Gothic and Renaissance carving in stone and mahogany, perhaps done by Spanish artists of high reputation (Bayón, p. 719) indicate the importance of Santo Domingo in the early sixteenth century and the intent by Spain to recreate Spanish civilization in the tropical Caribbean.

Europeans not only introduced crops and animals, new scientific ideas and new technologies. They also brought a world-view that was to have a lasting impact on the Caribbean. The Spanish world-view was coloured by the concepts of *limpieza de sangre* (and its opposite *de mala raza*) and of *gente decente* or *gente pensadora*. Concepts of inequality, surrounding the complementary notions of 'natural aristocracy' and natural servitude (Maignot, 1992, p. 226) were rooted in the medieval ethos. 'Racial distinctions,' notes Maignot, 'and grading were an integral part of the Spanish mentality' (Maignot, 1992, p. 226). Concepts of inequality, also a part of the British and Gallic mentality, flourished in the atmosphere of the New World where social distinctions and social distance were exaggerated by fundamental ethnic differences between a minority white ruling class and a coloured working class, whether Indian or African.

Concepts of inequality and *limpieza de sangre* applied both to slaves and to the mixed blood population. In fact, mixed

bloods were able, often enough, to achieve their freedom, to inherit and own property and slaves, and to obtain a European type education, but by the late eighteenth century their civil rights were severely curtailed in the British and French Caribbean. As property owners, the *mestizos* or *mullatos* constituted part of the ruling class but as mixed bloods, they were relegated to a secondary status. In the Spanish Caribbean there were black and coloured regiments which defended their territory from attack; yet they were forbidden to enter the legal, priestly, or medical professions, or to be pharmacists, or members of the royal bureaucracy. In St Domingue they were disallowed side-arms, entry into the apothecary's profession and the designation Monsieur or Madame. European culture, and economic status became secondary to caste distinctions. The norm of inequality in Caribbean culture was challenged by the French Revolution, especially in St Domingue after 1789, leading to a bloody and extended civil war which culminated in the political independence of Haiti in 1804.

From the sixteenth century contradictions developed out of the accommodation and the resistance to the prevailing dominant European cultural norm. Thus free blacks in Spanish colonial society 'could move up to the rank of *pardo* (another term for *mullatto*) for 700 *reales* or to *quinterón* for 1,100 *reales*' (Maignot, 1992, p. 227). On the other hand, runaway slaves established themselves in the mountain fastnesses of Jamaica, St Domingue, Santo Domingo, and Surinam, often recreating patterns of life and culture reminiscent of the African homeland. In such regions as Baoruco, in Hispaniola, communities of 200 to 300 were established. From the 1680s Jamaican maroons opposed the British authorities, using effective jungle warfare tactics, with which they had been acquainted in Africa, and held off all British efforts to subjugate them. In 1739, in Jamaica, and in the 1760s in Surinam, the maroons entered treaty arrangements with the British and Dutch, respectively. The treaties gave the maroons local civil autonomy and confirmed their freedom. In exchange, the maroons agreed to accept no more runaways, and to assist the British authorities to capture runaway slaves. The terms of agreement with maroon communities, ruled as African-style principalities, laid the foundation for the rapid expansion of the plantation system in Jamaica.

Accommodation with the maroons did not end slave revolts. In 1760, the Tacky Rebellion (involving 30,000 slaves) in Jamaica conceived of the overthrow of white plantation society and the establishment of African-style principalities. In Berbice, the slaves revolted in 1733, 1749, 1752 and 1762, and in 1763 the massive rebellion led by Cuffee took place. The presence of African patterns of warfare are evident in the role of Cuba, during the Tacky rebellion. Cuba re-enacted the role of Queen Mother of Ashanti, in her enthronement as Queen of Kingston. The slave conspiracy in Antigua in 1736 was preceded by a ritual dance and oaths of secrecy, and Tacky's rebellion saw a prominent role played by *obeah* whose ritual, it was hoped, would make the rebels immune to European bullets.

In the most serious, and only successful, slave rebellion, the St Domingue uprising of 1791, similar influences appeared. The uprising's leader, Boukman, belonged to a religious sect 'of a type ancestral to the modern Haitian vodun'. The historian Phillip Curtin notes that 'Boukman' was the 'title of a quasi-religious, quasi-political officer in voute Mande or Malinke states in West Africa at that time' (Curtin, 1990, pp. 77–8). (See Plate 155.)

At the same time there was a process of adaptation between African cultures. This adaptation was accompanied by a steady decline of ethnic particularism among Africans, the creation of creole languages and a growing black ethnicity. The history of the Caribbean is one of cultural synthesis and scientific/technological growth reflecting, by the end of the eighteenth century, inputs from Africa and Europe.

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AFRICA

27. I

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Abiola Felix Iroko

The centuries from 1500 to 1800 were a very trying period for the African continent, at least south of the Sahara, which suffered internal upheavals as the result of disruptive external pressures and successive waves of migration, frequently as the result of wars and raids. Of all the periods before European imperialism swept over the continent during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, this is probably the one with which we are most familiar, thanks to certain written documents and to oral sources that are invaluable to the researcher who knows how to extract the most from them.

In the intermediary period 1440 to 1600, within which the year 1500 falls, the discoveries of explorers, first the Portuguese then other Europeans, reveal an Africa hitherto little known and little understood by the rest of the world. As a result of these discoveries the coastal areas in contact with the European traders became better known, in contrast to the interior, the northern part of which looked north of the Sahara for its trade.

Although the slave-trade that had begun three centuries earlier still persisted in 1800, it was meeting with increasing condemnation from many quarters, even within the great slave-trade powers of the time. This heralded the beginning of the era of the great explorers in sub-Saharan Africa.

A MOSAIC OF VERY UNEVENLY DISTRIBUTED PEOPLES

The social and cultural diversity of the African continent, which certainly dates back to before the Christian era, is not confined to the period 1500 to 1800. Nevertheless, in this period it becomes much more apparent than before, with its specific features more sharply delineated.

One of the characteristics of this period was a marked increase in the intermixing of ethnic groups as a result of the major population shifts caused by wars and migration, which brought into contact socio-cultural groups that had hitherto been unknown to each other and lived far apart. It cannot be denied that some peoples that have a strong cultural identity today emerged between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries from the frequent intermingling of

population groups of different origins, as, for example, the Betammarihe or Tamhenna of the Atakora region (now in Benin and Togo), the Basida (Biseda) of Benin, and so on. This period is therefore characterized by many social and cultural transformations or mutations. These were not without an effect upon the languages, even though most of the languages were established before or during the period. This is certainly the first great phase in African history in which the checkered pattern of socio-cultural groups and languages of the continent may be distinguished very clearly (see Map 32).

As for social and political organization, the two types of society that emerge between 1500 and 1800, despite a number of intermediary forms, are State-controlled societies and societies based on a lineage system.

The State-controlled societies organized themselves into a pyramidal and stratified structure. Power lay at the top of the pyramid, where the leaders, though not necessarily forming a ruling class, had the privilege – for various reasons but most frequently through domination by force or prestige of birth – of governing the other layers of society. They were generally a minority forming a kind of aristocracy or élite and were respected or feared by the rest of the population, composed of free men whose social status, though inferior to that of the political leaders, was nevertheless superior to that of the slaves who formed the base of the socio-political pyramid.

Depending on the region and level of development, these societies took the form of chieftaincies, kingdoms, empires, and so on. These vertical structures were present in almost all the great cultural areas of the continent. The most famous during this period included the Fula Empire of Macina, the Yoruba Kingdoms in western Africa and the Munhumutapa or Monomotapa Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which was eclipsed by the Changanire or Rozvi Empire, also in the southern part of the continent. The Portuguese navigators left a valuable record of the Kingdom of the Congo; in the great lake regions there were also monarchies such as the Kingdom of Burundi, no less famous than those mentioned above.

The second main type of society was organized in a lineage system that had no strata. It seems so egalitarian that some



Map 32 Sub-Saharan Africa in the sixteenth century: some main peoples and ethnic groups (after L. M. Dimp-Maes, ANKH, 1993).

have described it as ultrademocratic. In contrast to State-controlled organizations, these societies were horizontal in form and more homogeneous with regard to the status of their members.

The cultural areas in which this egalitarian political system was to be found were apparently less numerous throughout Africa than those ruled by chiefs, kings or emperors. They were characterized by the lack of central authority and the importance of those responsible for the lineage, even though their importance did not confer on them higher social status than that of the other members of the society. This was true of the Lobi of Burkina Faso, the Bialba in the north of Benin and the Kabye in northern Togo; one of the larger groups were the Ibo of southern Nigeria, whose 'ultrademocratic' societies may be regarded as models of this type of structure, not having strong hierarchical central power such as existed in the monarchies.

The idea of being dependent on authority of any kind was almost nonexistent (and is still resisted in such societies, incidentally). This did not in any way preclude individual effort or self-fulfilment and competitiveness, which were always appreciated and encouraged. The village formed the residential unit *par excellence* as well as the basic political and social structure. Disputes were settled within the village by its own inhabitants, but each village had all kinds of relations with the other villages, especially close political links that facilitated the conducting of business. Marriage alliances consolidated the links between villages, and markets encouraged contacts.

Problems concerning several villages were settled at a higher level by village assemblies or councils of village federations. Those responsible for lineage, who did not in any way feel superior to other members of society, presided over the village assembly meetings. Although they had considerable moral influence they did not wield heavy, oppressive political power. With the consent or help of the ancestors, they rendered justice in a flexible way during the village assemblies, at which each individual could speak freely and give his or her opinions without fear of reprisals.

One of the features of most of these societies, in which birth had no determining influence on rank and in which people were always judged on the basis of their acts, was a system of division by age-groups with the corresponding initiatory ceremonies, which gave society its cohesion. As individuals grew older, they moved along with their peers of the same age from one age-group to another. Age-groups and rituals for moving from one group to another were determined in different ways according to different cultural areas, but the principle remained the same everywhere.

Among the Ibo, in particular, women were not excluded from the management of public affairs; in fact although they did not participate in the assemblies, which were attended only by men, they held their own councils, to which men were denied access.

In contrast to the vertical societies, in which highly prominent leaders held political authority which was not without constraints, the horizontal, egalitarian societies had no hegemonic ambitions. In fact it was usually the great monarchies that gave birth to politicians who were often also great conquerors. Between 1500 and 1800 their covetous ambition sparked off many migrations, human interminglings, massacres and finally a complete rearrangement of social, political and military values. The egalitarian societies without centralized power, more pacifist in tenor, were far more concerned with their own security than with upsetting that

of others. It is understandable that the system of domestic slavery, which was so frequent in the State-run regimes, was almost non-existent or less spectacular in other societies; although the period may be considered, *inter alia*, that in which emulism reached its height in Africa, this practice of sexual mutilation, often linked with slavery, was never a feature of the egalitarian, ultrademocratic societies but was to be found in the major pyramid-type political formations, which for the most part traded in slaves both within and outside the continent (Byzantium, the Arab world, and so on).

It is impossible to speak of the unequal distribution of the African populations from 1500 to 1800 without taking into consideration the matter of urban settlements. Although Africa was essentially rural at that time it was by no means exclusively so: the Africans, both sub-Saharan and from the northern part of the continent, did not await the colonial period before becoming urbanized. Discounting all the controversies as to what population figures constituted a residential unit that could be regarded as a town, the development of certain localities between 1500 and 1800 was such that they cannot be denied the designation of towns, even though figures concerning the number of inhabitants are always approximate and difficult to use.

In eastern Africa, the site of Engarouka (Diop-Maes, 1987, p. 16), between Lake Victoria and the east coast, is supposed to have been the centre of a human settlement of at least 50,000 inhabitants, and some authors consider that the population was at least twice that number: the sixteenth-century writer Leo the African estimated that Dongola (Diop-Maes, 1987, p. 24), in Nubia in Nilotic Sudan, had approximately 10,000 households. M'Binn and Sara in central Africa were said to have been in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries nations each of which exceeded 2 million inhabitants. In the Congo, several towns, including the capital Lovango (Diop-Maes, 1987, p. 13), were roughly as large as Rouen, in France, at the same period.

In western Africa, it cannot be denied that Kano, Jenné, Timbuktu and Gao deserved to be called towns at the beginning of the period we are studying. One famous anecdote gives an idea of the population of Gao, which researchers have estimated at between 75,000 and 140,000 towards the end of the sixteenth century:

The people of the Sudan had an argument with the people of Gao, the Sudanese saying that Kano was more important and bigger than Gao. . . . The young people of Timbuktu and some inhabitants of Gao, in a fever of impatience, took up paper, pen and ink, went to the town of Gao and began to count the houses, beginning with the first house on the west side of the town and noting them down one after the other ('X's house, Y's house') until they reached the last houses on the east side of the town. In the course of this operation, which took three days, they counted 7,626 houses, not including straw huts.

(Kati, 1964, p. 262)

In the nineteenth century, despite demographic fluctuations, Timbuktu still had an average of 20,000 inhabitants. It is estimated that in the fourteenth century it had a population of 100,000.

In the Bight of Benin, an outstanding urban civilization had also flourished, both in the Yoruba cultural area and in the Edo (Bini) country in what is now southern Nigeria. Recent studies based on descriptions by sixteenth-century European authors have shown that the capital of the Edo country, Benin, must have had between 125,000 and 250,000 inhabitants; the orderly structure of this locality is reflected

clearly in this anonymous account dating from the sixteenth century:

The town appears very large as you enter it; you walk along a wide, unpaved main street that seems to be seven or eight times broader than Warmones Street in Amsterdam and stretches far ahead . . . It is said that this street is 7 km long. There are many large streets running straight off on either side. The houses in this town are arranged in orderly fashion, in alignment with one another like the houses in Holland . . .

(quoted in Diop-Maes, 1987, p. 10)

Regarding urbanization, which was already spectacular in the Yoruba world between 1500 and 1800, Paul Mercier writes that 'human settlement in the towns is the rule rather than the exception' (Mercier, 1962). 'This very high degree of urbanization still persists today in the Yoruba country.'

Large or small, urban or rural, with a variety of systems of government ranging from kingdoms to more egalitarian and democratic regimes, the African societies organized all kinds of activities to ensure their survival.

WORK AND DAILY LIFE

The populations carried out a wide variety of production and trade activities. But these activities, thriving in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually changed and declined, especially in the eighteenth century with the increase in raids, wars and population movements, except in areas affected later (the Great Lakes, the Nile area of Sudan and Kanem). Three main sectors may be distinguished in this extremely composite and varied field of African economy:

- the primary sector
- processing activities
- trade.

The primary sector

From 1500 to 1800 Africa was mainly rural, despite the existence of various flourishing urban centres, and was still a continent based on agriculture, gathering, hunting, fishing and animal husbandry. Famine set in only when agricultural production or its essential pre-conditions were jeopardized in some way.

Furthermore, this most ancient sector of human activity was the one that employed the greatest number of workers during this period.

Agricultural implements and techniques, still very simple and archaic, were inherited from ancient times and seem to have remained relatively unchanged for centuries: the hoe or *daba* – which appeared in various forms but at the time consisted of a metal blade with a wooden shaft – the machete, the wooden dibble and the axe were very widespread. These rudimentary tools had the advantage, however, of being suited to thin soil.

Although there were many variations from one region to another, agrarian methods and systems had many points in common: rarely were animals such as cattle directly associated with agricultural activities, even though their manure fertilized the soil of their grazing pastures. The lack of the wheel in traditional Africa was a disadvantage the importance of which cannot be sufficiently stressed.

The people's knowledge of soils and methods of soil management – often ingenious and remarkably effective – was

derived from empirical practices that had proved their worth over the centuries. Africans knew, for example, how to tell the nature and quality of a soil and its agronomic value, that is the plants that could be successfully grown on it. Methods varied: looking at the colour of the soil provided much information; tasting also proved useful. A whole series of conclusions might be drawn from tasting a pinch of earth. 'There was no need to dig into the soil to know what it was like underneath: great above-ground termites' nests were to be found almost everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa, and it was enough to take a sample of their clay at a certain height in order to get an idea of the nature and agronomic value of the soil beneath, of which the termite's nest was composed, and hence to know that agricultural use might be made of the land.

African farmers knew that the presence of large numbers of termites' nests meant that the area was fertile, because they knew that termites, like earthworms, loosen and rejuvenate the soil. The Shanga (see Ayoub, 1991–2; Iroko, 1993) in the Niger Valley in western Africa appreciated the high agricultural yield they obtained from soil upon which they had previously spread clay from the termites' nests.

Moreover, the practice of fallowing land existed in this period: the Bamileke in Cameroon, the Kabiye in Togo and the Serers in Senegal, like other African agricultural communities, knew how to rotate crops and to alternate plants with different nutritional needs on the same piece of land. Hillside cultivation following the natural contours of the land was known almost everywhere throughout the continent.

Almost everywhere both men and women took part in agricultural activities, to different extents according to the region, either in the production itself, or in the harvesting or in the transport of harvested crops to the villages if there were no granaries or silos actually in the fields. Among the Nsaw in Cameroon, the women mainly worked in the fields, but the men took charge of transporting the harvested crops. Among the Yoruba of Nigeria, the men did most of the agricultural work, with help now and again from the women. In general, agriculture was much more a male than a female activity. There were many kinds of mutual assistance arrangements among young farmers, who took it in turn to help each other out in the fields. This system was very popular in the Yoruba and Ajatado cultural areas, although these were by no means the only examples in western Africa or even in the rest of the continent.

As the implements used were rudimentary, the yield was generally fairly low, in keeping with the density levels of production and productivity.

Regarding production, two categories of agricultural commodities may be distinguished during this period: those of African origin and those that were imported and thereafter cultivated in the continent. The main products that might be described as indigenous or ancestral between 1500 and 1800 are cereals such as sorghum, millet and fonio; tubers such as yams, together with beans and other legumes; trees such as the oil palm, the karite or shea-butter tree and the *neri* or *neti*.

Between 1500 and 1800 new plants imported from the Americas and Asia were to help diversify the means of subsistence, without, however, revolutionizing them: these were maize, cassava, the tomato, the ground-nut, the marrow, citronella grass, tobacco, the pineapple, the mango and the sweet potato, which were soon to become everyday plants in many regions of the continent. Although some of these plants, such as mango, cassava and pineapple, were completely new in Africa, many people do not know that others, such

as the ground-nut and the banana (Castro-Henriques, 1989), were only varieties of agricultural products that had existed on the continent for thousands of years.

Not all agricultural products had the same social or nutritional value everywhere; hence the staple diet varied a great deal from one region to another, among the Dyola of Casamance in Senegal it was rice; among the Yoruba, yams, and so on.

The African developed techniques for preserving certain agricultural products such as cereals. The granaries, which varied considerably in design and form from one region to another, were generally the object of careful attention; in the regions of the Bight of Benin the granaries were constructed of branches and vegetation and were permanent structures of the Sahel, Cameroon, and so on; they were part of the traditional architecture of many African peoples. As an integral part of their conceptual universe, these structures reflected certain aspects of their civilizations.

On the periphery of agricultural production, gathering was still highly developed, although it varied according to the period. Wild fruit of all kinds, especially berries, were gathered on a large scale, particularly by the inhabitants of the forest.

Hunting was also much more prevalent than today. Hunters were more numerous, and game, both animals and birds, more abundant than nowadays. But game included elephants, lions, leopards, rhinoceroses and buffaloes.

Although an essentially male activity, hunting was sometimes practised also by women during this period. Thus the 'amazons' of the Kingdom of Dan-Homé from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century went elephant-hunting to prove their courage.

Hunters' associations existed in many cultural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. It should be noted, however, that hunting was not only an activity for specialists, as many peasants also went after small game. Some peoples, however, were composed entirely of hunters, for example, the Pygmies and the Négrillos of the equatorial forests.

Although the influence of hunters on the economy during the period was by no means negligible, their influence on the migratory movements and implantation of human settlements was even more remarkable. In the oral sources and the few written documents of the period the names of hunters are frequently found among those of the leaders of the many migratory movements and the founders of settlements. This is readily understandable; they were often gifted with great supernatural powers that enabled them to face the dangers of great migrations. A correlation between hunting and warfare may also be seen: hunters were often great warriors, hunting being warfare against animals and warfare being the hunting of humans — albeit for a quite different purpose.

Fishing was practised by the peoples living along the many rivers. There were as many fishing communities, like the Sorko (Bozo) or fishers of Niger, as there were hunters.

Cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry were raised, but the great stock-rearing communities like those of the Fulani, widely scattered between Senegal and Lake Chad, raised mainly cattle. They led a special kind of life in harmony with the demands of these activities: nomadic or semi-nomadic, according to the region, but rarely sedentary.

Horses and donkeys in the savannah and the Sahel, and dromedaries in Saharan and northern Africa were also assiduously raised between 1500 and 1800.

During this period, when honey was a much more common part of the diet than cane sugar, bee-keeping was

more widespread than nowadays. Honey from wild bees was certainly collected, but it was supplemented by honey from bee-keeping. There were several techniques for building hives and domesticating bees. Some hives were made out of strategically placed earthenware pots; others were hollowed out of great empty termites' nests, and so on.

Processing activities

Between 1500 and 1800 the secondary sector, that of the processing activities, occupied, as now, far fewer people than the primary sector. Although by no means negligible, it was, however, less vital to the economy than the primary sector and less vulnerable to the hazards of nature. The main branches of activity were ceramics, weaving and dyeing, metal-working, grass or fibre weaving, and leather working.

Ceramics production is an ancient activity, dating far back to the Neolithic period; it seems that it was fairly common throughout Africa, as pottery sherds are often more numerous on the ancient, especially Neolithic, sites than on the more recent ones. To varying degrees, pottery was widespread throughout most of the continent and was at its height in the period before the importing of pots and metal receptacles from other countries.

In general, pottery making was a women's activity. Everything was done by hand in sub-Saharan Africa, from collecting the clay to shaping and firing the pots.

The material used was clay. This came from the termite mounds, so abundant in sub-Saharan Africa, or from quarries; these two kinds of clay were almost never combined. Fire-clay was sometimes used.

Archaeological excavations of sites dating from this period have revealed utilitarian pots of quite remarkable beauty, which were traded widely on a local or regional basis; almost all the pots were intended for everyday use, although some had a ritual function. The distribution of the pottery manufacturing centres seems to show that pottery was produced on a greater scale in sub-Saharan Africa during this period than in northern Africa.

Before the eighteenth century, when the transatlantic slave-trade was at its height, the industries of weaving and dyeing flourished in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Although there were obvious links between these two activities, it should be pointed out that they were not practised everywhere; in general the societies in which nudity existed did not practice them. This was true of several groups in the Atacora, where the Betammaribe were so scantily clad that they did not practice weaving or dyeing.

These two activities, the second of which follows the first, were of course never practised by the same workers. It often happened that districts, localities or regions specialized in one of those two activities but not in the other.

Locally produced cotton seems to have occupied the most important place among the textile fibres used by the weavers, although it was little used or non-existent in certain regions where only tree bark was used for making loin-cloths. The spinning of cotton that always preceded the weaving was generally a man's job. It was often done on horizontal looms, but tree bark fibres were sometimes woven manually, by women as well as men.

The cloth from the weaving workshops took the form of strips about 20 cm wide in which the weft yarn was most often thicker than the warp.

One of the most important of their weaving centres was Kano, in northern Nigeria.

Dyeing was also carried out in various regions of Africa, either by the men, as in the Tchanga country (Nigeria) or the Bariba country, or by the women among the Yoruba in Nigeria, Benin and Togo. The dyeing process was carried out in pot-holes among the Gummamche of Burkina Faso, the Tchanga, the Bariba, and so on; and in enormous jars in the Yoruba country.

A variety of colours were used, but the dark blue or midnight blue, often almost black according to the dyes, extracted from the leaves of the indigo tree (*indigofera*) was very common at the time. Some varieties of millet had stalks or leaves that gave a wine-red colour, much more often used for dyeing leather and grass or fibre-woven products than for colouring cloth.

The period also witnessed the spread or expansion of metal working in regions where it had hitherto been unknown, marking a dynamic peak in this important branch of activity.

A variety of metals – gold, copper, tin, iron, and so on – were worked during the period. It is the last mentioned, however, that is of most interest to us.

Of all the activities connected with metals, those concerning iron gave rise to a particularly abundant literature, given the economic and strategic importance of the metal.

Metal working consisted of two phases: metallurgy and working in the forge. The first phase concerned the extraction of metals; in the second phase the metals were transformed into all kinds of tools and weapons.

After some hesitation between the contradictory theories as to whether iron metallurgy was of foreign or indigenous origin, we now know, thanks to carbon dating, that it was a typically endogenous African technique without the slightest outside influence.

In most of sub-Saharan Africa iron ore was extracted from ferruginous rocks heated to a high temperature in terracotta furnaces, generally made out of termite mound clay or hollowed out of the termite mounds themselves, as in the Bariba country or in certain areas of central and eastern Africa. This was seasonal work carried out by specialists, with its constraints and taboos, and was reserved exclusively for men.

The fuel came from charcoal from plant species selected for their high calorific quality. Exceptionally, coke from oil palm nuts was used, as in the region of Abomey in the hinterland of the Slave Coast in western Africa.

According to region, the metallurgists were sometimes also iron-workers, or else sold their iron to smiths who did only forge work. The iron-workers, who were often organized into castes, manufactured a variety of metal objects for everyday use and had a fairly high status in society, on the same level as the metallurgists, although it varied considerably according to the socio-cultural context. Glass was produced and fashioned into objects in some regions, such as the Ife region.

Shoemakers were responsible for all work connected with leather and skins and manufactured horse saddles, sandals, hoots, scabbards, bags for grigris (amulets), leather shields, and so on.

All sorts of other hand crafts existed, such as weaving of mats, which were then used as articles of trade.

Mention should also be made of the importance of woodworking, producing objects which ranged from spoons to boats that could hold as many as eighty people. Various tools were made, doors, locks, lamps – all produced before the arrival of the European seafarers; soap too, whose quality is praised by Dapper.

Trade

The centuries between 1500 and 1800, which marked a period of political unrest and fragmentation, were characterized by a gradual distortion of trade activities within the continent and the emergence of the Atlantic coastal trade based mainly on the exchange of slaves, gold and ivory for firearms, cloth, iron, alcohol, trinkets, and so on.

On the continent the markets were the main centres for the exchange of various produce and were to be found in almost all regions, although very unevenly distributed. The scarcity of markets in the Tchanga country in the Niger Valley contrasted with the flourishing markets of Jega in Nigeria. But the quasi non-existence of markets in certain regions in no way signified a lack of trade exchanges or an autarkic way of life. Trade was carried on within residential units, from house to house.

These markets were held every three, four, five days or more, which meant that within a region they were not all held at the same time and there could therefore be a kind of rotation that promoted the circulation of merchandise, its purchase in one market and its sale in another a few days later. In several cultural areas of sub-Saharan Africa the calendar was based on the holding of the different markets, which determined the weeks and the names of the days.

Some markets, such as Kano and Katsina in Nigeria, were international or even intercontinental in character. They were held every day, and merchants came from different regions of Africa, Europe, Arabia and Asia.

The markets also had an undeniable social function, whether in sub-Saharan or in northern Africa: referring to the social role of the market among the Berbers of Algeria, Jean Servier wrote:

In Kabylia the market is not only a place for commerce, it is also a centre for peaceful contact between different groups, where people come not only to sell and buy but also to meet and exchange news, in other words, to throw open to the outside world the confines of the village and the tribe.

(see Moreau *et al.*, 1962)

These observations, which may be applied to the whole of Africa north of the Sahara, are also valid for the rest of the continent, in which markets proliferated. Often, in the corner of a market, people would gather around a stand selling locally made drinks, which in western Africa were mostly made from millet.

The market and other trade centres depended entirely on the roads; Africa in that period had many trade routes of generally mediocre condition, but they varied considerably from one region to another. Leo the African reports at the beginning of the sixteenth century (eighty years before the Moroccan invasion) that quantities of sandals were transported from Gohu, where they were manufactured, to Gao and Timbuktu some 1,000 km away. Growing insecurity wiped out this important trade, which was replaced by sinister columns of slaves chained by the neck. Security on these trade routes, which was essential, was provided mostly by the political authorities or equivalent institutions. But security was very unequal, for there were many dangerous areas the merchants would enter only if they were travelling in groups and armed, or would cross only at the least dangerous times of the year. Some of the most famous of the trade arteries were the trans-Saharan routes. Their origins go back at least as far as the eleventh century, and their history varied greatly

in accordance with the changes in the political landscape between the eleventh and the nineteenth centuries.

Running from north to south, they linked western Africa to the Mediterranean through the Sahara, providing a regular trade route between the towns of northern Africa and those of the Sahel, particularly Nigeria and Sudan.

These long-established trade links, covering such a wide and difficult area for the circulation of people and goods, were facilitated by the dromedary, that providential animal of desert lands. The dromedary was both a vehicle and an item of merchandise; to reduce the risks due to natural hazards and human intervention, the nomadic tribes (Sanhaja, Zaghawa, Tuab and Tuareg) who plied the trans-Saharan trade routes always travelled in caravans for the difficult and sometimes perilous crossing of the desert. Although some caravans had only 500 dromedaries, others might have up to 6,000 (Devixe, 1972, p. 47).

The main trade products were desert salt and gold from the southern forest regions of western Africa (see Plate 156). To a lesser degree, metals such as tin, iron, copper, bronze and brass, grain, Venetian glassware, cotton fabrics, lezzes, writing paper, books, resin, ivory and cardamoms were all used as articles of trade. To these was added the slave-trade.

Eastern Africa exported ivory to India and slaves and rubber to Arabia, from which it received dates and incense; porcelain was imported from China before 1500, and cloth from India.

In the seventeenth century, the island of Zanzibar became an important transit centre for east African maritime trade, the prosperity of which gave birth to or helped develop coastal towns such as Tanga, Pangani, Sadani and Bagamoyo.

Sudan had thriving trade relations with Egypt, particularly by the 'forty days route', which ran from Kobbai to Darfur and crossed the desert as far as Assim. The very ancient route from Chad to Fezzan continued to be used by merchants, despite its periodic insecurity.

The Nile route ran from Sennar to Querri before entering the desert. Pilgrims and traders from Darfur followed the route from Al Obeid to Kordofan and Shendi on the Nile, crossing the Funji territory.

Between 1500 and 1800 there was an important flow of trade in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, between Gondar and the Sennar on the Blue Nile, and with Massawa. The strategic position of Tigré on the trade route to Massawa should be noted.

Through the Portuguese, a trade route was set up between eastern Africa and Europe and the Americas, via the Cape of Good Hope. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese traders had built the forts of Sena and Tete in the lower reaches of the Zambezi, which they used as bases from which to establish contact with the Monomotapa.

Gold was the main item sought to which this important flow of trade, in the sixteenth century especially and to a lesser extent in the seventeenth century, owed its existence and dynamism. It should be noted, however, that the trade arteries of southern Africa were disrupted considerably during this period by political and military unrest, which sparked off large-scale population movements.

Trading practices in Africa were never so varied as during the period from 1500 to 1800. Direct exchanges of one object for another, commonly known as *barter*, continued to be the usual practice throughout the continent. This very ancient system was in no way original. What should be stressed is the wide variety of trading instruments, that is, the currency practices.

The immediately striking feature, on the whole, is the rudimentary nature of these methods of payment. Apart from the peripheral areas of the continent, such as the east coasts and the northern fringe, where circular coins – Arab dinars and some Marie-Thérèse thalers – were in use, little of the African continent had circular coins. Hence the use in the various regions of a general equivalent that, although in its own way meeting the criteria defining currency, never failed to surprise the foreigners who came upon Africa's diverse monetary practices, particularly in the sub-Saharan regions, which had a wide range of instruments of exchange of all kinds.

The most widespread currency area in this period was undoubtedly what might be called the 'cowrie area'. This shell-money came from the warm Indo-Pacific seas. The cowrie is a gastropod to be found mainly in the Maldives and Laccadive Islands near India and off the east coast of Africa, particularly the island of Zanzibar.

The cowrie had an unusual if very uneven history, especially in western Africa, where it appeared between 1500 and 1800 through trans-Saharan trade and by sea via the European ships, which brought whole cargoes of cowries to the west African coasts.

Although not in frequent circulation in central and eastern Africa, cowries were used as currency in Cameroon, Congo, Uganda and elsewhere. Northern Africa, southern Africa, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanganyika and other regions were outside the cowrie currency between 1500 and 1800.

On the Slave Coast (Togo, Benin and Nigeria), cowries were in such extensive use that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they served as a basis for a veritable banking system, which, although rudimentary, was perfectly functional. This was the only region in the world in which a shell currency was used to set up a banking system (Ioko, 1987).

Apart from cowries, other sea-shells were used as currency on the continent, still in different areas of sub-Saharan Africa. These included the *marginella* or *keroni* in the Niger Bend, the *Nzimbiri* or *olivancillaria Nama* of the Kingdom of the Congo and small discs of *achatina* or snail-shell, and so on, in central Africa.

Although sub-Saharan Africa had no circular coinage during this period, metals were used to make coins either in the form of rods or bars of all sizes or in the shape of rings. The *Sompe* in Guinea and the Ivory Coast, which were long metal rods, were commonly used along with *barter*; in these regions alone, their circulation area being very limited.

Smaller-sized iron rods were used at this time in a number of regions in central Africa; those of southern Africa, known as *lindeles*, do not seem to have been in use before 1500; they appeared later and were in use right up to the beginning of the twentieth century.

In sub-Saharan Africa, various small crowes, metal rings such as the copper bracelets used in the Gulf of Guinea, the small gold rings in Ethiopia, and so on, were also manufactured and used as monetary tokens.

Other objects – pearls, shirt buttons, blocks of salt, and so on – were sometimes used as currency. The African continent had never known so many varied and unusual monetary units as between 1500 and 1800. This undoubtedly reflects the intensity of trading and the desire to facilitate it and solve some of the problems of this type of human relations.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF LIFE

From the social and economic point of view, African populations in the period from 1500 to 1800 were confronted to varying degrees with three types of disaster, namely, wars, the slave-trade, famine and disease.

Wars

Although wars were not a novelty for the period – they had existed in much earlier times – there appears to have been renewed warfare between 1500 and 1800 on a general scale hitherto unknown that made these 300 years a period of turmoil. Wars also caused less carnage before the use of firearms. In the Great Lakes region during the seventeenth century, Buganda crushed Bunyoro. The Fulani repeatedly raided the Baunin kingdom in Cameroon. A wave of Nguni invasions from southern Africa disrupted the geopolitical balance in the Zimbabwe region. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, Ethiopia struggled against Arabs, Turks and Galla. The king of Dan-Homé in the Slave Coast hinterland in western Africa ravaged neighbouring areas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1591 Moroccan troops put an end to the sequence of large empires that had illuminated the Nigerian Sudan for centuries. In northern Africa a major movement of this period was Turkish expansion, during which Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria were subjugated. Some of these wars were incontrovertibly bound up with the expansion of Islam. The Portuguese ruined Congo and Angola. The Dutch, backed by French Protestants, settled in South Africa at the expense of the indigenous population. The wealthy ports of the east coast were destroyed and looted.

Although of major importance, the political repercussions of these military campaigns are less relevant to our present concern than the social and economic disruption they caused. We have no statistics relating to the demographic consequences of this empire-building, but we can form a rough idea of how much economic production was lost as a result of these military campaigns, which mobilized workers for the purpose of killing other workers or preventing them from doing productive work. Many villages disappeared, abandoned by their inhabitants, who were massacred or put to flight by enemy attacks or captured to be sold to Arabs or Europeans.

The slave-trade

The slave-trade was above all a factor of destruction through its direct and indirect effects on society and the economy.

Slavery was practised in Africa long before 1500. It took the form of slavery between Africans, and the slaves were either 'household' or 'war' slaves. How they were exploited varied from region to region, but many of them finished up being integrated into the families of their masters; generally speaking, their living conditions, even though were not to be envied, were far from being very harsh.

The Arab slave-trade also dates from before 1500, though it affected eastern and central Africa much more than the western part. After 1500 we find it in parallel with continuing domestic slavery but aggravated by a new intercontinental dimension. This was the Atlantic slave-trade, with its

spectacular history and consequences that have still not been thoroughly assessed.

The Atlantic slave-trade, started by Europeans at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was prompted by the need for labour to work plantations in the Americas. It was one side of the triangle of trade between Europe, Africa and the American continent. On a greater scale and with more important consequences than the Arab slave-trade, it continued throughout the entire period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

It was always organized through 'contracts' between European and African trading partners (see Plate 157). The Europeans took care not to become directly involved themselves in hunting for slaves. They found it more advantageous and less dangerous to buy them from Africans, who captured other Africans to supply them. The European merchants, organized for convenience into companies, were content to remain in the coastal strip, to which their trading partners came to deliver thousands of slaves captured in wars or organized raids. These white slave-traders were often very demanding and would carefully sort the persons brought to them to avoid being left with inferior merchandise. In exchange they gave objects of little value such as glass trinkets, adulterated spirits and cowrie shells, a number of which were essential in this type of trading, and many firearms, often obsolete, cloth, gunpowder and iron bars.

Although the Atlantic slave-trade was carried out in various parts of the Gulf of Guinea down to the coast of Angola, one particular part of the Bight of Benin became infamous in this context: the so-called Slave Coast reached its maximum area in the eighteenth century, when it extended from Porto Seguro (Togo) as far as Badagry and even Lagos (Nigeria).

There has been much passionate argument and splitting of hairs on the demographic, social and economic consequences of the slave-trade in its various forms – especially the Atlantic slave-trade – which had a profound impact on the period. In 1978 UNESCO held in Haiti a meeting of experts on the slave-trade at which the following figures were advanced:

- 15 million persons for the Atlantic slave-trade
- 4 million persons for the slave-trade in the Indian Ocean
- 10 million persons for the trans-Saharan slave-trade and the slave-trade via the Red Sea.

The total number of black Africans exported from Africa (including the period before 1500) in connection with the various forms of the slave-trade is said to be approximately 29 million. Although these figures need to be checked after identifying their sources, it should be remembered that they probably cover only a part of clandestine slavery. But total losses were much greater, including slaves dying *en route* in Africa itself, those killed during the raids, those who died without trace fleeing from the slave-hunters and those who died of famine and disease as a consequence of the raids. Although the number of slaves actually exported from Africa was smaller, according to various researchers, we shall never know the total number of those lost by the continent as a result of Arab and European activities in the slave-trade.

Although the sheer figures should never be disregarded, stress should be laid on the deleterious social and economic consequences of the slave-trade, which seriously depleted the population of its most dynamic and most vigorous members, paralysed the development of productive activity and caused serious disruption within the societies concerned. The social and economic fabric was threatened with collapse

as a result of continual wars and raids for the purpose of capturing slaves. Much of this unrest among the populations concerned led to migratory movements on a scale that varied according to the time and place. We find what amounted to forced relocations of various populations seeking safe refuge.

With its wide range of essentially undesirable consequences and the terrible suffering it caused at the time, the Atlantic slave-trade lay behind the founding of numerous black communities in the Americas. It was the biggest intercontinental forced migration ever known.

Famines

Although some ancient writings have handed down the memory of certain famines that ravaged Egypt, Ethiopia, the Bend of the Niger, and so on, before 1500, this type of calamity was much more evident between then and the nineteenth century. Some would argue that this is due much more to the relative abundance of documentation concerning this period than to any increase in the number or severity of famines. But the cause was the increase in number and severity of wars, raids, migrations and clashes of all descriptions.

Between 1500 and 1800, African societies lived increasingly in a precarious subsistence economy (insecurity leading to anarchy), within which the food supply equilibrium was extremely vulnerable. When the system broke down, famines occurred. As the economy was everywhere dominated essentially by agriculture, it was difficulties affecting this vital sector of production that caused the great majority of African famines.

The famines in Africa from 1500 to 1800 had many causes. Wars compounded the effects of adverse climatic conditions. These conditions, which did not follow a regular pattern, took two forms, both of which were connected with rain: an excess of rain is as harmful for crop-raising as its failure to materialize on time. The latter is more common than the former, but both extremes cause worry and desolation. The place of bad climatic conditions among the concerns of both black and white African traditional society is of capital importance: it can be easily gauged by the number of divinities and cults connected with the regulation of rainfall and the fervour of worship. It can also be gauged by the respected role occupied in these societies by those who are sometimes improperly called 'rainmakers' and whom it would be more accurate to call rain specialists or rainfall regulators because they almost always have a dual function: they are said to know the secret of halting an abnormally abundant rainfall, and also of causing rain to fall in the event of prolonged drought (Itoko, 1993).

Migratory locusts, which are distinct from grasshoppers, were also the cause of famines. These insects are Orthoptera of the Acrididae family. They are extremely destructive migratory and gregarious species; when they descend on a region they destroy the vegetation and devastate the crops in no time at all. Their arrival in swarms is always dreaded by the local population, since it means famine. The people are powerless to combat them, having no effective means of action, of preventing their arrival or of destroying them when they invade a region (Saunier, 1924). Manual techniques of crushing them or burying them in hastily dug pits have never arrested the scourge, which is so terrifying that in the Bight of Benin area the people implore their gods to drive these

pests away. In the collective memory the passage of these predatory insects is regarded as a severe trial for the populations affected.

During this period we also find a clear correlation between famine and epidemics, one causing the other. Many epidemics are triggered during certain periods of famine owing to the weakened resistance of the human organism, and certain epidemics provoke famine by reducing the labour force or putting it out of action. The few survivors of certain pandemics are often faced with famine (Cissoko, 1965).

The diseases with significant social and economic repercussions between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries were primarily tuberculosis, malaria, meningitis, Guinea worm and smallpox. The last was the most deadly and killed people in large numbers. It was so dread that the populations in the Yoruba and Ajatado cultural regions in the Bight of Benin made it into a divinity known as Shonkponnon or Sakpata. The Gurma of Burkina Faso and Benin call it *oyenbara*, the king of diseases. Treatment varied, ranging from infusions to decoctions and including variolization and even vaccination of a rudimentary type that nevertheless possessed some efficacy. Although far from being a widespread therapeutic technique in Africa between 1500 and 1800, the principles and use of vaccination were known to black Africans long before its discovery by Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Although there are no figures for the period, it was at this time that the links between epidemics and historical demographics and their numerous effects on everyday life became relatively clear. The ease with which famines took hold, their frequency and their gravity are pointers to the precariousness of the social and economic conditions in which Africans lived throughout these centuries.

Oral traditions record numerous cases of famines that claimed many victims or triggered large population movements.

Whatever the causes of a famine, people always tried to find solutions while at the same time taking precautions against its horrors. Children were pledged as security, sold for cowrie shells – one of the currencies used at that time – or, as often happened in the Atacora in western Africa and in the Sudan in central Africa, exchanged for cereals. Those who still managed to find something to eat had to ration it out. The normal daily rhythm of meals was interrupted. Generally speaking, however, Africans display funds of ingenuity and imagination during the harsh periods of famine. They feed themselves – or dull their hunger – by means of plants used in times of dearth. These substitute foods, never eaten in ordinary times, are merely palliatives or expedients. In most of Africa, people are much more likely to turn to tubers, kernels and leaves than to wild cereals or grasses. This food for desperate times is not always without danger: it is quite common to eat tubers or parts of trees that are unfit for human consumption owing to their toxicity. The Africans themselves are perfectly aware of this and take precautions to extract from these substitute food plants the harmful substances. In times of dearth the Sissu of Guinea (Conakry), for example, never eat the tubers of *tabe* or *bunki*, which are poisonous and bitter, after only one cooking as they would do yams or cassava. They get rid of the toxins by cooking the plants two or three times and soaking them in water for several days.

Another makeshift technique resorted to during food crises in the Sahel is the opening of termite mounds to collect grasses and small fruits stored by foraging termites.

All these efforts to ensure survival in times of dearth are made at the level of the individual. In organized societies, the central authorities were not always indifferent to the suffering caused by famine. In normal times they would take the precaution of stocking foodstuffs. In the Niger valley, the Emir of Karimama had reserve granaries for millet from village harvests under his authority. In the event of famine, the stored cereals were distributed in accordance with rules and criteria clearly laid down in advance. This kind of community measure was neither exceptional nor a novelty in sixteenth to nineteenth century Africa. Indeed, it was already practised in pharaonic Egypt.

Though the social and economic impact of imported plants should not be overlooked, it was relatively small and never succeeded in preventing the occurrence of famines. Cassava, less nutritious than yams, only took a place previously occupied by indigenous plants. Maize is also less nutritious than millet.

Conclusion

The period from 1500 to 1800, chiefly one of all kinds of disruption, especially migratory movements, fighting and numerous other conflictual situations such as slavery and slave-trading, could hardly be described as flourishing in all regions. The opening towards the outside world had negative consequences in sub-Saharan Africa which far outweighed the advantages.

In spite of certain remarkable achievements, in the arts for example, this period of African history was a difficult time, with painful experiences of every kind, centuries during which sub-Saharan Africa became gradually fragmented and depopulated, except in certain regions (Kanem-Bornu and various high plateaus) which were affected later. During this time, Africa became better known by the outside world. But the contacts established resulted in a severe regression for Black Africa, owing to the destructive effects of a vicious circle of trade, firearms for slaves, and slaves for firearms

which would be used to capture more slaves, and so on indefinitely.

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POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND TRENDS

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The question of the emergence and development of political organizations in Africa south of the Sahara remains an interesting one. Despite the existence of early kingdoms and empires, the framework for the study of Black African peoples was, for decades, that of cultural groups' whose relations with each other were characterized by a baffling confusion. It was to be an uphill struggle, particularly in the case of Equatorial Africa, a region reputed to be 'the most thankless for the historian' (Alexandrie, 1970, p. 353), to overcome these prejudices and pave the way for an objective approach to the study of political structures in precolonial Black Africa (Cuttin, 1950, pp. 77-96; Vansina, 1994).

The need to grasp and compare the variety of forms in the political organization led to attempts to produce 'models'. But it was not at all certain that the dynamics of African societies could be fully covered by rigid categorizations or even that the identified categories were incompatible. In fact, many situations that on the surface appeared to have nothing in common were in fact related.

Despite the differences in ecological environments, there are many and obvious similarities in political structures and trends in Africa south of the Sahara during the period AD 1500-1800. All the areas covered in this chapter experienced both centralized and non-centralized systems of government. However, there are also many and obvious differences from one area to another and within the same area. In the case of Western Africa, for instance, the centralized states differed from the Islamic theocracies of the savannah, the divine kingships of the middle belt from the strong monarchies of the Guinea zone; just as the non-centralized societies varied from the segmentary lineage communities of the Tiv and Igbo (Nigeria), or the dispersed territorially defined groups in the headwater of the Volta (Ghana) to the village communities of the Niger delta and Cross river basin (Horton, 1985, pp. 87-128). Similarly the basis or symbols of authority varied from one state or community to another.


These differences were largely the reflection of historical experiences, of shifting regional and local realities. African political situations were indeed complex, and this complexity cannot be accounted for by any theoretical typology.

WESTERN AFRICA

Abiodun Adebayo Adediran

For the purpose of this discussion, Western Africa can be subdivided into three. First is the savannah zone bordering on the Sahara desert to the north. Known as the Western and Central Sudan, the terrain is open and, in pre-colonial times, there were continuous migrations of peoples. Next is a zone of mixed savannah and forest vegetation known as the 'middle belt'. It is generally high with rocky outcrops but sparse population clustered mainly in the basin of the many rivers (particularly the Niger and Benue) which drain the region. Lastly, there is the Guinea zone which borders on the Atlantic to the south. The vegetation here is thick forest which made human movement less easy than in the north. This geographical variation is partly responsible for the variation and differences in political structures (see Map 33).

In the savannah zone, large cities had emerged by the sixteenth century: Kumbi Saleh, Awdaghost, Walata, Timbuktu, Jenne, Gao, Katsina, Zauzan (Zaria), Kano and Nijlani. These were mainly trading centres, cosmopolitan in nature and nuclei of centralized states. Because of Islamic influences dating to about the tenth century AD, the political structure of states in the area was based largely on Islamic ideology. Even though many of them practised the syncretic form of Islam, they made use of Muslim officials and adopted the Shari'a. This was so because the ruling groups, mainly powerful trading magnates, were Muslims and the states required their benevolence in their imperial exploits. The Islamic factor was, however, not the only basis of power organization in the Sudan; the establishment of strong armies and control of trade were of equal importance. There were also attempts to achieve a meaningful level of socio-political integration and ensure the loyalty of ethnically diverse peoples in each state. This was done through the codification of local customs to fashion a workable constitution; the division of the population into social classes to minimize conflicts in the society; the regulation of succession processes to prevent dynastic disputes; and the establishment of open and flexible administrative systems that would accommodate varying opinions. Nevertheless, as Muslim clerics were predominantly influential in the Sudan from 1500, Islam became the most crucial factor in its political development.



Map 13 The Lower Guinean coast in the eighteenth century (after *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. IV, Cambridge, 1975)

For instance, in the Songhay Empire, the overthrow of the indigenous Shi dynasty by Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, who took the title Askia, saw attempts to establish an Islamic theocracy over the Central Sudan. Muhammad had capitalized on the displeasure of Muslim clerics, hence it was to Islam that he turned in order to entrench his authority and extend the frontiers of Songhay to incorporate Masina, Taghaza, Agades, Katsina and Kano. There was peace and stability as reflected in intensive agriculture, increase in commerce and unprecedented pursuit of intellectual activities. On these solid foundations, successive Askia were able to build (see Plate 158). However, from 1586, a series of succession disputes sparked off a civil war which weakened the cohesive nature of the state. Under these circumstances a Moroccan force invaded the western Sudan in 1591. The final outcome was the collapse of Songhay which led to a chain of events: the breakdown of law and order, the decline of peaceful economic ventures such as trade, agriculture and mining, the influx of unruly foreigners who embarked on mercenary activities and an unprecedented upheaval which threw scholars and merchants into disarray. The general atmosphere was that of chaos and insecurity. The descendants of the Moroccans, the Arma, succeeded in arresting the chaos from 1635. They were able to establish a relationship of mutual confidence with the merchants and Muslim clerics. But this was short-lived. As individual Arma acquired private armies, there was a return to the lawlessness of the preceding era.

In the circumstances, the Bambara created a number of states of which Segou and Kaarta became very prominent. Although Segou did not become an imperial power, there emerged a royal dynasty, the Massassi, and a unique social system. At the base was the clan (*ion*), a collection of which formed the village (*dngu*), many of which comprised a province (*Kafu*). Each unit was divided into four social groups: freemen, skilled workers, slaves and labourers. In 1740 Mamari Koulabouli established Segou as the dominant political force in the region until the emergence of Kaarta in 1754.

In the religious sphere, there emerged missionary groups, such as the Zawaya and Torodbe, committed to the idea of Islamization. The culmination of their activities was the outbreak of reform movements which sought to create theocratic states entirely based on Islamic doctrine. Many of these reform movements took place in the Senegambia region: Bundu (1699), Futa Jalon (1727) and Futa Toro (1760).

In the Central Sudan, the collapse of Songhay saw the rise to prominence of some Hausa city-states (Usman, 1981; Batindo, 1983). The relative peace in the Nigerian savannah made the region the centre of Islamic and commercial activities from the middle of the sixteenth century. For instance, with agricultural prosperity backing up its commerce, Kano was a nodal town on the trans-Saharan network and a haven for Muslim scholars. In the seventeenth century, both Katsina and Kano appeared, at different times, to have attained prominence and were regarded as Islamic states.

The Hausa states had to contend with the expanding power of Borno following the transfer of its capital to Birm Ngazargamin adjacent to Hausaland. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century, under Mai Idris Aloma, Borno secured control of the major trade routes and asserted her hegemony over neighbouring Hausa states. Till the last quarter of the century, a serene atmosphere prevailed in the Nigerian Sudan, giving room for major developments in the religious and intellectual spheres.

In place of the large cities of the Sudan, the middle belt was dotted with small-scale communities. The period from 1500 was one of great social and political experimentation, with peoples making attempts to tame the environment and, in the process, evolving particular cultural characteristics. However, in spite of local peculiarities, cultural features and political systems show a large measure of similarity. The same fundamental issue of evolving a workable socio-political framework preoccupied the people.

For instance, the Jukun or Kororofa Kingdom centred in the Benue valley had, by the sixteenth century, been

transformed from a loose confederacy to a highly centralized state with a divine ruler, Akw Uka, and a strong army which overran Hausaland and parts of Borno. Colonies of Jukun traders and adventurers were established in various places in the Gongola valley and Bauchi plateau. This continued till the eighteenth century when internal crises weakened the imperial machinery. In contrast to the Jukun, the Igala state was a sizeable one whose history reflects the dynamics of interethnic relations in the Niger-Benue area (Boston, 1969, pp. 29-43; Okwoli, 1973). By the sixteenth century a number of chiefly lineages had emerged on the lower trunk of the Niger (just below its confluence with Benue), and Idah developed into the capital of a fledgling state. An advantageous location which gave the Igala control of the Niger-Benue trade and a consolidation of power through the strengthening of monarchical authority by religious sanctions and royal monopoly made the state powerful till the nineteenth century.

Like the Igala state, the Nupe Kingdom can be associated with a number of developments on the Niger. From the establishment of ritual centres along the Niger by Tsoede, the eponymous founder, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Nupe Kingdom was transformed to a theocratic state with a formidable army based on the cavalry. The state was made economically buoyant through the introduction of various crafts such as canoe-building, bronze-casting, iron and brass-working as well as glass-making. These made the influence of the Nupe up till the eighteenth century very widespread.

At the same time, the Borgu had constituted themselves into a powerful group in an attempt to control the trans-Niger trade to Hausaland in the north and to Gonja in the west (Crowder, 1973; Adekunle, 1973). They transformed the many city-states they had established on the Niger into four states: Busa, Nikki, Wawa and Illo, organized into a loose confederacy. In spite of this, the Borgu never achieved unification of their states even though jointly they provided a network of security systems for traders on the middle Niger.

To the west of Borgu, the Mossi (Skinner, 1964) also never became united into a single kingdom even though two or more states often co-operated to fight external enemies. By the sixteenth century, some Mossi states had become prominent. These were Mamprusi, Dagomba, Nanumba, Tenkodogo, Wagadugu, Fada N'Gurma and Yarenga. Mossi towns developed into large industrial centres specializing in cotton-weaving, leather-working and metalwork. Many of these towns had elaborate defence systems of massive walls. The army became famed for the use of horses, for in essence the Mossi states were warrior states.

In the Guinea zone, there were also developments in the consolidation of societies. There emerged large and powerful state structures, just as there were small-scale communities.

The Akan of modern Ghana had by 1500 exploited their environment to create complex political and social institutions which resulted in a number of viable chiefdoms actively engaged in trading activities (Anquandah, 1975; Daaku, 1970; Fynn, 1971; Kwamena-Poh, 1973). Until the sixteenth century, the most powerful and influential of these was Bono. In the seventeenth century, a loose confederation of states south of Bono emerged. Denkyira became the most important of these. Founded in the sixteenth century, Denkyira was symbolized by a beaded stool (Abankwadwa) believed to represent the spirit of the ancestors. This, with the executioner's sword (Sasatia), were the symbols of authority of the state. The political structure featured the king at the head, assisted by a council of state and district governors;

while vassal states were semi-independent. By the end of the seventeenth century, Denkyira became the most powerful state and remained so until it was eclipsed by Ashanti in 1701.

Even during the period of its pre-eminence, Denkyira was rivalled by Akwapim and Akyem to its east. Akwapim had been established in about 1600. It quickly became consolidated so that by the middle of the seventeenth century, it had gained control of the eastern coast of modern Ghana and turned its attention northwards. By 1770, it had become a large and powerful empire controlling trade between the coast and the hinterland. On the other hand, the power of Akyem was concentrated on the south especially between the Pra and Volta rivers. Also to the south, Fanti, originally composed of loosely united semi-autonomous chiefdoms, consolidated its hold on the coast. By 1730, Fante had gained control of most of the trading ports and held on to them till 1807 when the country was overrun by Ashanti which had eclipsed the earlier three states.

From 1698 when Osei Tutu created the Ashanti nation with the capital at Kumasi, and the 'Golden stool' (Sikadwa) as the symbol of unity, the Asantehene systematically became the most influential of the Akan rulers. In 1699, Ashanti defeated Denkyira and began to expand northwards, crossing the Volta in 1734. Thenceforth, Ashanti became a major participant in the trans-Saharan trade in gold and kola nut. The expansion to the coast also led to continuous participation in the trans-Atlantic trade with Europeans.

In the eighteenth century, Dan-Homé, established in about 1625, became the major European trading partner on the West African coast. Its history – and historiography – is closely associated with the trans-Atlantic slave-trade, the impact of which was of significant importance in the kingdom's political organization (Akinjogbin, 1967; Manning, 1982; Law, 1991). Militarism, human sacrifice, concentration of power in the king's hands, and so on, were not unconnected with the trade in men.

Although the Yoruba of the modern Benin Republic and Nigeria had established many states by the sixteenth century, Oyo was the most extensive and powerful (Johnson, 1921; Smith, 1969; Law, 1977). This was made possible by acceptance of the King (Alaafin) of Oyo as a direct descendant of Oduduwa (the putative progenitor of the Yoruba) and the possessor of a beaded crown (Ade Ileke) which was the symbol of divine authority in the Yoruba culture area. There was also a system of checks and balances in which the Alaafin, his elaborate court of priests, the state council of ministerial chiefs (Oyo Mesi) and other state functionaries such as provincial governors (Ajéle) ensured the smooth running of state affairs. This elaborate political structure and the army based on a cavalry with a corps of semi-professional war veterans (Eso) made Oyo the greatest state on the West African slave-coast by 1750. Nevertheless, conflicts over the sharing of power, influence and wealth that accrued to the capital led to constitutional troubles in the second half of the eighteenth century, with vassal states such as Nupe and Borgu renouncing Oyo overlordship. Until the nineteenth century, Dan-Homé and many non-Oyo Yoruba states were still within the Oyo imperial framework.

Comparable to Oyo in power, fame and influence before 1800 was the Edo state of Benin. As in Dan-Homé, the monarchical institution was very strong in Benin (Egharevba, 1968; Ryder, 1969; Bradbury, 1973). However, the council of seven chiefs (Uzama) continued to exercise strong influence in state affairs. So did the guilds, priests and palace associations who regulated affairs between the monarchy and non-royal

interests in the empire. Nevertheless, the interests and calibre of the kings dictated the pace and direction of development of Benin. Building on the fifteenth century imperial exploits of Oba Ewuare, Benin was essentially a commercial empire tapping the resources of the Yoruba, Nupe, Igala and Igbo hinterland to meet European demands. The trade with Europeans was a main prop to the political stability and territorial expansion which made the sixteenth century the 'golden age' of Benin's history (see Plate 159). But over-dependence on external trade had disastrous effects on political development and was inadvertently to contribute to its disintegration in the nineteenth century.

In the region east of the Niger, the most prominent political structure has been called the 'village democracy' because the basic unit was the village within which governmental duties were based on kinship ties (Green, 1964; Nzinio, 1972; Afigbo, 1973). Supreme authority was exercised by a council of elders made up of heads of the component lineages with the head of the most senior lineage being the chairman of the council. Among the Igbo, he bore the title 'Okpara' and had a club-like object called *Ofo* as symbol of authority. Neighbouring villages often developed close ties through the use of common market places and the worship of common guardian deities. From the mid-seventeenth century, there emerged institutions such as oracles and secret societies which bonded together settlements over a wide area. The best known of these is the *Ibinukpabi* of the Aro group of villages located in a frontier zone between the Igbo, Ibibio and Cross rivers peoples (Afigbo, 1971, 1972). Even though the Aro exploit was largely commercial, they succeeded in developing a quasi-centralized political system in the area bounded by the Niger, the Benue and the Atlantic.

From the foregoing, it is clear that between 1500 and 1800 there emerged and developed all over West Africa a variety of forms of political organization, reflecting both similarities and differences in ecological environments and historical experiences. This situation was not peculiar to the West African sub-region alone.

EQUATORIAL AFRICA

Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem

This is a vast region extending from the maritime borders of Cameroon and Nigeria in the west to the Somali and Kenyan coastline in the east, and from there, as far as Port Elizabeth in southern Africa (Obenga, 1985; Lwanga-Lunyiigo and Vansina, 1950). It is inhabited by peoples who speak the so-called Bantu languages (see Map 34).

The emergence and growth of political systems

While linguistic studies all note the unitary nature of these languages and account for it by the expansionism of an original group of speakers who imposed their language on this vast region, there is disagreement as to the development of their social institutions. The same organizational techniques apparently produced different political cultures, probably as a function of ecological and demographic variations.

Densely populated areas were more likely to see the development of the most complex modes of organization. This is true of the region along the axis of the great lakes in East Africa and that of the savannah to the North and

South of the great forest of the Congo basin (Vansina, 1963, 1966).

In contrast, the central area enclosed by these three highly populated axes, the second largest block of tropical forest in the world, was sparsely populated. After the desert, it is the least densely populated part of the continent, but it is also the wettest, having the highest rainfall. For this reason, it was, doubtless a little hastily, described as 'insalubrious', both literally and figuratively as, unlike the neighbouring territory, it had no large political formations (Mumbanza mwana Bawele, 1980; Vansina, 1990). Here too, descriptions have tended to be exaggerated or even distorted, as the forest habitat did have some advantages. For example, an abundance of food for hunter-gatherers made it very attractive to those who had developed a technology capable of limiting or controlling its negative aspects. Incidentally, in the history of the settlement of the continent, the forest was never, as one might think, an impenetrable barrier, much less unpopulated. The dating provided by archaeological excavations shows human occupation in this region, from southern Cameroon to Mayumba, and from the Equatorial region of Congo to Maniema, going back for as far as on the savannah (Vreck, 1983).

It is precisely beneath the diversity of modes of political organization adapted to varying environmental conditions that perplexing similarities can be detected, probably the echoes of a single institutional referent at the point of departure. For example, all the peoples produce and operate political structures in the same way. Symptomatically, Vansina's recent work (1990, 1991) on the political history of the 'forest peoples' confirms or expands what was already known about the political development of the 'peoples of the savannah'. Differences were on the whole very slight. There is much evidence that the same methods of social organization, adapted to a variety of environments, were used throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

First, the political order appears everywhere to be based on family structures, to such an extent that the terminology of kinship has been maintained at all levels of the political hierarchy. Within every type of political formation, be it a kingdom or a chiefdom, the same types of distinction are very often found between 'elder' and 'younger' dynasties; 'parent' aristocracies are distinguished from 'child' aristocracies; 'husband' villages are never confused with 'wife' still less with 'slave' villages. The transition from family to political order seems to have been a response to the need to find a way of distinguishing between the various 'elders'. It would seem that this was how the principle of *primus inter pares* came to be established, probably the first extra-parental hierarchy to have been developed, before a new hierarchy was produced, distinct and independent of family structure.

Another common feature is that all known political forms can be reduced to a single organizational technique consisting of a superposition of political systems in which the empire and the village are respectively the most complex and the simplest expressions. The same networks could operate together in one region and autonomously in another. Everywhere, both in centralized organizations and other political formations, the village is the foundation of the political edifice. A territorial and residential unit, the village is the first extra-parental, and therefore political, structure. It consists of houses grouped around a principal house, the real or presumed initiator of the grouping. This was regarded as the eldest house with the privilege of choosing from within it the individual who was to exercise effectively political power.



Map 34 Central Africa (after *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. IV, Cambridge, 1975).

in its name. Even if a young person was chosen, he none the less exercised the rights of an elder over the representatives of the other houses, who might well be older than him.

The existence of, and respect for, this hierarchy were symbolized by this house's right to tribute from the others. In return, it guaranteed their protection through its ability when necessary to mobilize all the other houses to defend the community's interests. Tribute took the form of the products of hunting and gathering and was paid every time the hunt was successful. The failure of one of the village families to pay tribute was an expression of political opposition

which had to be treated as such and deprived the person concerned of the right to the community's protection.

The need for protection against external military and economic aggression may have led village communities to form federations. In this way, chiefdoms or seigniories were formed here and there. The village that initiated or founded the federation had the prerogative of leading it through its founding house, now seen as 'the elder of elders' of the villages. To increase its power, political ideology would present it as the 'owner' of the territory on which the various villages were built. It was regarded as the owner in the same

way as the village chief was the owner of the village grasslands and forests. It also therefore had the right to receive tribute distinct from ordinary tribute. 'Noble' tribute consisted of symbols of power such as python or pangolin skins, eagle feathers, the canines of big game and, above all, leopard skins⁴. The route followed by leopard skins was the surest indications of the way to the top of the political pyramid: it passed from the hunter to the 'elder' of his house; from the latter to the village elder and so on, until it reached the highest point in the hierarchy. 'Membership of the highest political hierarchy', says Vansina, 'was always indicated by a sort of leopard gibbet in front of the house, while more modest structures indicated the residences of less important leaders' (1991, p. 140).

Federations of villages, the second hierarchical network, did not exist everywhere in Bantu Africa. They were in particular unknown in the Cuvette, where there was little need for political organization to extend beyond the village. Elsewhere, where this extension was possible, it took many different forms, ranging from complete autonomy to the closest dependency on the superstructure that had managed, as described above, to turn these groupings into its 'provinces', subject to one ruler and subdivided in their turn into 'villages'.

Sometimes the grouping process stopped short of this and simply took the form of an alliance among chiefdoms. This type of confederalism took the form of acknowledgement of a real or fictitious fraternity among ruling aristocracies, none of which had real supremacy over the others, as with the authority structures found in the Lower Kasai in Congo, particularly those of the Sakata, where the various seigniorial families had the same clan referents and claimed to be blood relations. The same was true of the centralized structures of the Kivu region, notably with the Shi, the Kodjo in Uganda and the Nande in Congo (Mashaury, 1983).

From chiefdom to kingdom

The region saw the emergence not only of kingdoms but of empires, in the sense of confederations of kingdoms, on either side of the great forest. Among those that have been identified, at various periods, are, to the north of this forest belt, the kingdoms of Bandia (de Dampierre, E.), Azande and Mangbetu (Keim, K.) and the centralized Ngbandi and Ngbaka systems (Ngbakpwa, L.); to the west, the chain of coastal kingdoms: Kakongo, Ngoyo, Bunu, Kongo and the Ndongo kingdom of the celebrated Queen Nzinga. In the hinterland were the kingdoms of Tio Boma and, further east, Kuba. To the south, several large political units were formed, such as the Luba and Lunda empires with, to the east, the kingdoms of the Great Lakes: Rwanda, Burundi, Buganda, Buha, and so on.

Usually the creation of these prestigious political systems was accompanied by the development of a specific ideology which did not apply to the lower, village and provincial, tiers in the hierarchy. While the latter based their status on landownership, royal power was not based on ownership of any kind but on the ability to mobilize and manipulate supernatural forces.

The king was, by definition, a 'superman', with extraordinary, supernatural powers. He could therefore only be superior to everyone else, as his power was essentially religious and could not be contested or questioned by a mere mortal. Only those with similar powers could aspire to overthrow the king, so political disputes at this level could

only take place within the royal clan. This gave royal power some stability, as dynastic changes were possible only among lineages of the royal clan. A usurper who succeeded in supplanting the monarch thus brought about a dynastic change which, if confirmed, led to the ennoblement of the new ruling clan.

Having access to the invisible world, the king was believed to have supernatural powers. He was the protector of his people, a rainmaker and guarantor of fertility. Any disaster was seen as an expression of his anger or negligence.

The sacredness of royalty was associated with technological mastery: the king was believed to be source of all new inventions. In the west coast kingdoms in Congo and Angola, for example, he was regarded as the master smith and known as 'the blacksmith-king' (Randles, 1969). Similarly, when tobacco was introduced, the Kuba regarded it as the invention of king Shyaam Bnlangong, on his return from the West.

It goes without saying that the protector of the people, who was also official innovator, could suffer from no physical weakness or disability. As far as possible, the king had to have stamina and be well-built, handsome and strong since his health was the reflection of the health of the kingdom. Even the missionaries who had to go to the royal court in Kongo noted that the king was almost always 'physically well-formed' (Chevillet and Jadin, 1954). One of the corollaries of this was that when the king's health did decline, a special ritual was sometimes performed to sever the link between his health and the health of the State, for fear that his weakness or old age would result in the ruin of the whole kingdom. The Kuba practised such a ritual.

It is not yet clear why centralized systems emerged in some places and not in others. The areas where the ecological and demographic conditions appeared to be favourable did not necessarily produce kingdoms. This is notably the case of the Ngbandi in the northern savannah. Although they provided the Nzakara and Zande kingdoms with dynasties, they did not form a kingdom in their own region. The Ghaya are another strange case: they lived in contact with ethnic groups which were organized into states, such as the Mbomn, but never imitated them. The mystery intensifies when one realizes that where these political formations did prevail, they were not the fruit of local innovation but had spread from somewhere else or were the result of something that had happened far away.

Traditional accounts usually identify the founder of the kingdom as a foreigner: either a hunter who has lost his way (Luba-Lunda), a prince escaping a curse after committing some blunder at home (Kongo), a native of the country who has returned from a long journey abroad (Kuba), or sons disinherited in favour of their sister (Lunda) who take the practice of royalty with them to distant lands where they were previously unknown.

Contrary to what one might think, royalty was not, therefore, the culmination of a series of political changes. It flourished not only where the necessary conditions existed, but where circumstances allowed its emergence. Once established, it was extremely vulnerable and could not be guaranteed to last. The royalty of Kongo, the best known because of its special historiographic status, shows that it was perfectly possible for a people to make the transition from chiefdom to kingdom and then revert to a chiefdom again. The kingdom of Kongo reached its apogee in the reign of Afonso after which its unity gradually crumbled until it once again became a region of autonomous chiefdoms.

A special case: Luba-Lunda culture

In sub-Saharan Africa the political creativity and expansion of the Luba-Lunda political system deserve special mention, despite the lack of reliable sources. This political culture not only produced both the empires of the region – Luba and Lunda, it also colonized the whole of the southern savannah between the west and east coasts. It is interesting to speculate how far this expansion might have gone had it not been halted by the expansion of early colonization.

The concepts Luba and Lunda refer to two political and cultural networks within which a whole range of separate ethnic and state referents can be identified (Ndaywel è Nziem, 1992). The two networks are politically akin in that the Lunda, the masters of the southern savannah, simply adopted the political system of the Luba and spread it more widely.

There is general agreement that the archaeological finds of the Upemba Depression show the historical foundation of Luba political culture to have been considerably earlier (De Maret, 1985) and that close examination of Lunda oral tradition reveals a regrettable misunderstanding which resulted in political titles being taken for the names of kings.³ The principle of perpetual kinship allowed the heir not only to take his predecessor's name, but also to take on his social relationships. This was a way of denying the passage of time and perpetuating the social order which concealed a chronological depth far greater than is suggested by too literal a reading of the genealogies.

As far as we know, the sacred royal line of the Luba – the *bulepure* – was founded between the Lomami and Lualaba Rivers on the eve of the second millennium. The first organization of any significance came into being with the arrival of Kongolo Mwamba, a Songe prince who built his capital not far from Lake Boya. He changed the political environment by establishing royal ceremonial and extended his power significantly by imposing his rule on the peripheral chiefdoms.

But this 'first empire' did not extend very far. Expansion became possible only later owing to political acculturation symbolized in oral tradition by the arrival of a hunter from a distant land who brought with him a new royal code. His union with one of the sisters of the master of the first empire led to the birth of the second civilizing hero, Kalala Ilunga, who symbolizes the establishment of a new political order, more complex and prestigious than its predecessor. This was the beginning of the 'second empire'; after a series of conquests, Kalala Ilunga's successors controlled the whole of the region situated between Lakes Tanganyika and Mweru and the River Mbuji Mayi and between the Maniema and southern Shaba.

Meanwhile, similar events were taking place further west. In the River Mbuji Mayi valley the court of the Aut Yav (sing. Mwant Yav) was developing, also a result of the assimilation of Luba political culture. Tshibinda Ilunga (Tshibinda Ilunga), the civilizing hero who introduced the new royal code among the Lunda, was also a wandering hunter. The hospitality offered to him by the young queen (Iueji) led to love which eventually took the form of a 'political conquest'. The earliest Lunda State was probably in place before 1450. The queen's brothers, who had already been disinherited in her favour, went into exile. Thus began the great expansion of the political system, not only to Angola and Upper Kwango (kingdom of Luena, Kasanje and Kiamfu), but also to northern Zambia and Upper Shaba (Lozi and Kazembe).

All these royal courts, linked hierarchically to Mwant Yav, the central power, formed the great Lunda Empire. The fortunes of these courts varied; almost everywhere the link was the question of the succession which often degenerated into infighting and power struggles. The situation became explosive with the introduction of firearms and interference by external forces, which had the effect of weakening these political units.

The great final conflict in the Luba Empire occurred at the end of the nineteenth century during the reign of Kasongo Niembo who was constantly opposed by his brother Kahongo. The succession of conflicts, fanned by nascent colonization, led irremediably to the division of the empire into two royal chiefdoms. As for the Mwant Yav court, it was undermined from within by internal conflict and from without by incessant attacks by Chokwe bands. The last king to confront this threat chose to ally himself with Belgian troops to combat the invading neighbours. When he later sought to escape from the tutelage of his protectors and re-establish his autonomy, they defeated him.

Colonization had come to central Africa, but Luba-Lunda political culture survived in a multitude of chiefdoms born of the memory of these prestigious organizations.

EASTERN AFRICA

Buluda A. handala


As used in this study, the term Eastern Africa refers to the eastern part of the continent which comprises the Horn of Africa, the countries which are known today as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania and the Island of Madagascar and its smaller neighbours in the western Indian Ocean. Generally speaking, the period from 1500 to 1800 witnessed very dramatic social and political changes throughout the region. The following is a brief discussion of these developments in the various parts of the region (see Map 35).

Developments in the Horn

The Christian Ethiopian empire

Most sources suggest that the Christian empire of Ethiopia had, by 1500, expanded from its original area in Tigre in the north to the central highlands of Amhara, Gojjam, Danot and Shoa. It had also already incorporated the southern kingdoms of Sekko, Guman, Inariya, Kaffa, Bosa, Dairro, Welayta and Gamo and the south-eastern Muslim states of Hadiyya, Ifat, Fatagar, Dawaro and Bali (Jones and Monroe, 1965, pp. 9–10, 53–5; Taurat, 1984, pp. 430–5). This expansion of the Ethiopian kingdom was accomplished after the restoration of the Solomonid dynasty to power in the thirteenth century.

But the state which the Solomonid dynasty expanded in the Ethiopian highlands by incorporating many formerly independent non-Muslim and Muslim states between 1300 and 1500 was not a unitary centralized kingdom. Rather it was a loose confederation of a large number of principalities differing in religion, ethnicity and language. Its unity as a political entity depended mainly on the determination of the central authority to hold it together. Whenever the Christian king slackened a little in maintaining his authority, each of



Map 35 Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa (after T. Tamarat, *General History of Africa*, UNESCO, 1984).

the incorporated units were ready to detach themselves from it. Among the factors which made Ethiopia a difficult state to govern after its expansion were probably its vastness, a scarcity of resources and a poor communication system between the provinces.

During the period 1500–1800, most of the incorporated provinces continued to be governed by their own hereditary princes under the supreme authority of the Ethiopian kings. That is probably why the Ethiopian state is generally referred to in most of the literature as an empire and its king as 'the king of kings' or emperor. Its structure since the early sixteenth century has been described by T. Tamarat as follows:

The empire had then become so heterogeneous and difficult to govern that the kings could prevent its dismemberment only by keeping the court continually on a war footing, ready to move in any direction required by the latest emergency. More than anything else, this was the reason for the continuous mobility of the court and the absence of any large urban areas during the period.

(1984, pp. 436–7)

While it was still struggling to remain intact during the sixteenth century, the Ethiopian Empire started facing serious threats from its Somali and Afar Muslim neighbors in the east and from the non-Muslim Oromo pastoralists in the south.

The first major threat which it faced was the *jihad* or holy war declared against it in 1527 by Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi (popularly known as 'Gran'), the then *sultan* or *imam* of Adal (Jones and Monroe, 1965, p. 82; Pankhurst, 1967, pp. 49–54; Lewis, 1965, pp. 25–6). Using firearms obtained from the Turkish army in Egypt and Yemen, Gran is said to have overrun a large part of the Ethiopian Empire before being killed in 1534 (Abir, 1975, p. 537). It was Portuguese military aid which saved the Ethiopian Empire from total destruction by the Afar and Somali Muslims and their Turkish supporters (Jones and Monroe, 1965, pp. 83–5; Pankhurst, 1967, pp. 70–3; Levine, 1974, pp. 75–7). After Gran's death, however, the empire gradually reconquered the territories which it had lost to the Afar and Somali Muslim invaders.

Meanwhile the Portuguese military intervention during the Afar-Somali invasion had opened the Ethiopian Empire to more extensive contacts with Christian Europe. The Jesuit order subsequently attempted to convert the Ethiopian Coptic Christians to Catholicism by sending missionaries to the country. They succeeded in converting Emperor Susenyos (1607–32) but his attempt to force his people to follow his example of converting to Catholicism made him very unpopular. In fact, it eventually led to civil war and to his abdication and to the expulsion of the missionaries. Following the expulsion of European missionaries in the seventeenth century, Ethiopia became isolated from other

Christian communities for some time. It also continued to face the problem of Oromo expansion and infiltration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, the empire found itself facing an even greater problem in the middle of the eighteenth century when the powers of provincial rulers increased at the expense of imperial power and the various provinces became almost independent and fought each other (Haberland, 1992, pp. 721-3; Jones and Mourao, 1965, pp. 108-26). As a result, by 1800, Christian Ethiopia was a single state in name only.

Muslim states and their relationship with Ethiopia

Islamic influences had spread to the Horn of Africa soon after the rise of Islam in the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century. Commercial and cultural relations between Arabia and the Ethiopian coast and the Somali coast, on the other hand, date back to pre-Islamic times. These relations led to the establishment of several commercial towns with mixed populations, including many Arabs. The most outstanding among them were Massawa, Dahlak, Assab and Tajura on the Red Sea coast, Zeila and Berbera on the northern Somali coast and Obbia, Mogadishu, Merka and Brava on the Benadir or eastern Somali coast. By 1500, most of these commercial centres had emerged as independent Muslim town-states.

Besides these coastal town-states, a number of Muslim states had also emerged before 1500 in some parts of the interior of the region. They were mostly located in areas bordering the Rift Valley which extends southwards directly opposite the Gulf of Aden. The most important among them were Adal, Dawaro, Bali, Ifat, Faagar, Arabahni and Hadiyya. All of them except Adal were incorporated in the Ethiopian Empire during the fourteenth century. They were easily distinguishable from neighbouring states by their Arabo-Islamic culture. Their structure, like that of the coastal Somali town-states, was essentially Islamic. They were ruled either by sultans, emirs or imams.

Although the attempt to conquer Ethiopia by the Afar and Somali in the sixteenth century failed, it did not end Somali expansion in other parts of the Horn. As cattle-rearing nomads, the various Somali groups seem to have been driven by the pressure of a growing population to look for new pastures in the interior. Arabo-Islamic cultural influence, which they had embraced while living on the northern coast, was probably another factor which enabled them to expand and occupy many areas in the south from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. This Arabo-Islamic cultural influence appears to have given them a strong sense of unity and cultural superiority over other peoples whom they encountered as they moved. Despite their division into clan groups such as the Issa, Darod, Gadabursi, Dir, Hawiya and Rahanweyn, they were all united by their claim of a common origin from Arabia, a common Islamic religion and a common Somali language. These were the basis of their cultural and ethnic identity.

With the exception of those living in the coastal town-states, all nomadic Somali pastoralists remained segmentary and stateless during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Political power among these pastoralists was in the hands of the elders of each clan or sub-clan. Those living in the town-states of the eastern Somali coast such as Obbia, Mogadishu, Merka and Brava fell under nominal Portuguese control in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and under nominal Omani overlordship in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Oromo (Galla) organization and expansion

Like their Somali neighbours, the Oromo were nomadic pastoralists consisting of many genealogically related groups and clans which tended to break away and form new politically independent groups as the populations increased. However, unlike the Somali, who evolved in the northern part of the Horn of Africa before expanding southwards, the Oromo emerged as a community in the southern highlands bordering the Ethiopian province of Bali.

In terms of socio-political organization, the Oromo had a generation-grading system known as *gada*. This generation-grading system had five divisions. Promotion from one *gada* to another took place automatically, collectively and regardless of age every eight years. Militarily, the most important was the third *gada*, generally known as *folle*, while ideologically the fifth *gada* known as *haba* was the ruling *gada*. But the Oromo were a very egalitarian people. All office-bearers in their community were elected and their *haba* were simply expected to implement group decisions rather than decide what was to be done themselves.

However, the Oromo did not establish a new ideology or introduce a new superstructure over the peoples whom they encountered, apparently because they were merely looking for new pastures and areas for settlement. That is probably why the Ethiopian ruling class and church leaders did not regard them as a serious threat to their interests. By the eighteenth century, Oromo groups such as the Arusi, Abichu, Tulama, Wallo-Raya and Mecha were already entrenched in southern and central Ethiopia, and had taken over the provinces of Bosa, Gmama and Inariya where they established their own states of Gimmma or Jimma, Gomma, Guma, Gena and Limmu-Inariya. Moreover, the Ethiopian Empire had incorporated large numbers of them into the administration and the army and had converted many of them to Christianity.

Furthermore, the contact with the peoples of the Ethiopian Empire had a profound impact on Oromo society and culture. Although this differed from one area to another, many Oromo gradually realized that their traditional organization was not suited to their new environment. Thus some began to adopt aspects of their neighbours' social and political institutions. In some cases, for example, traditionally elective offices became hereditary. In other cases they attached themselves to the political institutions of their neighbours. In fact by 1800, as we have already mentioned above, they had established highly centralized states in the Gibe River Basin. This evolutionary transition in Oromo society was no doubt influenced by their Sidama neighbours and by their own transformation from pastoralism to agriculture. The revival of Islam in Ethiopia and the development of caravan trade on the plateau during the second half of the eighteenth century probably contributed also to the establishment of these states. As a matter of fact, Islam was welcomed by the rulers of these states as a unifying force which helped them to consolidate their political power.

Developments in Middle East Africa

The Interlacustrine region

The Interlacustrine Region is that part of East Africa which is made up of areas lying between Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, Mobutu (Albert), Iddi Amin (Edward), Kivu and the northern part of Lake Tanganyika. Several fairly elaborate kingdoms



Map 36 States in Middle East Africa (after Buluda A. Ibandila).

emerged in this region between 1500 and 1800. The most notable among them were Buganda, Bunyoro, Nkole, Karagwe, Kyamutwain, Ihangiro, Buziiza, Rwanda and Burundi (see Map 36).

It was claimed by colonial scholars and European missionaries that the founders of these kingdoms were Hamitic (Cushitic) pastoralists from Ethiopia (Johnston, 1902, pp. 26-56; Ingham, 1957, pp. 131-3; Gorju, 1920, pp. 26-57; Page, 1933). These Hamitic (Cushitic) pastoralists, namely the Bahima (Hima) and the Batesi

(Tutsi), are said to have invaded the region shortly before 1500, conquered its agricultural Bantu-speaking peoples and founded the kingdoms. However, there is no convincing evidence to support this claim because even the oral traditions of the Bahima/Batutsi do not mention or claim Eritropia as their original homeland. Moreover, the Bahima and the Batutsi are completely Bantu-speaking with no indication whatsoever that they might have been Hamitic (Cushitic) minorities which were assimilated by the Bantu.

Another old theory claims that the pastoral rulers of the Interlacustrine kingdoms were Nilotes from the southern Sudanese Republic. This theory was advocated by Father Crazzolaro, M. d'Hertefeldt and a few others (Crazzolaro, 1950, pp. 91-101; d'Hertefeldt, 1965, p. 41). But there is, again, no convincing evidence supporting this theory. With the exception of the Nilotic Bahito rulers of Banyoro, whose arrival and takeover of the kingdom is historically known, there is nothing in the oral traditions of the peoples of the region to suggest that the rulers of the other kingdoms were of Nilotic origin. It was the rise of some clans to power which probably led to the formation of kingdoms in the Interlacustrine Region.

The most notable social and political feature which the Interlacustrine kingdoms acquired as they expanded between 1500 and 1800 was the patron-client relationship. This relationship is sometimes referred to as patronage or clientship. It is the giving of favours and privileges by ruler to their subordinate officials in exchange for service and loyalty. In the Lake Victoria or banana zone of this region, where cattle were few and sometimes absent, patronage was based on land. In the grasslands of the western Interlacustrine Region, on the other hand, it was mainly based on cattle. This relationship was known as *okutoja* in Nkore, *ubuhake* in Rwanda, and as *ubugabire* in Burundi and Buha (Karugire, 1971, pp. 50, 64-6; Itandala, 1986, pp. 38-9). Under this system, the *omugabire* or *umwami* (king) gave cattle to his senior regional administrative officials known as *abakungu* or *abaturire* in order to make them serve him well and loyally. Similarly, his officials at different levels gave cattle to their juniors as rewards for their services and support.

However, it was not only the ruling class which had clients in the cattle zone. Ordinary Bahima and Batutsi cattle-owners got clients also by loaning and giving cattle to poor people in exchange for goods, labour services and recognition of their superiority. This means, therefore, that the patron-client relationship was used by the Bahima/Batutsi cattle-owners for dominating and exploiting non-cattle-owners, especially the Bairu/Bahutu (Hutu) agriculturalists throughout the cattle zone of the Interlacustrine Region.

Hence, by 1800, the people of the Interlacustrine Region had established several elaborate kingdoms. These kingdoms, especially in the cattle zone, had established a stratified socio-political structure based on a rigid class system.

Other parts of the East African interior

The only other parts of the East African interior where states emerged between 1500 and 1800 were the Ntemi Region and north-eastern Mainland Tanzania. The Ntemi Region includes almost the whole of western and central Tanzania where the ruler of each political unit was known as *Ntemi* (Kimambo and Temu, 1969, pp. 22-6). It is a region made up of areas known as Usukuma, Unyamwezi, Iramba, Ugogo and Ukimbu. States known as *mabutemi* (sing. *bntemi*) started being formed in the sixteenth century by uniting a number of neighbouring Bantu-speaking clans. These states were more numerous and smaller than those of the Interlacustrine Region. Their structure was also much simpler because they were not as stratified as those of the former. Each *bntemi* was headed by a *ntemi* who was assisted by a group of state elders called *banang'oma* and number of ritual officials at the central level and by headmen known as *banangwa* at the local level (Itandala, 1983, pp. 69-75). The subject peasantry owned the means of production communally and provided goods and labour services to the ruling class.

As Stahl, Kimambo and Feierman have shown in their writings, the Chagga, Pare and Shambala states which rose in north-eastern Mainland Tanzania between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries were not a product of military conquest or diffusion of political ideas from elsewhere as claimed earlier by colonial scholars (Stahl, 1964, pp. 22-56; Kimambo, 1969, pp. 1-10, 47-81; Feierman, 1974, pp. 70-90). We now know that their nuclei were established by iron-smelting clans, while their expansion and centralization of their social and political institutions were carried out by other groups which took them over in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With the exception of the Shamba kingdom (see Plate 160), which resembled those of the Interlacustrine Region in structure, the states of north-eastern Tanzania were small in scale and simple in structure like the *ntemi* states.

Elsewhere in the East African interior, no states were established between 1500 and 1800. Instead, people in the areas concerned used segmentary institutions such as kinship ties, age-set groupings and religious leadership for managing their socio-political and economic affairs. The political set-up which emerged among the Bantu peoples of eastern Kenya, for example, was based on descent groups occupying small territorial units (Kimambo, 1974, pp. 205-7; Lamphear, 1970, pp. 75-101). Each of these territorial units was governed by a council of elders. This kind of gerontocratic rule had its counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania.

The Swahili coast

The Swahili coast stretched from southern Somalia to northern Mozambique. It got its name from its Bantu-speaking peoples who became known as Waswahili or Swahili and spoke a language known as Kiswahili after settling there since the beginning of the first millennium AD. By 1500 these people had established several politically independent port towns of different sizes such as Kisimayu, Lamu, Malindi, Mombasa, Mtang'ata, Kaole, Kunduchi, Kisiwani Mafia and Kilwa Kisiwani (Nurse and Spear, 1985, pp. 1-21, 37-67). They had also been interacting with foreigners from the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula who came to the East African coast as traders or settlers. In the many centuries of interaction with these Muslim traders and settlers, the Swahili became Muslim and assimilated a sizeable number of Persians and Arabs in their community (Sutton, 1966, pp. 8-18; Nurse and Spear, 1985, pp. 37-67). They also adopted many cultural traits and words from the languages of the newcomers.

The Swahili group which ruled the town-states called itself Shirazi. This group is said to have evolved in an area known as Shungwaya in the northern Swahili coast, though it claims to have originally come from Persia (Chittick, 1965, pp. 275-94; Nurse and Spear, 1985, pp. 70-9). This means that, by 1500, it had spread or expanded to all parts of the Swahili coast and the offshore islands of Pemba, Zanzibar, Mafia, Kilwa and Comoro. As Muslims, the rulers of the main Swahili town-states bore familiar Muslim titles such as *sultan* or *emir*. The smaller towns and the intervening rural communities between them were ruled by hereditary leaders known as *madivani* (sing. *divani*) or *majiube* (sing. *jube*). The *sultan*, *emir* or *divani* was advised and assisted by elders belonging to prominent families in the community called *wanungwana*. These *wanungwana* controlled also economic and religious affairs. The social and political role which they played in all coastal towns has been clearly and briefly explained by Nurse and Spear as follows:

Each village or town was also divided into two sections, a northern half and a southern half. One half was usually older and included the oldest and most prestigious families, the *urangama*, who dominated political and religious leadership, while the other half included subsistence farmers and fishermen, Swahili from elsewhere, Arab traders, and neighbouring peoples

(1983, p. 23)

At the bottom of the social ladder, there were a few slaves who were being used as domestic servants by the dominant classes in the towns.

The Portuguese conquered the whole East African coast shortly after discovering the Cape sea route from Europe to South-East Asia in 1498 (see Plate 161). Having done so, they introduced measures to monopolize trade in the region and they forced the rulers of all the main towns to pay specified sums of money annually to the Portuguese crown as tribute. These measures led to economic decline in the region during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As expected this state of affairs led to resistance against Portuguese overlordship in the seventeenth century. However, the Swahili towns were only able to liberate themselves from Portuguese domination after receiving military help from the Arabs of Oman at the end of the seventeenth century. After helping them to expel the Portuguese from their region, Oman seized the opportunity to impose its own overlordship on them. Due to internal political conflicts, however, it was unable to establish effective control on the Swahili towns before the nineteenth century.

One positive result of the expulsion of the Portuguese from the Swahili Coast was the gradual recovery of its

economy and prosperity. By the middle of the eighteenth century, several other towns such as Tanga, Pangani, Sadani, Bagamoyo, Mbwamaji, Kilwa Kivinje, Lindi and Mikindani emerged in response to the gradual development of caravan trade between the coast and the interior. These towns, and the older ones, grew bigger and became prosperous when Seyyid Said, the Sultan of Oman, established the Zanzibar Sultanate shortly after 1800.

Madagascar and neighbouring islands

There is consensus among scholars on Madagascar that its modern population is an outcome of fusion between mainly Indonesian and African elements and some settlers from the Arabian peninsula. However, there is no agreement on who the original inhabitants of the island were, what the sequence of immigration of the communities was, and what the origin of the ruling groups was (Heseltine, 1971, pp. 13-14, 51-66; Thompson and Adloff, 1963, p. 3). It is also evident that the three centuries from 1500 to 1800 were a formative period in Malagasy history during which ethnic and cultural fusion occurred which resulted in the evolution of the different modern ethnic groups such as the Sakalava, Amankara, Sihanaka, Betsimisaraka, Bezanozano, Merina, Betsileo, Antemoro, Antambahoaka, Antesaka, Tanala, Bara, Mahafaly, Antandroy and Antanosy (Keni, 1992, p. 848). This was also the period during which states were formed in different parts of the island (see Map 37).



Map 37 Ethnic groups of Madagascar and the location of neighbouring islands (after P. Munibwa, 1974).

It appears that major immigrations from overseas had ended by about 1550. The different communities had also, by then, established many small political units throughout the island. From this period, however, some royal lineages emerged in three separate areas which united some of these earlier political units to form kingdoms (Kent, 1970, pp. 4-17; 1992, pp. 849-59; Thompson and Adloff, 1965, p. 4). The Maroserana dynasty, for example, founded the Sakalava kingdoms of Menabe and Boina in western Madagascar. The Andriana, on the other hand, became a ruling group of the Merina in the central high plateaus, while the Anteozy emerged as the ruling group of the south-eastern Antemoro. Several other kingdoms were established by these ruling groups among the Bara of the southern interior, the Mahafaly of the south-west, the Antandroy of the southernmost coast and among the Antesaka, Antefasy and Antanosy of the south-east. All these kingdoms were loosely organized, each under its own king and a feudal hierarchy consisting of various strata of nobles, freemen and slaves. Only the Sakalava and the Betsimisaraka succeeded in uniting several kingdoms to form confederations which controlled large parts of western and eastern Madagascar respectively. But both confederations declined in the late eighteenth century because of internal contradictions and external forces. In contrast, the weak and disunited Imerina kingdom became united under the leadership of an able king

and introduced innovations which enabled it to expand its hegemony over many parts of the island after 1800.


While these internal developments were taking place, Madagascar found itself dealing with different European nations which were trading with South-East Asia, namely the Portuguese, Dutch, French and English. These nations, especially the French, established trading posts at different locations on the coast. Their main interest was to obtain slaves for export overseas and to the nearby Mascarene Islands of Bourbon (Réunion) and Ile-de-France (Mauritius) where the French established coffee plantations in the eighteenth century. Since these islands seem to have been devoid of people, many slaves from Madagascar and the East African coast were taken there.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Hayim H. K. Bhila

Village communities, chiefs and states

This brief discussion will concern itself with the nature of power, authority, government and politics in the traditional southern African societies. It will focus on the political



Map 38 Early societies of Southern Africa (after *Southern Africa. A Modern History*, 1978).

institutions of the early inhabitants of Zimbabwe who are now known by the collective name, Shona, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The political institutions of the Ndebele who settled in Matebeleland in the early nineteenth century were very much similar to those of the Zulu during the period under review.

Extrapolations will also be made regarding the Tswana, Sotho, Swazi, Zulu and other early inhabitants of South Africa. These inhabitants were organized in politically independent groups. However, these groups varied in size, origin, sometimes language and customs but their political and social institutions were basically similar. This discussion assumes that these political and social institutions underwent very little change until the advent of the missionaries in the second half of the nineteenth century and colonialism in the last quarter of the century (see Map 38).

The village among the Shona of Zimbabwe

The smallest unit of administrative importance was not the individual family but the village (*musha*) under a headman (*samusha*) whose function will be discussed in this chapter later. An aggregate of separate and independent villages formed a ward (*dunhu*) under a ward head (*sadunhu*) (Clyde, 1960, p. 147). Amongst the Shona-speaking peoples the villages were made up essentially of a core of kinsmen who traced their descent back to a common ancestor through the male line only. The size of the villages varied enormously from a cluster of huts to congregations which ranged between thirty and fifty huts. The kinsmen were generally linked to a headman who belonged to the village. There were cases, however, where the kinsmen did not necessarily derive from a common ancestor. Quite often there were several patrilineal groups in the village who were linked to the village headman's patrilineage through a woman at some point in the distant past. A typical example was a situation where a village was founded by a man and his wife; their sons grew to maturity in the village and after marrying, they brought their wives to live in the village. The man's daughter's probably married out into some other village initially. For some reason or other, however, such as severe quarrels in her husband's village or fear of witchcraft there, or because for some reason there was not enough land available, the daughter might return to her father's village with her husband and her children. The children then grew up in the village, together with their mother's brother's children. It should be noted that by traditional rules of descent these children did not belong to the headman's descent group but to the descent group of their mother. In the event of death of the founding village headman his place was taken, according to the principles of patrilineal succession, by one of his sons. The groups related to the new village headman's sister remained in the village though they could not expect the headmanship to fall to their lineage. In due course, other female kinsmen might return to the village so that in a village of some age there would be the headman's lineage, through female links. There might also be several others attached to the headman's lineage by even more remote kinship links or through no links at all, but these were rare.

The village was therefore not only the smallest autonomous political unit in a chiefdom but also an economic unit. That is, it produced practically all the food, tools and other economic goods and services it needed. It was the unit in which land was allocated and also within which most of the

disputes were settled. The position of the village headman was and still is important since he represented his village to the chief or king as the case might be.

Ward

The next administrative unit among the Shona-speaking peoples was the ward under a ward head (*sadunhu*) (Hughes, pp. 29-53). Ward boundaries were clearly demarcated but the size and population varied greatly, though as a rule a ward had a nuclear body of agnates which spread over more than one village and the head of the external group was also a ward head by hereditary right. If the ward head belonged to the lineage which controlled the larger tribal territory (*nyika*) he was called *jiinda*. The headmen of the remaining village might be related to the ward by cognatic ties or might be non-relatives.

In some groups, notably the Vamhira of Svosve in Hwedza, in Central Mashonaland, women were sometimes appointed as ward heads and among the Manyika in eastern Zimbabwe, females of the chiefs, titled *vazviri*, did succeed the *machinda* (chief's sons) under special circumstances and with special rituals.

The unity of the ward was based partly on genealogical and partly on territorial ties and probably its most characteristic feature was the control vested in it over the land rights of the inhabitants. The ward head (*sadunhu*) sanctioned and established new villages, settled disputes between inhabitants and exercised some obligations such as the initiation of the thanksgiving ceremony when the crops had been reaped. In the past he was entitled to occasional free labour but now this has been virtually replaced by reciprocal activities of ordinary work parties.

The state

The widest functional political unit which incorporated a number of wards was the state (*nyika*). The population of the *nyika* was classified into *machinda* (male members of the chief's patrilineage) and *vatorwa* (foreigners). This division did not imply political or social subordination but simply a distinction of origin between the lineage of the chief and others. No *machinda*, unless he occupied a position of authority in the state structure ranked higher than a *vatorwa*. All allegiance was personal, and subjects who were dissatisfied with one chief could transfer their allegiance to another.

In the course of his government the chief was assisted to a very large extent by a council of heads of wards and villages (*makoto*, in his chiefly capacity) and by a panel of personal advisors chosen from close relatives who usually stayed in or near his village. Their position was not hereditary but their authority was considerable. They also acted as a court of assessors and served in many ways as intermediaries between him and his subjects. Of special importance, however, was the chief's sister's son or father's son who was the only person who had jurisdiction in actions to which the chief himself was a party, and who acted as arbitrator in the chief's own family.

Position of the chiefs

The power of the Shona chiefs was relatively limited compared with that of the Ndebele kings. They did not have

centralized and disciplined age-regiments whereby they could exercise military control, and although they were at the head of the traditional system, subjects could and did appeal from them to the oracle. Nor did they exercise the religious influence associated with straightforward ancestral hierarchy. Furthermore the system of collateral succession found in most Shona states limited the power of any one family; state advisors exercised constant restraint on the behaviour of chiefs and kings.

Ritual functions of the Shona chiefs were generally confined to propitiation of their own ancestors. The periodic great ceremonies comparable to the Ndebele ceremonies associated with the army and the first fruits were conspicuous by their absence. The necessary sacrifices to their own ancestors were made after consultation with diviners and were generally carried out by their kinsmen. The rituals associated with 'doctoring' the personality of the chiefs have now disappeared except on their accession though certain restrictions are placed on their behaviour. Examples are Nyashanu of Buhera who cannot cross a particular river, or the Hera chief who must be blindfolded and carried over the Chadzila stream with shouting, singing and beating drums.

The ritual position of the Manobo dynasty of the Rozvi Empire during the eighteenth century was apparently more highly developed than that of the neighbouring states of Manyika and Ureve. The chief was undoubtedly the wealthiest man in the state but he was also supposed to be the most generous. He derived his income from fines, court fees and property confiscated from people guilty of witchcraft. His subjects were obliged to render tribute, through labour in cultivating and harvesting his fields and building his village.

The Ndebele and Shangani

We now move on to consider the nature of villages in Nguni societies or societies which have been greatly influenced by Nguni culture like the Ndebele and Shangani in north-western and eastern Zimbabwe respectively. Among the Ndebele and Shangani, villages in the sense of a concentration of huts occupied by people linked in a variety of ways to the headman did not exist (Clyde, 1960, p. 149). Instead, the local pattern was one of scattered homesteads, each homestead being occupied by a man and his immediate family. Sometimes several brothers lived together but as a rule the settlements were small, with one or two huts, and were dotted over the countryside.

The Zulu

The basis of Zulu village organization was an *umuzi* (the homestead) usually comprising the headman, with his wives and children, and his younger brothers, with their wives and families and often married sons too.⁴ As elsewhere in Africa today, the tendency is for villages to become smaller and smaller in size, to the extent that a village may only include one man, his wives and children. In the past, however, there were many people in the village, including very often a number of dependents, non-related people who had put themselves under the protection of a village headman. The village was a self-contained unit in which a complete life could be led. Each village, whether Shona, Ndebele or Zulu, had its own cattle which supplied milk, and its own field, in which sufficient corn and vegetables were grown to supply the needs of the

inhabitants. In addition, the village was both the basis and the pattern of the political organization of the clan.

South African societies

As regards the South African political institutions during the period under review an attempt will be made to highlight the main features of the governmental systems of these communities rather than give a detailed description of each one of them. In most South African communities, notably the Heikun Bergdama, the Nguni, Tsonga, Venda, Sotho and Khoikoi, there was always a person who was recognized as chief by the rest of the community and he held office for life (Schapera, 1936, p. 40).

However, there were a few exceptions to this rule among different communities. The exception among the Khoikhoi was that a chief could be expelled or killed if he sufficiently antagonized his subjects; the north-eastern Sotho communities expected him to commit suicide when he was very old; he could also forfeit chieftainship if his territory was subjugated by another chief. Outside these exceptions there was no prescribed or enforced limit to his tenure of office though he might retire voluntarily because of old age or infirmity.

The chief's duties and powers were many and varied including representing his people in their dealings with outsiders, and organizing such communal activities as war, collective labour and certain types of ritual; he often led his men into battle. The chief was both legislator and judge, with power to inflict capital punishment; he claimed many forms of tribute, in both labour and kind; he controlled the distribution and use of land, co-ordinated agricultural activities; provided for the poor and needy, and rewarded those who served him well; and he performed religious and magical ceremonies on behalf of his people. The duties of the Khoikhoi chief were, however, more limited.⁵ He too administered justice and punished offenders by death but he had comparatively little control over land tenure and economic life generally, and did not himself act as priest or magician. The San or Bergdama chief, unlike the others, had no judicial functions or organized penal powers; his main duties were to direct the migrations and subsistence activities of his people and to perform certain ceremonies for their welfare.

There were several segments of authority below that of chieftainship among the San and the communities of Bantu origin each of which had an official head. The Khoikhoi and Bergdama, however, lacked functionaries of this kind. The Khoikhoi had only one grade of local authority consisting of the 'headman' in charge of settlements outside the community headquarters. Among the Tswana, Nguni, Tsonga, Venda and many Sotho there were village headmen and ward heads. The head of a major group was also head of one or more of its subdivisions. Examples can easily be picked up from the Cape Nguni where the chief had his own district and sub-districts as well as among the Ngwato of Botswana.

Thus the group of rulers in Southern Africa was quite heterogeneous. It was also hierarchical with the power of some rulers extending throughout the territory, while that of others was limited to a ward or village. A few made the decisions, and many executed them.

The chief everywhere had assistants of various kinds who might be distinguished as advisors who helped him to determine policy, and executive officers who helped him to

carry out his routine tasks. The same people were often found serving in both capacities but the two categories might also vary in personal affairs. These two categories will, therefore be discussed separately.

A Southern African chief might seek advice from anybody whom he considered likely to be helpful in a certain matter. But as a rule there were a few people usually regarded as his 'confidential advisors' whom he consulted habitually and fairly often. They seldom belonged to a formally constituted body, nor did their identity need to be made public, though they always included some of his close agnates: they were merely persons he trusted and upon whose opinion he relied on, and he consulted them privately and informally, individually or collectively, and might vary them according to the issues involved.

The chief had also a formal and wider council which met as a body at his summons to discuss important questions of public policy. It generally included all sub-chiefs and prominent headmen, with other influential persons, and was therefore representative of the group as a whole. Some members lived permanently at the capital while others came periodically to stay there for a while, and usually the meeting consisted mainly of them. But on occasions of great importance the whole body was specially convened. The proceedings of such a meeting were treated as private among the Tswana and Venda, and nobody might attend unless personally invited; elsewhere the meeting was usually held in public and, in addition to the recognized members, anybody else who wished might come. There was seldom need for the full council to meet more than once a year and the interval might even be longer. But members present in the capital were expected to help the chief try the cases which were brought to his court, and thus advise him frequently in another capacity. With the exception of the Sotho, the council was the community's main deliberative assembly and whatever was decided there bound the people as a whole. After the meeting, every local authority returned to his area or, if outside members were summoned, a message was sent informing him of any decision; in either event, he then called together his own followers and told them the news.

But among the Sotho, especially the Tswana, almost all matters of public concern were discussed finally at a popular assembly, commonly termed *piso*, which ordinary people were expected to attend. Such assemblies, summoned by the chief whenever he thought fit, were in some communities held very often, at times almost weekly, except when the people were busy at their fields. They usually met in council at a place called *Kgotla*, adjoining the chief's residence. Normally only the men present in the capital were summoned, perhaps merely to be told about some forthcoming ceremony, to receive instructions about public labour or to listen to other formal announcements; and if necessary the message was conveyed to outlying settlements through their local rulers.

But on important occasions, as when new laws were proposed or other major decisions had to be made, the whole community was convened; if the matter was at all critical, such as serious internal disputes or threatened invasion, attendance might even be compulsory. A crucial meeting of this kind was sometimes held in the open veld, some distance from the capital, and the men all came to it armed and ready for any eventuality; it was usually preceded or followed by a collective drive for game.

Community assemblies were also known among the Nguni and Tsonga, but owing to the local pattern of settlement,

the scattered homesteads, they were much more difficult to organize and were, therefore, usually held only on great ceremonial occasions such as the annual first-fruits festival or before the army went to war. Consequently they were not nearly as important in the system of government; there was seldom any public discussion of policy except perhaps about waging war and even then the chief merely made use of the occasion to inform people about decisions already reached by him and his council. It was usually at the first-fruit ceremony that the chief announced new laws or the creation of a new regiment.

The kinds of advisory institutions, about which much has been already said, were found also at village and ward levels. Among the Nguni, such local assemblies were more frequent than those of the whole community, perhaps because they were simpler to arrange, but even among the Tswana, the chief, when anxious to have something considered thoroughly, might instruct his subjects to consult their people at home, whose views they subsequently reported at a full community gathering.

A Khoikhoi chief had only two official sets of advisors. The first was a restricted council, which varied according to the size of the community whom he consulted as a body and privately on most aspects of policy. In the larger communities, some of these men also constituted the main court of justice. The councils' decisions on all major issues such as war and peace had to be ratified by a much larger popular assembly specially summoned by the chief for the purpose. Local headmen had similar advisory bodies drawn from their own followers, which also met only as business arose.

Among the San and Bergdama, the chief discussed matters of public concern with all men of his group. They normally gathered every evening round the central camp fire, where they ate together and gossiped, and where never there was need to consider what action to take. The group was generally very small.

The executive staff

As in the case of the advisory council, the executive staff of South African chiefs differed considerably in composition and size from one people to another. The most important of the chief's executive staff was commonly termed the 'great *induna*'. He was in effect the chief's principal lieutenant in all his activities and often deputized for him in his absence. The *induna* was the recognized intermediary between the chief and the community, and royal spokesman on many formal and other occasions. It was normally through him that matters were referred to the chief for decision or action, and he could himself deal with those of minor concern. He interviewed important messengers, received all cases that came to the chief's court, arranged for them to be heard and might himself act as judge, helped the chief lead the army and organize council or community ceremonies, and supervised the running of the chief's household. In the larger communities there were several other kinds of *induna* who were sometimes distinguished by title as well as function, for example, administration of justice; some were in charge of the army and also controlled peace-time regimental activities, and others looked after land matters, and royal herds of cattle or the reception and entertainment of distinguished visitors. There were also the chief's state messengers or ambassadors on important occasions, who

might further be sent to investigate and solve serious local disputes.

Everywhere, too, the chief employed one or more professional magicians as his 'community doctors'. They were not so much executive officers as technical experts, but they played an important part in the system of government. They protected the chief's person with charms, helped on such ritual occasions as rainmaking, the 'doctoring' of the army, community initiation ceremonies and the annual first-fruit festival; and they always worked at his request and under his supervision.

In addition to regular and constant forms of assistance, the chief occasionally employed other *indunas* for special purposes, for example, among the Tswana and most northern Sotho, large-scale undertakings were organized through the age-sets or 'regiments' into which all adult members of the community were grouped. Each regiment consisted of coevals and there were separate regiments of men and women. The chief created a new regiment every five years or thereabouts when all the eligible youths, aged roughly from fourteen to eighteen years, were initiated simultaneously and given a distinctive group name. The chief subsequently called upon it for public service whenever he wished. The men's regiments fought as separate units in the community army and in times of peace were often employed on such tasks as rounding up stray cattle, hunting game, destroying beasts of prey and acting as police. Work of this nature was given only to regiments whose members were still relatively young and active.

The Zulu and Swazi also used age-regiments for both military purposes and community labour. In the heyday of Zulu power, each regiment on active service lived in a separate village of its own close to the chief's royal residence; these villages, controlled by resident *indunas* and various subordinates, often had thousands of inhabitants and were thus a conspicuous exception to the traditional Nguni pattern of settlement. The men remained there for years until the chief formally allowed them to return home and marry; when not at war, they were used for anything else he wanted done; they worked his fields, built his village, herded cattle and hunted and raided for him, arrested and, if required, killed convicted or suspected criminals, served as messengers and porters and when not engaged on such tasks 'danced and idled away their time'.

The Swazi apparently never had a standing army of this type but some men from each regiment were usually in residence at the royal villages and available for service either public or domestic.

The military organization of the Venda and Tsonga was likewise based upon a system of age-regiments though, as among the Tswana, the members of the regiment usually lived at their homes when not at war. Among the Nguni of the Cape and southern Sotho, both the army and community labour were organized on a local basis. The men of each district, regardless of age, constituted a separate division of the army, and could be summoned as a unit to work for the chief.

Succession

Chieftainship could be obtained in a variety of ways, notably through birthright, formal election, the use of wealth or military achievement. Among South African societies chieftainship was normally hereditary from father to son although rules of succession varied in detail from one people to another. In most Bantu and Khoikhoi societies it was not

uncommon for a person to become chief by usurpation or by seceding and creating a community of his own. But in such circumstances the usurper almost invariably belonged to a local ruling line. In most Bantu groups the eldest son of the 'great wife' was the heir apparent. This woman was rarely the first that a chief married but her status was always clearly defined. Unlike his other wives she was chosen by the royal family in consultation with the community councillors; she was preferably the daughter of another chief or, as among many Sotho societies, her husband's maternal cross-cousin or other close relative; except among the Venda and certain Sotho communities, the cattle given as her bride-wealth included contributions from all important members of the community, especially sub-chiefs and headmen; and at her wedding, a distinctive ceremony was often held to indicate that she was to be 'mother of the community' or 'wife of the country'. Among the Venda and Sotho she was usually chosen for the future chief during the lifetime and through the agency of his father. Among the Nguni and the Tsonga she was never married until he had already succeeded to office, and often not until he had ruled for some time; and should he die before choosing her, as sometimes happened among the Swazi and other Nguni societies, the most nobly born of his widows with sons was usually accepted as mother of the heir. If the great wife had no son, her younger sister or another substitute might be taken to bear one for her; as among the Sotho, she might cohabit after her husband's death with his younger brother. Failing this, the right of succession passed to the eldest son of the wife next in rank. If the chief had no male agnate descendants, he was succeeded by a brother's son, usually the man nearest to him in line of birth.

Conclusion

In nearly all southern African societies the institutions of chief served the same purpose: ensuring rainfall, plentiful harvests, victory in war, and so on, by means of ritual offerings to the chiefs' ancestors at their graves. The ancestors were the real wielders of power in the chieftaindom, and the reigning chief was merely a representative who was granted a limited share in their power. It was also possible for a chief to forfeit his power if he lost the mandate to rule from his ancestors. The chief was not an absolute dictator as it is generally believed. He was the chief-in-council. The council consisted of subsidiary chiefs and headmen. Among some communities, when additions to the laws or amendments to them were to be made, the regular procedure was for them to be considered by the chief in council, and for them to be submitted, for discussion, to a general assembly where every commoner had the right of speech.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

It appears from the survey of the areas covered in this chapter that the picture of political structures in precolonial Africa was not as confused as is depicted in some studies. African political systems shared many common features. Thus, contrary to what is generally believed, the ruler was not an absolute dictator because there were various traditional ways of getting rid of such a ruler.

Differences, however, were not uncommon. Some polities experienced earlier and greater exposure to external influences with a significant impact on their political systems.

On the whole, political structures in Africa south of the Sahara were the product of the environment and history.

NOTES

- 1 The most typical, in fact landmark, studies are essentially those of: Bauman and Westermann, 1948; Murdock, 1959; Herkovits, 1965.
- 2 In Bantu Africa the leopard is the ultimate symbol of the sacred nature of political power. The political leader takes his stand on its mottled skin, wearing a necklace of its canine teeth. If these articles – or the remains of any other 'sacred' animal – were kept by an ordinary mortal, it would be regarded as an act of political defiance.
- 3 On the basis of 'perpetual kinship' the Kingiri, Kniama (cursed by their father) and Lueji (younger sister blessed by the same father) in fact represent several generations of individuals who each assume in turn the same identity.
- 4 For a thorough discussion of the political structure of the Zulu kingdom see chapter two of Guy, 1979.
- 5 For a detailed account see Ham, 1928.

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27.3

CULTURE

Harris Memel-Foté

CULTURE AND RELIGION IN NUBIAN AFRICA¹: A QUESTION OF IDENTITY

There is no society without culture and no culture without religion, amongst other components (literature, the arts, medicine, and so on). Religion, a social and cultural reality, includes an essential core and the cultural model that supports it. By essential core we are referring to the fundamental beliefs and rituals, the community of believers and the apparatus (body of officiants, calendar, sacred places, shrines) that keeps it all going. The survival over time of this core, in the same state of homogeneity, constitutes an identity. It can also be described in terms of formation, in the three senses of that word: a process of production, a process of maintenance and the product of these two processes. To the cultural model corresponds the economic and political formation, with its language and its value system. Such is European civilization in relation to Christianity.

The question of the evolution of religion so understood may be envisaged as a question of collective and personal identity. With respect to the real world, it is a matter of determining the conditions that require the sudden or gradual, partial or total abandonment of the essential core, with or without the collapse, which might also be partial or total, of the cultural model, the socio-cultural agents or brokers that are at work, the modalities and stages, the resistance and the consequences. With respect to meaning, it means knowing whether the resisting identity is a positive or a negative identity, in what sense the identity is a construct, and if that construct is progressive or regressive in the context of the overall cultural development of humanity.

There are at least three possible situations. The first is that of a traditional culture with or without a state, in which the indigenous religion suffers an internal crisis: innovation (for example, the adoption of a new god) appears to be effected without problems because of the fact that there is unity of language. The second is when, because of the needs of trade, migration or conquest, the adoption of a foreign religion, written or otherwise, is imposed along with a new societal project: the transfer of the doctrine from one language to the other and its interpretation become an indispensable political compromise. In some places, there is more or less conflict-laden collective appropriation, pitting the guardians of the old identity against the brokers of the new one, those who support the former against those who support the latter; this appropriation is differentiated (as between strata, classes or ethnic groups), which means that this process proceeds at different speeds at different times and in different places. The third situation is one where the antagonism is potentially that much greater because of the fact that it pits not only

two religious systems (polytheism and monotheism) against one another, but also several monotheisms, thus making any appropriation precarious.

From these processes there result three degrees of appropriation, and in the case of a foreign religion three forms of acculturation: practices carry on side by side, there is a synthesis of beliefs and finally there is absolute appropriation, which brings the mystic or saint closer to the founder of a religion. The first two stages are called *amalgamation* and *syncretism* by M. Augé and *dualism* and *cultural reciprocity* by Trimmingham who sees the third stage as *assimilation*.

After assimilating the essential core of a religion and the associated features of its cultural model, and attaining freedom of initiative, in particular in the area of language, a community of believers that has thus been dissociated and differentiated constructs a new religious and cultural identity, a particular identity. By integrating itself into the universal community of the faithful of this religion, it at the same time incorporates that religion it is experiencing into the religious and cultural history of the society whose other activities and functions it shares. This renewal consists in an enrichment through the addition of new elements of belief and a cultural enlargement through the appropriation of foreign cultural traits (language, writing, clothing, architecture, and so on).

As it overcomes the contradiction between, on the one hand, this renewal and, on the other, the rerooting of which that renewal is both the occasion and the factor for the social fraction attached to the old identity, the historical movement of the relations of force, even against the exclusivism of states, effects a new synthesis and forms a new collective identity. The significance of this new synthesis or formation is twofold. The old identities seem positive for having preserved the societies from dissolution by teaching tolerance, but negative for having excluded writing. The new religious identities are regressive by virtue of the intolerance with which they threaten societies with an indigenous or different religion, but are on the contrary progressive as harbingers of modernity, through writing, the basis of science, and through the world awareness that they give to communities.

These general considerations apply globally to Africa from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, that part of Africa which we call Nubian and of which the *General History of Africa* presupposes, confirms and reconstructs the unity.

A detailed demonstration is rendered difficult by certain methodological considerations: the scale of the topic in time and space, the unevenness of documentation as between coastal countries and inland ones, the insufficient number of regional syntheses, the failure still to carry through the projected history of indigenous religions and the lack of figures. To these must be added some theoretical ones: while

the questions of the existence, role and unity of traditional religion no longer arise, there remain those of specificity and naming. Two theses confront each other on these points. One, generally sustained by members of the clergy and well synthesized by John S. Mbiti in *An Introduction to African Religion* (1975), treats this religion as a sort of universal quasi-monotheism, with distinct categories (holiness, mercy of God the creator, paradise). The other, developed by anthropologists, in particular in the *Le Grand atlas des religions* (1988), presents it on the contrary as a specific polytheism. African religion? Yes, but then this is in the same way as the monotheisms so long since appropriated whose 'African-ness' is obvious: the Judaism of the Falasha, African or 'Black' Islam, prophetism, and so on. No, if its general traits make it one with all polytheistic religions. Rather it is religion that is indigenous in the etymological sense, that is of which Africa is the birthplace, since the terms paganism, already loaded, and animism seem too broad.

Nevertheless, backed by anthropology whose data over a long period give rise to hypotheses that remain plausible, the better documented history of the monotheistic religions makes possible a review of this evolution in three phases. First, at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, there was a major fact, that is religious pluralism; then, from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, in opposition to the old identities, came the formation of new religious identities (Islamic and Christian); and finally, in the eighteenth century, a century of promises, despite regression elsewhere, the consolidation, maturation and extension of pluralism were combined.

LATE FIFTEENTH EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY, A MAJOR FACT: RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

What were the social and cultural bases, components, the functioning and consequences of this pluralism?

Social and cultural bases of religious pluralism

Many of the peoples and societies identified today, who were the creators and consumers of cultures, were already in existence: for example, the Wolof, Hausa and Edo (Bini) in west Africa, the Mpongwe, Shona, and Tonga in central and southern Africa, and the Masai, Amhara and Hova in east Africa and in Madagascar.

Their cultures were marked by four main features. These were fundamentally peasant and village-based cultures. Everywhere the civilizations of agriculturists had a preponderant effect over the others. Associated with cereal and root-based agriculture were herding (Fulbe, Khoi Khoi), river and sea fishing (see Plate 162) (Somono, Teke), hunting and gathering (Pygmies, San) or mining (gold, copper, salt, iron). But being agricultural, these cultures also had signs of fragility: poor soils, underpopulated areas, suitable but light implements (hoe, axe, machete and bow), one main source of energy, men and women, and finally, a preponderance of orality, which stocks the experiences in various forms of social memory (*dyeli* or griot, *dja* or gold weight, message bells, drums). These cultures also had a socio-political pluralism. Matrilineal and patrilineal systems coexisted, as did various types of socio-political lineage (Grebo), age-set village based (Oromo-Galla), kingdom (Serer) and empire (Amhara). But

for thousands of years, across the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Sahara, these cultures were open to transcontinental commerce. Towns were the focus of exchanges and hence of the diffusion of religious ideas, whether ancient towns (Axum), medieval towns (Awdagost), or recent towns (Cahinba).²

Urban life was controlled by an aristocracy, a diverse trading class (Arabs, Berbers, Afro-Shirazi, Wangara), a stratum of ideologues, literate or otherwise, with the intellectual support of religious pluralism.

Religious pluralism: components, functioning and consequences

The components of pluralism

Indigenous religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, in chronological order, made up the landscape. The polytheisms and monotheisms of the time had in common a close link between sacred and the divine, sacred and political power.

But unlike monotheisms, the indigenous religions were based on a pluralism of law, the right for each community, even under an imperial state religion, to have its own sacred, symbolic and ritual reference points, which underpinned tolerance and an ideal of religious peace which could have no obstacle but a political one. Whence, it seems, comes the openness of most representations.

These religions have been called religions of nature where the concept of religion is not lacking. In a first sense, the Great God, separate and remote in many myths (Zanahary, Mbori, Masa Dambali), is assimilated to heaven and his paradas to Earth; intermediate gods – Yoruba *orisha* – are identified with various powers (stars, planets, animals, enemies of various sorts, and so on) and all beings are identified with a hierarchy of forces (see Plate 163). The vast numbers in the pantheon thus oblige human beings to pay devotion to manifestations of nature and justify divination and possessive rituals and the numerous materials and forms of sacrifice. Despite the contradictions among the cosmogonies this devotion is all the more justified (that is, the world always existing for the Basuto, a world created by God according to the Kikuyu, and the world being self-created through nothingness by the Bambara). Most of them accept that spirits and animals were on earth first, the former being owners of the soil, the latter civilizing heroes of humanity. In a second sense, humanity inserts itself into nature, lives in symbiosis with it and is the microcosm of it.

But given that nature, as a network of symbols, is not dissociated from culture, these religions can equally be characterized as religions of society. First, they are society-centred, even in the conception of the person. Whether humanity is the creation of the divine power, a worthy emanation or a vegetable product, depending on the cosmologies, it generally appears there was a pair (man/woman). A human being partakes of matter through his perishable body, of divinity through his immortal soul and of society through the ancestral element of reincarnation, his name and his motto. Furthermore, the goal of these religions remains not personal salvation but the conservation of society. In its first image, this society is the pantheon, which obeys the principles of the structure and functioning of human society. In its second image, this society is that of the ancestors who 'survive' through the ritual practices of the living. Finally, the third image is that of lineages

agglomerated into villages or kingdoms which are a prolongation of their ancestors on their territory, whose chiefs remain objects of veneration (see Plate 164).

In truth, these religions are religions of the alliance between the individual and society, between man and nature, through the mediation of the ancestors and God. While nature is the image of the divinity, the condition of humanity and the means of labour and subsistence, it is also the product of human action, since humanity has participated since the beginning of the world in its creation. Sacrifices, prayers and obedience to taboos constitute modes of negotiation aimed at securing its fertility so that the eternal life of societies and human beings is assured, along with health and plenty.

Such in summary is the system that constituted the mission ground for monotheisms and first of all for Christianity. The oldest form of this was the Ethiopian Orthodox Christian church, a state church, whose head (*abuna*) was appointed by the patriarch of Alexandria. It had two foundations, one legendary (descent from Solomon, which associated the people of Ethiopia with the divine choice of Israel) and the other doctrinal, monophysitism which has, since the school of Alexandria represented by the Patriarch Dioscore and the Monk Eutyches (fifth century), recognized the single divine nature of Jesus Christ. The recent form, another state religion, was Roman Catholicism, attached to the Trinity and the cult of the Virgin Mary.

Judaism was that of the Beta Israel (Aylud or Falasha) of Ethiopia. It was the religion of a composite community (converted Agaw, Jews converted to Christianity and dissident Christians), probably contemporary with the introduction of Christianity. This community had been transformed into a caste of craftsmen, into a class and through ideology into an ethnic group. Its doctrine rested on two documents; the Old Testament, especially the Pentateuch (*Orti*) and the Sabbath Commandments (*Te'ezza Sambat*) and on three rituals: the Sabbath, the Day of Supplications (*Hehellanna*) and the festival of Esther (*Soma Ester*).

As for Islam, the religion of Muhammad, prophet of Allah, introduced in the seventh to eighth centuries in the form of brotherhoods who each followed his own path (sing. *Tariqa*, pl. *Turuq*), it was established in all its diversity: the Sunnism of the Maliki, the Shāfi'is, the Sufism of Qādiriyya, the Karijism of the Ihadiya order and the Shī'ism of the Isma'elīs.

The functioning of pluralism and its consequences

The landscape as described presented antagonistic poles of contradictions, one cumulative in character, the others simple in character.

North-east Africa was a pole of the first type. From the fourth to the fifth centuries, indigenous, Christian and Judaic religious systems had coexisted there and, from the seventh century four systems, including the newly founded Islam. The ruling classes attempted to impose a monopoly for their system by force over the routes taken by the trade in gold, slaves and firearms. In Nubia, a Christian kingdom since the sixth century, gradual Islamization was the work of traders and immigrants; it was then accelerated by the violence of the Mamluks of Egypt and culminated in the fifteenth century, under pressure from the Fuij nomads, polytheists converted to Islam, in the conversion of the royal court of Dongola in the Makurra. In Ethiopia, on the contrary, in a sustained struggle from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, the Christian state emerged victorious, bringing the polytheistic states (Damor, Hadiyya, Gojjam) and the Falasha provinces

(Begamder, Bambeya, Wagara, Sallamu) under its control, and subjecting to tribute the sultanates (Awfat, Dawaro, Shaakha and Bali). In the first case the consequences were that the Shari'a transformed the rules regarding marriage and the succession and the status of women; Christian visual arts, clothing and architecture were replaced by Muslim-style arts; architecture and clothing and the Arabic language was added to Nubian. In the second case, there were, in addition to the transfer of the capital from the north to the centre of the empire, the expansion of Christian arts and Amharic and Geez, a spiritual, intellectual and political awakening of the Ethiopian church. This did not happen, however, without a compromise with other religions as illustrated by Negus Zara Yacob (1434-68). This reformist theologian, married to a Muslim wife, had Falasha executed for disobeying the customs of African courts; he believed in sorcery and magic.

In west Africa, it was rather Islam that stood in simple contradiction to indigenous religions. From Tekrur through to Kanem-Bornu reigned an Islam that was generally urban, embraced by a royal aristocracy³, the trading class (Berber-Arabs, Wangara, Fulbe, Hausa) and a cosmopolitan intellectual élite (the Arab adviser Al-Maghili, the Berber cadi Mahamad ben Umar Agid of Timbuktu, the Sudanese Shari' Sidi Yahya). The outcome resulted in new dimensions of African culture, with the development of Arabic script and associated disciplines, Muslim visual arts, architecture and clothing. But here again compromise was general. The *Tariq* and the *Epistle* of Al-Maghili denounce Soum Ali Ber, a Kariji and reputed magician, as one of the worst infidels; infidels also were the imāms who wore gifts from kings (Casamance) and the marabouts who sold talismans against thieves.

There is the same type of simple contradiction between urban Islam and the indigenous system in east Africa, both in the coastal towns (Sofala, Mogadishu) and in the islands of the Indian Ocean (Zanzibar, Madagascar). Under the influence of the Arabs and Afro-Shirazi, a new material and spiritual culture flowered, carried by a Bantu language enriched with Arabic words: Swahili culture.

In central Africa, on the contrary, it was Roman Catholic Christianity that was at grips with the indigenous religions in Kongo. A state religion that had come in the Portuguese caravels of the slave and spice trade, it won over the ruling aristocracy (the *Mani*, including the Mani-Kongo, and their entourage), not without some opposition, and a fraction of the people as early as 1491 were led to adopt the European life-style along with Christian names.

In short, three formations differing in age and nature constituted the religious pluralism of the late fifteenth century: among the old ones, the primary, ancient formations of indigenous origin (first generation); the secondary or medieval formations, of Christian Orthodox and Judaic origin in Ethiopia, or Islamic origin in west and east Africa (second generation); and the tertiary, proto-modern formations of Nubia and Kongo (third generation).

SIXTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES: OLD IDENTITIES AND FORMATION OF NEW RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES

At a time when the slave-trade was intensifying, accompanied by the disruption of peasant societies, new attempts at centralizing and feudalizing political societies and slave or

caste-based formations, three religious processes characterized the century: the dynamism of old identities, the formation of new identities and resistance.

The dynamism of old identities

Old identities manifested three forms of dynamism: continuities, shocks and avatars.

Continuities in indigenous systems

At the end of the third quarter of the seventeenth century, Dapper provides evidence of continuity beneath the diversity and changes in indigenous religious systems. There was the same idea of the remote great God (the *Cann* of the Folia, the *Humma* of the Khoi Khoi or the *Maziri* in Monomotapa), in contrast to accessible gods (the *Belly* of the Quoja, the *Sun* of the Lovango or the *Meen* of the Khoi Khoi and Socotra) not to mention totemic animals (the *snake king* of the Bena and the *snake god* of the Mwenekisindele of Malawi). The same unity of the universe was seen in the secret power of beings and things (the *nyami* of the Bambara, the *noquisie* of the Bakongo or the *hasina* of the Malagasy). Finally, the same immortality of the ancestors was reaffirmed in numerous practices: questioning of corpses, human sacrifices, offerings and funerals. Everywhere, through possession (as among the Fon, Nuba or Shona), divination (as among the Manden or Tsonga) and magic, those with the power to mediate were busy acquiring the benefits of life (min, health, children, wealth, or fame).

As for change, it concerned first the formation of peoples, with new ones appearing: Akwapim in west Africa, Tikar in central Africa and Maroserana in Madagascar (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries), Quoja and Karou in west Africa, Ruviri in central Africa and Rozvi in southern Africa (seventeenth century). Next, it concerned the objects of beliefs, either through abandonment or transfer, or by acquisition or promotion. When Ajahnto founded the kingdom of Allada (Dan-Houmè) he transported the household deities and sacred objects from Tado. In the Maravi kingdom, in central Africa, the cult of *Mina*, the spirit of the ancestor who had led the migration of the Phiri, Kalonga Chinkhole, prevailed over the indigenous gods of the *Cheva*. In the new Rozvi society, in southern Africa, the cult of the oracular deity *Micari* arose as a factor in the consolidation of the military state.

But change also affected rituals. Thus Dapper notes in Lovango a decline in human sacrifices 'since fewer slaves are put to death than previously'.

This vision of the world justified the symbols of sacred power: the *stool* in Akan kingship (see Plate 156), *nkisi*, the ideology of kingship in Kongo, or *nudepwe*, the property of Luba royal blood. The ideology of knowledge associated with what is divine and sacred in the teaching of educational centres such as convents (Bight of Benin, Monomotapa), secret or mask societies (the delta of Niger, Cameroon, Zambia, Malawi), initiation societies (Bambara of Mali, Nyiha of Tanzania) or divination schools (Bight of Benin) derived from it. The authorized portrayal of the dead and the gods characteristic of the sculpture of the time – earthenware or ivory statues, wooden statues and masks (Bambara and Senufo in west Africa, Kuba and Teke in central Africa), bronze statues and masks (Ife, Benin, Nupe), steatite statuettes, or sacrificial objects (the *pomti* and *nomeli* of the forest peoples

of Guinea and Sierra Leone) – derived from it. And from it too came the critical attitudes of peasants towards Christianity, some doubting the divinity of Christ, others laughing at ideas of paradise, hell and resurrection (Gold Coast).

Accumulated clashes between systems; the Ethiopian exception

Ethiopia illustrates the accumulated shocks of four religious systems. The first clash was between the Orthodox Christian state and polytheism. Even as the imperial state was waging the centuries-old struggle against polytheism, fighting a rearguard action up to the victory over the pagan king Badanco of Inariya, it was suffering attacks by Oromo (Galla) polytheists. The pastoralists who worshipped a great Jehovah-type God were organized without a central authority into ten age classes which elected their chiefs and judges and whose ideal was military; every eight years they would proceed on warlike expeditions to collect booty and exalt the valour of their leaders. By tradition, but also in search of pastures on land emptied of people by the *jihad*, they spread out in numerous groups of horsemen, both by infiltration and by violence, from Bali towards the south, west, centre and north. Despite the counter-attacks of successive emperors, from Lebna Dengal to Iyasu I (1508–1705), they established themselves over much of the empire and acquired a place in political society and the state under the Gondarine dynasty (1632–1755).

The second clash pitted the state against the Beta Israel. Encircled by Islam, the imperial state wanted to reduce the last Falasha state of Samen so as to have control of all its resources of men and weapons. In order to preserve their autonomy, the Beta Israel would ally now with the Muslims against the Christian state, now with the state and its allies against Islamic domination. They finally rose up in arms against forced Christianization, courageously led by their leaders (Radeet (1560), Gweshan (1587–8) and Gedewon (1615, 1625), but they were defeated in 1625 and Samen was incorporated into the Christian empire. But the Beta Israel would survive indomitable, defeated and deprived of their lands, as artisans and soldiers, thanks to the edict of toleration (1632) which restored to them their right to exercise the religion of their ancestors.

The third clash, which also ended in victory, pitted the imperial state against Islam. For having kept in check the neighbouring Muslim states, such as Adal, ravaged in 1526–7 and whose leader Mahfiz was killed in 1516, the retaliation took the form of a *jihad* proclaimed in 1529 by imām Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, known as Gragn, the 'Left-handed'. Until 1543, this brilliant strategist conquered provinces from west to east and south to north (Shoa, Amhara, Lasta, Tigray), sacking monasteries and churches as far as Axum, offering the choice of Islam or death. Nevertheless, in February 1543, the Ethiopian army, aided by the Portuguese, defeated the invader and, later, in 1588, it drove the Turks out of Tigray. Isolating and neutralizing the Muslims as well as the Falasha then became the aims of kings Johannes I (1667–81) and Iyasu I (1681–1706). In the town of Gondar these non-Christians lived separately, the former in the *Islam Bet* quarter, the latter in six quarters, including *Kayla Meda*.

The fourth clash, internal to Christianity, pitted the Ethiopian church against the Roman Catholic church. The Portuguese attempt to unite the two churches by bringing the heretic back to the mother church was a failure, doctrinally and politically. In 1557, against the dogma of the superiority of Catholicism propagated by the Jesuits, a polemical literature,

illustrated by the *Confession of Faith* by the emperor Galawdewos, defended monophysitism and Ethiopian culture. In addition, the conversion in 1622 of emperor Susenyos, who made Catholicism a state religion, provoked a general revolt leading to the emperor's abdication. This was followed by expulsion of the Jesuits, repression of the Catholics and a breach between Ethiopia and European Christendom.

Progress and retreat (polytheism, Islam), regression (Judaism), retreat and new revival (Orthodox Christianity), such avatars are to be found in the evolution of the Islamic formations of the first generation.

The avatars of the advanced or first generation Islamic formations: west and east Africa

In west Africa, there was initially, following the Moroccan colonization in 1591, regression: de-Islamization. In Songhay, it occurred because of and despite the Moroccan occupation, in places where the imperial state had withered away. Such was the case in southern Songhay, Dendi, the refuge of the vanquished Askia (see Plate 138), who came together with other immigrants and the politically fragmented indigenous Gornamache and Hausa, far from the towns and the court, and returned to polytheism. The same happened in Mali, where the same political fragmentation of the end of empire and the same ruralization led the Malinke ruling class to the same abandonment of the Islam of their ancestors.

In the city-states of the Indian Ocean, a similar de-Islamization occurred under the violence and hegemony of the Portuguese who destroyed the trading networks and the mosques. But by the end of their occupation in the seventeenth century, under pressure from the sultanate of Oman, one could speak of a revival of Islam, a sort of re-Islamization, mingled as ever with the polytheism of the hinterland.

In the lands of Kanem-Bornu and Hausaland there was, on the contrary, an intensification of Islam. This must be seen as the work of the sanctuaries (*zawāya*), the brotherhoods, Marabout groups and all the groupings inspired by African intellectuals trained in the Arab countries. Inspired by the law and mystical theology, this reformist trend criticized, on the one hand, the syncretism and accretions of urban Islam and, on the other, oppressive and unjust rulers: this was the breeding ground for the instigators of future *jihads*.

Formation of new identities

New Christian identities

It was in this period, in order to give an impetus to overseas evangelization, that the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith was founded in Rome (1622) and the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge (1699) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1701) in England. Among the formations that came into being, it is possible to distinguish three situations: abortive attempts (Upper and Lower Guinea, Dan-Homé, Benin), authentic formations (Kongo) and colonial formations.

Monomotapa offers an example of an abortive attempt. As soon as Portuguese rule over the Indian Ocean coast (1505) was established, the Society of Jesus was the first to send a mission there. After the missionary voyage and death of Francis Xavier (1541), Father Gonçalo de Silveira took over in 1560. From Sofala to Monomotapa, he converted chiefs and baptized close to a thousand souls before baptizing the king and queen-mother of the great kingdom by the names of Sebastian and

Mary. This exploit led to his death: in a plot on 16 March 1561. A new mission by the Dominican Friars, which set out from Sofala for Tete, had no greater success, Friar Nicolas do Rosario having been killed, Portugal subjected to the crown of Spain in 1580 and the new Mwene Mutapa, Nyanini Kaparadzhe, being anti-Portuguese (1624-9). It was not until the accession to the throne of his uncle and adversary, Mamvura, with assistance from the Portuguese, that missionary activity revived: in c.1667, of sixteen places of worship, nine were in Portuguese territory, five in the kingdom of Monomotapa and two in Manika (see Plate 163).

Despite the spectacular conversion of the king in 1652 and the conversions trumpeted by the Augustinians in Monhasa and Malindi, missionary activity failed to produce any local Catholic church with a future. Christianization remained a veneer of the ruling aristocracy; there was no indigenous clergy to take up the spiritual heritage; the Portuguese, concerned in the slave-trade, lived a life of violence and desolation. Finally, indigenous religions were tenacious and competition from Islam strong. Many converts soon renounced their faith and the remin of the influence of the sultanate of Oman led to the massacre of Christians and the end of the missionary endeavour.

The Kongolese national Catholic church

The case of the kingdom of Kongo, of which Angola was a province until the seventeenth century, was the most important one. In one sense, cultural co-operation enabled the new church to attain maturity under the Champunzu and Chimulaza dynasties. Afonso I the founder, a Champunzu (1506-41), granted scholarships for study in Portugal. Several waves of missionaries (Franciscans, Carmélites and later Capuchins) helped in the establishment of schools and training. Two schools were started, one with 400 pupils in 1506, the other with 600 in 1548. In 1518, the first Kongolese bishop, prince Henry, was appointed titular bishop of Uiea, a subordinate to São Tomé (1534) and vicar apostolic of Kongo with residence at San Salvador. A 1548 catechism in Kikongo, reprinted in 1624, adapted theological notions such as God, *Nzambi Alungu*, on the basis of a misunderstanding which reduces the Ancestral Gods to the Biblical God and simplifies what is complex without interpreting other key factors (faith, spirit, sanctity and grace) as happened in Dan-Homé. Churches flourished. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Jesuits claimed to have baptised 5,000 souls in three months and founded numerous Christian villages. Twenty thousand baptisms are estimated to have taken place in Angola in 1590; 3,918 baptisms and 50 marriages, in Kongo in 1693, according to a missionary. This church was limited to the colony of Luanda and Matemba in Angola, but was more rural around San Salvador. But the slave-trade monopoly and Portuguese hegemonism in the end aroused the hostility of a national party and later provoked a civil war. This party was defeated in its struggle against the allies of the Portuguese (1665) but was victorious under the king of Nila, sacked the capital in 1678 and burned the churches and the palace, forcing the political class to scatter.

The colonial Protestant church

The years that saw the decline of a young, promising Catholic church also saw the birth of the Protestant church in the colony at the Cape of Good Hope, out of the encounter of Dutch Boers and French Huguenots driven out by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685).

New Islamic identities

These range from authentically new formations (Nubia, Somali) to transformations of old formations (Senegal, Bundu).

The Nubian and Somali formation

With the Funj conquest of Alwa in 1504, Nubia completed its incorporation into the Islamic world. In space, from Unyamweini to Badi II (late seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries) the sultans extended the hegemony of the new Nubia to Kordofan by way of the lands of the Shilluk and the Nuba. Spiritually, along with the Maliki rite, traders, Arab immigrants and teachers established the *Qādhiriya* (1577), *Shadhiliya* (1693) and *Majdhubiya* orders, spreading belief among the people in the *baraka* or charismatic power of faithful saints.

In Somali, the activity of Arab missionaries, such as Isma'il-Gabarti, a founding father, and the jihad of mufti Gragu which recruited Afar as well, propagated the Islamic faith. That faith in turn became a factor of cultural integration for all the peoples in the territory. These new Islamic formations emerge in Christian or polytheistic lands, while west Africa offers examples of Islamic formations emerging from old Islamic identities.

Unsuccessful revolutionary formations

In Senegambia, Muslim since the eleventh to twelfth centuries, there was an economic, social and political crisis, precipitated by the monopoly on the trade in grains and slaves that the French had established at Saint Louis in 1659, to the benefit of their bourgeoisie, Hasaniya Arab warriors and African aristocracies, and at the expense of the nomadic Berber nomads of the Chamaña and the peasants along the river bank. A radical response to this crisis came from the *jihad*, a popular revolution aimed at setting up a theocratic state based on the *Shari'a* which could guarantee freedom of trade and protect Muslims from slavery. It was instigated in 1673 by a Berber marabout, Nasir al-Din. After victories in Futa Toro, Waalo, Kayor and Jolof, following the death of its leader in 1674 the movement gradually got bogged down and was finally defeated in 1677.

The successful revolutionary formation of Bundu

In the kingdom of Bundu, on the contrary, the revolution of 1690, the first led by a 'Sudanese' African, was successful. It was a follow-on from the previous movement, and received support from defectors from it. It took place in an inland country at the terminus of the trade route between the Gambian coast and the Niger bend. It was a nationalist-type movement and at least six ethnic groups took part in it: Bajaranke, Basari, Koniagi, Jaxanke, Soninke and Fulbe. Its leader, Maalik Sy, defeated the military aristocracy of Gajaaga and assumed the title of *almamy* of a theocratic state.

Resistance

Such a complex evolution was bound to spark resistance. Some resistance thwarted formations from their very beginnings: such was the war fought by the traditionalist party against the coronation of the Christian Mani Kongo

Afonso I in 1506. Attempts were made to interrupt the process of formation or turn it back. Resistance, again in Kongo, was shown in the invasion by the Jaga, driven back thanks to Portuguese intervention, and on the east coast of Mozambique at Malindi, the invasion by the Zimba. Finally, polytheistic states, tolerant as they remained inland, defended themselves against a monotheistic and imperial environment: Kabu and Mosi in west Africa, Monomotapa and Rovzi in southern Africa.

But despite these diverse forms of resistance, monotheistic formations spread in space and consolidated their effects in nature. The patrilineal system continued to become more firmly entrenched and the status of women to be modified. Arabic and European architectural styles in places of worship and palaces developed; the same was happening with the visual arts. From the writing of languages, either in the Arabic alphabet (Swahili, Kanuri, Fulfulde, Hausa) or in the Latin alphabet (Kikongo, Kimbundu, Popo), there resulted an increasingly rich African literature, evidence of which, in the Islamic tradition, are the *Tariks*, the Chronicles and the *senbe* and their authors, ancestors of modern historians. Corresponding to these in the Orthodox tradition were Amharic and Geez literatures and in the Falasha tradition, Agaw literature. Yet at all levels of the new formations, syncretism testified to the compromise with indigenous religions and cultures, as can be witnessed in the Kongo, according to Dapper, and Dan-Homé, according to Bosman.

SEVENTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, A CENTURY OF PROMISE: DESPITE REGRESSION, CONSOLIDATION, MATURATION AND EXTENSION OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

At the height of the slave-trade and the anti-slavery movement, the religious landscape, despite the inevitable violence, harboured promise. Christianity was on the retreat in its Roman Catholic form but was taking final shape in its Orthodox form, and was spreading and opening up to pluralism in its Anglican Protestant variety. The Falasha, dispossessed of all political power, were working to complete their cultural integrity. Islam, reduced to the state of a private religion in Ethiopia, was advancing on two fronts, one in and through the *jihad* which gave the 'Sudanese' complete control of the future of the Islam adventure, and the other through liberal expansion into forest and southern Africa. As for polytheism, it continued all the time to show its vitality even in places where it was apparently in retreat.

The dynamism of indigenous religious identities

At this time, also, new social formations were emerging: for example, the Mende and the Baule in west Africa, Yaka and Lunda in central Africa, Chainouqua in southern Africa.

Ancestor cults (*dady* in Malagasy), possession cults and the cults of local gods continued to sustain the powers that be and the formation of new polities as well as rebel movements (see Plates 166-70). In the Great Lakes region, the cult of dead kings counterbalanced the power of the Cwezi spirits such as Ryagonhe in the kingdom of Kiziba, while a cult of Mugasha, the god of water and agriculture, sustained the kingship of Kyamutwara. In the new Ashanti confederacy,

at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in west Africa, the golden stool, installed by the priest Okomfo Anokye, became 'the soul and sacred symbol of the unity and survival of the Ashanti nation'.

Regression of Catholic Christianity

Catholic Christianity experienced two forms of regression in central Africa: a decline of the Kongolese national church and the establishment of a colonial church in Angola.

Decline of the Catholic national church of Kongo

In 1704 the kingdom's political-religious crisis rebounded with the Antonian movement. A sick young aristocrat, Kimpa Vita, known as Dona Beatrice (see Plate 171), 'dead and resuscitated', received from St Anthony 'lodged in her head', a mission to break away, a mission of hope and renewal. She prophesized an African religion (in which Mary and St Anthony were black), a national religion (in which Mbariza Kongo became Bethelchem and Mbariza Nsuudi, Nazareth), a religion cleared of fetishes and foreign rituals (for God only looks to intent). This religion was to be the foundation of a new, independent society of abundance and happiness. Regarded as anti-Christian and anti-Catholic, the prophetess was condemned to be burnt to death. At the same time, possession cults flourished everywhere, so much so that in 1740 the chapel of Our Lady of Mpinda became the home of a rain, healing and fertility cult for Christians and non-Christians alike. The priests appeared as magicians and healers (*nganga*), not teachers, and what remained of Christianity became an integral part of a *simbi* cult (Chimbi).

A colonial church: Angola

Having failed, because of the stress put on the slave-trade, to make a national Catholic church flourish in Kongo, the Portuguese established a Portuguese church in the colony of Angola. A cathedral had been built there and an episcopal see established in 1596. In the seventeenth century, the centre of gravity shifted from San Salvador to Luanda. The three orders functioned there and a Jesuit monastery had 12,000 slaves, a sign that the church and the flourishing slave-trade to Brazil had long been deeply involved with one another.

The consolidation of old second generation identities

The example of the Judaism of the Beta Israel

In the reformed Ethiopian Empire, in the Gondarine period (1632-1755) and the 'era of the princes' (1755-1868), the Beta Israel put to use their twin status as soldiers and craftsmen, an instrument of socio-political domination and an element in the structure of exploitation and classes, to preserve, protect and consolidate their cultural integrity. In the ethnic stratification of society, such was their place going from top to bottom: Amhara, Muslims, Quemant, Beta Israel, Wayto and 'Shanqualla'. The titles of *azmadi* or *azaj* (officer) or *bejrond* (master craftsman, foreman) marked them out and at the same time incorporated them into the state and the economy. But the hierarchy internal to their church was all their own, independent of the state. The culture that

supported and justified this hierarchy and its functioning (schools, synagogues, liturgical language, rituals and calendar) was reinforced by the discriminatory and pejorative ideology of *buda* which attributed the evil eye to the Falasha against which Christians would protect themselves by magical prayers. From this ideology the Beta Israel paradoxically drew an ethic of moral purity and superiority.

The example of Orthodox Christianity

The Ethiopian Orthodox church, saved by Portuguese intervention, pursued its restoration in an empire that had broken up into quasi-feudal states. In the north of Ethiopia, two tendencies marked this evolution. Literature was full of hymns to the Trinity, principally hymns of various sorts to the Virgin Mary. While graphic arts were chiefly inspired by the royal courts, architecture (castles, libraries and chapels), in which foreign models, from India or Portugal, were very much in evidence, lost the monumentality of earlier stone architecture. In the south where Christianization was under way, syncretism and cumulation were the key features (see Plates 172 and 173).

The example of Islam in east Africa and the islands in the Indian Ocean

While Islam was consolidating in Nubia, Somali and the Hansa states, the restoration of Islam in the Swahili city-states, especially in the Comoro islands, was going on at the same time as trade, freed from the Portuguese monopoly. Building numerous mosques, applying a system of justice with village judges (*kadis*) and a body of jurists (*madjelisse*), the Sunni Afro-Shirazi developed this renewal of an Islam that was rather bourgeois compared to the aristocratic Islam of the Arabs against a background of a political struggle between the founding stratum (the *Fani*) and the new sultans.

The maturing of new formations or identities

The revolutionary path

In west Africa, Islam advanced in two simultaneous ways: *jihad* and peaceful penetration. In the wake of Nasir al-Din's fruitless *jihad* and Maalik Sy's victorious one in Bundu, in and through their absolute extremism the *jihadis* of the century made Islam an integrally African adventure in its conception, implementation and negative and positive consequences, in short as historical and cultural heritage (see Plate 174).

This was the case with the Fulbe-Mandingo revolution in Futa Jallon when, in c.1725, Malinke and Fulbe marabouts belonging to the *qādirīya* rite brought together refugees from various ethnic groups in a nationalist outburst led by Karamokho Alfa, threw down the gauntlet to the pagan aristocracy of the Jallonke and established a theocratic kingdom. This state, led by the *Ahmady* Karamokho Alfa of Timbo, was made up of two horles; on the one hand, a confederation of nine *diue* (sing. *diural*, province), each headed by an *Alfa*, and on the other hand, a Council of Elders, a religious parliament, sitting at Fugumba. Schools brought Qur'anic education to every village. Such was the case, too, with the revolution in Futa Toro in 1776 in which the Torodo, led initially by Sulayman Baal and then by 'Abd al-Kadir Kan, overthrew the rule of the Denyanke, the military aristocracy (*ceddo*) of Waalo, Jolof and Bawol and the Moorish

emirates of Brakna and Trarza but failed in 1790 to reimpose their rule on Kayor. A Grand Council of electors (*Jaggorde*), under the authority of *Abmany* 'Alid al-Kadir Kan authorized the redistribution of vacant land and forbade the enslavement of Muslims. Individuals and mosques spread religious education into every village.

In one direction, this popular revolution reached the Cape Verde peninsula where the Lebu set up a 'republic' and, in the other, Kanem-Bornu where the theocratic state replaced the aristocratic rule of the Sefiwa. But the hegemony of the military fraction in Futa Jallon and that of the lettered and easy-going fraction in Futa Toro led to the relaxation of the revolutionary drive by the end of the century in societies that had become slave societies.

The liberal path

At the same time as this revolution, which involved both geographical expansion and social, political and cultural transformation, Islam penetrated the states along the Volta and in the forest. Muslim colonies already existed in polytheistic kingdoms: Fulbe and Yarse in Bobo, Wangara (Dyula) and Hausa in Kumbasi. But, by their conversion, the Naba of Dagomba (Na Zangina, early seventeenth century), Mamprussi (Na Zunibre, early eighteenth century) and Mosi (imām Na Dɔlugu, late seventeenth century) inaugurated an urban, aristocratic Islam centred in the palace, like the one that the early empires had experienced.

The expansion of Anglican Protestant Christianity

Anglican Protestant Christianity began to advance on the continent in two ways: through new settlements in west Africa and the extension of pluralism in southern Africa.

New settlements

These new settlements, grafted on to the remains of Portuguese influence, left little mark either in the Gold Coast or in Sierra Leone. In the Gold Coast, the action of the first African men of the cloth in the Company did nothing to strengthen the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. Jacobus Eliza Johannes Capitein, a freed slave, a pastor of the Dutch Reformed church, the first translator of the Apostles' Creed into Fanti (1744), apparently lived a rather marginalized existence in relation to both Europeans and Africans. Philip Quaoe, trained in Europe (1754), Anglican chaplain to the British Company from 1766, ignorant of his maternal tongue and communicating through an interpreter, baptized only fifty-two individuals in nine years. The historian Adu Boahen summarizes the result at the end of the century as the 'emergence of a small educated élite'.

In the last decade, new institutions came into being with the Sierra Leone Company (1791): these were the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the London Missionary Society (1795), the Edinburgh Missionary Society and the Glasgow Missionary Society (1796). From the very foundation of the colony of freed slaves, some of whom were preachers, the missions endeavoured to establish Christianity. But by the end of the century, none of the missions from before the eighteenth century, and despite the fraternal co-operation of the latter three, had truly succeeded in putting down roots: better, in the person of Peter Greig, murdered by traders in Susu country, they supplied the second martyr to

Christianization in Nuhian Africa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and fell back on Freetown and the nearby area.

The spread of pluralism: Cape Colony

By the end of the eighteenth century, Protestantism in the settlement colony at the Cape had evolved towards an extended pluralism. In the first place, the government of the Dutch East India Company, hostile to an evangelization that implied the emancipation of the slaves, could no longer, in a British colony, stop the action of the London Missionary Society (1799). Second, Islam, banned since the seventeenth century, could now come out openly. The first secret Muslim group of eastern captives, slaves and exiles, broke up on the death of Sheikh Yusuf, an Indonesian, and the freeing of his companions (1690). Taking over after thirteen years of imprisonment, Abdullah Kadi Abdus Salaan, known as Tuan Guru (1742-1807), founded a community (*jamna*) around the first *Amwal Mosque* and the first school in 1798, leaving in at his death in 1807 copies of the Qur'ān (Koran) and a *Fiqh kitāb*, a work of jurisprudence and guide to morality and ritual practice. Third, it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century (1819-22) that all restrictions on the Roman Catholic church were finally lifted.

Resistance

Although undermined, the polytheistic systems put up various forms of resistance through their guardians. In addition to the traditional cumulations and syncretisms, there was migration, a route taken by the Susu and Baga (Guinea), Ballom and Tenne (Sierra Leone), rejecting forced Islamization by the Fulbe-Malinke. Again, rulers who converted or were tempted to do so had sanctions imposed upon them. The son of queen Ravahiny of Madagascar, an Iboina Muslim, was barred from acceding to the throne, king Agonglo of Dan-Homé was put to death when he was about to convert to Christianity in 1797, while *asantehe* Osei Kwame (1770-1801), whose attachment to Islam seemed to be incompatible with his sacred function, was deposed. Finally, in addition to the freeing of people from slavery and the economic independence provided by control of trade routes, the demand for religious and cultural identity was a factor in the militarization of many a polytheistic state: Makua, Maravi and Rwanda in east Africa, Gurma, Macina, Bambara of Segu and Dan-Homé in west Africa. However, at the height of their imperialist expansion these states remained welcoming to other religious communities where there were any and established a *modus vivendi* with them.

CONCLUSION

Pending the completion of a comprehensive and improved history of all religions, we can say that the evolution of the religious landscape between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries reveals a number of constants. In the first place, the international factor, whether the commercial and political-religious antagonism between Europeans on the one hand and Arabs, Turks and Persians on the other, or simply the antagonism among Europeans or between Arabs and Berbers, played a continuing role in the recomposition of this landscape. Second, two structural contradictions were

permanently at work, one between the tolerant pluralism of age-old indigenous religions and the exclusive monism of revealed religions, the other pitting these latter against one another as politico-ideological doctrines. Third, among the main agents transmitting and defending systems, there were class coalitions (traders, ruling aristocracies and their secular arms, soldiers, intellectual and religious élites, and peasants); and there were coalitions of peoples whom these classes generally represented.

If trade routes – by land or sea – were transmission paths, three relays acted as channels for doctrines: the palace relay (the royal court), the urban relay (market, mosque, synagogue or church), and the village relay. The targets were reached in three ways: war and coercion, both collective means; marriage alliances, a social means; and persuasion, an inter-individual means. Fourth, whatever the particular spatial and temporal features of this evolution and the groups considered may have been, the trends of this evolution can be summarized in a few words: resistance of primary identities such as peasant identities, global advance of urban religions, notably Islam, and de facto pluralism that enriched the African religious universe and enlarged the civilization of Nubian Africa.

From the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries, as we analyse the dynamism of old identities (change within continuity, clashes, avatars) or the formation of new Islamic and Christian identities and resistance, we see that the evolution was indeed diverse, depending on the religion, the region and the society. But without the international factor mentioned above, how could most of these facts be understood? In *imām* Gragn's *jihad* and the victory of the emperor Galawdewos, there were the hands of the Ottomans on the one side and Portugal on the other. De-Islamization was the effect of direct action by the Portuguese on the Indian Ocean coast and the indirect effect of the Moroccan occupation of Songhay. The Kongoleses owed the growth of their church and the survival of the state to the Portuguese. And it was once again the wars of religion in Europe and the antagonism between Portugal and the states of the Indian Ocean that determined the religious policy of the Dutch colony at the Cape. Finally, it was a Berber marabout who initiated the 'Sudanese' of the seventeenth century into the revolutionary adventure of the modern *jihad*.

But when we look at the internal forces, that is the brokers who confronted the religious and cultural challenges of this period, we see first of all migrant or travelling peoples (Fulbe, Wangara, Oromo) and coastal peoples (Swahili, Kongoleses); then we see more or less literate ruling classes among whom the Berber Arabs occupy a significant position as traders, advisers and marabouts; finally we see leaders who are at once political, religious and military sometimes using war for religious ends. Except in Ethiopia, monotheisms remained chiefly urban religions and de facto pluralism rearranged the religious landscape to the benefit of indigenous religions, Islam and Christianity.

The eighteenth century offers a different landscape in several respects. First, despite the development of imperialism and the intensification of the overseas slave-trade, the cultural autonomy of Africans was affirmed and consolidated. The *jihad* revolutions constituted the Muslim form of this, in which 'Sudanese' élites, in what we call maturing, took the initiative of a popular religion bringing together town and countryside, breaking with aristocratic urban religion. Female prophetism in Kongo, like the act of Galawdewos in the seventeenth century, was the Christian form of it and was also a demand for a popular national religion in which peasants

and women would have pride of place and the benefits that are rightfully theirs. Second, the advance that Islam gained over Christianity is explained by five factors: mainly peaceful penetration through trade and matrimonial alliances, the doctrinal rigour of a religion which justified war against the infidel and the protection of believers from slavery, a marriage code close to African tradition, the formation of an indigenous clergy and the dialectic between the mystical order of an ideal of 'justice' in a theocratic state and the political realism of a monarchical state managing society according to the law of oppression and injustice.

There remains, however, throughout these centuries one question – that of knowing how and when the shift from a de facto pluralism, with the potential for conflict, to a de jure pluralism would take place. It was an unthinkable question, a question with no answers for Nubian African cultures of the time when there was as yet no functional differentiation between the sacred and government.

NOTES

- 1 Against naturalistic determinations by race (Black Africa) or by ecosystem (tropical Africa or sub-Saharan Africa), an anthropological determination by social and cultural history referring to an ancient nation of that area of civilization, Nubia. Cheik Anta Diop suggested Egypto-Nubian, and Jahnheinz Jahn *agysyudian*.
2. Awlagozi, town in Mauritania (eleventh century), Sofala, town on the east coast of Africa (fifteenth century), El Mina (Gold Coast, modern Ghana, fifteenth century), Cabiinda (ancient Kongo, modern Angola, fifteenth century).
- 3 Kings: Mansa (Mali), Sonni and Askiya (Songhay), Mai (Kancem-Bornu), Hene (Ashanti), Naba (Dagomba, Mamprusi, Mosi), Mami (Kongo), Negus (Ethiopia).

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OCEANIA

Kerry R. Howe

Centres and peripheries are states of mind. The myriad different inhabitants of Oceania – a region covering one-third of the globe – naturally considered themselves at the centre of their respective known worlds. When this region came very slowly to the attention of Europe in the three centuries after 1500, it appeared to the European mind to represent the world's ultimate periphery.¹

There are, therefore, essentially three stories of the region in the period 1500–1800 – one is about cultures *in situ*, another is about outsiders who came exploring and discovering. The third, that of an interaction between Oceanic and European peoples, barely begins since contact was mainly fleeting and tentative, though portentous.

The setting is one of contrasts. Australia and New Guinea are continental in size, whereas many of the islands of the Pacific are tiny specks of land in the world's water hemisphere. The islands of most of Micronesia and Polynesia are coral atolls, or raised coral, or the tips of mighty volcanic peaks that have reared up from the ocean floor. Much of Melanesia (and also New Zealand which is in the geographic region of Polynesia) lies inside the geologists' Andesite line and consists of backbones of ancient mountains belonging to the Indo-Australian tectonic plate. If there is one common environmental characteristic for the region as a whole it is of expanse – for Australia it is the expanse of an often flat, arid landscape, for the Pacific islands it is the vast expanse of ocean (see Map 39).

To the outside world, the history of Oceania began with the first recorded observations by intrepid European voyagers in the sixteenth century. Yet those Oceanic peoples thus caught in the act of their lives already had an ancient history, and one now accorded global significance. The western fringes of Oceania – Australia and New Guinea – were home to some of the world's oldest human civilizations. In eastern Oceania humans, in a triumph of adaptation, had already lived for a thousand or more years on islands so remote as to be the last of the habitable places discovered and settled on earth.


The ancient homeland of Oceanic peoples was in South-East Asia. Some 50,000 years ago, perhaps even 100,000 years ago, nomadic voyagers left the ancient continent of Sunda (which since the sea-level rose some 10,000 years ago is now the island archipelago of South-East Asia) for the nearby continent of Sahul (the land mass formed by what is now New Guinea, Australia, and Tasmania). These people are the distant ancestors of today's Australian Aborigines. Their journeying proceeded no further into the Pacific Ocean than

the neighbouring Solomon Islands since they lacked an ocean-going technology and, being hunters and gatherers, would have found it difficult to survive in any numbers on islands that, as one goes east, become increasingly poor in edible flora and fauna.

By about 4,000 – 6,000 years ago there were different people living in what had now become the island archipelago of South-East Asia. They are generally referred to as Austronesians, and may have come most immediately from coastal China and/or Japan. They possessed two key attributes – a sail and outrigger canoe technology, and the capacity to domesticate plants and animals. With these skills some travelled westward into the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as Mauritius, and probably Africa. Others sailed directly eastwards into the Pacific Ocean and colonized the islands of Micronesia. Yet others took a more south-easterly route, skirted the northern coasts of New Guinea (they missed Australia altogether) and made their way down the Melanesian island chain through the Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia. Some then crossed to the Fiji, Samoa, Tonga region by about 3,500 years ago. From there they explored on huge double-masted sailing vessels developed for travelling the increasingly empty oceanic expanses. Navigating mainly by horizon stars, they eventually reached the Marquesas at the far eastern fringe of Polynesia about 2,000 years ago. From there explorations fanned out in all directions with the remotest of all islands – Hawaii, Easter Island, and New Zealand – variously colonized 1,000–1,500 years ago.

By the time Europeans first came across these widely scattered peoples one of the notable characteristics was their cultural diversity, due both to the extreme range of environments in the region – from continents to atolls, from subantarctic to tropical climes – and to the many thousands of years of specific cultural adaptation to them.

The remoter islands of the Pacific were not generally populous because of their smallness and paucity of natural resources. The total population of Polynesia was only some 500,000 with the larger populations found on the larger island groups, in particular the Hawaiian Islands (250,000) and New Zealand (120,000). Settlement patterns varied. On islands such as Samoa with idealized political arrangements there were distinct villages. In places like Tahiti and Tonga with more regional forms of government there was tribal or neighbourhood settlement. Settlement patterns in Hawaii and New Zealand were more influenced by climatic conditions – most New Zealand Maori lived in the northern half of the North Island where it is warmer and especially



Map 39 Oceania. 1500-1800 (K. R. Howe).

around resource-rich rivers and harbours; Hawaiians tended to live in the more fertile windward regions.

Micronesia's 2,000 islands comprise less than 2,600 km² and half of that land area is made up of Guam, Babeldaob and Ponape. Micronesia contained only about 120,000 people in all, though because of the extreme smallness of many of the islands, some only a few hectares, population densities could be quite high.

The islands of Melanesia tend to be larger, much more geographically diverse, and richer in resources. In New Guinea alone there were some 3 million people, most of whom lived in the highland regions since much of that country's coastal and lowland plains were plagued by malaria and often extremes of rainfall. Such a large highland population was supported by very intensive gardening. Another 500,000 people were scattered throughout the rest of Melanesia, with half of them in Fiji. In New Caledonia and Fiji, settlement patterns varied according to tribal politics and resources. But in the rest of Melanesia – the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, and populous New Guinea – actual settlements tended to be very small, perhaps 70–300 people, autonomous, often hostile to all outsiders, and widely scattered throughout the generally mountainous landscape.

The Aboriginal population of continental Australia may have numbered 1 million, though given the huge size of the country population density was extremely low. Some Aborigines had temporary or seasonal settlements but most tended to lead a highly mobile hunting and gathering life-style in very small bands, or extended families. What is often not appreciated is the extreme range of ecological regions they occupied. Commonly regarded as desert dwellers only, Aborigines also occupied coastal and riverine lands that ranged from monsoon rain forest country in the far north to subtemperate, even alpine climes in the far south-east and Tasmania.

With the exception of Australian Aborigines who chose to retain their highly successful hunter-gatherer existence, even though they were in contact with the horticulturalists of nearby New Guinea from at least 6,000 years ago, all other peoples of Oceania survived by gardening, supplemented by fish and shellfish where possible. A rudimentary form of horticulture may have developed independently as early as 10,000 years ago in the highlands of New Guinea. But it was the Austronesian voyagers who greatly stimulated it there, and who so successfully colonized the islands of the Pacific thanks to the domestic animals (dogs, pigs, poultry), and root and tree crops (yams, taro, coconut, breadfruit, pandanus, sugar-cane, bananas) that they brought with them from the South-East Asian archipelago. These items were variously significant depending on climate and location – yams became a major staple in Melanesia, taro in Micronesia and Polynesia. Coconut and breadfruit were important almost everywhere. Most of these tropical plants could not survive in temperate New Zealand, but the sweet potato which has its botanic origins in South America somehow got to eastern Polynesia during the time of early human settlement there and was subsequently taken to New Zealand where it became a staple, along with indigenous fern root.

Horticultural practices varied widely according to climate, soils, populations, and cultural preference. Where land area and soils permitted, gardening might be extensive and shifting, using slash-and-burn techniques. Elsewhere, in drier and/or more constricted spaces, such as on atolls, gardening was intensive, the same plots in permanent use and heavily composted. The islanders were skilled irrigationists. In parts

of the New Guinea highlands, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the Hawaiian Islands water was sometimes conduited to gardens kilometres away.

Such land-use sometimes had a marked effect on the environment. Throughout Melanesia bush land was turned into savannah. In New Zealand much of the original forest cover was destroyed by firing. Easter Island, once heavily forested, became quite denuded of trees. Even in Australia where Aborigines did not plant crops, they sometimes fired the vegetation to assist its regeneration. Such fire-stick farming did much to alter vegetation patterns in whole regions of the country. Degeneration of the environment was common, but not inevitable, and sometimes barren lands, such as inland regions of some of the Hawaiian Islands, were made fertile with irrigation.

Economic life involved more than just subsistence production. Most communities were engaged in trading commodities, utensils, decorative and symbolic artefacts. Often this activity was as much social and/or political as strictly economic. Australian Aboriginal trading routes spanned the continent. In Melanesia there was considerable trading between interior or bush peoples and those on the coast. A number of highly complex regional trading networks also encompassed most of the separate archipelagoes of Melanesia. Perhaps the best known example is the Kula ring of the Trobriand and D'Entrecasteaux Islands. In Micronesia the island of Yap controlled a huge political and trading 'empire' extending more than 1,000 km across the Carolines. But throughout much of Micronesia and Polynesia, extremes of distance between islands meant that there were often few or no links with other lands. Economic exchange in such cases was more a function of internal economic redistribution, particularly in the more stratified, chiefly societies, and community self-sufficiency rather than specialization was more characteristic.

Oceanic societies produced remarkable material cultures. Australian Aborigines, once deemed to be animal-like, cultureless creatures, are now acknowledged to have developed some of the most functional tools and weapons for their nomadic purposes and enabled successful colonization of what to Europeans seemed most hostile, arid environments. They also developed a most extensive and complex religious/artistic material culture that survives in rock marking and painting, and decorative artefacts. Much more readily appreciated by early European commentators was the material culture of the Austronesian peoples throughout most of the rest of Oceania – a material culture reflecting a basic horticultural and maritime existence with its wide range of tools, utensils, agricultural implements, fishing gear, and weapons, all variously fashioned from available materials – shell, stone, bone, and wood. Most of these items were highly decorated indicating that they had a more than strictly utilitarian function. There was a universal regard for craft. Pottery was widespread throughout Melanesia. Every culture had an extensive range of personal decoration and ornamental and religious artefacts. Island life featured permanent settlements, often with very substantial and ornately decorated buildings, beautifully tended gardens, and extensive stone fish-traps. Amongst the more prominent items of material culture were in-shore and ocean-going sailing craft (some over 30 m in length), stone and earth forts, places of political and religious significance, especially the stone *marae*, or sacred places, of eastern Polynesia. Megaliths were built everywhere across the Ocean by the Austronesians – from the huge stone edifices of Nan Madol on Ponape in

Micronesia, to the Stonehenge-like construction of *Ia'a-monga-a-Mani* in Tonga, to the stone walls and statues of eastern Polynesia and especially Easter Island. All these items derived from the original Austronesian founders and so have a common, and often readily traceable, ancestry, but one that was subsequently adapted to particular local materials, conditions and usage.

Anthropologists have categorized most Oceanic communities into their respective descent groups (patrilineal, matrilineal, avunculocal, and so on), and have written at length on the nature of social relations. It is simply not practical to try to replicate such social maps for so many cultures here, and in any case, such information tends to emphasize static, text-book models that belie the pragmatic dynamism of communities in action. It is more appropriate to survey briefly more general types of socio-political organization.

Australian Aborigines were divided into about 500 tribes, each with their own territory, name, identity, history and mythology. But there was little political cohesion or organization in the classic sense of tribalism. Tribes were unstructured organizations, based on claims of kin. There were no chiefs as such, no ranked nobility, no structured administrative hierarchy. Tribal groups seldom acted in concert. The main initiative-taking entities were small clusters of extended families or bands who were highly mobile within their tribal territory. Government was in the main informal and usually in the hands of elders of each family, or, less commonly, a tribal council. There was little authority in the European sense. Decisions were taken, and order imposed, at a local level. Bands were heavily tradition-oriented, the young were taught by example and instruction to imitate the ways of their elders. Unacceptable behaviour was checked by ridicule, embarrassment, the invoking of kin obligations, and especially spiritual sanctions. Emphasis was on conciliation of internal disputes. There seemed little conflict too on an intertribal level. Given the scattered, nomadic life-style, there were no armies, and since there were no villages or plantations to capture, territorial conquest was virtually unknown. 'Warfare' was at most small-scale skirmishing, usually to avenge some insult.

While there was no one typical socio-political system in Melanesia there were a number of common characteristics in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and New Hebrides (but excluding New Caledonia and Fiji). In general there were no numerically or geographically large areas of political control. Village communities tended to be self-governing, commonly less than 100 people (though in some cases up to about 300), largely unstratified, and led by a 'Big-Man' rather than a chief. Most male members could theoretically become Big-Men if they possessed certain attributes — personal charisma and skills in diplomacy, warfare, oratory, or craft work. But most importantly, an aspiring Big-Man had to amass material wealth, usually pigs, but also certain valuable shells and stones, and distribute these in such a way as to get others indebted to him — perhaps by putting on a feast, or paying someone's bride-price. In turn the recipients would repay the gift which in turn could be further redistributed. Big-Man status came when sufficient numbers in a community acknowledged their indebtedness. But a Big-Man's authority was always limited, since he was not a leader by any established right or office, nor did he have any divine legitimacy. His influence was based on a reciprocal network of personal and economic ties that he created for himself. His position was personalized and thus inherently unstable.

Although these were common characteristics, there were many variations of them. Some of the smallest bush societies had no titular leaders at all. Other Big-Men societies had some elements of ascription and stratification.

Still within the geographic region of Melanesia were the much larger, stratified, chiefly societies of New Caledonia and Fiji, that shared many of the characteristics of socio-political organization more commonly found in some (but certainly not all) parts of Polynesia. Many of the socio-political systems throughout Polynesia appear relatively homogeneous, that is, stratified and chiefly, yet they actually displayed significant variations. Irving Goldman (1970) has proposed three useful categories. There were Traditional societies where rank was based on ascribed genealogical status (primogeniture in the male line), although effective power also owed something to achievement. With a high birth also had to come some ability. Society was stratified but there were no rigid classes as such. Examples of this are New Zealand, Uvea, Futuna, Tokelau, and New Caledonia. Then there were Open societies (like Easter Island, Samoa, Fiji, Marquesas) where achievement, especially by warriors in battle, was a way to political power, though hereditary chiefs could still retain high status alongside warrior-chiefs. Stability and control was often maintained through sheer physical force. Finally there were Stratified societies (notably Hawaii, Tonga, Tahiti) which were like large social pyramids with distinct classes separated by marriage barriers. Strong, centralized authority was monopolized by a small élite, and sometimes extended over groups of islands. Leadership was largely by birth, divinely sanctioned by ancestor gods, and succession was usually by primogeniture. These were the societies in which early European travellers delighted in finding the equivalents of slaves, peasants, landed aristocracies, priests, princes, and kings.

In Micronesia most islands had ranked chiefdoms with society usually divided into a landed nobility and high and low-ranked commoners.

Why any one socio-political system should have taken the form it did is still not adequately explained. Theories such as that large populations and/or substantial resources necessitated more government and social stratification, and the reverse, are contradicted by too many examples. The large populations and rich environments of New Guinea and Australia have the least government and stratification, while some tiny atoll populations of Micronesia have among the most.

While eighteenth century western philosophers sometimes claimed that life on Pacific islands was an Arcadian idyll, for those early Europeans actually visiting the Pacific one of the most daunting characteristics of island life almost everywhere was a high level of violence and personal insecurity. Within communities there were tensions generated by supernatural beings, and, particularly in more stratified societies, by priestly classes and domineering chiefs. In such societies violence was often institutionalized with prescribed punishments, often some form of mutilation, for wrong-doing. Fighting against enemies was universal. At one extreme was the limited skirmishing of Australian Aborigines. Throughout much of Melanesia fighting was often of a ritualized, and again limited nature, though there were sometimes more brutal and extensive conflicts. In many other parts of the Pacific, particularly where populations and pressures on resources were greater, larger-scale warfare with the mobilization of armies, and sometimes navies, was common. In battle there were varying degrees of torture and sadism. Cannibalism was

practised in relatively few societies, most notably in Fiji and New Zealand. Elsewhere it was uncommon or unknown.

The most significant features of any culture are generally invisible to outsiders, namely beliefs and cosmological perceptions. It is these that ultimately shape cultural behaviours and material cultures. While the inhabitants of Oceania had countless belief systems, there were some common features. For example the modern Western dichotomy between sacred and secular had no real equivalent. All cause and effect was attributed to deities and spirit-beings who exercised various powers. Most cultures had major founding deities or culture heroes who had created the world and humankind. Some of these continued to regulate the physical world and ensured that day followed night, or that the tides rose and fell, and the seasons changed. A whole range of lesser spirit-beings might control the weather, fertility of women and crops, and bring success in battle and fishing. Ranged against such potentially benevolent patrons were a whole host of malevolent demons and evil spirits who could bring death, disease, and bad luck. Most cultures conceived of an after-life, with the dead variously interacting with those still living. In general terms the physical world had superimposed upon it a powerful supernatural and mythological dimension, one that influenced all thought and action.

Given that everyday lives were greatly influenced by some or all of these supernatural beings and forces there was a great deal of private and public activity to placate evil forces and ensure protection and guidance from the beneficent. Ritual in a whole range of societies, whether large or small, might be very elaborate with mediums, sorcerers, priests or priestly societies, and cults, practising solemn rituals in special places of worship or invocation. The more elaborately stratified the society, the more likelihood there was an institutionalized belief system, partly because of the social and economic controls powerful leaders could exert by exploiting spiritual sanctions and claiming legitimacy from the ancestor gods. The respective *kapu/hapu* systems of the Hawaiian Islands and Tahiti, and the use made of major war gods (Oro in Tahiti, Kūkailimoku in the Hawaiian Islands) by the leading families, are obvious examples. At the other extreme, for example in many Melanesian communities, ritual might be private and apparently casual, but nonetheless purposeful and pervasive.

Belief structures usually involved more than simply a concern with the supernatural, but also had to do with relating past and future to the present. Indigenous religions demonstrated the centrality and significance of the oral transmission of culture. Whereas Westerners use the artifice of sociology or anthropology to 'explain' culture, Oceanic communities encoded and explained their identity and history in oral tradition, usually related to genealogical and mythological interpretation. The past was thus an integral component of the present in that it gave a community, and individuals within it, a legitimacy and purpose. Those orators who had specialized knowledge and were guardians of the past were often among the more powerful in a community, for those who controlled the past could better control the present. Paralleling the locating of self and community in time was location in place. All societies regarded humankind as intimately related to the physical world and thus they had a more empathetic attitude to what the West (at least until recently) has regarded as the essentially separate category of 'nature'. But this human relationship with the external natural world transcended purely physical considerations for the

landscape also had an overriding mythological dimension. There was not a rock, or tree, or place that did not have a name and a history. The external world was as independently alive and full of personality as the human communities living in it. Time and place, and indeed all aspects of life, were universally celebrated in song, music, and dance. All Oceanic cultures were particularly vigorous in such outward celebrations of their physical and mental landscapes.

And there were many more, and, to outsiders, increasingly esoteric features of indigenous beliefs. For example, many communities had a binary world-view whereby dual categories were set in opposition to each other. Among the most common and potent of these was a male-female dichotomy where 'male' qualities represented strength, light, and goodness, and 'female' phenomena were dark, weak, and dangerous. Yet such a view was more dynamic and complex than it might seem, especially since women were also the source of life itself and indeed went through cycles variously perceived as potentially good and evil. This male-female dichotomy was most obvious in some Melanesian communities where villages were physically divided into male and female areas. But the idea was variously present in many parts of the Pacific. One of the more apparent features of the Hawaiian *kapu* system was the prohibition of men and women eating together. With the notable exception of high-born women in some of the more stratified societies of Polynesia, women were not generally prominent in positions of public leadership, but often had a powerful influence behind the scenes.

In attempting to summarize the indigenous cultures of Oceania, anthropologist Douglas Oliver (1989, pp. 1182-3) has argued that 'except for their location in the geographic region of Oceania there was nothing entirely distinctive about Oceanic cultures per se.' Yet, he continued, there were 'at least two kinds of multidimensional culture complexes' that probably had no parallel elsewhere in the non-industrial world, namely the 'combination of actions and ideas' that enabled certain Australian Aboriginal desert dwellers to survive in an impoverished environment, and the maritime and navigational skills that enabled Austronesian people to find and successfully colonize the remotest specks of habitable land in the largest ocean on earth. Another unique characteristic I would highlight, especially for those communities throughout much of Micronesia and Polynesia, and Tasmania after it became an island, was extreme isolation over thousands of years. Unlike their counterparts on or near continental land masses elsewhere in the world they were uninfluenced by external cultural developments, were not subject to conquest or even exposed to new ideas. The isolated locations of these peoples were not only their respective centres, but these centres were their only known world.

The Atlantic countries that dominated the so-called great age of discovery - Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, France, and Britain - actually appeared very late in the narrative of human exploration of the globe. Thousands of years earlier the Austronesians were travelling across the Indian and Pacific oceans. Egyptians and Arabs also sailed the Indian Ocean, and, later, the Irish and Vikings undertook trans-Atlantic voyaging. The belated efforts at oceanic travelling by Europeans in the fifteenth century resulted from the emerging of nation-states and the associated commercial and psychological motives for expansion beyond continental Europe. There was also advancement in maritime technology, which relied heavily on Arab experience. Vessels were larger

(up to 1,000 tonnes), flat keeled, steered by stern rudder, multi-masted and square rigged. Navigational techniques improved too, particularly the technique of measuring the sun's altitude to give some idea of latitude, that is a position north or south of a given reference point. But the techniques for calculating longitude – a position east or west of some point – remained very rudimentary until the eighteenth century.

By the end of the fifteenth century the Portuguese had sailed around Africa and across the Indian Ocean and were beginning to develop their trading empire in the Moluccas or 'Spice Islands' of the South-East Asian archipelago. The Spanish meanwhile reached the Americas across the Atlantic. The Americas did not, as it was hoped, stretch as far westwards as Asia for Balboa sighted an ocean from Darien in 1513. The general region between Asia and central America was a mystery. Cartographers and geographers filled the blank on their globes with a huge and infinitely rich continent known as Terra Australis incognita.

The search for this fabled continent was, however, initially incidental to a much grander geopolitical contest between Spain and Portugal. In 1493–4 they had divided the known world between them – all lands lying to the west of a line running down the Atlantic near the Azores belonged to Spain, with lands to the east belonging to Portugal. The Portuguese could reach South-East Asia via their African route, but the Spaniards had to press westwards, to the Americas and beyond. In 1520 Ferdinand Magellan (ironically from Portugal) led the Spanish furthest in this direction by sailing around South America and into the ocean Balboa had seen. Magellan took a nightmare four months to cross the Pacific's great expanse, scribing a great arc across its largely empty equatorial regions, before making landfall at Guam in the southern Marianas and then the Philippines. It took a further eighteen months to complete this first circumnavigation of the globe. Its main geopolitical significance for Spain was to demonstrate the potential of a westward route to the fabled riches of Asia, particularly after Spain had conquered the Aztec and Inca Empires of the Americas and, from those bases, could now turn the Pacific Ocean 'into virtually a Spanish lake' (Spate, 1979, p. 85). Even so, it took many decades before Spanish navigators conquered the ocean's winds and currents and could make reliable return voyages to the Philippines that became a Spanish colony in the 1560s, and Spain's counterpart to the Portuguese Empire in the Moluccas. Thus began the famous Spanish galleon trade that lasted until the early nineteenth century. Vessels left Acapulco between November and April when they were driven by trade winds blowing reliably in latitudes 11–14° north. The return from Manila was made between May and September when south-west monsoons took the homeward bound vessels into the Japan current where they caught prevailing westerlies and were taken as high as latitude 40° N causing them to make eventual landfall in the Californias or further north. These routes out and back took the Spanish through some of the emptiest regions of the ocean.

Terra Australis had obviously shrunk, but it was still assumed to exist somewhere in the Ocean's southern hemisphere. Several Spanish expeditions set off from Peru specifically in search of it. Those led by Alvaro de Mendaña (1567 and 1595) and Pedro Fernandez de Quiros (1605) variously touched at the Marquesas and then probed the Ocean's south-western regions, coming across the Solomon Islands (rather hopefully named after King Solomon's mines),

the Santa Cruz group and the New Hebrides. In addition to finding treasure, the intention was to found godly kingdoms. Both grandiose ambitions failed miserably. The one Oceanic location where Spain had a permanent presence was Guam, a convenient landfall *en route* to the Philippines. Lopez de Legaspi claimed it for Spain in 1563 but not until 1676 did Spain have a resident governor. Over the next twenty years Spanish soldiers and Jesuit priests established a violent control over the indigenous Chamorro.

The great century of Spanish exploration, from the days of Balboa to Quiros, in the name of empire and Christianity, delineated much of the ocean's outline – from Tierra de Fuego to Queen Charlotte Islands on its eastern rim, and from New Guinea to Japan on the western rim. They saw most of the islands of Micronesia, many of the equatorial islands of Polynesia, as well as some of the major groups in Melanesia. But there were still huge southern regions yet unexplored by European sailors.

The Dutch led in the exploration of the Pacific in the seventeenth century. Having thrown off the shackles of Philip II in 1581, they developed a thriving maritime commerce and embarked upon a global search for trading commodities. By the 1640s they had exploited the waning political and economic fortunes of Spain and in particular Portugal and had established a commercial and military hegemony in Portugal's Spice Islands, now known as the Dutch East Indies. Motivated mainly by finding products for the Dutch East India Company, Dutch explorers such as Jan Carstensen, Abel Tasman, Jacob le Maire and Willem Corneliszoon Schouten added parts of New Guinea and Australia, together with New Zealand, Tonga, and Fiji to the map. But they added nothing to the Company coffers and commercial sponsorship was withdrawn. Dutch explorations ended as abruptly as had Spain's, although there was one belated voyage, sponsored by the Dutch West India Company in 1772, by Jacob Roggeveen who 'discovered' Easter Island.

The British had had at least a minor interest in the Pacific since the late sixteenth century, mainly because of opportunities to plunder Spanish galleons. But the buccaneers Francis Drake and Thomas Cavendish, and later British circumnavigators (William Dampier, Woodes Rogers, George Anson) added relatively little to geographic knowledge because they tended to follow the galleon routes that lay well north of most islands.

In the 250 years after Magellan, there were as many as 450 European crossings of the Ocean. Most of these were by the Spanish galleons on the Manila route. But much of the southern Pacific Ocean was unknown. Indeed, except for Tasman, no European had sailed in southern temperate latitudes at all, except when rounding South America before rapidly heading north to reach warmer climes. While many (though not all) of the main island groups had been 'discovered', though not accurately 'positioned', during these years, hardly anything was known about the Oceanic inhabitants, nor just because of little sustained contact, but because European voyagers before the 1760s generally had motives other than ethnological inquiry for being in that part of the world.

During the 1760s a qualitative shift in the techniques and character of European exploration of the Pacific became apparent. Explorers' vessels were by now markedly superior to those in previous centuries, thanks to relatively small but effective improvements such as in sail types and their placement, and with the use of a wheel rather than direct steering by tiller. Latitude could be calculated rather more

accurately using the log-line with the recently calculated nautical mile, together with the new quadrant (and then sextant). The problem of calculating longitude was finally solved with London watchmaker John Harrison's chronometer, which Cook had on his second voyage. Nevertheless, the dangers of such long voyages to the other side of the world remained very considerable – particularly scurvy and other diseases as well as the obvious trials of storms and uncharted reefs. The most significant advance was a new spirit of scientific inquiry that was manifest in Britain and France particularly after the Seven Years' War. The 1760s saw a string of expeditions to the Pacific (John Byron, Samuel Wallis, Philip Carteret, Louis Antoine de Bougainville (see Plare 175), Jean-François de Surville), but the most significant were the three voyages of James Cook (1768–71, 1772–3, 1776–9). Cook's instructions on his first voyage, sponsored by the Royal Society, captured the new investigative spirit of the age. At Tahiti he was to observe the transit of the planet Venus across the sun in order to help calculate the distance of the sun from earth. Accurate measurement of this distance would enhance navigational accuracy. He was also to search for the lost Terra Australis. But in addition he was

carefully to observe the Nature of the Soil, and the Products thereof; the Beasts and Fowls that inhabit or frequent it . . . to bring home . . . Specimens of the Seeds of Trees, Fruits, Grains . . . to observe the Genius, Temper, Disposition and Number of the Natives . . .

(cit. Smith, 1984, p. 16)

Ironically Cook discovered very little in a geographic sense. Apart from Australia's east coast, the Hawaiian Islands, and New Caledonia, every main island group that he came across had previously been sighted by Spanish, Portuguese or Dutch navigators – a point seldom conceded by generations of Anglo-centred scholarship. But Cook was often the first to chart accurately their positions which hitherto had been cartographically vague. Above all, his greatest geographic discoveries were of what did not exist. In a remarkable criss-crossing of the southern ocean that took him even below the Antarctic circle he proved once and for all that Terra Australis was a figment of fertile imaginations. And his unsuccessful efforts to penetrate ice much beyond the Bering Strait proved that the hoped-for North-West Passage that might link the northern Atlantic to the northern Pacific Ocean did not exist for practical purposes.

Cook's greatest contributions, or rather the contributions of his voyages, for they were collaborative scientific expeditions, were in the budding disciplines of ethnography, anthropology, botany, biology, geology, meteorology. And as art historian Bernard Smith (1984) has shown, Cook's voyages not only had a dramatic impact on European science, but on European art and Romantic taste. Among the more immediate appeals of the exotic were the 'Noble Savages' taken to Europe from the Society Islands – Omai (by Cook) and Ahioru (by Bougainville). The very idea of the Noble Savage had all manner of variously exciting or horrifying implications for philosophers, moralists, and evangelists. The Pacific, or, more accurately, fanciful images of the Pacific, meant far more to Europe than Europe meant to the Pacific.

In spite of 300 years of European exploration, relatively few Oceanic peoples ever saw Europeans – the ocean was just so vast, the islands so scattered, and European presence was so minimal and fleeting. Moreover, for much of this time, at least to the 1760s, most European sailors intent on crossing the ocean were far more concerned with surviving

the long journey with its inevitable horrors of scurvy, possible starvation, and storms, than with seeking intercourse with island inhabitants. Indeed the uncharted archipelagoes with their treacherous reefs themselves posed some of the greatest dangers in successful navigation and were to be avoided if possible.

Where the indigenous people did make contact with European sailors, the meetings were not generally pleasurable. The very first meeting was typical. When Magellan made landfall on Guam the Chamorro swarmed aboard and began taking what they could. Forty Spanish soldiers were landed to destroy their houses and boats and kill some of them. Mendaña's visit to the Solomons in 1568 was marked by violence and brutality by both sides. Even more spectacular was the killing of some 200 Marquesans by Mendaña's soldiers on his second Pacific voyage in 1595.

Mendaña's and Quiros's plans to found godly settlements in the Santa Cruz group, (Ndeni, 1595) and New Hebrides (Espíritu Santo, 1605) were in part dashed because of constant skirmishing with the local inhabitants. Violent confrontation was understandable. In Melanesia, many indigenous communities were hostile to all strangers. Even where they were not, the presence of so many strangers came suddenly into their tiny communities soon placed an intolerable strain on their food supplies and threatened their general well-being. As the Islanders became less accommodating and even threatening the Spaniards resorted to violence to secure food and maintain their own security. The peoples of the Marquesas, like many in eastern Polynesia, had a tradition of welcoming strangers. In return for such hospitality the strangers' possessions would be handed to their hosts. Thus after giving Mendaña an elaborate welcome, the Marquesans began taking things from the Spanish vessels. This was of course interpreted as theft and the Spaniards replied with firearms. But the Spaniards generally needed little provocation. Their *conquistador* mentality and the fact they held the lives of such 'heathen savages' in little esteem saw ready recourse to violent and sometimes symbolic acts of retribution:

The soldiers . . . killed five [Islanders] . . . and then hung three bodies on stakes . . . One of them they pierced through the heart with a lance . . . They erected three crosses and called the valley . . . Madre de Dios, the Valley of the Mother of God.

(Denning, 1980, pp. 10–11)

Contrary to older, imperialistic interpretations of Pacific history, the Spanish did not necessarily have the upper hand in their conflicts with Islanders. Their arquebuses, that needed lighting with a match, were often useless in the damp Pacific environment, and in any case were totally unsuited to skirmishing at close quarters. They certainly offered little protection to one boat's party on Guadalcanal in the Solomons that went ashore for water. The Islanders

came out from an ambush with weapons, and set upon them . . . and the greater part of them they cut into pieces; cutting off their heads and arms and legs, taking out their tongues, and sucking out their brains with great ferocity.

(cit. Howe, 1984, p. 75)

The Spanish legacy in such places was probably short-lived. It was 200 years before other Europeans visited these same locations. The exception was the Spanish colony of Guam. By 1700 the initial population of Guam and nearby parts of the Marianas had been decimated by Spanish killings and smallpox. The survivors were miserably resettled 'under the bells'.

The Dutch had much less and more fleeting contact with Islanders. There were hostile though very brief encounters in the Tuamotus, New Zealand, and northern Tonga, but most peaceful relations elsewhere on Tonga. When French and English explorers ventured briefly into Melanesian waters from the 1760s (Carteret, Bougainville, Surville, Cook) they met with the same hostile response earlier given to the Spanish. Partly as a result, there was relatively very little further contact with Melanesian islands until well into the nineteenth century. But in Polynesia too, from the 1760s, misunderstanding and hostility was seldom absent from even apparently friendly interchange, as witness the murder of Cook in Hawaii, and Marion du Fresne in New Zealand. But the more intensive and systematic European exploitation of Polynesia from this time introduced a new element – multiple return voyages by Europeans, especially to Tahiti which became the most visited island before 1800.

Early culture contact on Tahiti is steeped in the mythology of erotic island maidens rapaciously seducing astonished but delighted sailors in a stunning setting of tropical luxuriance. Here were living examples of the philosophers' Noble Savages. Tahiti was *La Nouvelle Cythère*; Venus was goddess of hospitality. Among the early European visitors whose descriptions of innocent eroticism in Paradise took European readers by storm were Bougainville, and Joseph Banks (on Cook's first expedition). Bougainville's account of naked women standing over open hatchways while sailors heaved at the capstan below is one of the most quoted passages of any explorer's journal.

Yet rather than being naive, sex-crazed creatures, the Tahitians were in fact implementing a calculated strategy to try to control their early European visitors. The first such visitor was Samuel Wallis on the *Dolphin*, in 1767. According to their custom, the Tahitians gave him a ceremonial welcome and then began to take things from his vessel. But the British drove off the 'thieves' with cannon fire. The tentative trading around the coastline over the next few days invariably led to conflict with the British resorting to gunfire and inflicting considerable damage. Tahitian chiefs eventually found a way to placate these dangerous strangers – by sending them women who made 'Lascivious Motions' and pulled 'up their cloaths'. Thus began a flourishing and peaceful trade in prostitution. The Tahitian women involved were of low birth and were ordered to their duties by their political masters. It was a successful political strategy that ensured the goodwill of the visitors and also brought considerable economic advantage to the chiefs. Thus it was that when Bougainville arrived some months later, and Cook after him, Tahitian leaders were careful to maintain an apparent servility and to make sure that naked women kept the sailors happy.

The basis . . . of relations between Europeans and Tahitians in the first ten years of contact was fear of European fire-power, and Tahitian behaviour . . . can be seen as a series of strategies by which the threat posed by the visitors could be diminished or controlled . . . Amiable as Tahitians no doubt were, their celebrated benevolence to the intruders was exacted at gun-point.

[Pearson, 1969, p. 217]

Tahiti in the period from the 1760s to 1800 is often cited as a good case study of how early European contact brought changes to indigenous Pacific societies. For example, the Tahitian desire for items of European manufacture – such as steel tools, metal fish-hooks, cloth – introduced an element of cultural dissatisfaction and even dependence upon

continued visits by European vessels. Sailors fathered a large number of children. And they introduced venereal diseases, and epidemics of influenza and dysentery. But there is debate as to how much, if at all, the Tahitian population was reduced by 1800 as a consequence.

The early impact of Europeans on Oceanic communities is too readily exaggerated. The outlines of coastal Australia and New Guinea were barely traced on maps. No European knew what lay inland. Elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean no island, not even Tahiti, was changed overnight. And it is worth stressing that even by 1800 most Pacific Islanders, like their counterparts in Australia and New Guinea, had had no contact with strangers from Europe. Even where contact was increasingly common, in Tahiti and the Hawaiian Islands in particular, the dominant preoccupation of indigenous communities was to continue with their own political, economic, and social agendas. Their lives did not suddenly revolve around some centrality of European visits. On the contrary such visits and visitors were usually quite peripheral to their affairs, or indeed were sometimes exploited within the context of these affairs. Apart from the potential technological benefits to be gained from explorers' sojourns, there were possibilities for political advantage. Both the ambitious Pomare family on Tahiti and the rival Hawaiian family dynasties led respectively by Kamehameha and Kahekili were aggressive in trying to enlist the support of European visitors in their efforts to conquer and impose a centralized rule over their islands. Pomare implored Cook on both his second and third voyages, Bligh in 1788, and Vancouver in 1791, to help him in his wars against rival chiefs. None of these captains actually intervened but certainly gave Pomare moral support since it was in their interests to have the island led by a powerful single ruler kindly disposed to visiting British crews. Mutineers from Bligh's *Bounty* returned to Tahiti and some did participate in tribal warfare. In the Hawaiian Islands Kahekili and Kamehameha were keen to get support and firearms from a few visiting traders in the 1790s and even kidnapped some. Vancouver was pestered here too by Kamehameha, who even offered Hawaii to Britain in return for military support. Both the Pomare and Kamehameha families finally achieved their goals of ruling over their respective islands, early in the nineteenth century. But that process owed far more to traditional political strategies, especially the manipulation of systems of indigenous rank status and legitimacy, than it did to any outside influences – even after 1800 when European mission and commercial interests were variously present. Certainly in the period before 1800 any argument that initial visits by Europeans caused fundamental socio-political change adopts a now unacceptable Eurocentric viewpoint that diminishes the capacity of the indigenous peoples to run their lives.

Three hundred years of European exploration of Oceania had no immediate impact on the vast majority of the peoples of region. At most, a few places, notably Tahiti, may have been minimally affected. The impact of such exploration was far greater in Europe where it made significant contributions to political, economic, and intellectual developments.

Yet accounts of exploration, particularly from the 1760s, ultimately had a most profound affect upon Oceanic cultures. A direct result of Cook's findings especially was the establishment of a tiny penal settlement at Sydney in 1788. And so began generations of terror for Australia's Aborigines, who, as the colonial frontier expanded over the continent over the next hundred years, were decimated by shooting,

poisoning, and new diseases. Less dramatic, but in other ways equally profound, was a steady stream of European commercial and religious interest into the Pacific islands from about 1800. Closely following explorers' published narratives came traders in search of timber, seals, sea-otters, whales, and other produce, and missionaries to claim souls.

Whereas both Oceanic peoples and Europeans had either not known of each other's presence, or had safely regarded each other as peripheral in their first 300 years of tentative contact, the situation was now to change. The social, economic, political, and strategic dynamics of European colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought the indigenous peoples into a new global world and effectively marginalized many of them. Perhaps the most fundamental consequence has been an altered state of consciousness, for many of these people no longer perceive themselves as occupying any particular centre, but living in someone else's periphery.

NOTE

1 For purposes of this chapter Oceania means Australia, New Guinea, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean. The Pacific islands are usually divided into three regions – Micronesia, Melanesia (of which New Guinea is a part), and Polynesia. I use these three categories in a geographic sense only, rather than as denoting cultural regions. It is now recognized that

as culture categories they do not take sufficient account of cultural complexities, especially similarities and differences between and amongst these regions.

Pacific islands' names are often problematic since there are variations from pre-European to colonial to postcolonial times. For this chapter I use terms which were in common use by Europeans in the nineteenth century, or earlier.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

CHRONOLOGICAL

1400

EUROPE	WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN	CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA
		<p>Note: 'India' in this Table means India in its pre-1947 frontiers, i.e. the area presently in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Burma is now officially called 'Myanmar'.</p> <p>1441-1501 Mir 'Alī Shīr Nāvā'ī, Turkī poet (Herāt).</p> <p>1419-1511 Mahmūd Begra, Sultan of Gujarat (India). Portuguese seized Malacca (S.E. Asia).</p> <p>1469-1506 Sultan Husam, Timurid ruler of Herāt.</p> <p>1469-1538 Guru Nanak, founder of Sikhism (Punjab, India).</p> <p>1475-1774 The Khanate of the Crimea vassal of the Ottomans.</p> <p>1478-1514 Mengli Qayı, the Khan of Crimea, ally of Muscovy against the Golden Horde and Lithuania.</p> <p>1481-1587 Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm, Vietnamese author.</p> <p>1482-1517 Sikandar Lodī, Sultan of Delhi (India).</p> <p>1485-1533 Chaitanya, preacher of Kṛṣṇa devotional cult (India).</p> <p>1498 Vasco da Gama's Portuguese fleet anchored off Calicut (S. India).</p>
1500	1500-5 Mosque of Bayezid II.	1500 Shībhūī founded Uzbek khānate in Transoxiana (Central Asia). Bihādī, painter, at work at Herāt (Central Asia).
1502 Leonardo da Vinci: La Gioconda 'Mona Lisa'	<p>1501 Shīh Ismā'īl's declaration of Imāmīyye Shī'ism as state religion of Safavid Empire.</p> <p>1501-24 Shāh Ismā'īl, founder of the Safavid dynasty in Iran.</p> <p>1504 End of the Golden Horde Empire in East Europe, the rise of Muscovy and the regional Khanates.</p>	
1505 The Nihil Novi Law in Poland establishes dominion of the Chamber of Deputies over the Senate.	<p>1505-52 Crimean-Russian rivalry in the Khanate of Kazan, Russian invasion in 1552.</p> <p>1505-74 The Spanish offensive in the Maghrib.</p>	

TABLE

EAST ASIA	THE AMERICAS	AFRICA
<p>Note: Chinese emperors are mentioned by their 'reign-names' and also the duration of their reigns</p>		
<p>1420-1506 Sesshu, Japanese monochrome painter</p>		
<p>1472-1528 Wang Shouren (Wang Yang-Ming), influential neo-Confucian philosopher</p>		
<p>1492-1505 Hong Zhi, Ming emperor</p>	<p>1492 Columbus lands in Hispaniola</p>	<p>1481 First Portuguese Catholic missions in Kongo (Central Africa).</p> <p>c.1496-8 Askia Muhammad, ruler of the Songhai Empire, in pilgrimage to Mecca.</p> <p>1497 Vasco de Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope.</p>
<p>1500-82 Wu Chengen, author of novel, <i>Journey to the West</i> (China).</p>	<p>1500 Peto Vaz, <i>Cana</i>, written.</p>	<p>1500</p> <p>c.1500 Foundation of Banyoro (Bito dynasty) (Central Africa). Expansion of the Christian Empire of Ethiopia completed, but this empire was not a unitary and centralized polity</p> <p>1500 Diego Diaz discovered Madagascar.</p> <p>From 1500 onwards Islam became the most critical factor of political development in the Sudan</p> <p>1500-86 Relieve peace and stability in Songhai Empire, development of economic and intellectual activities (West Africa).</p>
<p>1501-70 Korean neo-Confucian thinker, Yi Hwang.</p>	<p>1503 First Hospital for the care of the poor by the Catholic Church</p> <p>1504 Vesputi, <i>Letter</i>, written.</p> <p>1505 Columbus, <i>Letter</i>, published.</p>	

EUROPE (<i>cont.</i>)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (<i>cont.</i>)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (<i>cont.</i>)	
1109	University of Alcalá de Henares.	1507	The Portuguese occupation of Hormuz.	1509-29	Krishnadeva Rāya, Vijayanagar emperor (South India).
1110-11	The doctrine of the 'Three Ranks' established in Muscovy.	1507-09	Shinbans in Central Asia	1510	Shibbiri, Uzbek ruler, killed at battle of Muyn. Goa seized by the Portuguese (S India)
1511	Erasmus: <i>Enchiridion Moriae</i> , published.	1511-34	Struggle between the new dynasty of the Sa'adi settled in the south of Morocco and the old Warshid-Mimniid dynasty, and elimination of the latter in 1534	1512	Tom Pires's <i>Suma Orientalis</i> (S.E. Asia)
1512	Michelangelo: Sistine Chapel ceiling, finished.	1512-20	Selim I, Ottoman sultan.		
1513	Michelangelo: <i>Il principe</i> , written.				
1514	The 'Tripartitum' constitution in Hungary establishes the equality of all nobles, serfdom of the peasantry introduced.	1514	Peace agreements with Hungary, Venice and Mamluk Kingdom. Ottoman victory at Chaldoran over Ismā'īl, Shāh of Iran. Sultan Selim enters Tabriz.		
1516	Ariosto: <i>Orlando furioso</i> , published. Thomas More: <i>Utopia</i> , published.	1515-16	Ottoman annexation of eastern Anatolia.		
1517	Beginning of the Reformation. Collegium Trilingue at Louvain (Leuven).	1516	Ottoman victory at Marj Dabik against the Mamlūk army.		
		1517	Sultan Selim in Aleppo and Damascus. Ottoman victory at Ridaniya against the Mamlūk army, occupation of Cairo, execution of the last Mamlūk Sultan, Tīmurbay. Despatch of the Abbasid Caliph to Istanbul, submission of the Sherif of Mecca to Sultan Selim.		
		1518	Sultan Selim's construction of a mosque and mausoleum in Damascus for Muḥṣī al-Dīn al-Arībī, the great Muslim mystic philosopher.	1518	Death of Kabir, Indian monotheist.
1519	Charles I, King of Spain, became Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor.	1519	Khayr al-Dīn Barbarossa in Maghrib supporting Algiers against Spaniards. Jelili rebellion in Annaba under Sheikh Jalil.	1519	Shir-dar Madrasa, Samarkand (Transoxiana).
		1520	Death of Idris-i Bilihi, Ottoman statesman and historian.	1520	Burmese chronicle, <i>Yazawin Gīlaw</i> , by Thin-layun-tha.
1521	Belgrade taken by the Ottomans. End of Union between Denmark, Norway and Sweden.	1520-66	Süleyman I, Ottoman sultan.		
		1521	Ottoman conquest of Belgrade over Hungarians.		
		1522	Ottoman conquest of Rhodes over the Hospitallers.		
		1522-3	Persian 'Milan Hunting Carpet' woven.	1523	History of the world, <i>Ramzaini's Sifa</i> , published by Mir Khwand, completed by his son, Khwand Amir (d. 1535) (Herk., Central Asia).
		1524-5	Revolt in Egypt and Ottoman reorganization of the province.		
		1524-38	Özbeğ (Uzbek) attacks against Iran.		
		1524-76	Tahmasb I, Shāh of Iran. Reign of Shāh Tahmasb, during which illustrated <i>Shāhnāma-i Shāh Tahmasbi</i> manuscript was completed.		
		1524	Appeal for help of the French king, François I, to Emperor Charles V.		
1526	(August 29-30) Battle of Mohács: victory of the Ottomans, death of King Louis II of Hungary and Bohemia; both Kingdoms taken by the Habsburgs (Ferdinand, brother of Emperor Charles V), Hungary divided.	1526	Ottoman victory over the Hungarians at Mohács. Sultan Süleyman in Buda. John Zápolya King of Hungary.	1526	Bābur founded Mughal Empire in India.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
1510-12 Peasants' rebellion under Liu Lin and Liu Qiu, Hebei (China)	1512-41 Santo Domingo Cathedral constructed.	1506 Alfonso I became Mankongo. Growing Christian influence in the Kingdom of Kongo.
1512-81 De Biao, Buddhist proponent of vocal meditation.	1514 Pietro Martire d'Anghiera, <i>De orbe novo</i> , part 1 published.	1510 King of Katsina converted to Islam (West Africa).
1513 Arrival of Portuguese ships on China coast.	1519-26 Cortés, <i>Cortés</i> , written.	1518 Official beginning of the trans-Atlantic slave trade: Charles I of Portugal proclaimed the <i>Alvará de Negros</i> .
1521-67 Jia Jiang, Ming emperor 1521-91 Pan Jiyuan, Chinese irrigation engineer 1521-93 Hsu Wei, Chinese dramatist, author of <i>The Story of Malin and Successful Woman Candidate</i>	1523 Franciscans arrived in New Spain.	

EUROPE (cont.)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)	
1527	Sack of Rome by the army of Charles V	1527	Bibbi's victory over the Rajputs Ferdinand of Austria in Buda		
1528	Cosìquione: <i>Il Cosmographo</i> , published	1528	Piri Reis, second world map containing Christopher Columbus' lost map of America		
		1529	Sultan Süleymân besieges Vienna		
		1530-31	Tripoli in the hands of the Maltese knights	1530	Death of Bibbi, succeeded by Humayun.
1531	Antwerp Frickege, Henry VIII, Head of the English Church	1531	Habsburg counter-attack against the Ottomans.		
1531	Rebelan: <i>Pauguon</i> , published	1531	Sultan Süleymân's campaign against Ferdinand of Austria		
			Death of Lâmi, Ottoman poet		
		1531	Peace with Austria		
			Barboursa (Khar al-Din), grand admiral of the Ottoman Empire, conquers Tunis.		
		1533-6	Ottoman war with Iran.		
1533	Order of the Jesuit	1534	Ottoman occupation of Baghdad		
			Süleymân in Tiber, death of İbn Kemal, Ottoman scholar		
		1534-5	Reconstruction of the Prophet's mosque at Medina		
		1535	Emperor Charles V in Tunis.	1535	Portuguese arrived in Vietnam.
1536	Calvin: <i>Institutio Christianae religionis</i> , published	1537	Ottoman raid in southern Italy		
		1538	Ottoman naval victory in Prevesa.	1538	Pegu made capital by the Burmese Taungo dynasty (S.E. Asia).
			Ottoman siege of Din in India		
1539	Vitoria: <i>Relacion de lo que se hizo en la batalla</i> , published	1539	Yemen organized as an Ottoman province.	1539	Death of Ubadullah, Uzbek ruler (Central Asia)
		1539-57	Ottoman-Uzbek co-operation against Iran	1539-71	Sultan of Aceh (Achin), Alauddin Riayat Shih al-Kahar
1540	Buda taken by the Ottomans after death of King John Zápolya; new division of this country between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, centres of Hungarian culture move to the Upper Hungary (Slovakia) and to Transylvania.	1540-55	Austrian siege of Buda.	1540	Sher Shah (Afghan), crowned King of Delhi (ruigned till 1545).
			Ottoman-Venetian peace in 1545	ca 1540	Jayasi, <i>Padmavat</i> , metrical romance in Hindi (India).
		1541	Sultan Süleymân in Buda, annexation of Hungary as an Ottoman province.		
		1542	The Portuguese evacuated the town of Sâfi and Azemmour (Morocco).		
1543	Nicolaus Copernicus (Kopernik, 1473-1543): <i>De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium</i> , published	1543	The Franco-Ottoman fleet takes Nice		
	Vesalius: <i>De humani corporis fabrica</i> , published				
1544	Opening of the Council of Trent.	1547	Peace with Habsburgs, the Papacy Venice and the King of France.		
1547	Ivan IV (the Terrible) assumes power and declares himself tsar	1548-9	Ottoman-Iranian war, Sultan Süleymân in Georgia.		
	Tiempo: <i>Venus and Adonis</i> , Timotheus' Latin Supper				
		1550-7	Süleymaniye Mosque, Istanbul		
		1551	Ottoman conquests in Transylvania	1551	Burmese king Bayinnaung (reigned till 1581).
			Tunggal (Dragon) captures Tripoli.	1551-1562	Abd al-Laz, scholar, historian, naturalist and Akbar's minister (India).
1552	Ronsard: <i>Amours</i> , published	1552	Mosque of Selim I, Istanbul	1552	Death of Francis Xavier.
1552-6	Russian conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the Cossack Yermak begins conquest of Siberia				

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
		1527 <i>Jihad</i> of Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmad Gran) against the Christian Ethiopians
		1528 Conflict between the Portuguese and the Mutim of Mombasa
		1530 2,000-5,000 slaves embarked yearly from the port of Mpinda (despite the Munkougo's protestations to Dom Alonso)
	1534 Cartier in Nouvelle France	1534 Death of Ahmad Ibrahim ibn al-Ghazi
1535-1615 Chu-hung, who combined Confucian and Buddhist values	1535 Orteda, <i>Historia General de las Indias</i> (books 1-15), published	
	1538 First University in the Americas by the Catholic Church	
1540 Japanese silver production assumed significant scale.		
1542 Portuguese sailors arrived in Japan	1542 New Laws of the Indies promulgated	
1542-1616 Ieyasu, defeated rivals in Battle of Sekigahara (1600 (Japan)).		
1543-90 Kano Eitoku, Japanese monochrome artist of the Kano school.		1545 Death of Alonso
		1548 Arrival of Jesuits at Kongo
1548-94 Matsuo Basho, Japanese haiku poet.		1548-83 Introduction of cultivation of maize, a plant from the New World.
1549-51 Francis Xavier, Catholic missionary, in Japan	1549 Jesuit college founded in Salvador, Bahia	
	1551 Universities founded in Mexico City and Lima.	1550 Expulsion of Jesuits from Kongo.
	1552 Gómara, <i>Historia de la conquista de México</i> , published.	
	Cieza, <i>Crónica de Perú</i> , published.	
	Las Casas, <i>Destrucción de las Indias</i> , published	
1553 Portuguese occupied Macao.		

EUROPE (cont.)	WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)	CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)
	1552 Death of İbrî Reis, Ottoman admiral and cartographer	
	1555 Peace between the Ottomans and Iran.	1555 Mughal emperor Humāyūn (d. 1556) restored in India.
		1555-1605 Naresuan, Thai ruler.
1556 Philip II, King of Spain. Agneola; <i>De Re Metallica</i> , published.	1556 Russian invasion of the Khanate of Astrakhan; Cossack invasion of the Khanate of Sibir Inauguration of the Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul. Death of Fuzûlî, great Ottoman-Turkman poet	1556 Akbar (b. 1542), greatest Mughal emperor (India).
	1556-9 Ottoman war against the Habsburgs.	
1558 Elizabeth I, Queen of England.	1559 Civil war between Sultan Süleyman's sons.	1559-93 'Abdullāh Khān, ruler of Transoxania
1560 Presbyterian Church in Scotland	1560 Ottoman capture of Djerba	1560 Catholic 'Inquisition' set up at Goa
	1561 The Cossacks attack Azak (Azov).	1560-74 Mahendramalla of Kathmandu (Nepal).
	1562 Peace with Emperor Ferdinand.	
1563 Herrera: the Ecclesiastical, begun	1563 Death of Sidi Ali Re'is, Ottoman admiral.	
		1562 Poll-tax on non-Muslims (jizya), abolished by Akbar (India)
		1564-1622 Ahmad Sirhindi, leader of <i>nāghbandī</i> sect (India).
	1565 Ottoman siege of Malta.	1565 Vijayanagara Empire humbled at Battle of Talikota (S. India)
		Guani claimed for Spain (Oceania).
	1566 Süleyman's Siege of Szegedvár Ottoman conquest of Chios	
1567 Palestinian Missi Pape Alawelli, published	1566-74 Selim II, Ottoman sultan.	1567 <i>Smṛitiratna</i> of Raghurandana (E. India), published.
1568 Vignola: Gesù begun.	1567 Death of Celalzade Mustafa, Ottoman statesman.	1568 Death of Sankaradeva, founder of monothestic Viṣṇuavite sect (India).
		Burmese captured Ayutthia, Thai capital (S.E. Asia).
1569 The Union of Lublin between Poland and Lithuania; under Polish influence, Society of Orders develops in Lithuania	1569 Ottoman attempt at opening a canal between Don and Volga rivers. Ottoman-Russian war.	
1570 Veronica: 'The Feast in the House of Simon' (Levi).	1570 Ottoman capture of Tunis The merchants of Rouen (France) signed an act of Association with Morisco for trading.	1570-84 Sultan Babullah, Spice Islands (S.E. Asia).
	1571 Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. Devlet Giray, Khān of the Crimea, besieges Moscow. Naval battle of Lepanto	c. 1570 Tulsīdās's <i>Rāmāyana</i> in Hindi (India), published
		1571 Spanish settlement in Manila (Philippines).
1572 Sigismundus Augustus, King of Poland, dies Camões: <i>Os Lusíadas</i> , published Saint Bartholomew's Night in France.		
1573 Elective monarchy installed in Poland	1573 Ottoman peace with Venice	
	1574 Ottoman occupation of Tunis Death of Abū's Sa'ūd, Ottoman legat, chakhalidān.	1574 Akbar's reorganization of bureaucracy, army and land-revenue administration (N. India).
	1572-91 Murad III, Ottoman ruler	
	1572-1646 The Greek philosopher Korymbēns	
1575-1611 Rudolf Habsburg (1552-1612), King of Bohemia, in 1609 makes Prague the centre of Baroque culture in Central Europe.	1575 Opening of the observatory of Istanbul	
1576 Bolin: <i>Les Six livres de la République</i> , published		
		1577-1686 Jesuit missionary, Robert de Nobili

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
1555-1636 'Scholarly painter', Dong Qichang (China).	1555 Puebla cathedral begun. Zarate, <i>Descubrimiento y conquista de Perú</i> , published. 1555-6 Debate over Virgin of Guadalupe. 1556-58 Duán, <i>Historia de las Indias</i> , written.	1556 War between the Manikongo and the Ngola of Ndongo resulting in independence of Ndongo and establishment of the colony of Angola.
1562-1633 Xu Guanqi, Chinese author on agronomy.	1563 Mexico City cathedral begun. 1563-99 Mérida cathedral, Yucatán, constructed. 1564 Taqui Onqoy movement in Peru.	1560 Smallpox, an epidemic introduced into Black Africa from Europe.
1567-72 Long Qing, Ming emperor.	1561 Monardes, <i>Cosas de nuestras Indias</i> , published.	1566 The painter Simon Pereyus arrived in New Spain.
1568 Nobunaga became de facto ruler of central Japan.	1566 The painter Simon Pereyus arrived in New Spain.	1568 The Jaga (bands of immigrants or Nomadic Warriors) invaded Kongo.
1572-1620 Wan Li, Ming emperor.	1569 Ercilla, <i>Ataucama</i> , part 1, published.	1572 Expulsion of the Jaga with the help of the Portuguese.
1574-1646 Feng Menglong, author of three volumes of stories on social themes.	1571 Inquisition established in New Spain. Velasco appointed the first official chronicler of the Indies.	1574-1614 Alvaro II, King of Kongo, protested against the slave trade.
1575 Nobunaga's use of constant barrage by musketeers in Battle of Nagashino (Japan).	1575 Salasgán, <i>Historia de las cosas de Nueva España</i> , written.	1575-6 Paulo Dias Novais's arrival in Angola and foundation of the port of Luanda.
	1576 Jesuit college founded in Olinda. 1576-8 Frobisher's attempt to find Northwest Passage.	

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (cont.)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)	
		1578	'Battle of the Three Kings' at Wadī'at-Makhāzin, death of the Portuguese King Dom Sebastião and of Mulay Muḥammad, mark the decline in Portuguese influence in the Muslim world. Ottomans abandon any idea of conquering Morocco, which remained the only Arab territory outside Ottoman influence.		
		1578-90	Ottoman-Safavid war, Ottoman occupation of Azerbaijan.		
		1578-1603	Aḥmad al-Mansūr, sultan of Morocco		
		1579	The grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed assassinated		
1580	Montaigne: <i>Essais</i> , books 1-2, published.	1580	First English captivities	1580	Akbar began to propagate religious tolerance (Sulh-i Kul) (India).
1581	Tasso: <i>Gerusalemme liberata</i> , published.	1581-2	Russian invasion of Sibīr.		
1582	Gregorian Calendar	1582-5	Ottoman reconstruction of Kila walls.		
1584	Jan Kochanowski, the greatest poet of the Polish Renaissance, dies (born 1530)				
1585	Montaigne's <i>Essais</i> , published.			1585	Death of Dāyād, founder of Rāshanzai sect in Afghanistan
1586	El Greco: <i>El Entierro del Conde de Orgaz</i> .				
1587-1603	Three Vasa Kings successively elected kings of Poland, then claims to the Swedish throne contribute to the Swedish-Polish conflict	1587-1629	Abbas the Great, Shāh of Iran.		
1588	The Invincible Armada.			1588	Death of Fathallāh Shīrāzī, scholar and technologist.
				1589	Death of Tān Sen, Indian musician. Mukundram, <i>Chandamangal</i> , published in Bengal (India).
				c.1590	Murādī <i>Shāhnāma</i> manuscripts in Bukhārā style (Central Asia)
		1590	The Levant Company of England.	1591	Char Minār built, Hyderabad (India)
1592	Edition of the Vulgate.				
		1593-1603	Mehmed III, Ottoman sultan	1593	First systematic history of India, <i>Tabaqāt-i Akbarī</i> , published by Nizāmū'dīn Aḥmad (India).
		1593-1606	Ottoman-Austrian war		
		1593-1608	Jelālī depredations in Amul		
		1593-1612	Ottoman-Iranian war		
		1591-1640	Murādī pashas in Tunis.	1592-1723	Tashkent under Qazaq (Kazakh) rule
		1595-1601	Rebellion of Michael of Wallachia	1595	Spanish massacre of Marquesans, Polynesia
		1596	Ottoman victory, the Battle of Mezokertész, over the Austrian army		
1598	Edict of Nantes.	1597-1603	Yerli Cinn of Istanbul		
1599	Caravaggio: Saint Matthew's Calling	1599	Death of Khop Sa'dedīn, Ottoman scholar	1599	Asrākhiṁāl dynasty at Dnkhāī (Central Asia) Pegu (Burma) sacked by Arakanese (S.E. Asia).

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
1578 Li Shizhen (1518-93) completed <i>Outline of Herb Medicine</i> (China).	1578 L��ry, <i>Voyage en B��n��l</i> , published.	
1580 Death of Lung Chensu, author of <i>The Girl who Washes Silk</i> (China).		1580 12,000-13,000 slaves (mainly prisoners of war) embarked yearly from Luanda port
1582 Death of Nobunaga, Japanese commander	1582 Cuzco cathedral begun	
1583 Nurhachi of the Aisin Guro clan acclaimed Manchu chief		
1584 Death of Yi I, Korean Neo-Confucian thinker.	1584 First book printed in Peru	
1586-1641 Xu Hongzu, Chinese geographer		1585 Kalalabunga founded the second Luba Kingdom or Lunda Empire (Central Africa).
1587 Hideyoshi proscribed Christianity; peasants forbidden from bearing arms (Japan).		1586-91 Series of succession disputes and civil wars in Songhai Empire.
	1588 Acosta, <i>De procuranda Indorum salute</i> , published.	1587-1614 Reign of Alvaro II.
	1590 Acosta, <i>Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias</i> , published.	1591 Moroccan invasion of the Western Sudan and collapse of Songhai Empire, resulting in breakdown of law and order, chaos and insecurity of life. Their descendants, the Arima, set up their own small states.
1592 Japanese invasion of Korea under Hideyoshi.		
	1593 Anchieta, <i>Gramma of Tupi</i> , published.	
1594 Japanese withdrew from Korea.		1598 Construction of Fort Jem by the Portuguese. Conquest of Mauritius by the Dutch.
16th cent Cotton cultivation spread in Japan. Maize and sweet potato cultivation introduced into China.		

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (cont.)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)	
1600		1600	Death of Mustafa Ali, Ottoman historian.	1600	Population of India: 145 million (estimated). Habba Khair, Kashmir poetess, flourished (India). c. 1600 Death of 'Abdu'l Samad, Indian painter.
1600	Shakespeare: <i>Hamlet</i> , first performed.				
		1603-17	Ahmed I, Ottoman sultan.	1603-23	Arab Muhammad, first ruler of Khiva Khanate (Central Asia).
1604	Beginning of the Counter-Reformation in Hungary. Principality of Transylvania (under István Bocskai) becomes the centre of Hungarian resistance against the Habsburgs.			1604	Sikh scripture, <i>Guru Granth Sahib</i> , compiled.
1604-13	The Time of Troubles in Russia.				
1605	Cervantes: <i>Don Quixote de la Mancha</i> (part 1), published.	1605	Tobacco in Turkey.	1605	Death of Mughal emperor Akbar, succeeded by Jahangir (India).
1607	Monteverdi: <i>Opéra</i> , first performed.	1607-8	Suppression of the Jelili bands in Anadolu.	1607-36	Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh. Rulers of Mataram embraced Islam. Thai embassy to The Netherlands.
		1609-16	Mosque of Sultan Ahmed I, the so-called Blue Mosque.	1608	
1610	Rubens: <i>The Raising of the Cross</i> .			1610-28	Thai king, Song Thai (S.E. Asia).
		1612	Ottoman-Iranian peace.	1611	Emperor Jahangir married Nur Jahan (1590-1645) (India).
1613	Mikhail Romanov crowned tsar (1648), establishes the dynasty (until 1917).			1612	Death of Muhammad Quli Qutub Shah, poet in Dakhni (India).
1613-29	Gábor Bethlen rules in Transylvania; makes it the centre of Hungarian intellectual life; sides with the enemies of the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years' War.			1613	Tobacco cultivation began in Gujarat (India).
				1613-48	Sultan Agung of Mataram (Java).
		1617	Shah Abbas grants trade privileges to Armenians.	1616	San Ignacio College at Manila (Philippines).
1618	'Defenestration of Prague': the Czech Estates break with the Habsburgs. Synod of Dordrecht. Beginning of the Thirty Years' War.			1619	Dutch occupied Batavia, Java.
1620	Battle of the White Mountain. Bacon: <i>New Organum</i> , published.			c. 1620	Mitra Mitra's <i>Tantrapaddya</i> on Hindu law, published.
		1622	Murder of Osman III; Shah Abbas captures Qandahar. Persians seize Hormuz from the Portuguese.	c. 1621	Death of Mansur, Mughal painter.
		1622-40	Murad IV, Ottoman sultan.		
		1623-1797	The Greek college of Venice.		
1624	Bernini: <i>Sancti Petri's Baldachino</i> .				
1625	Goetius: <i>De iure belli ac pacis</i> , published.				

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
1600 Movable type introduced into Japan around this time.		c.1600 Introduction of manioc, tobacco and probably beans and groundnuts (New World plants)
1601 Li Zhu, critic of Confucianism, executed (China).		1.1600-1700 West Africa
1603 Ieyasu founded Tokugawa Shogunate (Japan).		Creation of a number of Bambara States with Segu as a dominant power, a royal dynasty and a unique social system.
1604 Death of Sŏnŏn Hyŏjong, Son-Buddhist scholar (Korea)	1604 Balbuena, <i>Grandes mexicanos</i> , published.	Establishment of the Kingdom of Dahomey in Abomey (c.1625)
1605 Second volume of Daoist Canon published.		Emergence of missionary groups and Islamic reform movements in the Senegambia region.
1609 Diplomatic relations restored between Korea and Japan; brisk China-Korea-Japan trade followed.	1608 Canclano, <i>Community Rules</i> , published; Acandio and Arce, <i>Discurso en los di la poria</i> , published.	Expanding power in Bornu.
1609-71 Wu Weiye, Chinese poet.		Transformation of the Fula of Kwarafa Kingdom from a loose confederacy to a highly centralized state with a divine ruler (Aku Uka).
1610 Death of Catholic missionary in China, Matteo Ricci.		Dominant position of Oyo among the Yoruba kingdoms. Provision of checks and balances in Oyo political system.
1610-95 Huang Zongyi, political theorist and historian		Power and influence of Benin kingdom with a strong monarchical institution.
1611-71 Fang Yizhi, Chinese materialist philosopher.		'Village democracy' among the Igbo, Ibibio and Cross Rivers people in the eastern region of Nigeria.
1613-81 Gu Yanwu, geographer (China).		c.1600-1700 The Pastoralist Galla established themselves over much of the Christian Ethiopian Empire.
1616 Nishichi declared himself 'Great Khan', and then founder of 'Later Jin'. Death of Ieyasu, the Shogun (Japan).	c.1615 Poma, <i>Nueva rŏnica</i> , finished; 1615 Torquemada, <i>Municipio indiano</i> , published.	1618 The Portuguese occupied the capital of Ndongo
1617-90 Yun Hyu, theorist of Korean monarchy.	1618 Brardŕio, <i>Grandes do Brasil</i> , published.	1621-38 The Dutch took the monopoly of Guinea from Portugal.
1619-82 Yamazaki Anzai, head of Kŕuon school.	1620 Plymouth colony established in New England.	1624 Smith, <i>General History of Virginia</i> , published.
1619-94 Mei onobu, among first wood-block artists in Japan.		
1619 Ming army defeated at Sarha by Nishichi (died in 1626).		
1619-92 Noted Chinese historian, Wang Fuzhi.		
1620-7 Tian Qi, Ming emperor.		
1622-85 Yamago Soko, philosopher of social hierarchy (Japan).		
1623 Dutch occupied Taiwan		

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (cont.)	WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)	CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)
1627 Hereditary rule of the Habsburgs in Bohemia confirmed. Oppositionist Czech/Moravian aristocracy replaced by the loyalists, chiefly Germans.		
1628 Harvey: <i>De motu cordis</i> , published.		1658-58 Shihjahan crowned Mughal Emperor; builder of the Taj Mahal, Agra.
1630-45 Prince György Rakoczy makes Transylvania a state virtually independent from Austria and Turkey.		1629-55 Thai king, Prasat Thong.
1632 Galileo: <i>Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo</i> , published.		
1634 Polianov Treaty between Poland and Russia; Poland regains Smolensk and reaches her largest territory (1 900,000 sq km). Borromini: San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane.		
1635 Van Dyck: Charles I of England's Portrait.		1635-87 Rajasimha II of Kandy.
1636 Corneille: <i>Le Cid</i> , first performed.		
1637 Russian pioneers reach the coast of the Pacific. Descartes: <i>Discours de la Méthode</i> , published.		1637-64 Vietnamese king, Suryawongsa.
		1638 Dutch expedition to Sri Lanka.
1640 First English Revolution. Jansenius: <i>Augustinus</i> , published.	1640 Death of Mullî Sâfî, Iranian Sufic Theosophical philosopher.	
	1640-8 Ibrahim I, Ottoman sultan.	
1642 Rembrandt: Night Watch.	1642-67 Reign of 'Abbâs II, last powerful Safavid emperor.	1641-74 Prithipati of Kāshmir (Nepal). 1642 Dutch captain sighted New Zealand.
		1643 Dutch massacred and expelled from Cambodia by King Chan (1642-59). 1643-63 'Abû-l Ghâzi, ruler of Khîva.
		1645-80 'Abdu'l 'Azîz Khân, ruler of Bukhârâ.
1648 The uprising of the Ukrainian Cossacks against Poland, led by Bohdan Khmel'nitsky. Peace of Westphalia. Independence of The Netherlands recognized.	1648-87 Mehmed IV, Ottoman sultan.	1647 Sâdiq Isfahânî's <i>World Atlas</i> , published (India).
	1650 Expulsion of the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf. Death of Qochi Bey, the 'Ottoman Montequieu'.	1649 Death of Tukaram, mystical monotheistic of Maharashtra. Wen Yamona Canal completed (India). 1650 Vijñānabhikṣu's <i>Samkhyasûtra</i> , published (India). Jagannāth Pandita, author of <i>Rasagangadhara</i> , flourished (India).

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)		THE AMERICAS (cont.)		AFRICA (cont.)	
1626	Ming victory over Manchus at Ningyuan.				
1627	Wang Fū led rebellion in Shaanxi, initiating series of anti-Ming peasant rebellions.				
1627-44	Chong Zhen, Ming emperor.				
		1630	English migration to Massachusetts begin.	1632-5	Mwene Mutapa, vassal of the Portuguese (Southern Africa)
1636	Manchu 'Khan', Huangtaiji, successor of Nurhachi, declares himself 'Emperor of Great Qing'.	1636	Harvard College founded.		
1637	Song Ying Xing's <i>Exposition of Works of Nature</i> published (China). Korea accepted vassalage of China.				
1639	Posthumous publication of <i>Complete Treatise on Agriculture</i> by Xu Guangqi (d. 1633).	1639	First book printed in Massachusetts.		
1640	Annual silver exports from Japan, having been in excess of 150 tonnes since 1600, now began to decline.				
1640-1715	Pu Songling, Chinese author of collection of tales.				
1642	Dalai Lama obtained temporal and spiritual supremacy over Tibet by grant of Qoshot Mongol Khan.				
1642-93	Ihara Saikaku, Japanese author of <i>Life of an Amorous Woman</i> and other erotic and secular tales.				
1643	Death of Tawaraya Sotatsu, famous Japanese painter.				
1643-4	Peasant leader, Li Ziching, captured Beijing; Ming emperor, Chong Zhen, committed suicide. The Manchus then crossed the Great Wall, occupied Beijing. Qing (Manchu) dynasty established in China. Fulin successor of Huangtaiji taking reign-name Shun Zhi.				
1644-94	Matsuo Bashō, Japanese poet.				
1645	Almanac, based on western scientific learning, published by Qing government.				
1645-1704	Hong Sheng, author of opera, <i>Hall of Longevity</i> (China).				
1647	Dalai Lama of Tibet submitted to the Qing.	1648	Sanchez, <i>Imagen de la Virgen Maria</i> , published.		
		1650	Bradstreet, <i>Tenth Muse</i> , published.		

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (cont.)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)	
1651	English Navigation Act			c.1650	Maize cultivation begun in W. India.
1652	Hobbes: <i>Leviathan</i> , published. <i>Liberm-veto</i> principle accepted by the Polish Diet for the first time.			1653	Mobad, <i>Ushistān-i Mazāhib</i> , published (India). Catholics in Kerala returned to Syrian Church.
1654	The Pereyaslav Council: Ukraine incorporated into Russia			1654	Death of Prince Patingalloang of Macassar.
1655-60	War with Sweden, as well as Russian, Transylvanian and Tartar incursions into Poland cause deep destructions and great human losses			1655	Rebuilding of Ayutthia, Thai capital.
1656	Velázquez: <i>Las Meninas</i> .	1656	Foundation of a Greek college in Padua	1656	Death of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, ruler of Bijapur. Prab Nriai, Thai king.
		1658	Death of Eliji Kalfa, (heleba) Ottoman encyclopedist.	1657	Persian translation of the <i>Upanishads</i> by prince Dara Shukoh (1615-59) (India).
				1659	Aurangzeb, Mughal emperor.
1661	Personal reign of Louis XIV of France				
1662	London's Royal Society.	1662	Death of Armenian geographer, Hieop Karnetsi.		
1663	<i>Journal des Savants</i> . <i>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society</i> began publication.			1664	Murad ruler Shivaji's sack of Surat, India's major port
1666	The Great Fire of London. Paris' Academy of Sciences	1666	Armenian Bible printed. Establishment of the 'Alawite dynasty (Morocco).	1666	First description of use of metal screw in India. Dutch obtained supremacy over Macassar.
1667	Milton: <i>Paradise Lost</i> , published.	1667	Death of Persian poet, Sa'ib.		
1668	Molière: <i>Le Misanthrope</i> , first performed.			1670	Khushbāl Khatak, Pushtu poet, flourished (Afghanistan).
1669	Racine: <i>Britannicus</i> , first performed			1671	Samimi peasant rebellion (N. India). Chikkadeva Raya of Mysore, reigned till 1704 (S. India)
1670	Pascal: <i>Pensées</i> , published.	1670-1800	Governments of the Deys in Algeria.		Karindrapur temple built by Pratapamulla (Nepal).
				1674	Shivaji crowned king (Maharashtra, India). Bīdshāhi Mosque built at Lahore by Aurangzeb.
1675	St. Paul's Cathedral. Greenwich Observatory.			1676	Maritime code in Bugis language, published by Amanna Gappa (S.E. Asia).
1677	Spinoza: <i>Tithia</i> , published			1677	First printed work in Tamil (S. India).
		1678-81	Ottoman-Russian war for Ukraine.	1679	Aurangzeb, re-imposed poll-tax on non-Muslims. Ming fugitive armies invaded Viet Nam

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)		THE AMERICAS (cont.)		AFRICA (cont.)	
1651	Conversion of tribute into land-tax in Korea began.			1652	Establishment of a Dutch colony at Capetown (Southern Africa).
1653	Qing recognition of Lama-Buddhism in Mongolia and Tibet.				
1655-1724	Chiknatsu, Japanese dramatist.				
1658-1717	Ogata Korin, Japanese painter.			1659	Establishment of the French at Saint Louis of Senegal.
				1660	The Portuguese are expelled from East Africa by the Arabs of Oman.
				1660-93	Kongo continued to decline.
1661	Ming general, Zheng Chenggong, expelled Dutch from Taiwan.				
1661-1722	Kang Xi, Qing emperor.	1662	Sigüenza y Góngora, <i>Primeros indios</i> , published.		
1662-1705	Zhu Da, famous Chinese painter of landscapes, flowers, birds.	1662-72	Áyacucho cathedral completed.		
1663	Land survey for taxation began in Korea.			1665	Mbumba fight the greatest battle of the century in Africa where Antonio I of Kongo was defeated by the Portuguese and perished in the battle.
				1667	A philosophical treatise in Amharic published by Zara Yaqob (1599-1623), Ethiopian philosopher.
1669	Population of Seoul (Korea): 194,000.	1670	Theatre built in Mexico City.	1672	Foundation of the Royal African Company by the English.
		1676	University of San Carlos founded in Guatemala.		
				1677	The French seized Gorée from the Dutch (Western Africa).
		1679	Vieira's sermons published.		

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (<i>cont.</i>)	WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (<i>cont.</i>)	CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (<i>cont.</i>)
1685		1682 Dutch occupied Banten (S.E. Asia).
1687 Johannes Hevelius, astronomer, dies in Danzig (Gdansk); born there in 1611 Newton: <i>Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica</i> , published		1686 Bijapur annexed to Mughal Empire, followed by Golkunda 1687 (S. India).
1688 English 'Glorious Revolution'		1689 Shambhaji, Indian Maratha ruler, executed by Mughals.
1689 Purcell: <i>Dido and Aeneas</i> , published 1689-1725 Peter I (the Great) emperor of Russia, administrative, cultural and military modernization. 1690 Locke: <i>Two Treatises on Government</i> (published)		
1694 Bank of England.		
1696 Bayle: <i>Dictionnaire historique et critique</i> , published.	1696 Russian capture of Azak (Azov).	
1699 Treaty of Karlowitz concluded for 25 years; most of Hungary received by Austria.		1698 Thailand closed to foreigners (for over a century).
1700 1700-21 The Great Northern War	1700 Tsar Peter I (Catherine I) in power	1700 Dynasty of Ming Begs established in Fergana (Transoxiana). Deaths of Maratha ruler Rājaram (India)
1703 St. Petersburg founded.	1703-30 Ahmed III, Ottoman sultan.	1702 Bhairav temple built by Bhupatindra-malla (reigned 1696-1722) (Nepal). 1702-62 Shah Waliullah, Indian jurist and thinker.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
<p>1681 Death of the fifth Dalai Lama, under whom Potala Palace, Lhasa, was built (Tibet).</p> <p>1683 Qing army occupied Taiwan.</p> <p>1684 Qing Empire and Japan established direct commercial relations.</p>	<p>c. 1680-90 <i>Matos, Soares</i>, written.</p> <p>1680 Sigüenza y Góngora, <i>Tratado de virtudes políticas</i>, published.</p> <p>1611 Sigüenza y Góngora, <i>Manifiesto contra las cometas</i>.</p> <p>Church of San Domingo Cuzco built.</p> <p>Viceroy returned to Brazil.</p> <p>University of Santo Tomás founded in Quito.</p> <p>1684 Increase Mahee, <i>Illustrious Precedents</i>, published.</p> <p>1686 Tuztu Tupic Inca, Virgin of the Almudena, Cuzco.</p> <p>1689 Juana de la Cruz, <i>Inundación Castálida</i>, published.</p> <p>c. 1690 Juana de la Cruz, <i>Primer Sueño</i>, written.</p> <p>1692 Juana de la Cruz, <i>El divino Narciso</i>, published.</p> <p>Salent witch trials.</p> <p>1693 Cotton Mather, <i>Wonders of the Invisible World</i>, published.</p> <p>c. 1694 Madre Castillo, <i>Afectos espirituales</i>, written.</p>	<p>1680 Rise of Buganda (Eastern Africa). Foundation of the Ashanti Kingdom (Western Africa).</p> <p>1685 The Kingdom of Changamwe seceded from Mwene Mutapa. Foundation of the 'Compagnie de Guinée' by the French.</p> <p>1688 Massive number of French Huguenots settled in South Africa.</p> <p>1693 The Manikongo became independent of Portugal.</p> <p>1700 Asamehene became the most influential of the Akan rulers (Western Africa). Growing intensification of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.</p> <p>1700 Invasion of Mwene Mutapa by the Rozwi (Southern Africa).</p>
<p>1704 Yan Yuan proposed equal distribution of uncultivated land.</p> <p>1705 Papal prohibition of Confucian rites for Catholics.</p>	<p>1704 Bogard academy becomes university. Boston Newsletter founded.</p>	<p>1704 Dona Beatrice 'Kimpia Vita' (a Joan of Arc) restored a king and repopulated Mbanza Kongo (Central Africa).</p>

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (<i>cont.</i>)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (<i>cont.</i>)	CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (<i>cont.</i>)
		1707-20 Dynastic conflicts in Iran.	1707 Death of Aurangzeb, Mughal emperor.
			1708 Death of Gobind Singh, last Guru of Sikhs.
			1709 Banda began Sikh peasant uprising; suppressed, 1716 (N. India).
			1710 Tin discovered at Bangka (Palembang) (Thailand).
1711-65	Michail Lomonosov, Russian scholar (chemistry, mechanics, history).	1711 Ottoman-Russian peace treaty at Prut, Ottoman recovery of Azak.	
1713	Peace of Utrecht. Bill 'Unigenitus' on Jansenism, published.	1714-15 Ottoman-Venetian war for the Morea.	1714 Bījī Vishwanath established Peshawa dynasty (India).
		1716-18 Ottoman-Austrian war, treaty of Passarowitz.	
1717	Watteau: <i>The Embarkation for Cythère</i> .	1717 Russian defeated in Riva.	1717 Khiva Khanate repelled Russian invasion (Central Asia).
1719	Defoe: <i>Robinson Crusoe</i> , published.	c.1730 Literary activity under Georgian King Vahtang VI.	1719-48 Muhammad Shāh, Mughal emperor.
			1730-40 Bījī Rao I, Peshwa, Maratha Confederacy.
1721	Treaty of Nystadt (today Uusikaupunki) between Russia and Sweden concludes the Great Northern War; Russia gets access to the Baltic and definitely takes her place as European power.	1723-7 Ottoman-Iranian war.	1723 Qalmuqs occupied Tashkent (Central Asia).
		1723-30 The <i>Takīp Em</i> in the Ottoman Empire.	1724 Death of Premānand, Gujarati poet (India).
1725	Vivaldi: <i>The Four Seasons</i> , first performed.		
1726	Swift: <i>Gulliver's Travels</i> , published.	1727 Opening of the first Turkish punting house in Istanbul.	
		1729 Nādir Shāh defeats and expels Afghans (for occupation of Isfahan since 1722) from Iran.	
1733	Kay, Flying Shuttle.		1734 Chinese revolt in Ayutthia (Thailand).
1735	Darby: Iron smelting with coke.	1736 Russian invasion of the Crimea.	1736 First chronicle of Jāfna published (Sri Lanka).
		1736-47 Reign of Nādir Shāh, the Iranian conqueror; his sack of Delhi (1739) and conquest of Transoxiana (1740).	
1737	Linné: <i>Genus plantarum</i> , published.		1737 Marathas established authority over Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh (India). First printed Sinhala book (Christian prayers) (Sri Lanka).
1739	Hume: <i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i> , published.	1739 Peace treaty of Belgrade between the Ottoman Empire and Austria.	1739 Iranian ruler Nādir Shāh sacked Delhi, annexed Afghanistan and Sind.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
1712 Poll-tax frozen at 1711-level realization (China)	1711 'Arcueil', <i>Cultura e epopéia do Brasil</i> , published.	1715 The French in Mauritius which became Ile de France. Coffee cultivation.
1716-97 Yuan Mei, Chinese lyrical poet.	1714-30 Nossa Senhora de Glória, Rio de Janeiro, constructed.	
1718 <i>Complete Atlas of the [Chinese] Empire</i> , published.		
1720 Qing expedition to Tibet (permanent Chinese ministers-in-residence appointed, 1727). Shogun Yoshimune (1684-1751) lifted restriction on import of foreign books.	1721 Havana University founded.	
1723-33 Yong Zheng, Qing emperor.		
1723-76 Tawo, leading <i>haikai</i> artist (Japan)	1724 Lafitau, <i>Mœurs des sauvages américains</i> , published.	1724 Annexation of Alhadi by Dahomey (Western Africa).
1724 Poll-tax and land-tax combined (China). Catholic missionaries expelled from China.	1725 Caracas University founded.	1725 Rise of Bemisaraka Kingdom in Madagascar. Setting up of a Muslim Theocratic state of Futa Jallon (Guinea).
1725 <i>Collection of Books of Ancient and Modern Times</i> published in China.		1727 Annexation of Ouidah by Dahomey (Western Africa).
	1728 <i>Gazeta de Mexico</i> founded.	
1729 Privy Chamber, established to assist Qing emperor. Village-level espionage system instituted (China).		
1729-77 Dai Zhen, advocate of enquiry based on evidence.		
1730-1801 Momoi, decipherer and translator of Kojiki as basic Shinto scripture, (Japan).		1714-1804 Fante expansion to the Coast (Western Africa).
1735-96 Qian Long, Qing emperor.		
		1737 The Tuareg overwhelmed the Arima from Timbuktu (Western Africa).
1739 Daoist 'immortal', Zhang Tiandi, forbidden from preaching, mark of official disfavour, Daoism in China.		1738 Dahomey tributary to Oyo (Western Africa).

EUROPE (cont.)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)	
1743	Händel: <i>The Messiah</i> , first performed.			1740	Nādir Shah invaded Transoxiana, occupied Bukhara 1740-7 (Central Asia). Mors' revolt in Pegu (Burma). Chinese massacred by Dutch in Batavia.
				1740-61	Bhāji Bāji Rao, Maratha Peshwa.
				1741	Death of Beschi, Tamil story-teller and novelist (S. India).
				1743	Death of Jai Singh Sawai, prince and astronomer (India).
1745	Brothers Zaluski open in Warsaw a library opened to the public; c. 400,000 volumes in 1794; in 1795 its collection helped to found the Imperial library in St Petersburg.			1746	French victory at Mylapore against Mughal cavalry.
				1747	Ahmad Shah. (d. 1773), founded kingdom of Afghanistan.
1748	Montesquieu: <i>L'Esprit des Loix</i> , published.	1748-55	Nuruosmaniye Mosque, Istanbul		
1749	Buffon: <i>Histoire naturelle</i> (1st volume), published.			1752-60	Burmese conqueror, Alauddin
1751-76	Diderot and d'Alembert: <i>L'Encyclopédie</i> , published.			1753	Kingdom of Mataram (Java) partitioned.
1754	Condillac: <i>Traité des sensations</i> , published.	1757-74	Mustafâ III, Ottoman sultan.	1757	English victory over Nādir of Bengal at Plassey (Bengal, India).
1755	Moscow University founded. The earthquake of Lisbon.	1757-90	Reign of Muhammad III (Morocco) strengthens the authority of the 'Alawiyye dynasty.	1758	End of Qalmuq power at hands of Chinese (Central Asia).
1758	Quesnay: <i>Tableau économique</i> , published.			1760	Hsinbyushin, Burmese king
1760	Voltaire: <i>Candide</i> , published.			1761	Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah defeated Miranias at Panipat.
	Macpherson: <i>Osian</i> , published.			1761-72	Mādhav Rāo, Maratha Peshwa (India).
1762	Rousseau: <i>L'Emile</i> and <i>Le Contrat social</i> , published.			1761-82	Haidar Ali, Mysore ruler (S. India).
1762-96	Catherine II (the Great).			1762	Massacre of Chinese in Manila.
1763	Peace of Paris which ended the Seven Years' war between France and England.				
1764	Stanislas Augustus elected king of Poland.	1764	Inauguration of the Laleli mosque in Istanbul.		
	Beccaria: <i>Dei delitti e delle pene</i> , published.			1765	English East India Company obtained control of revenues of Bengal and Bihar.
1765	Hugreaver: 'Spinning Jenny'.			1766	Dutch completed acquisition of control over coastal regions of Sri Lanka.
				1766-9	Chinese excursion repelled by the Burmese.
		1767	Muhammad III expels the Portuguese from Mazagón.	1767	Burmese sacked Thai capital, Ayuthia. British skirmish with the Tahitians (Oceania).
		1768-74	Ottoman-Russian war	1768	James Cook embarked on his voyage (1768-71, 1771-5, 1776-9) to Oceania.
1769	Watt: Steam engine.			1769-71	Prithvarayan, ruler of Gorkha, established unified kingdom of Nepal.
1770	D'Holbach: <i>Système de la Nature</i> , published.			1772	Dutch discovered Easter Island (Oceania).

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
		1740 Lunda expansion under General Kanyembo (Central Africa).
	1745 Yale College founded.	
	1746 Boturini, <i>Idea de una nueva historia general de la América</i> , published.	
	1747 University of San Felipe founded in Santiago de Chile.	
	1748 Havana cathedral begun.	
		1750 Apogee of Sakalava kingdom (Madagascar).
1751 Qing decree for joint rule by Dalai Lama and his representative in Tibet		1754 Birth of 'Uthmān dīn Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Caliphate. Emergence of Kaarta Kingdom (Western Africa).
1717 Law promulgated for <i>hojō-ji</i> system (population registration and collective obligation).		
1758 Qing expedition to Xinjiang, and its subjugation (1759).		
1762 Chinese population exceeded 300 million by official count.		
1764 Death of Cao Xieqin, author of the novel, <i>Dream of the Red Chamber</i> .		1764 Annexation of Zairi by Gobir; emergence of Gobir as a major Hausa State (Western Africa).
1765 Multi-coloured print (by Harunobi, 1725-70), first used in Japan.	1766 Playhouse built in Philadelphia 1766-94 San Francisco, Ouro Preto constructed.	
	1769 Gama, <i>O Uragui</i> , published.	
	1770 Jefferson began building Monticello. West, Death of General Wolfe, painted.	
1772 Large extensions to Summer Palace, Beijing.	1772 Academia Científica founded in Rio de Janeiro.	

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (<i>cont.</i>)		WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (<i>cont.</i>)		CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (<i>cont.</i>)	
1773	Dissolution of the Order of the Jesuits.	1773	Ali Bey declares his independence in Egypt.	1773	British Parliament's Act to regulate affairs of East India Company (chartered, 1600).
		1774	Kuchuk-Kainurgha Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, independence of the Crimean Khanate.		
1775	Arkwright: 'Watersframe'.	1774-80	Abdullah II, Ottoman sultan.	1777	Burmese driven out of Thailand.
1776	Smith: <i>The Wealth of Nations</i> , published.			1780	Sadasukhlal, Hindi prose writer, flourished (India).
1779	Crompton, 'Mule Jenny'.			1783	Burmese annexed Arakan.
				1782-1802	Rama I, founder of Chakri dynasty of Thailand.
1783	Hot-air balloons.	1783	Russian occupation of the Crimean Khanate. Russo-Georgian treaty.	1784	Pitt's India Act. Asiatic Society of Bengal founded, Calcutta.
1784	Beaumarchais: <i>Le Mariage de Figaro</i> , first performed.			1788	William Jones announced discovery of Indo-European language family, at Calcutta.
1785	Corporate rights of the nobility in Russia recognized by the Empress Catherine II. David, <i>Le Serment des Horaces</i> . Cartwright: Power loom.	1787-9	Ottoman-Russian war.	1788	British penal settlement at Sydney.
1788-92	The Grand (or Four Years) Diet in Poland, 3 May 1791 a new Constitution.	1789-1807	Selim III, Ottoman sultan.	1789	The Tay-sun of Vietnam inflicted defeat on Chinese.
1789	Beginning of the French Revolution.	1790	Ottoman-Prussian alliance.		
		1791	Peace treaty of Sistow between the Ottoman Empire and Austria.	1792	Chinese invasion of Nepal.
		1792	Peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.	1793	'Permanent Land-Revenue Settlement', Bengal (E. India).
		1793	Ottoman military reforms on western models.	1795	British seized Sri Lanka and Malacca from the Dutch.
1793	The Third Partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia and Austria (the two earlier - 1772 and 1793).	1796	Qajar regime established in Iran.		

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
	<p>1776 American Revolution began.</p> <p>1776-92 Town Hall, Havana, constructed.</p> <p>1780 Etendon, statue of George Washington.</p> <p>1780-1 Clavigero, <i>Historia Antica del Mexico</i>, published.</p> <p>1782 Crèvecoeur, <i>Letters from an American Farmer</i>, published.</p> <p>1783 Academia de las nobles artes de San Carlos founded in Mexico City. Royal School of Mining in Mexico City.</p> <p>1785-99 Jefferson, Virginia State Capitol, constructed.</p> <p>1786 Sociedade literaria founded in Rio de Janeiro.</p> <p>1787 Botanic garden founded in Mexico City.</p> <p>1789 Gonzaga, <i>Cartas Chilenas</i>.</p> <p>1791 Viscardo, <i>Letra aux Espanoles</i>, written. (13 August) Uprising of the slaves of Saint Domingue, triggering off the revolution of Saint Domingue and taking the first step towards the first legislative action to abolish the Atlantic slave trade.</p> <p>1791-95 The journal <i>Mercurio Peruano</i> published.</p>	<p>1780 Mwentu Mbatu, King of Loango (Central Africa).</p> <p>1786 Beginning of dan Fodio's revolution (Western Africa).</p> <p>1787 Birth of Chaka, King of the Zulu (Southern Africa). Apogee of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Andrianampoinirantena became King (Madagascar). First group repatriation of African ex-slaves was sent from England and settled in Sierra Leone.</p> <p>1795 The British seized the Cape of Good Hope.</p>
1781 Muslim rebellion in Gansu suppressed, 1784		
1787 <i>Complete Library of Four Treasures</i> , reproduced in 3,457 books, publication had begun in 1773 (China).		
1788 Gorkha invasion of Tibet, provoking Chinese expedition in 1792		
1792 Punitive Chinese invasion of Nepal.		
1793 Macartney Mission to China; China's 'Closed-Door' policy affirmed.		
1794 Sharaku's portraits of <i>kabuki</i> artists (Japan).		
1796 Rebellion of White Lotus Society, continuing till 1804. Qing government banned opium imports: ban ignored by the English.		
1796-1820 Jia Qing, Qing emperor.		

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EUROPE (cont.)	WESTERN ASIA, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (cont.)	CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (cont.)
	<p>1798 Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt, Battle of the Pyramids English victory at Abukir, Ottoman declaration of war against the French.</p> <p>1799 Death of the Ottoman Mawlawi poet, Galib Dede. Napoleon defeated at Acre and his departure from Egypt.</p>	<p>1798 Sri Lanka declared British Crown Colony.</p> <p>1799 Tipu Sultan's kingdom of Mysore destroyed by British.</p>
1800	<p>1801 Ottoman-French peace treaty.</p>	<p>1800 Haidar, <i>Amir</i> of Bukhara reigned till 1826 Urdu lyrics, Mir (d.1810), flourished (India).</p> <p>1801 Population of India: 200 million (estimated).</p>

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

EAST ASIA (cont.)	THE AMERICAS (cont.)	AFRICA (cont.)
<p>18th cent. The School of Painting of the 'Eight Eccentrics' of Yangzhou</p>		
<p>1800 China's population 295 million by official count.</p>	<p>1800-5 Alejandino, Congonhas prophets.</p>	<p>1800 Foundation of the Bamoun Kingdom. Intensification of the northern and eastern slave trade, especially towards Egypt.</p>



Plate 1 Portrait of English 'renegade' Samson Rowley, who served the High Admiral Uluà Hasan of the Ottoman Empire (MS Bodley, Or. 430, f. 47, Bodleian Library, Oxford).

(a)



(b)



(c)



Plate 2 Women workers at building sites at the Mughal-Indian capital cities of Agra and Fatehpur Sikri. *Akbarnama* (V&A Picture Library, London): (a) Women building workers, Agra fort under construction (Victoria & Albert Museum, London; detail, I.S.2-1896, Fol. 45/117); (b) Woman building worker carrying mortar-cement, Agra fort under construction (Victoria & Albert Museum, London; detail, I.S.2-1896, Fol. 46/117); (c) Women lime-makers, construction site, Fatehpur Sikri (Victoria & Albert Museum, London; detail, I.S.2-1896, Fol. 51/117).



Plate 3 Fort of São Jorge da Mina (El Mina), built and controlled by the Portuguese from 1482 to 1595 when it was seized by the Dutch. The fort was a large trading centre of gold on the west African coast (now in Ghana) (Dapper Foundation, Paris).



Plate 4 Representation of a Portuguese dignitary, bronze plaque from Benin, fifteenth to sixteenth centuries, Nigeria (British Museum, London).




Plate 5 Slave trade (a) Slave house at Isle Gorée: 'off the coast of Senegal, facing Dakar, Gorée was, from the fifteenth to nineteenth century, the largest slave trading centre on the African coast. Ruled, in succession, by Portuguese, Dutch, English and French, its architecture is characterized by the contrast between the dark slave quarters and the elegant houses of the slave traders. Today it continues to serve as a reminder of human exploitation and as a sanctuary for reconciliation' (UNESCO, World Heritage, 1997; Photo courtesy of Permanent Delegation of Senegal for UNESCO). (b) Shackles for slaves, neck chains, wrought iron, eighteenth century (Board of Trustees of the National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside (Merseyside Maritime Museum)). (c) Plan and cross-section of a European slave-ship (Hulton-Deutsch Collection, London).




Plate 6 Map of the Cape of Good Hope, eighteenth century, from *Petit atlas maritime de Bellin, ville et fort du Cap*, 1763-4 (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 7 Map of Khoi Khoi (Hottentots) Land, southern Africa, eighteenth century, from *Petit atlas maritime de Bellin, Pays des Hottentots*, 1763-4 (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).




Plate 8 European cartographers strove to reconcile traditional geographical knowledge with information collated from contemporary travel accounts, captains' log-books and astronomical observations in order to capture on paper an accurate image of the terrestrial world (from Johannes de Sacro Bosc, *Sphera volgare novamunde tradotta con molte notande*, Venice: B. Zanetti, 1537).




Plate 9 Drawing from *l'Histoire de la grande île de Madagascar*, 1658, by knight Étienne de Flacourt, sent by the West Indies French Company. For two centuries this 'History' was the most complete work about the island (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 10 Scene of astronomers at work in the observatory at Istanbul established by Taqī al-Dīn in 1575. The mechanical clock and terrestrial globe suggest an exchange of instrumentation with the Christian west (from *shāhanshāhi-nāmah*, MS N. FY 1404, University Library, Istanbul).



Plate 11 Gerard Mercator's globe of the world, 1541 (Photo Hugo Maertens, Bruges).



Plate 12 The title page to *Leviathan* illustrates two key aspects of Hobbes' argument. The body of the *Leviathan* is made up of his subjects, for his power derives from their consent and their support. The symbols of his authority combine spiritual and secular power, for only where they are combined can conflict between Church and State be avoided (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 13 Frontispiece of Jacques Esprit, *Fausseté des vertus humaines*, Paris, 1678. This frontispiece, to a work produced by a friend of La Rochefoucauld's, shows an orthodox view: the Christian has to choose between Vice, who bears a fakely attractive appearance, and Virtue (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 17 'Indran nuns dancing before an idol', from *The Book of Marvels* (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 18 Chinese studio painting (Ambras Collection, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna, Austria).



Plate 19 Leonardo da Vinci, self-portrait (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris)

Plate 20 Albrecht Dürer, *The Great Turf* (ALB 40.083, Graphisches Sammlung Albertina, The Albertina Museum, Vienna, Austria).



Plate 21 Mughal miniature by Basavan, *Akbar on his Elephant Crossing a Bridge of Boats* from *Akhamina* (22/117 15.2-1896, Indian Section, Victoria & Albert Museum, London).



Plate 22 Michelangelo (1475-1564), *La Pietà*, 1498 (Giraudon)



Plate 23 Raphael (1483-1520), *Sistine Madonna*, 1513-14, oil (Giraudon).



Plate 24 Titian (1490-1576), *Emperor Charles V*, 1532-33 (Museo del Prado, Madrid, Spain).



Plate 25 Mughal anonymous, *Descent from the Cross* (15.133-1969 (F79b) Indian Section, Victoria & Albert Museum, London).




Plate 26 San Juan Bautista Chammitchan, sixteenth-century mural painting of a jaguar and an eagle (Photo E. Wake, courtesy of INAH.-CNGA.-MEX.).



Plate 27 Tyi-wara antelope headdress, used by the Bambara in rites re-enacting the mythical birth of the bringer of agriculture, Mali (Werner Forman Archive, London).



Plate 28 Bronze head from Benin, Nigeria (City Museum, Bristol, UK).



Plate 29 John Constable (Brush, 1776–1837), *Wivenhoe Park*, 1816 (National Gallery, Washington, DC)




Plate 30 Title page of Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum* (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 31 Portrait of Christopher Columbus, late fifteenth century (Courtesy of Civico Museo Nazionale, Genoa, Italy).

Plate 34 Frontispiece of Jeronimo de Bovadilla, *La politica para corregidores y señores de vasallos* (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris)



Plate 35 Lucas Cranach (1472–1553), Portrait of Martin Luther, 1529 (wood, 37 × 23 cm) (Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence)



Plate 36 Portrait of John Calvin (Explorer Archives, Paris)



Plate 37 Velázquez (1599–1660), *Las Meninas* (Museo del Prado, Madrid, Spain)



Plate 38 St Paul's Cathedral, London (Courtesy of Central Office of Information, London).



Plate 39 The Gesù Church, Rome: (a) the façade; (b) the interior (Alinari).



M D C C L I
SIEG APPROBATION ET PRIVILEGE DU ROY

A black and white photograph of the main building of the University of Vienna. The building is a large, multi-story structure with a prominent central tower featuring a tall, dark spire. The facade is characterized by numerous windows, some with decorative elements. The building is situated in an urban environment, with a street and other structures visible in the foreground and background.

Plate 42 Master Pavel: Town Hall, 1537-9, Laomercia (from J. Bialostocki, *Art of the Renaissance in Eastern Europe*, 1976, London).



Plate 43 Benedikt Ried: Interior view of the Vladislav Hall, 1493–1502, Prague, Hradshin Castle (from J. Bialostocki, *Art of the Renaissance in Eastern Europe*, 1976, London).



Plate 44 Interior view of the Palace of Facets (Granovitaya Palace), Moscow.



Plate 45 General view of the Moscow Kremlin from the Moskva River.



Plate 46 Cathedral of St Basil the Blessed, built by the architects Barma and Posnik Yakolev in 1555-60, Moscow.



Plate 47 Church of the Transfiguration, 1714, Kizhi, Russia.



Plate 48 Fresco, Alexius - God's Man (altar enclosure). Workshop of Dionysius, early sixteenth century (Courtesy of Cultural State Museum, Moscow Kremlin).



Plate 50 Fresco, God Saviour (South-West Dome), mid-seventeenth century (Courtesy of Cultural State Museum, Moscow Kremlin)



Plate 49 Fresco, Martyr Markel, mid-seventeenth century (Courtesy of Cultural State Museum, Moscow Kremlin).



Plate 51 Fresco, Adoration of the Magi (Enlology partition), early sixteenth century (Courtesy of Cultural State Museum, Moscow Kremlin)



Plate 52 Church of the Nativity, Moscow



Plate 53 The first university in Russia, Moscow University, founded in 1755.



Plate 54 Smolny Monastery, St Petersburg (L'Ammoine, 2000)




Plate 55 Drawing of Dubrovnik in porcelain by Angelo degli Oddi, 1584 (Courtesy Croatian Ministry for Culture).



Plate 56 Patnareate, Peč (Photo N. Clayer, CNRS).



Plate 57 Tekke, Titov Veles, eighteenth century, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Photo A. Popovic).




Plate 58 The Janissaries, in a sixteenth-century Turkish miniature (© Soma Hatiday Photographs).



Plate 61 Miniature, Takiyy al Din and the Istanbul observatory.



Plate 59 Portrait of Sultan Mehmed II by Bellini (National Gallery, London).




Plate 60 Istanbul observatory: miniature of the comet of 1577.




Plate 62 Piri Reis' Map of the Americas.



Plate 64 Selimiye Mosque, Edirne, Turkey, by Ottoman architect Sinân, 1569–75.



Plate 64 Interior view of Selimiye Mosque in Edirne.




Plate 65 General view of a complex of buildings (*kuliye*) of Sultan Beyazıt II in Edirne, 1484–8.



Plate 66 Blue Mosque, Istanbul (Courtesy of Ministry of Culture, Turkey).




Plate 67 Polychrome tile, sixteenth century, Istanbul (Topkapi Palace Museum, Istanbul, Turkey).




Plate 69 Mother of pearl inlaid wooden door at women's quarters (harem) in the Topkapi Palace, sixteenth century.



Plate 68 Tile decoration at Ali Pasha Mosque in Tophane, Istanbul, sixteenth century.




Plate 70 Gordes prayer carpet, c. eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, 163 x 118 cm (Marisa Museum).



Plate 71 Miniature, *Süleymanname* by Nasuh al silahial matraqi, Hazine 1517 (Topkapi Palace Museum, Istanbul, Turkey).




Plate 72 *Bayan-ı Manazil-ı, Safar-ı İnaqayn* by Nasuh al silahial matraqi, 31.2 × 22.5 cm (Istanbul University Library, Turkey).



Plate 73 Two examples of eighteenth-century Turkish miniatures by Levni (Courtesy of Ministry of Culture, Turkey).



Plate 74 *Tekke, Selimye-Suleymaniye, Damascus, general view (Studio AZAD).*



Plate 75 *Darwishyya Mosque, Damascus (Studio AZAD).*



Plate 76 *Sinaniyya Mosque, Damascus, sixteenth century (Studio AZAD).*



Plate 77 Khusrawiyya Mosque, Damascus (Studio AZAD).



Plate 78 General view of Mecca and the Holy Mosque (Courtesy of RAF Photos).



Plate 79 The Holy Mosque of the Prophet, with several domes, Medina (Courtesy of RAF Photos).



Plate 80 View of Jeddah market (Courtesy of RAF Photos).



Plate 81 View of Hodeida market with bales of hides in the foreground (Courtesy of RAF Photos).



Plate 82 A scene from San'i Harat an Nahrein, with tall buildings showing architectural features (Courtesy of RAF Photos).




Plate 83 Windows with wooden panels of various geometric motifs at a house in Jeddah (after Sultan Mahmud Khan).



Plate 84 A house in Jeddah showing architectural features (after Sultan Mahmud Khan).




Plate 85 A decorative window designed for ventilating a house in Jeddah (after Sultan Mahmud Khan).

Plate 86 Ceramic sculpture of Shāh Abbās I, by the Indian artist Bishn Das, Iran (British Museum, London)



Plate 87 Ceramic tile from St George Church, 1619, Isfahān.



Plate 88 Miniature, *The Third Day of Creation*, Hacop Djoughaetsi, Isfahān, 1610.



Plate 89 Safavid miniature from the *Shāh-nāmah* of Firdawsī.



Plate 90 A corner of the citadel (*arg*), Karīm Khan Zand's fortress in Shiraz (Photo J. Perry).



Plate 91 The Bazaar-i Vakil, Karīm Khan Zand's covered bazaar in Shiraz, from a nineteenth-century European engraving.



Plate 92 Karīm Khan Zand (far left) and his courtiers: from a contemporary painting in the *Kūkh-i farangi*, a Zand pavilion in Shiraz.



Plate 93 St Guevork Monastery in the village of Moughni, 1661.



Plate 94 Khatchkars (stone crosses) of Djougha: (a) 1578; (b) 1602.




Plate 95 Eighteenth-century tapestry from Artzakh, Armenia.




Plate 96 Pottery from the first half of the eighteenth century, Kutaki.



Plate 97 The armies of Chingiz Khân and the Khwārazm-shāh Jālāl al-Dīn. From a manuscript copy of the *Ta'ākh Abū-l-Khayr*, c.1540 (Courtesy of Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan).




Plate 98 Bārbad playing before Khusrāw by the artist Muhammad Muqimī. From a manuscript copy of the *Shāh-nāmeh*, 1664 (Courtesy of Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan).



Plate 99 The Goldsmiths' Market, Bukhārā, *Taqī-i Zangārān* (Courtesy of Irene Iskender-Mochin).



Plate 100 Registan Square, Samarkand (Uzbekistan).



Plate 101 Bukhārā, Char-Bakr (complex of buildings), consisting of a mosque, a khānagāh and madrasa, 1560-3.




Plate 102 Faizabad khānagāh, interior, 1598-9, Uzbekistan.



Plate 103 Taj Mahal, 1632–54, Agra, India (UNESCO, Matthieu Pouly).



Plate 104 Jaunpur bridge, India (Courtesy of Indian National Office of Tourism, Paris).



Plate 105 Char Minar, Hyderabad, India (Courtesy of Indian National Office of Tourism, Paris).



Plate 106 Mughal black line drawing, *The Dying Inayat Khan*, India (Francis Bartlett Donation of 1912 and the Picture Fund, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston).



Plate 107 Mughal painting by Bichitr, *Wayside Singers*, India (Victoria & Albert Museum, London)



Plate 108 East meets West: an engraving depicting the meeting of Vimaladharmasiriya I, the King of Kandy, with Joris van Spilbergen, the Dutch envoy, in July 1602 (from A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Medieval Sinhalese Art*, 1936, New York).



Plate 109 An eighteenth-century painting from the Degaldoruwa Monastery associated with the revival of Buddhism in the central regions of Sri Lanka. It depicts a scene from the Vessantara Jātaka, one of the most popular tales of the previous lives of the Buddha (from A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Medieval Sinhalese Art*, 1936, New York).



Plate 110 Artisan of the gods and god of the artisans: a later representation based on medieval texts of Visvakarma, mythical ancestor of artisans and the central figure of their rituals, Sri Lanka (from A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Medieval Sinhalese Art*, 1936, New York).



Plate 111 Pagoda Chua Thin Mu, Hué, seventeenth century, Viet Nam (Courtesy of UNESCO/A. Vorontzoff).




Plate 112 Combai elephants for the Sultanate of Aceh, Indonesia (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 113 General view of the Ki Jima cannon and detail of the trunnion from the Sultan of Banten, Indonesia



Plate 114 Church of Santa Signora, Philippines (Courtesy of Augusto Villalon).



Plate 116 Ploughing and Weeding, by the artist Jiao Bingzhen, China.



Plate 117 Picture of Nanjing.



Plate 118 Downtown Beijing during the spring festival.



Plate 119 Guan Bang Tu: people looking at the Admission Notice.



Plate 120 Portrait of Gu Yanwu (1613–82), an eminent scholar during the Qing dynasty.




Plate 121 A page from *Siku qinshu* (Complete Library in Four Sections)




Plate 122 Portrait of Pu Songling (1640–1715), author of the late seventeenth-century novel *Liao zhai zhiyi* (Fantasy Tales of the Liao Studio).




Plate 123 *Aying*, a plate from the novel *Liao zhai zhiyi*





Plate 124 The Himeji Castle, built by Daimyo Ikeda in 1601-9 (from Tokuyi Kato, ed., *Himeji* (Himeji Castle), Nihon Meiji Shusei [Collection of Japanese Fine Castles] Tokyo, 1984).



Plate 125 Rice trading in Osaka's Dojima market (from *Settsu Meisho Zue* [An Album of Noted Places in Settsu Province], Osaka, 1796-8).



Plate 126 Odenmachi Cotton Wholesale Dealer in Edo cotton store (from *Edo Meisho Zue* [An Album of Noted Places in Edo], Edo, 1834-6).



Plate 127 Mitsui drapery store in Edo (from *Edo Meisho Zue* [An Album of Noted Places in Edo], Edo, 1834-6)



Plate 128 Ploughing in Early Spring (from *Nogyo Zuesetsu* [An Illustration of Agriculture]).




Plate 129 Rice Planting in Late Spring (from *Nogyo Zuesetsu* [An Illustration of Agriculture]).



Plate 130 Rest after the Good Harvest - a holy day after cultivation (from *Nogyo Zuesetsu* [An Illustration of Agriculture]).



Plate 131 The Kabuki Theatre in Osaka (from *Settsu Meisho Zue* [An Album of Noted Places in Settsu Province], Osaka, 1796-8).



Plate 132 *Sungnyemun*, the south gate of the capital wall, is representative of the early Chosŏn architecture, which emphasized the balance between heaven and earth, Korea.



Plate 133 This painting by Shin Yunbok entitled *Sword Dance* best exemplifies the genre paintings of eighteenth-century Chosŏn, Korea.




Plate 134 Strikingly decorated cauterizing irons, Tibet (Courtesy of C. C. Muller, W. Rattig, *Der Weg zum Dach der Welt*, Innsbruck, 1982)



Plate 135 The Potala in 1660, Tibet. Engraving after a sketch by J. Gruber of the Society of Jesus, in A. Kirchner, *China Illustrata*, 1667 (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris)



Plate 136 Gilt bronze statue of the future Buddha, Maitreya, Tibet, wrought by Zanabazar or his workshop (Musée Guimet, Paris)



Plate 137 Engraving depicting Amerindians infected with smallpox, sixteenth century, Mexico (ms Med. Palat. 420, c.460v, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence).



Plate 138 Extract from 'codex Canadiensis, natives fishing', seventeenth century (Bibliothèque nationale de France).




Plate 139 Engraving of a Native North American village, sixteenth century (Bibliothèque nationale de France).

Plate 140 Native North American, Powhatan's Mantle (Ashmolean Museum, Oxford).




Plate 141 Native North American otter-skin sac, seventeenth century (Musée de l'Homme, Paris).




Plate 142 A Chief's Wife and Child, watercolour drawing by John White. Engraved by Théodore de Bry, Virginia, about 1585-90 (British Museum, London).

Plate 143 A Woman of Florida, watercolour drawing by John White, about 1585-90 (British Museum, London).



Matoaka, or Rebecca daughter to the mighty Prince Powhatan Emperour of the whole country of Virginia, converted and baptised in the Christian faith, and is now wife to the Gentleman Robert. Engraved second time.

Plate 144 Portrait of Pocahontas (c. 1595-1617), daughter of Powhatan chief, by unidentified artist, English school, after the 1616 engraving by Simon van de Passe. Oil on canvas 77 x 64 cm (National Portrait Gallery, © Smithsonian Institution, 1983).




Plate 145 Sale of slaves in Rotunda, New Orleans (© The Wilberforce Museum, Hull).



Plate 146 Anonymous engraving, exploration of the Mississippi River and Louisiana, 1699 (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).




Plate 147 Image of viceroy and caciques from Codex Tlateloco (Courtesy of INAH.-CNCA.- MEX.; photo Fernando Osozio.)



Plate 148 Unfinished open chapel, Tlatmanalco, Mexico (illustration from Kubler and Soria, 1959. Courtesy of INAH.-CNCA.-MEX., photo Fernando Osozio).




Plate 149 Unclassical window frames, mid-eighteenth century, Mexico (illustration from Kubler and Soria, 1959. Courtesy of INAH.- CNCA.-MEX.; photo Fernando Osozio).



Plate 150 St Francisco de Lima, Peru (UNESCO/S.Mutal).

III.
INDI, QVA ARTE AVRVM EX
MONTIBVS ERVANT.



POTOSI montanis, aurisodinis omnium ditissimis per omnem Indiā, aurum Indi hac arte effodiunt, qua in nostris serri regionibus itidem facilius. Nam ex rupibus excindenda omnia sunt. Operarios in duos ordines dissecunt. Quorum hi de die laborantes, noctu quiescunt; illi noctu operis vacantes, interdum dormiunt. Quomodo nec diurnam nec nocturnam caliditatem vident, sed universim succensus cereus opus habent. Cum ultra 150. orgias infra terram sese demittant. Nec tamen ista tam immensa sodinarum profunditas impedit, quò minus omne effossum as suis dorso foras efferre cogantur. Quem in usum scalas adhibent, structas paratasque, ut bina sibi semper oñumelta habeant. Scale vero ex inortis boum coriis confecta sunt, quae transversis radiis ligneis sustentantur ita, ut ternis viris semper ex ordine descensu uno latere, altero vero totidem ascensu sit. Cumq; in ascensu labore utraq; manus scalam corripere cogantur, ideo qui illorum primus est, ceterum ardenti em de pollice reliquum gestat. Porro quia metus ascensu nimis longa est, ideo in media via surrecta quadam scama sunt, quibus onera sua quad. intenus deponere possunt.

Plate 151 Engraving by Théodore de Bry of the silver mines of Potosí, sixteenth century (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 152 Alenjadinho, prophet Congonhas, Brazil (Courtesy of National Artistic and Historical Institute, IPHAN).



Plate 153 Taino arts, Duho, wood. Greater Antilles, Haiti, Dominican Republic. 'Duho' seat representing an animal. The Tainos work with all materials but prefer wood. The ceremonial seats 'duho' were reserves for caciques or chiefs. Length 78 cm, height 42 cm, width 30.3 cm (Musée de l'Homme, Paris).



Plate 154 Baroque style: the Cathedral of Havana, Cuba, eighteenth century (UNESCO/A. Lopez).



Plate 155 Toussaint Louverture of Haiti, 1743-1802. He proclaimed Haiti's independence and thus became a symbol inspiring blacks in other parts of the Americas and the Caribbean that they could seek freedom with the possibility that independence could be theirs (Photo Willy Nicolas. Courtesy of the Permanent Delegation of Haiti at UNESCO, Paris).




Plate 156 Akan brass weights for weighing gold dust. Geometric forms (left) were used from the fifteenth century onwards, figurative forms (right) from the seventeenth century (Photos courtesy of T. Garrard, from *General History of Africa*, vol. IV: *Akan Weights and the Gold Trade*, T. Garrard, Longman, London, 1980, p. 280).



Plate 157 Engraving of European traders with the inhabitants of Cayor at Cape Verde (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).



Plate 158 Tomb of Askiya, King of Songhay, at Gao, Mali (Courtesy Fototek Gao).




Plate 159 Ivory mask of a Queen Mother from Benin, Nigeria, sixteenth century. The tiara carries the heads of bearded Portuguese (British Museum, London).



Plate 160 Side view of a Kuba royal statuette of King Shamba Bolongongo seated in front of a mascara board (British Museum, London).



Plate 161 Fort Jesus, Mombasa, built by the Portuguese in 1593 to protect themselves from the Turks and to assume control of the trade between the countries on the Red Sea, Mozambique, Goa and China. The Portuguese abandoned the fort in 1698 (Courtesy of Spectrum Picture Library).



MANIERE de BATTRE le BLED parmi les HOTTENTOTS.
KOORN-DORSEN der HOTTENTOTTEN. von Kolbe.

Plate 162 Khoi Khoi farmers threshing grain (Courtesy of Time Life, The Mansell Collection, London).



Plate 164 Honour hatchet of the Abomey kings, Benin (Musée de l'Homme, Paris).



Plate 163 Yoruba female statuette from Nigeria, dedicated to the worship of the *orisha* of creativity, Obatala. Height 49 cm (Photo H. Dubois, Brussels).



Plate 165 Church of Our Lady of Mercy, Mozambique, seventeenth century (Courtesy of ARPAC: Arquivo de Património Cultural, Maputo).



Plate 166 Soapstone sculpture of a bird on a monolith found in Philips Ruins in the valley of the Great Zimbabwe.



Plate 167 Soninke statuette of a kneeling hermaphrodite, from west Africa, made of wood with a patina derived from sacrifices. Height 29 cm (Photo G. Berjonneau).



Plate 168 Fang mask worn by a member of the Ngil society of Gabon, an association of men whose members maintain order in the community and protect it from evil spells. Height 70 cm (Musée de l'Homme, Paris; Photo D. Destable).



Plate 169 Mask used by the Nyau Secret Society, the most revered institution among the Chokwe peoples, central Africa (Courtesy of K. M. Phiri).



Plate 170 Sixteenth-century carved ivory hunting-horn from Sherbo Island (Bullom), Sierra Leone. Height 43 cm (Photo Rossini).



Plate 171 Kimpa Vita, also known as Dona Beatrice, founder of the Antonian movement in the kingdom of Kongo, 1704 (Courtesy of Ministry of Culture of Angola).



Plate 173 Castle of Gondar, Ethiopia (Courtesy of the National Tourist Board of Ethiopia).



Plate 172 Eighteenth-century Coptic painting (on cloth) of St George and the dragon, Gondar (Addis Ababa Museum, Ethiopia).



Plate 174 Decorated pages of a miniature Hausa Qur'an, late seventeenth century to early eighteenth century. Height c. 7.5 cm (Dapper Foundation).



Plate 175 Bougainville landing at Tahiti, 1768, from a painting by Gustav Alaux (Musée de la Marine, Paris).